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X.  X 


U  ^ 


PREFACE 


In  the  i^reparation  of  this  vohime  it  has  been  my  wish  and 
purpose  to  present  the  history  of  tlie  Greek  people  in  a 
form  which  may  interest  readers  of  all  classes,  as  well  as 
the  scholar  and  the  critic.  The  great  lessons  which  that 
history  teaches  must  be  learnt  by  all  who  would  really 
imderstand  the  life  of  the  modern  world  ;  and  the  task  of 
learning  them  is  one  which  calls  for  no  greater  eiFort  than 
the  attention  which  the  lioiicst  love  of  truth  will  never  fail 
to  awaken. 

During  the  present  century  historical  criticism  has,  it 
is  well  known,  been  largely  busied  with  the  earlier  history 
both  of  Greece  and  Rome  ;  but  stress  may  be  fairly  laid  on 
the  fact  that  in  the  former  the  most  rigid  scrutiny  has 
tended  rather  to  determine  the  true  course  of  events  than 
to  throw  over  the  whole  traditional  story  a  dark,  if  not 
an  impenetrable,  veil.  In  his  General  History  of  Rome, 
Dean  Merivale  is  constrained  to  admit  that  'thei'e  is 
scarcely  one  particular  of  importance  throughout  three 
centuries  of  our  j)retended  annals  on  the  exact  truth  of 
which  we  can  securely  rely.'  The  historian  of  Greece  may 
well  rejoice  in  the  happier  assurance  that  our  knowledge  of 
the  Persian  Wars  and  of  many  events  whicii  preceded 
tliose  wars  is  scarcely  less  full  or  less  trustworthy  than  our 
knowledge  of  the  Norman  Conquest  of  England. 

Throughout  this  earlier  portion  of  my  task  I  have 
striven  to  exhibit  clearly  the  motives  and  policy  of  the 
actors  in  this  great  struggle;  and  the  conviction  that  I 
have  established  rather  than  destroyed  tlie  history  has 
enabled  me  to  give  without  hesitation  my  reasons  for  calling 
into  question  or  rejecting  the  statements  of  the  traditional 
narratives,  whenever  it  became  necessary  to  do  so. 

The  history  of  Greece  is  the  history  of  the  most  wonder- 
ful political  and    intellectual    growth   which  the  world  has 


VI  PREFACE. 

yet  seen.  Its  interest  is  the  more  absorbing  from  the 
rapid  march  of  events  in  the  mighty  drama  which  may 
fairly  be  said  to  have  been  played  out  in  less  than  three 
centuries.  This  astonishing  quickness  of  development  and 
decay  must  be  ascribed  to  the  fact  that  the  ancient  Hel- 
lenic communities  never  coalesced  into  a  nation.  The  ex- 
planation of  this  fact  is  the  most  important  task  of  the 
historian  of  Greece.  Nor  can  we  regard  it  as  explained  by 
a  mere  reference  to  the  centrifugal  tendencies  (as  they  have 
been  called)  which  compelled  the  Greeks  to  see  in  the  Polls 
or  City  the  ultimate  Unit  of  Society,  or  by  the  assertion 
that  particular  clans  or  tribes  worshipped  particular  gods 
and  that  the  mixture  of  persons  of  different  race  in  the 
same  commonAvealth  tended  in  their  belief  to  confuse  the 
relations  of  life  and  their  notions  of  right  and  wiong  ; — for, 
in  truth,  the  tendency  which  brought  about  these  results  is 
the  very  fact  to  be  explained.  Nor  can  the  question  be 
really  answered  until  we  have  traced  the  political  and 
social  life  of  the  Greeks  to  its  source  in  the  earliest  Aryan 
civilisation.  The  clue  once  given  may  be  followed  through 
the  whole  history  of  the  Greek  states.  I  may  honestly  say 
tliat  I  have  followed  it  Aviih  special  care,  sparing  no  pains 
to  bring  out  in  the  clearest  light  all  the  circumstances 
which  at  Athens  tended  to  soften,  if  not  to  remove,  and 
at  Sparta  to  keep  alive,  the  narrow  exclusiveness  of  the 
primitive  society. 

We  are  thus  able  to  understand  the  wonderful  deve- 
lopment of  Athenian  power  which  followed  the  flight  of 
Xerxes  and  the  defeat  of  Mardonios.  The  empire  so  called 
into  being  was  in  reality  nothing  more  than  an  attempt  to 
weld  isolated  fragments  into  something  like  national  union, 
— an  attempt  Avhich  roused  the  fiercest  opposition  of  the 
Spartans  and  their  allies,  as  soon  as  they  began  to  compre- 
hend the  significance  of  the  changes  which  they  themselves 
had  been  foremost  in  bringing  about. 

The  necessary  result  of  this  antagonism  was  the  Pelo- 
poiinesian  War,  which  ended  in  the  triumph  of  the  old 
theory  of  exclusiveness.  Thus  far  my  narrative  is  in  sub- 
stance the  same  as  that  of  the  more  detailed  history  which 
I  have  brought  down  to  the  Surrender  of  Athens,  B.C.  404. 
In  the  subsequent  chapters,  written  for  this  volume,  I  have 
had  to  exhibit  the  falling  back  of  Athens  into  the  ranks 
of  mere  city  communities,  sharing  in  the  suspicions  or 
jealousies  always  awakened  where  the  growth  of  one  city 
seemed  likely  to  affect   the   complete   independence  of   its 


PREFACE.  vii 

neighbors.  Such  a  state  of  things  could  end  only  in 
foreign  subjugation.  From  this  point  therefore  the  his- 
torian is  charged  with  the  gloomier  task  of  tracing  the  in- 
fluence of  Makedonian  and  Roman  conquest  on  the  country 
which  was  to  become  the  seat  of  the  Empire  of  the  East, 
and  ultimately  to  pass  under  the  sway  of  the  Ottoman  Turks. 

To  relate  in  detail,  in  addition  to  the  narrative  of  pre- 
vious events,  the  history  of  the  Greek  people  from  the  times 
of  the  Makedonian  conquests  to  our  own,  is  in  the  limits  of 
a  single  volume  of  moderate  size  obviously  impossible.  I 
would  gladly  have  dwelt  more  especially  on  the  working  of 
the  federal  principle  in  central  Greece  when  the  day  of  the 
grea'  cities,  Sparta,  Thebes,  and  Athens,  had  passed  away; 
but  although  this  could  not  be  attempted,  I  felt  tliat  some 
acquaintance  with  the  later  fortunes  of  a  people  still  repre- 
senting, in  blood  scarcely  less  than  in  language,  the  Greeks 
of  Perikles,  Agesilaos,  and  Philopoimen,  is  almost  as  neces- 
sary as  a  knowledge  of  the  more  brilliant  history  of  earlier 
times.  This  want  has  not  been  met,  so  far  as  I  am  aware, 
by  any  of  the  smaller  Greek  histories  hitherto  published. 
The  last  Book  of  the  present  volume  may  therefore,  I  irusr, 
lay  before  the  reader  the  outlines  of  a  picture  which  I  hoj^e 
to  draw  out  in  more  full  detail  in  the  concluding  volumes 
of  my  larger  history. 

The  actors  in  this  great  drama  I  have  striven  to  bring 
before  the  reader  as  living  persons  with  whom  we  may  sym- 
pathise, while  they  must  be  submitted  to  the  judgment  of 
tlie  moral  tribunal  to  which  we  are  all  responsible.  Of  all 
I  have  spoken  plainly  and  honestly,  being  well  assured  that 
the  sternest  condemnation  of  the  treasons  and  lies  of  men 
iike  Alkibiades  and  Theramenes  will  in  no  way  clash  with 
the  profoundest  veneration  for  the  sober  wisdom  of  The- 
mistokles  and  Perikles,  for  the  heroism  of  the  gallant 
Demosthenes  who  all  but  saved  the  army  brought  to  its 
doom  by  Nikias,  and  for  the  genius  and  patriotism  of  his 
mightier  namesake  who,  in  the  immortal  speech  Avhich  un- 
masked the  treachery  of  ^schines,  pronounced  the  funeral 
oration  of  Athenian  freedom. 

I  am  indebted  to  the  Proprietoi*s  of  the  Encyclopaedia 
Britannica  for  permission  to  make  use  of  some  portions  of 
the  Chapter  on  Alexander  the  Great. 

To  the  Rev.  North  Pinder  I  express  my  grateful  thanks 
for  much  valuable  aid  given  to  me  in  carrying  this  volume 
through  the  press. 


vill  PREFACE. 


Note  on  the  Spelling  of  Greeh  Names. 

No  attempt  has  been  made  in  this  volume  to  alter  the  spellinfj  of 
Greek  names  which  have  assumed  genuine  English  forms, — e.  g., 
Athens,  Thebes,  Corinth,  Thrace.  It  would  be  well  perhaps  if  such 
forms  had  been  more  numerous. 

The  Latin  form  has  been  kept,  where  it  has  become  so  familiar  to 
English  ears  that  a  change  would  be  disagreeable,  e.  g.,  Thucydides, 
Cyrus.  This  last  name  is,  indeed,  neither  Latin  nor  Greek  ;  and  the 
adoption  of  either  the  Greek  or  the  Latin  form  is  a  matter  of  compara- 
tive indifference.  Probably  it  would  be  to  the  benefit  of  historical 
study  to  revert  to  the  true  Persian  form,  and  to  write  Gustashp  for 
Hystaspes. 

But  these  exceptions  do  not  affect  the  general  rule  of  giving  the 
Greek  forms,  wherever  it  may  be  practicable  or  advisable  to  do  so. 
This  rule  may  be  followed  in  all  instances  in  which  either  the  names 
or  the  persons  are  unknown  to  the  mass  of  English  readers.  Thus, 
while  we  speak  still  of  Alexander  the  Great,  his  obscure  predi  cesser 
who  acts  a  subordinate  part  in  the  drama  of  the  Persian  wars  may 
appear  as  Alexandres. 

The  general  adoption  of  the  Greek  form  is  indeed  justified,  if  not 
rendered  necessary,  bj'  the  practice  of  most  recent  writers  on  Greek 
History.  It  is,  therefore,  unnecessary  perhaps  to  say  more  than  that 
the  adoption  of  the  Greek  form  may  help  on  the  change  in  the  English 
pronunciation  of  Latin,  which  the  most  eminent  schoolmasters  of  the 
day  have  pronounced  to  be  desirable.  So  long  as  the  Phrygian  town  is 
mentioned  under  its  Latin  form  of  Celcenm,  there  will  be  a  strong  temp- 
tation for  young  readers  to  pronounce  it  as  if  it  were  the  Greek  name 
for  the  moon  Selene.  It  is  well  therefore  that  they  should  become 
familiarised  with  the  Greek  form  Kelainai,  and  thus  learn  that  the 
Greek  spelling  involves  practically  no  difference  of  sound  from  that  of 
the  true  Latin  pronunciation,  the  sound  of  the  0  and  K  being  identi- 
cal, and  the  diphthongs  being  pronounced  as  we  pronounce  ai  in  fail. 


CONTENTS 


BOOK  I. 

THE  FORMATION  OF  HELLAS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

PHYSICAL  GEOGRAPHY  OP  CONTINENTAL  HELLAS. 

Hellas  not  a  geograpliical  name 

Mountain  systems. — The  Thessalian  mountains 

The  ranges  of  Oita,  Othrvs,  and  ParnasTOs 

Mountains  of  Attica  and  the  Peloponnesos 

The  rivers  of  continental  Greece 

Land  and  sea  communication    . 

Climate  and  products  of  Hellas 


PAGB 
1 
1 

2 
2 
3 
3 
4 


CHAPTER  II. 

ORIGIN  AND  GROWTH   OF  HELLENIC  CIVILISATION. 

Character  of  ancient  civilisation            .            .  .  .5 

The  family  the  original  unit  of  society            .  .  .6 

Exclusiveness  of  the  ancient  family     .            .  .  ,6 

Origin  of  the  religious  character  of  the  family  .  .      7 

The  house  and  its  dependents  .            .            .  .  .    "  8 

Ideas  of  property             .            .            .            .  .  .9 

Laws  of  inheritance        .            .            .            .  .  .9 

Identity  of  religious  and  civil  penalties            •  .  .9 

Influence  of  religion      .              .             .             .  .  .10 

Obstacles  hindering  the  growth  of  civil  society  .  .     10 

Slow  growth  of  the  State           .            .            .  .  .11 

The  Family  and  the  Clan          .            .            .  .  .11 

The  Clan  and  the  Tribe              .            .            .  .  .12 

The  Tribes  and  the  City            .            .            .  .  .12 

Course  of  political  development  in  Greece  and  Rome  .     12 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE  MYTHOLOGY  AND  TKIBAL  LEGENDS  OF  THE  GREKKS. 

General  character  of  Greek  mytliical  tradition 

Greek  idejis  of  nature     .... 

Kelijjious  festivals  of  the  Greek  tribes 

Inconsistencies  and  contradictions  of  Greek  myths 

Dynastic  and  tribal  legends 

Greek  tribal  legends       .  .  .  .     , 

Historical  value  of  Greek  myths 

The  return  of  the  Herakleids     . 

Movements  following  the  Dorian  migration   . 

Greek  settlements  in  Asia  Minor 


PAGE 

13 
13 
15 
15 
16 
16 
17 
18 
20 
20 


CHAPTER   IV. 


HELLENES   AND  BAKBARIANS. 

Growth  of  a  common  Hellenic  sentiment 

The  Hellenes  and  the  barbarian  world 

Religious  associations  among  the  Greek  tribes 

The  great  games 

Greek  ethnology 

Evidence  of  geoijraphical  names 

Early  condition  of  Thessaly 

The  Lokrians,  Dorians,  and  Phokians 

Tlie  Aitolians  and  Akarnanians 

The  Bolotian  confederacy 

Ancient  supremacy  of  Argos     . 

The  Eleians  and  the  Arkadians 

The  Messenians  . 

The  Spartans 

Lykourgos 

Mythical  lawgivers 


21 
21 
22 
23 
24 
24 
24 
25 
26 
26 
26 
27 
28 
28 
29 
29 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE   CONSTITUTION  AND  EARLY  HISTORY  OF   SPARTA. 

The  Spartan  Gerousia  ;  the  Ephors  ;  and  the  Kings  .     30 

The  Spartiatai,  the  Perioikoi,  and  the  Helots              .  .     31 
Gradual  improvement  in  the  condition  of  the  Perioikoi  and 

the  Helots        .            .            .            .            .            .  .32 

The  Krypteia      .            .            .            .            .            .  .32 

The  Messenian  wars      .            .            .            .            .  .32 

Narratives  of  the  Messenian  wars        .            .            .  .33 

The  first  Messenian  war             .             .            .            .  .33 

The  second  Messenian  war        .            .            .            .  .34 

Spartan  aggression  against  Arkadia     .            .            .  .37 

Rivalry  of  Sparla  and  Argos     .            .            .            .  .38 

Early  supremacy  of  Sparta        .            .            .            .  .39 


CONTENTS. 


XI 


CHAPTER  VI. 


THE   GREEK   DESPOTS. 


PAGE 

Tendencies  of  early  Aryan  civilisation             .            .  .     iiO 

Decay  of  the  kingly  power  in  Hellas   .            .            .  .40 

Subversion  of  the  Greek  oligarchies  by  tyrants          .  .     40 

Ancient  and  modern  notions  of  monarchical  government  .     41 

The  power  of  the  kinoes  in  Sparta        .             .            .  .43 

History  of  the  Greek  despots, — Kleisthenes  of  Sikyon  .     43 

The  Bacchiad  oligrarchs  of  Corinth      .            .  .44 

Kypselos  and  Periandros            .            .            .            .  .44 

Theagenes  of  Megara    .             .            .            .            .  .46 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE  INTELLECTUAL   EDUCATION   OP  THE  GREEKS. 

The  greatness  of  the  Ionic  race,  and  the  settlement  of  Eu- 
boia       .... 

Pan-Ionic  festival  at  Delos 

Pan-Hellenic  festivals    . 

The  Delian  Hymn  to  Apollon    . 

The  Neniean  and  Isthmian  games 

The  influence  of  art  on  the  growth  of  a  Pan-Hellenic  senti- 
ment    .... 

Growth  of  physical  science 

Source  of  Greek  philosophy 

Greek  astronomy 

Thales  and  the  Ionic  school 

Pythagoras  and  the  Pythagoreans 

The  Pythagorean  brotherhood  . 

Influence  of  the  philosophers    . 


4? 
47 
48 
48 
4U 

50 
51 
53 
54 
54 
55 
55 
56 


CHAPTER   VIII. 


HELLAS   SPORADIKE. 

Early  Hellenic  migrations 

Greek  colonisation  in  Sicily 

Social  conditions  of  the  Greek  colonists  in  Sicily 
B.C.      Greek  settlements  in  Italy 
510      War  between  Sybaris  and  Kroton 

Effects  of  the  destruction  of  Sybaris    . 

The  Corinthian  colony  of  Korkyra 

Joint  colonies  of  the  Corinthians  and  Korkyraians 

Akarnanians  and  other  neighboring  tribes 

Epeirotai  .  .  .  , 

Illyrians  and  Makedonians 

Thrakians  .... 

Greek  settlements  in  Thrace 

Megarian  colonies  on  the  Propontis 

Greek  colonisation  .*d  Africa 

Sources  of  the  prosperity  of  Kyrene     . 


56 
57 
58 
58 
59 
60 
60 
61 
62 
62 
62 
63 
63 
64 
64 
65 


.di  CONTENTS. 

Conflicts  between  the  Carthaginians  and  the  Greeks 
Career  of  Dorieus  in  Africa  and  Sicily 
B.C.      Foundation  of  the  Qelonian  dynasty  of  Syracuse 
481       Incroachments  of  Gelon  on  Carthaginian  ground 
480  ?    The  Battle  of  Himera     .... 
4G7      The  fall  of  the  Qelonian  dynasty 


PAGE 

65 
G5 
G6 
66 
67 
69 


CHAPTER  IX. 

EARLY  CONSTITUTIONAL  HISTORY   OF  ATHENS. 

Contrast  between  Sparta  and  Athens  as  drawn  by  Perikles  .     69 

Complicated  character  of  the  Athenian  constitutions  .     70 

Athens  in  the  time  of  Kleisthenes        .             .            .  .70 

The  Trittyes  and  Naukrariai     .            .            .            .  .71 

Tlie  Union  of  the  Attic  Demoi              .            ,            .  .71 

Right  of  intermarriage                .            .            .            •  .73 

The  Eupatridai,  Geomoroi,  and  Demiourgoi   .            .  .72 

The  council  of  Areiopagos         .            .            .            .  .73 

The  Drakonian  legislation         .            .            .            .  .73 

The  conspiracy  of  Kylon            .            .            .            .  .74 


CHAPTER  X. 

ATHENS,   AND   THE   SOLONIAN  LEGISLATION. 

Historical  records  of  the  time  of  Solon  .  .  .75 

Misery  of  the  Athenian  people  .  .  .75 

Various  opinions  as  to  the  causes  of  this  misery  ,  .     76 

The  question  of  debt  and  mortgage     .  .  .  .76 

Actual  measures  of  Solon  .  .  .  .  .79 

Lowering  of  the  currency  .  .  .  .  .79 

New  classification  of  the  citizens  ;  the  Pentakosiomedimnoi, 

Hippeis,  Zeugitai,  and  Thetes  .  .  .  .79 

The  Probouleutic  Council  .  .  .  .  .80 

Relationship  of  the  four  classes  to  the  Tribes  .  .     81 

Later  years  of  Solon       .  .  .  .  .  .81 

Usurpation  of  Peisistratos  and  death  of  Solon  .  .    82 


CHAPTER  XI. 

THE  TYRANNY  OP  THE  PEISISTRATIDAI. 

Slow  growth  of  the  Democratic  spirit  at  Athens  .  .     82 

560       Seizure  of  the  Akropolis  by  Peisistratos          .  .  .83 

Character  of  the  administration  of  Peisistratos  .  .    83 

Expulsion  and  restoration  of  Peisistratos        .  .  .83 

Second  expulsion  of  Peisistratos    '       .             .  .  .84 

527  ?    Death  of  Peisistratos  and  subsequent  liistory  of  his  house  .     84 

Policy  and  plans  of  Hippias      .             .             .  .  .85 

Intrigues  of  the  Alkmaionidai  for  the  overthrow  of  Hippiaa     85 

510      Final  expulsion  of  the  Peisistratidai    .            .  -  .86 


CONTENTS. 


xm 


CHAPTER   XII. 

THE  REFORMS   OF  KLEISTHENES. 

B  c       Oligarcliical  elements  in  tbe  Solonian  constitution 
509      Renewal  of  factions  after  tlie  fall  of  Hippias 

Need  of  a  new  classification  of  citizens 

This  classification  the  cause  of  tlie  opposition  of  Isagoras 

The  Council  of  the  Five  Hundred 

The  Heliaia  and  the  Dikastai  . 

The  Archons      ... 

The  court  of  Areiopagos 

Ostracism 

Expulsion  and  return  of  Kleisthenes 
509  ?    Alliance  of  Plataia  with  Athens 

Discomfiture  of  Kleomenes  at  Eleusis  .  r^^    ^^  -a- 

Victories  of  the  Athenians  over  the  Boiotians  and  Chalkidi- 

ans      .  .  •  : 

Warlike  activity  of  the  Athenians 
Predominance  of  Sparta  in  Athens 
Congress  of  allies  at  Sparta     . 
Return  of  Hippias  to  Sigeion   . 


87 


89 
90 
91 
93 
93 
93 

94 
94 
94 
95 
96 


BOOK   II. 

THE  STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA,    AND  THE  GROWTH   OF  THE 
ATHENIAN  EMPIRE. 


540 


CHAPTER   I. 

THE  PERSIAN  EMPIRE  UNDER   CYRUS  AND  KAMBYSES. 

The  historical  and  traditional  Cyrus  . 

The  story  of  Astyages  and  Cyrus 

The  story  of  Deibkes    .    _        . 

Scythian  invasion  of  Media 

Physical  geography  of  Persia  . 

The  Median  and  Lydian  dynasties 

Geography  of  Asia  Minor 

The  Lydian  dynasties  . 

The  Lydian  Kings  and  the  Asiatic  Greeks 

The  last  of  the  Mermnad  Kings 

Conquest  of  the  Asiatic  Greeks  by  Kroisos 

The  drama  of  the  life  of  Kroisos  • 

The  beginning  of  woes  in  the  death  of  Atys 

The  paying  of  the  penalty  due  for  the  iniquity  of  Gyges 

Unhistorical  character  of  all  the  details 

The  revolt  of  Paktyas  . 

Flight  and  surrender  of  Paktyas 

The  story  of  the  Phokaians      . 

The  conquest  of  Lykia 


97 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
101 
103 
104 
104 
104 
104 
105 
106 
109 
110 
111 
111 
112 


XIV 


CONTENTS. 


B.C. 

570? 
625? 


520? 


PAGE 

Later  conquests  of  Cyrus  .  .  ,  .  .112 

Babylon  and  its  people  .....  112 

Siege  and  capture  ot  Babylon  .....  114 
Last  scenes  in  the  drania  of  the  life  of-  Cyrus  .  .  115 

The  Valley  of  the  Nile  .  .  .  .  .116 

The  people  of  the  Nile  Valley  .  .  .  .117 

Opening  of  Egypt  to  Greek  commerce  .  .  .118 

Invasion  of  Egypt  by  Kambyses  ....  118 

Expeditions  against  the  Ethiopians  and  the  temple  of  Amoun  119 
Failure  of  the  proposed  expedition  against  Carthage  .  120 

Kambyses  and  the  Egyptian  priests  ....  120 
Kambyses  and  the  Magian  Smerdis  ....  121 
The  conspiracy  of  the  Seven  Persians  .  .  .  122 

Accession  of  Dareios  to  the  Persian  throne    ,  .  .  123 


516? 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE  PERSIAKf   EMPIRE  UNDER  DAREIOS. 

The  revolt  of  Babylon  .... 

The  despotism  of  Polykrates  in  Samos 

The  last  scenes  in  the  career  of  Polykrates     . 

The  despotism  of  Maiandrios  and  of  Syloson 

Organization  of  the  Persian  Empire    . 

The  story  of  Demokedes 

Influence  and  intrigues  of  Atossa 

The  Scythian  expedition 

Credibility  of  the  narrative  of  the  Scythian  expedition 


124 
125 
126 
126 
127 
127 
129 
130 
132 


CHAPTER  in. 


THE   IONIC  REVOLT. 

Dareios  and  the  Athenians 

The  schemes  of  Aristagoras  of  Miletos 
502  ?    The  mission  of  Aristagoras  at  Sparta  and  at  Athena 

The  burning  of  Sardeis 

Extension  of  the  revolt  to  Byzantion  and  Karia 

Mission  of  Histiaios  to  Sardeis 

The  revolt  of  Kypros  and  Karia 

The  death  of  Aristagoras 

Adventures  and  death  of  Histiaios 

The  Ionian  fleet  at  Lade 
495  ?    Battle  of  Lade,  and  fall  of  Miletos 

Third  conquest  of  Ionia 

Flight  of  Miltiades  to  Athens  . 

The  punishment  of  Phrynichos 


134 
136 
137 
139 
139 
139 
139 
140 
140 
141 
143 
144 
144 
144 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  INVASION  OF  THRACE  BY  MARDONIOS,  AND  THE  BATTLE  OF 
MARATHON. 


Administration  of  Artaphemes  in  Asia  Minor 
493  ?    The  reforms  of  Mardonios 


145 
146 


CONTENTS. 


XV 


PAGE 

Failure  of  Mardonios  in  Thrace  ....  147 

Missiou  of  the  Persian  lieralds  to  demand  eartb   and  water 

from  the  Western  Greeks     .....  147 
Treatment  of  the  heralds  at  Sparta  and  Athens  .  .  147 

Deposition  and  exile  of  Demaiatos       ....  149 
Capture  of  Naxos  and  Eretria  by  the  Persians  .  .  149 

Landing  of  the  Persians  at  Marathon  ....  150 
Rivalry  of  Themistokles  and  Aristeides  .  .  .  150 

Genius  and  policy  of  Themistokles       ....  151 
Debates  in  the  Athenian  camp  at  Marathon  .  .  .151 

The  story  of  the  battle  of  Marathon    ....  153 
The  details  of  the  battle  .....  154 

The  raising  of  the  white  shield  ....   155 

The  expedition  of  Miltiadesto  Paros  :  his  trial  and  his  death  157 
The  alleged  ingratitude  of  the  Athenians        .  .  .   158 


CHAPTER   V. 


THE  INVASION  AND  FLIGHT  OF  XERXES. 


Preparation  for  the  invasion  of  Europe 

The  opposition  of  Artabanos     . 

Character  of  the  narrative  of  Herodotos 

March  of  Xerxes  to  Kelainai     . 

Bridfre  across  tlie  Hellespont    . 

Scourging  of  the  Hellespont     . 

The  march  from  Sardeis  to  Abydos 

The  crossing  of  the  Hellespont 

The  review  of  the  army  and  fleet  at  Doriskos 

The  conference  of  Xerxes  and  Demaratos 

Significance  and  value  of  this  conversation 


160 
161 
163 
163 
163 
163 
164 
166 
167 
169 
170 


Functions  of  Demaratos  in  the  narrative  of  the  Persian  war.  170 
Forced  contributions  from  Hellenic  and  other  cities  .  .  171 

Visit  of  Xerxes  to  the  vale  of  Tempe  ....  172 
Rivalry  of  Themistokles  and  Aristeides  .  .  .  173 

Pan-Hellenic  congress  at  the  Isthmus  of  Corinth       .  .  174 

Sendintj  of  the  spies  to  Sardeis,  and  the  answers  received  at 

Delphoi  by  the  Athenians     .  .  .  .  .175 

Faithlessness  of  the  Argives,  Kretans,  and  Korkyraians  .  177 
Mission  to  Gelon,  tyrant  of  Syracuse  ....  178 
Abandonment  of  the  pass  of  Tempe  ....  179 
Mission  of  Leonidas  from  Sparta  to  Thermopylai  (June)  .  180 
Destruction  of  a  portion  of  the  Persian  fleet  by  a  storm  on 

the  Magnesian  coast  ......  183 

March  of  Hydarues  over  Anopaia        ....  183 

Heroism  of  Leonidas     ......  185 

The  victory  of  the  Persians      .....  186 

The  sight-seeing  in  Thermopylai        ....  188 

The  generalship  of  Leonidas    .....  189 

The  motives  of  Leonidas  and  his  allies  .  .  .  190 

The  Greek  fleet  at  Artemision  ....  191 

Indecisive  action  off  Artemision  ,  .  .  .  193 


XV  i  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

Destruction  of  the  Persian  squadron  dispatched  to  the  Euripos  192 
Second  action  o£E  Artemisiou,  resulting  in  the  victory  and 
retreat  of  the  Greeks  .....  193 

Fortification  of  the  Corinthian  isthmus  .  .  .  193 

•    Migration  of  the  Athenian  people        ....  194 

Devastation  of  Phokis  ......  194 

The  attack  on  Delphoi ......  195 

Occupation  of  Athens  by  Xerxes  ....  196 

Intended  abandonment  of  Salamis  by  the  confederates  .  197 

Policy  of  Themistokles  .  .  ...  .198 

Battle  of  Salamis  ......  200 

Artemisia  and  the  Kalyndian  ship      ....  202 

Euin  of  the  Persian  fleet  .....  203 

Counsel  of  Mardonios    ......  203 

Alleged  second  message  of  Themistokles  to  Xerxes  .  .  204 

The  Hiffht  of  Xerxes     .  .  .  .  .  .205 

General  credibility  of  the  narrative     .  .  .  .  207 

Siege  of  Andros  by  the  confederates   ....  210 

Distribution  of  honors  among  the  Greeks       .  .  .  210 


CHAPTER  VI. 

BATTLES  OF  PLATAIAI  AND  MYKALE. 

Movements  of  the  Greek  and  Persian  fleets    .  .  .211 

Offers  of  alliance  made  by  Mardonios  to  the  Athenians        .  212 
Embassy  of  the  Spartans  to  Athens     ....  213 

Re-occupation  of  Athens  by  Mardonios  .  .  .  213 

March  of  the  Spartans  under  Pausanias  from  Sparta  .  215 

Paction  of  the  Argives  with  Mardonios  .  .  .  215 

The  feast  of  Attaginos  .....  216 

B.C.      Historical  value  of  the  story    .....  217 

479      Advance  of  the  confederates  into  Boiotia        .  .  .  218 

Attack  of  the  Persian  cavalry,  and  death  of  Masistios  .  218 

Change  of  the  Greek  position  .....  219 

Counsel  of  Timagenidas  .....  219 

The  infatuation  of  Mardonios  .....  220 

The  conference  of  the  Makedonian  Alexandres  with  the 
Athenian  generals     ......  220 

Clianges  of  position  in  the  Greek  and  Persian  armies  .  221 

The  resistance  of  Amompbaretos  to  the  orders  of  Pausanias  222 

.  223 
.  224 
.  225 
.  225 
.  226 
.  226 
.  227 
.  228 
.  230 
.  230 


Tlie  battle  of  Plataiai 

Retreat  of  Artabazos     .... 

Obstinate  resistance  of  the  Tliebans     . 

Storming  of  the  Persian  camp  . 

The  graves  at  Plataiai  .... 

Siege  of  Thebes  .... 

Movements  of  the  Greek  fleet  to  Samos  and  Mykale 

Battle  of  Mykale  .... 

Foundation  of  the  maritime  empire  of  Athens 

The  siege  of  Sestos        .... 

General  character  of  the  historv  of  the  Persian  war  .  232 


CONTENTS.  xvn 


CHAPTER   VII. 

THE  CONFEDERACY  OP  DELOS. 
B.C.  PAGE 

479  The  rebuildinfr  of  Athens,  and  the  fortification  of  Peiraieus  282 
Public  works  of  Theniistokles .  .  .  .  .  234 

478      Change  in  the  conduct  of  Pausanias    .  ...  .  234 

477      Formation  of  the  confederacy  ot  Delos  .  .  .236 

The  assessment  of  Aristeides  .....  236 
Treason  and  deatli  of  Pausanias  ....  237 

Traditional  narrative  of  the  later  history  of  Themistokles  .  238 
Alleged  journey  of  Themistokles  to  Sousa     .  .  .  240 

Uniform  policy  of  Themistokles  ....  240 

Amount  of  evidence  against  Themistokles     .  .  .  242 

Relations  of  Tliemistokles  with  the  Persian  King      .  .  243 

Alleged  personal  corruption  of  Themistokles  .  .  243 

Extent  of  the  guilt  of  Themistokles   ....  344 

468  ?    Death  of  Aristeides        .  .  .  .  .  .245 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE  GROWTH  OP   THE  ATHENIAN   EMPIRE. 

Objects  of  the  Delian  confederation     ....  246 

Change  in  the  relations  of  Athens  with  her  allies      .  .  246 

466      Athenian  operations  to  the  battles  of  the  Eurymedon  .  247 

465      The  Dllian  synod,  and  the  revolt  of  Thasos    .  .  .248 

464      The  revolt  of  the  Helots  ;  and  the  the  alliance  of  Athens 

with  Argos     .......  248 

459-8  Siege  of  Aigina.     Building  of  the  Long  Walls  of  Athens     .  250 
Battles  of  Tanagra  and  Oinophyta        ....  250 

457      Fall  of  Aigina    .  .  .  .  .  .  .251 

455      Disaster  of  the  Athenians  in  Egypt     ....  251 

Final  victories  and  death  of  Kimon      ....  252 

447      Evacuation  of  Boiotia  by  the  Athenians  .  .  .  252 

446      The  revolt  of  Euboia  and  Megara.   The  Thirty  Years'  Truce  253 

Gradual  development  of  the  Athenian  Democracy     .  .  254 

Rivalry  of  Kimon  and  Perikles  ....  255 

The  reforms  of  Ephialtes  .  .  .  .  .256 


BOOK   III. 

THE    EMPIRE    OP    ATHENS.        THE    STRUGGLE    BETWEEN 
ATHENS  AND  SPARTA. 

CHAPTER  I. 

THE  THIRTY  YEARS*  TRUCE. 

Public  works  of  Perikles  .  .  .  .  .  258 

Extension  of  Athenian  settlements      ....  259 

440      Revolt  of  Samos  .  .  .  .  .  .259 


xviil  CONTENTS. 

B.C.  FAOB 

436      Quarrel  between  Corinth  and  Korkyra  .  .  .  261 

433      Proposals  for  au  alliance  between  Korbyra  and  Athens        .  263 

Counter  arguments  of  the  Corinthians  .  .  .  263 

433       Defensive  alliance  between  Athens  and  Korkyra       .  .  264 

Battle  between  the  Corinthian  and  Korkyraian  fleets  off  the 

Island  of  Sybota        .  .  .  .  .  .264 

Revolt  of  Potidaia         .  .  .  .  .  .266 

Council  of  the  Peloponnesian  allies  at  Sparta  .  .  2*57 

Secret  debate  of  the  Spartans  .....  269 

Formal  Congress  of  the  allies  at  Sparta  .  .  .  270 

Efforts  of  the  Spartans  to  bring  about  the  downfall  of  Perikles  270 
Prosecutions  ot  Anaxagoras,  Pheidias,  and  Aspasia  .  .  271 

General  policy  of  Athens  in  reference  to  the  alleged  causes 
of  the  Peloponnesian  War   .....  272 


CHAPTER   II. 

THE  PELOPONNESIAN   WAR   FROM   THE   SURPRISE   OF   PLATAIAI 
TO   THE   CLOSE   OP   THE   PUBLIC   LIFE   OF   PERIKLES. 

431       Night  attack  on  Plataiai  by  the  Thebans        .  .  .273 

Slaughter  of  the  Theban  prisoners  ....  274 
Impolicy  and  immorality  of  this  act  ....  275 
Spartan  overtures  to  the  Persian  king  .  .  .  275 

The  allies  of  Athens  and  of  Sparta  ....  275 
The  resources  of  Athens  .....  276 

Attack  of  Oinoe,  and  invasion  of  Attica         .  .  .  277 

The  expulsion  of  the  Aiginetans  ....  278 

Measures  for  the  safety  of  Attica  and  Athens  .  .  278 

Alliance  of  the  Athenians  with  the  Thrakian  chief  Sitalkea  279 
Public  burial  at  Athens  and  funeral  oration  of  Perikles       .  279 

430       The  plague  at  Athens  .  .  .  .  .  .281 

Depression  of  the  Athenian  people     ....  283 

Close  of  the  career  of  Perikles  .  .  .  284 


CHAPTER   III. 

THE  PELOPONNESIAN   WAR   FRO.M   THE   CLOSE   OF   THE   PUBLIC 
LIFE   OF   PERIKLES   TO   THE   DESTRUCTION   OF   PLATAIAI. 

Execution  of  Spartan  envoys  at  Athens  .  .  .  285 

The  surrender  of  Potidaia         .....  286 

429       Attack  on  Plataiai  by  the  Spartans  under  Archidamos  .  286 

Defeat  of  tlie  Athenians  in  Clialkidike  .  .  .  288 

Invasion  of  Akarnania  by  the  Spartans,  aided  by  Chaonians, 

Molossians,  and  other  mountain  clans  .  .  .  288 

Victory  of  Phormion  over  the  Corinthian  fleet  .  .  289 

Athenian  expedition  to  Krete  .  .  .  .  .  290 

Battle  of  Naupaktns,  and  second  victory  of  Phormion  .  291 

Propo.sed  night  attack  on  Peiraieus     ....  292 
Expedition  of  SitalUes  against  Makedonia  and  Clialkidike   .  293 

428      The  revolt  of  Lesbos    .  .  .  .  .394 


CONTENTS.  XIX 

B.C.  PAGE 

Audience  of  tlie  Lesbian  envoys  at  Olympia    .     ^       .  .  296 

Measures  taken  by  the  Athenians  for  the  sujipression  of  the 

revolt    .  ......  296 

427       Surrenderor  Mytilene  to  Paches  .  .  .  .297 

('ondenmation  of    the  Mytilenaian  people  by  the  Athenian 

assembly  .......  298 

Influence  and  character  of  Kleon  ....  299 

Second  debate,  and  withdrawal  of  the  sentence  against  the 

Mytilenaian  people      ......  300 

The  subjujration  of  Lesbos        .  .  .  .  .  002 

The  destruction  of  Plataiai        .....  803 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR  FROM  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  KORKYRA 
TO  THE  CAPTURE  OP  SPHAKTERIA  BY  DEMOSTHENES  AND 
KLEON. 

427      State  of  parties  in  Korkyra        .....  305 

Intrigues  of  the  prisoners  set  free  by  the  Corinthians  .  306 

Open  enmity  of  the  populace  and  the  aristocratic  factions     .  300 
Massacres  at  Korkyra     ......  308 

Capture  of  Minoa  by  Nikias      .....  310 

426       Second  outbreak  of  plague  at  Athens   .  .  .  .311 

Foundation  of  Herakleia  by  the  Spartans        .  ,  .  311 

Defeat  of  Demosthenes  in  Aitolia  ....  312 

Attempt  of  the  Aitolians  and  Spartans  on  Naupaktos  .  313 

Retreat  of  the  Peloponnesians  after  the  defeat  at  Olpai         .  314 
Destruction  of  the  Ambrakiots  at  Idomene      .  .  .  314 

•125      Occupation  of  Pylos  by  Demosthenes  ....  315 

The  bay  of  Sphakteria  .  .  .  .  .310 

Attack  of  Brasidas  on  Pylos      .....  316 

Embassy   of    the   Spartans  to  Athens   for  the  negotiation 
of  a  peace  .......  318 

Debate  at  Athens  on  the  propositions  of  the  Spartan  envoys  319 
Rupture  of  the  truce       ......  320 

Resumption  of  the  war ;  blockade  of  Sphakteria       .  .  320 

Causes  tending  to  prolong  the  siege     ....  321 

Mission  of  Kleon  with  reinforcements  for  Pylos         .  .  321 

Attitude  of  Nikias  and  the  oligarchic  party     .  .  .  322 

Attack  of  Sphakteria  by  the  Athenians  .  .  .  323 

Return  of  Kleon  with  the  Spartan  prisoners  to  Athens  .  325 

CHAPTER  V. 

THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR  FROM  THE  CAPTURE   OP 
SPHAKTERIA  TO  THE  PEACE  OP  NIKIAS. 

Change  in  the  popular  feeling  at  Athens         .  .  .  325 

Campaign  of  Nikias  on  the  coasts  of  the  Saronic  gulf  .  326 

Capture  of  the  Persian  envoyArtaphernes  on  his  way  to  Sparta  326 
Order  to  the  Cliians  to  pull  down  the  new  wall  of  their  city  327 
424      Athenian  occupation  of  Kythera  ....  327 


XX  CONTENTS. 

B.C.  PAGE 

Massacre  of  Helots  by  tlie  Spartans      .  .  .  .  338 

Proposed  expedition  of  Brasidas  to  Thrace      .  .  .  329 

Attempts  of  the  Athenians  on  Nisaia  and  Megara      .  .  329 

Schemes  of  tlie  Athenians  for  the  recovery  of  their  suprema- 
cy in  Boiotia     .......  830 

Battle  of  Delion  .  .  .  .  .  .  .331 

Refusal  of  the  Boiotians  to  yield  up  the  Athenian  dead        .  382 
Assault  and  capture  of  Delion  .....  333 

March  of  Brasidas  through  Thessaly   ....  333 

Remissness  of  the  Athenians    .  .  .  .  .  334 

Revolt  of  Akanthos        .  ,  .  .  .  .334 

Surrender  of  Amphipolis  .....  335 

Lightness  of  the  Athenian  imperial  yoke         .  .  .  336 

Effects  of  the  fall  of  Amphipolis  on  the  Athenians  and  the 
Spartans  .  .  .  .  .  .  .337 

The  exile  of  Thucydides  .  .  ,  .  .337 

Capture  of  Torone  by  Brasidas  .  ...  .  338 

433      Truce  for  a  year  between  Athens  and  Sparta  .  .  338 

Revolt  of  Skione  and  Mende  from  Athens       .  .  .  338 

Difficulties  of  Brasidas  in  Makedonia  ....  839 
Recovery  of-Mende  by  the  Athenians  ....  340 
Arrival  of  Ischagoras  and  other  Spartan  commissioners        .  840 

423       Expedition  of  Kleon  to  Makedonia  .  .  .  841 

Capture  of  Torone  by  Kleon      .....  343 

Battle  of  Amphipolis.     Death  of  Brasidas  and  of  Kleon        .  342 
Comparative  merits  of  Brasidas  and  Kleon     .  .  .  844 

Negotiations  for  peace    ......  345 

Terms  of  the  treaty        ......  345 


CHAPTER   VI. 

THE   TELOPONNESIAN   "WAR  FROM    THE   PEACE    OP   NIKIAS    TO 
THE   MASSACRE   AT   MELOS. 

421       Separate  treaty  of  alliance  between  Athens  and  Sparta  .346 

Scheme   for  setting   up   a  new  Peloponnesian  confederacy 

under  the  presidency  of  Argos         ....  347 
Intrigues  for  bringing  about  an  alliance  between  Sparta  and 
Argos  .  .  .  .  .  .  .348 

420       Separate  alliance  between  Sparta  and  the  Boiotians  .  .  349 

Dismissal  of  the  Spartan  ambassadors  from  Atliens  .  .  .349 

Intrigues  of  Alkibiades  .....  349 

Treachery  of  Alkibiades  to  the  Spartan  envoys  .  .  351 

Alliance  between  Athens  and  Argos    ....  352 
Exclusion  of  the  Spartans  from  the  Olympian  games  .  352 

419      Operations  of  Alkibiades  in  Argos  and  Epidauros      .  .  353 

418       Invasion  of  Argos  by  the  Spartans  under  Agis  .  .  354 

The  battle  of  Mantineia  .....  354 

Treaties  between  Sparta  and  Argos      .  .         '  .  .  356 

417      Restoration  of  democracy  at  Argos       ....  256 
Failure  of  an  Athenian  expedition  for  the  recovery  of  Amphi- 
polis   ........  357 

416      Tlie  massacre  of  Melos   ......  357 


CONTENTS.  XXI 

PAGE 

Historical  autliority  of  the  Melian  Conference  .  .  359 

The  ostracism  of  Hyperbolos   .....  360 
Position  of  the  chief  Hellenic  states    ....  360 


CHAPTER  VII. 
THE    PELOPONNESIAN  WAR — THE   SICILIAN    EXPEDITION. 

427      First  interference  of  the  Athenians  in  the  affairs  of  Sicily    .  361 

424      Conorress  of  Sicilian  Greeks  at  Gela    ....  361 
Punishment  of  the  Athenian  commanders       .  .  .  362 

423       Renewed  dissensions  in  Leontinoi        ....  363 

416      Quarrel  between  Selinous  and  Egesta  .  .  .  363 

Resolution  of  the  Athenians  to  maintain  the  cause  of  the 
Egestaiaus      .......  363 

415      Opposition  of  Nikias      ......  364 

Counter  arguments  or  Alkibiades        ....  365 

Attempt  of  Nikias  to  disgust  the  people  by  insisting  on  the 

vast  efforts  needed  to  carry  out  the  enterprise        .  .  366 

Compliance   of   the   Athenians   with   all   the   demands    of 
Nikias  .  .  .  .  .  .  .366 

The  mutilation  of  the  Hermai  ....  367 

Accusation  of  Alkibiades  .....  368 

The  departure  of  the  fleet  from  Peiraieus       .  .  .  369 

Public  debate  at  Syracuse        .....  370 

Reply  of  Atheuagoras  to  Hermokrates  .  .  .  370 

Progress  of  the  Athenian  armament  to  the  Straits  of  Messene  371 
Plans  of  the  Athenian  commanders      ....  372 

Occupation  of  Katane,  and  alliance  with  the  Katanaians      .  372 
Recall  of  Alkibiades      .  .  .  .  .  .373 

Victory  of  the  Athenians  on  the  shores  of  the  Great  Har- 
bor of  Syracuse  ......  374 

Activity  of  the  Syracusans  during  the  winter  .  .  377 

Debate  at  Kamarina      ......  377 

Neutrality  of  the  Kamarinaians  ....  378 

Traitorous  schemes  of  Alkibiades        ....  379 

414      Mission  of  Gylippos  to  Sicily   .....  381 
Surprise  of  Epipolai  by  the  Athenians  .  .  .  382 

Destruction  of  the  first  Syracusan  counterwork  .  .  383 

Destruction  of  the  second  Syracusan  counterwork.     Death  of 

Lamachos       .....  384 

Prospects  of  the  Athenians  and  Syracusans    .  ,  .  385 

■    Voyage  of  Gylippos  to  Italy     .....  386 
Entry  of  Gylippos  into  Syracuse  ....  387 

Third  counterwork  of  the  Syracusans  .  .  .  388 

Letter  of  Nikias  to  the  Athenians        ....  389 

413      Outbreak  of  the  so-called  Dekeleian  war         .  .  .  390 

Peloponnesian  and  Athenian  reinforcements  for  Sicily  .  391 

Naval  victory  of  the  Athenians  ;  and  capture  of  Plemmyrion 
by  Gylippos    .  .  .  .  .  .  .391 

Indecisive  Athenian  operations  in  the  Great  Harbor  .  .  392 

Voyage  of  Demosthenes  to  Korkyra  and  Italy  .  .  392 

Arrival  of  Demosthenes  at  Syracuse    ....  393 


XXH  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

Night  attack  by  the  Atlienians  on  tbe  Syracusan  cross-wall.  395 
Refusal  of  Nikias  to  retreat,  or  allow  the  lieet  to  leave  the 
Great  Harbor  .  .  .  .  .  .396 

The  eclipse  of  the  moon  .....  398 

Defeat  of  the  Athenian  fleet,  and  death  of  Euryinedon  .  398 

Effects  of  the  victory  on  the  Syracusans        .  .  .  399 

Closing  of  the  mouth  of  the  Great  Harbor  by   the    Syra- 
cusans .......  400 

Preparations  for  the  final  conflict  in  the  Great  Harbor  .  401 

Destruction  of  the  Athenian  fleet        .  .  .  .  402 

Stratagem  of  Hermokrates  to  delay  the  retreat  of  the  Athe- 
nian army       .......  403 

The  departure  of  the  Athenians  from  their  fortified  camp     .  404 
Exhortations  of  Nikias  on  the  march  .  .  .  405 

History  of  the  retreat  to  the  surrender  of  Demosthenes        .  405 
Defeat  and  surrender  of  Nikias  ....  407 

Sufferings  and  treatment  of  the  prisoners       .  .  .  408 

Death  of  Nikias  and  Demosthenes       ....  409 

Effect  of  the  expedition  on  the  subsequent  history  of  Greece     409 

CHAPTER  Vni. 

THE  PELOPONNESIAN  (DEKELEIAN)   WAR  FROM  THE  CATAS- 
TROPHE  AT   SYRACUSE   TO  THE  SUPPRESSION   OF  THE   OLI- 
GARCHY  OF   THE   FOUR  HUNDRED   AT   ATHENS. 
B.C. 

413       Effects  of  the  Spartan  occupation  of  Dekeleia  .  .  410 

Tiie  massacre  of  Mykalessos  .....  411 
State   of   Athens   when   the   catastrophe   in  Sicily  became 

known  .......  413 

State  of  feelinij  in  Peloponnesos  and  among  the  oligarchical 

factions  in  the  cities  subject  to  Athens        .  .  .  412 

Overtures  of  Tissaphernes  and  Pharnabazos  to  the  Spartans.  413 
Synod  of  the  Spartan  allies  at  Corinth  .  .  .  414 

413       Defeat  and  death  of  Alkamenes  at  Peiraion    .  .  .  415 

Revolt  of  Chios,  Erythrai,  and  Klazomenai  from  Athens  .  416 
Employment  of  the  Athenian  reserv^e  fund  to  meet  this  crisis.  416 
Revolt  of  Miletos.  First  treaty  between  Sparta  and  Persia  417 
Rising  of  the  Samian  Demos  against  the  Qeomoroi  .  .  418 

Revolt  and  recovery  of  Lesbos  ....  418 

Defeat  and  death  of  Chalkideus.  Athenian  ravages  in  Chios.  419 
Victory  of  the  Atlienians  and  Argives  over  Astyochos  and 

Tissaphernes  at  Miletos  .....  420 
Dispute  between  Tissaphernes  and  Hermokrates        .  .  421 

Second  treaty  between  Sparta  and  Persia       .  .  .  422 

Fortification  of  Delphinion  ;  and  ravaging  of  Chios  by  the 

Athenians       .......  422 

Defeat  of  Charminos  by  the  Spartan  admiral  Astyochos        .  423 
Rupture  between  Lichas  and  Tissaphernes     .  .  .  423 

Revolt  of  Rhodes  from  Athens  ....  424 

Intended  murder  of  Alkibiades  by  the  Spartans         .  .  424 

Growing  influence  of  Alkibiades  with  Tissaphernes  .  .  425 

Suggestion  of  Alkibiades  for  prolonging  the  war       .  .  425 

Overtures  of  Alkibiades  to  the  Athenian  officers  at  Samos    .  426 


CONTENTS.  XXIH 

B.C.  PAGB 

Opposition  of  Plirynichoo  .....  427 

Reception  of  Peisandros   and   the  envoys   from   Sarnos   at 
Atliens  .  .  .  .  .  .  .428 

Appointment  of  Athenian  commissioners  for  settling  affairs 
with  Alkibiades  and  Tissaphernes    ....  429 

Organization  of  the  olifjarchic  conspiracy  at  Athens  .  429 

Victories  of  the  Athenians  at  Rhodes  and  Chios.     Death  of 
Pedaritos        .  .  .  .  .  .430 

Abortive  negotiation  of  the  Athenian  commissioners  with 
Tissaphernes  ......  430 

411       Progress  of  the  oligarchic  conspiracy  in  Samos        .  .  431 

Revolt  of  Thasos  .  .  .  .  .  .432 

Political  assassinations  at  Athens  by  the  oligarchic  conspir- 
ators  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  -  432 

Expulsion  of  the  Council  of  the  Five  Hundred  .  .  434 

Overtures  of  the  Four  Hundred  to  Agis  .  .  .  435 

Attempted  oligarchic  revolution  at  Samos      .  .  .  435 

Determination  of  the  Athenians  in  Samos  to  maintain  the 
constitution   .......  436 

Resolution  of  the  citizens  at  Samos  to  treat  Athens  as  a  re- 
volted city      .  .  .  .  .  .  .  437 

Election  of  Alkibiades  as  general  by  the  citizens  at  Samos  .  437 
Reception  of  the  oligarchic  envoys  at  Samos               .            .  438 
Opposition  of  Theramenes  in  the  Council  of  the  Four  Hun- 
dred     439 

Fortification  of  Eetionia  by  the  Four  Hundred  .  .  439 

Destruction   of  the   fort  on  Eetionia  with  the  sanction  of 
Theramenes   .......  440 

Defeat  of  Thymocliares,  and  revolt  of  Euboia  .  .  441 

Consternation  iit  Athens  on  the  defeat  of  Thymocliares        .  442 
The  suppression  of  the  tyranny  <it  the  Four  Hundred  .  442 

Restoration  of  the  Kb  istliHuean  democracy   .  .  .  443 

Trial  and  execution  of  Antiphon  ....  443 

Indecisive  movements  of  tlie  Athenian  and  Peloponnesian 
fleets  ........  444 

Revolt  of  Byzantion  from  Athens        ....  444 

Tumults  in  the  Spartan  camp  at  Miletos        .  .  .  445 

Dismissal  of  the  Phenician  fleet  from  Aspeiidos  .  .  445 

Revolt  of  the  Lesbian  town  of  Eresos  from  Athens   .  .  446 

Voyage  of  Mindaros  to  the  Hellespont  .  .  .  446 

The  battle  of  Kynossema  .....  447 

Moral  effects  of  the  victory  ou  the  Athenians  .  .  447 

CHAPTER  IX. 

THK  PELOPONNESIAN  (DEKELEIAN  OR  IONIAK)  "WAR  FROM 
THE  BATTLE  OP  KYNOSSEMA  TO  THE  BATTLE  OFF  THE 
ISLANDS   OF   ARGENNOUSSAI. 

Change  in  the  Athenian  character       ....  448 
Departure  of  Tissaphernes  for  the  Hellspont  .  .  449 

Defeat  of  Dorieus  and  Mindaros  in  the  bay  of  Dardanos        .  449 
410      Escape  of  Alkibiades  from  imprisonment  at  Sardeis  .  449 

Battle  of  Kyzikos  .  ,  .  .  .  .449 

Alleged  embassy  of  Endios  to  Athens  .  .  .  450 

Energy  of  Pharnabazos.  .....  451 


XXlv  CONTENTS. 

B.C.  PAGE 

Repulse  of  Agis  before  tlie  walls  of  Athens  .  .  .  451 

409  Operations  of  Thrasylos  in  the  Egean  .  .  .  452 
Recovery  of  Pylos  by  the  Spartans      ....  453 

408  Reduction  of  Chalkedon  by  the  Athenians  .  .  .  453 
Surrender  of  Byzantion              .....  453 

Arrival  of  Cyrus  the  Younger  in  Ionia              .  .  .  454 

407      Intrigues  and  operations  of  Lysandros            ,  .  -  454 

Return  of  Alkibiades  to  Athens            .             .  .  .  455 

Defeat  and  death  of  the  pilot  Antiochos  at  Notion  .  .  456 

Attack  on  Kyine  by  Alkibiades              .             .  .  .  457 

Removal  of  Alkibiades  from  his  command     .  .  .  457 

406       Arrival  of  Kallikratidas  to  supersede  Lysandros  .  458 

Character  of  Kallikratidas        ...  .  458 

Insubordination  in  the  Spartan  fleet  and  army  .  .  459 

Speech  of  Kallikratidas  to  the  Milesians         .  .  -  459 

Capture  of  Methymna  by  Kallikratidas          .  .  .  460 

Blockade  of  the  fleet  of  Konon  at  Mytilene    .  .  .  461 

The  battle  of  Argennoussai      .             .             .  .  .  461 

Departure  of  Eteonikos  from  Mytilene           .  .  .  462 

CHAPTER  X. 

THE  PELOPONNESIAN  (DEKELEIAN  OK  IONIAN)  WAR  FROM 
THE  BATTLE  OF  ARGENNOUSSAI  TO  THE  SURRENDER  OP 
ATHENS. 

The  tempest  after  the  battle  of  Argennoussai  .  .  463 

Measures  taken   by  the  Athenian  generals  for  rescuing  the 
crews  of  the  disabled  ships  .....  464 

Numbers  of  the  men  lost  in  the  disabled  triremes      .  .  464 

Charges  brought  against  the  generals  .  .  .  465 

Intrigues  and  conspiracy  of  Theramenes         .  .  .  467 

Violations  of  Athenian  law  in  the  proceedings  against  the 
generals  .......  469 

Condemnation  of  the  generals  ....  472 

Infamous  conduct  of  the  Athenian  Demos      .  .  .  473 

Moral  effect  of  the  execution  of  the  generals  .  .  474 

Difficulties  of  Eteonikos  in  Chios        ....  474 

405      Appointment  of  Lysandros  as  Secretary  of  Arakos     .  .  475 

Surprise  and  capture  of  the  Athenian  fleet  at  Aigospotamoi    476 
Treatment  of  the  Athenian  prisoners  by  Lysandros   .  .  478 

Utter  dismay  at  Athens  on  receijit  of  the  tidings  from  Aigos- 
potamoi .......  480 

Operations  of  Lysandros  in  the  Egean  and  the  Hellespont   .  481 
Pressure  of  famine  at  Athens  .....  481 

Siege  of  the  city,  and  negotiations  for  peace  .  .  .  481 

The  surrender  of  Athens  .....  483 

Character  of  Athenian  and  Spartan  polity  as  determining  the 
issue  of  the  war         ......  484 

The  social  and  domestic  life  of  Hellas  .  .  .  485 


CONTENTS.  XXV 


BOOK   IV. 


THE  EMPIRE   OP   SPAKTA. 


CHAPTER   I. 

FROM  THE  SURRENDER  OF  ATHENS  TO  THE  RETURN 
OF  XENOPHON  FROM  ASIA. 

FAGB 

Establisliment  of  tlie  Spartan  supremacy        .  .  .  487 

Tlie  tyranny  of  tlie  Thirty  at  Athens  ....  487 
The  death  of  Theramenes  .....  490 
Occupation  of  Phyle  by  the  exiles  under  Thrasyboulos  .  491 
Massacre  of  the  Eleusinians  by  the  Thirty      .  .  .  493 

Victory  of  Thrasyboulos,  and  death  of  Kritias  .  .  492 

Return  of  Lysandros  to  Athens  ....  493 

Operations  of  Lysandros  in  the  Egean  .  .  .  493 

March  of  Pausanias,  the  Spartan  king,  into  Attica   .  .  494 

Victory  of  Pausanias,  and  suppression   of  the   tyranny  at 

Athens  .  .  .  .  .         '    .  .495 

Restoration  of  the  democracy  .....  495 

Last  schemes  and  death  of  Alkibiades  .  .  .  497 

General  view  of  his  career        .....  498 

Pleas  of  Cyrus  for  the  dethronement  of  Artaxerses  .  .  499 

The  Greek  mercenaries  .....  501 

Reluctance  of  the  Greeks  to  march  with  Cyrus  .  .  502 

The  march  to  Kunaxa  .  .  .  .  .  .  502 

Battle  of  Kunaxa  and  death  of  Cyrus  ....  503 

Perplexities  and  dangers  of  the  Cyreian  Greeks         .  .  504 

Efforts  of  Artaxerxes  to  prevent  the  Greeks  from  marching  to 

Babylon  .  .  .  .  .  .  .505 

Treachery  of  Tissaphernes  ending  in  the  murder  of  Klearchos 

and  other  Greek  leaders  .....  506 
Energy  of  Xenophon,  who  is  appointed  one  of  the  new 

generals  .......  507 

Preparations  for  retreat  .  .  ,  .  508 

Passage  of  the  Zab  river  .  .  .  .  508 

Passage  of  the  Karduchian  mountains  .  .  .  509 

Journey  of  the  Greeks  to  Mount  Theches       .  .  .  510 

Arrival  at  Trapezous     ......  511 

March  from  Trapezous  to  Kerasous    ....  512 

Protest  of  the  envoys  from  Sinope      ....  518 

Reply  of  Xenophon       ......  514 

Alleged  difficulties  of  the  land-march  from  Kotyora  .  514 

Election  of  Cheirisophos  as  general  with  supreme  power  .  515 
Treachery  of  Anaxibios,  and  consequent  troubles  at  Byzan- 

tion     ........  515 

Intrigues  of  Anaxibios  ......  516 

Operations  of  the  Cyreians  in  Asia  Minor,  and  return  of 

Xenophon  to  Athens  ....  518 

A 


XXVI 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER   II. 


B.C. 

400 


399 


SOKRATES. 

PAGE 

Charges  brought  against  Sokrates  bv  Anytos,  Meletos,  and 
Lykon  .  .  .  '.  .  .  .520 

Early  life  of  Sokrates   .  .  .  .  .  .520 

Sokrates  and  the  science  ot  Physics     ....  531 

Sokrates  and  the  science  of  Ethics       .             .  ■          .             .  521 

The  religious  mission  of  Sokrates        ....  522 

Sokrates  and  the  Elenchos,  or  system  of  cross-examination  .  523 

The  Sokratic  method  in  its  relation  to  the  Athenian  drama  .  524 

Political  influence  of  the  Athenian  drama       .             .             .  525 

Rhetoric  and  Dialectic  ......  526 

Influence  of  the  Sophists          .....  526 

EfEect  of  the  teaching  of  the  Sophists  on  Athenian  character  .  527 

Ethical  theories  of  Sokrates  and  Prodikos       .             .             .  528 

Ethical  theory  ascribed  to  Kallikles   ....  529 

Character  of  the  paid  teachers  of  Athens        .             .             .  530 

Origin  and  character  of  Attic  comedy.             .             .             .  530 

Slanders  of  the  comic  poets      .....  531 

Aristophanic  caricatures  of  Sokrates  ....  532 

Causes  of  the  unpopularity  of  Sokrates           .             .             .  533 

Influence  of  Sokrates  on  the  young     ....  534 

Intercourse  of  Sokrates  with  Kritias  and  Alkibiadea  .             .  535 

Sokrates  and  the  Sophists         .....  535 

The  trial  and  defence  of  Sokrates         ....  536 

The  apologies  of  Xenophou  and  Plato            .             .             .  539 

EflFect  of  the  defence  on  the  jurymen  ....  540 

Motives  of  Sokrates  in  his  defence       ....  540 

Value  put  by  Sokrates  on  his  own  work          .             .             .  541 

Address  of  Sokrates  after  the  sentence  of  death        ,             .  542 
The  death  of  Sokrates  .             .             .             .             .             .543 

Peculiarities  in  the  method  of  Sokrates          .             .             .  544 

His  negative  and  positive  teaching      ....  545 

Protest  of  Sokrates  against  physical  research            .             .  546 

Modern  aspects  of  ethical  and  physical  philosophy  .             .  546 


CHAPTER   III. 

FEOM  THE  RETUKN  OP  THE  TEN  THOUSAND  TO  THE  BATTLE 
OF  LEUKTRA. 


Character  of  Greek  history  from  the  fall  of  Athens  to  the 
battle  of  Leuktra       ......  547 

Sup])ort  given  to  the  Spartans  by  the  oligarchic  factions  in 
Athens  and  other  cities         .....  548 

403      Intrigues  of  Lysandros  .  .....  548 

490      Punishment  of  tlic  Eleians      .....  549 

Election  of  Agesilaos  as  king  in  Sparta  .  .  .  549 

Effects  of  the  influx  of  money  into  Sparta      .  .  .  550 

The  conspiracy  of  Kinadon      .....  551 

Spartan  operations  in  Asia  Minor        ....  551 


CONTENTS. 


XXVI 1 


PAGE 

Mission  of  Agesilaos  to  Asia  Minor      ....  553 

Discontent  of  the  Tliebans  and  Corinthians  with  Sparta       .  553 
Activity  of  Konon  under  the  protection  of  Euagoras,  despot 
of  Sahaniis      .......  554 

Mission  of  Lysandros  to  the  Hellespont  .  .  .  554 

Defeat  and  death  of  Tissaphernes         ....  555 

Anti-Spartan  changes  in  Rhodes  ....  555 

Increased  power  of  Konon        .....  556 

Battle  of  Knidos  ......  557 

Boiotian  war  between  Thebes  and  Sparta.    Death  of  Lysan- 
dros    ........  557 

Alliance  between  Thebes  and  Athens.  Retreat  of  Pausanias 
from  Boiotia  .......  558 

Corinthian  war  .......  559 

The  recall  of  Agesilaos  .....  560 

Battle  of  Coroneia        ......  560 

Return  of  Agesilaos  to  Sparta .....  561 

The  rebuilding  of  the  Athenian  Long  Walls  .  .  .  561 

Mission  of  Autalkidas  to  the  Persian  King    .  .  .  563 

Death  of  Thrasyboulos  .....  563 

Attack  of  Teleutias  on  the  Peiraieus  ....  564 

The  peace  of  Antalkidas  .....  564 

Effects  of  the  peace  of  Antalkidas  on  the  position  of  Sparta  565 
386       The  restoration  of  Plataiai        .....  566 

Breaking  up  of  the  city  of  Mantineia  ....  566 

384       Formation  of  the  Olynthian  confederacy         .  .  .  667 

383  Opposition  of  Akanthos  and  Apollonia  .  .  .  567 
Amyntas  king  of  Makedonia  .....  568 
Resolution  of  Sparta  to  suppress  the  Olynthian  confederacj  .  568 
Seizure  of  the  Theban  Kadmeia  by  Phoibidas  .  .  569 
Seizure  and  execution  of  Ismenias  ....  569 
Suppression  of  the  Olynthian  confederacy      .             .             .  569 

384  Orations  of  Lysias  and  (380  B.C.)  of  Isokrates  .  .  570 
379       Conspiracy  of  Pelopidas            .....  571 

Surrender  of  the  Spartan  garrison  in  the  Kadmeia   .  .  573 

Attempt  of  Sphodrias  on  Peiraieus      ....  573 

Formation  of  a  new  Athenian  confederacy      .  .  .  574 

Epameinoudas  and  the  Sacred  Band  of  Tliebes  .  .  574 

378       Decline  of  Spartan  power         .....  575 

Renewed  jealousy  between  Athens  and  Thebes  .  .  575 

Peace  between  Athens  and  Sparta       ....  576 

lason  of  Pherai,  Tagos  of  Thessaly     ....  576 

Renewed  war  between  Sparta  and  Athens      .  .  .  576 

Operations  in  Korkyra  ......  577 

Seizure  of  Plataiai  by  the  Thebans      ....  577 

Declaration  of  war  by  Sparta  against  Thebes  .  .  .  578 

March  of  Kleombrotos  to  Leuktra        ....  579 

Battle  of  Leuktra  ......  580 

Loss  of  the  Spartans     .  .  .  .  ...  580 

Reception  of  the  tidings  at  Sparta       ....  581 

Character  of  Spartan  government        ....  581 

Inevitable  results  of  Spartan  principles  of  action      .  .  583 


XXVlll 


CONTENTS. 


BOOK  V. 


THE  RISE   AND   CULMINATION   OF   THE    MAKEDONIAN   TOWEE? 


CHAPTER    I. 


FROM   THE  BATTLE  OF  LEUliTRA  TO   THE   DEATH   OF  F.PAMEINONDAS. 
B.C.  PAGK 

871-62  General  policy  of  Epameiuondas        ....  583 

371       Treatment  of  the  hoplites  of  Kleombrotos  at  Sparta  .  .  584 

Punishment  of  Orchomenos  and  Thespiai  by  Thebes  .  584 

Amphiktyonian  verdict  against  Sparta  .  .  ,  585 

Re-establishment  of  Mantineia  ....  585 

370       Invasion  of  Lakonia  by  Ejaameinondas  .  .  .  586 

369  Appeal  of  the  Spartans  for  aid  to  Athens  .  .  .  586 
Formation  of  Megalopolis  .....  587 
Restoration  of  the  Messenians,  and  building  of  Messene  .  587 
Reception  of  Epameinondas  at  Thebes             .             .             .  588 

370  Relations  of  the  Athenians  with  Amyntas  .  .  .  588 
Assassination  of  lason  of  Plierai  ....  589 
State  of  affairs  in  Makedonia  .....  589 

369       Alliance  between  Athens  and  Sparta  ....  589 

308       The  Tearless  Battle       .  .  .  .  .  .590 

367       Third  expedition  of  Epameinondas  into  Peloponnesos  .  590 

366       Theban  embassy  to  Sousa        .....  590 

Peace  between  Thebes  and  Corinth  with  other  cities  .  591 

365       Recovery  of  Samos  to  the  Athenian  alliance  .  .  .  591 

Operations  on  the  Thrakian  Chersonesos        .  .  .  591 

363  Battle  of, Kynoskephalai.     Death  of  Pelopidas  .  .593 

364  Conflicts  in  the  Peloponnesos  .....  593 
363       Resentment  of  the  Tliebans  against  the  Arkadians   .  .  593 

March  of  Epameinondas  to  Sparta      ....  593 

Failure  of  the  attempt  to  surprise  Mantineia  .  .  594 

Battle  of  Mantineia      ......  595 

Death  of  Epameinondas  .....  5!)G 

Review  of  liis  career     .  .  .  .  .  .  597 


CHAPTER   II. 


FROM  THE   DE.\TH   OF   EPAMEINONDAS  TO  THE  BATTLE  OF 
CHAIRONEIA. 

Results  of  the  battle  of  Mantineia       .  .  .  .598 

361       Death  of  Agesilaos  in  Egypt    .....  598 

Decay  of  Athenian  generalship  ....  599 

358       Greatest  extension  of  the  second  Athenian  empire    .  .  599 

Growth  of  Makedonian  power  .....  600 

Relations  of  Philip  (^father  of  Alexander  the  Great)  with  the 
Athenians       .  .  .  .  .  .  .600 

Disinclination  of  the  Athenians  for  personal  military  service  600 
Early  life  and  character  of  Philip        ....  601 

Recovery  of  Euboia  by  the  Athenians  .  .  .  601 


CONTENTS.  xxix 

B.C.  PAGE 

357-     The  Social  War  .  •  .  .  .  .603 

i3o5       Character  of  the  Athenian  generals     ....  G03 

Chares  and  Phokion      ...,,.  603 

358       Reduction  of  Aniphipolis  by  Philip      ....  604 

356  Alliance  of  Philip  with  the  Olynthians  .  ,  .  605 

357  The  Phokians  fined  by  the  Aniphiktyonic  assembly  .  605 
356      The  Sacred  War            .             .             .             .             .  .605 

355^  Defeat  of  Philonielos    .  .  .  .  .  .606 

353       Defeat  of  Onomarchos  by  Philip  of  iMacedon  .  .606 

Fortification  of  Thermoi)y]ai  by  the  Athenians  .  .  607 

351       Report  of  Philip's  illness  and  death     ....  607 

353       Beginning  of  the  public  life  of  Demosthenes  .  .  608 

Earl.y  life  and  training  of  Demosthenes  .  .  .   608 

Opposition  of  jEschines  and   Phokion  to  the  policy  of  De- 
mosthenes      .......  610 

350      Remissness  of  the  Athenians  with  regard  to  Olynthos  .  611 

Repeated  warnings  of  Demosthenes    ....  612 

349      Revolt  of  Euboia  from  Athens  .  .  .  .613 

Proposition  of  Apollodoros  respecting  the  Theoric  Fund       .  613 

347      Fall  of  Olynthos  .  .  .  .  .  .615 

Temporary  agreement  between  .^schines  and  Demosthenes    615 
Alliance  of  Philip  with  the  Tliebans    ....   615 

Mission  of  ^schines  with  other  envoys  to  Philip     .  .  616 

Conversion  of  ^Eschines  .....  616 

346       Reply  of  Philip  to  the  proijosals  for  peace      .  .  .  617 

Omission  of  the  Phokian  name  from  the  treaty         .  .  618 

Delay  of  iEschines  in  receiving  the  engagements  of  Philip    618 
March  of  Philip  to  Thermopylai  ....   619 

Ending  of  the  Sacred  War  by  the  surrender  of  Phalaikos    .  630 
Alliance  of  Philip  with  Thebes  .  .  .  .620 

Treachery  of  iEschines  .....  630 

Election  of  Philip  into  the  Amphiktyonic  brotherhood  .   620 

Day-dreams  of  Isokrates  .....  631 

343      Disputes  between  the  Athenians  and  Philip  .  .  .  633 

Revived  energy  of  the  Athenians        ....  633 

339       Financial  reforms  of  Demosthenes       ....  633 
Origin  of  the  Third  Sacred  War  .  .  .  .633 

Refusal  of  the  Athenians  and  Tliebans  to  send  envoys  to  the 

Amphiktyonic  assembly  .....  625 
Fortification  of  Elateia  by  Philip  ....  635 
Proposal  of  Demosthenes  that  the  Athenians  should  aid  the 

Thebans 636 

Alliance  between  Thebes  and  Athens  .  .  .  637 

338      Battle  of  Chaironeia      .  .  .  .  .  .637 

Increased  influence  of  Demosthenes  after  the  defeat  .  628 

Surrender  of  Thebes     ......  638 

Acknowledgment  of  Philip  as  supreme  chief  of  all  the  Hel- 
lenes  ........  629 

Expedition  of  Philip  into  Peloponnesos  .  .  .  629 


XXX 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  III. 

ALEXAMDEU  THE   GREAT. 
B.C. 

Early  years  of  Alexander  the  Great 

Feuds  in  the  house  of  Philip    . 
336       Assassination  of  Philip  at  Aigai 

Alexander  becomes  king 

Alexander  at  Thermopylai 
335       Destruction  of  Thebes  . 

Alexander  at  Corinth    . 
334      Passage  of  the  Hellespont 

March  of  Alexander  to  Gordion 

Battle  of  Issos    . 

333  Expedition  into  Phenicia.     Fall  of  Tyre 
March  into  Egypt.     Founding  of  Alexandria 

331       Battle  of  Arbela,  or  Gaugamela 

Surrender  of  Babylon,  Persepolis,  and  Pasargadai 
330      Death  of  Dareios 

Murder  of  Philotas  and  Parmenion 
330-29  Passage  of  the  Jaxartes 
328      Murder  of  Kleitos 

Murder  of  Kallisthenes 
326      Alexander  in  the  Land  of  the  Five  Streams 

334  Return  to  Sousa 
Death  of  Hephaistion    . 

323       Death  of  Alexander  at  Babylon 

Purposes  and  motives  of  Alexander    . 


PAGE 

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.  631 
.  631 
.  633 
.  632 
.  633 
.  633 
.  638 
.  634 
.  636 
.  636 
.  637 
.  637 
.  638 
.  639 
.  639 
.  640 
.  641 
.  643 
.  643 
.  644 
.  644 
.  645 


BOOK  YI. 

LATEU   FORTUNES   OF   THE   HELLENIC   PEOPLE. 

CHAPTER   I. 


THE  LAMIAN  WAR. 
OF  THE  ELDER 
LEON. 


SICILIAN    AFFAIRS,   FROM   THE   USURPATION 
DIONTSIOS    TO    THE    RESIGNATION    OF   TIMO- 


Course  of  events  in  Hellas  in  Alexander's  absence     .  .  648 

Contest  between  iEschines  and  Demosthenes  .  .  649 

334      Arrival  of  Harpalos  at  Athena  ....  650 

Charge  of  embezzlement  against  Demosthenes  and  other  cit- 
izens  ........  650 

323       Return  of  Demosthenes  from  exile     ....  651 

323-22  Lamian  war.     Death  of  Demosthenes  .  .  .  653 

Sicilian  history  after  the  ruin  of  the  Athenian  armament  at 
Syracuse  .......  653 

405-307  Despotism  of  the  elder  Dionysios     ....  653 

367-343  Tyranny  of  the  younger  Dionysios  ....  653 

344-340  Career  of  Timoleon   .  .  .  .  .  .653 


CONTENTS. 


XXXI 


CHAPTER    II. 


FORTUNES   OP   THE   GREEK   PEOPLE    FROM   THE  LAMIAN   WAR   TO   TlIE 
EXPULSION   OF   THE  BAVARIAN   OTHO. 


Sequel  of  the  career  of  Phokion 

Administration  of  the  Phalerean  Demetrios  . 
315-14  Extinction  of  the  Family  of  Alexander  the  Great 

Expulsion  and  return  of  the  Athenian  philosophers 

Worship  of  Demetrios  Poliorketes  at  Athens 
300  Battle  of  Ipsos  ..... 
1G8       Fall  of  the  Makedonian  monarchy 

The  Achaian  League     .... 

The  career  of  Aratos     .... 

Career  of  Philopoimen  .... 

Roman  interference  in  Hellas  . 
197       Battle  of  Kynoskepbalai 

168       Battle  of  Pydna  .... 

146      Sack  of  Corinth  .... 

Influence  of  Greek  literature  and  art  . 
A.D.      Gothic  invasions  .... 

339      Transference  of  the  imperial  throne  from  the  old 
the  new  ..... 

The  Byzantine  empire  .... 
726      Insurrection  against  Iconoclasm 

The  Basilian  emperors  . 
1057-67  Inroads  of  the  Seljukian  Turks 
1095     The  Crusades    ..... 
1204  Capture  of  Constantinople 

The  Latin  empire  of  Constantinople  . 

Rise  of  new  empires  at  Nice,  Trebizond,  and  Durazzo 

Rise  of  the  Ottoman  Turks 
1329     The  enrolment  of  the  Janissaries 
1449     Coronation  of  Constantine  XI. 
1453     Fall  of  Constantinople  .... 

Ottoman  administration  in  Western  Greece  . 
1573     Victory  of  the  Venetians  at  Lepanto   . 

Campaigrns  of  the  Venetian  Morosini  in  Greece 
1718    Peace  of  Passarovitz     .... 

Improvement  in  the  condition  of  the  people  . 

Rebellion  of  the  Western  Greeks  against  the  Turks 

1821  Declaration  of  Independence    . 

1822  Massacre  of  Chios  (Scio)  by  the  Turks 
1827     Capture  of  Athens  by  the  Turks 

Battle  of  Navarino         .... 
Aj)pointment  of  Otho,  by  the  Great  Powers,  as  King 
Greeks  ..... 

1863     Deposition  of  Otho        .~  .  .  . 

Present  condition  of  Western  Greece  . 


Rome  to 


PAGE 

.  655 

,  656 

,  656 

.  657 

,  657 

,  658 

,  658 

,  658 

.  659 

,  660 

,  660 

660 

661 

661 

661 

661 


of  the 


LIST  OF  MAPS. 


General  Map  of  Greek  and  Plienician  Settlements 

Qreek  Settlements  in  Asia  Minor 

Tliermopylai    . 

Battle  of  Sal  a  mis 

Battle  of  Plataiai 

Athens  and  its  Neigh  bo  rliood 

Plan  of  tlie  Harbor  of  Navarino 

Athenian  Operations  b(  fore  Syracuse  : — 

1.  First  Counterwork  of  the  Syracusans 

2.  Serond  Syracusan  Counterwork 

3.  Third  Syracusan  Counterwork 

Campaigns  of  Alexander 


To  face  Title. 
To  face  Page  102 
180 
200 
219 
258 
316 

383 
384 
388 
684 


The  Latin  forms  of  Greek  names  are  given  in  the  Index,  with  their 
Greek  equivalents,  in  all  instances  in  which  there  seemed  to  be  any 
need  to  do  so.  The  following  list  contains  the  very  few  names  about 
which  the  reader  can  be  in  any  doubt. 


Latin  Foim, 
JEgina  . 
^gospotami 
^olians 
.^tolians 
Agrigentum 
Bucephalus 
Celfena? 
Cithseron 
Croesus 
Cyclades 
Cyprus . 
Corey ra 
Tarentiim 


Greek  Form. 

Aigina 

Aigos  potamoi 

Aiolians 

Aitolians 

Akragas 

Boukephalos 

Kelainai 

Kithairon 

Kroisos 

Kyklades 

Ky])ros 

Korkyra 

Taras 


Tlie  difference  in  sound  between  the  Latin  i>ronunciation  of  these 
flames  and  that  of  the  Greeks  was  scarcely  more  than  perceptible. 


HISTORY  OF  GREECE. 


•♦•-- 


BOOK    I. 
THE  FORMATION   OF  HELLAS. 


CHAPTER    I. 


PnYSICAl,   GEOGRAPHY  OP  CONTINENTAL  HELLAS. 

To  the  Greeks  of  the  historical  ages  the  idea  of  Hellas  was  not 
associated  with  any  detiiiite  geographical  limits.  Of  a  Hellas 
lying  within  certain  specified  bounds,  and  containing  ueilasnot 
within  it  only  Greek  inhabitants,  they  knew  nothing,  ageo^raphi- 
Not  only  were  some  of  the  most  important  Greek 
states  planted  on  the  soil  of  barbarian  tribes,  but  for  ages  the  title 
of  many  so-called  Greek  clans  to  the  Hellenic  name  remained  a 
matter  of  controversy.  Nor  in  the  description  of  Greece  can  we 
start  with  an  historical  order,  as  though  there  were  some  definite 
region  which  could  be  styled  the  mother  country  of  the  rest.  In 
the  prehistoric  age  the  name  Hellas  is  confined  to  the  small  and 
mountainous  territory  from  which  Achilleus,  it  is  said,  went  forth 
with  his  Myrmidones  to  fight  at  Ilion  ;'  but  it  is  absurd  to  regard 
the  land  of  the  I'hthiotic  chieftain  as  the  original  seat  of  the  Hel- 
lenic people,  and  all  attempts  to  determine  the  course  of  the 
migrations  which  brought  about  the  geographical  distribution  of 
the  historical  Greeks  can  yield  at  best  only  conjectural  results. 

For  the  sake  of  convenience  Greek  geographers  drew  a  distinc- 
tion between  the  lands  which  they  regarded   as  the   Mountain 
continuous  or  continental  Hellas  and  the   Sporadic  or   ^^^^^^ 
scattered  Hellas  of  the  Egean  sea  and  of  the  Asiatic,    Han  motm- 
Sicilian,  and  other  coasts.^     Adopting  this  division,    *^'°*- 
we  have  in  the  former  a  country  with  an  area  not  so   large  as 

'  Iliad,  ii.  683.  ix.  447. 

"  'EAAdf  cvvexm-    The  otlier  name,  'E7,Aaf  anopadiKr/,  is  seldom  used. 
1 


2  THE   FORMATION   OF   HELLAS.  [Book  I. 

that  of  Portugal,  stretching  from  the  gigantic  range  of  Olyrapos 
and  the  Kanibounian  mountains  on  the  north  to  the  southern- 
most promontories  of  the  Peloponnesos,  and  exhibiting,  through- 
out, a  singuhirly  distinct  and  marked  geography.  Olympos  itself, 
rising  to  a  height  of  nearly  10,000  feet,  forms  with  its  neighbor- 
ino-  hills  only  the  northern  wall  of  a  lower  region  which  may  be 
rouo-hly  described  as  a  square  60  miles  in  length  and  breadth,  the 
western  rampart  of  these  Thessalian  lowlands  being  the  chain  of 
Pindos,  which  runs  southward  at  right  angles  to  the  Kanibounian 
range  about  half  way  between  the  Ionian  and  the  Egean  seas,  until 
at  about  the  39th  parallel  of  latitude  the  southern  barrier  juts  off 
eastwards  from  Pindos,  under  the  names  of  Tymphrcstos  and 
Otlirvs,  and  ends  in  the  highlands  between  the  Malian  and  Paga- 
sai.iii  gulfs.  From  the  latter  gulf  northwards  the  eastern  wall  of 
Thessaly  is  formed  by  the  mighty  masses  of  Pelion  and  Ossa,  to 
the  east  of  which  lies  the  narrow  strip  of  Magnesian  coast,  terrible 
for  its  ruggedness  and  its  storms.  The  waters  of  this  mountain- 
locked  basin  are  carried  off  by  the  stream  of  Peneios  through  the 
far-famed  vale  of  Tempe  which  separates  Ossa  fiom  Olympos. 

Starting  almost  from  the  point  whence  Tymphrestos  shoots 
eastwards  from  Pindos,  the  great  chain  of  Oita  trends  for  a  few 
The  ranges  miles  in  a  more  southerly  direction  and  then,  running 
othrvs'and  P'^rallcl  with  Otlirvs,  reaches  the  Malian  gulf,  leaving 
Parnas'sos.  between  its  base  and  the  sea  only  the  narrow-  pass  of 
Thermopylai,  and  shutting  in  between  itself  and  Othrys  the 
fertile  valley  of  the  Spercheios.  To  the  southwest  of  Oita  the 
lands  to  the  north  of  the  Corinthian  gulf  are  for  the  most  part 
occupied  by  the  wilderness  of  mountains  which  formed  the  fast- 
nesses of  Aitolian  and  Akarnanian  tribes,  and  which  still  shelter 
a  marauding  and  lawless  population.  To  the  southeast  the  range 
extends  with  but  little  interruption  under  the  names  of  Parnassos, 
Helikon,  and  Kithairon,  leaving  to  the  north  the  rugged  territory 
of  Phokis  and  the  more  fertile  region  of  Boiotia. 

Separated  from  mount  Parnes  to  the  east  by  the  pass  of  Phyle, 
Kithairon  forms  with  that  mountain  the  northern  wall  of  Attica, 
Mountains  whicli  stretches  from  the  eastern  end  of  the  Krissaian 
anA"'ePelo-  *^''  Corinthian  gulf  to  the  headland  of  Rhamnous,  and 
pomiesos.  rises  up  as  the  back-ground  of  the  plain  of  Marathon. 
To  the  southwest  of  Kithairon  the  ridges  of  Aigiplanktos  and 
Geraneia  run  as  a  back-bone  along  the  Corinthian  isthmus,  and 
by  the  Akrokorinthos  are  joined  with  that  labyrinth  of  mountains, 
which,  having  started  as  a  continuation  of  the  Aitolian  highlands 
from  the  western  end  of  the  gulf,  rise  up  as  an  impregnable  for- 
tress in  the  heart  of  the  Peloponnesos,  leaving  to  the  north 
at  the  base   of  Kyllene  and  Erymanthos  the  long  and  narrow 


Chap.  I.J  PHYSICAL  GEOGRAPHY.  3 

rc>j;ioii  known  as  the  bi>-torical  Achaia.  To  the  south  of  this 
mass  of  mountains,  and  dividing  the  southern  half  of  I'eloponnesos 
into  two  nearly  e<iaal  portions,  tlie  huge  and  rugged  chain  of 
Taygetos,  forming  a  barrier  between  the  lowlands  of  the  Eurotas 
<):»  the  one  side  and  the  splenditliy  fertile  plains  of  Stenyklaros  and 
>Iakaria  on  the  other,  runs  on  to  its  abrupt  termination  in  cape 
Tainaros.  Following  a  nearly  parallel  course  about  30  miles  to  the 
east,  another  range,  striking  southwards  from  the  Arkadian  moun- 
tains under  the  names  1 'anion,  Thornax,  and  Zarex,  leaves  between 
itself  and  the  sea  a  strip  of  land  not  unlike  the  Thessalian  Mag- 
nesia and  ends  with  tlu;  formidable  cape  of  Maleai, 

The  whole  of  this  (-(juntry,  whieh  may  be  described  generally 
as  consisting  of  gre}'  limestone,  exhibits  almost  everywhere  the 
same  features.  Less  than  half  the  land  is  even  capable  The  rivers 
of  cultivation ;  and  of  this  land,  of  whieli  a  mere  neni'tll" 
fraction  is  at  present  in  u.se,  a  large  portion  pro-  tireece. 
bably  even  at  the  best  of  times  lay  idle.  Of  the  mountains  not 
a  few  are  altogether  barren,  while  othei*s,  if  not  well  woo  k'd, 
supply  pasture  for  flocks  when  the  lowlands  are  burnt  up  in 
summer.  If,  again,  these  mountain  ma.sse.s,  leaving  room  for 
few  plains  and  even  for  few  valleys  of  much  length,  raise  barriers 
practically  fatal  to  intercourse  between  tribes  who  in  a  |)Iain 
eountry  would  feel  themselves  near  neighbors,  this  dittieulty  is 
not  removed  or  lessened  by  the  preseiieeof  any  considerable  rivers. 
The  (ireek  streams  are  for  the  most  part  raging  torrent.^;  in  winter 
and  drv  betls  in  summer  ;  ami  the  names  ( 'harailrai  and  ( 'heimarroi 
commonly  ap[)lied  to  them  attest  the  fury  with  which  they  cleave 
their  way  through  the  limestone  rocks,  wlien  they  carry  off  the 
mountain  drainage  in  the  rainy  season.  Of  these  rivei-s  the  most 
important  arc  the  Peneios,  which  drains  tiie  Thessalian  valley,  and 
the  Aeheloos  which  separates  Akarnania  from  Ailolia.  The 
Kephis<»s  and  Ilissos  pour  in  summer  a  scanty  title  not  much  sur- 
pas.sed  by  that  of  the  Eleian  Alpheios  ;  and  the  persistent  flow  of 
tlu!  Argive  Lyrkeio>  '  when  the  neighboring  streams  are  altsorbed 
in  tlic  marshes  of  Lcrnai  was  recorded  in  the  myth  of  Lynkeus 
an<l  the  l)anaid  Ilvpcrmnestra. 

'I'hiscountrv,  so  broken  by  mountains,  so  imperfectly  penetrated 
by  rivers,  was  inhabited  by  a   race,  whioh,   as  we   shall  see,   had 
advanced  from  the  notion  of  the  family  to  that  of  the    Lanj  and 
clan,  from  that  of  the  clan  to  the  tribe,  and  from  the    seacommu- 
union  of  tribes  to  the  idea  of  the    Polls  or  City,  and   °**^  ''*"■ 
which,  having  assumed  this  as  the  flnal  unit  of  society,   stuck  to 

'  The  Lyrkeins  was  the  naiuo  tion  of  the  myth  see  Mytliofoffy  oj 
^jiveii  to  the  luachos  in  the  upi)er  the  Avynn  Nations,  book  ii.  ch.  vi. 
part  of  its  course    For  the  explaaa- 


4:  THE  FORMATION  OF  HELLAS.  [Book  I. 

the  belief  with  an  apparent  unconsciousness  that  any  alternative 
was  possible.  In  the  geographical  features  of  their  country  there 
was  everything  to  foster  that  love  of  absolute  isolation  which 
was  the  inevitable  result  of  this  political  creed.  But  for  one 
circumstance  this  centrifugal  tendency  would  have  kept  them 
much  on  a  level  Avith  the  half-civilised  or  wholly  savage  tribes  of 
Thrace  or  Epeiros.  From  this  monotony  of  feeble  self-sufficing 
units  they  were  saved  by  being  brought  almost  everywhere  with- 
in reach  of  the  sea.  Less  in  area  than  Portugal,  continental 
Greece  alone  has  a  coast  line  equal  to  that  of  the  whole  Pyre- 
nean  peninsula.  The  gulfs  of  Pagasai  and  Ambralda  are  prac- 
tically inland  lakes :  but  the  island  of  Euboia  with  an  area  of  less 
than  1,500  square  miles  furnishes  with  the  opposite  shores  of 
Lokris,  Boiotia,  and  Attica  a  coast  line  of  not  less  than  300  miles. 
Still  more  important  was  the  isthmus  which  separated  by  a  narrow 
neck,  three  miles  and  a  half  in  width,  the  waters  of  the  Corinthian 
from  those  of  the  Saronic  gulf,  thus  affording  to  merchants  and 
travellers  the  advantages  of  a  transit  across  the  isthmus  of  Panama 
as  compared  with  the  voyage  round  Cape  Horn.  So  too  the  Lok- 
rians,  Phokians,  and  Boiotians  had  access  to  the  sea  botli  to  the 
northeast  and  to  the  southwest,  while  all  the  cities  on  the  Corin- 
thian gulf  itself  had  a  common  highway  altogether  more  easy 
and  safe  than  any  road  by  land.  Pre-eminently  favored  in  situ- 
ation, Attica  was  practically  an  island  from  which  ships  could 
issue  in  all  directions,  while  they  could  cut  off  access  through 
the  narrow  strait  of  the  Euripos.  Two  Greek  states  alone  had 
no  access  to  the  sea.  These  were  the  Dorians  to  the  north  of 
the  Krissaian  gulf,  and  the  Arkadians  of  Peloponnesos  ;  and 
these  states  remained  far  in  the  rear  of  Hellenic  developement 
generally. 

For  the  growth  of  states  confined  within  these  self-imposed 
limits  no  country  could  have  been  found  more  favorable  than 
Climate  and  Hcllas.  It  could  produce  all  or  nearly  all  that  the 
products  of  needs  of  Greek  life  required  ;  and  its  powers  of  pro- 
duction, whether  of  grain,  wine,  or  oil,  were  turned 
to  account  with  a  diligence  and  skill  in  marked  contrast  with  the 
obstinate  stupidity  of  modern  Greek  statesmanship.  Ages  of  op- 
pression and  mismanagement  have  probably  in  their  turn  affected 
the  climate  more  than  the  climate  has  affected  the  inhabitants  ; 
but  although  the  country  generally  is  perhaps  less  healthy  now 
than  it  used  to  be,  there  were  at  all  times  differences  more  or 
less  marked  in  the  physical  conditions  of  the  Greek  towns.  These 
differences  gave  rise  to  epithets  and  proverbial  sayings,  many  of 
which  probably  had  the  slenderest  foundation  in  fact ;  but  these 
fancies  served  to  keep  up  the  fatal  antipathies  of  which  such  phrases 


Chap.  II.]     GROWTH  OF  HELLENIC  CIVILISATION.  0 

were  the  expression.'  In  reality,  the  feuds  and  jealousies  of 
the  Hellenic  tribes  made  them  practically  a  mere  aggregate  of 
independent,  if  not  hostile,  units  ;  and  until  we  reach  the  tra- 
ditional history  of  these  tribes  separately,  it  is  unnecessary  to 
hll  in  with  more  minute  detail  the  outlines  of  a  geographical 
sketch  which  is  intended  to  convey  a  mere  general  notion  of  the 
physical  features  and  conditions  of  the  country  lying  between 
the  ranges  of  Olympos  and  the  southernmost  promontories  of 
Peloponnesos. 


CHAPTER  11. 

ORIGIN  AND   GROWTU   OF  HELLENIC  CIVILISATION. 

Englishmen,  it  is  said,  are  tempted  to  regard  their  constitu- 
tion as  something  possessed  of  a  necessary  and  eternal  exist- 
ence. If  they  care  to  take  their  stand  on  facts,  it  character 
would  be  more  safe  to  assert  that  the  forms  and  of  ancient 
principles  to  which  the  most  ancient  polities  in  the 
world  may  be  traced  are  altogether  in  antagonism  with  the  prin- 
ciples not  of  English  law  only,  but  of  the  laws  of  all  civilised 
nations  of  the  present  day.  Modern*  law,  if  we  speak  roughly, 
raises  no  impassable  barrier  between  men  who  belong  to  different 
nations  or  even  different  races,  far  less  between  the  inhabitants 
of  different  cities  or  the  members  of  different  families.  In  all 
the  states  of  that  which  we  call  the  ancient  world,  as  in  some 
which  are  not  yet  things  of  the  past,  absolute  isolation  stands  out 
in  glaring  contrast  with  the  modern  tendency  to  international 
union.  The  member  of  one  country  or  city  or  even  family  had 
nothing  to  do,  and  according  to  the  earliest  ideas  could  have 
nothing  to  do,  with  the  members  of  any  other.  For  the  primitive 
Aryan,  whether  in  the  East  or  in  the  West,  the  world  beyond  the 
limits  of  his  own  family  contained  nothing,  or  contained  his 
natural  and  necessary  enemies.  With  all  who  lay  beyond  the 
bounds  of  his  own  precincts  he  had  nothing  in  common.  They 
were  by  birth  foes,  for  whom  in  the  event  of  war  he  could  feel  no 
pity,  and  on  whom  he  could  have  no  mercy.  In  such  a  state  of 
things  war  meant  to  the  defeated  utter  and  hopeless  ruin.  Their 
lives  were  at  the  absolute  disposal  of  the  conqueror  ;  and  if  these 

^  Thus  Tanagra  was  supposed  to     and  so  with  the  rest  of  the  Boiotian 
be  the  abode  of  envy,  Thebes  of    towns, 
insolence,  Haliartos  of  slupiditj'. 


6  THE   FORMATION    OF   HELLAS.  [Book  i. 

were  spared,  the  alternative  was  tlie  doom  of  life-long  slavery.  In 
peace  the  barriers  between  them  were  scarcely  less  rigid.  The 
stranger  could  have  no  rights  whether  of  intermarriage  or  of 
inheritance  ;  nor  could  the  lapse  of  generations  furnish  the  faintest 
legal  ground  for  the  relaxation  of  these  conditions,  If,  again, 
the  old  society  was  thus  hard  in  its  relations  with  all  who  lay 
within  its  narrow  boundaries,  it  was  not  less  imperious  within 
its  own  limits.  The  father  was  the  absolute  lord  within  his  own 
home.'  He  was  master  of  the  lives  of  his  children,  wiio,  so  long 
as  he  lived,  could  be  nothing  but  his  subjects  ;  and  his  wife  was 
in  theory  his  slave. 

The  origin  of  this  state  of  things  can  be  understood  only  if  we 
trace  the  society  and  laws  of  all  the  Aryan  tribes  to  their  earliest 
The  family  fomis  ;  and  iu  this  task  we  maybe  greatly  aided  by 
un1t°of""^"  an  examination  of  social  conditions  which  even  at 
society.  the   present  day    exhibit   the    primitive   type,      Such 

conditions  may  be  found  in  the  village  communities  of  India  and 
other  countries  ;  but  the  inquiry  is  obviously  one  which  extends 
beyond  the  limits  of  Greek  history,  and  we  may  here  start  from 
the  fact  as  proved  that  the  narrow  limitations  and  absolute  intole- 
rance which  were  rather  forced  on  than  congenial  with  the  legis- 
lation of  the  Greek  or  Roman  states,"  carry  us  back  to  the  time 
when  the  hovise  of  each  of  our  Aryan  progenitors  was  to  him  what 
the  den  is  to  the  wild  beast  which  dwells  in  it ;  something, 
narnely,  to  which,  lie  onJy.ha&.a^ri^ht  and  AvJiich  iie  allows  his 
rnate  and  his  offspring  to  share,  but  which  n(j  othev  living  thing 
may  enter  except  at  the  nskj>f  life, 

This  utter  isolation  of  the  primitive  Aryan,  as  doubtless  of 
Exclusive-  every  other,  human  home,  is  sufficiently  attested  by 
ancient*^''  social  conditions  which  we  find  existing  in  historical 
family.  timcs.     In   Latium   and    Rome,    as    in    Hellas,    cyery 

house  was  a  fortress,   carefully  cut  off  by  its  precinct  from  every 

'  The  word  father,  7rdrr7pr<3enot-  except  itself  a  rif^lit  to  deal  with  the 
ed,  at  first,  mere  power,  without  a  lives  and  property  of  its  members, 
trace  of  the  holier  feelinjj  since  as-  If  tliese  do  wronjf,  tlie  state  must 
sociated  with  it.  It  is  but  another  claim  to  be  their  sole  judge.  If  the 
name  for  the  potent  man,  and  re-  right  of  j adding  them  be  under 
appears  in  tlie  (ireek  SeanoTr)^,  certain  circumstances  conceded  to 
dasa-pati,  the  lord  or  conqueror  of  others,  tliis  must  clearly  be  the  re- 
enemies.  Precisely  tlie  same  notion  suit  of  a  comjimmise.  The  same 
of  mere  power  is  expressed  in  the  remark  ai>plies  to  the  ancient  laws 
Greek  Troair,  a  husband,  of  marriage  and  inheritance.    The 

'  It  cannot  be  questioned  that  the  history  of  investitures  and  of  the 

Roman  patria  potestas  is  not  the  legal    immuiiiiies   of    the   Clergy 

creation  of  Roman  state  law.     It  is  shows  the  natural   workings  of  a 

of  the  very  essence  of  a  state  to  be  state  in  reference  to  claims  of  pri- 

intolerant  of  private  jurisdiction,  vate  or  alien  jurisdicticm. 
It  cannot  possibly  recognise  in  any 


Chap.  II]     GROWTH  OF  HELLENIC  CIVILISATION.  7 

'_fjthGi:,  No  party  walls  might  join  togetlier  the  possessions  of 
different  families ;  no  plough  might  break  the  neutral  ground 
which  left  each  abode  in  impenetrable  seclusion.  The  action 
of  the  state,  as  such,  must  be  to  unite  its  citizens,  so  far  as  may 
be  possible,  into  a  single  body,  by  common  interests,  by  a  common 
law,  and  by  a  common  religion.  When  then  we  have  before  us 
a  condition  of  society  in  which  each  house  or  family  stands 
wholly  by  itself  and  is  only  accidentally  connected  with  any 
other,  worshipping  each  its  own  deity  at  its  own  altar,  and 
owning  no  obedience  to  a  law  which  may  extend  its  protection 
to  aliens,  we  see  that  the  materials  out  of  which  states  have 
grown  are  not  those  which  the  state  would  have  desired  as  most 
suitable  for  its  work.  Such  as  they  were,  they  must  be  rough 
hewn  to  serve  a  wider  purpose  ;  and  the  history  of  the  Greek  and 
Latin  tribes  is  the  history  of  efforts  to  do  away  with  distinctions 
on  which  their  progenitors  had  insisted  as  indispensable. 

But  the  den  which  the  primitive  man  defended  for  his  mate 
and  his  offspring  with  the  instinctive  tenacity  of  a  brute  would 
have  remained  a  den  for  ever,  if  no  higher  feeling  Origin  of 
had  been  evoked  in  the  mind  of  its  possessor.  This  charactfr'of 
ini})ulse  was  imparted  by  the  primitive  belief  in  the  the  family, 
continuity  of  human  life.  The  owner  of  the  den  had  not  ceased 
to  live  because  he  was  dead.  He  retained  the  wants  and  felt 
the  pleasures  and  pains  of  his  former  life  ;  his  power  to  do  harm 
was  even  greater  than  it  had  been  ;'^  Fut  above  all,  Ins  rights  of 
property  were  in  no  way  changed.  lie  was  still  the  lord  of 
his  own  house,  with  the  further  title  to  reverence  that  he  had  now 
become  the  object  of  its  worship,  its  god.  This  religious  foun- 
dation once  laid,  the  superstructure  soon  assumed  the  form  of 
a  systematic  and  well-ordered  fabric.  If  the  disembodied  soul 
cannot  obtain  the  rest  which  it  needs,  it  will  wreak  its  ven- 
geance on  the  living ;  and  it  cannot  rest  if  the  body  remain  un- 
buried.  This  last  office  can  be  discharged  only  by  the  dead  man's 
legitimate  representative,--in  other  words,  his  eldest  son,  born  in 
lawful  wedlock  of  ajft'oinarTmitiatedr^into  llie  "^niily  religion. 
Thus,  as  the  generations  went  on,  the Tiving'Tmster  of  the  house 
ruled  simply  as  the  vicegerent  of  the  man   from  whom  he  had 

^  That  tins  belief  would  become  a  consumed  by  fire,  as  in  tlie  story  of 

source  of  frightful  cruelty,  it  is  easy  Periandros  and  Melissa.     Herod,  v. 

to  imagine.     The  dead  man  would  92,  7.    If  be  be  slain,  his  spirit  must 

still  hunt  and  eat  and  sleep  as  in  be  appeased  by  human  sacrifices, 

the  days  of  his  life  ;  therefore  his  as  by  the  slaughter  of  the  Trojan 

horse,  his  cook,  and  his  wife  must  ca^Vives  on  the  pyre  of  Patroklos. 

be  dispatched  to  bear  him  company  In  short,  the  fulldevelopement  of 

in  the  spirit  world.     He  must  be  Chthonian    worship    with   all    its 

clothed  :  and  therefore  the  costliest  horrors  would  follow  in  a  natural 

raiment  must  be  offered  to  him  and  and  rapid  course. 


8  THE  FORMATION  OF  HELLAS.  [Book  I. 

inherited  liis  authority  ;  and  he  ruled  strictly  by  virtue  of  a  re- 
ligious sanction  which  set  at  defiance  the  promptings  and  impulses 
of  natural  affection.  His  Avife  was  his  slave.  He  might  have 
sons  grown  up  about  him,  and  they  might  even  be  fathers  of 
children  ;  but  so  long  as  he  lived,  they  could  not  escape  from  the 
sphere  of  his  authority.  Nor  even,  when  he  died,  could  he  leave 
his  daughter  as  his  heiress  or  co-heiress  with  her  brothers  ;  and 
for  the  younger  brothers  themselves  the  death  of  their  father 
brouiiht  no  freedom.  They  became  now  the  subjects  of  the  elder 
brother,  as  before  they  had  all  been  at  the  absolute  disposal  of 
tjieir  father.  At  once,  then,  the  master  of  each  household  be- 
came its  priest  and  its  king.  He  alone  could  offer  the  sacrifices 
before  the  sacred  hearth ;  and  so  long  as  these  sacrifices  were 
duly  performed,  he  was  strong  in  the  protection  of  all  his  pre- 
decessors. In  the  worship  which  he  thus  conducted  they  only 
who  belonged  to  the  family  could  take  part,  as  the  lion's  cubs 
alone  would  have  a  right  to  share  the  lion's  den.  Hence  the 
continuity  of  the  family  became  an  indispensable  condition  for 
the  welfare  and  repose  of  the  dead.  These  could  neither  rest  nor 
be  rightly  honored,  if  the  regular  succession  fi-om  father  to  son 
was  brokenly  Hence  first  for  the  father  of  the  family  and  then 
/foF  all  its  male  members  marriage  became  a  duty,  and  celibacy 
brought  with  it  in  later  times  not  merely  a  stigraa  but  political 
degradation.  If  the  natural  succession  failed,  the  remedy  lay  in 
adoption.  But  this  adoption  w'as  effected  by:  a^jcejigious^ 
3?  mony  of  the  most  solemn  kind  ;  and  the  subject  of  it  renounced^ 
-his  own  family  and  the  worship  of  its  gods  to  pass  to  another 
hearth  and  to  the  worship  of  other  deities.  Xor  can  the  solem- 
nity of  this  sanction  be  better  attested  than  by  the  fact  that  ex- 
cept in  case  of  failure  of  natural  heirs  resort  could  not  be  had  to 
adoption, 

Tiius^each_house_J:).ecame  a  temple,  of  which  the  inaster^  or 
fath(ii_(fi.>rr-as  ive  haye  seen,  the  two  terms  have  but  the  same 
The  house  ineaning)^as  also  the  priest,  who,  as  serving  only 
and  its  de--  the_godvS  of  bis  -Gwn  rcccsscs,  knew  notlliiig  of  nny 
pen  enttf.  vdigjous  bonds  which  linked  him  with  any  one  be- 
yond the  limits  of  his  own  household.  These,  of  course,  were 
extended  with  each  generation,  the  younger  sons  becoming  the 
iieadsx>f  new  iamilies-wh.LcIi,  ALCrjg  ,kept_jn  strict  subordination 
to  the  chief  who  in  a  direct  line  represented  the  original  pro- 
genitor~ttnd  who  tlius  T>ccame  the  king  of  a  number  of  houses  or 
ajclan.  But  it  was  indispensable  that  the  same  blood  should 
flow  or  be  thought  to  flow  through  the  veins  of  every  mem- 
.ber  of  these  houses,  and  that  they  must  worship  the  same  gods 
with  the  same  sacrifices.  All  who  could  not  satisfy  these  con- 
V  ditions  were  aliens  or  enemies,  for  the  two  wox'ds  were  synony- 


"0 


Chap.  II.]     GROWTH  OP  HELLENIC  CIVILISATION.  9 

mous  ;  and  thus  wc  liave  in  tlic  East  the  growth  of  caste,  in  the 
West  that  of  a  plebs  or  a  cHentehi,  beneath  whom  might  be 
placed  the  serf  or  the  helot.' 

Hence  in  the  primitive  Aryan  states  whether  of  the  East  or 
tlie  West  the  distinction  of  orders  was  altogether  based  on  re- 
ligion ;  and  if  in  these  states  citizenship  was  deriv-  ideas  of 
able,  as  it  has  been  said,  only  from  race,  this  was  the  property, 
necessary  result  of  the  action  of  the  earliest  religious  faith,  and 
nothing  more.  The  question  of  property  was  at  first  merely  a 
secondary  consideration,  The  home  of  the  family  must,  it  is 
true,  have  its  hearth  and  its  altar  ;  but  the  notion  of  property  in 
the  soil  was  fully  developed  only  when  the  death  of  the  founder 
made  it  necessary  to  set  apart  a  certain  spot  of  ground  as  his 
tomb  and  as  the  burial-place  of  his  successors ;  and  from  the 
in\iolability  of  the  grave  followed  necessarily  the  doctrine  that 
the  soil  itself  might  not  be  alienated. 

From  the  reverence  or  the  worship  paid  to  the  master  or  the 
founder  of  the  family  after  death  followed  that  strict  law  of  pri- 
mogeniture which  made  the  eldest  son,  as  his  father~Y,aws  of  in- 
had  been,  the  absolute  lord  of  all  (^ther  members  of  his   heritance. 
house.     It  was  impossible  for  the  father  to  divest  lum  of  his  sacred 
character,  and  impossible  for  him  to  admit  any  of  his  younger-sons     /  y\ 
to  a  share  of  his  dignity,      From  this  root  sprang  that  exclusive  and_   j^ 
intolerant  spirit  which  pervaded  the  whole  civilisation  of  the  ancient  1  ^^^-■ 
world  and  which  in  its  intensity  is  to  us  almost  inconceivable. 

But  if  the  walls  of  separation  between  the  orders  in  the  state 
or  city  slowly   crumbled  away,   the  barriers  which   cut  oS  the 
stranger  from  the  rights  of  citizenship  were  never  re-   identity  of 
moved.      The   Athenian,  the  Spartan,  the  Megarian,    and^dvii 
and  the  Theban  were  as  closely  akin    as  the  men  of   penalties. 
Kent  and  Essex,  of  Norfolk  and  Lincoln.     Yet  out  of  the  bounds 
of  his  own  city  each  was  a  stranger  or  alien  who  had  no  proper 
claim  to  the  protection  of  the  laws,   who  could  not   become  an 
owner  of  land  in  a  soil  sacred  to  the  worship  of  other  gods,  or 
inherit  from  the  citizens,  because   all   inheritance   involved  the 
imiintciiaiice  of  a  particular  ritual.      In  short,  to  the  citizen  of  tlie/^C,,^ 
ancient  eunnnuiiities  the  city  was  not  merely  his  home  ;    it  waS 
his  world.     Here  alone   coufd  he'  ttve" under  the   protection   of 
law,  that  is,  of  religion.     Hence  the  doom  of  banishment  became 
not  less  terrible   than  that  of  death,   and  was  regarded  as    an 
adequate  punishment  for  the  gravest  political  offences,   for  the 

^  The   position  of  the   domestic  plebeian,  as  such,  could   have  no 

slave  was  in  one  sense  liio-her.  He  worship  at  all,  and  bad  therefore 

was  initiated  into  the  family  wor-  no   title   to    the    consideration   of 

ship,  and  so  far  liad  a  community  those  who  were  above  him. 
of  interest  with  his  master.     Tlie 


10  THE  FORMATION  OF  HULIiAS.  [Book  i. 

banished  man  Avas  wiped  ont  from  liis  family  and  from  the  wor- 
ship of  the  family  gods,  lie  was  no  longer  husband  or  father  ; 
and  his  wife  and  children  were  free  to  act  as  though  he  liad 
never  lived. 

Tlie  same  religious  feehng  ran  through  every  relation  into  Avhich 
the  citizens  of  one  state  could  be  brought  with  those  of  another. 
Influence  of  Each  city  remained  as  much  an  isolated  unit  as  each 
religion.  original  family  of  the  state  had  ever  been  ;  and  the 
process  of  consolidation  never  went  further  than  the  immediate 
neighborhood  of  the  great  cities.  But  the  effects  of  the  old  reli- 
gion did  not  stop  here.  If  it  denied  to  all  strangers  the  riglit  of 
intermarriage,  it  fed  the  feelings  of  jealousy,  suspicion,  and  dis- 
like which  the  citizens  of  one  state  felt  for  those  of  other  states 
even  in  times  of  peace,  and  intensitied  all  the  horrors  of  war.  Each 
war  was,  in  short,  a  crusade,  not  a  struggle  for  the  attainment  of 
some  jwlitical  end.  The  duties  of  mercy  and  pity  to  the  conquered 
were  things  unknown.  The  life  of  the  vanquished  was  at  the 
disposal  of  the  victor  who,  if  he  did  not  slay  him,  sold  him  as  a 
slave  ;  and  if  terms  were  made  with  the  enemy,  the  contract  went 
for  nothing  if  the  religious  ceremonies  were  neglected. 
\The  liistory  of  every  form  of  Aryan  polity,  although  it  e.vhibits 
the  working  of  a  more  generous  feeling,  points  unmistakeably  to 
Obstacles  J  the  time  when  each  house  existed  in  utter  loneliness 
hinderinn:  I  and  in  necessary  antagonism  with  all  around  it.  ^AU 
of  civil  a^  indeed  that  the  state  could  do  was  to  modify  the  rules 
ciety.^  of  the  ancient  family  life  to  suit  its  own  purposes,  and 

to -work  out  its  own  ends  rather  by  means  of  compromise  than  by 
open  opposition  to  principles  which  derived  their  sanction  from 
religion.  The  Greek  Fhratriai  and  the  Latin  Curi;e  were  but 
clubs  in  which  a  number  of  houses  were  combined.  Xo  change 
was  made  in  the  character  of  the  houses  themselves.  All  that  was 
done  was  to  provide  a  common  ground  on  which  j^ertain  famihes 
might  meet  to  promote  their  secular  interests,  while  their  religion 
and  their  morality  remained  unchanged.  This  morality  was_ 
tjie  fruit  chiefly  of  a  religious  belief,  which  touched  neither  the 
heart  iior^thc  conscience.  If  a  certain  act  was  to  be  done  or  left 
undone,  this  was  not  because  they  had  in  themselves  a  certain 
sen.se  which  told  them  that  the  one  Avas  right  and  thc"T>thor 
wrong,  but  because  a  wolf  or  a  rabbit  had  crossed  their  path,  or 
because  they  had  lieard  a  crow  chatter,  or  sec"n  the  lightning  flash 
on  one  side  rather  than  on  the  other.  Their  only  idea  of  the  gods 
whom  they  worshipped,  that[s,  of  their  own  ancestors,  was  that  of 
beings  who  retained  their  human  appetites  while  thev  had  ac- 
qiiired  superhuman  power  and  superhuman  malignity.  It  was~^ 
impossible^ that  kindly  affections  could~Dave  any  real  scope  amoiig~~ 


Chap.  II.]     GROWTH  OF   HELLENIC  CIVILISATION.  H 

men  who  breathed  sucjia  moral  atinosphei^ejis  this^r_  that  the 
society  to  which  the_^  belonged  coiild  fail  to  exhibit  the  intole- 
rauce,  liar.sliness,  and  crnelty  of  the  principle  which  lay  at  theroot 
of  their  family  life,  if  not  of  their  social  order. 

By  bearing  in  mind  this  origin  of  Hellenic  polity,  we  shall  be 
able  to  find  our  way  with  coniparative  ease  through  the  compli- 
cated forms  which  that  polity  assumed  at  different  siowgrowth 
periods.  AVe  might  indeed  have  thought  that  the  con-  of  t^i"  state. 
stitution  of  the  prim;x3val  Aryan  family  could  never  depart  from 
its  ancient  simplicity  :  and  of  itself  possibly  it  might  never  have 
done  so.  But  the  members  of  these  families  recognised  no  duties 
beyond  the  limits  of  their  own  homes  ;  and  on  others  who  were 
not  so  strong  or  not  so  cunning  they  could  prey  witliout  hin- 
drance or  scruple.  Hence  the  natural  inequality  of  mankind 
allowed  the  most  powerful  families  to  lay  the  foundations  of  an 
irresponsible  despotism,  while  the  weaker  were  brought  into  a 
condition  of  clientship  which  differed  from  slavery  in  little  more 
than  its  name. 

But  so  far  as  these  original  families  were  actually  or  nearly  on 
a  level  in  point  of  power,  it  was  possible  that  they  might  combine 
for  the  purpose  of  extending  that  power  and  increasing  rp^^,  pamilv 
it :  and  by  the  establishment  of  a  common  worship  and  tiie 
which  in  no  way  interfered  with  that  of  tlie  family  '^^' 
this  union  was  at  once  accomplished.  Thus  united,  the  Greek 
houses  formed  a  Phratria  or  brotherhood.  But  while  the  circle 
of  interests  was  widened,  tlie  bond  of  union  remained  not  less 
strictly  religious ;  and  each  group  of  families  had  a  common 
altar  erected  in  lionor  of  a  common  deity  who  was  supposed 
to  be  more  powerful  than  the  gods  of  eacli  separate  household. 
The  principle  of  combination  thus  introduced  was  capable  of 
indofiuite  extension  ;  and  as  tlie  grouping  of  houses  or  families 
had  formed  the  Phratria,  so  the  union  of  Phratriai  alone  was 
needed  to  form  in  the  tribe  a  religious  society  strictly  analo- 
gous to  the  Phratria  or  the  family.  The  societies  thus  formed 
would  always  have  tlieir  own  territory,  the  fields  in  which  each 
family  liad  its  own  tomb  with  the  common  ground  which  lav 
between  tlieir  several  landmarks  ;  but  the  principle  of  these  com- 
binations was  essentially  not  local,  and  thus  the  dependents  of 
these  houses  could  never  acquire  interest  or  possession  in  the  soil 
on  which  they  lived,  toiled,  and  died,  xVt  best  they  might  be 
suffered  to  retain  a  certain  portion  of  the  produce  on  condition  of 
their  laying  the  rest  at  the  feet  of  the  lord  ;  and  thus  a  perpetual 
burden  was  laid  not  on  the  land  but  on  the  tillers  of  it  who,  if 
they  failed  either  to  yield  the  amount  demanded, or  in  any  other 
way,  might  be  reduced  to  personal  slavery. 


12  THE  FORMATION  OF  HELLAS.  [Book  L 

But  as  the  worship  of  the  family  was  subordinated  to  that  of 
the  Phratria,  and  that  of  the  Phratriai  to  the  worship  of  the  tribe, 
The  Clan       ^^  tribes  Avhicli  were  locally  near  to  each  other  could 
and  the         not  fail  to  desire  for  themselves   a  union   similar  to 
"  ^'  that  of  the  phratriai  or  the  houses.     This  final  union 

of  tribes  constituted  the  Polls  or  State,  the  society  which,  founded 
on  a  common  religion,  embraced  all  Its  members  within  the  circle 
of  a  common  law,  and  which  was  destined  in  the  end  to  sweep  away 
those  distinctions  of  blood  in  which  its  foundations  bad  been  laid. 

With  the  formation  of  the  State,  in  other  words,  of  the  in- 
dividual city,  the  political  growth  of  the  Greek  may  in  strictness 
The  Tribes  of  speech  be  said  to  have  ended  ;  and  his  inability  to 
and  the  City,  advance  to  any  other  idea  of  Parliament  than  a  Primary- 
Assembly'  Involved  a  fatal  hindrance  to  the  growth  of  a  nation.  In 
blood  and  in  religion  the  men  of  Athens,  Thebes,  and  Sparta  were  as 
closely  connected  perhaps  as  the  men  of  London,  Manchester,  and 
Liverpool  ;  but  In  going  to  war  with  each  other  Athens,  Thebes, 
and  Sparta  could  not  even  be  charged  with  that  violation  of  duty 
which  during  their  great  civil  war  was  urged  against  tlie  southern 
states  of  the  American  Union.  Hence  the  country  which  was 
called  Hellas  remained  practically  throughout  its  whole  history  a 
territory  In  which  a  certain  number  of  cities  inhabited  by  people 
more  or  less  resembling  each  other  might  or  might  not  be  allied 
together.  The  theory  of  Greek  citizenship  was  the  same  as  that 
of  the  Latin  city  which  achieved  the  conquest  of  the  world  ;  but 
Rome  attained  her  power  not  by  calling  nations  into  existence  but 
by  numbering  Italians  or  Gauls  among  her  citizens  by  a  process 
which  would  Intitle  Englishmen  or  Prussians  to  their  rights  only 
as  possessing  the  freedom  of  the  cities  of  London  or  Beilin. 

This  device  secured  to  Rome  universal  dominion  :  the  refusal 
or  the  failure  to  adopt  It  Insured  the  reduction  of  the  Hellenic 
Course  of  \nnd  to  the  form  of  a  Roman  province.  But  wliat- 
poiiticai  de-  ever  might  b'e  the  extent  of  Roman  or  Athenian 
in  (ireecc  powcr,  the  character  of  each  was  the  same.  It  was 
auduiKomc.  j^  power  which  they  only  could  share  who  were 
citizens,  and  a  vast  body  of  men  lay  at  all  times  beyond  the 
circle  of  citizenship.  The  powerful  families,  who  were  able  to 
domineer  over  their  weaker  neighbors  and  whose  confederation 
was  essentially  religious,  drew  between  themselves  and  their  de- 
pendents a  line  of  separation,  to  pass  wliich  was  an  Impiety  and 
a  sacrilege.  The  attempts  to  pass  it  sum  up  the  history  of  the 
political  contests  l)etween  the  patricians  of  Rome  and  the 
plebeians ;  in  other  forms  the  same  struggle  marks  the  history  of 
Athens,  and  in  greater  or  less  degree  that  of  all  the  other  cities 
of  Greece. 

'  A  parliament  in  which  every  citizen  has  his  place. 


CHAPTER    III. 

THE    MYTHOLOGY    AND    TRIBAL    LEGENDS    OF    THE    GREEKS. 

Of  all  the  Aryan  nations,  and  therefore,  it  may  be  said,  of  ali 
the  nations  of  the  world,  none  has  amassed  so  rich  and  varied  -a 
store  of  popular  tradition  as  the  Greek.  Into  this  General 
mas^nificent  storehouse  of  his  thoughts  the  Greek  cjiaiactcr  of 
gathered  together  all  that  he  knew,  or  thought  that  my'thical 
he  knew,  of  the  heaven  and  the  earth,  of  day  and  'edition. 
night,  of  fire  and  frost,  of  light  and  darkness,  of  the  bright  and 
the  swarthy  gods,  of  giants  and  nymphs  and  men.  All  were 
there,  endowed  with  life  and  with  all  the  feelings  and  the  passions 
of  men.  But  if  this  rich  harvest  sprung  with  a  random  or  irregu- 
lar growth,  it  was  destined  to  be  garnered  np  not  only  by  the 
greatest  of  epic,  lyric,  and  tragic  poets,  but  by  the  more  systematic 
hands  of  mythographers  who  wove  the  whole  into  a  connected 
history  from  the  awful  confusion  of  Chaos,  the  parent  of  Erebos 
and  Night,  to  the  settlements  of  the  Ilerakleids  in  the  Peloponne- 
sos  and  the  founding  of  every  Hellenic  city.  It  follows  then  that 
this  vast  mass  of  popular  tradition  was  not  all  of  one  kind.  If  in 
portions  it  expressed  the  religious  or  philosophical  thought  of  the 
people,  in  others  there  were  blended  stories  of  tribal  wars  and 
heroic  exploits  which  may  have  had  some  foundation  in  the  world 
of  historical  fact.  But  all  rest  upon  the  same  authority,  and  the 
achievements  of  Ilektor,  Achilleus;  and  Sarpedon  are  as  much  or 
as  little  attested  as  the  terrific  combats  of  Zeus  with  Typhon  and 
the  Titans  or  the  torturing  of  Prometheus  on  the  crao-s  of  Cau- 
casus. 

It  is  enough  to  say  that  for  the  Greek,  as  for  the  Aryan  con- 
querors of  India,  the  whole  world  of  sense  was  alive.  For  him 
the  trees,  the  clouds,  the  waters  were  all  sentient  beings :  Greek  ideas 
the  dawn  and  the  gloaming  were  living  persons,  con-  "fniture. 
nected  with  the  brilliant  god  whose  daily  approach  waked  all  thino-s 
from  slumber  and  whose  departure  left  them  in  darkness  repulsive 
as  that  of  death.  For  him  the  blue  heaven  over  his  head  was  the  liv- 
ing husband  of  the  earth  on  which  he  seemed  to  descend  each  eve- 
ning. He  was  Zeus,  the  glittering  or  shining  god,  whose  bride  Gaia 
or  Ida  was  the  teeming  mother  of  growths  awful  or  lovely,  healthful 
or  deadly  ;  or  he  was  Ouranos,  the  being  who  spreads  his  veil  over 
the  earth  which  he  loves.  For  him  the  sun  was  Helios,  the  in- 
habitant of  a  house  so  dazzling  in  its  splendor  that  no  mortal 
might  look  on  its  glory  and  live  ;  or  he  was  Phoibos  the  lord  of 


14  THE   FORMATION   OF   HELLAS.  [Book  L 

life  who  sprang  into  light  and  strength  in  Delos  or  Ortygia,  the 
land  of  the  morning  ;  or  he  was  Heraklcs  toiling  along  up  the  steep 
path  of  heaven,  laden  with  blessings  for  mankind  ;  or  he  was 
Sisyphos,  the  wise  or  crafty,  doomed  to  roll  daily  to  the  mountain 
summit  the  stone  which  then  rolled  down  again  to  the  abyss  ;  or 
Tantalos  sentenced  to  parch  into  slime  the  waters  from  which  he 
would  drink,  or  to  scorch  the  fruits,  which  were  his  own  children, 
before  the  eyes  of  Zeus,  the  broad  heaven.  For  him  the  corn 
came  up  from  the  living  bosom  of  the  Earth  Mother,  and  the  sum- 
mer was  her  child,  torn  from  her  arms  as  Persephone  each  winter 
and  restored  to  her  at  Eleusis,  the  joyous  trysting  place,  in  the 
spring.  For  him  the  golden  grape  was  ihe  gift  of  the  wine-god 
Dionysos,  the  wonderful  being  who,  gentle  at  his  birth  as  a  babe, 
could  change  himself  into  a  tierce  lion  and  rouse  his  worshippers 
into  irrepressible  frenzy.  But  more  frequently  present  to  his 
thoughts  were  the  bright  inhabitants  of  the  dawn  land, — the 
flashing-eyed  maiden  who  springs  fully  armed  from  the  cloven 
forehead  of  her  sire  and  who  has  her  home  on  the  sunlit  rock  of 
brilliant  and  happy  Athens, — the  queen  of  loveliness  and  grace 
who,  as  Aphrodite,  rises  in  faultless  beauty  from  the  sea  foam, — 
the  rosy -fingered  Eos  who  leaves  the  couch  of  Tithonos  to  gladden 
the  eyes  of  mortal  men, — the  pure  Artemis  whose  sjDcar  never 
misses  her  mark, — the  shortlived  Daphne  who  vanishes  away  be- 
fore the  fiery  breath  of  her  lover, — the  beautiful  Arethousa  who 
plunges  into  the  blue  waters  in  her  flight  from  the  huntsman 
Alpheios, — the  glowing  Charites  who  tend  the  bath  of  Aphrodite 
or  array  in  a  robe  of  spotless  white  the  form  of  the  new-born 
Phoibos, — the  tender  Proki'is  who  dies  loving  and  loved,  because 
earth  has  no  longer  a  place  to  shelter  her  ; — and  over  all  these, 
rather  oppressive  in  lier  greatness  than  winning  in  her  beauty, 
Here  the  majestic  queen  of  heaven,  whom  Ixion  woos  to  his  ruin, 
bringing  on  himself  the  doom  which  l)inds  him  to  his  blazing 
wheel  for  ever  and  ever.  AVith  these  beings  of  the  dawn  land 
came  the  harpi-r  Hermes,  the  babe  who  can  soothe  all  cares  away 
as  he  sings  softly  in  his  cradle,  the  Master-Thief  who,  when  a  few 
hours  old,  steals  the  bright  cattle  of  the  sun-god,  the  mighty  giant 
who  in  liis  rage  can  dasli  the  branches  of  the  forest  together  till 
tliey  burst  into  flame  but  who,  be  he  ever  so  hungry,  cannot  eat 
of  the  fleth  which  the  fire  has  roasted.  For  the  Greek,  lastly, 
Ilepliaistos,  the  youngest  of  the  gods,  limping  from  his  birth,  yet 
terrible  in  his  power,  was  the  lord  of  earthly  fire,  while  the  spotless 
Ilestia  dwelt  in  the  everlasting  flame  which  gleamed  on  the 
sanctuary  of  each  household  hearth.' 

'In  this  briof  summary  I  liav(*    or  n^fiil  beinjrs  wlio  peopled  tbe 
iiiiiiied  a  few  only  of  tlie  beautiful     niytliiral  woild  of  the  Greeks.  Ex- 


Chap.  III.  J  GREEK  TRIBAL  LEGENDS.  15 

All  these  beings  with  a  thousand  others  were  to  the  Greeks 
objects  of  love  or  fear,  of  veneration,  reverence,  or  worship  ;  and 
the  worship  of  some  among;  them  may  be  regarded  as  Religious 
the  very  foundation  of  the  brilliant  social  life  on  tiie  Greek 
which,  in  some  of  its  aspects,  in  spite  of  its  failure  inbes. 
to  waken  the  Greeks  to  a  national  life,  we  still  look  with  undi- 
minished admiration.  In  the  magnificent  gatherings  of  Olympia, 
in  the  contests  of  the  Corinthian  isthmus,  in  the  Nemean  and 
Pythian  games,  the  Hellenic  race  received  an  education,  which, 
regardjd  in  the  light  of  the  purpose  which  it  was  designed  to 
serve,  has  fallen  to  the  lot  of  no  other  people  upon  earth.  Here 
strength  of  body  was  used  not  as  a  means  for  supplying  the 
bloody  and  brutal  pleasures  of  a  Roman  amphitheatre,  but  as  an 
instrument  for  a  systematic  training  which  brought  out  all  its 
powers.  Here  the  painter  and  the  sculptor  could  feed  his  genius 
in  the  study  of  the  most  splendid  of  human  models  ;  and  here  the 
simple  wreath  which  formed  the  prize  of  victory  in  the  games  car- 
ried with  it  a  glory  which  kings  might  envy  and  a  power  which 
struck  terror  into  the  mind  of  the  barbarian.' 

For  working  purposes  then  it  may  be  said  that  the  mythical  or 
popular  beliefs  about  the  gods  and  the  heroes  formed  a  kind  of 
reliction,  which  no  one  felt  it  to  be  to  his  interest,  and   ^ 

P  1     1   •  1  •      1  •  Iiiconsisten- 

perhap.s  none  regarded  it  as  his  duty,  to  gainsay  or  to   cies  and 
weaken.     But  in  no  other  sense  can  we  identify  Hel-   tions^of**^' 
lenic  religion    or  morality  with   Hellenic  mythology.    Greeic 
The    so-called   Hesiodic  poems  give  us  some   of  the   '^^ 
most  repulsive  of  these  legends,  and  string  together  the  loves 
of    Zeus,    his  fight   with  his  father    Kronos,  his  struggles  Avith 
the  giants,  and  his  cheating  of  mankind.     But  when  the    poet 
betakes  himself  to  his  work  as  a  teacher,  we  hear  no  more  of  these 
stories ;  and  we   are  told  simply  that  the  eyes  of  Zeus  are  in 
every  place  beholding  the  evil  and  the  good  ;  that  his  even  justicfi 
requites  every  man  according  to  his  work,  and  that  all  are  bound 
to  avoid  the  smooth  road  to  evil  and  to  choose  the  strait  path 
of  good,  which,  rough  at  first,  becomes  easy  to  those  who  walk 
in  it." 

If,  however,  these  popular  traditions  are  not  to  be  taken  as  em- 
b.)diments  of  either  religious  faith  or  moral  convictions  or  philo- 
sophical thought,   by  the   vast   mass   of  the   Greeks   they  were 

cept  in  its  bearinjr  on  the  intellec-  orijjiii,  I  must  refer  the  reader  to 

tual  and  religious  growth  of  the  IhnMytJiolofiy  of  the  Aryan  Nations 

people,  this  mythology  cannot  be  and  the  I'alfS  of  Ancient  Greece. 

regarded  as  a  part  of  Greek  his-  '  Herod,  viii.  2G. 

tory.  For  the  myths  connected  with  "^  Works  and  Days,  35,  315,  263 

these  gods  and  heroes,  and  their  Myth.  Ar.  Nat.  i.  351. 


16  THE   FORMATION   OF   HELLAS.  [BOOK  L 

unquestionably  received  as  genuine  and  veritable  history.  The 
strongest  sentiment  of  tlie  Hellenic  mind  was  that  of  the  absolute 
Dynastic  independence  of  each  city  from  all  other  cities ;  and 
and  tribal  each  town  had  its  founder  or  heroic  EpoTiymos  whose 
cgen  b.  name  it  bore  and  whose  exploits  shed  a  lustre  on  his 
descendants  for  ever.  The  x\rgives  looked  back  to  the  glorioiis 
days  of  Perseus,  the  child  of  the  golden  shower,  who,  bearing 
the  sword  of  Chrysuur  in  his  hand  and  the  sandals  of  the  Xymphs 
on  his  feet,  journeyed  away  to  the  land  of  the  gloaming  and 
there  by  the  merciful  stroke  of  his  weapon  brought  to  an  end 
the  woes  of  the  mortal  Gorgon.'  The  Theban  legend  told  the 
tale  of  Laios  and  Oidipous  from  the  day  when  the  babe  was 
cast  forth  to  frost  and  heat  on  the  slopes  of  Kithairon  to  the 
hour  when,  after  the  slaughter  of  the  Sphinx  and  his  unwitting 
ofience  against  the  sanctities  of  law,  the  blind  old  man  departed 
on  the  wanderings  which  were  to  end  in  the  holy  grove  of  the 
Erinyes.^  The  Athenian  pointed  proudly  to  a  richer  inheritance. 
He  could  tell  of  the  Dragon-kings  Kekrops  and  Erechtheus  and 
recount  the  sorrows  of  the  gentle  Prokris  and  the  wrongs  done 
to  the  beautiful  Aithra.  He  could  dwell  on  the  glorious  career  of 
the  child  Theseus,  how,  on  reaching  the  vigor  of  full  manhood, 
he  raised  the  great  stone  and,  taking  in  his  hand  the  sword  of 
destiny,  proved,  like  Arthur,  that  he  was  rightwise  born  a  king,' 
how  he  cast  in  his  lot  with  the  doomed  tribute-children,  and 
sailing  to  Krete  trod  the  mazes  of  the  labyrinth  and  smote  the 
horrible  Minotauros.'' 

But  the  mere  naming  of  a  few  such  mythical  stories  can  scarcely 
give  an  idea  of  the  stupendous  fabric  reared  by  later  poets  and 
Greek  tribal  mythographers,  when  they  came  to  cement  together 
legends.  ^}jg  stones  which  they  found  more  or  less  ready  hewn 
to  their  hand.  Not  only  were  there  myths  which  belonged  to 
•particular  families,  clans,  or  cities ;  but  around  these  flowed  the 
stream  of  a  tradition  which  in  a  certain  sense  may  be  called 
national,  and  which  professed  to  furnish  a  continuous  history  in 
the  talcs  of  the  Kalydonian  boar  hunt,  of  the  voyage  of  the 
Argonauts,  of  the  rescuing  of  Helen,  the  returns  of  the  heroes,  the 
banishment  of  the  Herakleidai,  and  their  triumphant  restoration 
to  their  ancient  home.  But  the  fact  on  which  we  have  now  to 
lay  stress  is  that  all  these  stories  were  to  the  several  tribes  or 
cities  genuine  records  of  actual  events,  the  independent  chronicles 
of  kings  and  heroes  whose  fortunes  ran  each  in  its' own  peculiar 
channel ;  and  yet  that,  regarded  as  a  whole,  these  traditions  strictly 

'  ^f^|th.  Ar.  Nat.  ii.  58  et  seq.  die  Af/i's.  Introduction. 

"=  Ih.  ii  08  et  xcq.  *  Myth.  Ar.  Nat.  ii.  61. 

'  Popular  Roinanees  of  the  Mid- 


Chap.  III.]  GREEK  TRIBAL  LEGENDS.  17 

resemble  a  prism  in  which  a  thousand  pictures  flash   from  a  few 
planes  while  all  are  reflected  from  a  single  piece  of  glass.' 

It  is  therefore  no  part  of  the  historian's  task  to  relate  at  length 
the  mythical  tales  which  make  up  the  great  fabric  of  Hellenic 
tradition.  Grains  of  fact  may  lie  buried  in  its  stu-  Historical 
pendous  mass  ;  but  the  means  of  separating  the  fact  oi-eeit" 
from  the  fiction  are  lacking.  It  is,  of  course,  pos-  myths, 
siblc  that  there  may  have  been  a  war  undertaken  to  avenge  the 
wrongs  of  an  earthly  Helen,  that  this  war  lasted  ten  years,  that 
ten  years  more  were  spent  by  the  leaders  in  their  return  home- 
wards, and  even  that  the  chief  incident  in  this  war  was  the 
quarrel  of  the  greatest  of  all  the  heroes  with  a  mean-spirited 
king.  But  for  this  war  we  have  confessedly  no  contemporary 
historical  evidence,  and  it  is  of  the  very  essence  of  the  narra- 
tive, as  given  by  the  poets,  that  Paris,  who  had  deserted  Oinone, 
and  before  whom  the  three  queens  of  the  air  had  appeared  as 
claimants  of  the  golden  apple,  steals  from  Sparta  the  divine  sister 
of  the  Dioskouroi ;  that  the  chiefs  are  summoned  together  for  no 
other  purpose  than  to  avenge  her  woos  and  wrongs  ;  that  the  sea- 
nymph's  son,  the  wielder  of  invincible  weapons  and  the  lord  of 
undying  horses,  goes  to  fight  in  a  quarrel  which  is  not  his  own  ; 
that  his  wrath  is  roused  because  he  is  robbed  of  the  maiden 
Briseis ;  that  henceforth  he  takes  no  part  in  the  strife  until  his 
friend  Patroklos  has  been  slain  ;  and  that  then  he  puts  on  the  new 
armor  which  Thetis  brings  to  him  from  the  anvil  of  Hephaistos 
and  goes  forth  to  win  the  victory.  But  this  is  a  tale  which  we  find 
with  all  its  essential  features  in  every  Aryan  land  :^  and  therefore, 
if  such  a  war  took  place,  it  must  be  carried  back  to  a  time  preced- 
ing the  dispersion  of  the  Aryan  tribes,  and  its  scene  can  be  placed 
neither  in  the  Penjab  (the  land  of  the  Five  Streams),  nor  on  the 
plains  of  the  Asiatic  Troy,  not  in  Germany,  or  Norway,  or  Wales. 
It  has,  therefore,  in  strictness  of  speech,  nothing  to  do  with  Greek 
history.  The  poems  may,  and  undoubtedly  do,  tell  us  much  of  the 
state  of  society  and  law  at  the  time  when  they  took  shape.  The 
pictures  of  Andromache  and  Nausikaa  may  be  fairly  taken  as  proof 
that  the  condition  of  women  in  the  days  of  the  poets  was  inde- 
finitely higher  than  that  of  Athenian  women  in  the  days  of  Peri- 
kles.  The  Boule  or  Council  of  the  chiefs  may  be  regarded  as  the 
germ  of  the  great  assemblies  of  the  future  Athenian  people  ;  and 
in  spite  of  the  manifest  working  of  feudal  tyranny  we  see  in  the 

*  See  fujflier    Myth.    Ar.    Nat.  thology,  and  the  Introductionn  to 

book  i.  cli.  X.  the  Popular  Romances  of  the  Mid- 

^  The  proposition  is  a  sweeping'  die  Ages,  and  the  Tales  of  the  Teu- 

one.      For  the  proof  of  it  I  must  tonic  Lands. 
refer  the  reader  to  my  Aryan  My- 


18  THE  FORMATION  OF  HELLAS.  [Book  I. 

AcLaians  the  forefathers  of  the  conquerors  of  Xerxes.  We  may 
even  allow  that  the  poet  rightly  gives  the  names  of  dynasties  of 
which  he  speaks  as  flourishing  in  his  own  day  ;  but  these  names 
can  give  us  no  knowledge  of  the  deeds  which  may  liave  been  done 
by  those  who  bore  them. 

Pre-eminent  among  the  traditions  for  whicli  a  larger  amount 
of  credibility  has  been  claimed,  stands  the  legend  which  relates  the 
The  return  return  of  the  Herakleidai.  Of  this  event  it  is  enough 
of  the  Hera-   to  sav  that  it  is  the  last  in  the  series  of  movements 

kJgi(1s 

which  balanced  eacli  other  in  the  popular  stories  of 
the  Greeks,  and  that  the  object  of  all  these  movements  is  to 
regain  a  stolen  treasure  or  to  recover  a  lost  inheritance.'  But 
we  cannot  venture  to  say  that  we  have  these  traditions  in  their 
original  form.  They  were  altered,  almost  at  will,  by  later  poets 
and  mythographers  in  accordance  with  local  or  tribal  prejudices 
or  fancies,  and  forced  into  arrangements  wdiich  were  regarded 
as  chronological.  The  story  ran  that  when  Herakles  died,  his 
tyrant  and  tormentor  Eurystheus  insisted  on  the  surrender  of 
his  sons,  and  that  Ilyllos  the  son  of  Deianeira  with  his  brothers 
hastily  fled,  and  after  wandering  to  many  other  places  found  a 
refuge  at  last  in  the  only  city  where  the  children  of  Herakles  could 
be  safe.  Eurystheus  marches  with  his  hosts  against  Athens,  and 
the  Athenians  come  forth  to  meet  him  led  by  Theseus,  the  great 
solar-hero  of  the  land,  who  is  accompanied  by  lolaos,  the  son  of 
Ipli ikies  the  twin  brother  of  Herakles,  as  well  as  by  the  banished 
Hyllos.  Eurystheus  is  slain,  and  Hyllos  carries  his  head  back  to 
Alkmene.  In  other  words,  the  children  of  the  sun  return  to  the 
evening  land  with  the  treasure  which  the  dark  powers  had  carried 
away  to  the  east ;  but  day  and  night  follow  each  the  other,  and 
thus  the  Herakleidai  cannot  maintain  their  footing  in  the  Pelopon- 
nesos  for  more  than  a  year  and  then  by  an  irresistible  necessity 
find  their  way  back  to  Athens.  These  alternations,  which  repre- 
sent simply  the  succession  of  day  and  night,  might  be,  and  would 
have  been,  repeated  any  nuujber  of  times,  if  the  myths  had  not  at 
length  become  mixed  up  with  traditions  of  the  local  settlement  of 
the  country, — in  other  words,  if  certain  names  found  in  the  myths 
had  not  become  associated  with  particular  spots  or  districts  in  the 
Peloponnesos.  To  follow  all  tlie  versions  and  variations  of  these 
legends  is  a  task  not  more  profitable  than  threading  the  mazes  of 
alabyrintli ;  but  we  may  trace  in  many,  probably  in  most  of  them, 
tlie  working  of  the  f-ame  ideas.  Thus  the  version  which  after  the 
death  of  Eurystheus  takes  Hyllos  to  Thebes  makes  liijj  dwell  by 
the  p]lektrian,  or  Amber,  Gates.     The  next  stage  in  the  liistory  is 

^  Myth.  Ar.  Nat.  book  ii.  oh.  iii. 


Chap.  III.]  GREEK  TRIBAL  LEGENDS.  19 

another  homeward  journey  of  the  children  of  Herakles  which  ends 
in  the  slaughter  of  Hyllos  in  single  combat  with  Echemos ;  and 
the  Herakleidai  are  bound  by  compact  to  forego  all  attempts  at 
return  for  fifty  or  a  hundred  years,  periods  which  are  mere  multi- 
ples of  the  ten  years  of  the  Trojan  war  and  of  the  Nostoi  or  home- 
ward wanderings  of  the  Achaian  chiefs.  The  subsequent  fortunes 
of  Kleodaios  and  Aristomachos,  the  son  and  grandson  of  Herakles, 
simply  repeat  those  of  Hyllos  ;  but  at  length  in  the  next  genera- 
tion the  myth  pauses,  and  the  repetition  of  the  whole  drama  is 
prevented  by  the  gradual  awakening  of  the  historical  sense  in  the 
Hellenic  tribes.  For  this  last  return  the  preparations  are  on  a 
scale  whicli  may  remind  us  in  some  degree  of  the  brilliant  gathering 
of  the  Achaian  chieftains  with  their  ships  in  Aulis.  A  fleet  is 
built  at  the  entrance  of  the  Corinthian  gulf,  at  a  spot  which  hence 
bora  the  name  of  Naupaktos,  and  the  three  sons  of  Aristomachos, 
— Aristodemos,  Temenos,  and  Kresphontes, — make  ready  for  the 
last  great  enterprise.  But  Aristodemos  is  smitten  by  lightning 
before  he  can  pass  over  into  the  heritage  of  his  fathers,  and  his 
place  is  taken  by  his  twin  sons  Eurysthenes  and  Prokles,  the  pro- 
genitors of  the  double  line  of  Spartan  kings.  The  sequel  exhibits 
yet  other  points  of  resemblance  to  the  tale  of  the  Trojan  war. 
The  soothsayer  Chryses  reappears  in  the  prophet  Karnos,  whose 
death  by  the  hand  of  Hippotes  answers  to  the  wrong  done  to 
Chryses  by  Agamemnon.  In  either  case  tlie  wrath  of  ApoUon  is 
roused,  and  a  plague  follows.  The  people  die  of  famine,  nor  is  the 
hand  of  the  god  lifted  ofE  them  \intil,  as  for  Chryses,  a  full  atone- 
ment is  made.  Hippotes  is  banished,  and  the  chiefs  are  then  told 
to  take  as  their  guide  the  three-eyed  man  who  is  found  in  the 
Aitolian  Oxylos  who  rides  on  a  one-eyed  horse.  But  as  the  local 
myth  exhibited  Tisamenos  the  son  of  Orestes  as  at  this  time  the 
ruler  of  Peloponnesos,  that  prince  must  be  brought  forward  as  the 
antagonist  of  the  returning  Herakleids.  A  great  battle  follows,  in 
which  he  is  slain,  while,  according  to  one  version,  Pamphylos  and 
Dymas,  the  sons  of  the  Dorian  Aigimios,  fall  on  the  side  of  the  in- 
vaders. With  the  partition  of  the  Peloponnesos  among  the  con- 
querors the  myth  comes  to  an  end.  Argos  falls  to  the  lot  of 
Temenos,  while  Sparta  becomes  the  portion  of  the  sons  of  Aristo- 
demos, and  Messene  that  of  Kresphontes.  A  sacrifice  is  offered  by 
way  of  thanksgiving  by  these  chiefs  on  their  respective  altars  ;  and 
as  they  draw  near  to  complete  the  rite,  on  the  altar  of  Sparta  is 
seen  a  serpent,  on  that  of  Ai'gos  a  toad,  on  that  of  Messene  a  fox. 
The  soothsayers  were,  of  course,  ready  with  their  interpretations. 
The  slow  and  sluggish  toad  denoted  the  dull  and  unenterprising 
disposition  of  the  future  Argive  people  ;  the  serpent  betokened  the 


20  THE  FORMATION  OF  HELLAS.  [Book  L 

terrible  energy  of  the  Spartans  ;  tlie  fox,  the  wiliness  and  cunning 
of  the  Messenians. 

The  legends  which  relate  to  this  so-called  Dorian  Migration 
have  lost  in  great  degree  the  freshness  and  charm  of  the  myths 
Movements  which  gathered  round  the  fairhaired  Helen  and  the 
the  Dorian  ^^i^^  Medcia.  This  poverty  may  arise  from  their 
Migration,  comparative  nearness  to  an  historical  age,  and  from 
the  intermixture  of  real  incidents  on  which  the  floating  myths 
of  earlier  times  had  fastened  themselves.  That  this  may  have 
occurred  again  and  again,  is  matter  less  of  conjecture  than  of 
certainty,  although  the  fact  of  the  intermixture  furnishes  no  ground 
of  hope  for  those  who  think  to  find  history  in  mythology.  Unless 
they  are  known  to  us  from  contemporary  writers,  the  real  events, 
whatever  they  may  have  been,  are  disguised,  distorted,  and  blotted 
out  as  effectually  as  the  stoutest  trees  in  American  forests  are 
killed  by  the  parasitical  plants  which  clamber  up  their  sides. 
Whether  the  eastward  migrations,  which  are  said  to  be  caused 
by  the  return  of  the  Herakleids,  re(jresent  any  real  events,  we 
cannot  tell.  All  that  can  be  said  further  about  these  legends  as 
a  whole  is  that  the  historical  character  of  any  of  the  incidents 
recorded  in  them  can  be  attested  only  by  evidence  distinct  from 
these  myths  ;  and  no  such  evidence  is  forthcoming. 

These  eastward  migrations  which  followed  the  Herakleid  con- 
quests led,  it  is  said,  to  the  founding  of  those  Hellenic  settlements 
Greeksettle-  "^^lii^li  studded  the  western  coasts  of  Asia  Minor,  Avith 
ments  in  the  shorcs  of  the  Hellespont  and  the  Propontis,  and 
which  were  found  even  on  the  banks  of  the  Borys- 
thenes  and  the  Tanais.  These  settlements  are  grouped  under  the 
three  classes  of  Aiolian,  Dorian  and  Ionian  colonies.  Of  these 
colonies  we  shall  speak  more  particularly  hereafter.  It  is  enough 
to  remark  here  that  the  chronology  of  many  of  these  events  is 
given  with  an  assurance  which  might  w  ell  mislead  the  unwary, 
and  that  Thucydides  has  as  little  hesitation  in  assigning  dates  to 
events  following  close  on  the  Trojan  war  or  to  the  successive 
settlements  of  non-Hellenic  and  Hellenic  inhabitants  of  Sicily  as 
to  the  expulsion  of  the  Peisistratidai  from  Athens  or  the  forma- 
tion of  the  confederacy  of  Delos. 


CHAPTER  IT. 

HELLENES    AND    BARBARIANS. 

Long  before  tlie  dawn  of  contemporary  history  a  certain  feeling 
of  kinship  had  sprung  up  among  the  tribes  which  were  in  the 
habit  of  calling  themselves  Greeks,  or  rather  Hellenes,    Growth  of 
and  this  feeling  found  expression  in  customs  and  usages   Hy"™,™,?" 
which  separated  them  from  other  tribes  by  which  they   sentiment. 
were  surrounded.     There  was  first  the  bond  of  a  common  language  ; 
but  this  connexion  was  acknowledged,  uecessarily,  only  in  so  far 
as  one  tribe  understood  the  dialect  of  another,  and  the  frontier 
was  soon   passed  in   an  age  which  regarded  only  the  practical 
uses  of  speech  in  the  common  business  of  life.     All  who  could  not 
be  thus  easily  understood  were  cut  ofE  from  the  great  Hellenic 
society  by  barriers  which  were  supposed  to  be  impassable.     They 
were    speakers    of    barbarous  tongues,  and  belonged,  therefore, 
virtually  to  another  world.     But  these  convictions  rested  on  no 
solid  historical  grounds.     Thus  Herodotos  could  assert,  as  we  shall 
see  more  clearly  hereafter,  that  the  dialects  common  to  the  distant 
towns  of  Plakia  and  Kreston,  settlements  reputed  to  be  Pelasgic, 
proved  that  the  old  Pelasgic  speech  was  barbarous,  that  is,  non- 
Hellenic  ;'  but  he  could  also  maintain  in  a  far  larger  number  of 
passages  that  there  was  no  essential  difference  between  the  Pelasgic 
and  Hellenic  dialects,  and  that  the  Pelasgians  formed  coinmon 
names  from  strictly  Hellenic  roots  by  etymologies  not  always  very 
obvious.     In  short,  it  may  be  safely  said  that,  in  spite  of  one  or 
two  disclaimers,   Pelasgians  and  Hellenes  were  in  his  eyes  one 
and  the  same  people.     Inconsistencies  such  as  these  suffice  of 
themselves  to  show  that  the  ethnological  traditions  of  the  Greek 
tribes  are  not  to  be  trusted,  and  that  the  attempt  to  extract  history 
from  the  genealogies  of  eponymous  heroes  is  a  mere  waste  of  labor. 
All  that  can  be  said,  then,  is  that  long  trains  of  circumstances, 
which  it  would  be  impossible  to  trace  or  to  account  for,  led  cer- 
tain tribes  to  acknowledge  in   some  cases  relationship   The  Hei- 
which   they   repudiated    in   others,  unconscious     that   the^barba- 
their  tests  of   union,  if  logically  applied,  would   carry   "an  world, 
them  far  beyond  the  range  of  the  Hellenic  horizon.     So  far  as 
this  relationship  was  recognised,  a  common  speech  was  regarded 
as  evidence  of  descent  from  a  common  stock.     But  this  evidence 
was  not  admitted  in  many  cases  where  we  see  the  affinity  clearly 
enough  ;  and  thus  to  the  Dorian  or  the  Ionian  a  Roman  was 

'  Herod,  i.  57. 


22  THE  FORMATION   OF  HELLAS.  [Book  I. 

not  much  less  a  barbarian  than  were  the  Phenicians  or  the 
Gauls.  Still,  "as  time  went  on,  the  character  of  many  of  these 
tribes  was  so  far  modified  by  like  influences  as  to  present  features 
^^'llich  sufficiently  distinguished  them  from  other  tribes.  To  the 
Asiatic  generally  the  human  body  was  a  thing  which,  if  he 
had  the  power,  he  might  insult  and  mutilate  at  will,  or  disgrace 
by  unseemly  and  servile  prostrations,  or  offer  up  in  sacrifice  to 
wrathful  and  bloodthirsty  deities.  In  his  eyes  w^oman  was  a 
mere  chattel,  or  instrument  of  hisj)l^ejisures  j  and  while  he  might 
have  about  him  a  multitude  of  wives,  he  might  make  profit  of 
his  children  by  selling  them  into  slavery.  Of  these  abominable 
usages  the  Greek  practically  knew  nothing  ;  and  as  he  would  have 
shrunk  from  the  gouging  out  of  eyes,  the  ripping  up  of  stonuichs, 
and  the  slitting  of  ears  and  noses,  which  Persians  and  English- 
men, it  w^ould  seem,  have  regarded  as  a  duty,  so  he  rejoiced  to 
look  upon  the  vigor  and  beauty  of  the  unclothed  body  which 
carried  to  the  Oriental  a  sense  of  unseemliness  and  shame,  and 
the  exhibition  of  this  form  in  games  uf  strength  and  skill  bec^ne 
through  the~  great  festivals  of  the  separate  or  collected"  tlTbcs 
bound  up  intimately  with  his  religion.  Above  all,  withTiTm  this 
respect  for  the  person  was  accompanied  by  a  moral  self-respect 
Avhich  no  adverse  conditions  could  ever  wholly  extinguish.  The 
Boiotian  oligarch  who  could  oppress  his  serfs  still  refused  to 
submit  to  the  rnie  of  one  absolute  master  ;  and  the  most  powerful 
of  Greek  despots,  though  he  might  be  guarded  by  the  spears  of 
foreign  mercenaries,  still  moved  familiai'ly  among  his  subjects, 
who  would  as  soon  have  thought  of  returning  to  primitive  canni- 
balism as  of  approaching  him  with  the  slavish  adoration  of  Persian 
nobles.  Looking  at  these  points  of  marked  contrast  Avith  the 
nations  of  Asia  whether  Aryan  or  Semitic,  we  may  speak  broadly 
of  a  Greek  national  character  ;  and  this  contrast  Avould,  we  can- 
not doubt,  have  crossed  the  mind  of  every  Athenian  and  Spartan 
on  being  asked  to  what  race  he  belonged. 

This  feeling  of  nationality,  which,  however,  was  never  allowed 
to  intrude  into  the  region  of  politics,  was  sustained  and  strength- 
Religious  ened,  as  we  have  seen,  by  a  common  religion.  The  pri- 
amon|th°^  mitive  hearth  and  altar'  had  been  froni'  the  first  the 
Greek  tribes,  sacred  spot  where  the  members  of  the  family  might 
meet  on  all  occasions  of  festival  ;  and  these  feasts  were  marked 
by  games  which  in  the  course  of  ages  began  to  attract  visitors 
from  other  clans  now  recognised  as  sprung  from  the  same  stock. 
Such  was  the  simple  origin  of  those  splendid  and  solemn  gather- 
ings which  made  the  names  of  Pytho  and  Olympia  famous.  For 
tlieir  preJ^ervation  and  for  the  general  regulation  of  the  festivals 
some  of  the  (Treek  tribes  formed  themselves  into  societies  called 


Chap.   IV.]  HELLENES  AND  BARBARIANS.  23 

Amphiktyoniai,  as  denoting  the  nearness  of  their  abode  to  the 
common  sanctuary.  Of  the  many  societies  thus  formed  some  at- 
tained a  wide  celebrity.  But  there  was  one  which  from  the 
completeness  of  its  organisation  became  so  far  pre-eminent  as  to 
be  styled  expressly  the  Amphiktyonia.  This  was  the  alliance  of 
which  the  representatives  met  at  Delphoi  in  the  spring,  and  in  the 
autumn  at  Tliermopylai.  The  chief  work  of  this  council  was  to 
watch  over  the  safety  and  to  guard  the  interests  of  the  Delphian 
temple  ;  and  the  discharge  of  this  office  sometimes  involved  the 
carrying  on  of  war  against  those  who  were  supposed  to  have 
injured  them.  But  it  is  obvious  that,  unless  this  alliance  rested 
on  a  thorough  national  union,  its  action  or  inaction  would  be  far 
more  mischievous  than  beneficial.  Its  powers  might  be  diverted 
to  promote  the  schemes  of  the  predominant  states,  or  they  might 
be  kept  altogether  in  abeyance,  while  on  the  other  hand  the  plea 
of  defending  the  weaker  members  of  the  Amphiktyonia  might  be 
used  to  justify  the  interference  of  the  Makedonian  kings  in  the 
politics  of  the  Greek  cities.  Under  these  conditions  the  alliance 
was  at  one  time  prominent,  at  another  obscure  ;  but  at  no  time 
did  it  achieve  that  subordination  of  separate  cities  under  a  central 
representative  government,  without  which  nations  cannot  exist. 

The  tribes  composing  this  Amphiktyonia  did  not  include  all 
who  were  intitled  to  be  called  Hellenes  ;  but  the  tribes  which  were 
shut  out  could  make  use  of  the  oracle  at  Delphoi  or  The  great 
contend  in  the  games  at  the  Olympic  and  Pythian  games, 
festivals.  All  Greeks  therefore  were  admitted  to  share  the  large 
intellectual  inheritance  which  placed  them  in  the  front  ranks  of 
mankind.  The  full  influence  of  these  great  gatherings  on  the 
education  of  the  people  at  large  cannot  be  easily  realised  ;  yet, 
as  we  read  the  stirring  strains  of  the  great  Delian  hymn,  we  may 
to  some  extent  understand  the  charm  which  attracted  to  them 
all  that  was  noble  and  generous  tlu'ough  the  wide  range  of  Greek 
society.  But  although  from  Pytho  or  Olympia,  from  Delos  or 
Nemea  or  the  Corinthian  isthmus,  he  return(!d  to  his  home  ennobled 
by  the  stirring  associations  with  which  these  splendid  festivals 
were  surrounded,  he  was  brought  none  the  nearer  to  that  English 
feeling  which  would  regard  as  treason  the  mere  thought  of  war 
between  Birmingham  and  Manchester.  He  felt  a  justifiable  pride 
in  being  a  Hellen  ;  but  he  was  as  far  ^s  ever  from  wishing  to 
merge  the  sovereign  authority  of  his  city  under  a  central  govern- 
ment which  should  check  the  feuds  and  rivalries  of  all  the  Greek 
cities  alike.  In  various  portions  of  Hellas  the  system  of  village 
communities  still  kept  its  ground.  The  Spartan  boasted  that  his 
city  had  not  walls,  and  the  historian  pointed  to  the  four  hamlets 
of  which  it  was  composed,  with  the  remark  that  the  ruins  of 


24  THE  FORMATION    OF   HELLAS.  [Book  i. 

Sparta  would  never  tell  tlic  tale  of  its  ancient  greatness/  This 
life  of  villages  was  kept  up  not  merely  throughout  Epeiros,  where 
it  has  continued  to  our  own  day,  but  in  Arkadia,  Achaia,  and  Elis. 
Tliis  great  Hellenic  aggregate,  in  one  sense  a  nation,  in  another 
a  mere  fortuitous  combination  of  isolated  and  centrifugal  atoms, 
Greek  must  be  accepted  as  the  starting  point  of  our  history.  Of 

ethnology,  ^jjg  changes  which  preceded  the  advent  or  growth  of  this 
Hellenic  people  we  know  nothing.  The  record  of  them  was  never 
made,  or  it  has  been  lost  irretrievablj^  It  would,  in  truth,  be  easy 
to  fill  a  volume  with  speculations  on  the  origin  and  the  early  move- 
ments of  these  several  tribes  :  but  history  is  not  a  legitimate  field  for 
speculation,  and  the  result  of  such  speculation  must  be  a  pretence 
of  knowledge  in  place  of  the  reality.  In  any  attcm{)ts  of  this  kind 
we  can  but  take  their  traditions  ;  and  these  traditions  betray  not 
merely  complete  ignorance,  but  the  fixed  idea  that  they  might 
be  moulded  at  will  to  suit  the  sentiment  of  each  tribe,  of  which 
indeed  they  were  only  the  expression. 

There  are,  however,  other  sources  from  which  we  may  obtain 
sure  historical  results  and  from  which  we  may  be  justified  in 
Evidence  drawing  important  inferences.  Of  these  the  most 
phica?^*  trustworthy  is  hmguage.  From  the  speech  of  Greeks 
names.  and    Romans,     Teutons  and   Hindus,    we  infer  with 

certainty  not  merely  their  connnon  origin  from  a  single  home,  but 
their  mode  of  life,  and  the  stage  which  they  reached  in  civilisa- 
tion, science,  and  law.  From  identical  geographical  names, 
however  widely  separated  may  be  the  regions  in  which  we  find 
them,  we  infer  that  they  have  been  given  by  the  same  or  nearly  cog- 
nate tribes,  and  thus  we  assert  that  Keltic  races  have  dwelt  on  the 
banks  of  the  Don  and  the  Danube,  of  the  Teign  and  theTjiie,  the 
Tagus,  the  Tavy,  and  the  Tay,  of  the  Neda  and  the  Nith,  the  Euenos 
and  the  Avon,  the  Kebren  and  the  Severn,  the  Dart  and  the  Douro, 
the  Durance  and  the  Derwent,  while  their  kinsmen  have  sojourned 
on  those  of  the  Axios  and  the  Acheloos,  the  Exe  and  the  Esk. 

Confining  ourselves  within  these  limits,  we  may  yet  form  a 
clear  idea  of  the  actual  condition  of  the  several  countries  collec- 
Earlycon-  tively  regarded  as  Hellas,  at  a  time  when  history  was 
ditionof  in  its  dawn.  The  statement  of  Thucydides^  that  the 
icssay.  Spartan  colony  of  Ilerakleia  in  Trachis,  founded  early 
in  the  Peloponnesian  w;^-,  was  })lanted  on  Thessalian  ground 
proves  the  fact  of  Thessalian  supremacy  from  Thermojjylai  to  the 
pass  of  Tempe,  while  the  wall  built  by  the  Phokians  to  bar  the 
pass  at  Pylai^  may  be  taken  as  evidence  that  long  before  the  Persian 
war  the  Thessalians  threatened  to  make  further  conquests  to  the 

'  Time.  i.  10.  -■  iii.  92,  93.  '  Herod,  rii.  21.'>. 


Chap.  IV.]  HELLENES  AND   BARBARIANS. 


25 


south.  But  in  this  region  were  found  Magnesians  to  the  east, 
Achaians  and  Malians  on  the  south,  and  Dolopes  in  the  western 
higlilands  of  Pindos  andTymphrestos.  Whatever  may  have  been 
the  precise  affinities  of  these  tribes  with  each  other  or  Avith  the 
ThessaUans,  they  were  certainly  in  a  state  of  more  or  less  depen- 
dence on  the  latter,  who  were  lords  of  the  rich  plains  watered  by 
the  Peneios  and  studded  with  cities,  among  which  Pherai  and 
Pharsalos,  Krannon  and  Larissa  are  historically  the  most  promi- 
nent. In  these  towns  dwelt  a  nobility  who,  drawing  their  revenues 
from  tlie  rich  lands  round  about,  spent  their  time  in  feuds  and 
feasting  and  the  management  of  their  splendid  breed  of  horses.  Of 
the  origin  of  that  third  class  of  the  Thcssalian  population,  which, 
as  contrasted  with  the  subject  tribes  already  named,  was  known 
by  the  title  Penestai,  or  working  men,  we  can  say  little.  That 
these  Avere  earlier  inhabitants  reduced  to  serfdom,  there  is  perhaps 
little  doubt ;  but  whether  they  were,  as  some  said,  Perrhaibians 
and  Magnetes,  or  Pelasgians,  or,  as  some  would  have  it,  Boiolians 
driven  from  the  territory  of  Arno,  it  is  impossible  to  determine.' 
The  legends  which  brought  them  from  the  south  of  the  lake 
Kopais  are  contradicted  by  others  which  reverse  the  process. 
From  the  turbulent  oligarchs,  of  whom  the  Skopadai  of  Krannon 
and  the  Aleuadai  of  Larissa  may  be  taken  as  fair  specimens,  not 
mucli  unity  of  action  was  to  be  expected.  The  Thessalian  Tagos 
answered  to  the  Dictator  chosen,  like  Lars  Porsena,  to  head  the 
Etruscan  clans  ;  but  fierce  feuds  often  made  the  election  of  a  Tagos 
impossible,  and  even  in  the  Peluponnesian  war  not  all  the  Thes- 
salian cities  sent  their  forces  to  aid  their  ancient  Athenian  allies." 
To  the  south  of  the  rich  and  beautiful  valley  of  the  Spercheios, 
bounded  by  the  luxuriant  slopes  of  Othrys  to  the  north  and  the 
more  barren  range  of  Oita  to  the  south,  dwelt  the  The  Lok- 
Lokrians,  Dorians,  and  Phokians,  of  whom  it  cannot  rjans',  ami 
be  said  that  we  possess  any  continuous  history.  Sep-  Phokians. 
arated  by  the  territory  of  Daphnous,  a  small  corner  of  ground 
to  the  north  of  mount  Knemis  which  gave  to  the  Phokians 
their  only  access  to  the  Euboian  Sea,  lay  the  lands  of  the  Epi- 
knemidian  Lokrians  to  the  west,  and  of  the  Lokrians  of  Opous 
to  the  east.  With  these  sections  of  the  Lokrian  name  must  be 
taken  another  isolated  portion  of  the  same  race  inhabiting  tlio 
I  corner  of  land  which  ran  up  north  ward  j  from  the  Corinthian  gulf 
between  Aitolia  and  Phokis,  and  also  the  town  of  the  Epizephyrian 
Lokrians  at  the  southern  extremity  of  the  Italian  peninsula. 
These  Lokrians  were  regarded  as  Hellenes  ;  but  their  name  seems 
to  point  to  an  affinity  with  the  Ligurians  ofthegulf  of  Genoa  and 

Grote,  Hist.  Gr.  ii.  375.  =  Thuc.  ii.  23. 


26  THE  FORMATION  OF  HELLAS.  [Book  I. 

the  Lloegry  of  Britain  and  Gaul.  To  the  south  of  mount  Knemis 
lay  the  Phokian  plain  of  the  Kephisos,  which,  flowing  from  Par- 
Jiassos,  receives  the  stream  of  the  Euenos  near  the  town  of  Elateia 
and  runs  into  the  lake  Kopais  near  the  Boiotian  Orchomenos. 

To  the  west  of  the  Ozolian  Lokrians  and  of  the  little  state  of 
Doris  lay  the  fastnesses  of  mountain  tribes,  some  of  which  were 
The  Aito-  allowed  to  be  Hellenes  while  to  others  the  title  was 
Aktuna-^  refused, — on  what  grounds,  it  would  perhaps  be  not 
uiaus.  easy  to  determine.     Probably  both  in  their  language 

and  their  usages  the  Aitolians  and  Akarnanians  were  as  much  or 
as  little  entitled  to  be  regarded  as  Greeks  as  were  the  Agraians 
and  Amphilochians  of  the  Ambrakian  gulf,  who  were  classed 
among  barbarians.' 

With  these  rude  and  savage  clans  the  comparatively  orderly 
people  of  Doris  and  Phokis  stand  out  in  marked  contrast;  but  in 
The  Boiotian  historical  importance  all  these  are  far  surpassed  by  the 
coufedeiacy.  Boiotiaus,  whose  theory  even  from  prehistoric  times 
seems  to  have  been  that  the  whole  country  stretching  from  Chai- 
roneia  and  Orchomenos  to  the  Euboian  sea  and  from  the  lands  of 
the  Opountain  Lokrians  to  the  Corinthian  gulf  was  the  inalienable 
possession  of  the  Boiotian  confederacy.  Whether  this  confederacy 
was  coeval  with  the  greatness  of  Orchomenos,  we  cannot  say  ;  but 
certain  it  is  that  Orchomenos  was  the  seat  of  a  powerful  people  at 
a  time  when  Mykenai  and  Tiryns  stood  foremost  among  the  cities 
in  the  Peloponnesos.  The  huge  works  by  which  the  imperfect 
drainage  of  the  lake  Kopais  through  the  natural  Katabothra  was 
rendered  complete  point  to  a  government  as  stable  as  that  which 
produced  the  Cloacae  of  Rome.  But  before  the  dawn  of  the 
historic  ages  the  greatness  of  Orchomenos  had  passed  away,  and 
Thebes  becomes  the  leader  of  the  confederacy,  from  which  by  the 
aid  or  the  connivance  of  Sparta  Plataiai  seceded  to  form  its 
splendid  but  disastrous  alliance  with  Athens. 

If  from  these  communities  to  the  north  of  the  Corinthian  gulf 
Ancient  ^^^  ^"^'"  ^^  ^^^^  Peloponncsos  at  the  beginning  of  the 

supremacy  genuine  historical  age,  we  find  that  the  preponderant 
°  ^^'^^'  state  is  Sparta.  Iler  territory  includes  nearly  half  the 
peninsula  in  a  line  extending  from  Thyrea  on  the  east  to  the 
mouth  of  the  Neda  on  the  west.  She  has  thus  swallowed  up  all 
Messuno,  and  no  small  portion  of  land  which,  as  the  tradition 
asserts,  had  once  been  under  the  dominion  of  Argos,  There  had, 
indeed,  been  a  time  in  which  the  same  Argos  had  devoted  not  mere- 
ly the  city  which  held  aloof  from  the  struggle  w  ith  Xerxes,  but  the 

■  Yet    these    Agraians  are   in     the   common   designation   of   the 
name  simply  the  (iniioi  orGraikoi,     Hellenic  tribes, 
whose  name  the  Latins  adopted  as 


Chap.  IV.]  HELLENES  AND  BARBARIANS.  27 

wliole  of  the  Peloponnesos  and  many  a  district  lyino-  Leyond  ita 
limits  ;  and  therefore  the  town  of  Arg-os  was  already  shrank  when 
she  was  deprived  of  that  long  strip  of  land  which,  stretching;  from 
Tliyrea  to  Cape  Malea,  is  cat  off,  like  Magnesia,  hy  the  mountain 
range  of  Thornax  and  Zarex  from  the  lands  which  lie  to  the  west. 
This  ancient  supremacy  of  Argos  may  be  indicated  in  the  myth 
Avhicli  in  the  Ilcrakleid  conquest  assigns  the  northeastern  portion 
of  the  peninsula  as  the  prize  of  Temenos  the  eldest  smn-iving  son 
of  Aristomachos;  and  thus  the  Dorian  conquerors  Avould  become 
inheritors  of  her  ancient  greatness. 

Here,  as  in  the  Hellenic  lands  to  the  north  of  the  Corinthian 
isthmus,  we  must  content  ourselves  with  that  grouping  of  states 
which  is  revealed  to  us  at  the  dawn  of  the  historical  j,^^  Eieians 
ages  ;  and  this  grouping  in  the  Peloponnesos  exhibits  and  tiie 
Dorians  as  possessing  the  whole  peninsula  with  the 
exception  of  that  portion  to  the  northwest  which  included  the 
lands  of  the  Triphylians,  Pisatans,  Eieians,  Achaians,  and  Arka- 
dians.  The  Tri{)hylians,  separated  from  the  Dorian  .states  by  the 
river  Xeda,  fell,  it  was  said,  like  the  men  of  Pisa,  mider  the  yoke 
of  the  Eieians,  later  immigrants  from  Aitolia,  while  the  Achaians 
retained  in  their  dodekapolis  some  fragments  of  the  ancient  in 
heritance  won  from  lonians  whom  they  had  driven  from  their 
homes.'  It  is  of  more  importance  to  remark  that  the  tribes  who 
occupied  the  central  highlands  of  the  Peloponnesos  exhibit,  at 
the  time  when  we  first  become  historically  acquainted  with  them, 
social  conditions  much  resembling  those  of  the  highland  tribes 
■*■<)  the  north  of  the  Corinthian  gulf.  Girt  in  Avithin  the  mighty 
ranges  of  Kyllenc  and  Erymanthos  to  the  north,  of  Pholos  to 
the  northwest,  of  the  Maiualian  and  Parthenian  hills  to  the  south- 
east, this  bare  and  rugged  region  furnishedahome  to  village  com- 
munities ordered  after  the  primitiAC  Aryan  model. 

But  if  Arkadia  could  boast  of  no  beautiful  or  magnificent  cities, 
it  was  rich  in  its  wealth  of  popular  traditions.  The  birth-place  of 
Hermes  Avas  in  the  Kyllenian  hill,  and  here  lay  the  cradle  to  which 
the  child  returned  Avhen  wearied  with  his  Avork  of  destruction. 
Among  these  same  hills,  near  the  town  of  Xonakris,  flowed  the 
awful  stream  of  Styx,  the  Avater  which  imparted  a  deadly  sanction 
to  the  oaths  of  those  who  swore  by  it,  Avhile  far  away  on  the 
Lykaian  heights  rose  the  town  Avhich  the  simple  faith  of  the  people 
maintained  to  be  the  most  ancient  of  all  cities  and  the  first  Avhich 
Helios  (the  sun)  had  ever  beheld.  Here,  as  they  Avould  have  it, 
Zeus  had  been  nourished  by  the  nymphs  Theisoa,  Neda,  and 
Hagno  ;  and  here  in  Kretea,  and  not  in  the  Egean  island,  Avas  the 

■■  Herod,  vili.  73. 


28  THE  FORMATION   OF  HELLAS.  [Book  L 

mighty  son  of  Kronos  born.  Half  conscious  that  he  was  but  say- 
ing in  other  wuids  tliat  the  blue  heaven  is  seen  first  in  the  morn- 
ing against  tlie  bright  mountain-tops  on  -which  the  sun's  rays  rest 
before  they  liglit  up  the  regions  beneath,  llie  Arkadian,  localising 
in  his  Lykaian  Tenienos  the  old  faith  that  uo  man  might  look  on 
the  face  of  Zens  and  Uve,  averred  not  <r»iily  that  all  living  things 
vk'hich  might  enter  it  would  die  within  the  year,  but  that  uot  a 
single  object  within  it  ever  cast  a  shadow.' 

Lastly,  to  the  west  of  the  great  Jiiountain-chain  of  Taygetos 
which  runs  down  to  Tainaroii  the  southernmost  cape  of  tlie  penin- 
ThcMes-  sula,  lay  the  richest  land  to  the  Avest  and  south,  of  the 
senians.  Corinthian  isthmus,  the  plains  of  Stcnyklaros  and  Ma- 
kaiia,  watered  by  the  Bias  and  the  Pamisos.  This  fertile  Mes- 
ser.lan  land  (for  uo  city  called  Messt'ue  existed  in  the  days  of 
Herodotos)  must  once  have  been  independent  both  of  Argos  and 
of  Sparta,  if  there  be  the  least  foundation  for  the  belief  that  it 
was  assigned  as  the  ])ortion  of  the  Herakleid  Kresphontes. 

Whatever  may  have  been  the  origin  of  the  Messeniau  state, 
certain  it  is  that  its  fortunes  were  precisely  opposed  to  those  of  the 
rpj^g  half  savage  hamlets  which  together  formed  the  city  of 

Spartans.  Sparta.  Messene  after  a  long  and  desperate  struggle 
went  down  before  her  austere  rival  ;  Sparta,  having  extended  her 
borders  to  the  Western  and  Eastern  seas,  became  not  merely  the 
head  of  the  Dorian  tribes,  but  a  power  which  luade  itself  felt 
throughout  all  Hellas,  and  in  some  sort  succeeded  in  inforcing  a 
common  law.  Distinguished  from  all  other  states  by  the  rigidity 
of  its  system  and  the  peculiarity  of  its  institutions,  it  has,  perhaps 
from  the  mere  fact  of  its  prominence,  come  to  be  regarded  as  the 
type  and  model  of  a  Doric  state,  and  as  exhibiting  in  their  logical 
completeness  the  general  principles  of  that  which,  in  the  absence 
of  a  national  Hellenic  sentiment,  must  be  termed  Dorism.  This 
reputation  is  altogether  undeserved,  and  probably  would  have  l)een 
thoroughly  distasteful  to  the  companions  of  Leonidas  or  Archi- 
dainos.  In  her  chief  characteristics  Sj)aita  stood  alone.  Neither 
in  Argos  nor  in  Corinth  nor  even  in  Krete  from  which  she  was 
supposed  to  have  derived  her  special  institutions,  do  we  find  that 
military  and  monastic  system  which  converted  Sparta  into  an  in- 
campment  of  crusading  knights,  and  waged  an  impartial  war  not 
only  against  luxury  but  generally  against  art,  refinement,  and 
speculation.  This  lack  of  sympathy  with  the  general  Hellenic 
mind  was  shown   in  her  whole   polity  ;  and  this  itolity,  it  was 

'  The  clia])ter  in  which  Pausa-  of  Greek  literature  in  its  bearing 

niaa  (viii.  38,  1)  describes  the  phe-  on  the  niythopoeic  stage  of  Aryan 

nomena  of  Lykosonra  is  one  of  tlie  civilisation.  Myth.  Av.  Nat.  i-  iJGS. 
most  important  in  tiie  wbole  ranjjo 


Chap.  IV.]  HELLENES  AND  BARBARIANS.  29 

believed,  was  brought  into  permanent  shape  by  the  legislation  of 
Lykourgos. 

The  historian  who  lived  nearest  to  the  alleged  time  of  the  great 
Spartan  lawgiver  is  Ilerodotos  ;  and  the  account  which  he  gives 
is  briefly  this, — that  Lykourgos  became  guardian  of 
his  nephew  the  young  king  Leobotas  or  Labotas,  while  ^ 
Sparta  Avas  still  utterly  disorganised  and  unruly  ;  that,  resolving 
to  put  an  end  to  this  shameful  anarchy,  he  went  to  Krete,  and 
thence  returned  to  change  all  Spartan  manners  and  customs  ;  that 
when  afterwards  he  visited  Delphoi,  the  priestess,  although  she 
confessed  some  hesitation,  ranked  him  among  gods  rather  than 
among  men,  and  that  after  his  death  the  Spartans  built  a  temple 
in  his  lioiior  and  speedily  became  the  orderly  and  mighty  people 
which  he  wished  to  make  them.^  He  adds  that,  although  this 
was  the  Spartan  tradition,  yet  many  maintained  that  he  owed  to 
the  Pythia  at  Delphoi  the  remedies  which  he  applied  with  so  much 
success  to  the  maladies  of  his  countrymen  ;  and  all  that  we  need 
remark  here  is  that  Labotas  according  to  the  popular  chronology 
began  to  reign  perhaps  half  a  millennium  before  the  birth  of  the 
historian.  According  to  Herodotos,  the  Spartan  tradition  made 
Lykourgos  the  guardian  of  Labotas,  of  the  Agiad  or  Eurysthenid 
line  of  kings  ;  but  the  writers  whom  Plutarch  followed  would 
have  it  that  the  child  intrusted  to  him  was  not  Labotas  but  Cha- 
rilaos,  of  the  Prokleid  or  Eurypontid  house,  and  that  Lykour- 
gos, having  been  appointed  regent  on  the  death  of  his  brother 
Polydektes,  had  rejected  the  proposals  of  his  widow  who  wished 
him  to  marry  her  and  make  himself  king.  According  to  this 
version  the  love  of  the  widow  was  thus  turned  to  hate,  and  the 
charge  which  she  brought  against  him,  of  seeking  the  life  of  the 
babe  whom  he  had  presented  to  the  Spartans  as  their  king,  drove 
him  into  exile.  Going  first  to  Krete,  he  there  found  in  working 
order  the  institutions  which  he  transferred  to  Sparta,  and  thence 
wandered  on  to  Ionia,  Egypt,  Libya,  Iberia,  and  India,  obtaining 
in  the  first  of  these  countries  a  copy  of  the  Homeric  poems  which 
with  his  laws  he  was  the  first  to  introduce  into  Peloponncsos. 
The  framers  of  this  narrative  had  heard  of  his  visit  to  Delphoi, 
and  it  was  their  business  to  find  a  reason  for  his  going.  This  rea- 
son was  the  appalling  confusion  which  astonished  him  on  his  re- 
turn to  Sparta  and  drove  him  to  take  counsel  with  the  Delphian  god. 
In  short,  of  Lykourgos,  of  his  life,  and  of  his  works  we  know 
absolutely  nothing.  To  us  he  is  a  mere  phantom  ;  and  so  unsub- 
stantial did  his  form  appear  to  Timaios  and  to  Cicero  Mythical 
that  they  made  two  Lykourgoi,  and  simplified  matters  lawgivers. 
by  assigning  to  the  one  all  deeds  and  schemes  which  would  not 
'  Herod,  i.  65. 


30  THE  FORMATION  OP'  HELLAS.  [Book  L 

suit  the  other.  The  mythical  Lykourgos  is  not,  hke  the  mythical 
Solon,  a  person  for  whose  historical  existence  we  have  contempo- 
rary docimients  and  of  whose  constitutional  changes  we  have  ac- 
counts on  the  whole  adequately  attested  ;  but  he  is  one  around 
whom  the  mists  of  oral  tradition  have  gathered  as  they  have 
gathered  round  Karl  the  Great  and  Uruodland,  the  Roland  of 
Roncesvalles.  Solon  lives  and  dies  among  men,  of  whom  we  have 
at  least  some  historical  knowledge.  Lykourgos  is  removed  from 
the  period  of  genuine  history  by  a  gulf  of  centuries,  and  he  belongs 
to  the  ages  in  which  Mann,  like  Prometheus,  Hermes,  and  Phoro- 
neus,  bestows  on  his  kinsfolk  that  boon  of  fire  without  which  they 
would  never  have  attained  to  social  order  and  Jaw.'  We  nuist 
therefore  content  ourselves  with  such  knowledge  of  the  early  con. 
dition  of  Sparta  as  may  be  furnished  by  statements  relating  to  the 
working  of  the  Spartan  constitution  at  a  time  which  may  be  said 
to  mark  the  dawn  of  contemporary  history. 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE    CONSTITUTION    AND    EARLY    HISTORY    OF    SPARTA. 

The  Spartans  in  relation  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  country  gene- 
rally formed  strictly  an  army  of  occupation  ;  and  their  whole 
The  Spartan  Polity  may  be  said  to  be  founded  on  the  discipline  of 
t^''F"h'''  such  an  army.  In  its  earlier  stages  the  Spartan  cou- 
aiid  the  '  stitutiou,  according  to  the  accounts  given  of  it,  much 
Kings.  resembled  the  constitution  of  the  Achaians  as  described 

in  the  Iliad.  E.xternally,  then,  the  Spartans  occupied  a  position 
closely  analogous  to  that  of  William  the  Conqueror  and  his  Xoi*- 
mans  in  England  ;  internally  they  were  governed  by  a  close 
oligarchy.  But  the  Spartan  constitution  differed  from  tliat  of 
the  Achaians  in  its  peculiar  feature  of  two  co-ordinate  kings,  both 
Ilerakleids,  and  referred  by  way  of  explanation  to  the  twin  sons 
of  Aristodemos.  The  power  of  the  kings,  Avhatevcr  it  may  have 
been  (and  it  certainly  had  been  far  greater  than  that  wliich  they 
retained  in  the  time  of  llerodotos),  is  said  to  have  received  some 
limitations  from  Lykourgos  to  whom  the  Spaitans  attri])uted  the 
establishment  of  the  Cierousia,  or  senate  of  twenty -eight  old  men 
(the  whole  number  of  the  assembly  being  thirty,  as  the  kings 
sat  and  voted   with  them),   and  also   of  the  periodical   popular 

'  Myth.  Ar.  Nnt.  ii.  19L 


Chap.  V.]  EARLY  HISTORY  OF  SPARTA.  31 

assemblies  which  were  lield  in  the  open  air.  In  these  meetings 
tlie  2")eople  were  not  allowed  to  discuss  any  measures,  their  func- 
tions being  bounded  to  tlie  acceptance  or  the  rejection  of  the 
previous  resohitions  of  the  Gerousia.  To  this  earlier  constitution, 
according  to  Plutarch,  two  checks  were  added  a  century  later  in 
the  reigns  of  the  kings  Polydoros  and  Tlieopompos,  the  first  be- 
ing the  provision  that  the  senate  with  the  kings  should  have  the 
power  of  reversing  any  'crooked  decisions'  of  the  people,  and 
the  second  the  institution  of  a  new  executive  board  of  live  men 
called  Ephoroi  (overseers),  who  acquired,  if  they  did  not  at  the 
first  receive,  powers  which  in  the  issue  became  paramount  in  the 
state.  By  the  oath  interchanged  every  month,  the  kings  swore 
that  they  would  exercise  their  functions  according  to  the  established 
laws,  while  the  ephors  undertook  on  that  condition  to  maintain 
their  authority.  This  oath  could  have  been  instituted  only  at  a 
time  when  the  kings  still  possessed  some  independent  power  ;  it 
was  retained  long  after  the  period  when  their  authority  became « 
almost  nominal  as  compared  with  that  of  the  ephors. 

When  we  reach  the  times  of  contemporary  historians,  we  find 
the  population  of  the  Spartan  territories  marked  ofi  into  three 
classes,   the  Spartiatai  or  full  citzens,  the  Perioikoi,   T)jg  ^p^j._ 
and  the  Helots.  The  distinctions  between  these  classes   tiatai,  the 

rT>    •        I        1  1         •  •  -11       Perioikoi, 

severally  are  suinciently  clear  ;  but  it  seems  impossible  and  the 
to  attain  any  certainty  as  to  the  mode  in  v/hich  they  Helots, 
grew  up.  In  the  age  of  Herodotos  no  distinction  of  race  existed 
between  the  full  Spartan  citizens  and  the  Perioikoi,  while  a  large 
proportion  of  the  Ilelots  was  also  Dorian,  if  the  fact  that  they 
were  conquered  Messenians  gave  them  a  claim  to  that  title.  We 
are  therefore  left  to  mere  guesswork,  when  we  seek  for  the  reason 
why  the  Dorians  (f  outlying  districts  did  not  share  the  privileges 
of  the  Spartans,  and  why  certain  other  Dorians,  with  other  inhabit- 
ants whose  very  name  of  Helots  we  cannot  account  for,  should 
have  been  reduced  to  the  condition  of  villenage.  The  Dorian  con- 
quest of  the  Peloponnesos  is  shrouded  in  the  mists  of  popular  tra- 
dition ;  and  when  we  reach  the  historical  ages,  we  can  but  accept 
facts  as  we  find  them.  These  facts  exhibit  to  us  an  oligarchical 
body  filling  towards  the  other  inhabitants  the  relation  of  feudal 
lords  to  their  dependents,  supported,  like  the  Thessalian  nobility, 
entirely  from  their  lands,  and  regarding  all  labor,  whether  agri- 
cultural or  mechanical,  as  derogatory  to  their  dignity.  In  their 
relations  with  one  another,  these  lords  were  the  soldiers  of  an  army 
of  occupation  and  subjected,  as  such,  to  a  severe  military  disci- 
pUne.  In  fact,  they  retained  their  citizenship  only  on  condition 
of  submitting  to  this  discipline  and  of  paying  their  quota  to  the 
Syssitia  or  public  messes,  which  supplied  the  place  of  home  life  to 


'32  THE  FORMATION   OF  HELLAS.  [Book  L 

the  Spartans.  Failure  in  eitlier  of  these  duties  intailed  disfran- 
chisement: and  it  may  be  readily  supposed  that  the  nmltipli cation 
of  families  too  proud  to  labor,  and  even  forbidden  to  labor,  had 
its  necessary  result  in  producing  a  class  of  men  who  had  lost  their 
franchise  merely  from  inability  to  contribute  to  these  public  messes. 
These  disfranchised  citizens  came  to  be  known  by  the  name  Hypo- 
meiones  or  Inferiors,  and  answered  closely  to  the  '  mean  whites ' 
of  the  late  slave-holding  states  of  the  American  union.  The  full 
.  citizens  were  distinguished  by  the  title  of  Ilomoioi,  or  Peers. 

Thus  while  the  oligarchic  body  of  governing  citizens  Avas  per- 
petually throwing  ofE  a  number  of  landless  and  moneyless  men, 
Gradual  im-  the  condition  of  the  Perioikoi  and  even  that  of  the 
provement     Helots  was  by  comparison  gradually  improving.     The 

in  tnc  condi-  */  i.  o  *>  i  o 

tion  of  the  former  carried  on  the  various  trades  on  which  the 
and  the^^  Spartan  looked  witli  profound  scorn  ;  the  latter,  as 
Helots.  cultivators  of  the  soil,  lost  nothing  by  the  increase  of 

I  their  numbers,  while  they  differed  altogether  from  the  slaves  of 
Athens  or  Thebes  as  being  strictly  '  adscripti  gleba?,'  and  not  liable 
to  be  sold  out  of  the  country,  or  perhaps  even  to  be  sold  at  all. 

Such  a  polity  was  not  one  to  justify  any  great  feeling  of  security 
on  the  part  of  the  rulers.  We  find  accordingly  that  the  Spartan 
TheKryp-  government  looked  with  constant  anxiety  to  the  classes 
tela.  which  it  regarded  with   an   instinctive   dread.      The 

ephors  could  put  Perioikoi  to  death  without  trial  ;  crowds  of 
Helots  sometimes  disappeared  for  ever  when  their  lives  seemed  to 
portend  danger  for  the  supremacy  of  the  dominant  class  ;  and  the 
Krypteia  (even  if  we  reject  the  idea  of  deliberate  annual  massacres 
of  the  Helots)  was  yet  a  police  institution  by  which  young  citizens 
were  employed  to  carry  out  a  system  of  espionage  through  the 
whole  of  Lakonia.  But  with  all  its  faults  the  Spartan  constitu- 
tion fairly  answered  its  purpose,  and  challenged  the  respect  of  the 
Hellenic  world.  In  the  belief  of  Herodotos  and  Thucydides  Sparta, 
in  times  ancient  even  in  their  day,  had  been  among  the  most  dis- 
orderly of  states  ;  but  since  the  reforms  of  Lykourgos  none  had 
been  better  governed  or  more  free  from  faction.  The  fixity  of  their 
political  ideas  or  sentiments  won  for  them  the  esteem  of  their  fel- 
low-Hellenes, among  whom  changes  were  fast  and  frequent,  while 
this  esteem  in  its  turn  fed  the  pride  of  the  Spartans  and  inspired 
them  with  a  temper  as  self-satisfied  as  that  of  the  iidiabitants  of 
the  Celestial  Empire,  and  even  more  arrogant  and  exclusive. 

The  empire  of  Sparta  was  extended  to  the  western  sea  by  the 
The  Mc8-  result  of  two  wars  with  the  Messenians,  the  second  of 
Bcnian  which  ended  in  their  utter  ruin.     Of  these   wars  we 

^^""'  have  some  scanty  knowledge  from  the  fragments  which 

remain  of  the  elegies  of  Tyrtaios.     This  poet  wlio  belonged  to 


Chap.  V.]  EARLY  HISTORY  OF  SPARTA.  33 

the  Attic  deme  of  Aphidnai  was  for  the  Spartans  in  tlie  later  war 
wliat  Solon  was  to  the  Athenians  in  the  struggle  for  Salamis. 
Fi'om  him  we  learn  that  the  two  contests  were  separated  by  an 
interval  of  two  generations.  The  fathers  of  our  fathers,  he  said, 
conquered  the  Messenians  ;  but  this  first  conquest,  he  tells  us,  was 
acliieved  at  the  cost  of  a  war  which  lasted  for  twenty  years  and  in 
which  the  most  eminent  of  the  Spartan  warriors  was  the  king 
Theopompos.  The  second  war  he  describes  as  not  less  obstinate 
and  dangerous  for  Sparta,  against  which  the  Messenians  were  sup- 
ported by  the  aid  of  other  states  in  the  Peloponnesos.  This  is 
practically  all  that  we  learn  from  Tyrtaios,  and  it  is  not  much.  Of 
Tyrtaios  himself  later  writers  related  that  he  was  a  lame  school- 
master sent  by  the  Athenians  to  aid  the  Spartans  who  had  been 
commanded  by  the  Delphian  priestess  to  find  a  leader  at  Athens. 

Of  these  wars  we  learn  nothing  from  writers  preceding  the  age 
of  Epameinondas  ;  and  the  inference  seems  to  be  that  for  the 
wealth  of  incident  and  splendor  of  coloring  thrown  j^arratives 
over  the  narrative  of  this  long  struggle  we  are  in-  oftheMes- 
debled  not  to  traditions  of  the  time  but  to  fictions  ^euianwars. 
which  grew  up  after  the  restoration  of  Messenia  and  the  founding 
of  the  city  of  Messeiie.  If  either  from  Herodotos  or  Thucydides 
or  Xenophon  Ave  had  heard  of  the  treasure  buried  by  Aristoraenes 
as  a  pledge  of  the  future  resurrection  of  his  country,  we  might 
have  pointed  to  the  later  story  of  Pausanias  as  the  genuine  sequel 
of  an  old  tradition.  As  it  is,  we  can  but  take  as  we  find  it  the  tale 
which  tells  us  how,  when  the  battle  of  Leuktra  had  justified  the 
liopes  of  Aristomenes,  the  Argive  Epiteles  was  bidden  in  a  dream 
to  recover  the  old  woman  who  was  well  nigh  at  her  last  gasp  be- 
neath the  sods  of  Ithome  ;  how  his  search  was  rewarded  by  the 
discovery  of  a  water  jar  in  which  was  contained  a  plate  of  the 
finest  tin  ;  how  on  this  plate  were  inscribed  the  mystic  rites  for 
the  worship  of  the  great  gods,  and  how  the  history  of  the  new 
Messene  was  thus  linked  on  with  that  of  the  old. 

That  the  first  war  lasted  twenty  years  and  ended  in  the  aban- 
donment of  Ithomo  by  the  Messenians,  we  learn  on  the  authority 
of  Tyrtaios  ;  but  the  causes  aild  the  course  of  the  war  rpj^cflrst 
are  wrapped  in  the  mists  which  gather  round  all  popular   Messenian 
traditions,  if  the  accounts  of  these  conflicts  can  be  ^^^'^' 
called  traditions  at  all.     We  can  make  nothing  of  stories  which 
speak  of  disputes  at  the  border  temple  of  Artemis  Limnatis,  aris- 
ing, as  the  Messenians  said,  from  the  licence  of  the  Spartan  youths, 
or,  as  the  Spartans  retorted,  by  the  insolence  and  lust  of  the  Mes- 
senians.    In  one  of  the<e  disputes  the  Spartan  king  Teleklos,  it  is 
said,  was  slain  ;  and  the  war  broke  out  in  the  reign  of  Theopompos 
and  Alkamenes  on  the  refusal   of  the  Messenians  to    surrender 


34:  THE  FORMATION   OF  HELLAS.  [Book  I. 

Polycliaros,  who,  to  avenge  himself  of  wrongs  inflicted  on  him  by 
the  Spartan  Euaiphnos,  had  invaded  and  ravaged  Spartan  territory. 
The  sequel  of  the  war  exhibits  a  series  of  battles  by  which  the 
Messeniaiis  are  so  weakened  that  they  send  to  ask  aid  from  the 
god  of  Delphoi.  When  the  answer  came  that  a  virgin  of  the 
royal  house  of  Aipytos  must  die  for  her  country,  Aristodemos 
slew  his  daughter  with  his  own  hand  ;  but  for  a  time  the  sacrifice 
seemed  vain.  Six  years  had  passed  when  the  Spartans  advanced 
against  Ithome,  and  a  drawn  battle  took  place  in  which  the  Mes- 
senian  king  was  slain.  Aristodemos  was  chosen  to  fill  his  place, 
and  in  the  fifth  year  of  his  reign  at  length  won  a  decisive  victory 
over  his  enemies.  From  this  point  the  narrative  iis  lost  in  a  recital 
of  oracular  responses,  visions,  and  prodigies.  A  headache  restored 
the  sight  of  the  blind  prophet  Ophioneus,  and  the  wonder  seemed 
a  portent  of  good.  But  the  statue  of  Artemis  dropped  its  brazen 
shield  ;  and  as  Aristodemos  in  his  panoply  approached  the  altar  of 
sacrifice  before  going  forth  to  battle,  his  slaughtered  child  stood 
before  him  in  black  raiment  and  pointing  to  her  Avounded  side 
stripped  him  of  his  armor  and,  placing  on  his  head  a  golden 
croAvn,  arrayed  him  in  a  white  robe.  Aristodemos  knew  that  not 
for  nothing  had  she  thus  wrapped  him  in  the  garb  of  the  dead, 
and  gonig  forth  to  lier  tomb,  he  slew  himself  upon  it.  Why  he 
should  thus  despair,  it  is  indeed  not  easy  to  see.  Pausanias  who 
tells  the  story  is  obliged  to  admit  that  his  career  had  been  almost 
uniformly  successful,  and  winds  up  with  the  statement  that  on  his 
death  the  Mcssenians  instead  of  electing  a  king  appointed  Damis 
dictator,  that  in  a  battle  which  Damis  was  compelled  to  fight  owing 
to  failure  of  supplies  in  the  stronghold,  he,  his  fellow  generals, 
and  the  chief  jnen  of  the  Mcssenians  were  all  slain,  and  that  five 
months  later  the  gamson  abandoned  Ithume."  So  far  as  we  may 
see,  there  was  no  more  reason  for  this  than  for  the  death  of  Aristo- 
demos :  but  it  was  necessary  to  kill  them  off  somehow,  and  we 
have  here  manifestly  the  lame  ending  of  a  fiction  framed  to  glorify 
the  Mcssenians  by  representing  them  as  practically  victorious 
throughout  the  war  and  ascribing  the  catastrophe  at  its  close  to 
the  direct  interference  of  the  gods-. 

The  story  of  this  stmggle  was  told  in  verse  by  the  Kretan 
Rhianos  and  in  prose  by  Myron  of  Priene.  But  the  latter,  it  is 
The  second  ^'^^•^^  Confined  himself  to  the  chronicle  of  events  down 
Messenian  to  the  death  of  Aristodemos,  while  Rhianos  began  with 
''"■  tlie  revolt  of   tlie  conquered  Mcssenians  and   carried 

on  his  tale  to  the  final  destruction  of  the  Messenian  state.*  Both, 
however,  introduce  into  their  narratives  the  liero  Aristomenes ; 

'  Paus.  iv.  '  lb.  iv.  G,  1. 


Chap.  V.]  EARLY  HISTORY  OP  SPARTA.  35 

but  ill  the  pages  of  Myron  this  Messeiiiaii  cliampion  is  no  very 
extraordinary  personage,  whereas  in  the  poem  of  Rhianos  his 
glory  is  surpassed  only  by  that  of  Achilleus.  Myron,  again,  as- 
signs the  hero  to  the  first  war,  Rhianos  to  the  second  ;  and  as  ac- 
cording to  Tyrtaios'  the  second  war  was  waged  by  the  gi-and- 
ehildren  of  those  who  had  fought  in  tlie  first,  it  follows  that  either 
Myron  or  Rhianos  is  wrong.  The  elegies  of  Tyrtaios  throw  indeed 
a  gleam  of  light  on  the  interval  which  separates  the  first  war  from 
the  second.  It  was,  the  poet  assures  us,  a  time  of  intolerable  op- 
pression for  the  Messenians,  who  were  constrained  to  stoop  like 
as;es  beneath  heavy  burdens,  to  yield  to  their  conquerors  a  full 
half  of  all  the  produce  of  their  land,  and  to  appear  in  mourning 
garb  at  the  funerals  of  Spartan  kings.  At  length  tlie  Messenians 
re-olved  to  strike  a  blow  for  freedom,  and  the  war  thus  begun 
ended  after  nineteen  years,  so  Tyrtaios  said,  in  the  final  subjuga- 
tion of  the  country.  The  story  of  the  struggle  is  the  glorification 
of  Aristomenes  whose  final  defeat,  inexplicable  otherwise,  is  ac- 
counted for  by  a  series  of  treasons  from  his  friends  and  his  allies. 
Throughout  this  narrative  we  are  carried  away  into  the  world  of 
the  Argonautic  or  the  Trojan  heroes.  Like  Kekrops,  lie  is  the 
dragon's  son  f  and  no  sooner  is  he  made  dictfitor  after  the  drawn 
battle  of  Derai,  (king  he  would  not  be),  than  he  achieves  a  series 
of  exploits  which  rival  those  of  Herakles  or  Samson.  Enterino- 
Sparta  by  night,  he  went  straiglit  to  the  temple  of  Athana  of  the" 
Brazen  House,  and  in  the  morning  a  shield  was  seen  nailed  up  on 
the  wall  with  an  inscription  which  declared  it  to  be  an  offering  by 
Aristomenes  from  Spartan  spoil.  When  in  the  next  year  his  ene- 
mies met  him  by  the  Boar's  Grave  (Kaprou  Seina)  in  the  plain  of 
Stenyklaros,  they  were  saved  from  utter  destruction  only  because 
Aristomenes  sitting  down  under  a  wild  pear-tree  was  robbed  of 
his  shield  by  the  Dioskouroi.  Still  so  splendid  was  his  victory 
that  the  Messenian  maidens  crowned  him  with  garlands  and  gave 
utterance  to  their  joy  in  songs  which  told  how  into  the  midst  of 
the  Stenyklarian  plain  and  up  to  the  summit  of  the  hill  Aristo- 
menes chased  the  flying  Lakedaimonians.^  Open  force,  it  was  clear, 
could  avail  nothing  against  him,  and  the  Spartans  found  it  easier  to 
work  their  way  by  corruption.  Ample  bribes  secured  the  trea- 
chery of  Aristokrates  the  Arkadian  ally  of  the  Messenians,  who  in 
tlie  battle  of  the  Great  Trench  (Megalc  Taphros)  played  the  part  of 
Mettus  Fuffetius  in  the  Roman  legend.''  Thus  defeated,  Aristomenes  ' 
gathered  his  routed  forces,  and  taking  refuge  on  mount  Eira,  as 
Aiistodemos  liad  maintained  himself  on  Ithome,  held  liis  ground 

'  See  the  fragment  of  Tyrtaios  quoted  by  Pausanias,  iv.  15,  1. 

^  Pans.  iv.  14,  .5      3f^th.  Ar.  Nat.  ii.  369. 

2  Paus.  iv.  IG,  4.  «  Liv.  i.  27. 


36  THF   FORMATION   OF  HELLAS.  [Book  I. 

for  eleven  years  longer.  Far  from  reaping  any  benefit  from  the 
victory,  the  Spartans  saw  their  lands  ravaged,  their  people  worn 
down  by  famhie  or  by  seditions  more  fatal  tlian  famine,  and  learnt 
at  length  that  Aristomenes  had  snrpassed  his  former  exploit  in  the 
Brazen  House  by  the  capture  of  Amykhii  not  three  miles  distant 
from  Spatta..  lie  had  plundered  the  city  and  was  retreating  with 
the  spoil  when  the  enemy  overtook  him  in  overwhelming  numbers, 
and  made  him  prisoner  Avith  fifty  of  his  fellows.  "With  these  he 
was  thrown  into  the  Keadas,  a  pit  used  like  the  Barathron  at 
Athens  for  the  execution  of  criminals.  The  fifty  were  at  once 
killed,  Aristomenes  alone  reached  the  bottom  alive,  borne,  as 
some  said,  on  the  outstretched  wings  of  an  eagle.'  Kescued  from 
this  dismal  cavern,  like  Sindbad  in  the  Arabian  tale,  by  following 
a  fox  which  came  to  prey  upon  the  dead,  the  hero  appeared  once 
more  at  Eira  and  offered  up  for  the  second  time  the  Hekatom- 
phonia  or  sacrifice  for  the  slaughter  of  a  hundred  enemies.  But 
he  must  again  lose  by  the  craft  of  his  foes  what  he  had  gained  by 
his  own  prowess.  In  a  time  of  truce  he  is  seized  by  some  Kretan 
bowmen  ;  but  a  maiden  had  dreamed  the  night  before  that  wolves 
had  brought  into  the  city  a  chained  and  clawless  lion,  and  that 
she  had  given  him  claws  and  set  him  free.  The  sight  of  Aristo- 
menes amongst  his  captors  revealed  the  meaning  of  her  vision,  and 
having  made  the  archers  drunk,  she  placed  a  dagger  in  his  hands 
and  cut  his  bonds.  Seizing  the  weapon,  the  hero  slew  his  enemies ; 
and  the  maiden  was  rewarded  by  becoming  the  wife  of  his  son 
Gorges.  But  the  fated  time  was  now  drawing  near.  The  Pythian 
priestess  had  wanied  him  that  the  god  could  no  longer  defend 
Messene  if  the  he-goat  (Tragos)  should  drink  the  waters  of  the 
Ncda.  The  Messenians  thought  of  beasts  and  felt  no  fear  ;  but  a 
fig-tree  sprang  up,  and,  instead  of  spreading  its  branches  in  the 
air,  let  them  droop  into  the  stream,  and  the  seer  Theoklos,  as  lie 
looked  iipon  it,  knew  that  this  was  the  deadly  sign,  for  in  the 
Messenian  dialect  the  fig-tree  was  called  Tragos.  A^'arned  by  the 
prophet,  Aristomenes  buried  in  Ithomc  the  pledge  of  the  restora- 
tion of  his  country  and  hastened  away  to  Eira.  Here  again 
treachery  accomplished  what  strength  could  not  achieve.  Yet  so 
terrible  was  Aristomenes,  as  he  stood  at  bay  Avith  his  men  formed  in 
square  round  the  women  and  the  children,  that  his  enemies  readily 
suffered  him  to  pass  free  with  those  whom  he  still  guarded.  Re- 
treating into  Arkadia,  he  planned  another  attack  upon  Sparta, 
and  was  again  foiled  by  the  treachery  of  Aristokrates,  who  was 
now  stoned  to  death  by  liis  countrymen.     But  the  spirit  of  the 

'  Paus.  iv.  18,  4.     Tlie  Euemer-     broken  by  a  shield  bearing  an  out' 
ists  maintained  that  Lis  fall  was    etretcbed  eagle  as  its  device. 


Chap.  V.]  EARLY  HISTORY  OF   SPARTA.  87 

Messenians  was  broken.  Many  of  them  had  been  made  Helot^> ; 
some  had  taken  refnge  in  Kyllene,  a  port  of  the  Eleians  ;  others 
tnrncd  tlieir  thonghts  to  Sicily  and  besouglit  the  hero  to  become 
their  leader.  This  he  refused  to  be.  There  was  still  a  hope  that 
he  might  yet  be  able  to  do  some  hurt  to  the  Spartans ;  and  with 
this  hope  he  went  to  take  counsel  at  Delphoi.  Here  lie  met  Dama- 
getos  the  king  of  the  Rhodian  lalysos,  who  had  been  bidden  to 
marry  the  daughter  of  the  bravest  of  the  Hellenes.  Damagetos, 
knowing  that  none  could  challenge  the  right  of  Aristomenes  to  this 
title,  besought  of  him  his  child  and  offered  him  a  home  in  the 
beautiful  island  which  rose  up  from  the  sea  to  be  the  bride  of 
Helios.'  To  Rhodes  therefore  he  went,  and  thus  became  the  pro- 
genitor of  the  illustrious  family  of  the  Diagoridai.  A  peaceful 
end  in  the  happy  island  of  the  sun  was  the  fittest  close  of  a  career 
in  which,  as  in  a  stormy  day,  the  blackness  of  darkness  is  from 
time  to  time  broken  by  outbursts  of  dazzling  light. 

Far  older  than  the  comparatively  modern  romances  of  the 
Messenian  wars  were  the  legends  which  told  the  story  of  Spartan 
aggressions  or  conquests  in  the  direction  of  Arkadia  Spartan 
and  Argolis.  If  we  are  to  believe  Pausanias,^  Tegea  a^flnsf"^^ 
was  attacked  by  Chaiulaos,  the  king  whose  rights  were  Arkadia. 
maintained  by  Lykourgos  ;  but  the  invader  was  taken  prisoner 
by  the  Tegeatan  women  who  had  placed  themselves  in  ambush 
near  the  scene  of  battle.  According  to  Herodotos,^  the  unity  and 
discipline  of  the  Lykourgean  system  so  materially  added  to  the 
strength  of  Sparta  that  nothing  less  than  the  conquest  of  all 
Arkadia  could  satisfy  her  ambition.  But  when  the  Spartans 
asked  Phoibos  at  Delphoi,  how  this  ambition  could  best  be  grati- 
fied, the  answer  was  that  the  larger  scheme  must  be  given  up, 
although  they  might  dance  on  the  plain  of  Tegea  and  measure  it 
out  with  ropes.  If  the  expedition  undertaken  in  the  faith  of  this 
response  was  that  in  which  Charilaos  failed,  we  must  suppose 
further  that  the  Spartans  carried  with  them  fetters  to  be  worn  by 
the  conquered  Tegeatans,  and  learnt  by  bitter  experience  that  the 
chains  were  to  be  worn  not  by  their  enemies  but  by  themselves. 
The  long  series  of  defeats  which  the  Spartans  underwent  at  the 
hands  of  the  Tegeatans  w^as  at  length  brought  to  an  end  in  the 
reigns  of  Anaxandridas  and  Ariston.  The  Pythian  priestess  had 
told  them  that  they  would  win  the  day  if  they  could  briiig  back 
to  Sparta  the  bones  of  Orestes,  which  lay  on  a  level  spot  in  Tegea 
where  two  winds  were  made  to  blow  by  main  force,  and  where 
stroke  followed  stroke  and  woe  was  laid  on  woe.  The  riddle  set 
the  wit  of  the  Spartans  to  work,  and  at  length  it  was  solved  by 

'  Find.  Olymp.  vii.  137.  ^  iii.  7,  3.  =  i.  66. 


38  THE  FORMATION   OF  HELLAS.  [Book  I. 

Lichas,  one  of  their  roving  police,  who,  happening  to  visit  a  black- 
smith's forge,  gazed  in  wonder  as  the  hammer  fell  with  mighty 
power  on  the  anvil.  The  smith  told  him  that  he  would  have 
had  better  cause  for  wonder  if  he  had  seen  the  cofBn,  seven  cubits 
long,  and  the  body  as  gigantic  as  the  coffin,  which  he  had  found 
beneath  his  forge.  Hastening  home,  Lichas  said  that  the  blows  of 
the  blacksmith's  hammer  must  represent  tlie  stroke  on  stroke  and 
woe  on  woe  of  the  Delphian  enigma ;  and  bidding  them  pass  on 
him  a  sentence  of  banishment,  he  departed,  like  Zopyros  or  Sextus 
Tarquinius,  to  work  the  ruin  of  an  unsuspecting  enemy.  Ob- 
taining after  some  difficulty  a  lease  of  the  forge,  he  dug  up  the 
gigantic  bier  and  departed  with  a  treasure  as  precious  as  the  bones 
of  Oidipous  or  the  purple  loclcs  of  Nisos.  Henceforth  the  success 
of  the  Spartans  was  as  great  as  their  disasters  had  been  ;  but  what 
may  have  been  the  result  of  their  victories  it  is  not  easy  to  see. 
If  Tegea  was  conquered,  it  still  remained  independent.  In  the 
Pcrsi;ii\  wars  we  shall  find  the  Tegeatans  sending  as  the  equal 
allies  of  Sparta,  and  claiming  as  their  right  the  post  of  honor  on 
the  left  wing,  which  in  the  battle  of  Plataiai  was  for  the  first  time 
yielded  to  the  Athenians. 

Not  more,  and  perhaps  not  less,  likely,  and  certainly  not  better 
attested,  is  the  tradition  which  asserted  that  before  the  last  Lydian 
Rivalry  of  ^"^S  Ki""isos  souglit  alliance  with  the  chief  state  of 
Sparta  and  Western  Hellas,  Sparta  had  gained  possession  of  that 
°°^'  long  strip  of  Argive  territory  which,  lying  between  the 

range  of  Mount  Thornax  and  the  sea,  stretched  from  Thyrea  to 
theMalean  cape.  The  dispute  about  the  Thyreatis  was  settled,  it 
is  said,  by  a  duel,  in  which  three  hundred  Spartans  fought  with 
three  hundred  Argives  on  a  field  from  which  all  but  the  combatants 
were  rigidly  shut  out.  The  combat  was  as  fierce  and  fatal  as  that 
of  the  Clans  Chattan  and  Key  on  the  Inch  of  Perth  before  Robert 
III.  of  Scotland,  and  at  sundown  the  only  survivors  were  the 
Spartan  Othryades  and  the  Argives  Chromios  and  Alkenor.  The 
latter  hastened  home,  claiming  the  victory  ;  the  Spartan  plundered 
the  bodies  of  the  dead,  and  kept  liis  post  until  on  the  next  day  the 
Spartan  and  Argive  armies  came  to  see  the  result.  The  Argives 
dechned  that  by  the  terms  of  the  agreement  Thyrea  must  remain 
with  tlu'in  as  two  of  their  champions  had  returned  home.  The 
Spartans  argued  that  the  victory  must  be  adjudged  to  the  side 
which  held  the  ground,  and  the  controversy  ended  in  a  battle 
which  rendered  the  previous  duel  superfluous.  The  countrymen 
of  Othryades  were  again  conquerors ;  but  Othryades,  ashamed  to 
return  to  Spaita  as  the  sole  survivor  of  three  hundred,  slew  him- 
self on  the  field. 

However  it  may  have  been  acquired,  the  conquest  of  Thyrea 


Chap.  V.]  EARLY  HISTORY  OF   SPARTA.  39 

marked  the  utmost  extension  of  Spartan  territory  within  the  limits 
of  the  Peloponnesos.  Over  two-fifths  of  the  peninsula  the  Spartans 
were  now  supreme  ;  and  if  their  state  had  its  weak  ^.^^.^  mmre- 
side  in  the  discontent  of  the  Helots  or  the  Perioikoi,  macj'  of 
it  had  its  strength  in  a  geographical  position  which  ^P'*'"'^- 
made  it  practically  secure  against  all  attacks  from  foreign  enemies. 
With  these  conditions  there  is  nothing  to  surprise  us,  if,  as  we 
approach  the  age  of  genuine  history,  we  find  Sparta  not  merely 
supreme  in  the  Peloponnesos,  but  tacitly  or  openly  recognised  as 
the  head  of  the  ill-cemented  communities  wliich  claimed  the 
Hellenic  name.  The  true  narrative  of  the  events  which  brought 
about  this  result  may  be  lost  irretrievably  ;  but  the  result  itself 
stands  out  as  the  most  important  fact  in  the  early  history  of  the 
Greeks. 


CHAPTER  VI. 


THE    GREEK    DESPOTS. 


Although  the  foimdations  of  Aryan  society  were  laid,  as  we 
have  seen,  in  an  intense  selfishness  which  regarded  all  persons 
not  actual  members  of  the  family  as  beyond  the  pale  Tendencies 
of  law,  yet  from  the  first  it  was  possible  that  two  Aryan^ 
or  more  of  the  heads  of  such  families  might  enter  civilisation, 
into  a  league  either  for  mutual  protection  or  to  advance  their 
own  interests — a  task  which  in  these  primitive  ages  would  mean 
simply  interference  with  and  opposition  to  the  interests  of  others. 
These  heads  of  families  thus  combined  would  naturally  form  a 
close  and  exclusive  order — in  other  words,  an  oligarchy.  They 
would  also  be  sole  owners  of  the  land  on  which  their  families 
lived  ;  and  as  soon  as  all  the  houses  within  a  given  district  were 
combined  in  this  league,  the  name  of  Landholder,  Gamoros  or 
Geomoros,  would  become  a  general  designation  for  the  ruling 
class,  as  contrasted  with  the  main  body  of  people  whom  they 
may  have  been  able  to  subjugate.  Thus  the  members  of  the 
dominant  houses  would  be  calkul  Gamoroi  and  Eupatridai  indif- 
ferently. But  the  growth  (.)f  population  would,  by  increasing  the 
number  of  younger  sons  and  their  families,  multiply  the  number  of 
so-called  Gamoroi  who  would  not  be  owners  of  land,  but  who,  by 
virtue  of  their  common  descent  from  the  same  sacred  stock,  would 
belong  to  the  great  patrician  order.  Thus  far  the  natural  ten- 
dency of  Hellenic  as  of  other  Aryan  society  would  be  towards 


40  THE  FORMATION  OF  HELLAS.  [Book  I 

oligarcliy.  The  chiefs  of  the  houses  thus  formed  into  clans,  hav- 
ing been  originally  independent  of  each  other,  would  be  theo- 
retically at  least  on  an  equality.  Each  would  of  necessity  have 
his  seat  and  his  vote  in  the  council,  and  his  voice  "would  carry 
equal  weight  with  that  of  the  wealthiest  and  most  powerful  of 
his  fellows.  But  if  equal  among  themselves  in  relation  to  their 
subjects  they  would  be  a  college  of  kings,  owing  no  duties  except 
to  the  members  of  their  own  houses,  acknowledging  no  responsi- 
bility even  to  them,  and  extending  the  benefits  of  law  to  their 
dependents,  so  far  as  they  extended  them  at  all,  as  a  matter 
not  of  right,  but  of  favor,  which  might  at  any  moment  be  with- 
drawn. 

We  are  justified,  therefoi'e,  in  regarding  Hellenic  kingship  as 
a  comparatively  late  developement  which  carried  with  it  the  signs 
Decay  cf  of  its  speedy  decay.  If  the  description  in  the  Iliad 
powerm^  may  be  accepted  as  a  faithful  picture  of  early  Hellenic 
Hellas.  society,  the  Basileus   is  one  who  holds  his  power  in 

direct  trust  from  Zeus,  and  who,  if  he  takes  counsel  with  his 
chiefs,  is  still  free  to  reject  their  advice.  But,  whatever  might 
be  its  seeming  insignificance,  the  gathering  of  subordinate  chiefs 
was  the  germ  of  those  democratic  assemblies  in  which  Athenian 
citizens  learnt  to  respect  themselves  and  to  obey  the  law.  When, 
therefore,  an  Hellenic  dynasty  was  set  aside  and  an  oligarchy  set 
up  in  its  place,  this  was  strictly  nothing  more  than  a  return  to 
the  earlier  form  of  government.  The  great  chiefs  resumed  the 
full  rights,  of  which  they  had  conceded,  or  been  compelled  to 
yield,  some  portion  to  the  king.  For  this  reason  also  the  change 
from  monarchy  to  oligarchy  seems  to  have  been  effected  gene- 
rally without  any  great  convulsion  and  even  without  much  dis- 
turbance. 

It  might  be  supposed  that  the  Greek  cities  which  were  thus 
governed  by  oligarchies  were  now  on  the  high  road  to  constitu- 
Siibvcrsion  tioiial  order  and  freedom  ;  but  many  an  English  citi- 
oiilrarchk?  2*^"  ^^'^^^  would  rise  against  the  tyranny  of  men  above 
by  tyrants,  him  with  the  energy  of  Hampden,  and  wlio  would 
even  spend  his  life  in  pulling  down  the  shattered  fabric  of  feudal- 
ism, may  yet  show  to  his  inferiors  not  a  little  of  feudal  im- 
periousness.  In  these  such  conduct  is,  of  course,  grossly  and 
unreasonably  inconsistent ;  to  tlie  ancient  oligarch  the  charge  of 
such  inconsistency  would  have  seemed  simply  ludicrous.  It  was 
Irne  that  there  lay  a  large  multitude  beyond  the  sacred  circle  of 
liis  order,  a  multitude  constantly  increasiiig  from  many  causes 
which  kept  his  ow  n  class  stationary,  or  even  lessened  its  numbers  ; 
but  then  it  was  a  sacred  circle,  and  beyond  its  limits  he  recognised 
no  duties.      In  this  unprivileged  crowd  lay   the   sunken   rocks  on 


CHAP.  VI.j  THE  GREEK   DESPOTS.  41 

which  oHgarchies  must  sooner  or  later  make  shipwreck,  for,  happily 
for  the  advancement  of  mankind,  these  close  and  exclusive  bodies 
are  pre-eminently  liable  to  the  plagues  of  jealousy  and  dissension, 
and  divergence  of  int(;rcst  is  sure  to  create  an  opposing  minority 
which,  if  it  cannot  gain  its  own  ends,  may  yet  clog  the  movements 
of  others.  Of  the  general  effect  of  oligarchical  rule  on  the  subject 
population  we  shall  be  better  able  to  judge  when  we  reach  the 
early  history  of  Athens.  It  may  be  enough  to  say  liere  that 
whether  under  the  kings  or  under  the  oligarchs  the  subject  classes 
were  alike  shut  out  ivom  the  benefits  of  an  equal  and  impartially 
adi.iinistered  law.  The  change  from  kingship  to  oligarchy  had 
been  in  theory  no  change  for  them  ;  and  the  later  state  of  things 
differed  from  the  former  only  in  this,  that  even  in  the  ruling  class 
there  were  persons  whose  discontent  and  disaffection  might  break 
out  at  any  time  in  revolution,  and  who,  to  achieve  their  own 
selfish  purpose,  might  court  the  favor  of  the  people,  and  enlist 
their  aid  by  promising  them  justice.  This  was,  in  fact,  the  most 
potent,  and  perhaps  the  most  frequently  employed  of  the  modes 
by  which  some  ambitious  or  discontented  member  of  the  ruling 
class  succeeded  in  making  himself  absolute.  The  man  who  aimed 
at  supreme  power  came  forward  commonly  in  the  character  of  the 
demagogue,  and  declaiming  against  the  wanton  insolence  and 
cruelty  of  his  fellow  Eupatdds,  perhaps  exhibiting  in  his  own 
person  the  real  or  pretended  evidences  of  their  brutality,  induced 
them  to  take  up  arms  in  his  behalf  and  to  surround  him  with  a 
bodyguard.  The  next  step  was  to  gain  a  commanding  military 
position  ;  and  then  if,  like  Peisistratos  in  the  Athenian  Akropolis, 
he  could  gather  round  him  a  band  of  foreign  mercenaries,  his  task 
was  at  once  practically  accomplished. 

But  both  among  the  oligarchs  and  among  the  unfranchised 
people  were  some  in  whom  the  sense  of  law  and  of  duty,  as  arising 
from  law,  seemed  almost  intuitive;  men  who  were  Ancient  and 
animated    by   the    conviction   that    law  is  an    eternal   modern  uo- 

,.-',  .  ....  .,  1     tions  01 

power,  benig  the  expression  or  divme  righteousness,  monarciiicai 
Such  a  conviction  must  be  repressed  by  stern  and  government 
prompt  persecution,  or  it  will  spread  like  a  slow  fire  ready  to  burst 
out  at  any  vent :  but  so  long  as  this  feeling  existed,  it  was  im- 
possible for  the  tyrant  to  rule  with  impartial  justice,  even  if  he 
might  desire  to  do  so.  Living  in  constant  fear  of  unknown  dangers 
and  unseen  enemies,  he  was  tempted  to  trust  more  and  more  to 
terrorism,  and  to  seek  his  own  safety  by  cutting  off  the  tallest 
among  the  ears  of  corn.^     By  slaying  or  banishing  dangerous  or 

'  Soph.  Old.  Tyr.  863-871.  v.  93,  6,  and  to  Tarquin  the  Proud, 

*  Tliis  is  the  counsel  ascribed  to  Livy,  i.  54.  Arist.  Polit.  ill.  13, 
the  Milesian  Thrasyboulos,  Herod.     IG  ;  v.  10,  13. 


43  THE   FORMATION  OF  HELLAS.  [Book  I. 

suspected  citizens  and  by  confiscating  their  property  he  might 
maintain  himself  in  power  during  his  own  lifetime  ;  but  the  chances 
were  always  against  the  establishment  of  any  permanent  d3'nasty, 
and  when  at  length  the  tyrants  were  put  down,  the  feelings  of 
hatred  long  pent  up  burst  forth  with  a  vehemence  which  showed 
plainly  the  bent  of  the  popular  mind.  The  despots  had  really 
done  good  service.  They  had  made  the  idea  of  irresponsible 
power  inexpressibly  odious,  and  they  had  made  the  name  of  the 
monarch  or  tyrant  the  most  hateful  and  contemptible  of  titles. 
For  them  tlie  rule  of  one  man  was  henceforth  associated  with  the 
ideas  of  lawlessness  and  violence,  and  Avith  nothing  else. 

We  may  thus  ascribe  to  the  tyrants  tlis  greatest  impulse  given 
to  Greek  democracy.  If  the  despotism  of  Peisistratos  had  not 
The  power  foHowed  the  legislation  of  Solon,  and  made  the 
of  the  kinj,'8   xVtlieniaus  realise    the  full    extent  of   their   loss,   the 

pa  a-  reforms  which  were  carried  in  the  days  of  Kleisthenes 
might  not  have  been  accomplished  before  the  time  of  Perikles,  and 
a  different  turn  might  have  been  given  to  the  history  of  the  Persian 
invasion.  As  it  was,  a  state  of  feeling  was  produced  eminently 
unfavorable  to  the  schemes  of  the  Persian  monarch.  The  mind 
of  the  people  was  constantly  becoming  more  and  more  awake  to 
the  need  of  legal  safeguards  for  all  their  rights,  and  more  and 
more  averse  to  that  stolid  servility  which,  seeking  no  further 
remedy  for  unbearable  oppression,  is  well  satisfied  when  Tibni 
dies  and  Oniri  reigns.  S{)ai-ta,  with  its  two  hereditary  kings,  the 
ex  officio  commanders  of  her  armies,  might  seem  to  be  an  excep- 
tion. The  theory  of  kings  ruling  by  divine  right  Avas  there  ac- 
knowledged down  to  the  days  of  Agis  and  Kleomencs  ;  but  it  was 
acknowledged,  even  in  words,  only  because  they  had  never  been 
suffered  to  make  themselves  despots  and  because  the  jealousies  and 
contentions  of  the  kings  presented  an  effectual  hindrance  to  com- 
mon action  for  the  purpose  of  setting  up  a  tyranny.  Still  the 
Spartans  were  not  satisfied  with  these  negative  checks.  There 
was  fair  ground  for  thinking  that  the  council  of  twenty-eight  old 
men  holding  office  for  life  might  be  rather  an  instrument  in  the 
hands  of  the  kings  than  an  independent  assembly  ;  and  this  danger 
was  averted  by  the  appointment  of  a  board  of  annually  renewed 
commissioners.'  AVhen  the  kings  had  been  made  directly  respon- 
sible to  the  Ephors  both  in  peace  and  in  war,  the  Spartans  might 
well  feel  that  there  was  no  need  to  interfere  with  the  style  and 
dignity  of  chiefs  who,  as  lineal  descendants  of  the  mighty  Ilerakles, 
were  pre-eminently  fitted  to  be  the  generals  of  a  state  depending 
for  its  safety  on  the  perfection  of  its  militJiry  discipline, 

'  See  p.  31. 


Chap.  VI.]  THE  GREEK   DESPOTS.  -^3 

The  history  of  the  Peisistratidai  at  Athens,  in  spite  of  some 
perplexing  passages  in  the  narrative,   sufficiently  illustrates  the 
means  by   which  tyrannies  were  established  and  put   History  of 
down  ;  and  when  we  find  stories  more  or  less  resem-  ^^^  Greek 
bling  the  Athenian  traditions  told  of  other  Greek  cities   Kleisthenes 
at  the  same  or  in  earlier  times,   we  may  fairly  infer   ^f^^^'^y""- 
that  throughout  Ileilas  generally  the  change  was  going  on  which 
by  the  substitution  of  oligarchical  for  kingly  rule,  followed  by  the 
usurpation  of  despots  who  made  the  sway  of  one  man   still  more 
hateful,  fostered  the  growth  of  the  democratic  spirit,  until  it  be 
came  strong  enough  to  sweep  away  every  obstacle  to  its  free  de- 
velopement.     But  when  we  examine  the  tales  which  profess  to  re- 
late the  deeds  of  these  tyrants  and  to  determine  their  characters, 
we  find  ourselves  in  that  misty  twilight  which  marks  the  province 
of  oral  tradition,   and   especially    of    oral  tradition    warped  and 
colored  by  strong  political  passions  and  prejudices.     From  the 
stories  related  of  the  Orthagorid  Kleisthenes  of  Sikyon  we  may  be 
tempted  to  infer  the  existence  of  a  bitter  feud    between  that  city 
and  Argos  ;  but  how  far  the  acts  ascribed  to  the  tyrant  are  his 
own  and  how  far  they  may  be  reflexions   of  popular  antipathies 
among  his  Dorian  and  non-Dorian  subjects,  we  have  no  means  of 
ascertaining.     Nor  can  we  venture  to  say  how  far  their  antagonism 
may  have  given  color  to  the  singular  story  which  ascribes   to 
Kleisthenes  the  expulsion  of  Adrastos  from  Sikyon.     This  hero 
of  the  Theban  wars  who  is  regarded  as  personally  present  in  Sikyon 
is  represented  as  exciting  the  violent  hatred  of  the  tyrant  who  sees 
in  him  the  tutelar  genius  of  Dorism.     Everything  must  be  done 
to  get  rid  of  him  ;  but  Kleisthenes  seeks  in  vain  to  get  his  plan  of 
direct  banishment  sanctioned  by  the  Pythian  priestess.  Her  answer 
is  that  Adrastos  is  king  of  Sikyon  while  Kleisthenes  is  a  murderer  ; 
and  the  despot,  sending  to  Thebes,  invites  the  hero  Melanippos, 
the  enemy  of  Adrastos,  to  come  and  take  up  his  abode  in  Sikyon. 
The  invitation  is  accepted,  and  when  the  festivals  hitherto  kept  m 
honor  of  Adrastos  had  been  transferred  to  Melanippos,  it  is  con- 
cluded that  the  former  has  deserted  a  place  which  could  no  longer 
have  any  attractions  for  him.'     Of  Kleisthenes  we  are  further  told 
that  he  took  part  in  the  sacred  war  against  Kirrha,  that  he  gave 
his  daughter  in  marriage  to  the  Alkinaionid  Megakles,  and  that 
thus  the  name  of  the  Sikyonian  despot  became  connected  with  the 
ref  onns  carried  out  at  Athens  by  his  grandson  Kleisthenes  the  s^n 
of  Megakles  and  Agariste.     But  the  strange  story^  which  tells  us 
how  this  marriage  was  brought  about,  belongs  apparently  to  the 
class  of  legends  framed  to  explain  proverbial  sayings  and  only  adds 

'  Herod,  v.  67.  =*  lb.  vi.  126,  et  seg. 


44  THE  FORMATION  OF   HELLAS.  [Book  L 

to  the  darkness  which  has  gathered  round  the  last  of  the  Ortha- 
goridai.  The  accounts  given  of  Kleisthenes  serve  but  to  convince 
us  of  the  fact  that  lost  history  cannot  be  recovered. 

The  same  lesson  is  brought  home  to  us  still  more  forcibly  by 
the  contradictory  legends  of  the  despots  of  Corinth.  According  to 
The  Bac-  Ilerodotos  the  Bacchiad  oligarchs  of  that  city  had  been 
gar'chs°at  ■warned  by  the  Delphian  priestess  to  be  on  their  guard 
Corinth.  against  the  lion  which  should  be  born  of  an  cagh 
among  the  rocks  (I'etrai) ;  and  when  Eetion  one  of  the  Lapitliai 
and  a  descendant  of  Kaineus  sent  to  Delphoi  to  learn  the  fortunes 
of  the  child  of  his  wife  Labda  the  lame  daughter  of  the  Bacchiad 
Amphion,  the  answer  that  he  would  be  the  bane  of  the  Corinthian 
oligarchs  determined  the  latter  to  slay  the  babe  as  soon  as  it 
should  be  born.  Ten  of  them  accordingly  went  to  the  house  of 
Eetion  in  the  demos  of  Petrai  (the  rocks  among  which  the  lion 
should  be  born),  and  there  received  the  child  from  the  unsuspect- 
ing Labda.  But  the  man  who  took  him  from  his  mother's  hands,  un- 
nerved by  a  smile  of  the  babe,  handed  him  on  to  the  next  man, 
and  this  man  to  the  third  until,  when  all  had  in  turn  taken  him, 
the  tenth  restored  him  to  Labda  who,  pausing  to  listen  at  the 
door,  heard  them  chiding  each  other  for  their  faint-heartediiess 
until  they  agreed  to  enter  the  house  together  and  slay  the  child. 
Before  they  went  in,  the  mother  had  had  time  to  {)lar.e  him  in 
a  chest ;  and  the  murderers  thus  foiled  went  back  and  informed 
the  Baechiads  that  lliey  had  done  the  work  for  which  they  had 
been  sent.  The  child  grew  up,  and  as  having  been  saved  from  his 
pursuers  in  the  coffer  was  called  Kypselos.  Having  reached  man- 
hood, he  became  tyrant  of  Corinth  and  verified  the  predictions  of 
the  Delphian  priestess.  Many  of  the  Corinthians,  we  are  told,  he 
drove  into  exile,  many  more  he  deprived  of  all  their  goods,  and  a 
larger  number  still  he  put  to  death.'  The  story  refutes  itself. 
That  ten  of  the  Bacchiad  chiefs  should  be  faithless  to  their  own 
body,  IS  simply  incredible  ;  nor  can  it  be  supposed  that  they  could 
have  the  least  scruple  or  difticulty  in  compassing  the  death  of  the 
child  at  some  later  and  more  convenient  season. 

Wilting  at  least  two  centmnes  later,  Aristotle"  places  Kypselos 
in  the  ranks  of  those  tyrants  who  rose  to  power  by  courting  the 
Kypselos  and  favor  of  the  people,  and  ascribes  to  him  so  tirni  a 
I'eriandroB.  ]^q\(\  on  their  affections  that  he  never  needed  or  used 
the  protection  of  a  body  guard.  The  two  traditions,  if  they  be 
such,  exclude  each  other.  But  strange  as  may  be  the  inconsis- 
tencies of  these  Kypsclid  legends,  the  stories  told  of  his  son  Peri 
andros  are  far  more  astonishing.     Like  Aristodemos  of  the  Italian 

Mlcn.d.  V.  92.  "I'olit   v.  13.  4. 


Chap.  VI.]  THE  GREEK   DESPOTS.  i-^ 

Ciima%  lie  is  a  model  tyrant,  chastising  with  scorpions  where 
his  father  had  scourged  with  whips  ;  and  a  portion  at  least  of  the 
story  of  Oidipous  and  lokaste  was  by  some  mythographers  im- 
ported into  the  tradition  to  account  for  that  excess  of  cruelty  which 
Herodotos  traced  to  the  influence  of  Thrasyhoulos  tyrant  of  Miletos. 
This  despot,  he  tells  us/  on  receiving  from  Periandros  a  request 
for  counsel  in  the  general  management  of  his  affairs,  gave  no  verbal 
answer  to  his  messenger,  but  going  into  a  cornfield  cut  off  and 
threw  away  the  tallest  and  richest  of  the  ears  of  corn.  Like 
Sextus  Tarquinius  at  Gabii,  Periandros  knew  that  he  should  deal 
with  the  first  men  of  his  city  as  his  friend  had  dealt  with  the  ears 
of  corn,  and  the  mildness  of  his  previous  rule  \Aas  followed  by  a 
savage  and  merciless  oppression.  Whatever  the  father  had  spared, 
now  fell  by  the  hand  of  his  bloodthirsty  son  who  in  one  day 
stripped  of  their  raiment  all  the  women  of  Corinth,  whether  free 
or  inslaved,  and  burnt  the  dresses  that  their  ghosts  might  clothe 
the  shivering  phantom  of  his  beautiful  w'dc  Melissa  the  daughter 
of  Proklcs  tyrant  of  Epidauros.'^  j\Ielissa  had  been  murdered  by 
her  husband  ;  and  on  hearing  of  the  crime  Prokles  sent  for  her  two 
sons,  and  having  kept  them  for  some  time,  bade  them  at  parting 
remember  who  it  was  that  had  slain  their  mother.  On  the  elder 
son  the  words  made  no  impression  :  in  the  younger  they  awakened 
a  feeling  of  ineradicable  hatred  for  his  father,  whom  he  treated 
with  silent  contempt.  The  patience  of  Periandros  was  at  last  ex- 
hausted, and  the  young  man  was  driven  from  his  home,  a  heavy 
penalty  to  be  paid  to  Apollon  being  denounced  on  all  who  might 
speak  to  him  or  give  him  food  or  shelter.  Undismayed,  Lyko- 
phron  lived  as  best  he  might  in  the  porticoes,  where  his  father 
came  to  see  him  when  he  was  half  starved.  Contrasting  his  pre- 
sent misery  with  the  luxury  which  he  had  forfeited,  Periandros 
prayed  him  to  return  home.  The  only  answer  of  the  young  man 
was  that  his  father  was  debtor  to  Apollon  for  the  penalty  de- 
nounced on  any  who  might  speak  to  him.  Wearied  out  with  his 
obstinacy,  the  tyrant  sent  his  son  to  Korkyra,  and  then  marching 
to  Epidauros  made  Proklcs  a  prisoner.  But  still  yearning  for  his 
younger  son,  he  sent  his  sister  who  in  a  speech  garnished  with  a 
profusion  of  proverbs  worthy  of  Sancho  Panza  besought  him  to 
return  to  Corinth.  The  answer  was  that  lie  woidd  never  look  on 
its  walls  so  long  as  his  father  was  there  ;  and  Periandros  in  his 
despair  proposed  that  he  should  go  to  Korkyra  while  his  son  took 
his  place  as  despot  at  Corinth.  So  great,  however,  was  the  dread 
or  the  hatred  of  Periandros  that  on  hearing  of  the  proposed  ar- 
rangement the  Korkyraians  at  once  put  Lykophron  to  death.     But 

'  Herod,  v.  93-6  ^  See  note  1,  page  7. 


46  THE   FORMATION'   OF   HELLAS.  [Book  T. 

Ave  have  other  versions  of  the  story  of  Melissa  and  the  hiirnt  gar- 
ments, first  in  the  talc  that  Periandros  at  a  feast  stri})ped  the 
women  of  their  golden  ornaments  because  he  had  made  a  vow  to 
dedicate  a  statue  of  gold  at  Olympia  if  he  won  the  chariot  race, 
and  secondly  in  the  statement  that  he  obtained  the  gold  by  exacting 
for  ten  years  a  property  tax  of  ten  per  cent.  In  short,  from  first 
to  last,  Periandros  lives  in  a  world  of  marvels  and  wonders  •,  and 
the  story  of  Arion'  carried  on  the  dolphin's  back  from  the  Italian 
seas  to  Tainaron  is  a  worthy  pendent  of  the  legends  of  Lykophron 
and  Melissa.  AVe  need  only  to  note  further  that  this  rigid  ruler 
or  bloodthirsty  murderer  is  in  other  legends  ranked  among  the 
seven  wise  men  of  Ilellas  and  that  from  this  point  of  view  he  is 
represented  as  compelling  his  subjects  to  support  themselves  by 
honest  industry  and  to  make  a  report  of  their  means  of  livelihood. 
The  dilemma  is  clearly  not  to  be  solved  like  the  quarrel  of  the  two 
knights  about  the  shield  with  the  brazen  and  silver  sides. 

AVe  can  scarcely  be  said  to  know  more  of  the  Megarian  despot 
Theagenes.  Like  Kypsclos,  he  is  represented  as  acting  the  part 
Theagenes  of  a  demagogue,  and  thus  obtaining  from  the  people  a 
ofMegara.  bodyguard  which  he  employed  after  the  fashion,  of 
Peisistratos  at  Athens.  At  best  the  traditions  respecting  him  are 
uncertain  and  obscure  ;  but  Mcgara,  as  the  mother-city  of  colonies 
so  important  as  Byzantion  in  the  east  and  Thapsos  in  the  west, 
stands  forth  as  a  state  fully  able  to  hold  its  ground  against  Athens 
which  only  after  a  desperate  struggle  succeeded  in  wresting  the 
island  of  Salamis  from  her  dominion.  Henceforth,  as  with  Argos, 
her  greatness  belonged  to  the  past ;  and  it  is  possible  that  the 
prosperity  of  these  cities  m.ay  have  been  promoted  by  the  friend- 
ship or  alliance  of  the  despots  who  governed  them."  But  while 
the  general  course  of  developeinent  from  oligarchy  to  despotism, 
and  from  despotism  through  oligarchy  to  democratic  rule  is  per- 
fectly clear,  it  is  strange  that  the  history  of  individual  despots 
should  have  come  down  to  us  in  forms  so  fragmentary  and  dis- 
torted with  a  coloring  so  unreal  and  deceptive.  That  the  gov- 
ernment of  these  despots  and  oligarchs  secured  to  their  cities  for 
the  time  a  large  amount  of  wealth  and  power,  although  it  may 
have  hastened  their  dec:iy  or  their  downfall,  there  is  no  reason  to 
doubt ;  and  with  this  conclusion  we  must  be  content. 

•  Herod,  i.  94.     Myth.  Ar.  Nat.  ii.  26,  245.  "  Herod,  vi.  128. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE    INTELLECTUAL    EDUCATION    OF    THE    GREEKS. 

In  the  liistorical  ages  Athens  stands  pre-eminent  above  all  the 
states  or  cities  whose  people  belonged  to  the  Ionic  stock.     But 
before  we  reach  these  ages  the  glory  of  the  Ionic  name   ^^^       j^_ 
had  in  great  part   passed   away.     The  time  had  been   ness  of  the 
when   all   the   Ionian  tribes   regarded  as  an  honorable   Ju^liV'''' 
title  the  name   by  which   the   Greeks  generally  were   preiustoric 
known  to  the  barbarian  world  of  the  East.     But  the     "  ' 
sons  of  Javaii  on  the  western  coasts  of  Asia  i\Iinor  and  in  many  of 
the  islands  of  the  Egean  sea  had  fallen  under  the  power  of  IochI 
despots  or  of  the  Lydian  kings,  and  with  these  had  been  brought 
under  the  harsher  yoke  of  the  Persian  monarch  ;  and  if  constant 
oppression  had  not,  us  some  said,  destroyed  the  spirit  and  bravery 
of  the  Asiatic  lonians,  it  had   so   far  weakened   their  judgment 
and   their   powers   of   combination  and  action  that  the  Western 
lonians,  and  more  especially  the  Athenians,  no  longer  cared  to  be 
distinguished  by  the  name.'  The  Athenians,  indeed,  still  delighted 
in  being  known  as  the  men  of  the  violet  crown  :'  but  they  had  pro- 
bably forgotten  that  in  ages  not  very  far  removed  from  their  own 
they  were  not  the  foremost  or  the  greatest  of  the  Ionian  race.  In 
this  respect  the  history  of  Athens  bears  no  distant  likeness  to  that 
of  Rome,  the   insignihcant  Latin  town  which  was  destined  to  ex- 
tend its  empire  first  over  Italy  and  then  over  the  world.     But  in 
the  times  of  the  despots  and  the  oligarchs  the  f  ower  of  Athens 
was  eclipsed  l)y  that  of  many  cities  which  in  the  days  of  her  own 
greatness  had  almost  vanished  from  the  political  stage. 

The  prosperity  of  these  cities  belongs  to  that  golden  age  of  the 
Ionic  race  in  which  Delos  Avas  a  centre  of  attraction  not  less  bril- 
liant than  Olympia  became  for  all  the  Hellenic  tribes,    p^^.j^nig 
Here   in   the   craggy   island  where  Phoibos  was  born    festival  of 
and  to  which  after  his  daily  wanderings  he  returned 
with  ever  fresh  delight,^  were  gathered  at  the  end  of  each  fourth 
year  the  noblest  and  the  most  beautiful  of  the  children   of  men. 
Here,  as  he  looked  on  the  magnificent  throng  of  women''  whose 
loveliness  could  nowhere  be  matched  and  of  men  unsurpassed  for 

'  Herod,  i.  143.  had  secluded  the  women  of  Alliens 

"^  Myth.  Ar.  Hat.  i.  228.     Arist.  had  not  yet  taken  place  amono:  the 

Acliarn.  60G.  lonians  ;    and  the  Delian   festival 

^  Hymn,  Apoll.  146.  presents  a  pleasant  contrast  to  that 

■*  Hence    the   miserable    change  of    Olympia    from   which   women 

which  before  the  days  of  Perikles  were  excluded  on  pain  of  death. 


48  THE  FORMATION   OF   HELLAS.  [Book  I, 

splendor  of  form  and  strength  of  nerve,  the  spectator  might  -well 
fancy  that  he  gazed  on  beings  whom  age  and  death  could  never 
touch.  Here  on  the  sacred  shore  were  drawn  up  the  ships  which 
brought  thither  the  riches  and  the  treasures  of  distant  lands,  and 
which  had  already  made  the  lonians  formidable  rivals  even  of  the 
Phenician  mariners.'  But  in  the  days  of  Thucydides  the  glowing 
descriptions  of  the  blind  old  bard  of  Chios  were  those  of  a  time 
which  had  long  since  passed  away.  The  splendor  of  the  Dclian 
festival  had  long  faded  before  the  growing  popularity  of  the  Eplie- 
sian  games ;  and  when  in  the  days  of  the  brilliant  Pan-Athenaic 
celebrations  of  their  own  city  the  Athenians  made  some  attempt 
to  renew  the  glories  of  the  Delian  feast,  the  Hymn  which  spoke 
of  those  ancient  gatherings  was  the  only  document  from  which 
Tlmcydides  could  obtain  any  knowledge  of  that  time.^ 

At  no  time  was  the  Delian  festival  more  than  a  Pan-Ionic 
gathering.  But  similar  restrictions  had  been  common  to  those 
p  festivals  which  afterwards  became   Pan-Hellenic,  just 

Hellenic  as  the  feasts  open  to  the  Ionic,  xViolic,  or  Dorian  races 
estiva  s.  respectively  had  once  been  strictly  local  celebrations  of 
cities  or  villages  ;  nor  can  we  doubt  that  but  for  its  geographical 
position  Delos  would  have  become  the  resort  of  a  congress  not  less 
general.  But  the  conquests  of  the  Lydian  kings  first  broke  up 
the  Ionic  society,  and  their  downfall  left  the  Egean  waters  open  to 
the  Phenician  fleets  of  the  Persian  despots  ;  and  thus  the  espe- 
cially ennobling  influences  of  the  gathering  at  Delos  passed  for 
the  time  away.  The  genius  of  xVthens  had  as  yet  been  very  par- 
tially called  forth,  and  at  Olympia  there  was  neither  that  free 
mingling  of  men  and  women  Avhich  is  one  of  the  redeeming  fea- 
tures of  the  so-called  heroic  age,  nor  that  rivalry  of  art  and  poetry 
in  which  the  bard  of  the  Delian  hymn  expresses  so  keen  an  inte- 
rest.^ Far  removed,  not  only  as  an  inland  city  but  by  its  position 
in  the  western  corner  of  the  Peloponnesos,  from  all  danger  of  at- 
tack by  Persian  fleets,  Olympia  rose  to  greatness  as  the  glory  of 
Delos  waned.  In  luarked  contrast  with  the  shortlived  prosperity 
of  Delos,  the  quadrennial  celebration  of  the  Olympic  festival  was 
never  interrupted  until  the  Christian  Theodosius  decreed  its  abo- 
lition 800  years  after  the  death  of  Herodotos  and  Thucydides. 

The  so-called  Homeric  Hymn  to  Apollon  combines  with  the 
Th'Dli  poem  which  speaks  of  the  Delian  festival  another 
Hymn  to  and  a  later  pocm  in  which  Ai)ollon  is  represented  as 
Apo  on.  journeying  westwards,  seeking  a  home  which  he  cannot 
find  either  in  lolkos  or  the  Lelantian  plain,  in   Mykalessos  or  in 

^  Hymn,  AjjoU.  l^S-155.  bos,  B.C.  776.    The  era  may  be  con- 

-  Thuc.  iii.  104.  venieut  as  a  chronological  basis,  but 

^  Hymn,  ApoU.1(i7-n5.  Tlieenu-  it  represents  no  well-attested  his- 

meration  of  the  Olympiads  begins  torical  fact. 

with  the  alleged  victory  of  Koroi- 


Chap,  VII.]  EDUCATION  OF  THE  GREEKS.  J:9 

Thebes.  At  last  lie  is  advised  by  tlic  nymph  of  the  Telphousian 
stream  to  go  further  still  until  in  one  of  the  glens  of  Parnassos  he 
should  reach  the  village  of  Krisa.  There  beneath  the  mighty 
crags  wliich  beetled  over  it,  he  marked  the  spot  on  which  Tro- 
phonios  and  Agamedes  raised  his  shrine,  and  there  he  slew  the 
mighty  dragon,  the  child  of  Here,  and  leaving  his  body  to  be 
scorched  by  the  sun  commanded  that  thenceforth  the  place  shuuld 
be  called  Pytho,  the  ground  of  the  rotting.  But  though  his 
temple  had  been  reared,  priests  were  lacking  to  it,  and  spying  a 
Kretan  ship  far  off  on  the  sea,  he  hastened  towards  it  and  assuming 
the  form  of  a  dolphin  brought  the  vessel  without  aid  of  wind  or 
helm  or  sail  along  the  Lakonian  coast  by  Ilelos  and  Tainaron  to 
Sam6  and  Zakynthos,  and  then  through  the  gulf  which  severs  the 
Pelopomiesos  from  the  northern  land  t(j  the  haven  of  Krisa  with 
its  rich  soil  and  its  vinc-clothcd  plain.  There  coming  forth  from 
the  sea  like  a  star,  he  guided  them  to  their  future  home  where 
their  hearts  failed  them  for  its  rugged  nakedness.  '  The  whole 
land  is  bare  and  desolate,'  they  said  ;  '  whence  shall  we  get  food  ? ' 
'  Foolish  men,'  answered  the  god,  '  stretch  forth  your  hands  and 
slay  each  day  the  rich  offerings,  for  they  shall  come  to  you  with- 
out stint  and  sparing,  seeing  that  the  sons  of  men  shall  hasten 
hither  from  all  lands  to  learn  my  will.  Only  guard  ye  my  temple 
well,  for  if  ye  deal  rightly,  no  man  shall  take  away  your  glory  ; 
but  if  ye  speak  lies  and  do  iniquity,  if  ye  hurt  the  people  who 
come  to  my  altar  and  make  them  go  astray,  then  shall  other  men 
rise  up  in  your  place  and  ye  shall  be  thrust  out  for  ever.'  ' 

But  if  the  llynm  speaks  of  Pytho  or  Dclphoi  as  rich  in  wealth 
of  offerings  and  as  crowded  with  pilgrims  from  all  lands,  it  seems 
to  draw  out  almost  with  anxious    care  the    contrast  _.    ,,. 

1  IlG  WGinc^n 

between  this  rock-bound  sanctuary  and  the  broad  andisth- 
Olympian  plain  with  its  splendid  Stadion  and  vast  ""^^  games, 
racecourse.  Here  among  the  glens  of  Parnassos,  the  ear  of  Phoibos, 
it  is  said,  can  never  be  vexed  with  the  tumult  of  beasts  of  bur- 
den or  the  stamping  of  war  steeds  ;  and  we  are  thus  prepared  to 
learn  that  the  Pythian  festival  was  designed  to  call  forth  rather 
the  rivalry  of  poets  than  the  competition  of  the  chariot  race.  It 
is  perhaps  only  an  accident  that  traditions  not  less  rich  in  marvels 
have  failed  to  reach  us  respecting  the  origin  of  the  games  which 
the  Kleoiiaians  or  the  Argives  celebrated  in  the  Nemean  valley  in 
honor  of  Zeus,  or  of  the  festival  which  the  Corinthians  kept  at 
the  isthmus  in  honor  of  Poseidon.  These  feasts,  unlike  those  of 
Pytho  and  Olympia,  were  held  every  two  years  ;  but  all  four  were 

'  Hymn,    Apoll.   182-554.      The     and    Phinelias   in   their    dealings 
conduct    against    which    they    are     with  the  congregation, 
warned  is  precisely  tliat  of  Hophni 
3 


50  THE  FORMATION  OF   HELLAS.  [Book  I. 

instances  of  local  celebrations  which,  having  passed  through  the 
stage  of  tribal  popularity,  had  become  centres  of  attraction  to  the 
whole  Hellenic  world.  That  the  full  force  of  all  these  influences 
on  minds  so  sensitive  and  impressible  as  those  of  the  Greeks  can 
scarcely  be  realised  under  our  changed  conditions  of  society,  we 
have  already  admitted  :  but  powerful  as  they  may  have  been,  they 
could  not  even  tend  to  produce  the  convictions  which  seem  to  us 
the  very  basis  of  our  political  beliefs.  However  vivid  might  be 
the  glow  of  Pan-Hellenic  sentiment  at  Eleusis  or  Olymj^ia,  it  left 
untouched  the  veneration  paid  to  the  city  as  the  first  and  the  final 
unit  of  human  society,  and  in  no  way  interfered  with  the  local 
jealousies  and  the  strifes  of  towns  which  challenged  for  their  quar- 
rels the  high-sounding  title  of  wars.  Even  the  sacred  truce  pro- 
claimed before  these  games  might  be  used  to  further  the  interests 
of  one  belligerent  city  against  those  of  another.  So  far  therefore 
as  there  was  a  common  national  feeling  and  any  national  action 
among  Greeks,  it  was  created  and  kept  alive  by  influences  with 
which  their  political  tendencies  were  in  complete  antagonism. 
Happily  the  ambition  of  the  Persian  kings  awakened  in  some  of  the 
Hellenic  tribes  feelings  more  generous  than  the  selfish  and  brutal 
instincts  which  arrested  the  growth  of  Thrakians,  Aitolians  and 
Epeirots  ;  but  it  is  obvious  that  the  ill-organised  resistance  made 
in  fact  by  Athens  and  Sparta  would  have  been  no  resistance  at 
all,  if  they  had  not  been  so  far  educated  as  to  value  their  national 
life  above  the  mere  independence  or  wealth  of  their  own  cities. 

This  education  even  before  the  days  of  Peisistratos  was  of  a 
veiy  complex  kind.  Imperfect  in  all  its  parts,  it  exhibited  the 
The  in-  gemis  of  the  mighty  growth   of  after  ages;  and  the 

flueuce  of  great  festivals  with  their  tribal  or  Pan-Hellenic  gather- 
growth  of  ings  were  without  doubt  the  most  j:)owerful  instru- 
Heilenic  merits  in  promoting  it.  These  supplied  a  constant  in- 
sentiment.  centive  to  genius,  and  the  activity  awakened  in  one 
direction  led  by  a  necessary  consequence  to  greater  energy  in 
another.  The  old  heroic  lays,  Avhich  told  the  tales  of  Ilion  and 
Thebes,  of  the  Argonauts  and  the  Herakleidai,  were  followed  by  a 
school  of  poetry  which  unveiled  the  mind  of  the  poet  himself,  and 
lit  the  torch  which  has  been  handed  down  from  Hellas  to  Italy  and 
from  Italy  to  Germany  and  England.  Along  with  the  poet,  the 
sculptor,  and  the  painter  the  orator  Avas  daily  attaining  to  wider 
power ;  but  the  eloquence  even  of  Themistokles  was  necessarily 
directed  first  and  chiefly  to  promoting  the  individual  iiitcrcsts  of 
Athens.  Art  cannot  be  thus  selfish  :  and  the  sense  of  beauty, 
springing  as  it  did  from  a  thoroughly  patient  and  truthful  obser- 
vation of  fact,  was  combined  with  the  possession  of  a  connnon  trea- 


Chap.  VII.]  EDUCATION  OF  THE  GREEKS.  51 

sure  of  poetry,  linking  togetlier  by  a  national  bond  tribes  wLich 

could  never  be  schooled  into  our  notions  of  political  union. 

But  beyond  the  province  ot"  the  poet,  the  rhetorician,  and  the 

statesman,  there  lay   a  boundless  hold  in  which  the  Greek  first 

dared  to  drive  his  plouofh  ;  and  the  very  fact  that  this    „      ,,    , 
t^       ='     '  i-      1  ,•  -1  Growth  of 

attempt  was  made,  at  the  cost  or  whatever  raiiures  or   physical 

delusions,  marked  the  great  chasm  between  the  thought  ^^i'^"'^^- 
of  the  Eastern  and  the  Western  Aryans,  and  insured  the  growth 
of  the  science  of  modern  Europe.  The  Greek  found  himself  the 
member  of  a  human  society  with  definite  duties  and  a  law  which 
both  challenged,  and  commended  itself  to,  his  obedience.  But  if 
the  thought  of  this  law  and  these  duties  might  set  him  pondering 
on  the  nature  and  source  of  his  obligations,  he  was  surrounded  by 
objects  which  carried  his  mind  on  to  inquiries  of  a  wider  compass. 
He  found  himself  in  a  world  of  everlasting  change.  The  day  gave 
place  to  night ;  the  buds  and  germs  put  forth  in  the  spring  ripened 
through  sunnner  into  fruits  which  were  gathered  in  autumn  tide, 
and  then  the  earth  fell  back  into  the  sleep  from  which  it  was  again 
roused  at  the  end  of  winter.  By  day  the  sun  accomplished  his 
journey  in  calm  or  storm  across  the  wide  heaven  :  and  by  night 
were  seen  myriads  of  lights,  some  like  motionless  thrones,  others 
moving  in  intricate  courses.  Sometimes  living  fires  might  leap 
from  the  sky  with  a  deafening  roar,  or  the  earth  might  tremble 
beneath  their  feet  and  swallow  man  and  his  works  in  its  yawning 
jaws.  Whence  came  all  these  wonderful  or  terrible  things  ? 
What  was  the  wind  which  crashed  among  the  trees,  or  spoke  to 
the  heart  with  its  happy  and  heavenly  music  ?  These  and  a  thou- 
sand other  questions  were  all  asked  again  and  again,  and  all  in  one 
stage  of  thought  received  an  adequate  answer.  The  subject  was 
one  which  admitted  of  no  doubt,  and  the  system  thus  gradually 
raised  had  the  solemn  sanction  of  religion.  This  syste'i  was  the 
mythological,  and  it  w^as  marked  by  this  special  feature  that  it 
never  was,  and  never  could  be,  at  a  loss  for  the  solution  of  any 
difiiculty.  All  things  were  alive,  most  things  were  conscious 
beings ;  and  all  the  phenomena  of  the  universe  were  but  the  actions 
of  these  personal  agents.  For  the  Greek  the  moon  'wandering 
among  the  stars  of  lesser  birth  '  was  Asterodia  surrounded  by  the 
fifty  daughters  of  Endymion,  the  attendant  virgins  of  Ursula  in  the 
Christianised  myth.  All  the  movements  of  the  planets  were  for 
him  fully  explained  by  this  unquestioned  fact ;  and  with  the  same 
unhesitating  assurance  he  would  account  for  all  sights  or  sounds  on 
the  earth  or  in  the  heavens.  The  snow-storm  was  Niobe  weeping 
for  her  murdered  children  ;'  the  earthquake  was  the  heaving  caused 

'  Mi/th.  Ar.  ma.  ii.  279. 


52  THE  FORMATION  OF  HELLAS.  [Book  L 

by  the  struggles  of  imprisoned  giants  "who  av ere  paying  tlie  penalty 
for  rebellion  against  tbe  lord  of  heaven.  Such  a  belief  as  this 
might  seem  to  give  a  dangerous  scope  to  utterly  capricious  agents ; 
but  even  here  the  theological  explanation  was  forthcoming.  There 
was  a  fixed  and  orderly  movement  of  the  sun  through  the  sky,  a 
stately  march  of  the  stars  across  the  nightly  heavens  ;  but  this  was 
because  tlie  great  Zeus  ruled  over  all,  and  all  were  his  obedient 
or  unwilling  servants.  The  movements  of  some  were  penal ;  with 
others  they  were  the  expression  of  gladness  and  joy.  The  stars 
and  the  clouds  were  the  exulting  dancers  wlio  clashed  their  cym- 
bals round  the  cradle  of  Zeus  ;'  the  sun  was  the  hero  cora2)elledto 
go  his  weary  round  for  the  children  of  men,^  or  crucified  daily  on 
his  blazing  wheel, ^  or  condemned  to  heave  to  the  summit  of  the 
heaven  the  stone  which  thence  rolled  down  to  the  abyss. ■*  Tliis 
syslem  might  be  developed  to  any  extent ;  but  it  amounts  to  no- 
thing more  than  the  assertion  tliat  all  phenomena  were  tbe  volun- 
tary or  involuntary  acts  of  individual  agents.  Its  weak  point  la}'' 
in  the  forming  of  cosmogonies.  It  might  be  easy  to  say  that  the 
great  mountains  and  the  mighty  sea,  that  Erebos  and  Night  were 
all  the  children  of  Chaos  f  but  whence  came  Chaos  ?  In  other 
words,  whence  came  all  things  ?  The  weakest  attempt  to  answer 
this  question  marked  a  revolution  in  thought ;  and  the  man  who 
first  nerved  himself  to  the  effort  achieved  a  task  beyond  the  powers 
of  Babylonian  and  Egyptian  priests  with  all  their  wealth  of  astro- 
nomical observations.  He  began  a  new  work  and  he  set  about  its 
accomplishment  by  the  application  of  a  new  method.  Henceforth 
the  object  to  be  aimedat  was  a  knowledge  of  things  in  themselves, 
and  the  test  of  the  truth  or  the  falsity  of  the  theory  must  be  the 
measure  in  which  it  explained  or  disagreed  with  ascertained  facts." 
His  first  steps,  and  the  steps  of  many  who  should  come  after  him 
might  be  like  the  painful  and  uncertain  totterings  of  infants  ;  but 
the  human  mind  had  now  begun  the  search  for  truth,  and  the 
torch  tlius  lit  should  be  handed  down  from  Thales  to  Aristarcho?,' 
and  from  Aristarchos  to  Galileo,  Copernicus,  and  Newton. 

*  lb.  i.  364;  ii.  314.  against   the   intricate    system    of 
^  lb.  ii.  43  ct  seq.  Eudoxos  of  Knidos  is  perhaps  the 
^  lb.  ii.  36.  most  noteworthy  fact  in  the  whole 
Mb.  ii.  27.  history  of  ancient  phihisophy.     Ar- 
^  Hes.  Thcofj.  123.  chimedcs  rejected  liis  theory,  and  is 
"  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  say  therefore  a  witness  beyond  su*pi- 
that  Macaulay,  when  writing  his  ciou,   when  lie  tells  us  that   that 
essay  on  Lord  Bacon,  never  thought  most  illustrious  man  believed  the 
of  this  aspect  of  early  Greek  philo-  earth  to  revolve  in  a  circle  of  which 
sophy  ;  hut  it  is  unfortunate  that  the  sun  was  the  immovable  centre, 
for  many  the  true  facts  should  be  the  fixed  stars  being  .also  motion- 
kept  out  of  sight  by  the  fallacies  of  less,  and  that  he  explained  the  ap- 
a  popular  writer.  parent  annual  motion  of  the  sun  in 
'The     protest    of     Aristarchos  the  ecliptic  by  supposing  the  orbit 


Chap.  VII.]  EDUCATION  OF  THE  GREEKS.  53 

Sucli  was  the  mighty  change  wrouglit  by  the  old  Hellenic 
philosophers.  But  was  the  Greek  himself  reaping  on  a  field  where 
others  had  sown  the   seed  ?     Was  his  work   confined    „     „     , 

.  .  I'll!  hource  or 

to  the  introduction  of  a  philosophy  which  had  grown  Greek  phi- 
up  elsewhere  ?  Greek  traditions  of  a  later  day  pointed  '^^^P'^y- 
to  foreign  lands  as  the  sources  of  their  science  :  and  the  admission 
was  eagerly  welcomed  by  Egyptian  priests  who  boasted  of  obser- 
vations extended  over  more  than  600,000  years,  and  professed  to 
liavc  unlocked  the  secrets  of  heaven  to  the  stargazers  of  Chaldjiea. 
Thus  the  Egyptian  claimed  to  be  the  teacher  of  the  Greek,  and  the 
later  Greeks  made  no  resistance  to  the  claim.  It  remains  to  be 
seen  whether  it  had  any  foundation  in  fact.  At  the  outset  we  may 
note  that  the  Egyptians  are  said  to  liave  been  taught  how  to  mea- 
sure the  height  of  the  pyramids  by  Thales'  who  is  stated  to  have 
gained  his  knowledge  in  Egypt.  The  assertion  is  not  more  likely 
than  the  statement  that  he  discovered  the  seasons,^  while  his  specu- 
lations on  the  risings  of  the  Nile  would  not  prove  that  he  had  even 
seen  it.  Herodotos^  speaks  of  these  risings  as  caused  by  the 
Etesian  winds  without  mentioning  Thales  ;  and  the  phenomenon 
was  one  which  attracted  the  attention  of  Greek  observers  in  gene- 
ral. If  the  Egyptians  had  accumulated  a  stock  of  astronomical 
observations  indefinitely  larger  than  that  of  the  Greeks,  Aristotle 
makes  no  mention  of  Egyptian  astronomical  treatises,  or  indeed  of 
anything  received  from  them  in  writing.  It  is  not  pretended  that 
Aristotle  or  later  writers  derived  their  knowledge  from  Egypt ; 
and  the  plea  that  they  revealed  to  Hipparchos  the  precession  of 
the  equino.xes  discovered  by  that  illustrious  astronomer  is  a  purely 
gratuitous  assumption.  If  on  the  other  hand  the  relative  prece- 
dence of  Egyptian  and  Asiatic  astronomers  were  to  be  determined 
by  their  own  assertions,  we  should  have  simply  to  reject  a  mass  of 
claims  and  counter  claims,  all  equally  incredible  and  absurd.  The 
debt  due  from  Greece  to  Egypt  was  expressly  repudiated  by  Hip- 
parchos ;  but  if  taken  in  their  widest  meaning,  the  statements  of 
Greek  writers  come  to  no  more  than  this, — that  in  their  time  the 
Egyptians  had  amassed  a  store  of  observations,  that  they  had  a 
calendar  scarcely  so  accurate  as  the  Greek,  and  that  they  used  sun- 
dials for  the  notation  of  time.  If  there  is  nothing  to  contradict 
Herodotos  when  he  says  that  the  Egyptians  were  careful  in  record- 
ing unusual  phenomena,*  there  are  yet  the  more  significant  facts 
that  no  single  Egyptian  astronomer  is  known  to  us  by  name  and 

of tlis  earth  to  be  inclined  to  its        'Lewis,  Astronomy  of  the  An- 

axis.     In  sliort,  with  the  exception  cients,  80. 

of  a  formal  enunciation  of  tlieprin-        ^  lb.  81,  85. 

ciple  of  jjravitation,  he   put  fortli         ^  ii.  20. 

the  Copernican  or  Newtonian  sys-        *  Herod,   ii.    83.      Lewis,   Astr, 

tern  of  astronomy.  Anc.  70. 


54  THE   FORMATION  OP  HELLAS.  [Book  I. 

that  even  Ptolemy  never  mentions  any  observations  made  by  a 
native  Egyptian.  Tlie  most  that  can  be  said  for  Egypt  is  tliat  if 
its  science  was  meagre  and  its  influence  weak,  it  seems  to  have 
been  at  least  harmless.  It  was  otherwise  with  the  Babylonians. 
The  gTcat  gift  of  Syrian  science  was  the  boon  of  genethliuc  astro- 
logy. It  was  the  special  work  of  Chaldean  astronomers  to  link 
the  fortunes  of  man  with  the  position  of  the  planets  at  his  birth, 
and  to  draw  out  into  elaborate  system  a  superstition  which  almost 
more  than  any  other  dwarfs  and  cripples  the  human  intellect.  In 
Egypt  that  system  was  an  exotic,  not  less  than  at  Athens  or  Rome  ; 
but  Egyptian  vanity,  or  the  weakness  of  Egyptian  intellect,  Avas 
dazzled  by  the  mysterious  art  ;  and  forged  treatises  sprung  up  in 
abundance  to  prove  that  it  was  of  ancient  and  indigenous  growth.' 

These  characteristics  of  the  so-called  science  whether  of  Egypt 
or  of  Assyria  dispose  effectually  of  the  assertion  that  it  was  the 
Greek  parent  of  the  really  historical  and  always  progressive 

astrouomy.  science  of  Greece.  While  the  names  of  Chaldtean, 
Babylonian,  and  Egyptian  astronomers  remain  wholly  unknown, 
with  Thales  begins  a  long  line  of  philosophers  who  contributed  to 
the  advance  of  practical  astronomy  as  much  as  they  failed  to  im- 
prove it  in  theory. 

Most  of  these  philosophers  here  mentioned  are  to  us  little  more 
than  shadows.  They  belong  to  that  happy  band  who,  in  the  words 

^,  ,  1  of  Euripides,  have  given  their  lives  to  the  task  of  scru- 
Thales  and        ...^,',S  ,,. 

the  Ionic  tnnsmg  the  everlasting  order  of  mimortal  nature,  and 
school.  ^y.  ^j^gjj.  i^jjg]-  i^ave  been  raised  far  above  the  murky 

regions  of  meanness  and  vice.^  But  they  lived  before  the  age  of 
a  written  history  ;  they  left  behind  them  no  writings  of  their  own, 
and  the  outlines  of  the  picture  have  in  each  case  become  faint  and, 
blurred.  The  lifetime  of  Thales  is  said  to  belong  in  part  to  the 
age  of  Solon,  who  with  him  was  numbered  among  the  Seven  Wise 
Men ;  but  Solon  as  a  philosopher  recedes  far  into  the  mists  of  po- 
pular tradition.  We  shall  come  across  Thales  hereafter  in  the 
stories  of  the  two  last  Lydian  kings  and  again  in  the  disastrous 
revolt  of  the  lonians  against  Dareios.'  But  what  is  there  saiid  of 
him  proves  no  more  than  that  his  name  was  associated  with  ideas 
of  great  knowledge  and  power ;  and  Aristotle  who  speaks  of  him 
as  the  founder  of  philosophy  cites  his  opinions  from  hearsay.* 
'i'Jor  are  we  justified  in  saying  that  he  established  a  definite  school, 
for  the  series  of  the  so-called  Ionic  philosophers  were  independent 

*  See  at  length  Sir  G.  C.  Lewis,  vened  between  the  death  of  Solon 
Astron.  Arte.  chs.  i.  and  v.  and  the  Ionian  revolt,  Thales  must 

*  Fraprm.  (965)  136.  Clem.  Alex,  have  been  a  mere  child  in  the  last 
Strom,  iv.  25,  ^  157.  days  of  the  Athenian  lawgiver. 

*  As   according   to   the   reputed  *  Lewes,  Hist.  Phil.  i.  7. 
chronology  some  sixty  years  inter- 


Chap.  VII.]  EDUCATION  OF  THE  GREEKS.  55 

thinkers,  not  much   indebted  perhaps  the  one  to  the  others  and 
exhibiting  wide  differences  of  belief. 

The  so-called  Ionic  scliool  is  connected  with  a  more  widely  ex- 
tended and  more  celebrated  society,  if  the  tale  be  true  that  Pytha- 
goras, the  contemporary  of  Solon  and  Thales,  was  a  p  ^ j,  „  ^ 
pupil  of  the  Ionian  philosopher  Anaximandros.  Tra-  aud  the  Py- 
dition  assigned  him  to  the  age  of  Polykrates  and  of  thagoreane. 
Tarquinius  Superbus  ;  but  association  with  these  misty  personages 
can  scarcely  impart  an  historical  character  to  a  being  still  more 
shadowy.  If  we  say  that  of  las  personal  life  we  have  no  trust- 
worthy information,  we  call  into  question  neither  his  own  exist- 
ence nor  that  of  his  school  or  brotherhood.  But  the  stories  told 
of  him  must  be  classed  along  with  the  tales  which  related  the  ex- 
ploits of  the  Messenian  Aristomenes.  These  tales,  as  we  have 
seen,'  were  seemingly  unknown  to  the  historians  who  lived  before 
the  re-establishment  of  Mcssene,  and  thus  are  rather  the  deliberate 
manufacture  of  a  later  age  than  the  genuine  growth  of  popular 
tradition.  The  revival  of  Pythagorean  doctrines  by  the  Neopla- 
tonists  answers  to  the  political  changes  wrought  by  Epameinondas ; 
and  the  result  was  that  the  person  of  Pythagoras  became  the  cen- 
tre of  a  throng  of  myths  which  had  been  applied  to  many  before 
him  and  were  yet  to  be  applied  to  many  after  him.  He  now  be- 
came the  son  of  Phoibos,  whose  glory  rested  everlastingly  on  his 
form.  He  had  a  golden  thigh,  as  Indra  Savitar  had  a  golden 
hand,^  and  the  Hyperborean  Abaris  ^  flew  to  him  on  a  golden  ar- 
row. He  was  present  in  more  than  one  place  at  the  same  time, 
and  his  ears  were  soothed  with  that  music  of  the  spheres  to  wdiich 
duller  mortals  are  deaf.  Clad  in  robes  of  white  and  crowned 
with  a  golden  diadem,  he  became  the  embodiment  of  that  impas- 
sive and  eternal  calm  which  the  worshipper  feels  stealing  over  him 
as  he  gazes  on  the  majestic  face  of  Buddha. 

This  mysterious  being  was,  it  is  said,  the  first  who  called  him- 
self a  philosopher.*  The  Peloponnesian  Leontios  wished  to  know 
his  art.  The  sage  replied  that  he  had  none.  He  was  rrijep„<;ha- 
the  lover  and  the  seeker  of  wisdom,  that  source  of  gorean 
liappiness  more  precious  than  fine  gold,  sought  by  so  brotherhood 
few  among  the  children  of  men  who  have  all  come  down  from 
heaven  to  sojourn  upon  this  earth  for  a  little  while.     The  answer 

'  See  p.  33.  which    denoted   a  man    of   large 

^  Myth.  Ar.  Nat.  i.  370  :  see  also  powers  of  tboujrht   and    observa- 

references   in   index   s.v.  Maimed  tion  honestly  used  for  the  discovery 

Deities.  of  truth,  without  any  of  those  sec- 

^  lb.  ii.  114.  ondary  and  selfish  considerations 

*  With  Herodotos,  iv.  95,  Pytlia-  which  in  later  times  formed  part 

goras  is  a  Sophist,  in  the  primary  of  the  connotation  of  the  term. 

and  obvious  meaning  of  the  word. 


56  THE   FORMATION   OF  HELLAS.  [Book  L 

points  to  the  doctrine  of  Metempsychosis,  which  hecanie  promi- 
nent in  the  system  bearing  his  name.  But  his  name  is  for  us 
more  closely  linked  with  the  sect  or  brotherhood  or  secret  society 
of  which  he  is  the  real  or  the  reputed  founder. 

The  teaching  of  all  these  schools  was  marked  by  fancies  and 
notions  which  may  seem  to  us  as  grotesque  as  they  are  strange. 
But  the  mere  propounding  of  the  first  guess  was  the 
the  philo-  emancipation  of  the  human  mind  from  the  yoke  of 
sophers.  mythological  belief  ;  and  each  successive  guess,  linked 
as  it  was  to  the  theories  which  had  preceded  it,  and  having  fur- 
ther a  certain  logical  justification,  had  the  effect  of  strengthening 
the  mind  and  widening  the  range  of  its  knowledge.  The  influ- 
ence of  these  philosophical  schools  must  be  carefully  distinguished 
from  those  general  influences  which,  culminating  in  the  great 
games  and  festivals,  wrought  so  powerfully  towards  the  formation 
of  a  Panhellenic,  although  unhappily  not  of  a  really  national,  sen- 
timent. It  was  not  a  popular  influence.  The  schools  themselves 
were  liable  at  any  moment  to  be  draAvn  into  deadly  collision 
with  the  popular  belief ;  and  this  collision  became  inevitable 
when  from  the  condemnation  of  human  conceptions  about  the 
gods  they  went  on  to  deny  the  functions  of  the  gods  in  the  pro- 
duction of  physical  phenomena.  But  they  did,  nevertheless,  a 
mighty  Avork.  They  moulded  the  highest  thought  of  their  coun- 
trymen ;  and  the  teaching  of  Xenophanes  and  Anaxagoras  had  its 
fruit  in  the  statesmanship  of  Perikles  and  in  the  judicial  criticism 
of  the  greatest  of  Greek  historians. 


CHAPTER  YIII. 

HELLAS      SPORADIKE. 


At  the  beginning  of  the  historical  age  we  find  the  whole  of  the 
Peloponnesos  with  the  islands  of 'the  Egean  sea  and  the  lands 
lying  between  the  ranges  of  Pindos  and  the  Corinthian 
Hellenic  gulf  in  the  possessiou  of  tribes  claiming  the  common 
migrations,  ^j^j^  ^f  Hellenes.  Beyond  these  limits  lay  a  vast 
number  of  Hellenic  cities  in  countries  which  contained  among  their 
inhabitants  tribes  either  non-Hellenic  or  barbarian.  Hellas  thus 
became  a  land  which  had  no  borders,  for,  inserting  itself  in  wedge- 
like fashion  amongst  indifferent  or  hostile  races,  it  was  found  on 
the  banks  of  the  Tanais  and  under  the  ranges  of  the  Caucasus,  on 


Chap.  VIII.]  HELLAS   SPORADIKI;.  57 

the  moutli  of  the  Rhone  and  the  shores  of  Spain.  At  Trapezous 
and  Sinope,  in  Massalia,  Aleria,  and  the  Iberian  Zalcynthos  (Sagun- 
tinn)  were  seen  societies  of  inen  who  in  langnage  and  religion,  in 
manners  and  in  forms  of  thought,  acknowledged  some  common 
bond ;  and  the  citizen  of  the  Tauric  Chersonesos  or  the  Scythian 
Olbia,  although  he  might  know  nothing  of  our  modern  national 
life,  might  yet  take  pride  in  the  thought  that  he  belonged  to  a 
people  which  stood  in  the  front  ranks  of  mankind.  But  if  the 
light  of  Greek  civilisation  shed  some  lustre  even  on  these  distant 
settlements,  it  shone  out  with  full  splendor  in  the  magnificent 
cluster  of  ctties  which  lined  the  eastern  shores  of  the  Egean  sea, 
and  gave  to  the  southern  portion  of  the  Italian  peninsula  its  name 
of  Megale  Hellas  (Magna  Grajcia).  How  these  tribes  found  their 
way  into  tlie  lands  of  the  Kepliisos  and  the  Eurotas,  we  cannot 
say.  The  Greek  saw  in  the  Latin  an  alien,  and  in  the  Persian  a 
barbarian  :  yet  the  evidence  of  language  points  unmistakably  to  a 
time  when  the  ancestors  of  the  Greek,  the  Roman,  the  Persian,  the 
Teuton,  and  the  Hindu,  all  dwelt  together  as  a  single  people.  It 
shows  us  further  that  before  this  ancient  people  was  separated,  they 
had  made  no  small  progress  in  the  decencies  of  life  and  in  thede- 
velopement  of  morality  and  law.  We  know  that  they  could  build 
houses,  tend  cattle,  plough,  sow,  and  reap,  that  they  had  devised 
for  relations  of  affinity  names  more  precisely  accurate  than  those 
which  we  have  retained  ourselves, — nay,  even  that  they  had  stored 
up  a  vast  mass  of  phrases  and  maxims,  and  of  popular  tales  illus- 
trating these  maxims  and  forming  now  the  folk  lore  of  tribes  and 
nations  which  since  the  separation  hcive  been  cut  o£E  utterly  from 
ail  communication  with  each  other.  We  find  the  Hindu  in  the 
land  of  the  Five  Streams ;  we  find  the  Hellen  in  the  valleys  of 
Phthiotis  and  the  cliftsof  Olympos  and  Parnassos.  But  we  have 
no  means  of  tracing  the  stages  of  the  journey  which  carried  these 
offshoots  from  the  same  stock  to  their  eascern  and  western  homes. 
When  Thucydides  Avas  about  to  trace  the  course  of  xhat  disas- 
trous expedition  which  the  sagacity  of  Perikles  had  by  anticipation 
emphatically  condemned,  he  thought  it  right  to  give  ^  q  i.  i 
brief  sketch  of  Hellenic  colonisation  in  the  island  of  nisaiionin 
Sicily.  This  sketch  is  drawn  with  all  the  confidence  ^''^^^y- 
of  a  man  who  feels  sure  of  the  trustworthiness  and  completeness  of 
his  evidence.  Nothing  can  be  more  precise  than  his  ethnolugy, 
nothing  more  definite  than  the  dates  which  he  assigns  to  the  seve- 
ral Greek  settlements  in  the  island.  From  first  to  last  the  narra- 
tive is  to  all  appearance  thoroughly  probable  ;  but  the  account 
which  he  gives  of  the  Trojan  war  has  the  same  air  of  likelihood. 
In  the  latter  case  we  know  the  process  by  which  this  result  baa 
been  obtained,  and  we  have  no  guarantee  that  his  early  Sicilian 
3* 


58  THE  FORMATION  OF  HELLAS.  [Book  I 

history  may  not  be  of  precisely  the  same  kind.  This  at  least  is 
certain  that  for  none  of  it  was  there  any  contemporary  registration 
and  that  most  of  the  events  recorded  in  it  took  place  by  his  own 
admission  more  than  four  hundred  years  before  his  own  day. 

But  whatever  may  be  the  precise  order  in  which  the  Hellenic 
colonies  of  Sicily  were  founded,  the  great  prosperity  which  for  the 
Social  con-  most  part  they  enjoyed  for  generations  preceding  the 
ditionsof^  despotism  of  Peisistratos  at  Athens  is  beyond  ques- 
eoionistsin  tion.  These  new  communities  were  established  in  a 
Sicily.  ]antl    of    singular   fertility,    the    resources    of    which, 

especially  in  its  eastern  and  southern  portions,  had  never  been 
systematically  drawn  out.  In  a  country  where  the  people  had 
thus  far  obtained  from  the  earth  just  enough  to  supply  the  wants 
of  a  life  spent  in  caves,  there  now  sprung  up  cities  secured  by 
their  walls  against  attack  from  without,  and  rich  in  all  the  varied 
appliances  of  Hellenic  civilisation.  The  influence  of  this  civilisa- 
tion was  brought  to  bear  on  the  natives,  the  gradual  blending  of 
the  new  comers  with  these  ti'ibes  being  sufficiently  attested  by  the 
adoption  of  a  non-Hellenic  system  of  weights  and  measures.  This 
blending  had  in  turn  its  effect  oii  the  character  of  the  Sikeliot; 
Hellenes,  who  were  left  behind  in  the  race  by  their  eastern 
kinsfolk.  But  unlike  the  Greek  communities  of  Asia  Minor  or 
Africa,  the  Sicilian  colonies  soon  acquired  sufiicient  strength  to 
insure  the  failure  of  any  attacks  which  might  be  made  upon  them 
by  neighboring  populations.  The  Asiatic  Hellenes  lost  their 
independence  under  the  Lydian  kings  ;  they  passed  under  a  far 
heavier  yoke  when  Cyrus  entered  Sardeis  in  triumph.  The  great 
Eastern  despot  had  in  Sicily  no  more  powerful  imitator  than  the 
Sikel  prince  Douketios,  and  the  attempts  of  Douketios  ended  in 
nothing. 

Great  as  were  the  attractions  of  Sicily,  those  of  the  neighbor- 
ing peninsula  were  far  greater.  On  either  side  of  the  mountain 
,,     ,  rano'e  which  fonns   its  backbone   magnificent  forests 

settlements  rose  above  valleys  of  marvellous  fei'tility,  and  pastures 
m  Italy.  green  in  the  depth  of  summer  sloped  down  to  plains 
which  received  the  flocks  and  herds  on  the  approach  of  winter. 
The  exuberance  of  this  teeming  soil  in  wine,  oil,  and  grain  veiled 
the  perils  involved  in  a  region  of  great  volcanic  activity.  Tliis 
mighty  force  has  in  recent  ages  done  much  towards  changing  the 
face  of  the  land,  while  many  parts  have  become  unhealthy  and 
noxious  which  in  the  days  of  Thucydides  had  no  such  evil  repu- 
tation. "^Mien  Ave  allow  for  the  effects  of  these  causes  and  sub- 
tract further  the  results  of  misgovernment,  if  not  of  anarchy,  ex- 
tended over  centuries,  we  may  form  some  idea  of  the  wealth  and 
splendor  of  southern   Italy  in   the  pahny  days  of  Kroton  and 


Chap.  VIII.]  HELLAS   SPORADIKIi.  59 

Sybaris,  of  Thourioi,  Siris,  Taras  and  Metapontion.  When,  final- 
ly, we  remember  tliat  by  the  conditions  of  ancient  navigation 
every  ship  sailing  from  Athens  or  Argos,  from  Corinth  or  any 
other  Peloponaesian  port,  worked  its  way  coastwise  to  Korkyra 
and  thence  crossed  tlie  sea  to  the  lapygian  or  Sallentine  cape,  we 
might  well  suppose  that  every  Hellenic  colony  in  southern  Italy, 
with  the  exception  perhaps  of  Brentesion  (Brundusium)  which  lay 
to  the  north-west  of  the  cape,  would  have  been  established  before 
any  attempts  were  made  to  occupy  the  coasts  of  Sicily.  According 
to  the  traditional  chronology  the  course  of  Hellenic  colonisation 
reversed  this  natural  order,  and  the  chief  Sicilian  cities  had  been 
established  for  years  when  at  length  Sybaris  was  founded  at  the 
mouth  of  the  river  of  the  same  name  on  a  line  almost  due  west  of 
the  lapygian  promontory.  Ten  years  later,  it  is  said,  an  Achaian 
named  Myskellos  led  a  colony  to  Kroton,  about  forty  miles  to  the 
south  of  Sybaris  on  the  mouth  of  the  Aisaros.  But  these  cities  in 
their  turn  sent  out  colonists  to  the  western  coasts  of  the  peninsula. 
The  dates  assigned  to  these  settlements  claim  for  them  a  compa- 
ratively modest  antiquity  ;  but  it  is  clear  that  the  tales  which 
represented  a  vast  number  of  the  Hellenic  colonies  in  Italy  as 
founded  by  the  heroes  returning  from  Troy  were  not  contented 
with  these  humble  limits,  while  they  also  go  far  to  prove  that  the 
later  stories  are  not  more  trustworthy  than  the  earlier. 

Whether  planted  earlier  or  later  than  the  Sicilian  settlements, 
these  Italian  colonies  soon  attained  to  a  far  greater  pi'osperity. 
Their  dominion  extended  from  sea  to  sea ;  but  their   War  be- 
predominance  was  secured  much  less  by  force  than  by  baHs'and" 
the    influence    of   that    civilisation    which    had    been   Kroton. 
moulded  by  the   poetry,  the   worship,  the  tribal  and  in  a  certain 
sense  national  festivals,  of  the  mother  country.     How  long  the 
two  great  cities  of  Sybaris  and  Krotos  had  flourished  before  the 
friendly  feeling  between  them   gave  way  to   furious   hatred,  it  is 
impossible  to  say  ;  but  the  story  goes  that,  in  the  same  year  which 
witnessed   the  expulsion  of  the  Peisistratidai  from  Athens,  five 
hundred  of  the  wealthier  citizens   of   Sybaris  fled  for 
refuge  to   Kroton  from  the  oppression  of  the  tyrant 
Telys.'     Fear  of  a  power,  which  at  this  time,  it  would  seem,  far 
surpassed  that  of  Athens,  had  almost  impelled  the  Krotoniates  to 
surrender  the   fugitives,   when   Pythagoras   came  forward  to  de- 
nounce the   impiety.     On  hearing  that  his  demand  for  the  exiles 
had  been  rejected,  Telys  advanced  soutli wards,  and  a  battle  was 
fought  in  which  100,000  Krotoniates  under  the  athlete  Milon  ut- 
terly routed  300,000  Sybarites.     Hastening  onwards  after  a  victory 

*  Herod,  v.  44. 


60  THE  FORMATION   OF   HELLAS.  [Book  1. 

pressed  without  mercy,  tlie  conquerors  stormed  Sybaris,  scattered 
its  people,  aud  destroyed  its  power.  Such  as  escaped  fled  to  Laos 
and  Skidros.  The  result  was  disastrous  not  only  for  Sybaris,  but 
for  the  Italian  Hellenes  generally.  Whether  the  destruction  of 
the  Pythagorean  order  should  be  reckoned  among  the  evils  thus 
caused,  it  a\  ould  perhaps  be  rash  to  say. 

•The  effect  of  the  ruin  of  Sybaris  on  the  Greek  world  generally 
was  a  matter  of  greater  moment.  Thus  far  the  lonians  had  been 
Effects  of  the  predominant  race  in  Hellas.  The  prosperity  of 
tion  of*^'"'^  Sybaris  and  Kroton  belonged  to  the  golden  age  of  the 
Sybaris.  great  Panionic  festival  at  Delos.  Among  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  several  Ionic  tribes  there  assembled  there  is  no- 
thing to  lead  us  to  suj^pose  that  the  Athenians  filled  the  foremost 
place,  and  Sparta  was  as  yet  scarcely  sensible  of  the  position  which 
the  conditions  of  the  Greek  world  were  tending  to  secure  to  her. 
In  the  west  the  great  Italian  colonies  had  not  merely  planted 
themselves  firmly  on  the  coast,  but  were  extending  their  influence 
and  their  power  even  over* the  inland  regions  of  the  peninsula. 
The  defeat  of  Kroisos  and  the  fall  of  Sybaris  went  far  towards 
changing  the  face  of  things.  The  Asiatic  Greeks  became  subjects 
of  the  Persian  despot.  The  Italian  Greeks  became  less  and  less 
able  to  extend  their  conquests,  or  even  to  maintain  their  ground 
against  the  pressure  of  native  tribes  ;  and  henceforth  the  title  of 
Megale  Hellas,  the  Magna  Gra?cia  of  the  Latins,  becomes  confined 
to  a  strip  of  \and  running  along  the  coast. 

We  might  have  suppo.sed  that  the  course  followed  by  the 
navigation  of  the  ancient  world  would  have  determined  chro- 
The  nologically  the  order  in  which  the  several  settlements 

coiony'of"  would  be  founded.  AVe  have  already  seen  that  the 
Korkyra.  popular  traditions  respecting  the  Hellenic  cities  of 
Italy  and  Sicily  reverse  this  order,  and  the  same  inversion  marks 
the  traditions  of  the  colonies  scattered  along  the  Eastern  shores  of 
the  Ionian  sea.  We  might  have  supposed  that  the  point  from 
which  all  ships  sailing  from  the  Peloponnesos  struck  off  across  the 
open  water  to  the  Italian  peninsula  would  have  been  chosen  as  the 
spot  for  the  earliest  settlement  in  this  direction  ;  but  Korkyra'  is 
said  to  have  been  colonised  about  the  same  time  as  Syracuse,  and 
therefore  some  years  later  than  the  Sicilian  Naxos.  The  stem 
and  rugged  mountain  country  whii'h  on  the  main  land  rises  to  the 
magnificent  Akrokeraunian  range  furnished,  it  is  true,  no  great 
attraction  for  Hellenic  colonists  ;  but  Korkyra  with  its  broad 
plains  and  fertile  valleys  might  have  satisfied  emigrants  who  had 
not  been  accustomed  to  therich  soil  of  Messene.     Severed  from 

'  The  name  is  so  given  on  the  coins  of  the  colony. 


Chap.  VIII.]  HELLAS  SPORADIKfi.  61 

the  main  land  by  a  strait  at  its  northern  end  scarcely  wider  than 
that  of  Euripos,  it  still  had  the  advantage  of  an  insular  position 
at^ainst  attack  from  without,  while  its  moderate  size,  not  exceed- 
ing forty  miles  in  length  by  half  that  distance  in  width,  involved 
none  of  the  difficulties  and  dangers  of  settlement  on  a  coast  line 
with  barbarous  and  perhaps  hostile  tribes  in  the  rear.  Nowhere 
rising  to  a  greater  height  than  3,000  feet,  the  highlands  of  the 
northern  end,  Avhich  give  to  the  island  its  modern  name  of  Koru- 
phoi  (Corfu),  subside  into  a  broken  and  plain  country,  now  covered 
in  great  part  with  olive  woods  planted  under  Venetian  rale,  but 
capable  of  yielding  everywhere  abundant  harvests  of  grain  and 
wine.  Here,  it  might  be  thought  that  a  colony  would  have  grown 
up  which  we  might  class  among  the  most  peaceful  of  Hellenic 
communities  :  here  in  fact  grew  up  perhaps  the  most  turbulent, 
if  not  the  most  ferocious,  of  Greek  societies.  Alliance  with  Athens 
did  little  to  soften  the  violence  of  their  passions ;  and  the  rapid 
developement  of  the  feud  between  the  Korkyraian  colony  and  the 
mother  city  of  Corinth  may  be  attested  by  the  tradition  that  the 
first  naval  battle  of  the  Greeks  was  fought  by  the  fleets  of  these 
two  cities.  "We  have  no  means  of  ascertaining  the  cause  of  this 
implacable  enmity  against  the  mother  city  of  which  the  Corin- 
thians bitterly  complained.  It  is  more  than  likely  that  it  had  its 
origin  in  jealousies  of  trade.  The  Korkyraians  had  acquired  on 
the  opposite  side  of  the  strait  a  strip  of  land  which  enabled  them 
to  anticipate  the  Corinthians  in  traffic  with  the  Epeirotic  tribes 
and  to  protect  their  own  property  within  strong  fortifications  ;  and 
it  is  not  unlikely  that  this  fact  may  have  determined  the  Corin- 
thians to  found  their  colony  of  Ambrakia  near  the  mouth  of  the 
Arachthos  which  after  a  due  southward  course  runs  into  the  Am- 
brakian  gulf  on  its  northern  shore. 

But  in  spite  of  their  jealousies  joint  colonists  from  Corinth  and 
Korkyra  founded  the  settlement  of  Anaktorion   at  the  southern 
entrance  of  the  Ambrakian  gulf,  on  the  waters  where   jojnt  colo- 
the  fortunes  of  the  Roman  world  were  decided  by  the   "i«*  o^  f^e 
victory  of  Octavianus  at  Aktion  (Actium).     Another   andKorky- 
joint  colony  was  founded  at  Leukas,  now  Santa  Maura,   ''^"'"s- 
which  became   an   island  when,  in   the  fourth  century  b.c,  the 
Leukadians  cut  through  the  narrow  isthmus  between  the  city  and 
the  main  land.     The  slaughter  of  the  Akarnanian  settlers  who,  it 
is  said,  had   invited  the  new  comers  may  account  for  the  hatred 
with  which  the  neighboring  tribes  regarded  the  colonies  of  Ambra- 
kia, Anaktorion,  and  Leukas.     The  joint  foundation  of  the  two 
northernmost  Greek  settlements  on  the  Epeirotic  coast  had  more 
important  results  in  the  later  history  of  Greece.     These  two  Kor- 
kyraian colonies  were  founded  the  one  at  Apolloniaon  the  mouth 


^2  THE   FORMATION  OF   HELLAS.  [Book  I. 

of  the  Aoos  about  sixty  miles  north  of  Korkyra,  the  other  at  Epi- 
damiios,  about  the  same  distance  still  further  north,  with  the 
Corinthian  Phalios  as  Oikistes.  Corinth  had  thus  a  technical 
right  of  interference  in  their  affairs,  and  the  exercise  of  this  right 
was  one  of  the  alleged  causes  for  the  outbreak  of  the  Peloponne- 
sian  war. 

Between  the  coast  extending  from  Leukas  to  Bouthroton 
(opposite  the  northernmost  promontory  of  Korkyra)  and  the 
Akama-  mountain  range  of  Pindos  lay  a  number  of  tribes,' 
niansand       some  of  which  Were   regarded  as  belonsinsr  in  some 

other  nci*^ii-  t  •  o     o 

boring  °  sort  to  the  Hellenic  stock,  while  others  were  looked 
tribes.  upon  as  mere  barbarians.     Socially  and   morally  they 

stood  probably  on  much  the  same  level.  The  physical  features 
of  the  country,  broken  up  throughout  by  hills  and  mountains  with 
mere  glens  or  gaps  but  no  broad  valleys  or  plains  between  them, 
made  the  growth  of  cities  an  impossibility  ;  and  even  the  village 
communities  scattered  over  this  wild  region  were  linked  together, 
if  joined  at  all,  by  the  slenderest  of  bonds.  Of  these  tribes  th.e 
most  reputable  were  the  Akarnanians,  who,  though  they  preyed 
npon  each  other,  met  together  near  the  Amphilochian  Argos  to 
settle  their  disputes,  and,  though  they  tended  their  flocks  with 
anns  in  their  hands,  lacked  the  deep  cunning  and  treachery  which 
gave  to  their  brutal  Aitolian  neighbors  a  decided  advantage  over 
them. 

Of  the  tribes  which  lay  to  the  north  of  the  Arkananian  terri- 
tory we  need  say  but  little.  By  the  southern  Greeks  they  were 
included  under  the  common  term  Epeirotai,  or  people 
of  the  main  land  :  among  themselves  they  were  distin- 
guished as  Chaonians,  Thesprotians,  Molossians,  or  by  other  names. 

Beyond  these  Epeirotic  tribes  stretched  to  the  north  and  the 
east,  from  the  Hadriatic  to  the  Euxine  seas,  a  vast  region  inhabited 
111  Tians  and  ^"*y  I'aces  more  or  less  nearly  akin  to  each  other,  and  all 
Makedo-  perhaps  having  some  affinity  with  the  ruder  Hellenic 
°^^^^^-  clans.     Of  these  tribes  the  most  prominent  are  the 

Illyrians,  Makedonians,  and  Thrakians,  each  of  these  being  subdi- 
vided into  several  subordinate  tribes,  and  all  exhibiting  character- 
istics common  to  the  inhabitants  of  countries  whose  physical  fea- 
tures present  an  effectual  barrier  to  political  union  and  the  life  of 
cities.  By  far  the  larger  portion  of  this  enormous  region  is  occu- 
pied by  mountains  often  savage  in  their  ruggedncss  and  almost 
everywhere  presenting  impassable  barriers  to  the  passage  of  armies. 
At  best  therefore  we  find  the  inhabitants  dwelling  in  village  com- 
munities ;  and  of  some  we  can  scarcely  speak  as  having  attained  to 
any  notions  of  society  whatever.  Of  these  tribes  many  were,  as 
they  are  still,  mere  robbers.     Some  made  a  trade  of  selling  their 


Chap.  VIII.]  HELLAS   SPORADIKfi.  63 

cliildren  fur  exportation  :  many  more  were  ready  to  hire  themselves 
out  as  mercenaries  and  were  thus  employed  in  maintaining  the  pow- 
er of  the  most  hateful  of  Greek  despots.  The  more  savage  lUyrian 
and  Thrakian  clans  tattoed  their  bodies  and  retained  in  the  histo- 
rical ages  that  practice  of  human  sacrifices  which  in  Hellas  be- 
longed to  a  comparatively  remote  past.  Without  power  of  com- 
bination in  time  of  peace,  they  followed  in  war  the  fashion  wliich 
sends  forth  mountaineers  like  a  torrent  over  the  land  and  then 
draws  them  back  again  whether  to  reap  the  harvest  or  to  feast  and 
sleep  through  winter.  Like  the  warfare  of  the  Scottish  High- 
landers, their  tactics  were  confined  to  a  wild  and  impetuous  rush 
upon  the  enemy.  If  this  failed  they  could  only  retreat  as  hastily 
as  they  had  advanced.  More  fortunate  in  their  soil  and  in  the 
possession  of  comparatively  extensive  plains  watered  by  t*he  Eri- 
gon,  the  Haliakmon,  and  the  Axios,  the  Makedonians,  although  in 
the  time  of  Herodotos  they  had  not  yet  extended  their  conquests 
to  the  sea,  were  still  far  in  advance  of  their  neighbors. 

A  few  generations  after  the  time  of  Herodotos  the  Makedonians 
were  to  be  lords  of  Hellas  and  almost  of  the  world  ;  but  in  his 
own  day  they  were  not  the  most  formidable  of  the  ti'ibes 
to  the  north  of  the  Kambounian  hills.  In  his  belief ' 
the  Thrakians  might  with  even  moderate  powers  of  combination 
carry  everything  before  them  ;  but  there  was  no  fear  of  such 
united  action  on  the  part  of  these  tattoed  savages  whose  roving 
and  desultory  warfare  was  only  once  interrupted  by  the  abortive 
expedition  of  the  Odrysian  Sitalkes.^  The  Thrakian  was  a  mere 
ruffian  who  bought  his  wives,  allowed  his  children  to  herd  together 
like  beasts,  and  then  sold  them  into  slavery.  With  these 
habits  was  combined  that  fierce  periodical  excitement  which,  like 
the  most  savage  of  African  or  Polynesian  tribes  of  our  own  day, 
they  were  pleased  to  call  religious  worship.  The  attraction  of  the 
frenzied  rites  which  were  thus  celebrated  among  the  mountains 
whether  on  the  European  or  the  Asiatic  side  of  the  Propontis  was 
unhappily  not  confined  to  themselves.  The  madness  spread  west- 
wards and  southwards,  and  gave  rise  to  one  of  the  most  disgrace- 
ful phases  of  Greek  social  life. 

The   coast  line  of  the  regions  occupied  by  these   savages  was 
dotted  with  Hellenic  settlements ;  but  Greek  civilisation  brought 
with   it   no   charm  for  Thrakian  tribes.     Foremost  in  _ 
the  enterprise  was,  it  is  said,  the  Euboian  city  Avhich  ments  in 
had  founded  the  earliest  colony  in   Sicily,   and  the  Thrace, 
whole  of  the  country  south  of  a  line  drawn  between  Therme  and 

'  Herod,  v.  3.    Tliucydides,  ii.  98,     Scytliians. 
7,  asserts  that  this  remark  would        ^  Thuc.  ii.  ^6. 
ai>ply  even  more  strongly  to   the 


64  THE   FORMATION   OF   HELLAS.  [Book  I. 

Stageiros  received  the  name  of  Chalkidike  in  attestation  of  her 
activity.  This  territory  of  Chalkidike  is  cut  off  from  the  country 
to  the  north  by  a  range  of  mountains  sloping  down  to  two  of  the 
three  peninsulas  which  run  out  into  the  sea  between  the  Thermaic 
and  the  Strymonic  gulfs.  On  the  easternmost  of  these  projections 
called  Akte  the  magnificent  mass  of  Atlios,  casting  its  shadow  as 
far  as  the  island  of  Lemnos,  rises  sheer  from  the  coast  to  a  lieight 
exceeding  six  thousand  feet,  the  ridge  connecting  it  with  the 
mountains  at  the  base  being  about  half  that  height.  The  inter- 
mediate peninsula,  though  thickly  wooded  like  that  of  Akte,  still 
has  more  of  open  ground  ;  and  on  these  spaces  rose  among  other 
Chalkidian  cities  the  towns  of  Torone  near  the  end  of  the  penin- 
sula and  of  Olynthos  at  the  head  of  the  Toronaic  gi'lf.  At  the 
neck  of  the  third  or  Pallenian  peninsula,  Avhose  earlier  name  of 
Phlegra  points  to  ancient  volcanic  action,  stood  the  Corinthian 
city  of  Potidaia,  while  the  peninsula  itself  contained  Skione, 
Mende,  Sane,  and  other  towns. 

Further  yet  to  the  east  we  reach  the  Thrakian  Chersonesos 
which,  starting  from  a  base  scarcely  more  than  four  miles  in  width, 
Megarian  Stretches  to  the  southwest  for  fifty  miles  from  the 
the^Pro'-  "^  long  wall  near  the  Milesian  colony  of  Kardia  to  Elaious 
pontis.  at  the   entrance  of  the   Hellespontos.^     On  the  Euro- 

pean side  of  this  strait  and  of  the  Propontis  lay  the  Ai)lic  Sestos, 
and  the  Megarian  settlements  of  Selymbria  and  of  Byzantion,  the 
future  home  of  Roman  emperors  and  Turkish  sultans.  The  fact 
that  a  city  like  Megara  could  thus,  in  the  century  (it  is  said)  pre- 
ceding the  lifetime  of  Solon,  lay  its  hands  on  the  kej^to  the  Eux- 
ine  and  the  Egean,  brings  before  us  a  picture  in  strange  contrast 
with  the  familiar  features  of  later  Athenian  history.  In  the  ex- 
tension of  the  Hellenic  race  along  the  Makedonian  and  Thrakian 
coasts  or  along  the  shores  of  Epeiros,  Illyrikon,  and  Sicily,  such 
cities  as  Chalkis,  Eretria,  and  Megara  seem  by  comparison  every- 
where, Athens  nowhere.  We  might  almost  say  that  these  states, 
which  liad  thus  reached  tlieir  maturity  before  Athens  had  passed 
under  the  sway  of  the  Peisistratidai,  exhausted  thehiselves  in  the 
multiplication  of  isolated  units,  while  the  strength  of  Athens  was 
reserved  for  the  conflict  which  determined  the  future  course  of 
European  history. 

The  opening  of  Egypt  to  Greek  trade  by  Psammitichos  ^  gave 
„     ,  that  impulse  to  Hellenic  colonisation  in  Africa  which 

colonisation  raised  up  to  the  east  of  the  great  Syrtis  a  city  not  un- 
in  Africa.  -worthy  to  be  the  rival  of  Carthage.  Placed  on  a 
mountain  terrace  nearly  two  thousand  feet  in  height  and  com- 

'  Herod,  v.  33.  '  Herod,  ii.  178. 


Chap.  VIII.]  HELLAS   SPORADIKEl.  65 

manding  from  a  distance  of  ten  miles  a  vast  sweep  of  the  sea,  Ky- 
rene  had  in  the  loftier  liiils  whicli  rose  behind  it  a  source  of  wealth 
more  precious  than  the  richness  of  the  most  fertile  soil,  sources  of 
With  water  even  poor  soils  will  yield  marvellously  perjfy^of 
under  an  African  sun  ;  and  that  boon  was  abundantly  Kyrene. 
secured  to  Kyrene  by  the  constant  vapors  and  rains  condensed 
and  precipitated  by  these  beneficent  mountains.  AVith  this  moist- 
ure the  plains  near  the  sea  yielded  lavish  liarvcsts  of  grain,  while 
the  lower  hills  and  valleys  furnished  never-failing  pasture.  Nay, 
with  the  differences  of  climate  between  the  higher  and  the  lower 
lands,  the  fruits  were  ripening  and  harvest  was  going  on  all  the 
year  round  ;  and  lastly  in  the  Silphium,  whose  leaves  nourished 
cattle  while  the  stalk  furnished  food  for  men  and  the  root  yielded 
a  juice  highly  valued  in  all  parts  of  Hellas,  Kyrene  had  a  special 
source  of  wealth  which,  in  spite  of  civil  dissensions  and  tumults, 
carried  the  colony  to  a  height  of  prosperity  reached  by  no  other 
African  city  except  Carthage. 

Thus  in  tliat  fertile  region  which,  lying  between  the  island  of 
Platea  in  the  cast  to  tlie  settlement  of  Ilesperides  (Bengazi)  in  the 
west,  stretched  from  the  coast  to  the  scnithern  moun-  conflicts 
tain  ranges,'  Greek  colonists  had  a  field  for  enterprise  i>etweenthe 
which,  if  persistent,  could  not  fail  to  be  richly  re-  frinians  and 
warded;  and  commercially,  it  must  l)e  admitted  that  t'>« G'^eks. 
these  colonies  were  successful. 

The  lands  which  lay  to  the  west  of  Ilesperides  were  manifestly 
regarded  by  Carthago  as  ground  over  which  she  could  suffer  no 
dominion  to  be  established  but  her  own.  She  had  now  career  of 
been  compelled  to  j^ut  down  Hellenic  incroachments  in  ^frVcaand 
Africa.  The  same  task  awaited  her  in  Sicily,  calling  Sicily, 
for  greater  efforts  on  her  part  and  involving  a  risk  of  more  serious 
failure.  Her  first  conflict  in  that  battle-ground  of  opposing  races 
was  with  the  Spartan  Dorieus  who  had  attempted  to  found  a  set- 
tlement on  the  banks  of  the  Kinyps.  The  history  of  Dorieus  be- 
longs to  a  class  of  traditions  which  would  seem  strange  if  ascribed 
to  any  Greek  city  but  Sparta.  But  for  the  oflicious  meddling  of 
the  ephors  and  the  senate^  Dorieus  would  liave  been  king  instead 
of  the  mad  Kleomencs.  Thus  deprived  of  his  iidicritance,  he  re- 
solved to  quit  Sparta.  "With  all  the  high  spirit  of  his  younger 
brother  the  illustrious  Leonidas,  he  sailed  to  Libya  without  asking, 
it  is  said,  the  advice  of  the  Delphian  god  ;  and  this  carelessness 
was  probably  regarded  as  fully  explaining  his  expulsion  by  the 
Libyan  tribes  in  alliance  with  Carthage.  Thus  driven  out,  he  re- 
turned to  Sparta,  and  had  he  chosen  to  remain  there  he  would  have 

'  The  land  to  the  south  of  these  mountains  is  desert. 
"  Herod,  v.  41. 


66  THE  FOEMATION   OF  HELLAS.  [Book  I. 

been  the  general  in  command  at  Thermopylai.  But  at  Sparta  he 
could  not  rest ;  and  he  departed,  this  time  after  consulting  the  god 
at  Delphoi,  to  seek  a  new  home  in  Sicily.  He  landed  in  that  island 
to  find  himself  opposed  not  only  by  the  people  of  Egesta  but  by 
the  full  force  of  the  Carthaginians  ;  and  in  the  battle  which  ensued 
Dorieus  was  slain  Avith  all  the  other  leaders  of  the  colony  except 
Euiyleon  who  with  the  remnant  of  the  array  seized  the  Selinoun- 
tian  settlement  of  Minoa,  about  twenty  miles  to  the  west  of  Akra- 
gas,  and  having  rid  the  city  of  its  tyrant  Peithagoras  made  himself 
despot  in  his  stead.  His  subjects  were  not  altogether  satisfied 
with  this  measure  of  freedom,  for  after  a  while  they  put  him  to 
death  at  the  very  altar  of  Zeus  Agoraios. 

But  the  rivalry  of  Carthage  had  little  effect  in  repressing  those 
innate  vices  of  the  Greek  character  which  seemed  to  gain  strength 
Foundation  ^'^  ^^^  ^oil.  The  Greek  Colonies  in  Sicily  exhibit 
of  the  generally  the  same  transitions  from  oligarchical  govern- 

dynasty  of  ment  to  tyranny  which  mark  the  history  of  the  parent 
Syracuse.  country  during  the  generations  preceding  the  Persian 
wars.  The  gi-eat  power  and  prosperity  attained  by  many  of  these 
Greek  cities  in  Sicily,  in  spite  of  everlasting  feuds  and  frequent 
revolutions,  furnish  sufficient  evidence  of  the  extraordinary  ad- 
vantages which  they  enjoyed  in  the  soil,  the  climate,  and  the 
physical  resources  of  the  country.  Among  the  despots  who  rose 
to  power  in  these  cities  the  most  prominent  was  Gelon,  despot  of 
Syracuse,  and  virtually  master  of  all  Sicily  east  of  a  line  drawn 
from  the  borders  of  Messenc  to  those  of  Akragas. 

AVhen  the  aid  of  this  tyrant  was  sought  against  Xerxes  by  the 
envoys  from  Athens  and  Sparta,  Gelon  in  his  reply  expressed,  it  is 
incroach-  said,  his  readiness  to  furnish  them  with  a  force  such  as 
odon  on  ^^*^^  other  Greek  state  was  able  to  raise,  and  with  a  wealth 
C'artha-  of  supplies  wholly  beyond  the  resources  of  all  the  Greek 

frouiKl.  cities  put  together.     But  Avhile   in   return  for  this  aid 

481  B.C.  he  insisted  on  being  recognised  as  supreme  commander 

of  the  Greek  confederation,  he  took  care,  we  are  told,  to  rebuke 
them  for  the  selfishness  which  now  made  them  his  suppliants, 
when  in  his  time  of  need  they  had  refused  to  help  him  in  his 
efforts  to  avenge  the  death  of  Dorieus  and  drive  the  Carthaginians 
out  of  Sicily.'  If  these  Avords  point  to  historical  facts,  these  facts 
fully  explain  the  real  reason  for  that  refusal  of  aid  to  the  conti- 
nental Greeks  which  the  tradition  of  the  latter  ascribed  to  their 
own  rejection  of  his  claim  to  the  Hegemony.  The  efforts  of  Gelon 
had  succeeded  in  pushing  the  Carthaginians  back  to  the  west  of  a 
line  drawn  between  the  Greek   cities  of  Himera  on  the  northern 

'  Herod,  vii.  158.     Diod.  xl.  20. 


Chap.  VIII.]  HELLAS   SP0RADIK6.  67 

and  Selinoiis  on  the  southwestern  coast  of  the  island  ;  but  he  had 
not  succeeded  in  detaching  these  cities  from  their  friendship  for 
or  their  alliance  with  Carthage,  a  friendship  shared  further  by 
the  towns  of  Messene  and  Rhegion.'  Within  this  line  the  Cartha- 
ginians retained  only  the  settlements  of  Motye,  Panormos,  and 
Soloeis  (Soluntum)  ;  and  although  their  policy  tlius  far  had  been 
to  avoid  all  wars  (for  their  contest  with  Dorieus  was  the  result  of 
open  aggression  on  his  part),  the  rapid  aggrandisement  of  Gelon 
made  them  fear  that  without  a  vigorous  effort  they  would  lose 
their  hold  even  on  this  western  corner  of  the  island.  The  way 
was  opened  for  such  an  effort  by  those  internal  feuds  among  Greeks 
which  raised  an  insuperable  barrier  to  the  growth  of  a  Greek 
nation.  Combination  on  the  part  of  the  Greek  settlers  would  have 
made  them  absolute  masters  of  all  Sicily.  Sustained  and  syste- 
matic action  would  have  secured  the  same  result  for  tlie  Cartha- 
ginians. Both  alike  failed  in  the  conditions  indispensable  for 
permanent  ascendency,  and  the  end  was  the  absorption  of  both  in 
the  dominion  of  imperial  Rome.^ 

We  shall  find  that  but  little  trust  can  be  placed  in  the  minute 
details  of  the  battles  fought  during  the  Persian  war  at  Thermo[)y  lai, 
Salamis,  Plataiai,  or  Mykale.     We  are  even  less  justi-   The  battle 
fied  in  fjivinff  credit  to  the  narrative   of  the  battle   of  llimeia. 

480  B  c 

which,  fought,  it  is  said,  on  the  very  day  of  the  fight 
at  Salamis,  left  Gelon  by  the  utter  defeat  of  Hamilkar  master,  for 
the  time,  of  all  Sicily.  Diodoros,  who  like  Herodotos  raised  the 
Carthaginian  army  to  300,000,  kills  off  half  that  number  on  the 
field  of  Himera  where,  seventy  years  later,  the  grandson  of 
Hamilkar  sacrificed  three  thousand  Hellenic  prisoners,^  v/hile  he 
ascribes  the  result  of  the  conflict  to  a  stratagem  suggested  to  Gelon 
by  some  intercepted  letters  from  the  Selinountians  to  the  Cartha- 
ginian leader.  The  incident  is  in  no  way  unlikely  ;  but  the  ground 
seems  to  be  less  firm  when  we  reach  the  tale  which  relates  the 
death  of  Hamilkar.  This  ill-fated  chief,  it  is  said,  was  never  seen 
again  after  the  fight.  The  whole  field  was  searched  with  minute 
care  by  the  order  of  Gelon,  but  his  body  could  not  be  found  ;  and 
Herodotos  was  inclined  to  put  faith  in  an  alleged  Carthaginian 
tradition  that  during  the  battle  Hamilkar  stood  by  a  huge  altar  oi\ 
which  he  was  sacrificing  whole  beasts  as  victims,  and  that  on 
seeing  the  day  going  against  him  he  leaped  into  the  consuming 
fires.  The  historian  adds  that  his  countrymen  raised  monuments 
to  his  memory  in  all  their  colonies  as  well  as  in  Carthage  itself 
and  worshipped  him  as  a  god.''     If  this  be  true,  it  is  of  itself  con- 

'  Herod,  vii.  165.     Diod.  xi.  33.  '  Herod,  vii.  165.     Died.  xi.  20. 

=■  Ihue,  History  of  Rome,  ii.  33.  *  Herod,  vii.  167. 


68  THE  FORMATION   OF  HELLAS.  [Book  L 

elusive  evidence  that  his  defeat  was  not  so  overwhelming  as  his 
enemies  would  have  it  and  that  on  the  day  of  battle  the  general 
did  something  more  than  roast  flesh  to  appease  the  hunger  of 
Moloch.  It  was  not  the  hahit  of  Carthaginians  to  venerate  men 
who  brought  their  country  to  the  verge  of  ruin.  The  tradition  is 
throughout  disfigured  by  the  vanity  of  the  Sicilian  Greeks.  As  in 
one  version  of  the  eastern  story  Xerxes  was  suffered  to  reach  the 
Asiatic  shore  with  only  one  solitary  boat,  so  with  Diodoros  a 
single  vessel  reaches  Carthage  with  the  miserable  remnant  of  the 
army  which  Hamilkar  had  conveyed  to  Sicily  in  more  than  two 
thousand  ships.  There  is,  in  fact,  no  limit  to  their  humiliation. 
Carthaginian  envoys  fall  in  tears  at  the  feet  of  Gelon,  praying  him 
in  the  name  of  humanity  to  have  mercy  upon  them.  His  wife 
Damarete  plays  the  part  of  queen  Philippa  in  the  scene  between 
Edward  III.  and  the  burgesses  of  Calais  ;  and  the  Carthaginians 
are  pardoned  on  condition  of  paying  2,000  talents  as  the  cost  of 
the  war  and  building  two  temples  in  which  the  treaty  of  peace 
might  be  preserved.  Like  men  reprieved  from  a  sentence  of  death, 
they  accept  these  terms,  with  a  gratitude  which  finds  expression  in 
the  gift  to  Damarete  of  a  golden  crown  200  talents  in  Aveight.  To 
complete  the  fiction,  we  are  told  that  Gelon  was  thus  indulgent 
to  the  enemies  whom  he  had  crushed,  because  he  was  anxious  to 
take  part  in  the  continental  war  against  Xerxes  ;  that,  before  he 
could  set  sail,  the  ti  lings  came  of  the  victory  of  Salamis  and  the 
retreat  of  the  tyrant ;  that  on  receiving  the  news,  he  summoned 
the  citizens  to  appear  armed  in  the  assembly,  and  going  to  that 
assembly  not  only  without  arms  but  even  without  an  lapper  gar- 
ment, entered  into  an  elaborate  review  of  his  acts  and  of  the  policy 
by  which  they  had  been  dictated.  No  Greek  despot  had  ever  thus 
thrown  himself  on  the  good  faith  of  his  people.  The  Syracusans 
knew  how  to  appreciate  such  confidence,  and  hailed  the  tyrant  by 
acclamation  as  their  benefactor,  their  saviour,  and  their  king.' 
In  striking  contrast  with  this  extravagant  romance  the  lyric  poet, 
writing  at  a  time  not  many  years  after  the  event,  prays  that  Zeus 
may  put  oflf  as  long  as  possible  the  conflict  then  impending  with  the 
Carthaginians,  which  he  feels  must  be  a  struggle  for  life  or  death." 
If  the  defeated  Hamilkar  was  worshipped  by  his  countrymen, 
the  victorious  Gelon  deserved  at  least  equal  honors.  He 
the  Gelonian  too  was  venerated  as  a  hero,  when  a  few  months  after 
dynasty.  j^jg  gj-gat  triumph  he  died  of  dropsy.  He  had  de- 
sired that  his  power  should  be  shared  between  his  two  brothers, 

•■  Diod.  xi.  21-26.    It  is  clear  that  tradition  is  very  modest,  and  there- 

this  story  must  have  beenin%-ented  forn  probably  near  to  the  truth, 

after  the  time  of  Herodotos,  accord-  ^  Find.  Nem.  ix.  67.     Ihne,  His- 

injJT  to  whom,  vii   lii4,  the  Sicilian  tory  of  Rome,  ii.  23. 


Chap.  VIII.]  HELLAS   SP0RADIK]6.  69 

Hieron  whom  he  liud  placed  at  Gela  succeeding  to  the  tyranny, 
while  Polyzelos  was  to  have  the  military  command.  The  arrange- 
ment was  not  to  Hieron's  mind.  Polyzelos  took  refuge,  it  is  said, 
with  Theron  of  Akragas,  who  by  refusing  to  surrender  him  drew 
down  on  himself  the  wrath  of  llieron.  In  short,  after  the  death 
of  Gelon  the  liistory  of  the  Greek  cities  in  Sicily  falls  back  into 
the  old  round  of  faction,  revolution,  and  war.  Between  Gelon 
and  Theron  of  Akragas  there  liad  been  a  firm  friendship  :  between 
Hieron  and  Thrasydaios  the  son  of  Theron  there  was  a  war  in  which 
the  former  paid  a  high  price  for  his  victory.  The 
death  of  Hieron  a  few  years  later  was  followed 
by  further  troubles.  His  brother  Thrasyboulos  had  a  rival,  it  is 
said,  in  liis  nephew  the  son  of  Gelon.  He  met  and  averted  tlie 
danger  by  corrupting  the  boy,  and  then  gave  full  play  to  his 
vindictive  and  merciless  nature.'  The  result  was  a  revolt  of  his 
subjects  who  besieged  him  in  Ortygia,  and,  if  avc  are  to  believe 
the  account  of  Diodoros,  compelled  him  to  yield  np  his  power. 
Eighteen  years^  only  had  passed  since  the  foundation  of  tlie 
Gelonian  dynasty  at  Syracuse  when  Thrasyboulos  departed  and 
took  up  his  abode  among  the  Epizephyrian  Lokrians,  who  dealt 
with  him  more  mercifully  than  the  Megarians  had  dealt  with 
Thrasydaios.  We  have  now  to  see  how  and  with  what  results, 
on  soil  not  much  more  promising  at  the  first,  the  seeds  of  law, 
order,  and  freedom  were  sown  at  Athens. 


CHAPTER    IX. 


EARLY    CONSTITUTIONAL     HISTORY    OF    ATHENS. 

We  have  already  seen  that  the  constitutions  of  Athens  and  Sparta 
furnish  abundant  evidence  of  their  common  origin  from  the  primi- 
tive Aryan  household  with  its  absolute  subjection  to  the   (.Q^f^ggf 
father  of  the  family,  or,  in  other  words,  to  the  priest  between 
who  alone  could   offer  the  necessary  sacrifices  to  his  Athen/as 
deified  ancestors.     But   although   the  theory  of  this   I""* -^l  ^^ 
ancient  family  life  remained   intact  in  both,  the  dif- 
ferences in  the  growth  of  these  two  states  were  wide  indeed.     If 
we  may  accept  as  substantially  true  and  fair  the  picture  which 
Perikles  in  his  great  Funeral   Oration'  draws  of  the  political  and 

'  Arist.  Polit.  v.  10,  31.  ^  lb.  v.  12,  6.  ="  Time.  ii.  35-40. 


70  THE  FORMATION   OF   HELLAS.  [Book  I, 

social  condition  of  Athens  in  his  own  day,  we  shall  find  it  difficult 
to  avoid  the  conclusion  that  distinctions  of  time  and  place  go  for 
little  indeed.  All  the  special  characteristics  of  English  polity — 
its  freedom  of  speech,  the  right  of  the  peojile  to  govern  them- 
selves, the  supremacy  of  the  ordinary  courts  of  law  over  all  func- 
tionaries Avithout  exception,  the  practical  restriction  of  state  inter- 
ference to  the  protection  of  person  and  property,  the  free  play 
given  to  the  tastes,  fancies,  prejudices,  and  caprices  of  individual 
citizens — may  be  seen  in  equal  developement  in  the  polity  of 
Athens, 

But,  like  the  constitution  of  England,  the  full  developement  of 
Athenian  democracy  was  the  work  of  ages.  It  was  no  makeshift 
Complicated  hastily  adopted  and  modified  at  haphazard  after  the 
character  fashion  of  some  European  nations  who  expel  kings  and 
Athenian  queens  and  then  sit  down  to  meditate  on  the  forms  of 
constitution,  government  which  may  best  suit  their  interests  or  their 
fancies.  Like  the  English  constitution,  it  was  the  fruit  of  long  and 
arduous  struggles,  slowly  ripened  as  the  people  awoke  more  and 
inore  to  that  consciousness  of  law  and  order  which  can  be  fully 
awakened  only  among  men  Avho  feel  that  the  law  which  they  obey 
is  their  own  law  and  that  they  obey  it  because  it  aims  more  and 
more  at  being  in  accordance  with  a  justice  and  righteousness  higher 
than  that  of  man.'  Like  the  constitution  of  Ensxland  at  once  in 
its  coherence  and  in  its  powers  of  adaptation  to  change  of  circum- 
stances, it  carries  us  back  in  the  history  of  its  growth  to  times  of 
which  we  must  candidly  confess  that  we  know  very  little  ;  and 
we  must  on  many  matters  be  content  either  to  suspend  our  judg- 
ment or  to  reason  from  signs  which,  as  in  the  early  history  of 
English  polity,  seem  to  point  to  sufliciently  probable  conclusions. 

The  undoubted  existence  down  to  the  time  of  Kleisthenes  (a 
period  preceding  by  only  a  few  years  the  battle  of  Marathon)  of 
Athens  in  '^  subdivision  by  clans  and  houses  takes  us  back,  as  we 
the  time  of     have  already    seen,    almost   to    the    earliest   form    of 

eist  enes.  ]^m^-,j^^^  society.  AVhatever  may  have  been  the  origin 
snd  meaning  of  the  names  which  have  been  variously  assigned  to 
the  Athenian  tribes,  the  evidence  already  reviewed  ^  seems  to  leave 
it  certain  that  the  point  of  starting  Avas  from  the  house  or  family 
upwards,  and  not  from  the  larger  division  downwards.  We  have 
licre  in  fact  the  same  growth  as  that  of  the  English  families  into 
ti  things,  hundreds,  and  shires, — a  division  which  preceded  and 
survived  the  several  kingdoms  into  Avliich  the  country  was  from 
time  to  time  parcelled  out.^  Nor  can  we  questi()n  that  the  prin- 
ciple underlying  this  grouping  was  one  of  blood  and  of  religion, 
which  could  take  no  reckoning  of  those  who  Avere  not  sprung  from 

■  Soph.  Old.  Tyr.  864.  ^  Freeman,  Norman  Conquest,  vol. 

*  Chapter  ii.  i.  ch.  iii.  ^  2. 


CH.VP.  IX.]  EARLY   HISTORY   OF   ATHENS.  71 

the  same  stock.  Hence  if  in  later  times  there  were  superadded  to 
tjie  old  clan  names  a  fm'tlier  political  grouping  wliicli  took  in  the 
whole  country  territorially,  still  this  grouping  would  not  neces- 
sarily embrace  all  its  inhabitants.  AH  wlio  could  not  share  in  the 
gentile  sacrifices  would  be  shut  out ;  and  the  influx  of  strangers 
and  foreigners  would  tend  to  swell  a  population  to  which  the 
existing  social  order  allowed  no  political  rights.  It  was  the 
growth  of  such  a  popxilation  which,  owing  to  conflicts  between  the 
ruling  classes,  determined  the  form  of  Athenian  democracy. 

In  the  Trittys  and  Naukraria  we  have  a  classification  which 
clearly  follows  a  downward  course.  The  tribe  must  have  been 
organised  before  it  could  be  divided  into  three  portions,  TheTrittves 
and  the  twelve  Trittyes  obtained  for  the  four  tribes  and  Nau- 
were  then  divided  each  into  four  Naukrariai,  forty-  '''^"''^• 
eight  in  all.  Solon,  it  is  said,  laid  on  each  of  these  Naukrariai  the 
charge  of  providing  one  sliip  for  the  public  service  ;  and  hence  it 
lias  been  inferred  that  the  classification  itself  was  devised  by  him 
and  was  thus  designated  from  its  reference  to  the  navy.  But 
if  Ilerodotos  be  right  in  saying  that  Kylon  was  removed  from 
sanctuary  by  the  Prytaneis,  or  presidents,  of  the  Naukraroi,  it 
would  follow  that  the  division  existed  before  the  days  of  Solon 
and  that  tlie  Naukraroi  were  simply  the  chief  householders 
charged  with  the  levying  and  administration  of  the  taxes  in  each 
district.' 

We  are  still  on  doubtful  ground  when  we  come  to  the  story 
of  the  settlement  of  Athens  as  related  by  Thucydides.*  Of  the 
Theseus  who  is  said  to  have  made  Athens  the  seat  of  j,^^  union 
a  central  government  which  superseded  the  indepen-  of  the  Attic 
dent  action  of  a  set  of  voluntarily  confederated  boroughs 
or  cities,  our  knowledge  comes  only  from  the  stories  which  tell 
us  of  his  marvellous  childhood,  of  the  discovery  of  his  father's 
weapons  under  the  great  stone,  of  his  battle  with  tlie  Minotauros 
and  his  stealing  of  Helen,  the  fatal  sister  of  the  Dioskouroi.  Still, 
although  we  may  not  regard  the  narrative  as  liistory,  we  are  not 
free  to  say  that  no  such  change  ever  took  place.  It  is  far  more 
likely  that  it  did.  The  mere  classification  into  Trittyes  and 
Naukrariai  is  of  itself  proof  that  the  need  was  felt  of  political 
divisions  which  should  run  counter  to  the  religious  and  exclusive 
constitution  of  the  houses  and  clans  ;  and  this  feeling  is  brought 
out  still  more  prominently  in  the  accounts  of  the  political  changes 

'   The   word   Naukraros   would  the  officers  chartred  with  the  duty 

thus  be  only  another  form  of  Nau-  of  tryinrj  cases  of  unlawful  admis- 

kleros  in  the  sense  of  a  household-  siou  into  the  Phratries. 

er.  as  vaC'ov  denoted  the  rent  of  a  ^  ii.  15. 
house,  and  as  the  Nautodikai  were 


'^2  THE   FOEMATION   OF  HELLAS.  [Book  L 

attributed  to  Kleistlienes.  There  could  have  been  no  reason  for 
substituting  local  Demoi  for  the  existing  tribes,  if  the  latter  could 
have  been  made  as  available  for  the  purposes  of  the  statesman. 

The  consolidation  of  the  Attic  Demoi  into  a  single  state  Avould 
thus  answer  to  the  gradual  absorption  of  the  several  English  king- 
Riffhtof  in-  doms  under  the  sovereignty  of  the  chiefs  of  Wessex. 
termarriage.   jj^  -^i^g  q^^q  q^^q  j^g  jj^    i[^q  Other  the    task  was  not 

accomplished  in  a  day,  nor  without  violent  struggles.  The  pro- 
hibition of  intermarriage  which  is  said  to  have  existed  among  some 
of  the  Attic  Demoi  would  point  to  the  jealousy  and  animosity  of 
communities  originally  independent ;  nor  must  we  leave  out  of 
sight  such  legends  as  the  story  of  the  Athenian  Tellos  who  falls 
in  a  battle  between  the  men  of  Eleusis  and  of  Athens'  and,  more 
particularly,  the  evidence  of  poems  like  the  Hymn  to  Demeter  in 
which  Eleusis  is  clearly  still  an  independent  state  and  in  which 
the  Athenians  take  no  part  in  the  mj-steries  of  the  Great  Mother. 
The  strength  of  this  cantonal  feeling  is  further  shown  in  the 
eagerness  with  which  the  Athenians  returned  to  their  country  life 
after  the  Persian  invasion  and  in  the  reluctance  w^ith  Avhich  they 
abandoned  their  homes  to  take  up  their  quarters  within  the  city 
at  the  beginning  of  the  Peloponnesian  war." 

But  when  Ave  come  to  the  reforms  of  Theseus,  we  find,  in  place 
of  four  tribes  whose  names  seem  to  liave  been  by  no  means  per- 
TheEupa-  mauent,  a  new  division  under  the  three  titles  of  Eupa- 
morol,^nd  tridai,  Geomoroi,  and  Demiourgoi, — in  other  words, 
Demiourgoi.  the  uoblcs.  the  yeomen,  and  the  mechanics.^  What- 
ever else  may  be  denoted  by  this  classification,  it  represents  with 
suflicieiit  exactness  the  social  order  which  prevailed  for  a  long 
ihna  both  at  Athens  and  at  Rome,  and  which  gave  to  certain 
families  a  preponderance  over  all  other  members  of  the  state. 
Whatever  may  have  been  their  relation  to  the  tribes,  we  may 
fairly  accept  the  fact  that  the  substantial  power  in  tlie  state  was  in 
the  liands  of  the  Eupatridai.  The  days  of  kings  had  long  been 
ended.  The  devotion  of  Kodros,  it  is  said,  had  made  the  title  too 
sacred  to  be  borne  by  any  after  him,  as  the  tyranny  of  Tarquin 
had  made  it  too  horrible  to  be  tolerated  at  Rome.  After  him  there 
w^ere,  we  are  told,  archons  for  life,  then  for  ten  years,  and  then 
the  office  was  put  into  commission,  and  a  complicated  con- 
stitution grew  up,  for  Avhich  in  the  earlier  stages  we  have  no 
contemporary  history,  and  to  Avhich  writers  who  lived  after  the 
'  Herod,  i.  30.  and    clients.      But   lie   is   clearly 

^  Thuc.  ii.  16.  reasoning   from    Latin    to    Greek 

^  Dionysios,  ii.  8,  divides  the  forms;  and  the  looseness  of  his  ar- 
Athenians  into  Eupatridai  and  gument  is  sufficiently  shown  from 
Agroikoi  or  dependent  cultivators,  his  random  guesses  as  to  the 
answering  to  the  Latin  patricians     meaning  of  the  Latin  Patres. 


Chap.  IX.]  EARLY   HISTORY   OF   ATHENS.  73 

changes  introduced  by  Aristeides,  Perikles,  and  Ephialtes,  ap- 
plied, whenever  it  seemed  necessary,  the  convenient  method  of 
conjecture. 

But  every  confederation  implies  a  council  ;  and  xVryan  history 
generally  furnishes  ample  evidence  that  the  several  combinations 
of  families  into  a  tribe  and  of  tribes  into  a  city  would  The  Council 
result  in  a  subordination  of  the  councils  representing  ofAreiopa- 
the  clans  and  houses  to  the  great  council  of  the  state.  ^°^' 
This  council  at  Athens  was  that  of  Areiopagos  or  the  hill  of  Ares, 
known  at  first  simply  as  Boule,  the  Council,  which  with  the 
magistrates  included  in  it  inherited  the  large  and  undefined  powers 
belonging  of  right  first  to  the  master  of  the  family,  then  to  the 
chief  of  the  clan,  and  lastly  to  the  king.  Of  these  powers  the  most 
sacred,  if  not  the  most  important  to  the  state,  was  that  of  the 
priesthood.  As  the  name  and  person  of  the  father  and  the  king 
were  most  closely  associated  with  the  sacerdotal  idea,  so  the 
khigly  title  both  at  Athens  and  Rome  was  assigned  to  the  officer 
charged  with  the  guardianship  and  direction  of  the  state  religion  ; 
and  thus  the  Roman  Rex  Sacrorum  answered  to  the  Athenian 
Arclion  Basileus  whose  jurisdiction  embraced  cases  of  liomicide 
and  religious  offences.  Two  other  archons,  belonging  to  the  col- 
lege of  nine,  who  are  said  to  have  entered  on  their  functions  with 
Kreon,  bore  distinctive  titles, — the  first,  who  was  also  head  of 
the  college,  being  the  Archon  Eponymos,  as  giving  his  name  to 
the  year,  or  simply  the  Archon,  and  the  Archon  Polemarchos. 
Of  these  two  the  former  settled  all  disputes  arising  from  the  re- 
lations of  the  family,  the  gens,  and  the  phratria,  while  the  latter 
dealt  with  all  quarrels  between  citizens  and  non-citizens,  and  had 
the  command  of  the  army  in  war.  All  other  matters  not  restricted 
to  these  were  under  tlie  cognisance  of  the  remaining  six  an^lions 
who  were  known  as  Thesmothetai,  a  title,  common  doubtless  to 
all  the  nine,  which  may  be  interpreted  by  the  Homeric  description 
of  the  judges  who  receive  and  maintain  the  laws  for  Zeus.'  These 
oflScers  at  the  end  of  their  year  of  office  became,  on  passing  the 
necessary  test,  permanent  members  of  the  great  council  of  the 
Areiopagos. 

The  whole  course  of  Athenian  history  seems  to  attest  the 
gradual  restriction  of  the  powers  of  this  body,  which  continued  to 
retain  its  jurisdiction  in  cases  of  homicide  long  after  rpj^^  jjj.jj^q. 
it  had  been  deprived  of  its  legislative  and  administra-  nian  ks^isia- 
tive  functions.  The  basis  of  its  power  was  distinctly  ^'""' 
religious,  and  the  power  itself  was  necessarily  exercised  inflexibly. 
It  was   not  competent  for  the  Areiopagos  to  draw   distinctions 

'  IL  i.  239. 


74r  THE   FORMATION   OF   HELLAS.  [Book  L 

between  the  guilt  of  one  liomicide  and  that  of  another.  There 
could  be  but  one  doom  for  all  who  were  judged  guilty  of  having 
shed  blood,  Avhether  they  might  plead  accident  by  way  of  excuse, 
or  urge  provocation  by  way  of  palliating  the  offence.  The  hard- 
ness of  the  Drakonian  laws  has  passed  into  a  proverb  ;  but  if  we 
give  credit  to  the  tradition,  it  was  a  movement  in  the  way  of 
lenity,  not  of  severity,  when  Drakon  made  the  distinctions  de- 
manded by  equity,  and  ordained  that  the  court  of  the  Ephetai, 
fifty-one  in  number,  should  sit  in  different  places  to  adjudicate  in 
different  cases  of  homicide  according  to  their  complexion  or  to  the 
plea  urged  by  the  criminal.  If  he  alleged  accident,  he  was  to  be 
tried  at  the  Palladion  ;  if  he  pleaded  provocation,  he  was  to  be 
arn.ignedat  the  Delphinion  or  consecrated  ground  of  Apollonand 
Artemis.  The  religious  scruples  which  regarded  one  spot  as  pro- 
faned by  acts  which  might  be  lawfully  done  in  another  are  ex- 
hibited still  more  clearly  in  the  rules  Avhich  prescribe  that  a 
person  banished  for  homicide  and  charged  with  a  second  offence 
of  the  like  sort  should  take  his  trial  at  a  place  called  Phreattys  in 
a  boat  hauled  close  in  on  the  shore,  wdiile  the  animism  of  the 
earliest  forms  of  thought  Avhich  attribute  life  to  all  sensible 
objects^  is  seen  in  the  jurisdiction  of  the  four  Phylo-basileis  or 
tribe-kings  who  meet  in  the  Prytaneion  to  try  inanimate  objects 
which  have  caused  the  death  of  a  human  being,  and  if  found 
guilty,  to  cast  them  solemnly  beyond  the  borders  of  the  laud. 

That  the  rule  of  the  Eupatridai  exercised  through  this  council 
and  the  College  of  Archons  would  be  both  harsh  and  irksome,  is  no 
The  con-        more  than  what  we  might  expect ;  and  it  was  as  likely 
spiracyof      that  efforts  to  control  or  change  it  might  come  from 
^  °°"  those  w'lio  wished  to  set  up  a  despotism  as  from  those 

who  wished  to  introduce  a  democracy.  Of  the  attempt  of  Kylon 
to  seize  the  Akropolis,  as  it  is  said,  for  the  former  purpose,  the  chief 
importance  lies  in  the  use  made  of  it  by  the  Spartans  to  counteract 
the  influence  of  Perikles  before  the  outbreak  of  the  Peloponnesian 
war,'^  as  it  had  been  employed  in  like  sort  against  Kleisthenes.* 
It  is  as  likely  that  a  vain  attempt  to  erect  a  despotism  should  have 
been  made  by  Kylon  as  that  the  exploit  should  have  been  achieved 
by  Peisistratos,  But  the  story  itself  is  told  with  singular  contra- 
dictions. In  the  brief  summary  of  Herodotos  Kylon  tries  in  vain 
to  seize  on  the  Akropolis.  When  on  his  failure  he  takes  refuge  at 
the  shrine,  he  is  removed  by  the  Prytaneis  of  the  Naukraroi  on  the 
pledge  that  his  life  should  be  spared,  but  the  coTOuant  is  disre- 
garded by  the  Alkmaionidai  who  put  him  to  death.  In  the  more 
full  report  of  Thucydides,  Kylon,  aided  by  his  father-in-law  The- 

'  Tylor,  Primitive  Culture,  voL  i.        ^  Tbuc.  i.  127. 
cb.  ii.  '  Herod,  v.  70. 


Chap.  IX.]  EARLY  HISTORY  OF   ATHENS.  75 

agenes  tyrant  of  Mcgara,'  succeeds  in  occupying  the  Akropolis, 
and  is  foiled  only  by  a  lack  of  the  food  needed  to  witlLstand  a 
long  siege,  the  blockade  being  intrusted  to  the  nine  archons,  who 
iit  that  time  had  virtually,  we  are  told,  the  whole  administration 
of  the  state.  But  according  to  this  version  Kylon  and  his  brother 
escaped,  and  only  his  followers  were  slain  in  violation  of  the 
pledges  given  to  them.  With  such  evidence  as  this,  we  may 
accept  tlie  fact  of  the  conspiracy  and  its  failure  ;  nor,  although 
in  its  details  the  tradition  is  manifestly  untrustworthy,  can  we 
question  that  the  clan  of  the  Alkmaionidai  were  permanently 
tainted  for  their  bad  faith  in  tlie  opinion  of  the  people,  and  that 
in  times  of  trouble  they  Avere  regarded  as  men  on  whom  the 
divine  wrath  specially  rested  and  who  might  fairly  be  treated  as 
scape-goats  to  appease  tlio  anger  of  the  gods. 


CHAPTER    X. 

ATHENS,    AND    THE    SOLONIAK    LEGISLATION. 

With  the  name  of  Solon,  the  son  of  Exekestides,  are  associated 
some  of  the  most  momentous  changes  ever  made  in  Athenian  or 
in  any  other  polity  ;  and  for  even  some  details  in  Historical 
liis  work  we  have  indisputable  evidence  in  tlie  frag-  [hcTime'of 
ments  of  his  poems  which  have  been  preserved  to  us.  Solon. 
Evidence  also  remains  in  the  fragments  of  his  laws  ;  but  in  examin- 
ing the  accounts  given  of  his  legislation  we  are  met  by  the  diffi- 
culty that  later  writers  and  orators  attributed  to  him  many 
changes  and  ascribed  to  him  many  institutions  with  which  he  had 
nothing  to  do.  Hence,  except  when  we  have  positive  statements 
of  Solon  himself,  it  must  be  carefully  borne  in  mind  that  in  the 
descriptions  given  of  his  measures  we  are  dealing  rather  with  the 
views  of  men  who  lived  under  very  different  social  and  political 
conditions,  tlian  with  actual  historical  evidence  ;  and  the  conclu- 
sions which  we  are  most  justified  in  accepting  will  be  those  which 
arc  most  easily  reconciled  with  the  words  of  Solon  and  most  in 
harmony  with  what  we  know  of  the  earlier  conditions  of  society 
in  Attica  and  Hellas  generally 

The  chief  interest  of  the  life  of  Solon  centres  in  the  social  con- 
dition of  the  Athenian  people.  If  Drakon  did  something  Misery  of 
to  soften  the  indiscriminate   severity  of  the  court  of   theAtin;ni- 
Areiopagos,  no  heed,  it  would  seem,  was  taken  of  the  ^"P®°p®- 
frightful  sufferings  of  the  classes  who  were  excluded  from  all  share 

^  Sec  p.  46.     The  date  of  Kylon's  attempt  is  quite  uncertain, 


T6  THE  FORMATION  OF   HELLAS.  [Book  I. 

in  tlio  government.  But  the  only  points  of  real  importance  wliicli 
we  have  to  determine  are  tlie  nature  and  the  cause  of  the  intestine 
disorders  prevalent  in  the  country  ;  and  it  is  on  these  points  pre- 
cisely that  complete  informaiion  fails  us.  If  we  confine  ourselves 
to  the  words  of  Solon,  we  have  before  us  the  fact  that  tiie  men  who 
exercised  power  in  the  state  were  guilty  of  gross  injustice  and  of 
violent  robberies  among  themselves,  while  of  the  poor  many  were 
in  chains  and  had  been  sold  away  even  into  foreign  slavery.  Nay, 
in  the  indignant  appeal  which,  after  carrying  out  his  reforms, 
Solon  addresses  to  Ge  Melaina,  the  Black  Earth,  as  a  person,  he 
speaks  of  the  land  itself  as  having  been  in  some  way  inslaved  and 
as  being  now  by  himself  set  free,  by  the  removal  of  boundaries 
which  had  been  fixed  in  many  places.  Many  again,  he  adds,  had 
through  his  efforts  been  redeemed  from  foreign  captivity  and 
brought  back  to  their  ancient  homes,  while  those  who  on  Attic  soil 
were  reduced  to  slavery  and  trembled  before  their  despots  were  now 
raised  to  the  condition  of  freemen.  The  whole  question,  it  is 
obvious,  turns  on  the  meaning  of  the  words  debtor,  creditor,  slavery, 
freedom,  boundary  and  landmark,  as  used  in  these  passages  ;  and  on 
this  meaning  it  is  not  suqmsing  that  opinions  not  easily  reconciled 
should  have  been  held  by  writers  living  under  later  and  very  differ- 
ent  conditions  of  society,  or  that  these  opinions  should  in  greater 
or  less  degi'ce  have  received  the  sanction  of  modern  historians. 

On  the  one  side  it  has  been  maintained,  by  those  who  regard 
the  representations  of  Plutarch  as  in  the  main  trustworthy,  that 
Various  ^^^^  system  which  tended  to  reduce  English  freemen  to 
opinions  as    villenage  was  in  the  days  of  Solon  converting  the  Attic 

to  the  causes  l-ti  \  fi^r  i 

of  this  peasants  mto  slaves.     Arrears  or  rent  or  ot  produce 

misery.  pavable  to  the  owners  of  the  soil  were  changed  into 

debts,  for  which  the  tenant  was  allowed  by  law  to  pledge  his  own 
body  or  the  bodies  of  his  sisters  or  his  children.  That  the  smaller 
tenures  generally  should  be  heavily  mortgaged  was  a  circum- 
stance, it  is  argued,  not  very  favorable  to  the  real  prosperity  of 
the  country  ;  but  this  was  as  nothing  compared  with  a  practice 
which  aimed  at  establishing  and  extending  a  servile  class  by  the 
offer  of  loans  which  the  lender  well  knew  would  never  be  repaid 
in  money,  and  for  which  he  sought  no  other  repayment  than  the 
bodies  of  the  borrowers.  Such  a  state  of  things  must  sooner  or 
later  eat  out  the  life  of  a  nation  ;  and  a  legislator,  who  had  the 
welfare  of  the  })eople  at  heart,  could  see  in  it  only  a  plague  to  be 
suppressed  at  all  hazards.  Doubtless  the  debts  incurred  by  the 
Thetes  or  tenants  were,  it  is  maintained,  legitimate  debts,  and  the 
lenders  were  intitled  to  repayment.  The  repudiation  of  the  debts 
must  involve  injustice  to  them  ;  but  their  maintenance  would  bring 
with  it  the  destruction  of  the  whole  people.     The  growth  of  dis- 


Chap.  X.]  THE  LEGISLATION  OF  SOLON.  77 

content  and  rebellion  had  frightened  the  ruling  class  ;  and  when 
Solon  was  invested  with  something  like  dictatorial  power,  ho  used 
it  not  to  make  himself  a  despot,  hut  to  put  an  cud  to  the  mischief 
at  once  by  introducing  his  Seisachtheia,  or  Removal  of  Burdens, — 
a  measure  which,  it  is  held,  annulled  all  mortgages  on  land  in 
Athens,  restored  to  freedom  all  debtors  who  had  been  reduced  to 
slavery,  provided  the  means  for  recovering  such  as  had  been  sold 
into  foreign  countries,  and  more  particularly  struck  at  the  root  of 
the  evil  by  prohibiting  all  security  for  loans  on  the  body  of  the 
borrower  or  of  his  kinsfolk.  The  losses  of  the  lenders  who  may 
themselves  have  been  indebted  to  others  were,  it  is  said,  in  some 
measure  lessened  or  compensated  by  a  depreciation  of  the  currency, 
while  the  objections  urged  against  these  measures  are  sufficiently 
answered  by  the  fact  that  the  public  credit  was  not  shaken  and 
that  it  never  again  became  necessary  either  to  debase  the  money 
standard  or  to  repudiate  a  debt. 

This  view,  it  is  maintained  on  the  other  side,  involves  some 
great,  if  not  insurmountable,  difficulties.  When  the  distress  of  the 
Athenian  agriculturists  is  ascribed  definitely  to  debts  ,p,|j.  question 
secured  by  mortgage,  the  assertion  lies  open  to  the  of  debt  and 
retort  that  the  security  of  mortgage  can  be  given  only  """^  °'^°^' 
by  the  owner  of  the  soil,  and  Ihat  the  distressed  men  of  Attica 
were  not  owners  of  the  land,  but  only  the  cultivators.  There  can 
be  no  doubt  that  in  the  belief  of  Plutarch  a  large,  if  not  by  far  the 
greater,  part  of  the  p()[)ular  distress  arose  from  the  conditions  of 
land-tenure  imposed  on  the  class  called  ThcteSj  or  Ilektemorioi,  as 
paying  to  the  owner  one-sixth  portion  of  the  yearly  produce,  and 
that  these  distressed  persons  were  not  proprietors.  Whether  he  is 
speaking  of  the  same  class  when  he  mentions  those  who  pledged 
their  persons  for  the  repayment  of  debts,  or  whether  by  the  Dan- 
eistai,  or  money-lenders  or  usurers,  he  supposed  the  landlords  and 
the  landlords  only  to  be  meant,  is  not  so  clear  ;  and  when  we  look 
more  closely  into  the  facts  of  the  earliest  .social  history  of  Athens, 
so  far  as  they  are  known  to  us  at  all,  we  are  confronted  by  two 
grave  difficulties,  the  one  turning  on  the  question  whether  the 
more  modern  idea  of  mortgage  was  so  much  as  known  at  that  time, 
the  other  making  it  necessary  for  us  to  determine  whether  thcrQ 
existed  then  a  class  of  professed  money-lenders.  It  is  at  the  least 
difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  imagine  that  capitalists  could  be 
found  to  advance  loans  in  money  to  cultivators  of  the  soil  who 
were  unable  to  pay  even  one  sixth  of  the  produce  ;  nor  can  we  well 
suppose  that  pressure  caused  simply  by  a  somewhat  excessive  rent 
could  assume  very  formida1)le  proportions.  If  again  lenders,  being 
landowners,  could  be  found  to  advance  money  to  cultivators  who 
could  not  pay  to  them  even  one-sixth  part  of  the  produce  of  the 


78  THE  FORMATION   OF  HELLAS.  [Book  1. 

soil,  wc  can  Init  wonder  at  the  superfluity  of  the  loan,  when  the 
failure  of  the  tenant  to  yield  the  stipulated  portion  of  the  produce 
involved  in  itself  the  forfeiture  of  his  freedom.  If  on  the  other 
hand  the  landowners  and  the  money-lenders  were  not  the  same 
persons,  then  it  is  scarcely  a  matter  of  douht  that  the  Hcktemorioi 
would  never  have  heen  allowed  by  the  landowners  to  pledge  to  pro- 
fessed usurers  their  persons,  the  value  of  which  might  far  exceed 
the  amount  of  the  debt,  for  this  would  be  directly  to  defraud  the 
landlord  whose  claim  to  their  bodies  on  failure  to  pay  the  proceeds 
would  be  paramount ;  and  to  make  two  classes  of  men  indebted  to 
two  classes  of  creditors,  (the  Thetes  or  Hektemorioi  being  pledged 
to  the  landowners,  and  the  free  proprietors  of  small  estates  pledged 
to  professional  usurers,)  is  to  multiply  gratuitous  suppositions. 
What  then  were  the  pillars  which  beyond  doubt  Solon  removed 
from  the  land  ?  In  the  absence  of  direct  evidence  that  they  were 
mortgage  pillars  inscribed  with  the  name  of  the  lender  and  the 
amount  of  the  loan,  it  is  reasonable  to  suppose  that  they  were 
simply  the  boundaries  or  landmarks  Avhich,  whether  in  Attica  or  in 
Latium,  and  throughout  the  Aryan  world  or  even  beyond  its 
limits,  it  was  sacrilege  to  touch.  These  landmarks  represented 
those  ancient  patriarchal  rights  which  received  their  whole  sanction 
from  religion.  That  the  greater  part  of  the  Athenian  soil  was 
marked  off  by  these  landmarks,  is  asserted  by  Solon  himself.  In 
other  words,  the  Eupatridai  were  still  the  lords  of  almost  all  the 
land  ;  and  thus  we  have  on  the  one  side  a  few  heads  of  families  who 
might  in  the  strictest  sense  of  the  tenn  be  spoken  of  as  despots,  and 
on  the  other  the  dependents  who  trembled  before  them  but  who 
were  suffered  to  draw  their  livelihood  from  the  soil  on  condition  of 
paying  a  fixed  part  of  the  produce  to  the  lord.  It  can  scarcely  be 
doubted  that  even  this  fixed  payment  marks  a  step  forward  in  the 
condition  of  the  laborer  Avho  had  started  without  even  this  poor 
semblance  of  right.  It  was,  however,  a  mere  semblance  after  all. 
So  long  as  he  could  comply  with  the  terms  imposed  on  him,  he 
might  remain  nominally  free  ;  but  his  real  state  was  not  changed. 
Tlie  lord  might  demand  a  larger  portion  of  the  produce  ;  or  a  hard 
season  might  leave  him  unable  to  pay  even  the  sixth  part.  In 
either  case,  he  reverted  necessarily  to  the  sernle  state  from  which 
he  bad  never  been  legally  set  free.  So  long  as  things  continued 
thus,  Solon  might  with  perfect  truth  say  that  the  land  itself  Avas 
inslaved,  for  t'lie  scanty  class  of  small  proprietors,  even  if  any  such 
existed  at  the  time,  would  be  powerless  against  tlie  Eupatrid  land- 
owners, and  would  be  liable  to  the  same  accidents  which  might 
at  any  moment  make  the  client  once  more  a  slave. 

If  this  be  at  all  a  true  picture  of  the  condition  of  Attica  in  the 
days  of  Solon,  it  was  obviously  impossible  that  things  could  go  on 


Chap.  X.]  THE   LEGISLATION  OF   SOLON.  79 

indefinitely  as  they  were.  If  even  tbe  concession  which  raised 
the  slave  to  the  state  of  the  Hcktemorios  Avas  wrung,  as  probably 
it  was,  from  an  unwilling  master,  it  was  certain  that  ^^tj^jji  ^jg^. 
the  man  who  had  gained  this  poor  boon  would  never  suresof 
rest  content  in  a  position  which  had  not  even  the  °  "^"^ 
guarantee  of  law  and  which  left  him  at  the  mercy  and  caprice  of  a 
despot  who  might,  if  he  pleased,  sell  him,  into  foreign  slavery. 
One  of  two  results  must  follow  under  such  circumstances.  Either 
the  half  emancipated  peasant  must  become  a  free  owner  of  the  soil, 
or  lie  must  fall  back  into  his  original  subjection.  Here,  then,  in 
dealing  with  grievances  which  every  year  must  become  less  and 
less  tolerable,  Solon  had  abundant  materials  for  his  Seisachtheia  or 
Relief  Act ;  and  the  measures  which  such  a  state  of  things  would 
render  necessary  are  precisely  those  which  seem  to  be  indicated  by 
his  words.  From  all  lands  occupied  by  cultivators  on  condition  of 
yielding  a  portion  of  the  produce  he  removed  the  pillars  which 
marked  the  religious  ownership  of  the  Eupatridai,  and  lightened 
the  burdens  of  the  cultivators  b}"  lessening  the  amount  of  produce  or 
money  which  henceforth  took  the  shape  of  a  rent.  In  other  words, 
a  body  of  free  laborers  and  poor  landowners  was  not  so  much  re- 
lieved of  a  heavy  pressure,  as  for  the  first  time  called  into  being. 

Whether  the  lowering  of  the  currency  attributed  to  Solon  be 
or  be  not  merely  the  idea  of  later  writers,  it  would  seem  that  in 
their  accounts  of  the  relations  of  debtors  with  creditors  Lowerino-of 
at  the  time  of  the  Seisachtheia  they  transferred  to  the  the  cur-" 
Athens  of  Solon  notions  which  belonged  to  a  much  ^'^"*^^' 
later  generation,  and  comprehending  but  faintly  the  tremendous 
power  exercised  by  the  ancient  lords  of  the  soil,  concluded  that  the 
relief  which  Solon  gave  was  chiefly  through  the  abolition  or  the 
diminution  of  debts.  The  words  of  Solon  point  rather  to  a 
struggle  between  slavery  and  freedom  ;  and  the  tradition  that  it 
was  never  afterwards  found  necessary  to  modify  contracts  or  to  de- 
base the  currency  may  be  regarded  as  suflScient  evidence  that  his 
Avork  Avas  done  effectually. 

But  Solon  did  more  than  redress  existing  Avrongs.     The  tribes 

Avith  their  principle  of  religious  association  had  remained  thus  far 

undisturbed  ;  but  the  greater  part  of  the   population  ^^       ,     . 
,  '  ,     ,   .  °      .,        ^    ,  .  ,^    ^     ,        .»  New  classi- 

was  not  included  \n  any  tribe,  and  it  Avas   clear  that  it  flcationof 

the  statesman  Avished  to  avail  himself  of  the  full  powers  Ihe  penS-^' 

and  resources   of   the   country,   it   was  indispensably  kosiomedim- 

necessary  to  introduce  a  new  classification  AA'hich  should  zeuVitai',^  ^  ' 

take  in  all  the  free  inhabitants  of  the  land  Avithout  refe-  andThetes. 

renee  to  affinities  of  blood  and  be  based  AA^holly  on  property.    The 

principle  thus  introduced  Avas  termed  the  timocratic,  and  its  most 

important  political  result  Avas  that  it  excluded  the  poor  Eupatrid 


80  THE  FORMATION    OF  HELLAS.  [Book  i 

irom  offices  and  honors  for  wliicli  richer  citizens  now  became 
eligible  who  could  lay  no  claim  to  the  religious  character  of  the  old 
nobility.  The  Pentakosioraedimnoi,  or  men  whose  annual  income 
was  equal  to  500  mediranoi  (about  VOO  imperial  bushels)  of  corn, 
the  Ilippeis  or  Knights  (so  called  as  possessing  sufficient  means  to 
serve  as  horsemen)  who  had  from  300  to  500  medimnoi,  and  the 
Zeugitai,  or  owners  of  a  team  of  oxen,  who  possessed  from  200  to 
300,  paid  a  graduated  income-tax  called  Eisphora,  on  a  capital 
which  for  members  of  the  first  class  was  rated  at  twelve  times, 
for  those  of  the  second  at  ten  times,  and  for  those  of  the  third 
at  five  times  their  yearly  income, — the  Pentakosiomedimnos  who 
had  simply  his  500  bushels  being,  for  instance,  rated  at  6000 
drachmas,  the  Ilippeus  with  300  medimnoi  at  3000,  and  the 
Zeugites  of  200  drachmas  at  1000,  or  five  times  his  yearly  income. 
In  the  fourth  or  Thetic  class,  so  called  as  including,  and  not 
as  consisting  only  of,  the  Thetes,  were  placed  all  citizens  whose 
property  fell  short  of  200  drachmas  a  year.  The  members  of  this, 
the  largest,  class  in  the  state  were  not  liable  to  the  direct  taxation 
of  the  Eisphora,  although  they  shared  with  the  men  of  the  wealthier 
classes  the  more  permanent  burden  of  indirect  taxation  in  the  form 
of  import  duties.  Nor  \vere  they  called  upon  to  discharge  the  un- 
paid services  of  the  state  called  Leitourgiai,  liturgies,  while  in  war 
they  served  only  as  light-armed  infantry,  or  in  armor  provided  for 
them  by  the  state.  On  the  other  hand,  they  were  ineligible  to  all 
public  offices — the  archonship  and  all  military  commands  being 
open  only  to  members  of  the  first  class,  while  certain  minor  offices 
might  be  filled  by  the  Hippeis  and  Zeugitai,  the  former  of  whom 
were  bound  to  serve  as  horsemen,  the  latter  as  heavy-armed  in- 
fantry, at  their  own  expense.  Thus  in,  the  classification  which  ex- 
cluded the  Eupatrid  whose  income  fell  sliort  of  500  medimnoi  from 
tlie  high  offices  which  he  regarded  as  his  inalienable  birthright,  the 
spell  of  the  ancient  despotism  of  religion  and  blood  was  broken  ; 
and  a  further  democratic  element  was  introduced  by  the  law  which, 
while  it  confined  the  archonship  to  members  of  the  first  class,  left 
the  election  of  the  archons  to  the  Heliaia,  or  general  council,  which 
included  not  merely  the  men  of  the  first  three  classes,  but,  as  the 
Eupatrid  would  have  termed  them,  the  rabble  of  the  fourth  class. 
This  law  went  even  further,  making  the  archons  at  the  end  of  their 
year  of  office  directly  accountable  to  the  pubUc  assembly  and  sub- 
ject to  an  impeachment  by  it  in  case  of  misbehavior. 

The  power  of  this  assembly  was  strengthened  by  the  institution, 
The  Probon-  fittributed  to  Solon,  of  the  Probouleutic  Council  of  Four 
k'utic  Hundred  (in  the  proportion  of  one  hundred  for  each 

Council.  tribe)  who,  like  the  archons,  were  to  be  elected  by 
the  whole  people  from  the  first  class.     This  council,  as  its  name 


Chap.  X.]  THE  LEGISLATION  OF  SOLON.  81 

implies,  was  charged  chiefly  with  the  preparation  of  matters  to  be 
brought  before  the  assembly,  with  the  summoning  and  management 
of  its  meetings,  and  with  the  execution  of  its  decrees. 

Such,  in  the  main,  seems  to  have  been  the  great  work  of  Solon, 
a  work  accomplished  just  at  a  time  when  attempts  like  tho>e  of 
Kylon  or  Peisistratos,  if  made  at  that  moment,  might  Reiation^^inp 
have  crushed  for  ever  the  rising  freedom  of  Athens,  ciasse/to\'i,y 
and  achieved  by  a  man  who  was  charged  with  mad-  tribes, 
ness  for  not  following  the  example  of  tliose  who  had  made  them- 
selves tyrants  in  other  Hellenic  cities.  But  Solon  himself  scarcely 
more  than  laid  the  foundations,  and  it  is  a  common  error  which 
ascribes  to  him  developements  of  the  constitution  belonging  to  a 
time  later  even  than  that  of  Kleisthenes.  The  members  of  the 
fourth  and  by  far  the  largest  class  of  citizens  could  have  no  further 
inlluence  on  the  conduct  of  affairs  than  by  the  check,  probably  not 
always  very  effectual,  which  they  exercised  by  electing  the  archons 
and  examining  them  at  the  end  of  the  year.  But,  more  particu- 
larly, although  a  citizen  of  the  first  class  who  was  not  an  Eupatrid 
was  in  point  of  money  qualification  eligil)le  for  the  archonship,  he 
could  be  neither  archon  nor  a  member  of  the  Areiopagos,  unless  he 
also  belonged  to  a  tribe  ;  and  as  the  Probouleutic  Council  con- 
sisted of  four  hundred,  or  one  hundred  for  each  of  the  tribes,  it 
followed  that  only  members  of  the  tribes  could  be  elected  to  this 
council,  and  thus  that  the  political  position  of  non-tribal  citizens, 
even  if  they  belonged  to  the  first  class  in  the  timocracy,  was  simply 
on  a  level  with  that  of  the  fourth  or  Thetic  class.  All  that  the 
Solonian  reform  had  done  wtis  to  exclude  from  the  archonship  the 
poor  Eupatrid  and  to  adn)it  to  it  the  non-Eupatrid  Pentakosiome- 
dimnos,  if  he  belonged  to  some  tribe  ;  but  no  one  who  did  not 
possess  the  religious  title  could  hold  office,  and  thus  Solon  left  the 
constitution,  as  he  found  it,  practically  oligarcliic. 

Over  the  sequel  of  the  career  of  Solon  the  mists  of  oral  tradition 
liave  gathered  thickly.  His  work  as  a  legislator  was  done  ;  but 
there  remained  the  fear  that  others  might  destroy  it  or  Later  years 
that  he  might  be  induced  to  impair  it  himself.  He  of  Solon, 
therefore  bound  the  Atheniaiis,  we  are  told,  by  solemn  oaths  that 
for  ten  years,  or,  as  some  said,  for  a  hundred  years,  they  would 
suffer  no  change  to  be  made  in  his  laws,  and  then,  to  make  it  im- 
possible that  this  change  should  come  from  himself,  he  departed  on 
the  long  pilgrimage  which  is  associated  with  the  names  of  other 
legislators  as  great  as  himself,  though  less  historical.  That  he 
visited  Egypt  and  Kypros  (Cyprus)  is  proved  by  his  own  words ; 
but  the  time  of  the  visit  is  undetermined,  and  that  he  cannot  have 
sojourned  witli  Amasis,  seems  to  be  clear  from  the  fact  that  the 
reign  of  Amasis  began  at  least  a  generation  after  the  legislation  of 


82  THE  FORMATION  OF  HELLAS.  [Book  I. 

Solon.'  Not  more  trustworthy  chronologically  is  the  exquisitely 
beautiful  tale  -which  relates  the  intercourse  of  Solon  with  the 
Lydian  king  Kroisos.  It  is  clear  that  in  the  belief  of  Herodotos 
Solon  visited  Sardeis  not  more  than  six  or  seven  years  before  the 
fall  of  the  Lydian  monarchy.  The  death  of  Atys  which  marked 
the  turning-point  in  the  unbroken  happiness  of  Kroisos  was  fol- 
lowed, after  two  years  only,  by  the  war  with  the  Persian  Cyrus  ; 
and  the  catastrophe  occurred  scarcely  less  than  fifty  years  after  the 
legislation  of  vSolon.  The  story  is  manifestly  a  didactic  legend 
setting  forth  the  religious  philosophy  of  the  time,  insisting  on  the 
divine  jealousy  which  hates  and  punishes  pride  and  self-satisfaction 
in  mortal  man,  and  virtually  maintaining  that  happiness  is  a  state 
■which  cannot  be  predicated  of  anyone  before  his  eai-thly  life  has 
reached  its  close. 

The  return  of  Solon  to  Athens  was  not  to  be  followed  by  new 
reforms  for  the  benefit  of  his  countrymen.  The  tide  had  turned. 
Usurpation  ^^  ^^^  struggle  which  ensued  Solon,  it  is  said,  foresaw 
of  Peisis-  that  Peisistratos  must  be  the  conqueror  ;  but  he  strove 
death  of  in  vain  to  rouse  the  Athenians  to  combine  against  the 
Solon.  tyranny   with   which  they   were    threatened.     To    no 

purpose  he  stood  in  his  armor  at  the  door  of  his  house,  and  ho 
could  but  console  himself  with  the  thought  that  he  had  done  his 
duty,  and  reply  to  those  who  asked  on  what  he  relied  to  save  him- 
self from  the  vengeance  of  his  enemies, '  Oji  my  old  age.'  Peisis- 
tratos,  as  the  story  goes,  did.  him  no  harm  ;  and  the  man  who  had 
done  more  than  any  who  had  gone  before  him  to  make  his  country 
free  died  in  peace,  full  of  years  and  with  a  fame  which  is  the 
purer  for  the  unselfishness  which  refused  to  employ  for  his  own 
exaltation  opportunities  greater  than  any  which  fell  to  the  lof  even 
of  Peisistratos  himself. 


CHAPTER    XI. 

THE    TYRANNY    OF    THE    PEISISTRATIDAI, 

The  success  of  Peisistratos  is  of  itself  sufficient  evidence  of  the 
slow  growth  of  the  democratic  spirit  at  Athens.  The  people, 
Slow  growth  which  a  few  generations  later  appears  in  the  satire  of 
cratic  spWt  ^^^^  comic  poct  under  the  guise  of  the  rude  and  in- 
at  Athens,  tractable  old  man  of  the  Pnyx,  now  show  themselves 
apt  disciples  in  that  school  of  indiflEerence  which  Solon  had  branded 

■  Herod,  i.  30.  PIuLaSo?.  26.  Lewis,  Credibility  of  E.R.H.  ii.532etseq. 


Chap.  XI.]  THE  PEISISTRATIDAI.  83 

as  the  worst  of  civil  crimes;  and  the   man  who  has  crashed  his 
rivals  may  count  on  their  passive  acquiescence  under  his  sway. 

In  this  instance  the   successful  plotter  was   supported  by  the 
faction  (if  such  it  was)  of  the  Hyperakrians  or  men  of    seizure  of 
the  hills,  whose  part  he  professed  to  take.     As  their  ^^^.-^,'^^'i;  . 
champion,  he  avowed  (if  we  are  to  follow  the  story   sistratos. 
of  Herodotos)  that  he  had  narrowly  escaped  from  the   ^^ob.c.  (?) 
hands  of  his  enemies  who  had  fallen  upon  him  in  the  country. 
Hastening  to  Athens,  he  pointed  to  the  wounds,  which  he  had 
inflicted  on  himself  and  on  his  mules,  as  attesting  the  truth  of  his 
tale,  and  prayed  the  people  to  grant  him  a  body-guard  to  protect 
him  against  the  weapons  of  the  rival  factions.     The  club-bearers 
by  whom  he  was  now  attended  may  soon  have  become   spear- 
bearers  ;  but  in  any  case  the  disguise  was  thrown  off  when  with 
their  help  Peisistratos  seized  the  Akropolis,  and  Megakles  with 
the  Alkmaionids  fled  from  the  city. 

Whatever  may  be  the  value  of  these  details,  there  is  no  reason 
to  question  the  general  statement  of  Herodotos  that,  having  thus 
made  himself  master  of  Athens,  Peisistratos  ruled  characterof 
wisely  and  well,  without  introducing  a  single  consti-  tjftj'o™'?^^' 
tutional  change.'  With  sound  instinct  he  perceived  Peisistratos. 
that  the  Solonian  forms  were  sufficiently  oligarchic  in  spirit  to 
suit  his  purposes  :  and  Athens,  although  in  the  power  of  a  despot, 
had  the  benefit  of  a  despotism  lightened  as  it  had  been  lightened 
in  no  other  Hellenic  city.  But  although  the  praise  of  Herodotos 
is  confirmed  by  that  of  Thucydides,^  who  asserts  that  with  no 
direct  impost  beyond  an  income-tax  of  five  per  cent.  Peisistratos 
and  his  successors  found  means  to  carry  on  wars,  to  pay  the  cost  of 
sacrifices,  and  to  embellish  the  city,  their  wisdom  and  their  other 
qualities  failed  to  make  the  course  of  their  despotism  run  smoothly. 
The  first  disaster,  we  are  told,  was  not  long  in  coming.  They 
owed  their  power  to  the  divisions  among  the  people,  and  a  coali- 
tion of  the  Pediaian  and  Paralian  factions,  in  other  Expulsion 
words,  of  the  men  belono-ina;  to  the  plains  and  the  sea-  ?."^  restora- 

^     ^  .-*■  tion  of  Pei- 

coast,  was  at  once  followed  by  their  expulsion.  But  sistratos. 
this  success  served  only  to  renew  and  whet  the  strife  of  these 
parties,  and  Megakles,  as  the  head  of  the  Paralians,  offered  to  restore 
the  exiled  tyrant  on  the  condition  that  the  latter  should  marry  the 
daughter  of  the  Alkmaionid  chief.  The  terms  were  accepted  ;  and 
to  insure  the  assent  and  favor  of  the  people,  the  conspirators,  it  is 
said,  obtained  the  services  of  a  tall  and  beautiful  woman  of  the 
Paionian  tribe,  whom  they  placed  in  full  armor  on  a  chariot,  and 
then  made  proclamation  to  the  citizens  that  they  should  welcome 
Peisistratos  whom  Athene  herself  was  bringing  to  her  own  Akro- 
'  Herod,  i.  59.  ^  vi.  54. 


84  THE   FORMATION   OP   HELLAS.  [Book  I. 

polis.  Hastening  to  the  scene,  they  saw  a  majestic  woman  about 
six  feet  high,  and  taking  her  at  once  to  be  the  virgin  goddess,  gave 
her  Avorship  and  received  the  despot/ 

But  the  curse  which  rested  on  the  house  of  Megakles  cast  its 
dark  shadow  on  the  mind  of  Peisistratos,  who  resolved  that  the 
Second  ex-  marriage  to  wliich  he  had  consented  should  be  a 
miit^iou  of  barren  one ;  and  the  discovery  of  this  design  led 
Peisistratos.  fQ^i^^^tii  to  the  reconciliation  of  Megakles  with  Ly- 
kourgos,  the  head  of  the  so-called  Pediaian  faction,  and  to  the 
second  expulsion  of  the  tyrant,  who,  it  is  said,  spent  the  next  ten 
years  chiefly  in  the  Euboian  Eretria,^  aiding  Lygdamis  to  establish 
his  despotism  in  Naxos,  and  in  some  way  or  other  helping  Thebes 
and  other  cities. 

The  story  of  his  restoration  implies  a  singular  indifference  and 
inactivity  on  the  part  of  the  Athenians.  The  invader  occupied 
Final  re-  Marathon  Avithout  opposition  ;  and  when  on  his  mov- 
the'^Peisi-^^  ing  from  that  place  the  Athenians  advanced  against 
Btratidai.  him,  they  allowed  him  to  fall  upon  them  while  some 
were  dicing  and  others  sleeping  after  their  morning  meal.  The 
sons  of  the  tyrant  rode  towards  Athens,  and  telling  the  citizens 
what  had  happened,  bade  them  go  home.  The  order  was  placidly 
obeyed,  and  for  the  tliird  time  Peisistratos  was  master  of  the 
Akropolis.  He  was  resolved  that  this  time  no  room  should  be  left 
for  the  combinations  which  had  twice  driven  him  away.  Me- 
gakles with  his  adherents  left  the  country  :  the  rest  who  had 
ventured  to  oppose  him  were  compelled  to  give  hostages  in  the 
persons  of  their  children  whom  Peisistratos  placed  in  tlie  safe 
keeping  of  Lygdamis  at  Naxos ;  and  the  new  rule  was  finally 
established  by  a  large  force  of  Thrakian  mercenaries. 

For  Peisistratos  himself  tliere  were  to  be  no  more  alternations 
of  disaster  and  success.  He  died  tyrant  of  Athens,  three  and 
527  B  c.  (?)  thirty  years,  it  is  said,  after  the  time  of  his  first  usur- 
Death  of  pation.  His  sons,  Hippias  and  Hipparclios,  followed, 
and  eubse-  '  we  are  told,  tlie  example  of  sobriety  and  moderation 
ior™of  hi's  ^^*  ^y  their  father.  But  their  political  foresight 
house.  failed  to  guard  them  against  dangers   arising   from 

their  pleasant  vices  ;  and  Hipparchos  in  an  evil  hour  sought  to 
'  This  woman,  who  is  called  Pbye,  union  of  the  two  factions  bad  at 
is  said  to  Lave  become  the  wife  of  once  brought  about  the  banishment 
Hipjiarchos.  The  contempt  with  of  the  despot,  nothing  more  than 
which  Herodotos  stigmatises  the  the  adhesion  of  one  of  them  to 
silliness  of  the  Athenians  for  being  Peisistratos  would  be  needed  to 
thus  duped  seems  to  imply  the  accomplish  his  restoration, 
esictence  of  a  general  unbelief  that  -  The  presence  of  Peisistratos  in 
manifestations  of  the  gods  could  Naxos  for  the  purjwse  of  lie) ping 
any  longer  take  place.  If  we  look  Lygdamis  is  assftrted  by  Herodotos, 
to  the  narrative,  the  stratagem  cer-  i.  64. 
tainly  seems  superfluous.     If  the 


Chap.  XI.]  THE   PEISISTRATIDAI,  85 

form  a  shameful  intimacy  with  the  beautiful  Harmodios.  By  way 
of  revenge  his  paramour  Aristogeiton  with  a  few  partisans  deter- 
mined to  await  the  greater  Panathenaic  festival,  being  sure  that  on 
seeing  the  blow  struck  the  main  body  of  the  citizens  would  hasten 
to  join  them.  When  the  day  came  and  the  conspirators  drew  near 
to  their  work,  they  were  astonished  to  see  one  of  their  number 
talking  familiarly  with  Hippias,  and  then,  supposing  that  their  de- 
sign was  betrayed,  determined  that  at  least  the  man  who  had  in- 
jured them  should  die.  They  found  Ilipparchos  near  the  temple  of 
the  daughters  of  Leos,  and  there  they  killed  him.  Aristogeitou 
for  the  moment  escaped  ;  but  Harmodios  wa;;  slain  on  the  spot  by 
the  guards  of  the  murdered  man.  Tidings  of  the  disaster  were 
soon  brought  to  Hippias,  who  was  at  the  Keraineikos.  With  great 
presence  of  mind,  he  simply  commanded  the  hoplites  who  with 
shields  and  spears  were  to  take  part  in  the  procession  to  lay  down 
their  arms  and  go  to  a  certain  spot.  The  command  was  obeyed 
under  the  notion  that  their  general  had  something  to  say  to  them  ; 
and  the  arms  being  seized  by  the  mercenaries,  all  citizens  found 
with  daggers  were  set  aside  as  sharing  in  the  conspiracy. 

The  death  of  Hipparchos  and  the  circumstances  which  led  toii 
warned  Hippias  that  yet  more  disasters  might  be  in  store  for  him 
and  that  he  would  do  well  to  provide  betimes  au;ainst   „  ,.         , 

1  .1    1  TT-      1      •   •  1     1  Policj' and 

the  evil  day.  His  decision  led  to  momentous  conse-  plans  of 
quences  in  the  history  of  Athens  and  of  the  world  ;  ^'PP'^*- 
and  the  great  struggle  between  Asiatic  despotism  and  western 
freedom  was  at  the  least  hastened  by  his  policy.  His  thoughts 
turned  to  the  Persian  king  whose  power  after  the  fall  of  the  Ly- 
dian  monarchy  had  been  extended  to  the  shores  of  the  Hellespon- 
tos,  and  to  whom  the  Athenian  settlement  at  Sigeion  had  thus 
become  tributary.  Uippoklos,  the  tyrant  of  Lampsakos,  was  at 
this  time  in  high  favor  with  the  Persian  king ;  and  though  an 
Athenian  might  look  down  upon  a  Lampsakene,'  Hippias  gladly 
gave  his  daughter  Archedike  in  marriage  to  Aiantides,  the  sou  of 
Hippoklos.  In  Sigeion  then  he  thought  that  he  might  have  a  safe 
refuge,  and  in  the  Lampsakene  despot  he  found  a  friend  through 
whom  he  gained  personal  access  to  the  Persian  king. 

While  Hippias  was  thus  guarding  himself  against  possible 
disasters,  the   intrio-ues  of  the  Alkmaionidai  were   pre-   .  ,  .  , 

paring  the  way  for  the  expulsion  which  he  dreaded,    the  Aik- 
About  five  and   thirty   years  before  the  marriage  of   fi^uleover- 
Archedike  the  temple  of  Delphoi  had  been  burnt  by   thi-o\v  of 
accident ;   and  the  Amphiktyonic  Council   determined 
that  it  should  be  restored  at  the  cost  of  three  hundred  talents,  about 

'  This  is  probably  the  meaning  of  the  words  'A6r}valog  uv  Aaurl)aK7jvu. 
Thuc.  vi.  59. 


S6  THE  FORMATION  OF  HELLAS.  [Book  I. 

115,000^.  of  our  money,  one  fourth  portion  of  this  to  be  contri- 
buted by  the  Delphians  themselves.'  When  at  length  the  money 
was  gathered  together,  the  Alkmaionidai  took  the  contract  for 
carrying  out  the  designs  of  the  Corinthian  Spintharos  ;  but  they 
executed  the  work  with  greater  sumptuousness  than  the  contract 
specified,  and  the  front  of  the  new  temple  instead  of  being  built 
with  common  tufa  shone  with  all  the  brilliancy  of  Parian  marble. 
The  Alkmaionidai  had  thus  won  for  themselves  a  lasting  title  to 
the  gratitude  of  the  Delphians,  which  according  to  Herodotos  was 
heightened  by  further  gifts  bestowed  on  the  condition  that  to  all 
Spartans  who  might  consult  the  oracle  the  answer  should  be  re- 
turned by  the  Pythia  or  priestess,  '  xVthens  must  be  set  free.'  ^ 
Wearied  out  by  the  repetition  of  this  command,  the  Spartans, 
doing  violence  to  their  own  inclinations  in  obedience  to  the  divine 
bidding,  sent  Anchimolios  by  sea  with  an  army  which  landed  at 
Phaleron.  But  Hippias  had  been  forewarned.  With  the  help  of 
a  thousand  ThessaUan  horsemen  under  their  chief  Kineas  he  ut- 
terly defeated  the  Spartans  on  the  Phalerian  plain,  and  Anchimo- 
lios found  a  grave  on  Athenian  soil. 

The  attempt  was,  however,  repeated  on  a  larger  scale  under  the 
Spartan  king  Kleomenes,  the  son  of  Anaxandridas,  who  invaded 
Finales  Attica  by  land,  and,  advancing  to  Athens,  shut  up 
thePe^sf-'  Hippias  within  the  Pelasgic  wall.  But  he  had  no  idea 
stratidai.  of  a  permanent  blockade,  and  the  besieged  Avere  well 
provided  with  food.  A  few  days  more  would  have  seen  the 
departure  of  the  Spartan  force,  when  an  accident  brought  the 
matter  to  an  issue.  The  children  of  Hippias  were  taken  in  the 
attempt  to  smuggle  them  out  of  the  country.  The  tables  were 
effectually  turned,  and  for  the  recovery  of  his  children  Hippias 
agreed  to  leave  Attica  within  five  days.  Thus,  after  the  lapse  of 
fifty  years  from  the  establishment  of  the  first  tyranny  of  Peisis- 
tratos,  the  last  despot  of  his  house  betook  himself  to  the  refuge 
which  he  had  prepared  on  the  banks  of  the  Scaman- 
dros  ;  and  a  pillar  on  the  Akropolis  set  forth  for  the 
execration  of  future  ages  the  evil  deeds  of  the  dynasty  and  the 
names  of  all  its  members. 

'  Of  course,  out  of  moneys  re-     sources  could  not  possibly  Lave  fur- 
ceived  from  pilgrims.     The  little    nisbed  nearly  30,000^. 
town  of  Delpboi  out  of  its  own  re-        ^  Herod,  v.  63. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

THE    REFORMS    OF    KLEISTHENES. 

The  outward  forms  of  the  Solouian  constitution  underwent,  we 
!ire  told,  little  or  no  change  under  the  dynasty  of  Peisistratos.  By 
that  constitution  a  shock  had  been  given  to  the  re-  oligarchical 
lio-iou;  sentiment  which  invested  the   Eupatridai  with   elements 

o  .,,,..  T-.      1  •        •  ...       in  the  So- 

an  mcommunicable  dignity.  i>y  ins  timocratic  chissi-  Ionian  con- 
tication  Solon  made  property  the  title  to  Athenian  st^'^""""- 
citizenship  and  insured  to  the  poorest  the  right  of  voting  in  the 
Ekklesia,  which  elected  the  Archons  as  well  as  the  members  of  the 
Probouleutic  Council  of  the  Four  Hundred  and  which  reviewed 
the  administration  of  the  magistrates  at  the  end  of  their  year  of 
office.  But  he  had  not  interfered  with  the  religious  constitution 
of  the  tribes,  phratriai,  and  houses  ;  and  while  none  but  the  mem- 
bers of  the  first  and  richest  class  of  citizens  were  eligible  for  the 
archonship,  even  the  richest  had  no  further  political  privileges 
than  the  members  of  the  fourth  or  poorest  class,  unless  they  were 
also  members  of  a  tribe.  Hence  the  Archonship,  the  Probouleutic 
Senate,  and  the  Court  of  Areiopagos  were  still  confined  to  the 
sacred  oligarchy  of  the  ancient  houses.  Ail  that  the  main  body 
of  the  people  had  to  do  was  to  elect  the  archons  and  the  senate 
from  the  members  of  the  patrician  tribes,  and  exercise  a  feeble 
judicial  power  on  magistrates  going  out  of  office. 

With  the  expulsion  of  Hippias  the  Solonian  laws,  nominally  at 
least,  resumed  their  force.     But  the  first  fact  which  comes  before 
us  is  a  renewal  of  the  strife  which  it  was  the  object  of   Renewal  of 
the  Solonian  constitution  to  put  down, — the  contend-   factions 
ing  parties  being  the  Alkmaionid  Kleisthenes,  who  was   of  Hippias. 
popularly  credited  with  the  corruption  of  the  Delphian   ^•^-  ^^■ 
priestess,  and  Isagoras  the  son  of  Tisandros,  a  member  of  a  noble 
house,  who  now  appears  on  the  political  stage  for  the  first  time. 
The  causes  of  the   quarrel  between  them  are  not  specified ;   but 
when  we  read  that  the  defeated  Kleisthenes  took  the  people  into 
partnership,'  or  rather  made  common  cause  with  the  Demos,  and 
that  his  first  act  was  to  substitute  new  tribes  in  place  of  the  old, 
we   feel   that   the  contest  went  to  the  very  foundations  of  social 
order  and  government.     From  Herodotos  we  learn  only  that  he 
changed  the  name  of  the  ancient  tribes,  and  for  four  substituted 
ten,  each  tribe  having  its  own  Phylarchos  or  chief,  and  each  tribe 
being  subdivided  into  ten  Demoi  or  cantons.     Yet  the  new  .clas- 
'  Herod,  v.  66. 


88  THE  FORMATION  OF   HELLAS.  [Book  I. 

sification  must  have  involved  a  new  principle  ;  or  else  the  oppo- 
sition between  Kleisthenes  and  Isagoras  could  never  have  assumed 
formidable  proportions. 

But  if  there  be  any  truth  in  the  accounts  which  we  have 
received  of  the  Solonian  constitution,  the  fourth  class  contained 
Need  of  a  practically  not  only  all  those  whose  annual  income 
ficrtion  of'  f<^l'  s^ort  of  200  drachmas,  but  all  (no  matter  what 
citizens.  their  wealth)  who  were  not  members  of  phratriai  or 
tribes.  To  such  men  wealth,  while  it  added  to  their  civil  bur- 
dens, brought  no  political  privileges  ;  and  the  influx  of  strangers, 
allured  by  Athenian  commerce,  was  constantly  increasing  the 
numbers  of  a  class  which  already  contained  by  far  the  larger  por- 
tion of  the  population.  Many  of  these  men  would  be  among  the 
most  intelligent  and  enterprising  in  the  land  ;  and  the  discontent 
with  which  they  would  regard  their  exclusion  from  all  civil  offices 
would  be  a  serious  and  growing  danger  to  the  state.  Nor  could 
Kleisthenes  fail  to  see  that  if  he  wished  to  put  out  a  fire  which 
was  always  more  than  smouldering  and  might  at  any  time  burst 
into  furious  flame,  he  must  strike  at  the  root  of  the  religious  orga- 
nisation which  rendered  all  true  political  growth  impossible. 
There  was  nothing  left  but  to  do  away  with  the  religious  tribes 
as  political  units,  and  to  substitute  for  them  a  larger  number  of 
new  tribes  divided  into  cantons  taking  in  the  whole  body  of  the 
Athenian  citizens  ;  and  into  this  body  Kleisthenes,  according  to 
the  express  statement  of  Aristotle,'  introduced  many  resident 
aliens  and  perhaps  slaves. 

Such  a  change,  although  it  might,  as  the  Kleisthenean  proposal 
did,  leave  the  houses  and  phratries  untouched  as  religions  societies 
This  classi-  founded  on  an  exclusive  worship,  would  be  regarded 
fication  the    i^y  the   conservative   Eupatrid   as    virtually    a    death- 

CHllSG  01  tilO  1  ^ 

opposition  of  blow  to  the  old  faith.  Nothing  more  is  needed  to  ex- 
isagoras.  plain  the  vehement  opposition  of  Isagoras  ;  nor  can  we 
well  avoid  the  conclusion  that  it  was  the  proposal  of  this  change 
which  roused  his  antagonism,  and  that  it  was  not  the  rivalry  of 
Isagoras  which  led  Kleisthenes  to  promulgate  his  scheme  as  a  new 
method  of  winning  popularity.  The  struggle  at  Athens  is  re- 
flected in  the  strife  between  the   plebeians  and  the   patricians  of 

'  Polit.  iii.  2,  3.     The  number  of  case,  it  is  impossible  to  say.    Citi- 

HEToiKoi,  or   permanently   resident  zensliip  could  at  any  time  be  jrrant- 

foreiprners    (passing    strangers   or  ed  by  a  public  vote  of  the  people  ; 

travellers  never   bore  this   name),  but  even  without  this  vote,  wealthy 

was  very  large  at  Athens.    Of  these  non-freemen,  Mr.  Gfrote  remarks, 

foreigners  many  became  Athenian  might    purchase   admission    upon 

citizens,  many  did  not.     What  de-  the  register  of  some  poor  Demos, 

termining  circumstance  may  have  probai)ly  by   means  of  a  fictitious 

brought  about  the  result  in  each  adoption.     Hint.  Gr.  iv.  180. 


Chap.  XII.]      THE  REFORMS  OF  KLEISTHENES. 


89 


Rome,  and  again  between  the  great  families  of  the  German  and 
Italian  cities  in  the  middle  ages  and  the  guilds  which  grew  up 
around  them. 

While  tlie  principle  wliieh  avoided  all  unnecessary  interference 
with  existing  forms  left  a  nominal  existence  to  the  Trittyes  and 
Naukrariai,  the  Probouleutic  council  of  Four  Hundred  „,  r,Qj,jgji 
underwent  more  important  changes.  To  that  assembly  of  the  Five 
only  those  citizens  were  eligible  who  belonged  to  the  ""  ^^  ' 
first  class  and  were  members  of  one  of  the  four  tribes,  which  had 
each  a  hundred  representatives  in  the  Senate.  In  the  new  council 
of  Five  Hundred,  to  which  all  citizens  were  eligible,  each  of  the 
ten  new  tribes  was  represented  by  fifty  senators,  who  seem  now 
to  have  been  elected  by  lot. 

By  the  definition  of  Aristotle  those  only  can  be  rightly  called 
citizens,  who  exercise  in  their  own  persons  a  judicial  as  well  as  a 
legislative  power ;'  and  this  judicial  authority  was  w  r  " 
extended  to  all  the  citizens  by  the  constitution  of  the  and  the 
Heliaia,  in  which,  as  we  find  it  in  the  days  of  Perikles,  ^''^'^^t'^'- 
6000  persons  called  Dlkastai  or  jurymen,  above  the  age  of  thirty 
years,  were  elected  annually  by  lot  in  the  proportion  of  600  for 
each  of  the  ten  tribes,  1000  of  these  being  reserved  to  fill  vacan- 
cies caused  by  death  or  absence  among  the  remaining  5000  who 
were  subdivided  into  ten  decuries  of  500  each.  To  each  man  was 
given  a  ticket  bearing  a  letter  denoting  the  pannel  to  which  he 
was  assigned,  while  the  dii^tribution  of  the  causes  to  be  tried  by 
the  decuries  was  left  to  the  Thesmotlietai  or  six  inferior  archons. 
Thus  no  juryman  knew  until  the  time  of  trial,  in  wliat  court  or 
under  what  magistrate  he  might  be  called  upon  to  sit ;  and  in  his 
ignorance  lay  the  best  guarantee  that  he  would  approach  without 
prejudice  tlie  cause  which  he  was  pledged  by  his  solemn  oath  to 
determine  with  strict  justice  and  truth.  In  the  discharge  of  this 
function  each  decury  was  regarded  as  the  collective  state,  and  like 
the  whole  body  of  Six  Thousand  was  called  the  Heliaia.  Thus 
each  decision  was  the  decision  of  the  people,  and  from  it  there 
was  no  appeal. 

But  the  constitution  which  intrusted  to  the  archons  the  assign- 
ment of  the  causes  to  the  several  Dikasteria,  or  jury-  The 
courts,  insured  the  downfall   of   their  ancient  power.   Archons. 
The  experience  of  these  courts  furnished  a  high  legal  education  to 

'  PoUt.  iii.  1,  6.     In  the  republic  deed   assign  to  the   city  an   exact 

of  Andorre  Aristotle  would  find  all  limit  of  numbers  ;   but  he  asserts 

that  is  needed  to  constitute  a  Polls  ;  distinctly  that  the  limit  of  a  Statn 

tliti  idea  of  a  parliament  like  that  or  Polls  is  passed  if  it  lias  a  iiopula- 

)f  (ii'eat  Britain  would  to  him  have  tion  which  would  be  far  less  than 

ii])  pared  to  involve  impracticable  that  of   Birmingham.     Eth.   Nik. 

complications.     He   could   not  in-  ix.  10. 


90  THE  FORMATION   OF  HELLAS.  [Book  I. 

the  Athenian  citizens,  and  the  exercise  of  judicial  power  became 
for  them  more  and  more  a  necessary  constituent  of  their  civil  U- 
berty,  while  the  functions  of  the  archon  became  more  and  more 
subordinate  to  those  of  the  Hcliaia.  Accordingly  in  the  time  of 
Perikles  we  find  the  Dikastai  in  receipt  of  a  certain  fixed,  thougli 
small,  payment  for  their  services,  while  the  archons  are  amongst 
the  ofiicers  who  are  chosen  by  lot.  Under  the  Solonian  constitu- 
tion which  admitted  to  the  archonship  none  but  members  of  tribes 
who  belonged  to  the  wealthiest  class,  such  a  mode  of  appointment 
would  have  been  more  acceptable  to  the  Eupatridai  than 
election  by  the  Ekklesia  in  v/hich  the  poorest  had  their  vote, 
though  they  could  not  be  elected  themselves.  But  when  all  offices 
of  state  had  been  thrown  open  to  the  general  body  of  citizens,  it 
was  clear  that  selection  by  lot  could  be  applied  to  those  ofiices 
only  which  needed  on  the  part  of  those  who  filled  th?m  nothing 
more  than  the  con)mon  honesty  and  average  abilit}"  of  ordinary  citi- 
zens. This  method,  which  had  value  for  the  poor  as  giving  them  a 
chance  of  obtaining  oflices  to  which  they  were  legally  eligible,  Avas 
never  applied  to  the  appointment  of  the  Strategoi  or  generals, 
who  Avere  always  chosen  by  show  of  hands  of  the  people  in  the 
Ekklesia.  The  mere  fact  that  it  Avas  applied  to  the  selection  of 
archons  shoAvs  how  completely  the  relative  positions  of  the  Strate- 
goi and  the  archon  Polemarchos  had  been  reversed  since  the 
days  Avhen  Miltiades  applied  to  Kallimachos  to  decide  in  favor  of 
battle  on  the  field  of  Marathon,'  and  further  pro\es  that  their  an- 
cient poAvers  had  been  cut  down  to  the  scantiest  measure,  as  they 
could  not  fail  to  be,  when  the  Dikastai  had  incroached  on  their 
judicial  functions  on  the  one  side  and  the  Strategoi  had  taken 
their  place  as  military  leaders  on  the  other. 

The  law  which  made  all  citizens  eligible  to  the  archonship 
dealt  the  deathblow  to  the  predominance  of  the  Areiopagos.  By 
The  Court  of  the  Solonian  constitution  this  court  remained  strictly 
Areiopagos.  oligarchical,  Avhile  during  the  usurpation  of  the  Peisis- 
Iratidai  the  archons  by'  Avhom  its  numbers  Avere  recruited  Avere 
necessarily  mere  creatures  of  the  tyrant ;  and  so  long  as  only  the 
Avealthy  members  of  tribes  could  be  elected  to  the  office,  the 
Areiopagos  would  continue   to  be  the   bulwark  and  garrison  of 

■  It   is  true  that  Herodotos,  vi.  490  B.C.  tlie  political  conditionB  of 

109,    speaks    of    Kallimaclios    as  Athens  in  his  own  day. 

Jiavinp:  been  chosen  by  lot ;  but  if  Dr.    Curtius   {Hist.   Or.    i.    478, 

it  seems  impossible  to  believe  that  trans.)  holds  tliat  the  assertion  of 

the  Strategoi  Avere  elected,  as  they  Ht-rodotos  must  be  conclusive  as  to 

always  were,  Avliile  the  Polemar-  the  fact.     It  would  be  so  if  Herodo- 

chos,  at  a  time  when  his  functions  tos  had  been  speaking  of  a  time  for 

were  the  same  as  theirs,  was  taken  Avliich  he  had  l)efore  him  a  written 

by  lot,  it  would  follow  tliat  the  his-  contemporary  history. 
torian  has  transferred  to  the  year 


Chap.  XII.]      THE  REFORMS  OF  KLEISTHENES.  91 

oligarchy.  This  character  it  retained  at  the  time  when  Perikles 
and  Ephialtes  carried  their  measures  of  reform :  hat  when  it.s 
seats  began  to  be  filled  with  archons  who  had  been  chosen  by  lot, 
the  safeguards  of  its  ancient  dignity  were  taken  away,  and  it 
gradually  became  merely  a  respectable  assembly  of  average  Athe- 
nian citizens. 

If  these  various  reforms  raised  an  effectual  barrier  against  the 
abuse  of  political  power  whether  by  the  tribes  or  the  demoi,  there 
remained  a  more  formidable  danger  from  the  over- 
weening influence  which  might  be  exercised  by  iin-  ''  '''''^"'™- 
scrupulous  individual  citizens.  It  was  true  that  the  Kleisthenean 
constitution  could  not  fail  to  give  to  the  main  body  of  the  people 
a  political  education  which  should  build  up  in  them  a  strong 
reverence  for  the  principle  of  law  :  but  there  Avere  many  in  whom 
this  moral  sense  had  not  been  formed.  The  aliens,  or  slaves  (if 
any  such  there  were)  who  had  been  admitted  to  citizenship,  and 
the  citizens  generally  of  the  poorest  class  who  had  been  declared 
eligible  to  high  offices,  would  find  their  interest  in  the  new  order 
of  things  ;  but  the  changes  welcomed  by  them  would  rouse  no  feel- 
ing but  those  of  indignation  and  hatred  in  the  minds  of  the 
genuine  Eupatrid  oligarchs.  For  such  men  there  would  be  an 
almost  irresistible  temptation  to  subvert  the  constitution  from 
which  they  had  nothing  to  expect  but  constant  incroachments  pu 
their  ancient  privileges  ;  and  if  one  like  Peisistratos  or  Isagoras 
should  give  the  signal  for  strife,  the  state  could  look  to  the  people 
alone  to  maintain  the  law.  In  other  words,  the  only  way  to  peace 
and  order  would  lie  through  civil  war,  in  which  there  would  be 
everything  to  encourage  the  oligarch,  and  very  little  to  inspirit 
their  opponents.  The  difficulty  was  met  by  an  appeal  to  that 
sense  of  the  sovereign  authority  of  the  people  which  Avas  soon  to 
make  Athens  pre-eminent  alike  among  all  Hellenic  and  non-Hellen- 
ic states ;  and  it  was  left  to  the  citizens  to  decide,  once  perhaps  in 
each  year,  by  their  secret  and  irresponsible  vote,  whether  for  the 
safety  of  the  Avhole  community  one  of  the  citizens  should  go  for  a 
definite  period  of  years  into  an  exile  which  involved  neither  loss  of 
property  nor  civil  infamy.  But  against  the  abuse  even  of.  this 
power  the  most  jealous  precautions  were  taken.  No  one  could  be 
sent  into  exile,  unless  at  the  least  6000  votes,  or  in  other  words 
the  votes  of  one-fourth  of  the  whole  body  of  citizens,  were  given 
against  him  ;  and  it  was  expressly  provided  by  the  Kleisthenean 
constitution  that  apart  from  this  secret  vote  of  6000  citizens  no 
law  should  be  made  against  any  single  citizen,  unless  that  same 
law  were  made  against  all  Athenian  citizens.  Th«  result  might 
be  that  a  less  number  than  6000  votes  demanded  the  banishment 
of  an  indefinite  number  of  citizens,  and  in  this  case  the  ceremony 


J)2  THE   FORMATION  OF   HELLAS.  [Book  L 

went  for  nothing.  If,  liowever,  more  than  6000  votes  were  given 
against  any  man,  he  received  warning  to  quit  Athens  within  ten 
days  ;  bnt  lie  departed  without  civil  disgrace  and  without  losing 
any  portion  of  his  property.  Thus  without  bloodshed  and  without 
strife  the  state  was  freed  from  the  presence  of  a  man  who  might 
be  tempted  to  upset  the  laws  of  his  country  ;  and  this  relief  was 
obtained  by  a  mode  which  left  no  room  for  the  indulgence  of  per- 
sonal ill-will.  On  the  whole,  the  Athenians  had  no  cause  to  feel 
ashamed  of  a  device  which  had  wrought  far  more  good  than  harm, 
and  which  at  the  cost  of  the  least  possible  hardship  to  the  banished 
men  prevented  the  recurrence  of  the  feuds  and  intrigues  which 
had  led  to  the  despotism  of  former  days.  No  shame  can  attach 
to  a  practice  certainly  less  harsh  than  that  which  banishes  pretend- 
ers from  the  countries  Avhose  crowns  they  claim,  and  which  was 
so  far  from  being  the  necessary  fruit  of  democratic  suspicions  and 
jealousies  that  it  fell  into  disuse  just  when  the  government  of 
Athens  was  most  thoroughly  democratical. 

It  was  this  constitution  with  its  free-spoken  Ekklesia,  its  per- 
manent Probouleutic  senate,  and  its  new  military  organisation, 
Expulsion  which  Isagoras  determined,  if  it  were  possible,  to 
Klei'Thenes"^  Overthrow.  His  oligarchical  instinct  left  him  in  no 
B.C.  509.  •  doubt  tliat,  unless  the  impulse  given  by  freedom  of 
speech  and  by  admitting  to  public  offices  all  but  the  poorest  class 
of  citizens  were  speedily  checked,  the  result  would  assuredly  be 
the  growth  of  a  popular  sentiment,  which  would  make  the  revival 
of  Eupatrid  ascendancy  a  mere  dream.  Feeling  that  his  resources 
at  Athens  were  inadequate  to  the  task,  he  appealed  to  his  friend 
the  Spartan  king  Kleomenes,  who  availed  himself  of  the  old  re- 
ligious terrors  inspired  by  the  curse  pronounced  on  the  Alkmaio- 
nidai  for  the  death  of  Kylon  or  his  adherents  more  than  a  hundred 
years  before.  This  terror  was  still  so  great  that  Kleisthenes  with 
many  Athenian  citizens  was  constrained  to  leave  Athens.'  After 
his  departure  Kleomenes,  having  entered  the  city  with  a  small 
force,  drove  out  as  being  under  the  old  curse  seven  hundred 
families  whoso  names  had  been  furnished  to  him  by  Isagoras.  In 
his  next  step  he  encountered  an  unexpected  opposition.  The 
Council  of  Five  Hundred  refused  to  be  dissolved,  and  the  Spartan 
king  with  Isagoras  and  his  adhei'ents  took  refuge  in  the  Akropolis. 
But  he  had  no  means  of  withstanding  a  blockade,  and  on  the  third 
day  he  agreed  to  leave  the  city  with  his  Spartan  force.  The 
departure  of  Kleomenes  was  followed  by  the  restoration  of  Kleis- 
thenes and  the  seven  hundred  exiled  families  ;  but  impelled  by 
the  conviction  that  between  Sparta  and  Athens  tlieiew'as  a  deadly 
quarrel,  tlie  Athenians  made  an  effort  to  anlici[)ate  the  intrigues 
of  Ilippias,  and  sent  an  embassy  to  Sardeis  to  make  an  indepen- 


Chap.  XII.]      THE  REFORMS  OF  KLEISTHENES.  93 

dent  alliance  with  the  Persian  King.  The  envoys  on  being  admit- 
ted to  the  presence  of  Artaphenies  were  asked  who  they  were  and 
where  they  lived,  and  were  then  told  that  Dareios  wonld  admit 
them  to  an  alliance  on  their  giving  him  earth  and  water.  To  this 
demand  of  absolute  subjection  the  envoys  gave  an  assent  wliich  was 
indignantly  repudiated  by  the  whole  body  of  Athenian  citizens.' 

But  Kleomenes   had   not  yet  laid  aside  the  hope  of  punishing 
the  Athenians.     On   liis   retreat  from  the   city  he  took  the  road 
whicli   led   him    by  Plataiai,    a    small   Boiotian    town  Alliance  of 
wliich   lay   at   a   distance   of   about  thirty  mik^s  from  ^Vin.'^'wi  „. 

J  ,,.i.»  1  ^^^^"  Athens. 

Athens  to  the  south  of  the  river  Asopos  on  the  nortliern  b.c.  509.  (.?> 
slopes  of  Kithairon.  This  town  the  Thebans  claimed  as  their 
latest  colony  ;''  but  the  Plataians,  who  were  probably  unwilling 
subjects  and  certainly  complained  of  ill-treatment  on  the  part  of 
the  Thebans,  availed  themselves  eagerly  of  the  presence  of  Kleo- 
menes to  surrender  themselves  and  their  city  on  condition  of  being 
admitted  among  the  allies  of  Sparta.^  For  the  Spartans  he  felt 
that  the  alliance  had  no  attraction  and  must  be  a  source  of  annoy- 
ance and  trouble  ;  but  he  was  not  unwilling  to  suggest  a  step 
which  should  transfer  this  annoyance  to  Athens  and  lead  perhaps 
to  a  series  of  wars  between  that  city  and  the  Theban  confederacy. 
The  distance  of  Sparta  was  alleged  as  a  reason  why  the  Plataians 
should  look  out  for  nearer  allies  ;  and  the  Athenians  were  named 
as  those  who  were  best  able  to  help  them.  The  counsel  was  fol- 
lowed, and  some  Plataians  reaching  Athens  during  a  festival  of 
the  twelve  gods  sat  as  suppliants  at  the  altar  and  made  to  the 
Athenians  the  proposals  which  had  been  rejected  by  Kleomenes. 
A  prayer  thus  urged  was  not  to  be  resisted  ;  but  the  anticipations 
of  Kleomenes  were  justified  by  the  event.  The  alliance  embroiled 
Athens  with  Thebes,  and  did  no  good  ultimately  to  Plataiai. 

Foiled  for  the  time  in  his  efforts,  Kleomenes  was  not  cast  down. 
Regarding  the  Kleisthenean   constitution  as  a  personal  insult  to 
himself,  he   w^as   determined   that  Isagoras  should  be   Discom- 
despot  of  Athens.     With   this  view  he  gathered   an   Kieolj^J^es 
army  from  all  parts  of  Peloponnesos  and  arranged  with   atEiensie. 
the  Boiotians  a  simultaneous  invasion  of  Attica.     The   latter  ac- 
cordingly seized  llysiai  and  Oinoe,  Attic  cantons,  the  one  about 
eight,  the  other  about  twenty  miles  from  Plataiai,  while  the  men 
of    the    Euboian    Chalkis    ravaged   other  parts  of  Attica.     The 
punishment  of  these  invaders  the  Athenians  left  to  some  future 
day.     For  the  present  they  marched  to  Eleusis,  which  Kleomenes 
had  reached  with  an  army  from  Avhich  he  carefully  concealed  the 
purpose  of  the  campaign.     The  appearance  of  the  Athenians,  and 
possibly  the   tidings   of  the  Boiotian   invasion  of  Attica  on  the 

'  Herod,  vi.  70-73.  -  Tliuc.  iii.  61.  '  Thuc.  iii.  68. 


94  THE   FORMATION   OF   HELLAS.  [Book  I. 

north,  taught  them  what  this  purpose  was  ;  andKleomenes  found 
that  his  opponents  Avere  not  confined  to  the  Kleisthenean  council 
of  Five  Hundred.  The  Corinthians,  confessing  tliat  they  had 
come  on  an  unrighteous  errand,  went  home,  followed  by  the  other 
Spartan  king,  Demaratos  the  son  of  Ariston. 

The  Athenians  were  now  free  to  turn  their  arms  against  their 
other  enemies.  They  marched  against  the  Chalkidians  ;  but  as 
y.      .  they  fell  in  with  the  Boiotians  who  were  hastening  to 

of  the  their  aid  at  the  Euripos,  they  attacked  these  first,  and 

over^the"^  having  inflicted  on  them  a  signal  defeat,  crossed  on 
Boiotians  the  same  day  into  Euboia  and  won  another  great 
Chalkidians.  victory  Over  the  Chalkidians,  The  Chalkidianr,  were 
B.C.  509.  further  punished.  Four  thousand  Athenian  settlers, 
wlio  under  the  title  of  Klerouchoi  retained  all  their  riglits  as 
citizens,  were  placed  on  the  lands  of  the  wealthy  Chalkidian 
owners  called  Hippobotai  or  horse-feeders,  and  served  like  the 
Roman  Colonise  as  a  garrison  in  a  conquered  country. 

Such  were  the  first-fruits  of  Athenian  freedom  ;  and  contrast- 
ing this  outburst  of  warlike  activity  with  their  stipineness  under 
Warlike  the  factions  of  the  Eupatrids  and  the  despotism  of  the 
onhe*^  Peisistratidai,  llerodotos  cannot  repress  the  utterance 
Athenians,  of  his  convictioii  that  liberty  of  speech  is  a  right  good 
thing,  since  the  Athenians  under  their  tyrants  were  in  war  no 
better  than  any  of  their  neighbors,  but  on  being  rid  of  them  rose 
rapidly  to  pre-eminence,  the  reason  being  that  forced  service 
for  a  master  took  away  all  their  spirit,  whereas  on  winning  their 
freedom  each  man  made  vigorous  elf orts  for  himself.'  This  change 
in  the  Athenian  character  excited  no  feelings  of  admiration  in  the 
Thcbans,  who  entered  into  an  alliance  with  the  Aiginetans.  The 
new  energy  of  Athens  is  seen  in  the  continued  maintenance  of  a 
war  with  Thebes  and  Aigina  at  once.  But  it  was  now  clear  to 
the  Spartan  king  and  to  his  countrymen  that  the  Athenians  would 
not  acquiesce  in  the  predominance  of  Sparta  ;  that  if  they  retained 
their  freedom,  the  power  of  Athens  would  soon  become  equal  to 
their  own  ;^  and  that  their  only  safety  lay  in  providing  the  Athe- 
nians with  a  tyrant.  An  invitation  was,  therefore,  sent  to  Hippias 
at  Sigeion,  to  attend  a  congress  of  the  allies  of  Sparta,  who  were 
summoned  to  meet  on  the  arrival  of  the  exiled  despot. 

The  words  in  which  Herodotos  relates  these  facts  show  not 
merely  that  Sparta  regarded  herself  as  in  some  sort  the  first  city 
Prcdomi-       in  Hellas,  but  that  among  the   Hellenic    states  there 

Spartaln  ^^'^''^  ^^°^  ^  ^^^^  ^^'^^^  "^^'^-^'^  disposed  to  look  up  to  her 
Hellas.  as  such.     Her  claim  to  supremacy  is  seen  in  the  com- 

plaint that  Athens  was  not  willing  to  acknowledge  it ;  and  the 
*  Herod,  v.  78.  "Herod,  v.  9L 


Chap.  XII.]      THE  REFORMS   OF   KLEISTHENES.  96 

recognition  of  this  claim  in  certain  quarters  is  proved  by  the  fact 
tliat  the  men  of  Corinth  and  other  cities  marched  witli  Kleomenes 
to  Eleusis  even  tliough  they  did  not  know  the  purpose  for  which 
they  had  been  brought  together.  Tiie  Congress  now  summoned 
exhibits  Sparta  still  more  clearly  as  in  some  sort  the  head  of  a 
confederacy,  able  to  convoke  her  allies  at  will,  yet  not  able  to 
dispense  with  the  debates  in  council  which  implied  their  freedom 
to  accept  or  reject  her  plans.  The  assembly  in  which  Ilippias 
appeared  to  plead  the  cause  of  despotism  seems  to  have  gone 
through  all  the  formalities  needed  to  maintain  the  self-respect  of 
citizens  of  subordinate  but  independent  states. 

The  address  of  the  Spartans  to  the  allies  thus  convoked  was 
brief  after  their  fashion  and  to  the  point.  It  candidly  confessed 
their  folly  in  having  been  duped  by  the  Pythia  at  congress  of 
Delphoi,  and  in  having  given  over  the  city  of  Athens  l^'j^'^jf'' 
to  an  ungrateful  Demos,  which  had  already  made  the  b.c.  509. 
Boiotians  and  Chalkidians  feel  the  sting  of  democracy  and  would 
speedily  make  others  feel  it  also  ;  and  not  less  candidly  it  besought 
the  allies  to  help  them  in  punishing  the  Athenians  and  in  re- 
storing to  Hippias  the  power  which  he  had  lost.  The  reply  put 
into  the  mouth  of  the  Corinthian  Sosikles  is  an  indignant  con- 
demnation of  this  selfish  and  heartless  policy.  "  Surely  heaven 
and  earth  a.re  going  to  change  places,"  he  said,  "  and  fishes  will  live 
on  land,  and  men  in  the  sea,  now  that  you,  Lakedaimonians,  mean 
to  put  down  freo  governments  and  to  restore  in  each  city  that 
most  unrighteous  and  most  bloodthirsty  thing, — a  despotism.  If 
you  think  that  a  tyranny  has  a  single  good  feature  to  recommend 
it,  try  it  first  yourselves,  and  then  seek  to  bring  others  to  your 
opinion  about  it.  But  in  point  of  fact  you  have  not  tried  it,  and 
being  religiously  resolved  that  you  never  will  try  it,  you  seek  to 
force  it  upon  others.  Experience  would  have  taught  you  a  more 
wholesome  lesson  :  we  have  had  this  experience,  and  we  have 
learnt  this  lesson."  This  moral  is  inforced  by  the  strange  stories 
which  Sosikles  goes  on  to  tell  of  Kypselos  and  Periandros,  the 
memory  of  whose  crimes  made  Corinthians  shudder  ;  and  he  ends 
with  Spartan  plainness  of  speech  by  confessing  the  wonder  which 
their  invitation  to  Ilippias  had  excited  at  Corinth,  and  the  still 
greater  astonishment  with  which  they  now  heard  the  explanation 
of  a  policy,  in  the  guilt  of  which  the  Corinthians  at  least  wen 
resolved  that  they  would  not  be  partakers.  The  Spartan  in  this 
debate  differed  from  the  Corinthian  only  in  tlie  clearness  with 
which  he  saw  that  there  was  that  in  Athenian  democracy  which, 
if  not  repressed,  must  prove  fatal  to  the  oligarchical  constitutions 
around  it.  To  this  point  the  Corinthian  had  not  yet  advanced, 
and  he  could  urge  now  as  a  sacred  thing  the  duty  of  not  meddling 


96  THE   FORMATION   OF   HELLAS.  [Book  I. 

with  the  interna]  affairs  of  an  autonomous  community.  In  the 
debates  which  preceded  the  outbreak  of  the  Peloponnesian  Avar 
the  Corinthian  deputies  held  a  very  different  languajye.  Their 
eyes  had  been  opened  in  the  meantime  to  the  radical  antagonism 
of  the  system  in  which  every  citizen  is  invested  with  legislative 
and  judicial  powers,  and  the  system  in  which  these  powers  are  in 
the  hands  of  an  hereditary  patrician  caste. 

That  the  Corinthians  would  be  brought  to  see  this  hereafter, 
was  the  gist  of  the  reply  made  by  Hippias.  The  time  was  coming, 
Return  of  he  said,  in  which  they  would  find  the  Athenians  a  thorn 
^^?ori^*^*'  in  tbeir  side.  For  the  present  his  exhortations  were 
B.C.  509.  thrown  away.  The  allies  protested  unanimously  against 
all  attempts  to  interfere  with  the  internal  administration  of  any 
Helieuic  city  ;  and  Hippias  went  back  disappointed  to  Sigeion. 


BOOK    II. 

THE  STRUGGLE    WITH  PERSIA,  AND    THE   GROWTH 
OF  THE  A  THENIAN  EMPIRE. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE    PERSIAN    EMPIRE    UNDER    CYRUS    AND    KAMBYSES. 

Fhe  Persian   king  by  whose  aid  Hippias  hoped  to  recover  his 
ost  power  was  lord  of  a  vast  inheritance  of  conquest.     With- 
n  tlie   compass   of  a  few  years  the  kingdoms  of  the   The  iiistori- 
Sledes,  the  Lydians,  and  the  Egyptians  had  been  ab-  traditional 
iorbed  into  the  huge  mass  wliose  force  was  soon  to  be   ciyrus. 
jrecipitated  on  the  ill-cemented  confederacy  of  the  Hellenic  tribes. 
[f  we  follow  the  popular  chronology,  Peisistratos  made  himself 
lespot  at  Athens  at  the  very  time  when  Cyras  founded 
,his  great  empire  by  the  dethronement  of  the  Median 
istyages.     But  the  figure  of  Cyrus  emerges  only  for  a  time  from 
he  cloud-land  to  which  the  earliest  and  the  latest  scenes  of  his  life 
)elong. 

In  the  version  of  the  tale  which  Herodotos  followed,  he  was 
he  grandson  of  the  Median  king  Astyages,  who,  frightened  by  a 
)rapliecy  that  his  daughter's  child  will  be  his  ruin,  The  story  of 
!;ives  the  babe  on  its  birth  to  Harpagos  Avith  orders  Astyages 
hat  it  shall  be  forthwith  slain.  By  the  advice  of  his  ^°  ^"'^' 
vife  Harpagos,  instead  of  killing  the  child,  places  it  in  the  hands 
)f  one  of  the  royal  lierdsmen,  who  carries  it  home.  Finding  that 
lis  wife  had  just  given  birth  to  a  dead  infant,  the  herdsman  ex- 
)0se3  the  corpse,  and  brings  up  Cyrus  as  his  own  son.  But  his 
ligh  lineage  cannot  be  hidden.  In  the  village  sports  the  boy  plays 
he  king  so  well  that  a  complaint  is  carried  to  Astyages  ;  and  by  the 
evere  judge  is  found  to  be  the  child  who  had  been  doomed  to  die 
)ut  who  turns  out  to  be  the  man  born  to  be  king.  Astyages  is 
iwe-struck:  but  nevertheless  he  takes  vengeance  on  Harpagos  by 
nviting  him  to  a  banquet  at  ^hich  he  feasts  on  the  body  of  his 
!wn  son,  and  his  fears  are  quieted  by  the  soothsayers  avIio  tell  him 
hat  the  election  of  Cyrus  as  king  by  the  village  children  has  ful 
iiied  the  prophecy.  Harpagos,  however,  is  resolved  that  there 
5 


98  THE   STRUGGLE   WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  U. 

shall  be  a  second  and  a  more  serious  fulfilment ;  and  he  drives 
Cyrus  into  the  rebellion  which  ends  in  the  dethronement  of  the 
despot.  To  achieve  this  end  Cyrus,  according  to  the  notion  of  a 
historian  who  is  thinking  only  of  the  inhabitants  of  a  small  canton, 
convokes  the  Persian  tribes,  and  holds  forth  the  boon  of  freedom, 
in  other  words,  of  immunity  from  taxation,  if  they  will  break  the 
Median  yoke  from  off  their  necks.  The  contrast  of  a  banquet  to 
which  they  are  bidden  after  a  day  sj^ent  in  severe  toil  so  weighs 
with  them,  that  they  at  once  throw  in  their  lot  with  Cyrus  and 
presently  change  their  state  of  oppression  for  tlie  more  agreeable 
power  of  oppressing  others.  The  latter  part  of  this  story  is  an  in- 
stitutional legend  accounting  for  the  fiscal  immunities  of  the  Persian 
clans.  The  former  is  a  myth  which  reappears,  amongst  many  more, 
m  the  tales  of  Oidipous,  Telephos,  Paris,  Romulus  and  Remus, 

The  Median  dynasty,  which  ended  with  Astyages,  began,  it  is 
said,  with  Deiokes.  Of  this  Deiokes  we  are  told,  according  to 
The  story  of  the  uotion  Avhich  regarded  all  the  Persians  as  in- 
Dciokes.  habitants  of  a  single  township,  that,  aiming  from  the 
first  at  despotism,  he  set  himself  to  administer  justice  amongst  the 
lawless  men  by  whom  he  was  surrounded,  and  having  at  length 
won  a  high  name  for  impartiality  withdrew  himself  from  them  on 
the  plea  that  he  was  unable  to  bear  the  continued  tax  on  his  time. 
The  seven  tribes  or  clans  of  the  Medes  then  met  in  council  and 
resolved  on  making  Deiokes  their  king.  Tlieir  offer  is  accepted, 
and  Deiokes  at  once  bids  them  build  him  a  palace  with  seven 
concenti'ic  walls,  and  taking  up  his  abode  in  the  centre  becomes 
henceforth  a  cruel  tyrant.  These  seven  walls  have  been  regarded 
by  some  as  having  reference  to  the  seven  Median  tribes :  by 
others  they  are  supposed  to  signify  the  seven  planets,  the  worship 
of  the  sun  being  denoted  by  the  palace  in  the  centre."  Deiokes 
in  neither  case  retains  any  historical  character :  and  when  we  see 
that  here  also,  in  the  details  which  do  not  belong  to  the  myth, 
we  have  simply  an  institutional  legend  describing  generally  the 
origin  of  despotism,  the  credit  of  the  whole  narrative  is  gone. 
Nay,  this  very  origin  of  Eastern  monarchy  is  described  not  as  it 
would  be  conceived  by  the  Medes,  but  as  it  would  present  itself 
to  Greeks  acquainted  only  with  the  arts  by  which  their  own 
tyrants  had  worked  their  way  to  power.  The  turbulence  and 
factiousness  of  the  Median  tribes  in  their  small  cantons,  the  rigid 
justice  under  which  Deiokes  masks  the  object  steadilj'^  aimed  at 
from  the  first,  the  care  which  he  takes,  as  soon  as  the  offer  of  king- 
ship is  made  to  hini,  to  build  himself  a  stronghold  and  surround 
his  person  with  a  body-guard,  are  all  features  which  belong  to  the 

'  Leiioiiiiant,  Manual  of  Ancient  TJiHtory,  book  v.  cli.  3,  tJ|  3. 


Chap.  I.]  THE  PERSIAN   EMPIRE.  99 

liistory  of  Greek  rather  than  of  Oriental  despots.  The  Greek  ideal 
is  still  further  shown  in  the  ascription  to  Deiokes  of  a  severe, 
laborious,  and  impartial  administration  which  probably  no  Asiatic 
government  ever  sought  to  realise.  Thus  of  Deiokes  himself  and  of 
the  incidents  of  his  life  we  know  nothing  ;  and  at  the  utmost  the 
Avhole  story  can  be  regarded  as  nothing  more  than  a  tradition  indi- 
cating some  change  in  the  political  relations  of  the  Medes  and  the 
Assyrians,  though  whether  this  change  involved  the  destruction  of 
the  city  of  Nineveh  or  was  merely  the  revolt  of  some  mountain 
tribes,  it  is  impossible  to  say.  According  to  Herodotos'  Nineveh 
itself  had  undergone  no  disaster,  when  Phraortes,  the  son  of  Dei- 
okes, after  a  reign  of  two  and  twenty  years  met  his  death  before 
its  walls.  His  successor  Kyaxares  sought,  it  is  said,  to  avenge  his 
father  by  again  besieging  Nineveh,  but  was  compelled  to  abandon 
or  interrupt  the  blockade  owing  to  an  irruption  of  Scythians,  who 
had  chased  the  Kimmerians  out  of  Europe.^ 

It  may  possibly  have  been  before  this  inroad  that  the  cause  of 
quarrel  arose  between  Kyaxares  the  Median  king  and  Alyattea  the 
father  of  Kroisos.  Herodotos  tells  us  that  some  fugi-  gcy^ijian 
tive  Scythians  found  their  way  into  the  Median  terri-  invasion  of 
tory,  where  they  were  well  treated  by  the  king  as  long  '^  '''■ 
as  they  brought  the  tribute  imposed  on  their  captures  in  hunting. 
The  harsh  punishment  with  which  an  accidental  failure  was  visited 
led  the  Scythians,  first,  to  place  on  the  banquet  board  before  the 
king  the  limbs  of  one  of  the  Median  youths  who  had  been  sent  to 
them  to  be  taught  archery,  and  then  to  avoid  the  consequences  of 
their  revenge  by  taking  refuge  in  the  laud  of  the  Lydian  king. 
Alyattes  gave  them  shelter,  and  even  refused  to  yield  them  up  at  the 
request  of  Kyaxares.  The  war  Avhich  ensued  lasted,  it  is  said,  for 
six  years,and  was  brought  to  an  end  partly  by  an  eclipse  which  took 
place  in  the  midst  of  a  battle,  and  in  part  by  the  mediation  of 
Labynetos  king  of  Babylon  and  the  Kilikian  chief  Syennesis. 
These  sovereigns  determined  that  the  doubtful  reconcihation 
should  be  strengthened  by  a  marriage  between  Aryenis  the  daughter 
of  Alyattes  and  Astyages  the  heir  to  the  Median  throne.  While 
the  Median  dynasty  was  thus  connected  with  that  of  Lydia,  the 
alliance  with  Babylon  was  cemented,  according  to  Berosos,  by 
the  marriage  of  Nebucadnezzar,  the  son  of  Nabopolassar,  with 
Amuhia  the  daughter  of  Kyaxares.  Thus  Kroisos  became  the 
brother-in-law  of  Astyages,  and  Astyages  the  brother-in-law  of 
Nebucadnezzar.  The  chain  might  well  have  been  deemed  strong: 
but  the  links  broke,  and  left  to  the  brother-in-law  of  Astyages  the 
duty  of  avenging  him, — a  duty  which  seems  not  to  have  troubled 

'  i.  102.  '  Herod,  i.  103. 


100  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  IL 

Nebucadnezzar,  but  Avhicli,  if  we  are  to  believe  Herodotos,  was  to 
Kroisos  the  strongest  motive  for  raeasiiiing  bis  strength  against 
that  of  the  Persian  king.'  For  Kyaxares  himself  the  troubles  of 
the  Scythian  inroad  were  followed,  if  we  may  belie\e  the  story, 
by  a  brilliant  triumph  when  with  the  aid  of  the  Babylonian 
Nabopolassar  he  overthrew  the  ancient  dynasty  of  the  Assyrian 
kings  and  made  Nineveh  a  dependency  of  the  sovereigns  of  Media. 
Over  the  vast  territory  thus  brought  under  the  Median  rule  the 
Persian  king  became  lord,  on  the  ending  of  the  struggle  Avhich 
is  described  as  the  war  between  Cyrus  and  Astyages. 

The  supremacy  in  Asia  thus  passed  into  the  hands  of  a  king 
whose  chief  strength  lay  in  that  comparatively  small  country  which 
Physical  still  bears  the  name  of  Fars  or  Far.istan.  This  was 
irpema^  the  home  of  the  dominant  tribe  in  Iran  or  the  land  of 
Proper.  the    Aryans,   a  tenu    already  used   in  an  indefinitely 

contracted  meaning.  By  Herodotos  this  region  is  called  a  scanty 
and  rugged  land," — a  description  not  altogether  unbefitting  a 
country  which,  with  the  exception  of  the  hot  district  or  strip  of 
plain  lying  between  the  mountains  and  the  coast  line,  consists 
chiefly  of  the  high  plateau  formed  by  the  continuation  of  the 
mountain-system,  which,  having  furnished  a  boundary  to  the  Meso- 
potamian  plain,  turns  eastwards  and  broadens  out  into  the  high 
land  of  Persia  Proper.  Of  the  whole  of  this  country  it  may  be  said 
that  where  there  is  water,  there  is  fertility  ;  but  much  that  is  now 
desert  Avas  doubtless  rich  in  grass  and  fruits  in  the  days  when 
Cyrus  is  said  to  have  warned  his  people  that,  if  they  migrated  to  a 
wealthier  soil,  they  must  bid  farewell  to  their  supremacy  among 
the  nations.  Strong  in  a  mountain-barrier  pierced  by  astonishingly 
precipitous  gorges  along  which  roads  wind  in  zigzag  or  are  thrown 
across  furious  torrents  on  bridges  of  a  single  span,  this  beautiful  or 
desolate  land  was  not  rich  in  the  number  of  its  cities.  Near  Mur- 
gab,  about  sixty  miles  almost  due  north  of  Shiraz,  are  the  ruins 
of  Pasargadai,  probably  in  its  original  form  Parsa-gherd  or  the 
castle  of  the  Persians.^  On  a  larger  plain,  about  half-way  between 
these  two  towns,  rose  the  second  capital  Persepolis.  The  two 
streams  by  which  this  plain  is  watered  maintain  the  exquisite 
verdure  which  a  supply  of  water  never  fails  to  produce  in  Persia. 
But  ruggf  d  in  parts  and  sterile  as  this  plateau  may  be,  it  must  be 
distingiiished  from  that  vast  region  which  at  a  height  varying  be- 
^tween  3000  and  5000  feet  extends  from  the  Zagros  and  Elburz  ranges 

'  Herod.  5.  73.  well  as  with   the  Latinised  names 

^  ix.  122.  of  the  Parthian  cities  Titjranocerta. 

"  Mr.  Rawlinson' compares  tlie  Carcathrocerta.     This  terminatiou 

name  Parsa-g-herd  with  the  names  is  found   again   in   our  girth   and 

Darab-gherd,  Lasjird,  Burujird,  as  gnrth. 


Chap.  I.]  THE  PERSIAN  EMPIRE.  101 

on  the  west  and  north  over  an  area  of  1 100  by  500  miles  to  the  Suli- 
man  and  Hala  mountains  on  the  east,  and  on  the  south  to  the 
great  coast  chain  which  continues  the  plateau  of  Persia  Proper 
almost  as  far  as  the  Indus.  Of  this  immense  region,  nearly  two- 
thirds  are  absolute  desert,  in  which  the  insignificant  streams  fail 
before  the  summer  heats  instead  of  affording  nourishment  to  veo-e- 
tation.  In  such  a  country  the  habits  of  a  large  proportion  of  the 
population  will  naturally  be  nomadic  ;  and  the  fresher  pastures 
and  more  genial  climate  of  the  hills  and  valleys  about  Ekbatana 
would  draw  many  a  roving  clan  with  their  lierds  and  tents  from 
regions  scorched  by  a  heat  which  left  them  no  water. 

Into  the  vast  empire  ruled  by  the  lord  of  these  Aryan  tribes 
there  was  now  to  be  absorbed  another  kingdom  which  had  grown 
up  to  great  power  and  splendor  on  the  west  of  the  The  Median 
river  Halys,  the  stream  which,  flowing  from  the  Tauros  and  Lydian 
range,  discharges  itself  into  the  Euxine  about  sixty  ^"'^^  '°^' 
miles  to  the  east  of  the  Greek  settlement  of  Sinope.  This  stream 
was  the  boundary  which  separated  the  Semitic  inhabitants  of  Asia 
Minor  on  its  eastern  side  from  the  non-Hellenic  nations  on  the 
west,  who  acknowledged  a  certain  brotherhood  not  only  between 
themselves  but  with  the  Thrakian  tribes  beyond  the  Hellespont 
and  the  Chersonese.  The  conquests  which  had  brought  the 
Lydian  king  thus  far  placed  him  in  dangerous  pi'oximity  with  a 
power  not  less  aggressive  and  more  formidable  than  his  own.  By 
a  strange  coincidence  (if  any  trust  may  be  placed  on  the  narrative) 
the  dynasty  represented  by  Kroisos  the  last  Lydian  king  had 
supplanted  the  ancient  line  of  the  Ilerakleidai  (whatever  this  may 
mean)  about  the  same  time  when  the  Median  power  asserted  its 
independence  of  the  Assyrian  empire.  But  the  relations  which 
existed  between  Kroisos  and  the  Greeks  of  Asia  Minor  imparted 
to  the  catastrophe  at  Sardcis  a  significance  altogether  beyond 
that  which  could  be  attached  to  the  mere  transference  of  power 
from  the  despot  Astyages  to  the  despot  Cyrus. 

The  Lydian  kingdom  had  grown  up  in  a  country  iahabited  by 
a  number  of  tribes,    between  most  or  perhaps  all   of  whom  there 
existed  some  sort  of  affinity.     These  tribes,  whatever  Gco<n-aphy^- 
may  have  been  their  origin,  were  spread  over  a  region   of  A*sia 
of   whose  loveliness  Herodotos  speaks  with  a  proud 
enthusiasm.     The  beauty  of  climate,  the  richness  of  soil,  and  the 
splendor  of  scenery  which  made  Ionia  for  him  the  most  delightful 
of  all  earthly  lands,'  were  not  confined  to  the  exquisite  valleys  in 
which  for  the  most  part  the  Hellenic  inhabitants  of  Asia  Minor 
had  fixed  their  homes  ;  and  the  on!/  drawback  even  to  the  colder 

'  Herod,  i.  143. 


102  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

parts  of  this  vast  peninsula  was  that,  while  they  yielded  grain, 
fruits,  and  cattle,  they  -would  not  produce  the  olive.  These  colder 
parts  lay  on  the  large  central  plain  to  the  north  of  the  chain  of 
Tauros  which,  starting  from  the  Chelidonian  or  southeastern  pro- 
montory of  Lykia,  extends  its  huge  mountain-harrier  to  the  north 
of  the  Kilikian  country,  until  its  chain  is  broken  by  the  Eujjhrates 
a  little  below  the  point  where  this  stream  receives  the  waters  of 
the  Kappadokian  Melas  or  black  river.  This  great  plateau  runs 
off  towards  the  north,  west,  and  south,  into  a  broken  country 
whence  the  mountains  slope  down  to  the  sea,  bearing  in  their 
valleys  the  streams  which  keep  up  its  perpetual  freshness.  Stretch- 
ing in  a  southwesterly  direction  from  the  mouth  of  the  Hellespont, 
the  mountains  of  Ida,  Gargaros,  Plakos,  and  Temnos  form  the 
southern  boundary  of  the  lands  through  which  theGranikos,  Aise- 
pos,  and  Rhyndakos  find  their  way  into  the  Propontis  or  sea  of 
Marmora.  Striking  to  the  southeast  from  Mount  Temnos  until 
it  meets  the  range  of  Tauros  runs  a  mountain  chain  which  sends 
out  to  the  southwest  a  series  of  ridges  between  which  lie  the  most 
celebrated  plains  of  Asia  Minor,  each  watered  by  its  own  stream 
and  its  tributaries.  In  the  triangle  formed  by  the  mountains  of 
Gargaros  and  Temnos  on  the  north  and  mount  Pelekas  on  the 
south,  the  streams  of  Kaikos  and  Euenos  flow  into  the  Elaiatic 
gulf  between  Elaia  and  Pitane,  tlie  latter  place  being  about  ten 
miles  distant  from  the  rocks  of  Argennoussai  (disastrous  in  later 
Athenian  history),  opposite  to  the  souiheastern  promontory  of 
Lesbos.  Again  between  mount  Pelekas  on  the  north  and  the 
mountains  of  Sipylos  and  Tmolos  on  the  south  lies  the  valley  of 
the  Hermos  which,  a  few  miles  to  the  north  of  the  citadel  of  Sar- 
deis,  receives  the  waters  of  the  Paktolos,  and  flowing  westward 
past  the  Sipylan  Magnesia,  turns  to  the  south  near  the  city  of  Tem- 
nos and  runs  into  the  Egean  a1>ori"L  midway  between  Smyrna  and 
Phokaia.  To  the  cast  of  Smyrna  rise  the  heights  of  Olympos 
and  Drakon,  whicli  r.iay  be  regarded  as  a  westward  extension  of 
mount  TirK)ios,  between  which  and  mount  Messogis  the  Kaystros 
finds  its  way  to  the  sea  hard  by  Ephesos  and  about  ten  miles  to 
the  east  of  Kolophon.  Finally  beneath  the  southern  slopes  of 
Messogis  the  winding  Maiandros,  having  received  not  far  from 
Tralleis  the  waters  of  the  Marsyas,  goes  on  its  westward  way  until, 
a  little  below  the  Maiandrian  Magnesia,  it  tnms  like  the  Hermos 
to  the  south,  and  running  by  Thymbria  and  Myous  on  its  left  bank 
discharges  itself  into  tlie  gulf  which  bears  its  name,  precisely 
opposite  to  the  promontory  of  Miletos.  From  this  point  stretch 
to  westward  the  Latmian  hills  where,  as  the  tale  went,  Selene 
came  to  gaze  upon  Endymion  in  his  dreamless  sleep.  Thus  each 
between  its  mountain  walls,  the  four  streams,  Kaikos,  Hermos, 


'em   York:   Ilarj^er 


Chap.  I.]  THE  PERSIAN  EMPIRE.  103 

Kaystros,  and  Maiandros,  follow  courses  which  may  roughly  bo  re- 
garded as  parallel,  through  lauds  thau  which  few  are  richer  in  their 
wealth  of  historical  association.  Round  the  ruins  of  Sardeis  gather 
the  recollections  uot  only  of  the  great  Lydian  kingdom  but  of  the 
visionary  conversations  between  Kvoisos  and  the  illustrious  Athe- 
nian law-giver,  while  f  rora  Abydos  on  the  north  to  the  promontory 
of  Kynossema,  facing  the  seaborn  island  of  Rhodos,  every  bay 
and  headland  of  this  glorious  coast  brings  before  us  some  name 
sacred  from  its  ancient  memories,  not  the  least  among  these  being 
the  birthplace  of  Herodotos,  and  among  the  greatest  that  spot  on 
the  seashore  l)eneaththe  heights  of  Mykale  where,  as  fame  would 
have  it,  the  fleet  of  the  barbarian  was  shattered  at  the  very  time 
when  Mardonios  underwent  his  doom  at  Plataiai. 

It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  say  that  of  the  dynasty  of  Lydian 
kings  which  came  to  an  end  with  Kroisos  we  have  no  contemporary 
liistory  whatever.  The  Ilerakleid  dynasty  of  Lydia  TheLydiaa 
ends  with  Kandaules  of  whom  Herodotos  speaks  as  dynasties, 
known  to  the  Greeks  by  the  wholly  different  name  of  Myrtilos. 
Five  centuries  liad  passed  away  while  these  kings  reigned  in  an 
uninterrupted  succession  of  fatlier  and  son  until  Kandaules,  as 
Herodotos  believed,  fulfilled  his  destiny  by  insisting  on  exhibiting 
the  unclothed  form  of  his  beautiful  wife  to  liis  spear-bearer  Gyges. 
His  queen,  discovering  the  trick,  offers  to  Gyges  the  alternative  of 
death  or  of  life  and  marriage  with  herself  when  he  shall  have  slain 
his  master.  Of  this  story  it  is  enough  to  say  that  we  find  quite 
another  version  in  Plato  who  tells  us  that  far  beneath  the  surface 
of  tlie  earth  Gyges  takes  from  the  hand  of  a  gigantic  corpse  a  ring 
which  has  the  power  of  making  the  wearer  invisible,  and  that 
having  by  means  of  this  ring  corrupted  the  wife  of  Kandaules  he 
slew  his  lord  and  usurped  his  throne.'  This  ring,  discovered 
beneath  the  earth,  is  the  magic  ring  of  the  dwarf  Andvari  in  the 
Volsung  tale,  and  its  wonderful  powers  are  seen  in  the  Arabian 
story  of  Allah-ud-deen  where  a  giant  is  its  slave  as  in  the  story  of 
Gyges  he  is  its  lifeless  guardian  ;  and  the  maiden  whom  he  wins  is 
one  of  those  fair  women  who  in  a  crowd  of  legends  have  been 
wedded  to  beings  who  represent  the  darkness,  as  lokaste  of  Thebes 
to  Laios,  and  who  are  all  married  afterwards  to  the  spear-bearer 
armed  with  the  rays  of  the  glancing  sun.  The  wife  of  Kandaules 
is,  in  short,  Urvasi,  the  dawn-goddess,  who  is  invested  with  the 
beauty,  the  daring,  and  promptitude  of  the  Teutonic  Brynhild.^ 

For  this  nuirder  of  Kandaules  the  divine  penalty,  we  arc  told 
by  Herodotos,  Avas  to  descend  not  on  the  head  of  Gyges  but  on 

'  Piato.  Pnlit.  859.  mnnces  of  MidMe  Ages,   introd. 

'  Myth.  Ar.  Nat.  i.  248,  380 ;  ii.     Tales  of  Teutonic  Lands,  ib. 
63.    163,    174,   295.     Popular   Ro- 


104  THE   STRUGGLE   WITH   PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

that  of  Kroisos  his  fifth  descendant,  the  last  who  should  sit  on 
his  throne.'  The  accession  of  Kroisos  brings  us  to  the  last  act 
The  Lyclian  in  the  drama.  The  heir  of  immense  wealth  and 
the^sfatic  master  of  a  stronghold,  invulnerable  as  Achilleus,  in 
Greeks.  the  akropolis  of  Sardeis,  living  under  the  brightest  of 

skies  and  amid  the  most  beautiful  of  earthly  scenes,  Kroisos  is 
depicted  as  from  the  first  animated  by  the  ambition  of  being  a 
The  last  of  ^^^PPJ  ™an,  and  by  the  conviction  that  he  had  really 
tbeMerm-  attained  to  the  state  at  which  he  aimed.  The  golden 
"  ■  sands  of  the  Paktolos,  or,  as  others  said,  the  produce 
of  his  mines  at  Pergamos,  speedily  filled  his  treasure-houses,  and 
throughout  the  world  the  fame  went  that  Kroisos  was  the  wealthi- 
est and  happiest  of  men. 

It  was  the  destiny  of  this  magnificent  sovereign  to  bring  under 
the  yoke  of  the  Persian  king  not  merely  the  people  who  had  been 
Conquest  of  subject  to  the  rulc  of  his  forefathers,  but  the  Hellenes 
Greeksb'y'  ^f  the  eastern  coast  of  the  Egean.  The  political  dis- 
Kroisos.  union  to  which  the  Greeks  whether  of  continuous  or  of 
scattered  Hellas  seem  to  have  clung  as  the  most  precious  heritage 
of  the  ancient  Aryan  family  type,  had  insured  his  success  against 
these  Hellenic  settlements  as  at  a  later  day  it  insured  the  triumph 
of  Makedonian  kings  and  Roman  consuls.  Unquestionably  the 
conquest,  whatever  may  have  been  its  character,  had  wrought  a 
momentous  change  in  their  position.  They  were  now  included  in 
a  vast  empire  which  was  at  any  time  liable  to  the  sudden  and 
irreparable  disasters  which  so  frequently  changed  the  face  of  the 
Asiatic  world.  If  these  Hellenes  could  so  far  have  modified  their 
nature  as  to  combine  Avith  the  decision  and  firmness  of  English- 
men, their  union  might  have  broken  the  power  of  Xerxes  before 
he  could  set  foot  on  the  soil  of  Europe.  But  no  danger  could 
impress  on  them  the  need  of  such  a  sacrifice  as  this  ;  their  posi- 
tion on  the  borders  of  a  vast  undefended  country  deprived  them 
of  the  advantages  enjoyed  by  their  kinsmen  of  western  Hellas  ; 
and  the  whips  of  Kroisos  were  therefore  soon  exchanged  for  the 
scorpions  of  the  Persian  despot. 

Splendid  as  is  the  drama  Avhich  Herodotos  brings  before  us  in 

his  narrative  of  the   life   of   Kroisos,   we   have  to  re- 

of  the  life  of  member  that  it  is  strictly  a  drama,  arranged  in  accor- 

Kioisos.         djxnce    with    a  fixed    religious  idea, — a  drama  which 

admirably  illustrates  the  popular  sentiment  of  the  age,but  of  which, 

^  In  otlier  words,  the  sun  kills  the  dRrkness.    In  short,  the  traditional 

nisrlit:    but  the   slauo-hter  of  the  history  of  the  Lydian  kinprdom.  like 

niffht  cannot  be  avenged  until  the  that  of  so  many  other  dynasties, 

end  of  the  day,  when  the  sun  in  has  been  tilted  into  the  framework 

his  turn  must  be  conquered  by  the  of  a  solar  myth. 


Chap.  I.]  THE  PERSIAN  EMPIRE.  105 

if  we  regard  it  as  belonging  to  the  every-day  world,  of  fact,  we 
know  neither  the  motives  nor  the  incidents.  To  the  facts  that 
Kroisos  was  king  of  Lydia,  that  from  some  cause  or  other  he  be- 
came involved  in  a  quarrel  with  Persia  after  having  subdued  the 
Asiatic  Hellenes,  that  in  this  quarrel  he  had  the  worst, 
and  that  all  his  subjects  passed  at  once  under  the  do-  ^'^' 
minion  of  his  conqueror,  there  is  probably  not  a  single  detail 
which  we  can  add  with  any  feeling  of  confidence  that  we  are  re- 
gistering an  historical  incident.  We  have  to  mark  at  the  outset 
that  Kroisos  in  the  legend  inslaves  the  autonomous  Hellenic  com- 
munities, that  he  can  put  to  death  with  horrible  tortures'  those 
whom  he  regards  as  his  enemies,  and  yet  that  he  is  loved  not  less 
6y  these  Asiatic  Hellenes  than  by  the  Lydians,  and  that  the  catas- 
trophe which  overwhelms  him  excites  no  other  feeling  than  that 
of  profound  sorrow.  In  truth,  as  soon  as  he  has  chronicled  the 
fact  of  the  Ionian  conquest,  the  historian  forgets  that  he  is  deal- 
ing with  an  Asiatic  despot,  and  Kroisos  becomes  to  him  a  being 
in  whose  life  we  read  the  sad  and  stern  lesson  that  man  abides 
never  in  one  stay  and  that  he  is  born  to  trouble  as  the  sparks  fly 
upward.  Impressive  as  the  tale  may  be  thus  regarded  as  a  para- 
ble, it  can  scarcely  be  said  to  have  any  other  value.  The  very 
advice  given  by  Sandanis^  at  the  outset  of  the  struggle  shows  un- 
mistakeably  how  far  we  have  wandered  from  the  regions  of  history. 
It  is  simply  ludicrous  to  suppose  that  anyone  could  have  repre- 
sented to  Kroisos  the  conquest  of  Persia  as  an  enterprise  in  which 
he  had  nothing  to  gain  and  everything  to  lose.  The  conqueror  of 
Media  could  not  without  absurdity  be  described  as  the  ruler  of  a 
poverty-stricken  kingdom  ;  nor  without  even  greater  absurdity 
could  Sandanis  be  said  to  thank  the  gods  that  they  had  not  put 
into  the  minds  of  the  Persians  to  go  against  the  Lydians,  when 
the  whole  course  of  the  narrative  implies  that  the  one  absorbing 
dread  which  oppressed  Kroisos  was  the  fear  of  that  insatiable 
spirit  of  aggression  which  marks  all  Asiatic  empires  until  they  pass 
from  robbery  to  laziness. 

But  the  task  of  preparing  for  the  invasion  of  Persia  or  for  the 
attack  of  the  Persian  king  was  not  for  Kroisos  the  beginning  of 
troubles.  In  the  warning  of  Solon  that  none  might  TUebegin- 
be  called  happy  before  his  life  was  ended  he  saw  the  f^  Uie^dc°ti! 
handwriting  on  the  wall  which  foreboded  the  coming  of  Atys. 
catastrophe.  Thus  far  most  things  had  gone  well  vvith  him,  and 
the  dumbness  of  his  younger  son  seemed  as  nothing  to  be  set  in 
the  balance  against  the  vigor  of  Atys  the  brave  and  fair,  the 
pride  and  the  hope  of  his  life.     But  the  word  of  the  god  had  gone 

'■  im  Kvu<t)ov  Fakuv.     Herod,  i.  92.  ^  Herod,  i.  72. 

5* 


106  THE  STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

fortli  that  Atys  must  be  smitten  by  the  spear  and  die.  In  vain 
Kroisos  seeks  by  every  means  to  prevent  the  threatened  calamity. 
All  -weapons  are  put  out  of  the  lad's  reach,  and  he  is  wedded  to  a 
maiden  whose  love  may  turn  away  his  thoughts  from  any  tasks 
involving  the  least  danger.  But  there  comes  to  ihe  court  of 
Kroisos  a  suppliant  who  prays  the  king  1o  give  him  shelter  and 
absolve  him  from  the  guilt  of  involuntary  homicide.  Such  a 
prayer  was  never  made  to  Kroisos  in  vain  ;  and  when  yet  other 
suppliants  came  beseeching  that  Atys  might  be  sent  to  hunt  and 
slay  the  boar  which  was  ravaging  their  land,  Adrastos,  whose 
very  name  carried  with  it  the  omen  of  inevitable  doom,  is  sent  to 
guard  the  beautiful  boy  from  the  weapon  which  is  laden  with  his 
death.  But  the  god  spake  of  no  other  spear  than  that  of  Adras- 
tos ;  and  when  the  Phrygian  in  his  unutterable  agony  slays  him- 
self on  the  tomb  of  Atys,  Kroisos  owns  that  the  instrument  of  the 
divine  will  is  not  to  be  condemned  for  a  result  over  which  he  had 
no  control.  From  his  long  and  bitter  mourning  Kroisos  is  at 
length  roused  by  the  tidings  of  the  fall  of  his  brother-in-law  As- 
tyages  :  biit  before  he  enters  on  the  task  of  avenging  him,  he  re- 
solves to  have  the  counsel  of  the  gods  and  further  to  test  their 
oracles  before  he  puts  to  them  the  question,  the  answer  to  which 
shall  detennine  him  to  fight  out  the  (quarrel  or  to  lay  it  aside. 

He  sent  therefore,  so  the  story  goes  on  to  tell  us  (and  it  is 
useless  to  give  it  in  any  other  words  than  those  of  the  old  histo- 
Thc  payinsr  I'ian),  to  Ammou  in  Libya,  to  Amphiaraos  and  Tro- 
of  the  penal-  phonios  and  the  Milesian  Branchidai,  to  Delphoi,  to 
the  hiiquity  Abai  of  the  Phokiaus  and  to  Dodona,  charging  his 
of  Gyges.  messengers  to  count  one  hundred  days  from  the  time 
of  leaving  Sardeis,  and  then  to  ask  all  the  oracles  at  once  Avhat  the 
Lydian  king  might  at  that  moment  be  doing.  What  the  other 
oracles  answered,  there  Averc  none  to  say  ;  but  at  Delphoi  the 
priestess  ansAvered  : 

'  I  know  tlie  number  of  the  sand  and  the  measures  of  the  sea  ; 
I  understand  the  dumb  man  and  hear  him  who  speaks  not : 
And  there  comes  to  me  now  the  savor  of  a  hard-shelled  tortoise, 
Which  is  seethiutj  iu  a  brazen  vessel  with  the  tlesh  of  a  ram, 
And  brass  there  is  beneath  it  and  brass  above  it.' 

These  words  the  Lydians  wrote  down  and  carried  back  to  the 
king  ;  and  when  all  had  returned  to  Sardeis  from  the  other  oracles, 
Kroisos  took  the  answers  and  unfolded  them  ;  but  none  pleased 
him  until  he  came  to  the  Avords  of  the  Delphian  god,  Avho  alone 
knew  that  on  the  hundredth  day  Kroisos  went  into  a  secret  place 
where  none  might  see  him  and  boiled  a  tortoise  and  a  ram  in  a 
brazen  vessel  on  Avhich  he  placed  a  brazen  lid.  This  oracle  alone 
with  that  of  Amphiaraos  he  held  to  liaA'C  spoken  truly  ;  and  there- 


Chap.  I.]  THE  PERSIAN   EMPIRE.  107 

fore  lie  asked  them  if  lie  should  march  against  the  Persians  and  if 
he  should  get  any  others  to  help  him  in  the  war.  Both  gave  the 
same  answer  that  if  he  went  against  the  Persians  he  would  destroy 
a  great  power,  and  counselled  hiin  to  find  out  the  mightiest  among 
the  Hellenes  and  make  them  his  friends.  Still  more  pleased  with 
this  fancied  assurance  that  he  should  tlirow  down  the  kingdom  of 
Cyrus,  Kroisos  besought  the  god  for  the  third  time,  if  his  empire 
should  last  long.     The  priestess  answered  : 

'  When  a  mule  shall  be  kinor  of  the  Medes, 
Then,  light-footed  Lydian,  flee  to  the  banks  of  the  pebbly  Hermos, 
Flee  and  tarry  not,  neither  care  to  hide  thy  fear.' 

More  pleased  than  ever  from  the  supposed  impossibility  of  a  mule 
being  ever  king  of  the  Medes,  he  sought  now  to  learn  who  were 
the  mightiest  among  the  Greeks,  and  found  that  these  were  the 
men  of  Athens  and  of  Sparta.  Having,  therefore,  made  a  covenant 
with  these,  that  they  should  help  him  in  the  war,  he  marched 
from  Sardeis  to  Pteria,  taking  many  cities  and  ravaging  their 
lands,  until  Cyrus  came  up  with  his  armies  and  tried  to  draw  off 
the  lonians  from  Kroisos.  But  they  would  not  hear  him,  and 
afterwards  a  groat  battle  was  fought  in  which  neither  side  had  the 
victory,  for  the  night  came  on  and  parted  them.  On  the  next  day, 
as  Cyrus  came  out  again  to  the  attack,  Kroisos  drew  off  his  army 
to  Sardeis,  for  he  liked  not  the  scantiness  of  its  numbers,  and  he 
was  minded  during  the  winter  to  gather  to  his  aid  the  Egyptians 
and  Babylonians  with  the  men  of  Sparta  and  early  in  the  spring  to 
march  out  at  once  against  the  Persians.  So  when  he  reached 
Sardeis,  he  sent  away  all  the  army  which  he  had  with  him ;  but 
Cyrus,  having  learnt  what  Kroisos  meant  to  do,  marched  straight 
after  him  and  came  before  Sardeis  when  the  allies  of  Kroisos 
were  scattered.  In  a  great  strait  the  Lydian  king  led  out  his  own 
people  who  were  at  this  time  the  bravest  of  all  the  nations  in  Asia 
and  who  fought  on  horseback  with  long  spears,  and  he  drew  them 
up  on  the  large  plain  which  lies  before  the  city.  These  horsemen 
Cyrus  greatly  feared,  and  by  the  counsel  of  Harpagos  the  Mede  he 
placed  riders  on  all  the  camels  and  drew  them  up  in  front  of  his 
army.  So  when  the  battle  began,  the  horses  of  the  Lydians 
saw  and  smelt  the  camels  and  fled,  and  the  hopes  of  king  Kroisos 
perished.  Still,  the  Lydians  fought  on  bravely,  until  they  were 
driven  into  the  city  and  shut  up  there.  Then  Kroisos  sent  in 
haste  to  his  friends  and  bade  them  come  at  once  to  his  aid.  Thus 
fourteen  days  passed  away,  and  then  Cyrus  promised  to  reward 
richly  the  man  who  should  first  climb  the  walls.  But  the  men 
tried  in  vain,  until  a  Mardian  named  Hyroiades  found  the  part 
where  no  guards  had  been  placed  and  to  which  king  Meles  had  not 


lOS  THE  STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

carried  the  woman-born  lion,  because  he  thought  that  no  enemy 
would  ever  attempt  to  climb  a  rock  so  steep  and  rugged.  But 
Hyroiades  had  seen  some  one  come  down  and  pick  up  his  helmet 
which  had  rolled  from  the  wall.  By  this  same  path  he  went  up 
himself  and  other  Persians  with  hi  ni ;  and  so  was  Sardeis  taken 
and  Kroisos  made  prisoner,  when  he  had  reigned  for  fourteen  years 
and  had  been  besieged  for  fourteen  days,  and  when,  as  the  oracle 
had  foretold,  he  had  destroyed  a  great  power,  namely  his  own. 
Then  Cyrus  raised  a  great  pile  of  wood  and  laid  Kroisos  upon  it 
bound  in  chains  with  fourteen  of  the  Lydians,  either  because  he 
wished  to  offer  them  up  as  the  firstfruits  of  the  victory  or  to  see  if 
any  of  the  gods  would  deliver  Kroisos  who,  as  he  had  learnt,  was 
one  who  gi'eatly  honored  them.  Then  to  Kroisos  in  his  great 
agony  came  back  the  words  which  Solon  had  spoken  to  him  that 
no  living  man  was  happy  ;  and  as  he  thought  on  this,  he  sighed 
and  after  a  long  silence  thrice  called  out  the  name  of  Solon. 
Hearing  this,  Cyrus  bade  the  interpreters  ask  him  v,-hom  he  called  ; 
but  for  a  long  time  he  would  not  answer  them.  At  last  when 
they  pressed  him  greatly,  he  told  them  that  long  ago  Solon  the 
Athenian  came  to  see  him  and  thought  nothing  of  all  his  Avealth, 
and  how  the  words  had  come  to  pass  which  Solon  spake,  not 
thinking  of  him  more  than  of  any  others  wbo  fancy  that  they  are 
happy.  While  Kroisos  thus  spake,  the  edge  of  the  pile  was 
already  kindled  ;  but  Cyrus,  hearing  the  tale,  remembered  that  he 
too  was  but  a  man  and  that  he  was  now  giving  alive  to  the  flames 
one  who  had  been  not  less  wealthy  than  himself,  and  when  he 
thought  also  how  man  abideth  not  ever  in  one  stay,  he  charged  his 
people  to  put  out  the  fire  and  bring  Kroisos  and  the  other  Lydians 
down  from  the  pile.  But  the  flame  was  now  too  strong ;  and 
when  Kroisos  saw  that  the  mind  of  Cyrus  was  changed,  but  that 
the  men  were  not  able  to  quench  the  flames,  he  prayed  to  Phoibos 
Apollon  to  come  and  save  him,  if  ever  he  had  done  aught  to  please 
him  in  the  days  that  were  past.  Then  suddenly  the  wind  rose, 
and  clouds  gathered  where  none  had  been  before,  and  there  burst 
from  tiie  heaven  a  great  storm  of  rain  which  put  out  the  blazing 
fire.  So  Cyrus  knew  that  Kroisos  was  a  good  man  and  that  the 
gods  loved  him :  and  when  Kroisos  came  down  from  the  pile, 
Cyrus  asked  him,  '  Who  persuaded  thee  to  march  into  my  land 
and  to  become  my  enemy  rather  than  my  friend  ?'  '  The  god  of 
the  Greeks  urged  me  on,'  answered  Kroisos,  '  for  no  man  is  so 
senseless  as  of  his  own  pleasure  to  choose  war  in  which  the  fathers 
bury  their  children  rather  than  peace  in  which  the  children  bury 
their  fathers.'  Meanwhile  the  city  was  given  to  storm  and 
plunder,  and  Kroisos,  standing  by  the  side  of  Cyrus  who  had 
loosed   him   from   his   chains,  asked  him  what  the  Persians  were 


Chap.  I.]  THE  PERSIAN  EMPIRE.  109 

doing  down  below.  '  Surely,'  said  Cyrus,  '  they  are  plundering 
thy  city  and  spoiling  thy  people  of  their  goods,'  '  Nay,'  an- 
swered Kroisos  ;  '  but  it  is  thy  wealth  and  thy  goods  which  they 
are  taking  as  booty,  for  I  and  my  people  now  have  nothing.  But 
take  good  heed.  The  man  who  may  get  the  most  of  this  wealth 
will  assuredly  rise  up  against  thee  :  so  place  thy  guards  at  all  the 
gates  and  bid  them  take  all  the  goods,  saying  that  a  tithe  must 
first  be  paid  of  them  to  Zeus,  and  thus  thou  wilt  avoid  the  peril  and 
no  hate  shall  accrue  to  thee  thereby.'  For  this  good  counsel 
Cyrus  bade  him  ask  as  a  gift  what  he  should  most  desire  to  have  ; 
and  Kroisos  said,  '  Let  me  send  these  fetters  to  the  god  of  the 
Greeks  and  ask  him  if  it  be  his  wont  to  clieat  those  who  have 
done  him  good.'  When  Cyrus  learnt  the  reason  for  this  prayer, 
he  laughed  and  said  that  Kroisos  might  do  this  and  aught  else 
that  he  might  wish.  So  men  were  sent  to  Delphoi  to  show  the 
chains  and  to  ask  if  the  Hellenic  gods  were  wont  to  be  ungrateful ; 
and  when  they  came  into  the  temple,  the  priestess  said,  '  Not  even 
a  god  can  escape  the  lot  which  is  prepared  for  him,  and  Kroisos 
in  the  fifth  generation  has  suffered  for  the  sin  of  him  who  at  the 
bidding  of  a  woman  slew  his  lord  and  seized  his  power.  Muc'i 
did  the  god  strive  that  the  evil  might  fall  in  his  children's  days 
and  not  on  Kroisos  himself  ;  but  he  could  not  turn  aside  the 
Moirai.  For  three  years  he  put  off  the  taking  of  Sardeis,  for  thus 
much  only  they  granted  to  him  ;  and  he  came  to  his  aid  when  the 
flame  had  grown  fierce  on  the  blazing  pile.  And  yet  more,  ho  is 
wrong  in  blaming  the  god  for  the  answer  that  if  he  went  against 
the  Persians  he  would  destroy  a  great  power,  for  he  should  then 
have  asked  if  the  god  meant  his  own  power  or  that  of  Cyrus  ;  and 
therefore  is  he  the  cause  of  his  own  sorrow.  Neither,  again,  would 
he  understand  what  the  god  spake  about  the  mule,  for  Cyrus 
himself  was  this  mule,  being  the  son  of  a  Median  woman,  the 
daughter  of  Astyages,  and  of  a  man  born  of  the  meaner  race  of 
the  Persians.'  This  answer  the  Lydians  brought  to  Sardeis  ;  and 
Kroisos  knew  that  the  god  was  guiltless  and  that  the  fault  was  all 
his  own. 

The  didactic  purpose,  not  less  than  the  materials  of  this  story, 
strips  its  incidents  of  all  historical  character.  The  artless  remark 
of  llerodotos  that  until  Kroisos  was  actually  taken  no  Unhistoricai 
one  had  paid  the  least  attention  to  the  plain  Avarning,  ^{i^[h'^'|e  ""^ 
uttered  five  generations  before,  that  the  fifth  from  tails. 
Gyges  should  atone  the  old  wrong,  proves  at  the  least  that  the 
prediction  grew  up  after  the  catastrophe,  even  if  it  proves  no 
more  ;  and  the  fabrication  of  one  prophecy  brings  the  rest  under 
the  same  suspicion.  But  the  narrative  convicts  itself  in  other  ways. 
Unless  when  a  literal  acceptation  of  oracular  responses  is  needed 


110  THE  STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  H 

to  keep  up  a  necessary  delusion,  tlie  recipients  of  these  answers 
take  it  for  granted  that  these  utterances  are,  or  are  likely  to  be, 
metaphoiical ;  and  to  Kroisos  himself  the  facts  shrouded  under 
the  guise  of  the  mule-king  Avere  better  known  than  they  could  be 
to  any  others.  The  Median  sovereign  was  his  brother-in-lav/,  and 
the  very  matter  which  had  stirred  his  wrath  was  that  Cyrus  the 
son  of  the  Persian  Kambyses  had  dethroned  his  grandfather  and 
thus  brought  Medes  and  Persians  under  one  sceptre.  But  the  city 
of  Kroisos,  like  the  great  cities  and  heroes  of  tradition  generally, 
is  vulnerable  only  in  one  spot ;  and  the  mythical  records  of  the 
Mermnad  despots  are  brought  to  an  end  with  the  artificial  chro- 
nology of  a  reign  of  fourteen  years  and  a  siege  of  fourteen  days. 
The  sequel  of  the  tale  Herodotos  admits  that  he  received  from 
Lydian  informants.'  Like  the  stories  of  the  mad  freaks  ascribed 
to  Kambyses  in  Egypt,  we  might  well  suppose  that  the  tale  of  the 
rescue  of  Kroisos  from  the  flames  would  be  found  in  no  Persian 
chronicle  :  and  accordingly  this  tradition  cannot  be  traced  in  the 
pages  of  Ktesias.  No  Persian  could  represent  his  king  as  pro- 
faning the  majesty  and  purity  of  Fire  by  offering  to  it  the  flesh  of 
men ;  and  the  one  fact  to  which  the  whole  story  points  is  that  in 
some  way  or  other  and  by  some  means  or  other,  of  which  we 
know  nothing,  the  great  Lydian  empire  was  absorbed  in  the 
mightier  monarchy  of  Persia. 

The  fall  of  Kroisos  was  followed,  it  is  said,  by  a  request  of  the 
lonians  to  be  received  as  tributaries  of  Cyrus  on  the  same  terms 
rr^u         ,.   ,  which  had  been  imposed  on  them  by  the  Ijvdian  king. 

The  revolt  of  .  .  *  "^  ~ 

Paktyas.  The  petition  implies  the  singular  lightness  of  the 
546B.C.  (?)  Lydian  rule,  and  explains  the  stern  refusal  of  Cyrus, 
who  grants  these  terms  to  the  Milesians  only.  On  this  many  of 
the  Ionian  cities  sent  to  Sparta  a  pressing  intreaty  for  aid  ;  but 
although  the  Spartans  would  take  no  active  measures  in  their  be- 
half, thev  sent  one  ship  to  ascertain  generally  the  state  of  affairs 
in  Ionia,  the  result  being  that  one  of  their  officers,  named  Lakrines, 
went  to  Sardeis  and  warned  Cyras  that  any  attempt  to  injure  an 
Hellenic  city  would  bring  down  on  him  the  anger  of  the  Lakedai- 
raonians.  To  this  warning  Cyrus  replied  by  asking  who  the 
Lakedaimonians  might  be  ;  and  on  hearing  some  account  of  them, 
he  added  that  he  had  never  feared  men  who  sec  apart  a  place  in 
their  city  where  they  came  together  lo  buy,  sell,  and  cheat.'^  But 
Cyrus  himself  could  tarry  no  longer  in  the  west.  So  having  placed 
the  Persian  Tabalos  in  command  of  the  garrison  and  having  with 
strange  indiscretion  charged  the  Lydian  Paktyas  to  bring  the 
plundered  treasures  to   Sousa,  Cyrus,  taking  Kroisos  with  him, 

'  Herod,  i.  87.  =*  Herod,  i.  1.^2. 


Chap.  I.]  THE  PERSIAN  EMPIRE.  Ill 

hastened  away  from  Sardeis.  No  sooner  had  he  set  off  than 
Paktyas,  hurrying  to  the  coast,  employed  the  means  thus  placed 
in  Ills  power  for  tlte  hiring  of  an  army  of  mercenaries  by  whose 
aid  he  besieged  Tabalos  in  the  Sardian  akropolis.  So  great  was 
the  anger  of  Cyrus  on  hearing  of  this  revolt  that  lie  threatened  to 
reduce  all  the  Lydians  to  slavery. 

But  Paktyas  was  not  a  man  to  give  the  Pei'sian  king  much 
trouble.  No  sooner  had  lie  lieard  thatMazares  had  been  dispatched 
to  inslave  all  who  had  taken  part  with  him  in  the  _.. 
block:ide  of  the  Sardian  akropolis  and  to  bring  Paktyas  surrenderor 
liims.'lf  to  Sousa,  than  he  lied  in  terror  to  Kyme,  P^^^'y^®- 
whence  he  was  sent  on  to  Mytilene.  But  the  messengers  of  Ma- 
zares  still  followed  him,  and  the  Mytilenaians  were  just  going  to 
give  him  up  when  the  men  of  Kyme  sent  a  ship  to  Lesbos  and 
brought  Paktyas  away  to  Chios,  where  the  citizens  agreed  to  sur- 
render him,  if  in  return  they  might  receive  the  territory  of  Atar- 
neus  on  the  Mysian  coast  facing  Lesbos.  So  the  bargain  was 
made  and  Paktyas  given  up,  doubtless  to  be  slain  (althougli  Hero- 
dotos  takes  no  further  notice  of  him)  with  frightful  tortures  at 
Sousa.  But  the  curse  of  ill-gotten  wealth  clung  to  the  Chians, 
who  dared  not  offer  to  the  gods  anything  that  had  been  grown  on 
H  field  of  such  bad  repute.  The  resistance  to  Cyrus  was  drawing 
towards  its  close  ;  and  Mazares,  having  inslaved  Priene,  ravaged 
the  beautiful  valley  of  the  Maiandros.  But  he  had  scarcely  done 
his  master's  bidding  in  the  lands  of  Magnesia  when  he  was  struck 
by  sudden  illness  and  died,  and  Harpagos,  one  of  the  prominent 
actors  in  the  mythical  history  of  Astyages,  was  sent  down  to  take 
his  place. 

The  first  city  assailed  by  Harpagos  was  Phokaia,  about  twenty 
miles  to  the  northwest  of  the  mouth  of  the  Hermos.     This  town 
was,  in   ])Iain   speech,  a  nest  of  pirates.     Their  long 
marauding  expeditions'  liad  carried  them  to  the  shores   the  Pho- 
of  the   Iladriatic,  and   even   as  far  as  the  region   of   '^'^'*"*- 
Tartessos,  or  Tarshish,  hard  by  the  pillars  of  Herakles,  the  west- 
ernmost bounds  of  the  great  inland  sea.     A  natural  desire  for  an 
easy  conquest  led  Harpagos  to  express  to  the  Phokaianshis  readi- 
ness to  accept,  as  evidence  of  their  submission,  a  single  breach  in 
1  heir  walls  and  the  consecration  of  a  single  house  in  the  town.    Li 
reply  the  Phokaians  demanded  one  day  for  deliberation,  and  the 
withdrawal  of  the  Persians  from  the  walls  for  that  time.  Although 
he  knew,  it  is  said,  the  meaning  of  this  request,  Harpagos  did  as 
they  wished  :  and  the  Phokaians,  hastily  conveying  their  woinen, 
their  children,  and  all  their  movable  goods  to  iheir  ships,  made 

'  The  foundation  of  Massalia  (Marseilles)  by  these  commercial  corpairs 
is  ascribed  to  the  year  GOO  B.C. 


112  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

sail  for  Chios  and  left  an  empty  town  for  the  occupation  of  the 
Persians.  From  the  Chians  they  sought  to  purchase  some  islets 
called  Oinoussai  lying  off  the  northeastern  end  of  the  island.  The 
Chians  refused,  and  the  latter  thereupon  detemiined  to  betake 
themselves  to  their  Kyruian  or  Corsican  colony  of  Alalia.  But 
they  would  not  depart  without  striking  a  blow  which  should  make 
their  departure  memorable.  Sailing  back  to  Phokaia,  they  slaugh- 
tered the  Persian  garrison  left  there  by  Harpagos,  and,  sinking  a 
lump  of  iron  in  the  harbor,  bound  themselves  by  a  solemn  vow 
never  to  revisit  their  old  haunts  until  that  iron  should  float  to  the 
surface  of  the  water.  But  although  all  now  set  off  for  Alalia,  less 
than  half  carried  out  the  plan.  The  rest  returned  to  Phokaia  : 
and  if  we  are  to  infer  that  even  after  the  loss  of  his  garrison 
Harpagos  yet  received  them  as  tributaries  of  Cyrus,  we  have  in 
this  fact  further  evidence  that  the  burdens  imposed  on  them  by 
the  Lydian  king  had  been  light  indeed. 

But  whatever  the  Lydian  dominion  may  have  been,  the  lonians 
were  now  to  feel  the  bitterness  of  the  slavery  which  compelled 
_,,  them  to   take   part   in  the  inslaving  of  the   kindred, 

quest  of  Ly-  although  nou-Hellenic,  tribes  of  Karians,  Kaunians, 
'^'  and  Lykians.     The  resistance  of  the  Karians  seems  to 

have  shown  but  little  energy.  The  resistance  of  the  Lykians  and 
Kaunians  was  as  desperate  as  that  of  the  Karians  was  feeble.  As 
soon  as  the  army  of  Harpagos  took  up  its  position  on  the  plains 
of  the  Xanthos,  they  each  brought  their  wives,  children,  and 
slaves  into  the  akropolis  of  their  towns,  and  having  set  the  akro- 
polis  on  fire,  rushed  out  on  the  enemy  and  fought  till  not  a  man 
of  them  remained  alive. 

But  while  these  isolated  communities,  Avhose  civilisation  was 
immeasurably  beyond  that  of  their  conquerors,  were  being  ab- 
sorbed in  the  vast  mass  of  Persian  dominion,  that  do- 
quests  of  minion  was  being  extended  far  to  the  east  and  the  south 
Cyrus.  ijy  Cyi'us  himself,  who  swept  like  a  whirlwind  over  all 

Asia,  subduing,  as  the  historian  tells  us,  every  nation  without  pass- 
ing over  one.'  Of  the  details  of  these  conquests,  with  one  excep- 
tion, we  know  nothing :  and  even  in  this  solitary  instance  the 
mists  which  rest  on  Mesopotamian  history  generally,  leave  little 
clear  beyond  the  fact  that  the  sceptre  of  the  old  Babylonian  or 
Assyrian  kings  was  broken  by  the  despot  of  Persia. 

But  as  the  historical  scene  chainges  from  Ionia  to  Babylon,  we 
are  driven  to  note  the  contrast  between  the  intense  individual 
Babylon  and  ^^^^SJ  '^^  *^^^  autonomous  Hellenic  communities  with 
its  people,  their  woful  lack  of  political  combination,  and  the  iron 
system  of  Asiatic  centralisation  which  could  accomplish  the  most 

'  Herod,  i.  177. 


Chap.  I.]  THE  PERSIAN   EMPIRE.  113 

gigantic  tasks  by  dint  of  sheer  manual  labor,  the  multitude  as  a 
political  machine  being  everything,  the  individual  man  nothing. 
Between  the  Assyrians  and  Babylonians  on  the  one  hand  and  the 
Hellenic  tribes  on  the  other,  the  Phenicians  and  Carthaginians 
occupy  a  middle  ground,  combining  the  rigid  manipulation  of 
masses  with  the  exercise  of  those  higher  independent  faculties 
which  won  for  them  both  fame  and  wealth  from  the  coasts  of  Tyre 
to  the  Mediterranean  gates.  But  generally  it  may  be  said  that,  in 
the  measure  in  which  it  prevailed,  the  monotony  of  Eastern  des- 
potism became  the  seed-bed  in  which  an  imposing  but  utterly  im- 
perfect civilisation  was  forced  to  an  early  maturity.  The  plains 
of  Bagdad  and  Mosul  are  now  a  dreary  and  desolate  waste  ;  but 
these  arid  sands  were  thrice  in  the  year  covered  with  a  waving  sea 
of  corn,  in  the  days  when  Sennacherib  or  Nebucadnezzar  ruled  at 
Nineveh  or  Babylon.  Crushing  and  pitiless  as  may  have  been 
their  despotism,  they  yet  knew  that  their  own  wealth  must  be 
measured  by  the  fertility  of  the  soil,  and  thus  they  took  care  that 
their  Avhole  country  should  be  parcelled  out  by  a  network  of 
canals,  the  largest  of  which  might  be  a  highroad  for  ships  between 
the  Euphrates  and  the  Tigris.  On  the  soil  thus  quickened  grew 
the  tree  which  attracted  to  itself  an  affectionate  veneration  :  and 
while  the  date  palm  yielded  both  wine  and  bread,  the  grain  of  corn, 
of  millet,  or  of  sesame  was  multiplied,  as  the  more  cautious  said, 
fifty  or  an  hundred  fold,  or,  as  llerodotos  believed,  in  years  of  ex- 
ceptional abundance  even  three  hundredfold.  Scarcely  less  daz- 
zling than  this  picture  of  cereal  wealth  produced  in  a  land  where 
rain  scarcely  ever  fell  is  the  description  which  Herodotos  gives  of 
the  magnificence  of  Babylon,  and  he  saw  the  great  city  after  it 
had  been  given  up  to  plunder  by  Dareios  and  robbed  of  its  cost- 
liest treasures  bv  Xerxes.  The  coloring  of  this  sketch  must  be 
heightened,  if  we  would  realise  the  grandeur  of  that  royal  town  in- 
closed amidst  exquisite  gardens  within  the  stupendous  walls  which 
rose  to  a  height,  it  is  said,  of  three  hundred  feet,  each  side  of  the 
square  extending  to  fifteen  English  miles,  and  giving  the  means  of 
ingress  and  egress  by  five-and-twenty  brazen  gates.  Within  this 
wall  rose  at  some  distance  another,  less  huge,  but  still  very  strong; 
and  within  this  were  drawn  out  the  buildings  and  streets  of  the  city 
in  rectangular  blocks  reaching  down  to  the  wall,  which  was  carried 
from  one  end  of  the  town  to  the  other  along  the  banks  of  the  river, 
broken  only  by  the  huge  brazen  gates  which  at  the  end  of  each 
street  gave  access  to  the  water.  High  above  the  palaces  and 
houses  around  it  towered  the  mighty  temple  of  Bel,  story  above 
story,  to  a  height,  it  is  said,  of  six  hundred  feet,  from  a  base  ex- 
tending over  more  than  1200  feet  on  each  side,  while  the  stream 
was  spanned  by  a  bridge,  the  several  portions  of  which  were  dra\vn 


114  THE  STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

aside  at  niglit,  but  whicli  was  used  during  the  day  by  such  as 
might  not  care  to  enter  the  ferry  boats  stationed  at  each  landing- 
place  along  the  river  walls. 

It  might  have  been  thought  that  this  great  seat  of  theocratic 
despotism  could  withm  its  network  of  canals  and  behind  its  stu- 
g.  ,      pendous  walls  have  bidden   defiance  to   the    utmost 

capture  of  efforts  of  Cyrus.  For  a  year  the  coming  of  the  invader 
Babylon.  ^^^g^  ^.^  ^^.^  ^^j^^  delayed  by  the  grave  duty  of  aveng- 
ing on  the  river  Gyndes  the  insult  which  it  had  offered  to  one  of 
the  sacred  white  horses.  This  stream  which  joins  the  Tigris  near 
the  ancient  Opis  and  the  modern  Bagdad  dared  to  drown  the 
beast  which  liad  rashly  plunged  into  it,  and  the  fiat  of  the  ting 
went  forth  that  the  river  should  be  so  lowered  by  the  dispersion 
of  its  waters  through  a  hundred  canals  that  women  should  hence- 
forth cross  it  without  wetting  their  knees.  This  seeming  freak, 
which  we  might  be  tempted  to  compare  Avith  the  scourging  of  the 
Hellespont  by  Xerxes,  is  ascribed  by  some  to  a  wise  and  deliberate 
design  by  way  of  preparing  his  army  for  the  more  momentous  task 
of  diverting  the  Euphrates  as  the  means  for  surprising  Babylon. 
But  he  can  scarcely  suppose  that  Cyrus  could  know,  a  year  before, 
that  he  would  have  either  the  need  or  the  opportunity  of  putting 
this  plan  into  action,  or  that  Avith  his  unbounded  command  of  la- 
bor, insuring  the  same  results  at  one  time  as  at  another,  he  should 
find  it  necessary  thus  to  rehearse  the  most  troublesome  scene  in 
the  coming  drama,  lie  might  rather  expect  that  he  would  be  com- 
pelled to  tight  his  way  inch  by  inch  from  one  canal  to  another,  and 
that  a  series  of  victories  in  the  open  plain  might  render  a  siege  of 
the  great  city  superfiuous.  If  we  may  trust  the  traditional  narra- 
tives, his  expectations  were  in  every  particular  disappointed.  The 
road  lay  open  before  him  without  resistance  to  the  very  gates  of 
Babylon  ;  and  Cyrus  resolved  to  see  whether  the  stream  to  which 
his  enemies  most  trusted  for  their  safety  might  not  be  made  the 
means  of  achieving  their  destruction.  But  whether  we  take  the 
narrative  of  llerodotos  or  that  of  Xenophon,  we  are  following  a 
story  Avhich  is  full  of  difficulties.  On  one  point  only  are  they 
agreed, — that  the  city  was  taken  by  surprise  during  a  time  of  fes- 
tival. This  surprise  Avas  effected,  according  to  llerodotos,  by  draAV- 
ing  off  the  Avatcrs  of  the  Euphrates  into  a  largo  reservoir  dug  con- 
siderably to  the  north  of  the  city,  like  the  lake  ascribed  to  queen 
Nitokris.  But  this  lake  is  said  to  have  been  designed  to  receive  the 
overflow  of  the  river  in  seasons  of  flood  ;  and  a  basin  which  might 
suffice  for  this  purpose  would  be  ludicrously  insufficient  to  take  off 
the  Avhole  stream  so  far  as  to  leave  the  remainder  easily  fordable. 
In  short,  the  mode  by  Avhicli  llerodotos  supposes  the  Avork  to  have 
been  done  may  fairly  be  pronounced  impossil)le  :  but  this  objection 


Chap.  I.]  THE  PERSIAN   EMPIRE.  115 

cannot  be  iirg-ed  witlillic  same  apparent  force  against  the  account, 
given  by  Xenophon,  that  Cyrus  drew  otf  tlie  water  into  two  large  ca- 
nals or  trenches,  which  ran  round  the  walls  on  both  sides  of  the  river 
and  discharged  it  again  into  its  natural  bed.'  There  remain  in  this 
case  two  difficulties,  one  lying  in  the  vastness  of  the  labor  of  dig- 
ging trenches  to  inclose  an  area  as  large  as  that  of  the  Landgraviat 
of  Hesse  Homburg,^ — trenches,  moreover,  deeper  necessarily  than 
the  bed  of  the  stream,  in  default  of  a  dan\  or  barrier  across  the 
river  which  would  have  at  once  betrayed  his  design  to  the  enemy, 
and  of  which  not  a  hint  is  given  by  any  historian.  The  other 
difficulty  is  more  serious.  The  whole  design  assumes  that  the  feast 
would  be  accompanied  by  the  incredible  carelessness  of  not  mere- 
ly withdrawing  all  the  guards  from  the  river  walls  but  of  leaving 
open  all  the  gates  in  these  walls, — a  carelessness,  moreover,  which 
made  the  whole  task  of  canal-digging  a  superfluous  ceremony,  for, 
the  gates  being  open  and  the  guards  withdrawn,  boats  would  have 
furnished  means  of  access  for  the  assailants  vastly  more  easy,  rapid, 
and  sure,  than  the  oozy  bed  of  an  alluvial  stream  which  would  in 
all  likelihood  have  insured  the  destruction  of  the  whole  army.  In 
truth,  here,  as  elsewhere,  the  main  fact  may  rest  on  adequate 
evidence  :  tlie  details  must  remain  unknown.  Babylon  was  sur- 
prised by  Cyrus, — how,  we  cannot  venture  positively  to  say. 

Babylon  was  treated,  it  would  seem,  much  like  the  cities  of 
Ionia  and  Lydia.  The  walls,  it  is  said,  were  breached,*  and  a 
tribute  was  imposed  ;  but  it  underwent  neither  the  Last  scenes 
cruelties  nor  the  spoliation  which  followed  the  visits  J^^^f  t^'^" 
of  Dareios  or  Xerxes,  and  the  population  remained  pro-  life  of  Cyrus 
bably  undiminished.  From  Babylon  the  thirst  of  conquest  led 
Cyrus,  according  to  Herodotos,  against  the  Massagetai,  a  nomadic 
tribe  whom  he  places  on  the  further  bank  of  tlie  Araxes  ;  and  here 
he  received  the  first  and  last  check  in  liis  career  of  unbroken  suc- 
cess.*    Cyrus,  it  is  said,  was  slain  ;   but  the  impulse  which  his 

'  It  is  well  to  see  what  is  implied  chauce  of  being  able  to  surprise  the 

in  this  statement.     The  amount  of  town  in  some  unguarded  moment 

water  conveyed  by  the  Euphrates  on  which  he  had  no  right  to  count, 

at  Hillah,  according  to  the  dimen-  "  I  take  Mr.  Rawlinsoa's  illustra- 

sions  now  assigned  to  the  stream  at  tion,  Anc.  East.  Mon.  ii.  340. 

that  point,  is  not  much  less  than  ^  Mr.  Rawlinson,  East.  Mon.  iii. 

that   of    the   Thames   at   London  519,  affirms  the  fact :    Mr.  Grote 

Bridge.     According  to  Herodotos,  denies  it. 

the  walls  of  Babylon  formed  a  *  The  plan  of  Herodotos  rendered 
square  of  which  each  side  was  four-  this  arrangement  indispensable, 
teen  miles  in  length  ;  and  thus,  if  That  the  Persian  or  other  traditions 
we  follow  Xenophon,  Cyrus  dug  represented  his  course  as  less  pros- 
two  canals,  each  capable  of  convey-  perous  is  clear  from  the  statement 
ing  half  the  contents  of  the  Eu-  of  Arrian,  vi.  24,  that  Cyrus  lost 
phrates,  and  each  about  thirty  his  whole  army  in  the  attempt  to 
miles  in  length,  at  the  least.  This,  invade  India  through  Gedrosia. 
moreover,  lie    did    on    the    mere 


116  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

career  had  o^iven  to  the  Persian  tribes  was  as  strong  as  ever.  For 
tbem  freedom,  as  they  called  it,  meant  immunity  from  taxation  in 
time  of  peace  and  unbounded  plunder  and  licence  in  time  of  war. 
The  motive  thus  supplied  would  account  for  tlie  invasion  of  Egypt 
as  readily  as  for  the  campaigns  in  Lydia  and  Babylonia. 

Long  before  the  first  feeble  notions  of  a  polity  were  awakened 
in  the  nations  of  Europe,  long  even  before  Mesopotamian  civilisa- 
The  valley  ^ion  showed  its  cumbrous  and  ungainly  proportions, 
of  theNUe.  the  Egyptians  presented,  in  their  wealth,  their  organi- 
sation, their  science  and  their  art,  a  marvellous  sight  which  in  after 
ages  excited  the  astonishment  of  Hcrodotos  more  than  all  the  vast- 
ness  of  Babylon.  This  wonderful  exuberance  of  life,  at  a  time 
wlien  every  other  land  was  sunk  in  barbarism,  was  the  result  of  the 
fertility  of  the  Nile  valley  ;  and  the  Nile  valley  was  the  creation  of 
the  great  river  which  first  scooped  out  its  channel  and  then  yearly 
filled  it  up  with  mud.'  The  low  limestone  hills,  Avhich  serve  as  a 
boundary  to  tlic  narrow  belt  of  luxuriant  vegetation  on  either  side 
of  the  stream,  mark  probably  the  course  of  the  river  which  has 
been  thrust  liither  and  thither  in  its  path  according  to  the  strength 
of  the  material  with  which  it  came  into  conflict.  AYhere  this 
material  was  soft,  its  channel  is  wide  :  wdiere  it  presented  a  less 
yielding  front,  the  stream  narrows,  until  in  the  granite  districts  of 
Assouan  it  forces  its  way  through  the  rock  by  plunging  down  a 
cataract.  In  all  likelihood  these  falls,  which  the  traveller  now 
faces  only  in  the  upper  part  of  its  course,  have  receded  gradually 
southwards  from  Cairo  ;  and  thus  the  Nile  has  only  been  before- 
hand in  the  process  which  is  now  slowly  but  surely  eating  away 
the  ledge  of  rock  which  forms  the  barrier  of  Niagara.  These  cliffs, 
it  is  true,  are  now  far  above  the  level  of  the  stream  :  but  the  mark- 
ings which  Egyptian  kings  have  left  at  Semneh  in  Nubia  show 
that  at  a  time  long  preceding  the  visit  of  Herodotosto  Egypt  the 
river  rose  to  a  height  exceeding  by  f onr-and-twenty  feet  that  which 
it  ever  reaches  now  :  and  the  deserted  bed  of  a  still  earlier  age 
proves  that  the  inundation  rose  at  least  seven-and-twenty  feet 
above  its  highest  mark  at  the  present  day.  Hence  it  may  probably 
be  said  with  literal  truth  that  Egypt  is  the  creation  of  the  Nile. 
Througliout  its  long  journey  of  more  than  a  thousand  miles  after 
entering  the  region  of  the  cataracts,  this  mysterious  stream,  receiv- 
ing not  a  single  atBuent,  lavishes  itsAvealthon  the  right  hand  and 
on  the  left,  not  only  affording  to  the  peoj)le  of  each  spot  an  easy 

'  This   fact    was    perceived    by  scarcely  sixty  centuries  from  our 

iferodotus.ii.  11,  with  the  clearness  own   age,   he   could    never    have 

of  a  mind  free  from  prej  udice.    Had  grasped  the  idea  of  processes  whicli 

lie  been  shackled  by  the   popular  he  clearly  sees  must  liave  occupied 

chronolo<ry  which  dates  the  crea-  many  thousands  or  even  myriads 

tion  from  a  period  removed    by  of  years. 


Chap.  L]  THE  PERSIAN  EMPIRE.  117 

and  sure  maintenance  which  called  for  the  use  of  neither  spade  uor 
plough  nor  for  any  nourishment  beyond  that  of  its  life-giving  wa- 
ters, but  furnishing  the  materials  for  an  active  commerce  by  the 
difference  of  its  products  in  the  northern  and  southern  portions  of 
its  course  and  by  the  long  prevalence  of  northerly  winds  which  en- 
able vessels  to  overcome  the  force  of  the  descending  current.  All 
this  it  did,  and  it  did  even  more.  The  ease  and  rapidity  Avith  which 
the  crops  were  sown  and  the  harvest  gathered  insured  to  the  peo- 
ple an  amount  of  leisure  which  to  the  barbarians  of  Europe  toilin"" 
for  bare  subsistence  was  an  unknown  luxury.  It  was  no  wonder, 
therefore,  that  the  inhabitants  of  the  Nile  valley  should  have  grown 
into  a  compact  and  well-ordered  state  even  while  the  beautiful 
banks  of  the  Ilcrmos  and  the  Maiandros  were  still  a  solitude  or 
peopled  only  by  rude  and  isolated  tribes.  But  more  than  this,  the 
river  which  gave  them  wealth  guarded  them  against  their  enemies. 
The  belt  of  verdure  which  marks  its  course  stretches  to  no  greater 
width  than  two  miles  and  a  half  on  either  side  ;  and  this  happy 
region  is  shut  in  by  arid  deserts  in  which  an  abundance  of  nitre 
would  render  all  rain-water,  if  any  fell  there,  unfit  for  drinking. 

But  if  the  river  insured  the  rapid  developement  of  the  people 
who  might  dwell  on  its  banks,  it  also  determined  the  character  of 
their  civilisation.     Allowance  beingf  made   for    some   ^^ 

i  riG  DGoplc 

variation  of  climate  in  its  long  course,  the  physical  of  the  Nile 
conditions  of  their  existence  Avere  throughout  much  ^'^'^^y- 
the  same.  Everywhere  there  was  the  river  with  its  nourishing 
stream,  and  the  strip  of  verdure  which  was  literally  its  child. 
Everywhere  were  the  low  hills  girding  in  this  garden  and  marking 
off  the  boundless  burning  desert :  and  over  all  by  day  and  by 
night  hung  the  blue  unclouded  sky,  across  which  the  sun  journeyed 
in  his  solitary  chariot,  to  be  followed  by  his  bride  the  moon  with 
the  stars  her  innumerable  sisters  or  children.  When  to  this  we 
add  that  from  one  end  of  the  land  to  the  other  there  was  no 
stronghold  where  a  discontented  or  rebellious  chief  might  defy  the 
king  or  the  people  and  no  spot  which  gave  access  to  an  invader 
across  the  fiery  barrier  to  the  east  or  the  west,  we  have  a  series  of 
conditions  which  we  feel  sure  must  produce  a  great  people  but 
which  will  keep  all  on  a  dead  level  of  submission  to  the  one 
governing  power.  Whatever  this  power  might  be,  it  would  be 
able  to  sweep  the  Nile  with  its  ships,  and  by  shutting  off  the 
water  from  the  canals  to  reduce  to  starvation  at  any  moment  the 
inhabitants  of  a  disaffected  city  or  village.  Thus  from  first  to  last 
we  have  a  nation  which  could  never  make  way  against  its  rulers, 
and  whose  skill  and  labor  these  rulers  might  apply  to  any  work 
however  oppressive  and  unprofitable  :  nor  can  it  for  a  moment  be 
doubted  that,  however  great  may  have  been  the  blessings  which 


118  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

the  Nile  brought  with  it  from  its  mountain  sources,  these  works 
involved  an  amount  of  hardship  and  tyranny  which  must  at  best 
have  made  life  seem  hard  and  the  problem  of  life  a  strange  riddle, 
if  nothing  lay  beyond  it.  But  this  people,  so  shut  off  from  all 
other  nations,  and  thus  rising  into  an  astonishingly  early  greatness, 
exhibited  few,  if  any,  points  of  resemblance  to  the  tribes  of  the  vast 
continent  in  Avhich  their  river  ran.  In  color  less  dark  than  the 
Arab,  in  features  little  resembling  any  Semitic  tribe  and  displuy- 
ing  often  a  strange  resemblance  to  the  Greek,  in  habit  utterly  op- 
posed to  the  roving  Bedouin,  the  Egyptians  embellished  their  life 
with  arts  which  no  negro  tribe  has  ever  known.  They  Avere  spin- 
ners and  weavers,  potters  and  workers  in  metals,  painters  and 
sculptors.  Their  social  order  harmonised  in  its  system  of  caste 
with  that  of  India  and,  it  may  very  safely  be  added,  with  that  of 
the  Hellenic  and  the  Latin  tribes.  These  castes  were  united  in  a 
firm  and  centralised  polity  in  which  the  king  ruled  conjointly 
with,  if  not  in  submission  to,  the  priestly  order  which  surrounded 
his  life  and  that  of  the  people  with  a  multitude  of  ceremonial  rules 
invested  with  an  appalling  power  by  the  terrors  of  an  unseen  world. 

To  the  Greeks  this  country  witli  its  ancient  and  mysterious 
civilisation  remained,  it  is  said,  altogether  unknown  down  to  a 
Openino-of  ^i'"*^  preceding  the  battle  of  Marathon  by  about  180 
Egypt  to  years,  when  a  fleet  of  Milesians  took  possession  of  a 
merce.  harbor  on  the  eastern  shore  of  the  Kanopic  branch  of 

stob-c.  (?)  ^\^Q  -^[Iq  r^,j(^  there  built  the  city  of  Naukratis,  which 
became  a  depot  of  trade  between  Egypt  and  Europe.  In  tha 
reign  of  Amasis  this  settlement  received  the  privileges  of  a  strin- 
gent monopoly.  Foreign  merchants,  arriving  at  any  other  mouth 
of  the  Nile,  were  compelled  to  swear  that  they  had  been  driven 
thither  by  stress  of  weather  and  to  depart  at  once  for  the  Kanobitic 
mouth,  or  in  default  of  this  their  goods  were  sent  to  Naukratis  by 
one  of  the  inland  canals.  The  leanings  of  Amasis  towards  the 
Greeks  are  still  further  shown  by  his  alliance  with  Bolykrates  ;  but 
the  story  of  this  alliance  is  only  another  illustration  of  that  Divine 
jealousv  which  dashes  the  cup  of  happiness  from  the  lips  of  Kroi- 
sos  and  of  Cyrus. 

This  ancient  kingdom  Avitli  its  wonderful  cities  and  its  teeming 
soil  was  now  in  its  turn  to  be  absorbed  into  the  wide  sea  of  Persian 
InvBsion  of  dominion  :  but  although  the  fact  of  its  subjugation  is 
Kam'b'ses  dcarly  established,  not  much  confidence  can  be  placed 
525  B.C.  (?>'  in  the  details  of  the  narrative.  The  stories  of  Ilero- 
dotos  and  Ktesias  cannot  be  reconciled  ;  and  the  statements  of  the 
Beliistun  inscription,  so  far  as  it  notices  the  reign  of  Kambyses, 
<liifer  in  sonn^  points  from  both.  At  once  then  we  are  driven  to 
look  with  suspicion  on  statements  which  represent  Kambyses  as  a 


Chap.  I.]  THE  PERSIAN  EMPIRE  119 

man  closely  resembling  the  mad  emperor  Paul  of  Russia,  while 
the  facts  related,  if  they  be  true,  seem  capable  of  an  easier  expla- 
nation as  results  of  a  scheme  carefully  laid  and  deliberately  carried 
out.  The  two  points  which  needed  the  most  carefol  forethought 
in  his  plan  of  Egyptian  conquest  lay  in  the  supply  of  wator  for  his 
army  during  thair  passage  across  the  desert  which  protects  Egypt 
from  the  north-east,  and  in  the  co-operation  of  a  fleet  which 
should  make  it  impossible  for  the  Egyptian  king  to  prolong  the 
contest  by  obtaining  supplies  from  the  sea.  In  securing  the  first 
Karabyses  is  said  by  llerodotos  to  have  followed  the  advice  of  the 
Halikarnassian  Phanes,  a  deserter  from  the  service  of  Amasis,  vvho 
advised  him  to  make  a  treaty  of  friendship  with  a  chief  or  chiefs 
of  the  Arab  tribes  of  the  desert.  The  fleet,  with  the  men  who 
manned  it,  was  supplied  by  the  Ionian  and  Aiolian  cities  of  Asia 
Minor  and  by  the  Phenicians  of  Tyre.  Had  Amasis  lived,  the 
struggle  might  have  been  prolonged,  perhaps  even  with  a  different 
result :  but  he  liad  died  a  few  months  before  the  in- 
vasion,  and  his  son  Psammenitos  seems  to  have  in- 
herited neither  his  wisdom  nor  his  vigor.  Signs  from  heaven 
were  not  wanting  to  tell  of  the  coming  troubles.  Rain  had  fallen 
at  Thebes  ;  and  the  horrible  draught  in  which  his  Hellenic  mer- 
cenaries had  drunk  the  blood  of  the  sons  of  Phanes'  may  have 
added  fierceness  to  the  courage  with  which  they  fought  for  Egypt, 
but  it  could  not  countervail  the  disparity  of  numbers  which  turned 
the  scale  in  the  great  battle  near  the  Pelousian  mouth  of  the  Nile. 
Thus  had  Kambyses  carried  to  its  utmost  bounds  the  Persian 
empire,  as  it  was  conceived  by  llerodotos,  for  according  to  his 
narrative  all  the  wisdom  and  vigor  of  Dareios  did   not   _      ,.^. 

,   .        ,.     .  '^  J   .  .  Expedition 

enable  mm  to   extend  its   lunits  or  to  guard,  it  against   against  the 
som-i  grave    disasters.     But    Kambyses    in    Memphis   ^^^a^^^'^^ 
was  lord  of   all   the   nations   from  Baktra  to  the  Nile,    temple  of 
and  it  was  now  time  that   the   Divine  Nemesis  should 
lay  its  hand  not  merely  on  Kambyses   as  it  had   done   upon  his 
father,  but  also  on  that  invincible  army  which  both  he  and  Cyrus 
had  healed   in   a   career  of  all  but  uninterrupted  conquest.     He 
must  therefore  now  begin  to  make  war  not  only  against  men,  but, 
liko  Xerxes  in  his  defiance  of  Phoibos,  against  the   gods.     The 
mildness  thus  sent  upon  him  was,  according  to  the  informants  of 
Herodotos,    shown   first  in   the   insults  which  he   heaped  on  the 
mummy  of  Amasis,*  and  tlien  in   the  infatuation  which  led  him 

'  Herod,  iii.  11.    The  indignation  prosperity  of   the  Hellenic  settle- 

wiiicli  Herodotos  describes  them  as  ment  at  Naukratis,  and  of  the  ad- 

f-elinjy  against  the  man  who  had  vantages  which  they  derived  from 

liroiitrht     down     strangers     upon  the  trade  with  Egypt. 

Egypt    is  strong  evidence  of  tlie  '^  Herod,  iii.   2. 


120  THE  STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  IL 

from  Thebes  to  niaivh  against  the  Ethiopians,  while  lie  sent 
50,000  men  to  destroy  the  shrine  of  Amoun  in  the  desert.  Scarcely 
raore  than  a  tifth  part  of  the  march  was  to  bo  accomplislied  to- 
wards the  land  of  that  mysterions  people,  who  lay  far  beyond  the 
Nile  cataracts.  They  were  goiiiijf,  as  thov  thouixht,  to  a  region 
where  the  earth  daily  produced,  like  the  Holy  Clrail  and  the  won- 
derful napkins  and  pitchers  of  Aryan  folk-lore,  inexhaustible  ban- 
quets of  luscious  and  reaily-cookod  moats.'  But  before  they  could 
cross  the  zone  of  burning  sand  which  lay  between  them  and  those 
luxurious  feasts,  the  failure  even  of  grass  for  food  drove  them  to 
decimate  themselves  ;  and  this  outbreak  of  cannibalism  warned 
Kandiyses  that  some  tasks  were  too  hard  e\  en  for  the  great  king. 
]'robably  before  he  could  reach  Memphis,  he  had  heard  of  another 
disaster.  The  men  whom  he  had  sent  to  destroy  the  shrine  of 
Amoun'  were  traced  as  far  as  the  city  of  Oasis,  where  according 
to  Ilerodotos  a  colony  of  Samaians  was  established  :  but  from  tlie 
day  on  which  they  left  it,  not  one  was  ever  seen  again.  Tlie 
guardians  of  the  shrine  asserted  (and  the  guess  was  in  all  likeli- 
hood right)  that  they  had  been  overwhelmed  by  a  dust-stonn  and 
their  bodies  buried  beneath  the  pillars  of  ticry  sand. 

A  third  en.terprise  by  which  Kambyscs  proposed  to  extend  the 
Persian  dominion  as  far  as  the  Tyrian  colony  of  Carthage  was 
Failure  of  frustrated  by  the  blunt  refusal  of  the  Phenician  sailore 
the  proposed  to   ijo   against   their    kinsfolk.     The    refustd   of   these 

expedition       i       "i  •  ^  •  ,^        i  i     i 

aptinst  oir-  liardy  manners  to  scFvc  against  Cartilage  secured  the 
thage.  freedom  of  the  great  city  which  under  Hannibal  wjis 

to  contend  with  Home  for  the  dominion  of  the  world  ;  but  in 
Kandnses  this  disregard  of  his  wishes,  following  on  the  disasters 
which  had  befallen  liis  army,  stirred  up,  it  is  sjiid,  the  tiger-like 
temper  which  must  slake  its  rage  in  blood. 

The  opportunity  was  supplied  by  the  jubilant  cries  which 
greeted  Kambyscs  on  his  return  to  Memphis.  The  people  were 
Kanibyses  shouting,  not  for  him,  but  because  they  had  found  the 
E''vpt'ian  *^'''^  ^"  whom  they  worshipped  the  incarnation  of  the 
i)nests.  god  Apis.      If  the  time  during  which   they   had   been 

without  such  a  calf  '  was  long,  their  exultation  would  be  greater 
on  finding  an  animal  which  met  the  difficult  tests  of  complete 
blackness  of  skin  with  a  square  of  white  on  the   forchcail,  double 

'  Tlmt  this  is  one  of  tlie  many  zciil    for  tlu>  Zon>astri:in  inmiotlie- 

s'orics  of  nnl)ounded  jileuty  con-  ism    whidi    must    iiavf    been    bis 

ncctoil  with  the  earth  and  its  sym-  taitli,  if  he  was  a  tnn-  Pcrfiaii. 

hols,  there  can  be  no  qufstinn.    See  '  Tlie  calf  was  noi  siitfered  to  live 

Afijt/iolotji/ of  A r.  Xdt.  hook  \'\.  vh.  more    than    twelve    years.      If    it 

3,  section  I'J.  reached  that  aire,  it  was  .solemnly 

^  It  is  possible  that  this  expodi-  slain  and  its  luxiy  reverently  iiii- 

ti  ui  may  have  been   prompted  bj  balmeif. 


CiiAi'.   I.J  THE   PERSIAN   EMPIRE.  121 

liairs  oil  tlie  tail,  and  a  beetle  mark  ou  its  tongue.  But  the 
tyrant  would  have  it  that  they  were  niakino-  merry  over  liis  cala- 
mities. In  vain  did  the  natives  whom  he  had  himself  intrusted 
with  the  government  of  Memphis  strive  to  explain  the  real  cause 
of  the  rejoicing.  They  were  all  put  to  death.  The  priests  who 
were  next  summoned  gave  the  same  explanation  ;  and  Kamhyses 
said  that  he  would  see  this  tame  god  who  had  come  among  them. 
The  beast  was  brought,  and  Kambyses,  drawing  his  dagger, 
wounded  him  on  the  thigh.  '  I'oor  fools,  these  then  are  your 
gods,'  he  cried,  '  things  of  flesh  and  blood,  which  may  be  wou'.uled 
by  men.  Truly  the  god  and  his  Avorshippers  are  well  matched  : 
but  you  shall  smart  for  raising  a  laugh  against  me.'  So  the  priests 
were  scourged  ;  an  order  was  issued  that  everyone  found  in 
holiday  guise  should  forthwith  be  slain  ;  and  the  feast  was  broken 
up  in  terror.  The  calf-god  pined  away  and  died  in  the  temple  ; 
and  the  priests  in  secret  buried  it  with  the  Avonted  rites.  From 
this  time,  so  said  the  Egyptians,  Kambyses  became  hopelessly 
mad.  It  is  possible  that  his  madness  may  have  been  not  without 
method,  and  that  these  insults  to  Apis  and  his  worshippers  were 
only  part  of  a  deliberate  plan,  such  as  would  commend  itself  to 
Nadir  Shah  or  Timour,  for  crushing  the  spirit  of  the  conquered 
nation  ;  but  the  opinion  must  remain  little  more  than  a  conjecture. 
It  is  to  this  period  that  Ilerodotos  assigns  the  murder  of  his 
brother  whom,  in  jealousy  of  his  strength  and  beauty,  he  had  sent 
back  to  Sousa.  In  the  dreams  which  followed  his  departure  the 
tyrant  had  seen  a  lierald  and  heard  from  his  lips  that  Smerdis  sat 
on  a  throne  and  that  his  head  touched  the  heaven.  Putting  on 
this  vision  the  only  interpretation  which  would  suggest  itself  to  a 
despot,  Kambyses  at  once  sent  Prexaspes  home  with  orders  to  slay 
the  prince.  When  it  was  afterwards  discovered  that  the  deed  had 
been  done  to  no  purpose,  Prexaspes  swore  solemnly  that  he  had 
not  only  slain  but  buried  him  with  his  own  hands  ;  but  the  his- 
torian admits  that  while  one  account  represented  him  as  murder- 
ing Smerdis  on  a  hunting  expedition,  others  said  that  he  had 
enticed  him  out  to  sea  and  thrown  him  overboard.  The  Bchlstun 
inscription  shuts  out  both  these  tales  by  saying  that  the  tyrant's 
brother  was  murdered  long  before  the  army  started  for  Egypt. 

We  now  come  to  the  last  act  of   the   tragedy.     The  army  had 
reached  on  its  homeward  march  a  Syrian  village  named  Agbatana, 
when  a  herald  coming  from  Sousa  bade  all   Persians   Kambyses 
to  own  as  their  king  not  Kambyses  who  was  deposed   ^^J^^ 
but  his   brother    Smerdis    the   son   of    Cyrus.     To   a   iSinerdi«. 
question  of  Prexaspes,  put  by  the  order  of  Kambyses,  the  herald 
replied  that  he  had  received  his  message  not  from  the  new  king, 
whom  lie  had  never  seen,  but  from  the   Magian  who  was  over 


12S  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH   PERSIA.  [Book  II 

his  household.  A  farther  question  put  by  Kainbyses  to  Prexaspes 
himself  called  forth  the  answer  that  he  knew  not  who  could  have 
hatched  this  plot  but  Patizeithes,  whom  Kambyses  had  left  at 
Sousa  as  his  high  steward,  and  his  brother  Smerdis.  So  then  this 
was  the  Smerdis  whose  head  was  to  touch  the  heaven  :  and  the 
despot  wept  for  his  brother  whom  he  had  so  uselessly  done  to 
death.  Presently  he  said  that  he  Avould  march  on  at  once 
against  the  usurper,  and  leaping  on  his  horse  gashed  his  thigh 
(the  part  where  he  had  wounded  the  calf-god)  with  his  sword 
from  which  the  sheath  had  accidentally  fallen  off.  '  What  is  the 
name  of  this  place  ? '  asked  Kambyses,  when  he  felt  that  the 
wound  was  serious.  Tliey  told  him  that  he  was  at  Agbatana ; 
and  the  tyrant,  loiowing  now  that  only  a  misinterpretation  of  the 
oracle  from  Bouto  which  said  that  he  must  die  at  Agbatana 
had  led  him  to  indulge  in  pleasant  dreams  of  an  old  age  spent 
among  the  Median  hills,  confessed  that  his  brother  had  been 
righteously  avenged.  His  remaining  days  or  hours  were  spent  in 
bewailing  his  evil  deeds  to  his  courtiers,  and  in  exhortations  to 
them  to  stand  out  bravely  against  the  Magian  usurpation  which, 
he  clearly  saw,  was  designed  to  transfer  to  the  Modes  the 
supremacy  of  the  Persians.  His  words  were  naturally  received 
with  little  faith,  for  Prexaspes,  of  course,  swore  as  stoutly  before 
the  Persians  that  he  had  never  harmed  Smerdis  as  he  had  to  Kam- 
byses averred  that  he  had  buried  him  with  his  own  hands  ;  and 
thus  the  Magian  Smerdis  became  king  of  the  Persians. 

Such  is  the  dramatic  version  of  Herodotos,  which  absolutely 
needs  the  doubling  of  the  names  Agbatana  and  Smerdis.  The  Be- 
The  conspi-  histuu  inscription,  it  is  said,  affirms  that  Kambyses 
se\^enPer-  billed  liimself  purposely;  that  the  name  of  the  Magian 
sians.  was  Gomates,  not  Smerdis ;  and   that  his  usurpation 

was  a  religious,  and  not,  as  has  been  generally  supposed,  a  national 
rebellion,  its  object  being  to  restore  the  ancient  magism  or  element 
worship,  which  the  predominance  of  the  stricter  monotheism  of 
Zoroaster  had  placed  under  a  cloud.  The  details  of  the  sequel  may 
be  passed  lightly  over.  The  false  Smerdis,  who  had  had  his  cars 
cut  off,  is  discovered  by  the  daughter  of  Otanes,  who  passes  her 
hands  over  his  head  while  he  sleeps ;  and  Otanes,  taking  counsel 
with  Aspathines  and  Gobryas,  gains  over  to  the  conspiracy  Inta- 
phernes,  Megabyzos,  and  Ilydarncs,  Dareios  being  admitted  last  of 
all  as  the  seventh,  on  his  arrival  from  the  province  of  Persia  l*roper, 
of  which  his  father  Ilystaspes  was  the  viceroy.  The  number  of  con- 
.spirators  l>eing  complete,  two  debates  follow,  the  first  issuing  in  the 
resolution  to  slay  the  Magian  and  his  supporters  at  once  ;  the  second, 
after  their  death,  to  determine  the  form  of  government  which  it 
would  be  wise  to  set  up.     Otanes,  the  author  of   the  conspiracy, 


Chap.  I.J  THE  PERSIAN   EMPIRE.  123 

having  proposed  a  republic  on  the  ground  that  in  no  other  way  can 
a  really  responsible  government  be  attained,  is  opposed  by  Mega- 
byzos  who,'  urging  that  the  insolent  violence  of  the  mob  is  quite  as 
hateful  as  that  of  any  despot,  recommends  an  oligarchy,  while 
Dareios  with  the  old  stuck  argument  that,  if  the  ruler  be  perfect  as 
lie  tnight  to  be,  no  form  of  polity  can  be  preferable  to  monarchy, 
insists  that  the  customs  of  the  Persians  shall  not  be  changed. 
Upon  this,  Otanes,  it  is  said,  seeing  that  things  would  go  as  Dareios 
wislied,  made  a  paction  that  he  would  neither  be  king  himself  nor 
submit  to  anyone  else  as  king,  lie  and  his  successors  with  their 
families  should  remain  independent  for  ever,  while  the  king  on  his 
part  must  covenant  to  take  his  wives  only  from  the  families  of  the 
seven  conspirators,  who  should  have  as  their  special  privilege  the 
right  of  entering  the  king's  presence  without  being  announced. 
The  sovereign  power  was  to  belong  to  that  man  whose  horse  should 
neigh  first  after  being  mounted  on  the  following  morning. 

All  these  conditions,  it  has  been  urged,  furnish  clear  evidence 
that  these  seven  conspirators  are  not,  as  Herodotos  supposes, 
founders  of  seven   families  who  form  henceforth  the   _, 

The  nccGs- 

highest  nobility  of  Persia,  but  heads  of  seven  existing  sion  of  Da- 
princely  houses,  who  thus  carried  into  action  their  pe,?|ian  ''^° 
protest  against  the  usurpation  of  the  infidel.'  Such  a  throne, 
national  movement  may  have  taken  place  :  but  we  can  "  ^''^' 
scarcely  venture  to  affirm  the  fact  positively,  while  the  Behistun 
inscription  compels  us  to  reject  almost  every  portion  of  the  story 
as  given  by  Herodotos.  Of  the  mutilation  of  the  Magian  by  Kam- 
byses,  of  Ins  discovery  through  the  agency  of  Phaidyme,  of  the 
conspiracy  of  the  Seven,  this  monument  says  absolutely  nothing. 
To  the  version  of  Herodotos,  who  represents  Dareios  as  the  last 
who  joined  the  conspirators,  it  gives  the  most  complete  contradic- 
tion. Dareios  asserts  unequivocally  that  no  one  dared  to  say  any- 
thing against  the  Magian  until  he  arrived.  To  the  seven  he  makes 
no  reference,  unless  possibly  in  the  words  that  '  with  his  faithful 
men  '  he  fell  on  the  Magian  and  slew  him,  whde  the  legend  of  his 
election  by  the  trick  of  liis  groom  Oibares  is  put  aside  by  his  asser- 
tion that  the  empire  of  which  (jomates  dispossessed  Kamb3'ses  had 
from  the  olden  time  been  in  the  family  of  Dareios.'  The  incidents 
so  rejected  are  the  chief  and  (issential  features  in  the  narrative  of 
Herodotos  ;  and  the  rock  inscription  must,  on  the  supposition  of 
their  truth,  have   made  to  them  at  least  some  passing  allusion,  if 

^  Niebuhr,  who  takes  this  view,  would  have  remained,  so  that  the 

Lect.  Anc.  Hist.  \.  13] ,  says  thut  aa  famihes    cannot   be     the    descen- 

lliese  seven  (jraudees  continue  to  be  dants  of  the  seven  conspirators, 
mentioned  in  later  Persian  history,         ^  This  would  mean  that   Cyrus, 

and  as  Dareios,  being  an   Achai-  like  Dareios,  was  an  Achaimenid. 
menid,  was  one  of  them,  only  six 


124  THE  STRUGGLE  WITH   PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

not  some  direct  reference.  But  if  such  a  monument  as  the  inscrip- 
tion of  Behistun  overthrows  on  such  important  points  a  series  of 
narratives  in  the  history  of  one  of  the  most  trustworthy  of  men, 
and  if  other  large  portions  ars  to  be  set  aside  as  mere  retiexionsof 
Hellenic  thought  or  feeling,  alike  absurd  and  impossible  in  the 
East,  with  what  trust  may  we  receive  any  story  which  paints  the 
course  of  intrigue  and  illustrates  the  secret  history  of  a  Persian  or 
Assyrian  Court  ?  for,  with  the  exception  of  the  niarcli  of  armies 
and  tales  of  foreign  conquest,  the  annals  of  those  courts  are  only 
a  secret  history.  Hints  of  execrable  cruelties  may  force  their  way 
into  the  outer  air  ;  pictures  of  fancied  luxury  and  generosity  may 
light  up  the  dim  recesses  of  the  hidden  harem  :  but  what  reason 
hav3  we  to  suppose  that  of  any  single  motive  we  shall  have  a  faith- 
ful description,  of  any  single  deed  a  true  report  ?  We  liave  ar- 
rived at  a  time  in  which  such  intrigues  and  ludden  motives  are  said 
to  be  the  mainspring  of  actions  affecting  all  Hellas  ;  and  the 
answer  to  this  doubt  must  seriously  affect  almost  the  whole  history 
of  Persia  in  its  connexion  with  events  which  have  changed  the 
fortunes  of  the  world. 


CHAPTER   U. 

THE    PERSIAN    EMPIRE    UNDER    DAREIOS. 

The  death  of  the  usurper  who  dethroned  Kambyses  was  followed, 
it  is  said,  by  a  general  massacre  of  the  Magians.  This  massacre 
The  revolt  Seems  to  point  to  a  state  of  confusion  and  disorder 
of  Babylon,  which,  according  to  Herodotos,'  prevented  Dareios  from 
taking  the  strong  measures  which  he  otherwise  would  have  taken 
against  some  refractory  or  rebellious  satra[)s  of  the  empire.  The 
statement  is  amply  borne  out  by  the  inscription  of  Behistun,  which 
describes  the  early  years  of  the  reign  of  I)areios  as  occupied  with 
putting  down  a  scries  of  obstinate  insurrections  against  his  author- 
ity. The  massacre  of  the  Magian  and  liis  partisans  seems  in  no 
way  to  have  deterred  the  Medians  from  making  a  general  effort  to 
recover  the  supremacy  of  which  they  had  been  deprived  by  Cyrus. 
But  the  fortune  of  war  went  against  them.  The  revolt  of  Babylon 
may  have  appeared  a  matter  even  more  serious  ;  but  our  knowledge 
can  scarcely  be  said  to  extend  beyond  the  facts  that  it  broke  out 
and  that  it  was  with  groat  difficulty  suppressed  ;  the  walls  of  the 
'  Herod,  iii.  120,  127,  150.  The  Trpvyunnjv,  if  justified  by  the  facts, 
phrases  //  rapa^?;,  and  oit^f^irwv  tuv     would  indicate  a  partial  anarchy. 


Chap.  II.]  THE  REIGN  OF  DAREIOS.  125 

city  being  now  so  far  dismantled  as  to  leave  the  place  lienceforth 
at  the  mercy  of  the  conqueror. 

But  the  worst  enemies  of  Dareios  came  sometimes  from  his  own 
people.  In  Aryaudes,  who  had  been  appointed  satrap  of  Egypt  by 
Kambyses,  he  found  a  rival  rather  than  a  subject :  but  The  despo- 
the  career  of  the  viceroy  who  dared  to  have  an  indepen-  po^-krates 
dent  mint  was  soon  cut  short.'  Another  formidable  insamos. 
antagonist  was  Oroites,  the.  satrap  of  Lydia,  who  has  a  wider  fame 
as  the  murderer  of  Polykrates  the  despot  of  Samos.  This  unscru- 
pulous tyrant  liad,  it  is  said,  seized  on  the  government  of  the  island 
some  time  before  the  Egyptian  expedition  of  Kambyses,"  and  had 
shared  it  at  first  with  his  brothers  Pantagnotos  and  Syloson  ;  but 
having  afterwards  killed  the  one  and  banished  the  other,  he  en- 
tered into  a  close  alliance  with  Amasis  king  of  Egypt,^  and  soon 
achieved  a  greatness  inferior  only  to  that  of  Minos,  like  whom  he  is 
said  to  have  had  a  navy  which  was  the  terror  of  the  islands  and 
countries  round  about.  In  the  emphatic  words  of  Herodotos,^  he 
was  lord  of  the  most  magnificent  city  in  the  world.  His  war-ships 
plundered  friends  and  foes  alike  ;  and  the  men  of  Lesbos  who  ven- 
tured to  aid  the  Milesians  paid  tlie  penalty  by  having  to  dio-  in 
chains  the  moat  round  the  wall  of  tlie  city  of  Samos.  But  in  spite 
of  all  his  iniquities  Polykrates  enjoyed  an  unbroken  good  fortune; 
and  his  well-doing  became,  we  are  told,  a  cause  of  grief  and  mis- 
giving to  his  ally  Amasis,  who  reminded  him  of  the  Divine  Jea- 
lousy, and  counselled  him  to  inflict  some  pain  on  himself,  if  none 
were  sent  to  him  by  the  gods.  '  Seek  out,'  he  said,  *  that  thing  for 
the  loss  of  which  thy  soul  would  most  be  grieved,  and  cast  it  away 
so  that  it  may  never  come  to  mortal  hand  :  and  if  hereafter  thy 
good  fortune  be  not  mixed  with  woe,  remedy  it  in  the  manner 
which  I  have  set  before  thee.'  This  counsel  Poykrates  thought 
that  he  could  not  follow  more  effectually  than  by  rowing  out  into 
the  deep  sea  and  casting  into  the  water  a  seal-ring  of  emerald  set 
in  gold,  wrought  by  the  Samian  Theodores.  A  few  days  later  a 
fisherman  brought  to  him  as  a  gift  a  fish  which  seemed  to  him  too 
fine  to  be  taken  to  the  market.  Polykrates  in  requital  bade  the 
man  to  supper  :  but  before  the  time  for  the  meal  came,  his  servants 
had  found  the  seal-ring  in  the  fish.  In  great  astonishment  Poly- 
krates sent  to  Amasis  a  letter  telling  him  what  had  happened.  The 
Egyptian  king,  feeling  now  that  no  man  could  deliver  another  from 
that  which  was  to  come  upon  him,  sent  a  herald  to  Samos  and 
broke  off  the  alliance,  in  order  that,  when  some  evil  fate  overtook 
Polykrates,  his  own  heart  might  not  be  grieved  as  for  a  friend. 

*  Herod,  iv.  166.  '  lb.  iii.  55. 

^  lb.  iii.  39.  *  lb.  iii.  139. 


126  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH   PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

It  is  possible,  as  some  have  tlioiight,  that  the  alliance  was  broken 
off  not  by  Aniasis  but  b}'  Polykrates  liimself,  for  the  next  thing 
The  hist  Avhich  Herodotos  relates  of  him  is  an  offer  to  furnish 
career  of  ^"^"^  troops  for  the  army  of  Kambyses.'  The  Persian  king 
Polykrates.  eagerly  accepted  the  offer,  and  Polykrates  as  eagerly 
availed  himself  of  the  opportunity  to  get  rid  of  those  Samians 
whom  he  regarded  as  disaffected  towards  himself.  But  in  the 
epical  method  of  Herodotos  the  time  was  now  come  when  the  man 
who  had  been  victorious  over  all  his  enemies  should  exhibit  in  his 
own  person  the  working  of  that  law  which  keeps  human  affairs  in 
constant  flow  and  ebb.  We  can,  therefore,  only  say,  as  he  tells  us, 
that  Oroites  whom  Cyrus  had  left  as  satrap  in  Sardeis  had  made  up 
his  mind  to  intrap  and  slay  Polykrates,  and  sent  a  messenger  to 
Samos  with  this  message,  'Thussaith  Oroites  to  Polykrates,  I  hear 
that  thou  art  set  on  great  things,  but  that  thou  hast  not  money  ac- 
cording to  thy  designs.  Know  then  that  king  Kambyses  seeks  to 
slay  me.  Therefore  come  and  take  me  away  and  my  money,  and 
keep  part  of  it  for  thyself,  and  part  of  it  let  me  have.  So,  if  thou 
thinkest  for  money,  thou  shalt  be  ruler  over  all  Hellas  ;  and  if  thou 
believest  not  about  my  wealth,  send  the  trustiest  of  thy  servants, 
and  to  liim  will  I  show  it.'  These  words  roused  the  greed  of 
Polykrates,  and  Maiandrios  his  scribe  was  sent  to  test  the  words  of 
Oroites  who,  when  he  liad  heard  that  the  Samian  was  nigh  at  hand, 
filled  eight  vessels  with  stones  all  but  a  little  about  the  brim,  and 
having  placed  gold  on  the  stones''  fastened  the  vessels  and  kept 
them  ready.  Maiandrios,  having  seen  the  jars,  broTight  the  tidings 
to  Polykrates,  who  made  ready  to  go,  although  the  soothsayers  with 
his  friends  forbade  him  to  do  so.  His  daughter  pleaded  that  she 
had  seen  a  vision  which  betokened  disaster  ;  but  she  pleaded  in 
vain.  Polykrates  sailed  from  Samos,  taking  with  him  many  of  his 
comrades,  and  among  them  Demokedes,  the  son  of  Kalliphon  of 
Kroton,  a  physician  famed  beyond  all  others  of  his  time  for  the 
iro^  /.x  practice  of  his  art.  But  he  reached  Mac^nesia,  the 
liistorian  adds,  only  to  perish  with  an  end  befitting 
neither  himself  nor  his  great  designs,  for  Avith  the  exception  of 
the  despots  of  Syracuse  no  one  of  the  Greek  tyrants  deserved  to 
be  compared  for  greatness  with  Polykrates. 

Wlien  the  tidings  of  his  death  were  brouglit  to  Samos,  his 
The  degpo-  deputy  Maiandrios  made  a  strong  effort,  it  is  said,  to 
andrios  and  restore  thu  constitution  which  his  master  liad  subverted. 
ofSjloson.  He  offered  to  resign  his  power  and  to  obey  the  laws 
as  a  simple  citizen,  reserving  to  himself  only  a  grant  of  six  talents 

'  Herod,  iii.  44.  Athenians,    and    seems    to     linve 

"A  trick  somewhat  resemblintr  turned  the  scale  at  Athens  in  favor 
this  was  actually  played  off  by  tlie  of  their  disastrous  expedition  to 
men  of  Egesta  in   Sicily  upon  the     that  island.     Time.  vi.  8  and  40. 


Chap.  II.]  THE  REIGN   OF  DAREIOS.  127 

and  the  priesthood  of  Zeus  the  DeUvLTcr.  The  ofier  was  con- 
temptuously refused,  and  Maiandrios  against  his  will  wa.s  com- 
pelled to  remain  a  despot,  until  a  new  actor  appeared  upon  the 
scene  in  the  person  of  Syloson  the  exiled  brother  of  Polykrates. 
Syloson  by  the  gift  of  a  cloak  had  earned  the  gratitude  of  Dareios 
when  the  latter  was  serving  with  the  army  of  Kambyses  in  Egypt. 
He  now  claimed  from  Dareios  the  Persian  king  the  aid  which  hi 
had  promised  in  his  humbler  station  ;  and  a  Persian  tieet  under 
Otanes  appeared  before  Samos  to  inforce  the  pretensions  of  Sylo- 
.son.  By  Maiandrios  no  opposition  Avas  offered,  but  the  mad  folly 
of  his  brother  Charilaos  brought  about  a  massacre  of  the  unsus- 
pecting Persian  officers  in  the  market-place  of  the  city.  Otanes 
retaliated  by  an  indiscriminate  slaughter  alike  of  men,  women,  and 
children  throughout  the  island.  Syloson  remained,  it  would  seem, 
tributary  despot  of  Samos  and  was  succeeded  by  his  sou  Aiakes.' 

Thus  the  first  whether  of  Hellenic  or  of  barbarian  cities  passed 
in  a  state  of  desolation  under  the  yoke  of  Dareios  who  was  known 
among  his  subjects  rather  as  an  organiser  than  as  a  orfani^^atiou 
conqueror,  or,  as  the  Persians  put  it,  rather  as  a  buck-  of  the  Per- 
ster  than  as  the  father  of  his  people.  Under  the 
former  kings  the  several  portions  of  the  empire  had  sent  yearly  gifts. 
Henceforth  the  several  provinces  were  to  pay  an  assessed  tribute  ; 
and  Herodotos  is  naturally  careful  to  state  the  measure  of  ^he  bur- 
dens imposed  on  the  Asiatic  Greeks.  Four  hundred  silver  talents 
were  demanded  yearly  from  the  lonians,  Magnesians,  Aiolians,  Ka- 
rians,  Lykians,  ]\Iilyans,  and  Pamphylians,  who  were  ranged  in  one 
department  or  Xomos.  On  the  second  which  included  the  My- 
sians  and  Lvdians  was  assessed  the  sum  of  five  hundred  talents. 
The  third  department  which  stretched  from  the  Hellespont  east- 
wards paid  three  hundred  and  sixty  talents  in  silver.  But  although 
something  was  thus  done  for  the  wealth  and  dignity  of  the  king, 
the  Persian  empire  remained,  as  it  had  been,  a  mere  agglomeration 
of  units,  with  no  other  bond  than  that  of  a  common  liability  to 
tribute  and  taxation,  with  no  common  sentiment  extending  be- 
yond the  bounds  of  the  several  tribes,  and  with  no  inherent  safe- 
guards against  disruption  from  without  or  decay  and  disorganisa- 
tion within. 

The  tragedy  of  Polykrates  is  followed  by  two  stories  from 
which^it  is  no  easy  task  to  extract  much  historical  fact.  Of  the^e 
stories  the  former  is  associated  with  the  name  of  the  The  story  of 
Krotonian  physician  Demokedes,  who,  on  the  death  of  Demokedes. 
Oroites,  was  carried  to  Sousa  along  with  the  other  slaves  found  in 
his  household  and  for  some  time  remained  there  unknown  and  un- 
cared  for.  At  length  it  happened,  so  the  story  ran,  that  Dareios  in 
'  Herod,  vi.  13. 


128  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH   PERSIA.  [Book  IL 

a  huut  leaped  from  his  horse,  and  so  twisted  his  foot  that  the 
ankle  bone  was  moved  from  its  soclcet.  Tlie  Egyptian  physicians, 
whom  he  kept  about  him,  made  the  mischief  worse  than  they 
found  it ;  and  it  was  not  until  he  had  passed  eight  wretched  and 
sleepless  nights  that  some  one,  who  had  heard  in  Sardeis  of  the 
great  skill  of  Demokedes,  told  the  king,  at  whose  bidding  the 
friend  of  Polykra^es  was  brought  before  him,  dragging  his  chains 
and  clothed  in  rags.  This  man's  heart,  we  are  told,  was  tilled  with 
one  absorbing  desire,  for  the  attainment  of  which  he  was  ready  to 
shape  both  his  words  and  his  actions  and  to  work  on  persistently, 
no  matter  what  misery  and  ruin  he  might  bring  on  the  land  which 
he  yearned  to  see  once  more.  Hence  when  Dareios  asked  him  of 
his  craft,  Demokedes  denied  that  he  had  any,  fearing  that,  if  he 
should  be  found  useful  to  the  king,  he  should  have  no  hope  of 
setting  foot  again  on  Hellenic  soil.  But  Dareios  saw  that  he  was 
lying,  and  scourges  and  goads,  brought  at  his  bidding,  drew  from 
Demokedes  the  admission  that  he  knew  the  art  of  the  physician, 
but  that  he  knew  it  poorly.  Such  as  it  was,  Dareios  bade  him  use 
it  at  once  on  the  injured  limb,  which  Demokedes  so  handled  that 
in  a  little  while  it  was  as  sound  as  it  had  ever  been.  Persian 
despots  are  seldom  ungrateful  for  benefits  which  add  to  their  own 
comfort ;  and  Demokedes  was  rewarded  with  a  great  house  in 
Sousa  and  Avith  the  })rivilege  of  eating  at  the  king's  table.  He 
had,  in  short,  every  wish  of  his  heart  but  one.  The  king  Avould 
not  part  with  him  ;  and  Demokedes  would  rather  starve  in  Hellas 
than  feast  at  Sousa.  But  the  illness  of  Atossa,  the  ruling  spirit  in 
the  seraglio  of  Dareios,  brought  an  opportunity  of  escape  of  which 
Demokedes  eagerly  and  deliberately  availed  himself.  Grateful  for 
the  healing  of  a  tumor  which  had  long  tortured  her,  this  daughter 
of  Cyrus,  following  the  instructions  of  the  physician,  went  to 
Dareios  and  reproached  him  with  sitting  idle  on  his  throne  without 
making  an  effort  to  gain  nations  or  kingdoms  for  the  Persians. 
Dareios  hastened  to  answer  that  he  had  just  resolved  to  do  as  she 
now  desired  him,  and  that  he  was  making  ready  to  go  against  the 
Scythians.  '  Nay,'  replied  Atossa,  in  words  which  to  the  Athe- 
nians who  heard  or  read  the  narrative  of  the  great  historian 
conveyed  an  exquisite  irony,  'go  not  against  the  Sc3'thians  first. 
I  have  heard  of  the  beauty  of  the  women  of  Hellas,  and  I  desire  to 
have  Laconian  and  Argive  and  Athenian  and  Corinthian  maidens 
to  be  my  servants.  Go  then  against  Hellas  :  and  thou  hast  here 
one  who  above  all  men  can  show  thee  how  thou  mayest  do  this — 
I  mean  him  who  has  healed  thy  foot.'  Dareios  so  far  yielded  as 
to  sjvy  that  Demokedes  should  serve  as  a  guide  to  the  Persians 
whom  he  would  send  to  spy  out  Hellas  and  bring  back  an  account 
of  what  they  might  see  there.  xVccordingly  fifteen  Persian  officers 


Chap.  II.]  THE  REIGN  OF  DAREIOS.  129 

left  Sidon  with  Dcmokedes,  and  sailing  along  the  coasts  of  Hellas, 
made  a  record  of  all  that  they  saw  until  they  came  to  Taras, 
which  the  Latins  called  Tjtrcntum,  in  Italy.  There  Aristophilides, 
the  king  of  the  Tai-antines,  at  the  suggestion  of  Demokedes,  took 
off  the  rudders  of  the  Persian  ships  and  shut  up  the  Persians 
themselves  in  prison  as  spies  ;  and  while  they  were  in  this  plight, 
Demokedes  fled  away  to  Kroton.  Having  given  his  friend  time 
to  escape,  Aristophilides  let  the  Persians  go ;  but  their  mis- 
fortunes were  not  yet  ended.  They  were  wrecked  on  the  lapy- 
gian  coast,  but  a  Tarantine  exile  ransomed  them  from  slavery  and 
took  them  to  Darcios.  So  fared  the  first  Persians  who  visited 
Hellas  to  the  west  of  the  Egean  sea. 

It  is  useless  to  speculate  on  the  amount  of  knowledge  which 
we  might  have  obtained  from  the  records  of  this  Persian  Periplous, 
if  they  had  been  preserved,  when  the  point  to  be  influence 
determined  is  whether  the  Periplous  was  made  at  all.  tri^u'esof 
The  results  of  Persian  observation  would  probably  in  Atossa. 
any  case  have  had  but  little  value  :  but  when  we  renrember  the 
unlikelihood  of  the  story,  we  must  at  the  least  place  it  amongst  the 
tales  of  which  we  can  neither  affirm  nor  deny  the  reality.  The 
plan  of  Demokedes  was  to  obtain  his  freedom  at  the  possible  cost 
of  the  ruin  of  his  country  :  the  plan  of  Atossa  clearly  was  to  pre- 
cipitate the  whole  power  of  Persia  upon  Hellas  at  a  time  when 
Hippias  was  still  tyrant  of  Athens,  and  when  the  Persian  could 
have  encountered  no  serious  resistance,  unless  perhaps  from  the 
mountaineers  of  the  Peloponnesos.  This  plan  confessedly  failed  ; 
but  there  is  no  record  that  Dareios  expressed  any  indignation  at 
the  treatment  of  his  oflicers.  As  a  political  motive,  these  intrigues 
are  thus  superfluous,  and  all  that  can  be  said  in  favor  of  the 
narrative  is  that,  unlike  the  stories  of  Deiokes  or  of  the  seven  con- 
spirators against  Smerdis,  it  is,  at  least  in  its  earlier  scenes,  so 
strictly  Oriental  in  its  coloring  as  to  come  before  us  with  a 
specially  deceptive  force.  But  if  the  plausible  form  thus  assumed 
by  the  story  may  tempt  us  to  think  that  it  cannot  be  without  some 
historical  value,  still  the  different  impressions  which  even  eye- 
witnesses receive  of  the  same  events  and  the  same  scenes,  and  the 
irresistible  temptation  or  the  unconscious  tendency  to  vary  the 
coloring  of  a  story  at  each  successive  recital,  must  justify  a  strong 
reluctance  to  admit  the  truthfulness  of  vivid  or  minute  detail  in 
any  but  a  contemporary  narrative.  This  reluctance  must  pass  into 
positive  unbelief,  if  the  tradition  involves  an  imputation  of  im- 
probable or  unaccountable  motives  or  assigns  some  secondary  or 
irrelevant  causes  where  more  simple  and  forcible  motives  are  not 
wanting.  There  is  nothing  in  itself  unlikely  in  the  tale  that 
Dareios  was  incited  by  his  wife  Atossa  to  an  attack  on  Athens  and 
6* 


130  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

Sparta.  But  the  admission  of  her  influence  cannot  necessarily 
lead  us  to  admit  motives  which  are  improbable  in  the  case  of 
Demokedes,  which  are  more  unlikel}'  still  in  the  case  of  Histiaios, 
and  fairly  pass  the  bounds  of  credibility  in  that  of  Themistokles. 
The  very  completeness  of  the  picture  drawn  for  us  in  the  story  of 
the  Krotoniate  physician  may  reasonably  lead  us  to  question 
whether  these  are  the  genuine  movements  which  stirred  the  ancient 
world.  Polykrates  is  undoubtedly  an  historical  person  :  but  the 
tale  of  his  life  is  in  great  part  a  romance  to  illustrate  an  ethical  or 
theological  theory  ;  and  the  image  of  Demokedes  already  grows 
more  indistinct,  when  we  see  that  his  careei  is,  almost  more 
legendary  than  that  of  his  master.  But  in  truth  it  seems  enough 
to  note  that  the  inscription  at  Behistun  is  very  far  from  bearing 
out  the  rebuke  of  Dareios  by  Atossa  for  warlike  inactivity  in  the 
first  or  in  anv  other  part  of  his  reign.  The  matter  is  not  mended 
if  we  say  that  the  words  of  Atossa  were  true  and  that  the  records 
of  the  inscription  are  false.  These  may  fairly  be  received  as  the 
genuine  work  of  Dareios  :  for  the  words  of  Atossa  w^c  can  have 
no  evidence  beyond  that  which  is  attributed  to  a  deliberate  traitor.* 
When  from  the  story  of  Demokedes  we  turn  to  the  second  tale, 
that,  namely,  of  the  Scythian  expedition,  the  residuum  of  fact  is 
The  Scy-  fouud  to  be  scarcely  less  scanty.  With  600  ships  and 
dufom^^"  an  army  of  700,000  men  Dareios,  it  is  said,  reached  the 
516  B.C.  (?)  bridge  of  boats  thrown  across  the  Thrakian  Bosporos, 
and  thence  marched  on  through  Thrace  to  the  spot  wdiere  the  loni- 
ans  whose  ships  had  been  sent  round  by  the  Black  Sea  had  pre- 
pared the  bridge  of  boats  by  which  lie  was  to  cross  the  Istros,  or 
Danube.  This  bridge,  after  all  had  crossed  over,  Dareios,  it  is  said, 
gave  orders  to  break  up  ;  but  Koes  of  Mytilene  warned  him,  not  of 
the  danger  of  defeat  in  battle,  (for  this  he  professed  to  regard  as  im- 
possible), but  of  starvation  in  a  country  where  thcrcwere  no  settled 
dweUings  and  no  tillage.  The  king,  following  his  advice,  com- 
manded the  lonians  to  guard  the  bridge  for  sixty  days,  and,  if  he 
should  not  by  that  time  have  come  back,  then  to  break  it  up  and 
sail  away.  The  story  of  the  campaign  which  follows  is  told  with 
an  abundance  of  detail  illustrating  the  plan  of  the  Scythians  to 
avoid  all  battles  but  to  entice  the  Persians  continually  further 
from  their  base  of  supplies,  if  they  thought  of  having  any,  through 
tlie  countries  of  those  nations  who  would  not  take  part  with  them 
in  the  war.  In  this  way  the  Persians  are  lured  across  the  Tanais 
and  to  the  banks  of  the  Oaros,  which,  like  the  Lykos,  Tanais, 
and  Syrgis,  is  represented  as  flowing  into  the  Maietian  lake  (Azoff). 

'  Tliey  are  seemingly  inconsistent      things  early  in  the  reign  of  Dareioa 
■with  the  words  in  which  Ilerodotos      See  page  124. 
Limself  describes  the  condition  of 


Chap.  II.]  THE  REIGN  OF  DAREIOS.  131 

At  this  point  the  Scythians  who  act  as  decoys  begin  to  move  west- 
wards ;  and  Dareios,  taking  it  to  be  a  general  movement  of  the 
tribes,  orders  iiis  army  to  march  in  the  same  direction.  Accord- 
ingly they  wander  on  through  the  lands  of  the  Black  Coats 
(Melanchlainoi),  the  Cannibals  ( Anthropopliagoi),  and  other  tribes, 
whom  the  Scythians  wished  to  punish,  until  Dareios  in  sheer 
weariness  sent  a  herald  to  the  Scythian  king  to  beg  him  either  to 
come  forward  and  fight  like  a  man  or  to  give  earth  and  water  as  a 
slave.  '  Tell  your  master,'  said  the  wandering  chief,  '  that  he  is 
quite  mistaken  if  ho  thinks  that  \ye  are  ruiming  away  from  liim. 
The  fact  is  that  we  are  only  doing  now  wliat  we  always  do,  for  it 
is  our  way  to  move  about.  If  he  wants  to  fight  us,  let  him  find 
out  the  tombs  of  our  forefathers  ;  and  if  he  lays  hands  on  them, 
he  shall  soon  know  how  the  Scythians  can  strike.'  So  Dareios  was 
obliged  to  go  on  his  way.  But  the  monotony  of  his  course  was 
at  last  broken  by  the  arrival  of  a  Scythian  herald  who  brought  as 
gifts  for  the  king  not  earth  and  water  but  a  bird  and  a  mouse,  a 
frog  and  five  arrows,  and,  having  left  them,  went  his  way.  Sum- 
moning his  chief  men,  Dareios  expressed  his  opinion  that  by  these 
gifts  the  Scythians  meant  that  they  yielded  up  themselves,  their 
land,  and  their  water,  because  the  mouse  lives  on  the  land  and  the 
frog  on  the  water,  and  the  bird  signified  the  horses  of  warriors 
and  the  arrows  showed  that  they  gave  up  their  power.  But 
Gobryas,  one  of  the  six  who  rose  up  with  him  against  the  Magian 
Smerdis,  gave  another  interpretation  and  warned  the  Persians  that, 
unless  they  should  become  birds  and  tiy  up  into  heaven,  or  go  down 
like  mice  beneath  the  earth  or  becoming  hogs  leap  into  the  lake, 
they  would  be  shot  to  death  by  the  Scythian  arrows.  The  words 
of  Gobryas  struck  a  chill  into  the  heart  of  Dareios ;  but  while  he 
with  his  bulky  army  made  what  speed  he  could  to  reach  the  bridge 
on  the  Danube,  a  body  of  Scythians  taking  a  shorter  road  hastened 
to  the  lonians  wlio  were  guarding  it,  and  urged  them  to  abandon 
their  trust,  not  only  because  by  so  doing  they  would  free  them- 
selves but  because  they  were  acting  unrighteously  in  aiding  and 
abetting  a  wanton  invader.  The  advice  of  Miltiades,  the  future 
victor  of  Marathon,  was  that  they  should  do  as  the  Scythians 
wislied.  But  although  the  other  despots  there  present  gave  at 
first  an  eager  assent,  they  at  once  changed  their  minds  when  His- 
tiaios  of  Sliletos  warned  them  that  without  the  help  of  Dareios 
they  could  not  possibly  hope  to  retain  their  power.  Still  it  was 
necessary  to  do  something  to  get  rid  of  the  Scythian  army  on  the 
banks  of  the  river.  The  lonians  therefore  pretended  to  accept 
their  proposal,  and  setting  to  work  to  loosen  the  bridge  on  the 
Scythian  side,  urged  them  to  go  in  search  of  the  Persian  iiost  and 
destroy  it.     The  Scythians  accordingly  hurried  off,  but  were  as 


132  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

unsuccessful  now  in  finding  the  Persians  as  the  Persians  had  been 
in  tracking  them.  Meanwliile  Dareioswas  hurrying  to  the  Istros. 
Jt  was  night  when  they  reached  the  bridge  :  and  when  they  found 
Ihat  the  boats  were  unloosed,  they  feared  greatly  that  the  lonians 
Lad  left  them  to  perish.  But  Dareios  commanded  an  Egyptian 
in  bis  army  who  had  a  very  loud  voice  to  call  Histiaios  of  Miletos  ; 
and  at  the  first  cry  Histiaios  had  the  bridge  fastened  again.  Thus 
the  Persians  got  over  in  safety  ;  and  the  Scythians  on  learning 
hov/  they  liad  been  tricked  comforted  themselves  by  reviling  the 
fonians  as  cowards  who  hug  their  chains. 

We  may  smile  at  such  details;  but  only  by  a  summary  of  the 
wi  ole  narrative  can  it  be  shown  that  no  one  part  of  the  story  is 
CTedibility  ^'cally  more  trustworthy  than  any  other.  It  is  quite 
of  the  narra-  true  that  the  record  of  all  that  takes  place  on  the 
Scythian*^  Scythiau  side  of  the  Danube  is  like  a  bewildering 
expedition,  dream.  The  great  rivers  which  water  the  vast  regions 
on  the  north  of  the  Black  Sea  are  forgotten  by  the  historian  in  his 
description  of  the  Avanderings  of  a  million  of  men  through  a  coun- 
try which  yielded  no  food  and  in  many  places  no  Avater.  An 
eastward  marcli  of  700  or  800  miles  in  Avhich  no  great  stream 
seemingly  is  crossed  except  the  Tanais,  and  in  Avhich  the  Scythians 
never  attack  them,  Avhen  to  attack  them  would  be  to  destroy  them 
utterly,  is  followed  by  a  march  of  a  like  length  Avestward,  Avith  the 
same  result.  The  tale  is  incredible  from  beginning  to  end  ;  but 
there  is  nothing  to  justify  the  belief  that  Ave  enter  the  Avorld  of 
reality  on  the  Thrakian  bank  of  the  Istros.  The  motive  assigned 
for  the  expedition  is  the  desire  of  Dareios  to  avenge  the  Avrong 
done  to  the  Median  or  Persian  empire  about  a  hundred  years  be- 
fore :  but  this  motive  is  scarcely  more  constraining  than  that  Avhich 
is  supposed  to  have  taken  the  Persians  to  Egypt  to  avenge  the 
slaughter  of  their  remote  forefathers  by  Ramcses  or  Sesostris.  The 
story  of  the  ignominious  retreat  of  Dareios  must  be  compared  with 
that  of  the  still  more  ignominious  retreat  of  Xerxes  ;  and  if  there  be 
good  reason  for  caHing  into  question  the  later  tradition,  not  much 
can  be  urged  in  favor  of  the  older.  The  incidents  in  the  guarding 
of  the  bridge  are  even  more  bewildering  than  any  Avhich  Avere 
supposed  to  have  taken  place  in  the  rugged  deserts  of  Scythia. 
Even  under  the  circumstances  as  they  are  given  in  the  narrative, 
there  is  no  need  to  suppose  a  liaste  to  cross  the  river  so  pressing 
as  to  make  it  impossible  to  wait  till  the  day  had  dawned.  Still  more 
absurd  is  it,  with  the  noise  of  a  vast  army  in  disorderly  retreat,  to 
introduce  the  Egyptian  lierald  with  his  Stentorian  voice  to  rouse 
the  attention  of  Histiaios.  If  any  debates  took  place  among  the 
guardians  of  the  bridge,  Ave  cannot  decide  Avhat  amount  of  exagge- 
ration or  oven  of  Avilful  falsehood  may  have  been  introduced  into 


Chap.  11. ]  THE   REIGN   OF  DAREIOS.  133 

the  report  of  them.  But  the  mutter  is  speedily  brought  to  an 
issue.  Eitlier  tlie  Ionian s  were  faithful  to  Dareios  or  they  were 
not.  Either  the  Scythians  were  in  earnest  in  their  efforts  to 
defend  tlicir  country  and  to  defeat  the  invaders,  or  they  were  not. 
Under  either  alternative  it  is  in".possible  to  give  any  credit  to  the 
story  of  the  incidents  which  are  supposed  to  have  taken  place  at 
the  bridge.  Whctlier  the  Greeks  Avished  to  abandon  Dareios  or 
to  save  him,  they  would  in  eitlier  case  have  urged  the  Scythians  to 
remain  on  the  bank, — in  the  one  case  that  these  Sythians  might 
destroy  the  Persian  army  in  the  desperate  confusion  caused  by  the 
efforts  of  an  unwieldly  multitude  caught  in  a  deadly  snare, — in  the 
other  that  they  might  fall  victims  to  the  Persian  host.  On  the 
other  hand,  whatever  may  be  the  stupidity  of  wandering  tribes, 
the  folly  attributed  to  the  Scythians  exceeds  that  which  might  well 
be  ascribed  to  Australian  savages.  An  enormous  and  unmanageable 
army  is  lost  in  a  trackless  desert  or  has  to  cross  rivers  which  may 
not  be  forded  ;  and  yet  during  a  march  of  sixteen  hundred  miles 
not  an  effort  is  made  by  a  determined  enemy  to  in  trap  or  crush 
them.  Nay  more, — the  Scythians  are  represented  c/^  knowing 
perfectly  well  the  position  of  the  Persian  army  at  every  stage  of 
their  march  ;  and  therefore,  as  knowing  that  Dareios  was  in  full 
retreat  for  the  bridge,  they  knew  that  he  and  his  army  must  cross 
it  or  speedily  perish.'  Yet  they  are  infatuated  enough  to  depart  at 
the  bidding  of  the  lonians  to  go  and  look  for  an  enemy,  whom,  if 
only  they  remained  where  they  were,  they  might  assuredly 
slaughter  at  their  ease.  The  folly  which  could  forego  so  sure  and 
easy  a  means  of  vengeance  is  so  stupendous  that  we  are  driven  to 
dismiss  the  story  of  the  Scythian  campaign  of  Dareios  as  unhis- 
torical  in  all  its  details,  even  if  it  be  admitted  that  any  such 
expedition  ever  took  place  at  all.  But  it  is  perfectly  natural  that 
the  Hellenic  tradition  should  represent  the  defeat  of  the  Persian 

'  III   liis   play   of    the   Persians  maiiied   at   home.     But   it   seems 

^schylos  makes  neither  reference  more  likely  that  neither  iEschylos 

nor  allusion  to  the  Scythian  expedi-  nor  his  audience  kiie\y  anythino:  of 

tiou,  while  the  language  which  he  the  Scythian   expedition  ;    and   it 

puts  into   the    mouth    of   Dareios  must  be  remembered  that  no  light 

seems   altogether   to    exclude    it.  whatever  is  thrown  on  it  by  the 

Dareios  here  speaks  of  the  catastro-  inscriptions  at  Behistun.    As  to  the 

plie  which  had  befallen  Xerxes  as  a  Athenians,  we  can  scarcely  suppose 

fit  retribution  for  his  impiety  in  that  they  would  have  much  greater 

bridging  over  the  Hellespont.     It  regard  for  Dareios  than  for  Xerxes, 

certainly  is  just  possible  that  the  or  that  they  would  have  allowed 

poet  may  have  purposely  exhibited  the  poet  to  exhibit  the  latter  as  the 

Dareios  as  lying  by  implication  ;  first  to  lay  profane  hands  on   the 

and  the  conquests  which  (P('mr/;is,  sacred   wateis  of  the  Hellesijont, 

864)  he  is  said  to  have  made  with-  when   they  knew   that   the   same 

out  crossing  the  Halys  or  even  with-  offence  had  been  committed  by  llio 

out  moving  from  his  hearth  can  re-  man  whose  phantom  in  the  drama 

fer  only  to  conquests  achieved  by  upbraids  his  infatuated  son. 
his  fifenerals  while  he  himself  re- 


134  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

king  as  more  disastrous  than  it  really  was.  That  it  has  thus  over- 
colored  the  disorder  of  the  flight  of  Xerxes,  we  shall  presently 
see  ;  but  we  may  note  here  the  significant  circumstance  that  with 
the  passage  of  the  Danube  on  his  return  all  the  difficulties  of 
Dareios  disappear.  It  was  his  wish  that  the  Thrakians  should  be 
made  his  subjects  ;  and  his  general  Megabazos  bears  down  all 
opposition  with  a  vigor  which  the  incapacity  of  the  Persians  on 
the  northern  side  of  the  Danube  would  not  lead  us  to  expect  and 
to  which  we  might  suppose  that  Scythian  revenge  would  offer 
some  hindrance.  But  from  the  Scythians  Megabazos  encounters 
no  resistance  ;  and  his  course  to  the  Strymon  is  one  of  uninter- 
rupted conquest.  Near  the  mouth  of  this  river  was  tlie  Edonian 
town  of  Myrkinos,  in  a  neighborhood  rich  in  forests  and  corn- 
land  as  well  as  in  mines  of  gold  and  silver.  Here,  when  the  great 
king  announced  his  wish  to  reward  his  benefactors,  Histiaios 
begged  that  lie  might  be  suffered  to  take  up  his  abode,  while 
Koes  contented  himself  with  asking  that  he  might  be  made  despot 
of  Mytilene.  But  Megabazos  advanced  still  farther  westward, 
and  from  the  lake  of  Prasiai  sent  envoys  to  the  Makedonian 
Amyntas,  who  gave  them  earth  and  water.  The  supremacy  of 
the  Persian  king  was  at  the  same  time  extended  to  Lemnos,  an 
island  inhabited,  it  is  said,  by  a  Pelasgian  population  ;  and  Lyka- 
retos,  the  brother  of  the  Samian  Maiandrios,  was  appointed 
governor.  But  Lemnos  was  not  to  remain  long  under  Persian 
power.  When  the  resources  of  the  empire  were  being  strained  to 
suppress  the  Ionic  revolt,  the  Athenian  Miltiades,  sailing  from 
Elaious  in  the  Chersonesos,  made  a  descent  on  the  island,  which 
with  Skyros,  subsequently  conquered,  remained  henceforth  most 
closely  connected  with  Athens. 


CHAPTER  TIL 


THE    IONIC    REVOLT. 


When  after  the  outbreak  of  the  Ionic  revolt  a  joint  expedition  of 
Athenians  and  lonians  under  the  Milesian  Aristagoras  led  to  the 
Dareios  unci  accidental  burning  of  Sardeis,  Dareios,  we  are  told,  on 
thcAthe-  hearing  the  tidings,  asked  who  the  Athenians  might 
""""*■  be,  anil,  on  being  informed,  shot  an  arrow  into  the  air, 

praying  Zeus  to  suffer  hiin  to  take  vengeance  on  this  folk.  About 
thelonians  and  their  share  in  the  matter  he  said  nothing.  These 
he  knew  that  he  might  punish  as  he  might  clioose  :  but  so  careful 


Chap.  III.]  THE  IONIC  REVOLT.  135 

was  he  not  to  forget  the  foreigners  who  had  done  him  wrong,  th;it 
an  attendant  received  orders  to  bid  liis  master  liefore  every  meal 
to  remember  the  Athenians.'  If  the  chronology  of  this  period 
may  at  all  be  trusted,  ten  or  twelve  years  had  passed 
away  since  Hippias  allied  himself  with  llippoklos,  the 
Lampsakene  despot,  on  the  express  gronnd  that  lie  stood  high  in 
the  favor  of  Darcios  ;  and  eight  years  perhaps  had  gone  by  since 
Hippias,  expelled  from  Athens,  departed  to  Sigeion  with  the  deti- 
nite  purpose  of  stirring  up  the  Persian  king  against  his  country- 
men. His  intrigues  were  probably  not  less  active  than  those  of 
James  H.  at  St.  Germain's  :  and  his  disappointment  at  the  congress 
in  Sparta^  probably  sent  him  back  to  the  Hellespont  not  less 
determined  to  regain  his  power  by  fair  means  or  by  foul.  AVe 
may  be  sure  that  the  friendship  of  Hippoklos  Avas  taxed  to  this 
end  to  the  uttermost ;  and  we  may  well  believe  the  words  of  Hero- 
dotos  that  from  the  moment  of  his  return  from  Sparta  he  left  not 
a  stone  unturned  to  provoke  Artaphernes,  the  Sardian  satrap,  to 
the  conquest  of  Athens,  in  order  that  the  Peisistratidai  might  hold 
it  as  tributaries  of  Dareios.  The  conclusion  seems  to  follow  irre- 
sistibly that  Dareios  had  heard  the  whole  story  of  their  expulsion, 
and  that  he  gave  no  such  answer  to  their  prayers  as  effectually  to 
discourage  their  importunities.  The  acts,  of  which  we  have  here 
a  significant  glimpse,  were  not  done  in  a  corner.  The  Athenians 
were  perfectly  aware  of  the  way  in  which  Hippias  was  employing 
himself  at  Sardeis  ;  and  their  ambassadors,  appearing  before  Arta- 
phernes, laid  before  him  the  whole  state  of  the  case,  and  urged 
every  available  argument  to  dissuade  the  Persian  king  from  inter- 
fering in  the  affairs  of  the  Western  Greeks.  The  answer  of 
Artaphernes  (and  we  cannot  suppose  that  it  was  given  without 
the  full  sanction  of  Dareios)  charged  the  Athenians,  if  they  valued 
their  safety,  to  receive  Hippias  again  as  their  tyrant.  The  Athe- 
nians retorted  by  a  ilat  refusal,  and  interpreting  the  words  of 
Artaphernes  as  a  practical  declaration  of  war'  were  induced  to 
aid  Aristagoras  with  a  force  of  twenty  ships,  which  Herodotos 
regarded  as  a  beginning  of  evils  both  to  the  barbarians  and  to  the 
Greeks.*  Yet  these  are  the  people  of  whom  Dareios,  on  hearing 
of  the  burning  of  Sardeis  with  the  temple  of  Kybcbe,  speaks  as 
though  he  had  never  so  much  as  heard  their  name.  This  is  a 
sample  of  the  details  which  form  the  greater  part  of  the  narrative 
of  the  Ionic  revolt,  and  furnishes  a  measure  of  their  general  trust- 
^  Herod,  v.  105.  details   are    uncertain  when    tlipy 

^  See  page  96.  come  from  Hellenic  sources,   :iiiil 

^  Herod.  V.  96.     It  is  in  these  iu-     perliaps  altofretlier  unti'iistwo!  ihy 
cidental  remarks  tlitit  we  liave  the     when  the  informants  are  Persians, 
real  history  of  the  time,  lor  even  in         ^  Herod,  v.  96. 
the  narrative  of  the  Ionic  revolt  the 


136  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  11. 

worthiness.  In  short,  these  details  are  essentially  dramatic,  not 
historical. 

For  the  Ionic  revolt,  as  in  the  earlier  portions  of  the  history, 
tiie  Traditional  narrative  mnst  be  given  in  its  integrity.  In  no 
The  schemes  other  way  can  we  hope  to  determine  the  degree  of 
ras^'f  Mlfe°-"  ^^'^^^t  which  may  be  placed  in  it.  The  story  takes  us 
tos.  back  to  the  time  when  Dareios,  having  recrossed  the 

Danube,  rewaixled  his  supposed  benefactors  Koes  and  Ilistiaios, 
and  Megabazos  found  his  way  to  Sardeis  with  the  Paionians  whom 
he  was  charged  to  transport  into  Asia.  This  general  carried  with 
him  the  tidings  that  Histiaios  was  busily  occupied  in  fortifying 
Myrkinos,  and  warned  Dareios  of  the  great  imprudence  of  allowing 
him  to  establish  there  a  power  which  might  become  formidable 
even  to  the  great  king.  Unless  the  enterprise  were  nipped  in  the 
bud,  the  Greeks  and  barbarians  round  about  the  city  Avould  take 
Ilistiaios  for  a  chief  and  do  his  will  by  day  and  by  night.  If 
therefore  war  was  to  be  avoided,  Histiaios  must  be  removed  be- 
yond the  reach  of  temptation.  So  a  messenger  was  sent  to 
Myrkinos  with  a  letter  in  whicli  Dareios  told  him  that  he  needed 
the  help  of  his  counsel  forthwith  at  Sardeis.  Thither  Ilistiaios 
hastened,  delighted  Avith  a  summons  whicli  proved  his  importance, 
and  Avas  received  by  Dareios  with  the  bland  assurance  that  there  is 
nothing  more  precious  than  a  wise  and  kind  friend.  '  Tliis,  I  know, 
thou  art  to  me,'  added  the  king,  '  for  I  have  learnt  it  not  by  thy 
words,  but  by  thy  deeds.  So  now  thou  must  leave  Miletos  and  thy 
Tlirakian  city,  and  come  with  me  to  Sousa.'  But  although  Ilistiaios 
was  thus  carried  into  splendid  captivity,  the  causes  of  disquiet 
were  not  removed,  for  either  he  or  the  king  had  placed  the  gov- 
ernment of  Miletos  in  the  hands  of  Aristagoras,  a  nephew  of  His- 
^  tiaios  ;  and  the  help  of  Aristagoras  was  now  sought  by 

some  oligarchic  exiles  from  Naxos.  But  althougli  Arista- 
goras would  gladly  have  made  himself  master  of  Naxos  and  of  the 
large  group  to  which  it  belonged,  he  felt  that  his  own  power  alone 
could  not  achieve  the  task,  and  lie  told  them  that  they  must  have 
the  help  of  Ai-taphernes,  the  brother  of  tlie  great  king.  The  exiles 
in  their  turn  besought  him  to  stint  nothing  in  promises.  They 
would  pay  him  well  for  his  aid  and  would  further  take  on  them- 
selves the  cost  of  the  expedition.  To  Artaphernes,  therefore, 
Aristagoras  held  out,  with  these  inducements,  the  further  bait 
that  the  conquest  of  Naxos  would  bring  Avith  it  the  possession  of 
Paros,  Andros,  and  the  other  islands  known  as  the  Kyklades,  and 
probably  of  the  large  and  wealthy  island  of  Euboin,  which  would 
give  him  the  conunand  of  a  large  portion  of  the  Boiotian  and 
Attic  coast.  One  hundred  ships,  he  said,  would  amply  suffice  for 
the  enterprise  ;    but  Artaphernes,  expressing  a  hearty  assent  to 


Chap.  III.J  THE   IONIC  REVOLT.  137 

the  plan,  promised  liiin  two  Imndrod,  while  Davcios,  -when  the  re- 
port of  Artaphernes  was  laid  before  him,  expressed  his  full  ap- 
proval of  the  scheme.  The  general  appointed  to  command  the 
expedition  was  Megabatcs,  a  cousin  of  Dareios  and  Artaphernes, 
who,  sailing  with  the  ileetfrom  Miletos  professedly  for  the  Helles- 
pont, stopped  at  the  Kaukasian  promontory  of  Chios  that  he 
might  sail  down  on  Naxos  with  a  north  wind.  But  it  had  been 
destined,  adds  the  historian,  that  the  Naxians  should  not  be  de- 
stroyed by  the  army  under  Megabates  and  Aristagoras.  That  night, 
as  it  so  happened,  no  watch  was  kept  on  board  a  Myndiau  vessel ; 
and  Megabates  in  his  anger  ordered  Skylax  the  captain  of  the 
ship  to  be  placed  in  one  of  the  oar-holes  with  his  head  hanging 
out  over  the  water.  To  the  prayer  of  Aristagoras  that  he  would 
release  liis  friend  Megabates  would  not  listen.  Aristagoras  there- 
fore released  the  man  himself  ;  and  when  the  Persian  on  learning 
this  became  even  more  vehement,  Aristagoras  told  him  that  Arta- 
phernes had  sent  him  as  a  subordinate,  not  as  a  master.  Mega- 
bates made  no  reply  ;  but  as  soon  as  it  was  dark,  he  sent  a  vessel 
to  warn  the  Naxians  of  their  peril  and  to  acquaint  them  with  all 
that  had  happened.  The  result  was  that,  when  the  fleet  approached 
the  island,  the  Naxians  were  well  prepared.  Four  months  passed 
away.  The  money  which  Megabates  and  Aristagoras  had  brought 
was  all  spent,  and  the  Naxians  were  not  subdued.  Aristagoras 
further  suspected  that  Megabates  meant  to  deprive  him  of  his 
power  at  Miletos ;  and  the  result  of  his  deliberations  was  a  deter- 
mination to  revolt,  in  which  he  was  confirmed,  it  is  said,  by  a  mes- 
sage which  at  this  time  he  chanced  to  receive  from  Histiaios. 
This  man,  it  seems,  like  Demokedes,  was  ready  to  sacrifice  his 
country  and  his  friends,  if  only  he  might  win  what  he  called  his 
freedom.  Having-  shaved  the  head  of  his  most  trusty  servant,  he 
tattooed  a  message  upon  it,  and  then  having  kept  him  till  his  hair 
was  again  grown,  he  sent  him  to  Miletos,  with  the  simple  charge 
that  Aristagoras  should  shave  his  head  and  look  at  it.  Aristagoras 
there  read  advice  which  jumped  with  his  own  conclusions,  and 
made  up  his  mind  to  begin  the  revolt  which  Histiaios  hoped  that 
he  might  be  sent  downi  to  suppress. 

In  the  council  which  Aristagoras  tlicn  convoked  the  logographer 
Hekataios  warned  them  that  they  could  not  expect  to  cope  with 
the  Persian  power,  but  that,  if  they  resolved  to  run 
ths  risk,  they  should  at  the   least  take  care  that  they   sionof  Aris- 
had  the  command  of  the  sea.     He  further  urged  them    sp^;,7Ja",i'ncl 
to  seize  the  vast  wealth  of  the  oracle  at  Branchidai,  if   at  Athens. 
only  to  make  sure  that  these  resources  should  not  fall      ~^-'--^- 
into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.     His  advice  was  rejected  ;  but  a 
ship  was  sent   to  Myous,  where  the  army  was  encamped  on  its 


138  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH   PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

return  from  Naxos,  -witli  orders  to  seize  on  sncli  of  tlie  Hellenic 
tyrants  as  might  be  found  there.  Among  the  despots  thus  seized 
were  Aristagoras  of  Kyme  and  the  more  notorious  Koes  of  Myti- 
lene.  These  Avcre  all  given  up  to  the  people  of  their  respective 
cities  by  Aristagoras,  who,  in  name  at  least,  surrendered  his  own 
power  at  Miletos,  in  order  to  insure  greater  harmony  and  enthu- 
siasm in  the  conduct  of  the  enterprise.  Aristagoras  of  Kyme  and 
the  rest  were  allowed  by  their  former  subjects  to  depart  unhurt, 
the  only  exception  being  Koes,  who  was  stoned  to  death.  Thus 
having  put  down  the  tyrants  and  ordered  the  citizens  of  the  towns 
to  choose  each  their  own  Strategos  or  general,  the  -Milesian  Aris- 
tagoras sailed  away  in  the  hope  of  getting  help  from  Sparta,  bear- 
ing with  him  a  brazen  tablet  on  Avhicli  was  drawn  a  map  of  the 
world,  as  then  known.  Having  reached  Sparta,  he  pleaded  his 
cause  earnestly  before  king  Kleomenes.  He  dwelt  on  the  slavery 
of  the  Asiatic  Greeks  as  a  disgrace  to  the  city  whi(;li  had  risen  to 
the  headship  of  Hellas,  and  on  the  wealth  as  well  as  the  glory 
which  with  little  trouble  and  risk  they  could  assuredly  win.  The 
trousered  and  turbaned  Persians  who  fought  with  bows  and 
javelins  it  would  be  no  specially  hard  task  to  vaiiquish  ;  and  the 
whole  land  from  Sardeis  to  Sousa  would  then  be  for  the  Spartans 
one  continuous  mine  of  Avealth.  The  picture  was  tempting  ;  but 
when  Aristagoras  appeared  again  on  the  third  day  to  receive  the 
final  answer,  he  was  asked  how  far  it  might  be  from  the  coast  to 
Sousa.  '  A  three  months'  journey,'  said  the  unlucky  Aristagoras, 
who  was  going  on  to  show  how  easily  it  might  be  accomplished,' 
when  Kleomenes  bade  him  leave  Sparta  before  the  sun  went  down. 
There  seemed  to  be  yet  one  last  hope.  AVith  a  suppliant's  branch 
Aristagoras  went  to  the  house  of  Kleomenes.  Finding  him  with 
his  daughter  Gorgo,  the  future  wife  of  the  far-famed  Leonidas,  ho 
asked  that  the  child,  then  eight  or  nine  years  old,  should  be  sent 
away.  The  king  bade  him  say  what  he  wished  in  lier  presence ; 
and  the  Milesian,  beginning  with  a  protfcr  of  ten  talents,  had 
raised  the  bribe  to  a  sum  of  fifty  talents,  when  the  child  cried  out 
'  Father,  the  stranger  will  corrupt  you,  if  you  do  not  go  away. 
Kleomenes  rose  up  and  went  into  another  house  ;  and  Aristagoras, 
leaving  Sparta  with  the  story  of  tlie  easy  march  from  Sardeis  to 
Sousa  untold,"  hastened  to  Atliens.  Here  to  his  glowing  descrip^ 
tions  he  added  the  plea  that  Miletos  was  a  colony  from  Athens 
and  that  to  help  the  Milesians  was  a  clear  duty.     The  historian 

'  A  fi'at  perhaps  even  more  bazar-  tlian  in  the  reality.     Tliere  was  an 

(lous  was,  as  we  shall  see,  actually  excellent  road   the  whole  way,  of 

nchieved  in  the  march  of  the  Ten  which  Herodotos  (v.  52— 54)  {rives  a 

Thousand  with  Xenophon.  niinnteaccount,  with  the  number  of 

'^  In  fact,  the  difficulties  lay  rather  the  stages, 
in  the  imagiDation  of  the  Spartans 


Chap.  III.]  THE   IONIC   REVOLT.  130 

remarks  that  Aristagoras  found  it  easier  to  deceiv^e  thirty  thousand 
Athenian  citizens  tlian  a  soUtary  Sjiartan,  for  the  Athenians  at 
once  promised  to  send  twenty  ships  under  the  command  of  Mehm- 
thios.  But  he  forgot  that  the  circumstances  of  the  two  cities 
were  widely  different.  Athens  was  ah-eady  virtually  at  war  with 
Persia  ;  and  in  pledging  themselves  to  help  Aristagoras,  the  Athe- 
nians were  entering  on  a  course  which  after  a  severe  struggle 
secured  to  them  abundant  wealth  and  a  brilliant  empire. 

At  last  Aristagoras  reached  Miletos  with  the  twenty  Athenian 
ships  and  five  sent  by  the  Eretrians.  There  he  set  in  order  an 
expedition  to  Sardeis,  which  was  occupied  witliout  The  burning 
any  resistance,  Artaphernes  being  unable  to  do  more  °^  sardeis. 
than  hold  the  Akropolis  ;  but  the  accidental  burning  of  a  hut  (the 
Sardian  houses  were  built  wholly  of  reeds  or  had  reed  roofs)  caused 
a  conflagration  which  so  terrified  all  the  Lydians  and  Persians  that 
they  rushed  with  frantic  eagerness  to  the  Agora.  The  Athenians, 
fearing  to  be  overborne  by  mere  numbers,  retreated  to  the  lieights 
of  Tmolos,  and  as  soon  as  it  was  dark  hastened  away  to  their 
ships.  The  fire  at  Sardeis  by  destroying  the  temple  of  Kybebe 
furnished,  it  is  said,  an  excuse  for  the  deliberate  destruction  of  the 
temples  in  Western  Hellas  by  the  army  of  Xerxes. 

The  revolt  now  assumed  a  more  serious  character  in  spite  of  the 
desertion  of  the  Athenians.  The  lonians  sailing  to  the  Hellespont, 
prevailed  on  the  citizens  of  Byzantion  and  the  neigh-  Extension 
boring  towns  to  take  part  in  the  revolt.  The  Karians  tfl^Bvzantixin 
for  the  most  part  also  joined,  and  even  the  Kaunians  and  Kaiia. 
threw  in  their  lot  with  them  when  they  heard  of  the  burning 
of  Sardeis.  Still  more  important  was  the  adhesion  of  Kyi)ros 
(Cyprus),  in  which  large  and  wealthy  island  the  city  of  Amathous 
alone  remained  faithful  to  the  Persians. 

The  tidings  of  these  events,  so  the  story  runs,  roused  the  ve- 
hement indignation  of  Dareios,  who,  sending  for  Histiaios,  frankly 
expressed  his  strono;  suspicion  that  his  old  friend  had  ^,       .   . 

11         1         1    •         I        7       •  TkT       1       •  1    TT-     •    •  Tlie  mission 

had  a  hand  m  the  business.  iNay,  said  Histiaios,  of  Histiaios 
'had  I  been  in  Ionia,  these  things  would  never  have  i^" '^^^''^^is. 
happened,  if  they  have  happened  at  all  ;  and  even  now  I  pledge 
myself,  if  thou  wilt  let  me  go  thither,  to  bring  this  revolt  to  an 
end.'  '  Be  it  so,'  answered  Dareios  ;  '  but  be  sure,  when  thou  hast 
done  thy  work,  to  come  back  to  nic  here  at  Sousa.'  So  Histiaios 
departed  on  his  errand. 

Meanwhile  the  Kyprians  with  their  allies  now  made  ready  for 
the  great  struggle  with  their  anatagonists  ;  but  they   ,j,^g  ^^.^.^ju 
were  completely  defeated,  and  from  this  time  the  his-   of  Kypms 
tory  of  the  Ionian  revolt  is  little  more  than  a  chronicle 
of  disasters.    From  Sardeis  the  lonians  were  driven  to  their  ships 


140  THE  STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

by  the  Persian  generals,  who  advancing  thence  towards  the 
Hellespont,  took  the  five  cities  of  Dardanos,  Abydos,  Perkote, 
Lampsakos,  and  Paisos,  it  is  said,  in  as  many  days,  and  were  on 
their  way  to  Parion,  when  tidings  came  that  the  Karians  had 
broken  out  into  rebellion.  They  at  once  turned  their  arms  south- 
wards ;  but  the  news  of  their  approach  reached  the  Karians  early 
enough  to  enable  them  to  take  up  a  strong  position  at  the  White 
Pillars  (Leukai  Stelai)  on  the  banks  of  the  Marsyas,  a  tributary 
of  the  Maiandros.  In  the  ensuing  battle  the  Karians  were  borne 
down  by  mere  numbers.  The  survivors  flying  to  Labranda,  a 
temple  of  Zeus  the  Lord  of  Armies  (Stratios),  were  there  besieged, 
and  were  holding  counsel  on  the  prudence  of  yielding  or  of  aban- 
doning Asia,  when  the  an'ival  of  the  Milesians  and  their  allies 
made  them  resolve  on  renewing  the  struggle.  The  result  was  a 
defeat  more  terrible  than  that  which  they  had  already  undergone, 
the  Milesians  being  the  greatest  sufferers.  But  the  Karian  spirit 
was  not  yet  broken.  Having  heard  that  the  Persians  were  about 
to  plunder  their  cities  one  by  one,  they  lay  in  ambush,  and  cut  off, 
seemingly,  the  whole  Persian  force  with  Daurises,  Amorges,  and 
Sisimakes  at  its  head. 

This  catastrophe  had  no  influence  on  the  general  issue  of  the 
revolt.  Tlie  golden  visions  of  Aristagoras  had  now  given  way  to 
The  death  of  the  simple  desire  of  securing  his  own  safety,  and  he 
Aristagoras.  hastened  to  suggest  to  the  allies  that  they  ought  to  be 
ready,  in  case  of  expulsion  from  Miletos,  Avith  a  place  of  refuge 
whether  at  Myrkinos  or  in  Sardo  (Sardinia).  His  own  mind  was 
really  made  up  before  he  summoned  the  council.  Leaving  Py- 
thagoras in  command  of  the  city,  he  sailed  to  Myrkinos,  of  which 
he  succeeded  in  taking  possession.  Soon  after,  he  attacked  and 
besieged  a  Thi'akian  town,  but  was  surprised  and  slain  with  all 
his  forces. 

The  career  of  Histiaios  was  brought  to  an  end  not  long  after 
tlie  death  of  his  nepliew.  The  narrative  reads  like  a  wild  and 
perplexing  romance  ;  and  if  it  represents  actual  fact, 
and  death  of  it  assuredly  illustrates  the  adage  that  truth  may  be 
Histiaios.  stranger  than  fiction.  On  reaching  Sardeis  Histiaios 
appeared  before  Ailaphernes  in  seeming  ignorance  of  all  that  had 
liappened  during  his  stay  in  Sousa.  '  It  is  just  this,'  said  Arta- 
phernes  bluntly  ;  '  you  stitched  the  slipper,  and  Aristagoras  put  it 
on.'  Ilistiaos  took  the  hint  thus  broadly  given,  and  making  his 
escape  to  Chios  was  seized  by  the  Chians  who,  however,  gave  him 
his  freedom  when  they  learnt  that  he  had  come  to  fight  against 
Dareios,  not  for  him.  His  next  step  was  to  send  by  Hermippos 
of  Atarneus  to  the  Persians  in  Sardeis  letters  which  spoke  of  a 
plan   for   revolt   ah-cady   concerted  between    them  and  himself. 


Chap.  III.]  THE   IONIC   REVOLT.  141 

Hermippos  carried  the  letters  straight  to  Aitaphernes,  who  told 
him  to  give  them  to  the  persons  to  whom  they  were  addressed  and 
to  bring  him  the  answers.  These,  we  are  told,  were  of  sucli  a 
nature  that  Artaphernes  ordered  many  Persians  to  be  executed. 
From  Chios  Histiaios  was  at  his  own  wish  conveyed  to  Miletos ; 
but  the  Milesians,  well  pleased  to  be  rid  of  Aristagoras,  had  no 
notion  of  submitting  to  their  old  master.  It  was  night  when 
Histiaios  tried  to  force  his  way  into  the  city,  and  in  the  scuffle  he 
received  a  wound  in  the  thigh.  It  was  clearly  necessary  to  try 
some  other  course.  His  request  for  ships  was  refused  by  the 
Chians ;  but  he  succeeded  in  persuading  the  Lesbians  to  man  eight 
triremes  and  sail  under  his  command  to  Byzantion,  where  he  seized 
all  Ionian  ships  entering  from  the  Black  Sea  except  such  as  were 
at  once  surrendered  to  hira.  Here  he  remained  until  he  received 
tidings  of  the  last  and  crowning  disaster  to  the  Ionian  cause  in 
the  fall  of  Miletos ;  and  leaving  Bisaltes  of  Abydos  in  charge  of 
matters  at  the  Hellespont,  he  sailed  to  Chios,  where  he  seized 
Polichna.  From  Chios  he  sailed  with  a  large  force,  it  is  said,  of 
lonians  and  Aiolians  to  Thasos,  attracted  possibly  by  its  neigh- 
borhood to  his  old  haunts  at  Myrkinos  ;  but  abandoning  the  siege 
of  the  island  on  hearing  that  the  Phenician  fleet  was  advancing 
from  Miletos,  he  hastened  back  to  Lesbos,  whence  he  crossed  over 
to  Atarncus  to  reap  the  standing  corn  for  his  army  which  was 
now  starving.  Here  he  was  surprised  by  a  troop  of  cavalry  under 
Harpagos,  and  being  overtaken  in  his  flight  he  confessed  to  the 
man  who  was  going  to  kill  him  that  he  was  Histiaios  of  Miletos. 
His  motive  in  thus  surrendering  himself  was,  it  is  said,  the  hope 
that  he  would  easily  be  able  to  make  his  peace  with  Dareios; 
but  Harpagos,  determined  that  he  should  never  have  the  oppor- 
tunity, ordered  him  to  be  crucified,  and  sent  his  head  to  Sousa, 
where  Dareios,  upbraiding  those  who  had  put  him  to  death, 
gave  charge  that  it  should  be  washed  and  buried  as  the  head  of 
a  man  who  had  been  a  great  benefactor  to  himself  and  to  the 
Persians. 

The  hopes  of  the  lonians  now  rested  on  their  fleet.  It  was  de- 
cided therefore  at  Panionion  that  no  attempt  should  be  made  to  op- 
pose the  Persian  land  forces,  and  that  the  Milesians  Tj^gj^^ij^^ 
should  be  left  to  defend  their  walls  against  the  be-  fleet  at  Lade, 
siegers,  while  the  ships  should  assemble  at  Lade,  then  an  island  off 
the  Milesian  promontory  to  which  by  an  accumulation  of  sand  it  is 
now  attached.  But  even  these  resolutions  take  it  for  granted  that 
the  whole  force  of  the  Persians  would  be  concentrated  on  the 
blockade  of  Miletos,  or  at  least  that  the  other  towns  had  nothing 
to  fear  from  such  attacks  as  might  be  made  on  them.  Yet  of  these 
towns  Myous  and  Priene  were  but  a  few  miles  distant  from  Mile- 


14-2  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

tos ;  and  nothing  within  past  experience  of  Persian  generalship 
warranted  the  hope  that  the  Hellenic  cities  would  only  be  attacked 
in  succession.  But  if  the  lonians  were  afraid  of  the  land  forces 
opposed  to  thera,  the  Persians  seem  to  have  been  scarcely  less  afraid 
of  the  Hellenic  fleet,  although  they  had  little  reason  to  shrink  from 
a  comparison  of  their  Phenician  seamen  with  the  Asiatic  Greeks. 
This  want  of  confidence  in  themselves  led  them,  it  is  said,  to  resort 
to  a  policy  wdiich  might  cause  division  and  disunion  among  their 
adversaries.  The  Greek  tyrants,  who  were  allowed  to  go  free  by 
their  former  subjects  when  the  Mytilenaian  Koes  was  stoned  to 
death,  were  instructed  to  tell  them  that  immediate  submission 
would  be  rewarded  not  only  by  a  full  amnesty  but  by  a  pledge  that 
they  should  not  be  called  on  to  endure  any  burdens  heavier  than 
those  which  had  already  been  laid  upon  them,  but  if  they  should 
carry  their  resistance  so  far  as  to  shed  Persian  blood  in  battle,  the 
punishment  which  defeat  would  bring  upon  them  would  be  terrible 
indeed.  These  profEers  were  conveyed  to  the  Greek  cities  by  mes- 
sengers who  entered  them  by  night ;  and  the  citizens  of  each  town, 
thinking,  it  is  said,  that  the  overtures  were  made  to  themselves 
alone,  returned  a  positive  refusal.  For  a  time  the  debates  at  Lade 
took  another  turn.  The  remnant  of  the  Phokaians,  who  in  viola- 
tion of  an  awful  oath  came  back  to  their  old  city  while  their  kins- 
folk sailed  on  their  ill-omened  voyage  to  Alalia,  were  brave  enough 
or  faithless  enough  to  rise  once  more  against  their  Persian  masters  ; 
and  their  general  Dionysios  now  came  forward  to  give  his  advice. 
Warning  the  lonians  that  the  issue  whether  of  slavery  or  of  free- 
dom hung  on  a  razor's  edge,  he  told  them  that  they  could  not  hope 
to  escape  the  punishment  of  runaway  slaves,  unless  they  had  spirit 
enough  to  bear  with  present  hardship  for  the  sake  of  future  ease ; 
but  at  the  same  time  he  pledged  himself  that  if  they  Avould  sub- 
mit to  his  direction,  he  would  insure  to  them  a  complete  victory. 
Their  acceptance  of  his  prosposal  was  followed  by  constant  and  sys- 
tematic manoeuvring  of  the  fleet,  while,  after  the  daily  drill  was 
over,  the  crews,  instead  of  lounging  and  sleeping  in  their  tents  on 
the  shore,  were  compelled  to  remain  on  board  their  ships  which 
were  anchored.  For  seven  days  they  endured  this  terrible  tax  on 
tlicir  patience  ;  but  at  the  end  of  the  week  Ionian  nature  could 
hold  out  no  longer.  Many  were  already  sick  ;  many  more  were 
threatened  with  illness.  In  short,  rather  than  submit  to  be  thus 
handled  by  an  upstart  Phokaian  who  had  brought  only  three 
ships,  they  would  gladly  take  their  chances  in  I'ersian  slavery, 
whatever  this  might  be.  What  these  would  be,  unless  they  sub- 
mitted before  fighting,  they  had  according  to  the  story  been  dis- 
tinctly informed.  Their  grown  men  were  to  be  slain,  their  boys 
made  eunuchs  and  with  the  women  carried  away  into  Persia,  while 


Chap.  III.]  THE  IONIC   REVOLT.  143 

tlieir  cities  should  be  given  to  strangers.  But  tl;eir  object  was 
not,  it  seems,  immediate  submission.  They  were  quite  ready  to 
light,  when  the  time  for  fighting  sliould  be  come  ;  but,  rather  than 
take  any  trouble  to  secure  success,  they  would  prefer  death,  muti- 
lation, or  everlasting  banishment.  In  short,  the  two  stories  ex- 
clude each  other,  and  come  from  two  dilferent  sources.  The  one 
was  apparently  framed  in  the  interests  of  the  expelled  tyrants  by 
their  partisans  :  the  second  certainly  is  a  tale  devised  to  account 
for  the  disastrous  issue  of  the  revolt. 

Of  the  details  of  the  battle  which  decided  the  issue  of  the  revolt 
Herodotos  admits  that  he  knows  practically  nothing.'  That  in 
spite  of  its  confusion  and  inconsistencies  the  narrative  Tiie  battle  of 
points  ti>  an  astonishing  lack  of  coherence  among  the  J^f(ff,',n"f 
confederates,  we  cannot  doubt.  Almost  everywhere  Miietos. 
we  see  a  selfish  isolation,  of  which  distrust  and  treachery  arc  the 
natural  fruits  :  but,  as  in  the  intrigues  of  Ilippias  we  have  a  real 
cause  for  Persian  interference  in  Western  Greece  which  makes  the 
story  of  Demokedes  utterly  superfluous,  so  in  this  selfishness  and 
obstinacy  of  the  Asiatic  Greeks  we  have  an  explanation  of  the 
catastrophe  to  which  the  episode  of  the  Phokaian  Dionysios  fails  to 
impart  either  force  or  clearness.  The  outlines  suffice  at  least  to 
show  that  the  brief  splendor  of  the  Tonic  revolt  was  closing  iu 
darkness  and  disaster.  The  fate  of  the  revolt  was  sealed  by  the 
partisans  of  the  banished  despots  ;  and  Dionysios  determined  to 
quit  his  country  for  ever.  With  three  war-ships  which  he  took 
from  the  enemy,  he  sailed  straight  to  Phenicia  ;  and,  if  the  tale  be 
true,  he  must  liave  swooped  down  on  some  unguarded  or  weak 
port,  for,  having  sunk  some  merchant-vessels,  he  sailed  with  a  large 
booty  to  Sicily.  Here  he  turned  pirate,  imposing  on  himself  the 
condition  that  his  pillage  should  be  got  from  the  Carthaginians  and 
Tyrrhenians  and  not  from  the  Italiot  or  Sikeliot  Greeks.  The  dis- 
persion and  ruin  of  the  Ionic  fleet  left  Miietos  exposed  to  blockade 
by  sea  as  well  as  by  land.  The  Persians  now  set  vigorously  to 
work,  undermining  the  walls  and  bringing  all  kind^  of  engines  to 
bear  upon  them ;  and  at  last,  in  the  sixth  year  after  the  outbreak 
of  the  revolt  under  Aristagoras,^  the  great  city  fell.  .^^^  ,„ 
The  historian  adds  that  the  grown  men  were  for  the 
most  part  slain  ;  that  the  rest  of  the  inhabitants  were  carried  away 
to  Sousa ;  and  that  Miietos  with  the  plain  surrounding  it  was  oc- 
cupied by  Persians,  while  the   neigliboring  highlands  were  given 

'  Herod,  vi.  14.  gorasandthedestructionof  hiscity: 

^  This  date,  the  only  definite  in-  but  while  the  chronology  of  earlier 

dication  of  time  iu  the  narrative  of  and  later  events  remains  uncertain, 

the  Ionic  revolt,  may  be  regarded  as  we  can  scarcely  say  more  than  that 

representing  accurately  the  inter-  the  fall  of  Miietos  may  probably  be 

val  between  the  rebellion  of  Arista-  assigned  to  the  year  496-5  B.C. 


144  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH   PERSIA.  [Book  n„ 

to  IvHrians  from  the  town  of  Pedasa.  The  picture  is  overcolored, 
unless  we  suppose  that  new  Greek  inhabitants  were  afterwards  ad- 
mitted into  the  city,  for,  although  its  greatness  was  gone  for  ever, 
Miletos  continued  to  be,  as  it  had  been,  Hellenic. 

The  Persian  operations  of  the  following  year  were  directed 
against  the  islands.  Chios,  Lesbos,  andTenedos  were  taken  ;  and, 
Third  con-  if  we  choose  to  believe  the  story,  the  Persians,  holding 
?oula.  hand  to  hand  and  without  even   breaking  their  order, 

495  B.C.  (?)  went  from  one  end  of  each  island  to  the  other,  caring 
for  no  hindrances  of  mountains,  precipices,  torrents  and  streams, 
and  sweepirig  oii  every  living  thing  that  came  in  their  way.  This 
pleasant  pastime  of  netting  human  beings  Herodotos'  for  some  not 
very  obvious  reason  pronounces  impracticable  on  the  mainland  ; 
and  hence  the  Hellenes  of  the  Asiatic  continent  escaped  th^  fate 
of  their  insular  kinsfolk.  Thus  was  brought  about  that  which 
Herodotos  speaks  of  as  the  third  conquest  of  Ionia. 

From  the  conquest  of  the  Ionic  cities  the  Persian  fleet  sailed 
on  against  the  towns  on  the  northern  shores  of  the  Helle^pont. 
Plight  of  ^^^  towns  on  its  Asiatic  shore  had  already  been  rc- 
Miftiades  to  duced  by  Dauriscs  and  other  I'ersian  generals  f  and 
the  subjugation  of  the  European  cities  was  apparently 
no  hard  task.  Perinthos,  Selymbria,  and  the  forts  on  the  Thrakian 
march,  were  at  once  surrendered,  while  the  inhabitants  of  Byzan- 
tion  and  of  Chalkedon  on  the  opposite  Asiatic  promontory  fled 
hastily  away  and  founded  the  city  of  Messembia  on  the  Euxine 
sea.^  The  deserted  towns,  we  are  told,  were  burnt  to  the  ground  * 
by  the  Phenicians,  who  also  destroyed  in  like  manner  the  cities 
of  Prokonnesos  and  Artake  and  took  all  the  towns  of  the  Cher- 
soncsos  except  Kardia.  Here  the  future  victor  of  Maratlion 
lingered,  until  he  heard  that  the  Phenicians  were  at  Tcnedos, 
when  witli  five  ships  loaded  with  his  goods  he  set  sail  for  Athens. 

When,  some  years  earlier,  the  Hellenic  colony  of  Sybaris  had 
been  conquered  by  the  men  of  Kroton,  the  men  of  Miletos  had 
The  punish-  shaved  their  heads  in  token  of  their  mourning.  Milc- 
Ph"vn?chos  **^^  itself  was  a  city  built  by  colonists  whom  the  Ko- 
495  B.C.  (?)  drid  Neileus  had,  it  is  said,  brought  from  Athens  :  but 
the  great  disaster  which  had  now  befallen  it  called  forth  no  such 
signs  of  sori'ow  on  the  part  of  the  Athenians.  The  drama  in  which 
Phrynichos  exhibited  the  terrible  scenes  which  accompanied  its 

'  vi.  31.  this  tiinetheymay  have  undergone. 

^  Herod,  v.  117,  123.  *  KaraKavaavrec.      Herod,  vi.  38. 

^  Herod,  vi.  33.  It  is  not  easy  to  This  word  also  must  be  probably 
receive  without  stron<;  qualification  taken  in  a  very  modified  sense.  Ky- 
Buch  statements  about  cities  wliich  zikos,  we  are  told,  had  already  sub- 
unquestionably  remained  Hellenic  mitted  to  Oibares,  the  satrap  of 
iu  spite  of  the  disasters  which  at  Daskyleiou, 


Chap.  IV.]         THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  MARATHON.  145 

downfall  brought  involuntary  tears  to  the  eyes  of  the  audience  ; 
but  his  only  recompense,  we  are  told,  was  a  fine  of  a  thousand 
drachmas  for  daring  to  remind  them  of  calamities  which  touched 
them  so  closely,  and  a  decree  that  the  play  should  never  be  acted 
again.  Had  this  drama  been  preserved,  it  might  possibly  have 
explained  the  reason  for  that  abandoment  of  the  Ionic  cause  by 
the  Athenians  which  may  have  been  forced  on  them  by  the  feuds 
and  factions  of  the  allies.  It  might  also  have  taught  lis  the  nature 
of  those  evils  or  misfortunes,  the  remembrance  of  which  so  stung 
the  Athenian  hearers  of  Phrynichos.  Although  the  subjects  of 
tragedy  had  hitherto  been  chosen  mainly,  if  not  altogether,  from 
the  old  legends  or  theogonies,  it  may  be  doubted  whether  their 
resentment  was  caused  by  any  effort  on  the  part  of  the  poet  to  in- 
terest his  audience  in  Persian  success  and  Grecian  suffering  as 
such  or  by  any  dread  of  similar  disasters  for  themselves,  so  much 
as  by  the  intimation  that  they  were  in  reality  chargeable  with 
the  ruin  of  the  most  illustrious  of  their  own  colonies.  Apart  from 
this  consciousness  of  their  guilt  or  weakness,  the  picture  of  Hel- 
lenic misfortunes  could  have  roused  in  them  only  a  more  strenuous 
patriotism,  and  stirred  them  under  disappointment  or  defeat  with 
an  enthusiasm  not  less  deep,  although  more  grave,  than  that  with 
which,  after  the  victory  at  Salamis,  they  drank  in  the  words  of 
-^schylos. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE    INVASION    OF    THRACE    BY    MARDONIOS    AND    THE    BATTLE 
OF    MARATHON. 

The  threats  of  terrible  vengeance  by  which  it  is  said  that  the  Per- 
sians sought  to  chill  the  courage  of  the  Asiatic  Greeks  might  have 
prepared  us  for  a  long  tale  of  wanton  cruelty  and  op-  Administra- 
pression.  But  after  the  complete  subjugation  of  the  p^eme^^'**" 
country  the  scene  is  suddenly  changed;  and  the  Sar-  Asia  Minor, 
dian  satrap  Artaphernes  comes  before  us  as  an  administrator  en- 
gaged in  placing  on  a  permanent  footing  the  relations  of  these 
Greeks  with  their  masters.  If  the  materials  with  which  he  had 
to  deal  had  been  of  a  different  kind,  if  the  lonians  of  Asia  Minor 
had  had  any  of  that  capacity  for  establishing  an  empire  on  the 
basis  of  self-government  which  marked  their  western  kinsfolk,  he 
might  have  deserved  blame  rather  than  praise  for  striking  at  the 
root  of  the  evils  which  had  nipped  in  the  bud  the  political  growth 
7  


146  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  IL 

of  the  Asiatic  Greeks.  By  compelling  them  to  lay  aside  their  in- 
cessant feuds  and  bickerings,  and  to  obey,  if  not  a  national,  yet 
an  interpolilical  law  whicli  should  put  an  end  to  acts  of  violence 
and  pillage  between  the  Hellenic  cities,  he  was  inforcing  changes 
which  would  soon  have  made  men  of  a  temper  really  fonnidable 
to  the  king,  and  which  in  any  case  must  be  regarded  as  avast  im- 
provement of  tlieir  condition.*  These  changes,  the  historian  re- 
marks significantly,  he  compelled  them  to  adopt,  whether  they 
willed  to  do  so  or  not,  while,  after  having  the  Avhole  country  sur- 
veyed, he  also  imposed  on  each  that  assessment  of  tribute  which, 
Avhether  paid  or  not,  (and  we  shall  find  that  for  nearly  seventy  years 
it  was  not  paid)  remained  on  the  king'sbooksas  the  legal  obligation 
of  the  Asiatic  Greeks,  until  the  Persian  empire  itself  fell  before 
the  victorious  arms  of  the  Makedoniau  Alexander,  As  the 
amount  of  this  assessment  was  much  wliat  it  had  been  before  the 
revolt,  the  Persians  cannot  be  charged  with  adding  to  their  hnv- 
dens  by  Avay  of  retaliation. 

Still  more  remarkable,  in  the  judgment  of  Herodotos,  Avere  the 
measures  of  Mardonios  who  in  the  spring  of  the  second  ^  year 
The  reforms  after  the  fall  of  Miletos  marched  Avith  a  large  army  as 
nios^^"^*^"  far  as  the  Kilikian  coast,  Avhere  he  took  ship,  while  the 
493  B.C.  (?)  troops  found  their  Avay  across  Asia  Minor  to  the  Hel- 
lespont. This  man,  avIioso  name  is  associated  Avith  the  memor- 
able battle  at  Plataiai,  Avas  now  in  the  prime  of  manhood.  The 
errand  on  Avhich  he  came  Avas  nothing  less  than  the  extension  of 
tlic  Persian  empire  over  the  Avhole  of  Western  Greece  ;  but  before 
he  Avent  on  to  take  tliat  special  vengeance  on  Athens  and  Eretria 
Avhich  Avas  the  alleged  object  of  the  expedition,  he  undertook  and 
achieved,  it  is  said,  the  task  of  putting  down  the  tyrants  and  of 
establishing  democracies  in  all  the  Ionic  cities.  Yet  the  Avork  of 
Mardonios  can  mean  no  more  than  that  he  drove  away,  or  possibly 
killed  (as  the  more  efiectual  mode  of  dealing  Avith  them)  the 
Hellenic  tyrants,  on  Avhose  deposition  the  people  Avould  at  once 
revert  to  the  constitution  subverted  by  these  despots  :  nor  is  it 
easy  to  see  Avherein  tliis  task  differed  from  that  Avhich  Herodotos 
has  just  ascribed  to  Artaphernes.  All  therefore  that  can  be  said  is 
that,  if  Artaphernes  really  carried  out  his  measures  before  the  ar- 
rival of  Mardonios,  notliing  more  remained  for  the  latter  than  to 
sanction  changes  of  Avhich  he  approved. 

But  Mardonios  was  not  destined  to  achieve  the  greater  Avork 
for  Avhich  he  had  been  dispatched  from  Sousa.  Thasos  submitted 
without  opposition  ;  and  on  the  mainland  the  Avork  of  conquest 

'  Herod,  vi.  42.     ;fp//ff7ua  Kupra  rolai  '\uai. 
»  Herod,  vi.  31,  43. 


Chap.  IV.]         THE  CAMPAIGN   OF  MARATHON.  1.17 

was  carried  beyond  the  bounds  reached  by  Megabazos.  But  when, 
having  left  Akanthos,  the  fleet  was  coasting  along  the  peninsula 
of  Akte,  a  fearful  storm  dashed  three  hundred  ships,    Failure  of 
it  is  said,  on  the  iron   coast  of   mount   Athos,  about   i^'xfjrace^ 
twenty  thousand  men  being  killed  either  by  the  force   4'J2b.c.  (?) 
of  the  waves  beating  against  the  rocks  or  by  tlie  sharks  which 
abounded  in  this  part  of  tlie  sea.  The  disaster  made  it  impossible 
to  advance  further  south  ;  and  Mardonios  returned  home,  where 
during  the  reign  of  Dareios  he  is  heard  of  no  more. 

The  failure  of  Mardonios  seems  to  have  made  Dareios  more  than 
ever  resolve  to  ascertain  how  far  he  might  rely  on  the  submission 
of  the  Greeks  to  the  extension  of  the  Persian  empire.   ,,.    . 

mi       />  •        I       !•  !•  1  1       mi  Mission  of 

Ihe  nrst  step  came  in  the  form  or  an  order  to  the  iha-  the  Persian 

sians  to  take  down  the  walls  with  whicli  they  were  |icnia'|i*/° 

fortifying  their  city  and  to  surrender  their  ships  at  Ab-  earth  and 

dera.  In  the  next  step  taken  by  Dareios  we  may  fairly  the  Western 

discern  the  influence  of  Hippias,  who  left  nothinsr  un-  9JP'^^^',„, 

11'  ®  491  B.C.  (?) 

done  to  fan  the  flame  which  he  had  kindled.'  The  way 
would  be  in  great  measure  cleared  for  the  complete  subjugation 
of  Hellas  if  the  king  could,  without  the  trouble  of  fighting,  learn 
how  many  of  the  insular  and  continental  Greeks  would  be  willing 
to  inroU  themselves  as  liis  slaves.  Heralds  were  accordingly  sent, 
it  is  said,  througliout  all  Hellas,  demanding  in  the  king's  name 
the  tribute  of  a  little  earth  and  a  little  water.  The  summons  was 
readily  obeyed,  we  are  told,  by  the  men  of  all  the  islands 
visited  by  the  heralds,  and  probably  also  by  those  cities  which  we 
afterwards  find  among  the  zealous  allies  of  Xerxes.  Among  the 
islanders  who  thus  yielded  up  their  freedom  were  the  Aiginetans, 
who  by  this  conduct  drew  down  upon  themselves  the  wrath  of  the 
Athenians  with  whom  the}'  were  in  a  chronic  state  of  war.  Athenian 
ambassadors  appeared  at  Sparta  with  a  formal  accusation  against 
the  Aiginetans.  Tliey  had  acted  treacherously  not  towards  the 
Athenians  or  towards  any  Greek  city  in  particular  but  against 
Hellas  :  and  the  charge  shows  not  merely  the  growth  of  a  certain 
collective  or  almost  national  Hellenic  life,  but  that  Sparta  was  the 
recognised  head  of  this  informal  confederacy. 

The  embassy  of  the  Athenians  was  followed  by  prompt  action 
on  the   part  of  the  Spartans,  or  rather  on  the  part  of  their  king 
Kleomenes.     This  joint  action  of  the  Athenians  and   ^jjg  t^eat- 
Kleomenes,  it  has  been  thought,  can  be  accounted  for   mentof  the 
only  by  the  alleged  treatment  of  the  Persian   heralds   sparta  and 
when  they  came  first  to  Athens  and  then  to  Sparta,   at  Athens. 
asking  earth  and  water.      In  the  former  city,  these  men,  in  spite 

>  Herod,  vi.  94. 


148  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  IT. 

of  the  inviolability  of  the  character  in  which  they  appeared,  were 
thrown  into  the  Barathron,  in  the  latter  into  a  well,  and  bidden  to 
get  there  the  earth  and  water  which  they  wished  to  carry  to  the 
king.  This  treatment  of  the  messengers  of  Dareios  is  alleged  as 
the  reason  why  Xerxes,  when  he  sent  his  heralds  again  to  the 
Hellenic  states,  excepted  Athens  and  Sparta  from  the  number  of 
the  cities  to  whom  he  offered  his  mercy  ;'  but  the  story  cannot  be 
dismissed  without  a  reference  to  the  difficulties  which  seem  to  be 
involved  in  it.  Among  the  many  perplexing  statements  in  the 
history  of  the  Persian  wars  not  the  least  remarkable  are  the 
stories  of  occasional  vehemence  displayed  by  men  who  for  the 
most  part  were  little  chargeable  witli  any  furious  and  unreasoning 
valor.  The  subsequent  conduct  of  the  Athenians  may  exhibit 
nothing  inconsistent  with  their  alleged  treatment  of  the  heralds 
of  Dareios  :  but  neither  pride  (although  at  this  time  it  seems  not 
to  have  been  great)  as  the  acknowledged  heads  of  the  Hellenic 
world,  nor  security  against  Persian  invasion,  can  wholly  explain 
the  strange  agreement  of  the  Spartans  in  a  retaliation  which  it  is 
unlikely  that  they  could  have  devised  for  themselves,  and  which, 
while  inconsistent  with  their  subsequent  conduct,  was  by  no 
means  rendered  more  prudent  by  the  submission  of  their  near 
neighbors.  But  this  very  circumstance  warrants  the  suspicion 
that  the  story  of  the  violation  of  the  heralds  is  the  unhistorical 
growth  of  a  later  tradition.  The  point  especially  to  be  noted  is 
this,  that  the  political  results  would  be  precisely  the  same, 
whether  the  Athenians  or  Spartans  killed  the  heralds  sent  to  them 
or  whether  they  were  saved  from  this  iniquity  by  not  having  any 
heralds  to  kill.  It  is  not  very  likely  that  Dareios  would  send 
messengers  to  a  people  who,  according  to  the  story,  had  eagerly 
espoused  the  cause  of  Kroisos,  had  sent  an  imperious  mandate  to 
Cyrus  himself,  and  had  been  warned  by  Cyrus  that  they  should 
smart  for  their  presumption.  But  it  is  altogether  unlikely  that 
any  overtures  for  submission  would  be  made  to  Athens.  Had  it 
been  so,  they  must  have  taken  the  form  of  a  demand  that  they 
should  receive  again  their  old  master  Hippias.  But  in  truth  Ar- 
taphernes  had  long  since  taken  their  refusal  to  receive  him  as  a 
virtual  declaration  of  war  ;^  and  we  can  scarcely  suppose  that  a  sum- 
mons addressed  to  those  with  whom  the  Persian  king  had  not 
come  into  conflict  would  be  sent  to  men  who  were  his  open  and 
avowed  enemies.  If  then  these  two  great  cities  were  exempted 
from  the  number  of  those  who  were  bidden  to  acknowledge  the 
supremacy  of  Persia,  they  would  be  as  much  driven  to  make  com- 
mon cause  with  each  other  as  if  they  had  slain  the  officers  of 
Dareios.  The  unflagging  zeal  with  which  the  Athenians  in  spite 
'  Herod,  vii.  133.  ^  '  See  p.  135. 


Chap.  IV.]         THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  MARATHON.  149 

of  all  discouragements  maintained  the  contest  against  Xerxes 
would  readily  account  for  the  growth  of  a  story  which  seemed 
to  be  in  harmony  with  their  general  conduct  throughout  the 
Persian  war. 

But  whatever  may  have  been  the  treatment  experienced  by  the 
Persian  heralds,  Sparta  might  perhaps  have  shrunk,  as  she  did  in 
the  case  of  Plataiai,  from  asserting  her  jurisdiction  The  deposi- 
over  the  Aiginetans,  if  her  old  rival  Argos  had  not  exi?eo'f*i)e- 
already  been  humbled.  The  narrative  of  the  struggle  maratos. 
with  Argos  and  of  the  events  which  followed  it  exhibits  a  strange 
picture  of  feud  and  discord  in  the  Spartan  state.  The  humiliation 
of  Argos  seemed  to  justify  Kleomenes,  the  Eurysthenid  king,  in 
making  an  effort  to  seize  those  Aiginetans  who  had  been  foremost 
in  swearing  obedience  to  Dareios.  His  demand  for  their  surrender 
was  met  by  a  refusal  to  yield  them  up  to  a  Spartan  king  who  was 
acting  illegally,  not  only  as  having  been  bribed  by  the  Athenians, 
but  as  having  come  without  his  colleague,  the  Prokieid  Demaratos, 
the  future  companion  and  adviser  of  Xerxes  in  the  wonderful  epic 
of  the  Persian  war.  Kleomenes  went  back  to  Sparta,  fully  re- 
solved to  bring  about  the  downfall  of  the  man  who  had  thwarted 
and  foiled  him  in  his  march  to  Athens  ;'  and  he  found  the  means 
in  the  stories  told  about  his  birth.  Evidence  was  forthcoming, 
it  is  said,  to  prove  that  Demaratos  was  not  the  son  of  his  reputed 
father :  and  his  deposition  was  followed  by  his  flight  into  Asia, 
where  we  are,  of  course,  toM  that  Dareios  assigned  him  a  terri- 
tory with  cities  to  afford  him  a  revenue. 

Against  tribes  thus  agitated  by  the  turmoil  of  incessant  in- 
trigues and  habituated  to  an  almost  complete  political  isolation,  the 
Persian  king  was  now  preparing  to  discharge  the  pro-  Capture  of 
digious  forces  at  his  command.  He  had  some  old  Naxosand 
wrongs  to  avenge  ;  but  the  Peisistratidai  were  at  hand  theVefsia^us. 
to  urge  him  on  by  their  still  more  importunate  plead-  490  b.c. 
ing.  In  place  of  the  disgraced  Mardonios  he  intrusted  the  com- 
mand of  the  expedition  to  Artaphernes  and  to  the  Median  Datis 
who,  announcing  himself,  it  is  said,  as  the  representative  of 
Medos  the  son  of  the  Athenian  Aigeus  and  his  wife  the  Kolchian 
Medeia,  claimed  of  right  the  style  and  dignity  of  king  of  Athens. 
Their  mission  was  to  inslave  the  men  oJF  that  city  and  also  of 
Eretria  and  bring  them  into  their  master's  presence.  Their  first 
object  was  to  punish  the  Naxians  for  daring  to  defeat  Megabates,^ 
and  the  task  was  now  by  comparison  an  easy  one.  The  suppres- 
sion of  the  Ionic  revolt  had  struck  terror  into  the  hearts  of  the 
Greeks  generally  ;  and  the  Naxians  at  the  approach  of  the  Per- 

'  Page  94.  ^_  ^  Herod,  vi.  96. 


150  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH   PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

sians  fled  to  the  monntains.  Those  who  remained  in  the  town 
were  inshived  ;  and  the  city  with  its  temples  was  burnt.  The 
Persian  force  was  increased  on  its  voyage  westwards  by  men  from 
the  islands  who  were  compelled  to  serve  against  their  kinsfolk. 
The  first  opposition  to  Datis  came  from  the  people  of  Karystos 
the  southernmost  town  of  Euboia,  which,  after  resisting  the  at- 
tacks of  the  Persians  for  six  days,  was  taken  by  treachery.  From 
Karystos  the  fleet  sailed  northwards  to  Erctria.  Here,  as  else- 
where, the  Persians  j)lundered  and  burnt  the  temples  and  partiallv 
reduced  the  inhabitants  to  slavery. 

At  Eretria  the  Persians  might  well  have  fancied  their  task 
practically  done.  Thus  far  their  enemies  had  given  way  before 
Landing  of  them  like  chaff  before  the  wind  ;  and  Hippias  prob- 
at^M^ra"""^  ably  flattered  their  vanity  by  assurances  that  they 
thon.  need  look  for  no  more  serious  resistance   at  Athens  or 

at  Sparta.  But  meanwhile  they  must  advance  with  at  least 
ordinary  care  ;  and  his  knowledge  of  the  land  which  he  had  once 
ruled  might  now  serve  his  Persian  friends  to  good  purpose.  The 
best  ground  which  it  contained  for  the  movements  of  cavalry  was 
the  plain  of  Marathon  bounded  by  the  northeastern  Cliersonesos 
or  promontory  of  Attica  ;  and  at  Marathon  accordingly  the  ban- 
ished tyrant  of  Athens  landed  with  liis  Persian  supporters  to 
fight  his  Battle  of  the  Boyne.  By  a  strange  turn  in  the  course  of 
things  the  exiled  despot  of  Athens  in  setting  foot  once  more  on 
Attic  ground  was  confronted  by  the  very  man  wliom,  as  an  apt 
pupil  in  his  own  school  of  tyranny,  ho  had  sent  to  govern  tJie 
Thrakian  Chersonesos.  How  far  Miltiades,  the  son-in-law  of  a 
Thrakian  king,  and  the  employer  of  Thrakian  mercenaries,  had 
outgrown  the  ideas  of  his  earlier  years,  we  can  scarcely  venture 
to  say.  The  whole  history  of  the  man  from  the  time  of  his 
leaving  Athens  to  liis  return  is  wrapped  in  an  obscurity  so  strange 
that  we  can  do  no  more  than  ascribe  his  election  as  one  of  the 
ten  generals,  at  a  time  when  Hippias  and  the  Persians  were 
known  to  be  on  their  way  westwards,  to  the  reputation  which  he 
had  acquired  by  the  conquest  of  Lemnos. 

A  more  formidable  hindiancc  to  the  plans  of  Hippias  and 
Dareios  was  involved  in  the  rise  of  statesmen  at  Athens  like  The- 
Rivalrj'of  mistokles  and  Aristeides.  Neither  of  tliem  belonged 
kles™nd°'  ^^  ^^^^  "^^^  Eupatrid  nobility.  But  although  neither 
Aristeides.  wealthy  nor  by  birth  illustrious,  these  two  men 
were  to  exercise  a  momentous  influence  on  the  history  not  only 
of  their  own  city  but  of  all  western  civilisation.  Singularly 
unlike  each  other  in  temper  and  tone  of  thought,  they  were  to  be 
throughout  life  rivals  in   whom  the  common  danger  of  their 


Chap.  IV.]         THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  MARATHON.  151 

country  could  yet  suppress  the  feeling  of  liabitual  animosity.  It 
would  have  been  happy  for  themselves,  happier  for  Atliens,  if  tbey 
liad  been  rivals  also  in  that  virtue  whicli  Greek  statesmen  down  to 
our  own  day  have  commonly  and  fatally  lacked.  Unfortunately 
Themistokles  never  attempted  to  aim  at  that  standard  of  incor- 
ruptibility which  won  for  liis  rival  the  name  of  the  Righteous  or 
the  Just.  Tlie  very  title  implies  the  comparative  corruption  of  the 
leading  citizens ;  and  thus  Aristeides  might  the  more  easily  gain 
the  reputation  of  Avhich  the  rustic  who  asked  him  to  write  his 
name  on  the  shell  professed  himself  so  heartily  tired  of  hearing. 

Of  his  rival  it  would  be  as  absurd  to  draw  a  picture  free  from 
seams  and  stains  as  it  would  be  to  attempt  the  same  ridiculous 
task  for  Oliver  Cromwell  or  Warren  Hastings.  That  Genius  and 
he  started  on  his  career  with  a  bare  competence  and  i^'^emisto- 
that  he  heaped  together  by  not  the  fairest  means  an  kies. 
enormous  fortune,  is  a  fact  which  cannot  be  disputed.  That, 
while  he  was  determined  to  consult  and  to  advance  the  true  in- 
terests of  his  country,  he  was  not  less  resolved  that  his  own 
greatness  should  be  secured  through  those  interests,  is  not  less 
certain.  Endowed  with  a  marvellous  power  of  tracing  the  true 
relations  of  things  to  all  seeming  thoroughly  confused  and  of  dis- 
cerning the  method  by  which  the  worst  complications  miglit  be 
nnravelled,  he  went  straight  to  liis  mark,  while  yet,  so  long  as  he 
wished  it,  he  could  keep  that  mark  liidden  from  every  one.  With 
the  life  of  such  a  man  popular  fancy  could  not  fail  to  be  busy  ; 
and  so  the  belief  grew  up  that  he  knew  every  citizen  of  Athens 
by  name.  But  however  this  may  have  been,  he  was  enabled,  as 
Thucydides  tells  us,'  by  his  astonishing  powers  of  appi'chension 
and  foresight,  to  form  the  truest  judgment  of  existing  things  and. 
without  toilsome  calculation  to  forecast  the  future,  while  yet  no 
man  was  ever  more  free  from  that  foolhardy  temper  which  thinks 
that  mere  dash  and  bravery  can  make  up  for  inexperience  and 
lack  of  thought. 

But  the  genius  of  Themistokles  was  not  yet  to  shine  out  in  its 
full  lustre.     While   the  Athenians  were  vainly  seeking  aid   from 
Sparta,'    Hippias   was  busy    on   the  Persian   side    in   Deijatesia 
drawing   up   his   allies  in  battle  array  on  the  held  of   theAthe- 
Marathon.     He  had  a  vision  which  seemed  to  portend   atMara- 
the  recovery  of  his  former  power  :  but  he   lacked  the   "^°"- 
readiness  of  the  Norman  Wi'liam  in  turning  to  good  account  the 

*  i.  138.  garded.not  perhaps  without  reason, 

^  The  feat  ascribed  to  the  courier  as  an  impossibility  by  writers  who 

Pheidippides,  who  was  sent  to  ask  are  well  aware  of  the   powers  of 

this  aid,  Herod,  vi.  106,  has  been  re-  Asiatic  runners  at  the  present  time- 


152  THE  STRUGGLE  WITH   PERSIA.  [Book  If. 

fall  of  one  of  his  teeth  which  a  violent  fit  of  conghing  forced 
from  his  jaw.  The  Conqueror  would  have  interpreted  the  acci- 
dent as  a  presage  of  victory.  Hippias  could  only  bewail  among 
his  friends  the  "fate  which  assigned  to  him  no  larger  a  portion  of 
Attic  soil  than  might  suffice  to  bury  a  tooth.  On  the  Athenian 
side  a  sign  of  coming  success  was  furnished  by  the  arrival  of  the 
Plataians  with  the  full  military  force  of  their  little  city  ;  but  tlie 
unanimity  of  the  Plataians  Avas  not  reflected  in  the  councils  of 
the  Athenian  leaders,  if  we  may  accept  the  story  that  Miltiades, 
who  Avith  four  others  wished  for  immediate  battle,  appealed  to 
the  Polemarch  Kallimachos  of  Aphidnai  to  give  his  casting  vote 
against  the  five  generals  who  wished  to  postpone  it.  The  appeal 
was  made  in  stirring  language.  It  depended  on  Kallimachos  not 
only  whether  Athens  should  be  the  first  of  Hellenic  cities,  but  whe- 
ther she  and  Hellas  should  even  be  free.  Delay  would  sap  the 
energy  of  the  faithful  and  swell  the  number  of  the  traitors  who 
even  now  counselled  submission  to  the  Persian  despot.  Yet  the 
story  carries  with  it  in  some  measure  its  own  contradiction.  Kal- 
limachos decides  to  fight  at  once  ;  but  the  fight  does  not  take 
place.  Tlie  four  generals  who  had  all  along  agreed  with  Miltiades 
handed  over  to  him  the  presidency  which  came  daily  to  each  in 
his  turn  ;  and  still  Miltiades  would  not  fight  until  his  own  presi- 
dency came  in  its  ordinary  course.  We  can  scarcely  bring  our- 
selves to  think  that  the  Athenian  generals  would  deprive  the  city 
of  its  main  military  force,  unless  they  had  resolved  already  to  fight 
on  the  first  favorable  opportunity.  Still  less  can  we  think  that 
when  more  than  half  felt  the  urgent  need  of  immediate  action  they 
Avould  allow  nearly  a  week  to  j^ass  before  they  took  any  step  to 
bring  matters  to  an  issue.  They  must  have  known  that  by  so  doing 
they  Avere  putting  it  in  the  power  of  the  Persians  to  detach  an 
overwhelming  force  from  their  fleet  and  army  and  send  it  round 
Cape  Sounion  against  Athens,  Avhile  they  lay  inactiA'e  at  Marathon. 
Here  then  in  the  broad  plain  which  by  the  loAver  road  between 
Hymettos  and  Pentelikos  lay  at  a  distance  of  about  twenty-five 
ThcHtoryof  "liles  from  Athens,  Miltiades  and  his  colleagues  pre- 
thu  battle  of  pared  to  .strike  a  blow  in  defence  of  their  own  freedom 

Marathon.        .^^^j  ^|,_^,.  ^f  jj^,,,.^^        j^^  ^j^j^^^  ^^^^^    ^^   ^j^.^    ^j_^.^    .^   ^ 

marsh,  the  nr)rtlicru  one  being  still  at  all  seasons  of  the  year  im- 
passable, Avhilc  the  smaller  one  to  the  south  is  almost  dried  up 
during  the  summer  heats.  On  this  broad  and  level  surface  between 
the  rugged  hills  which  rose  around  it  and  the  firm  sandy  beach  on 
which  the  Persians  were  drawn  uj)  to  receive  them,  stood,  in  the 
simple  story  of  Herodotos,  the  Athenian  tribes.  The  Polemarch 
Kallimachos  (for  such  was  then  the  law  of  the  Athenians)  headed 
the  right  wing ;  the  men  of  Plataiai  stood  on  the  left.  But  as  with 


Chap.  IV.]         THE   CAMPAIGN   OF  MARATHON.  153 

their  scantier  numbers  it  was  needful  to  present  a  front  equal  to 
that  of  the  Persian  host,  the  middle  part  of  the  Greek  army  was 
only  a  few  men  deep  and  was  very  weak,  while  the  wings  were 
comparatively  strong.  At  length  the  orders  were  all  given  ;  and 
when  the  signs  from  the  victims  Avere  declared  to  be  good,  the 
Athenians  began  the  onset  and  went  running  towards  the  barba- 
rians, the  space  between  the  two  armies  being  not  less  than  a  mile. 
The  Persians,  when  they  saw  them  coming,  made  ready  to  receive 
them,  at  the  same  time  thinking  the  Athenians  mad,  because,  being 
so  few  in  number,  they  came  on  furiously  without  either  bows  or 
horses.  But  the  Athenians  on  coming  to  close  quarters  with  the 
barbarians  foaght  well,  being,  the  historian  adds,  the  first  Greeks 
who  charged  the  enemy  running  and  who  endured  the  sight  of  the 
Median  dress,  for  up  to  this  time  the  Greeks  had  dreaded  even  to 
hear  their  name.'  Long  time  they  fought  in  Marathon  ;  and  in 
the  middle  the  barbarians  were  victorious,  Avhere  the  Persians  and 
Sakians  were  drawn  up.  These  broke  the  centre  of  the  Athenians, 
and  drove  them  back  on  the  plain  ;  but  the  Athenians  and  Pla- 
taianshad  the  best  on  both  wings.  Still  they  would  not  go  in  chase 
of  the  barbarians  who  were  running  away  ;  but  they  closed  on  the 
enemy  which  had  broken  their  centre,  and  fought  until  they  over- 
came them.  Then  they  went  after  the  Persians  as  they  fled,  and 
slaughtered  them  until  they  reached  the  sea,  where  they  tried  to 
set  the  ships  of  the  Persians  on  fire.  In  this  struggle  the  Pole- 
march  Kallimachos  fell  fighting  bravely  ;  and  there  died  also  Ste- 

*  This  is  one  of  the  few  utterly  move  twenty  miles  without  corn- 
astonishing'  and  bewildering  state-  ing  to  some  Greek  island  or  some 
nients  which  we  come  across  in  the  Hellenic  city,  whereas  in  the  other 
pages  of  Herodotos.  Without  the  they  would  have  to  grope  their  way 
least  qualification  he  here  asserts  along  coasts  on  which  they  would 
that  the  Athenians  were  the  first  find  but  two  or  three  scattered 
Greeks  who  could  look  without  settlements  of  their  most  venture- 
terror  even  on  the  dress  of  the  Per-  some  kinsfolk, 
sians  or  dare  to  withstand  them  in  The  plain  fact  is  that  this  state- 
the  field.  Not  less  sweepingly  he  ment  of  Herodotos  is  not  true,  al- 
affirms.viii.  133,  that  not  only  to  the  though  at  the  time  of  his  writing  it 
boorish  and  ignorant  Spartans  but  he  made  it,  beyond  doubt,  in  good 
to  the  Greeks  generally  the  eastern  faith.  He  had  just  related  the  his- 
waters  of  the  Egean  were  as  terri-  tory  of  the  Ionic  revolt ;  and  al- 
ble  as  those  of  the  western  Medi-  though  the  whole  narrative  shows 
terranean,  and  that  in  the  imagina-  a  pitiable  lack  of  cohesion  and  very 
tion  of  the  Greeks  who  had  con-  indifferent  generalship  on  the  part 
quered  at  Salamis  a  voyage  from  of  the  Asiatic  Greeks,  it  certainly 
Delos  to  Saraos  appeared  as  long  as  does  not  justify  imputations  of 
a  voyage  to  the  pillars  of  Herakles,  habitual  cowardice. 
— thedistancein  the  one  case  being  We  shall  come  across  another 
a  bare  100  miles,  while  the  other  by  statement  even  more  glaringly  im- 
the  methods  of  ancient  navigation  probable  in  the  words  put  into  the 
extended  to  4,000  or  5,000  miles,  mouth  of  Pausanias  on  the  eve  of 
with  the  further  diflTerence  that  in  the  battle  of  Plataiai. 
the   one  case  they  could  scarcely 


154  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  IL 

silaos,  one  of  the  generals,  and  Kynegeiros,  the  son  of  Euphorion.* 
In  this  wav  the  Athenians  took  seven  ships  :  with  the  rest  the  bar- 
barians beat  out  to  sea,  and  taking  up  the  Eretrian  captives  whom 
they  had  left  in  the  islet  of  Aigilia,  sailed  round  Sounion,  wishing 
to  reach  the  city  before  the  Athenians  could  return  thither.  But 
the  victors  hastened  back  with  all  speed  and,  reaching  the  city 
first,  incamped  in  the  Herakleion  in  Kynosarges  as  they  had  in- 
camped  in  the  Herakleion  at  Marathon.  For  a  while  the  barbarians 
lay  Avith  their  ships  off  Phaleron  which  was  at  that  time  the  port 
of  the  Athenians,  and  then  Datis  and  Artaphernes  sailed  away  to 
Asia,  and  led  their  Eretrian  slaves  up  to  Sousa  where  Dareios, 
though  ho  had  been  very  wroth  with  them  because  they  had  begun 
the  wrong,  did  them  no  harm,  but  made  them  dwell  in  theKissian 
land  in  his  own  region  which  is  called  Ardericca.  There,  Hero- 
dotos  adds,  they  were  living  down  to  his  own  time,  speaking  still 
their  own  language.  As  to  the  Spartans,  when  the  moon  was  full, 
they  set  out  in  haste  and  reached  Attica  on  the  third  day  after  they 
left  Sparta  f  but  although  they  were  too  late  for  the  battle,  they 
still  wished  to  look  upon  the  Medes.  So  they  went  to  Marathon 
and  saw  them,  and  having  praised  the  Athenians  for  all  that  they 
had  done,  v.'ent  home  again.  Now  Dareios  had  been  very  bitter 
against  the  Athenians  because  they  had  taken  Sardeis  ;  but  when 
he  heard  the  tale  of  the  battle  of  Marathon,  he  was  much  more 
wroth  and  desired  yet  more  eagerly  to  march  against  Hellas. 
Straightway  he  sent  heralds  to  all  the  cities,  and  bade  them  make 
ready  an  army,  and  to  furnish  much  more  than  they  had  done  be- 
fore, both  ships  and  liorses  and  corn  ;  and  while  the  heralds  were 
going  round,  all  Asia  was  shaken  for  three  years ;  but  in  the 
fourth  year  the  Egyptians,  who  had  been  made  slaves  by  Kara- 
byses,  rebelled  against  the  Persians,  and  then  the  king  sought 
only  the  more  vehemently  to  go  both  against  the  Egyptians  and 
against  the  Greeks.  So  he  named  Xerxes  his  son  to  be  king  over 
tlie  I'ersians  after  himself,  and  made  ready  for  the  march.  But 
in  the  year  after  the  revolt  of  Egypt  Dareios  himself  died  ;  nor 
was  he  suffered  to  punish  the  Athenians  or  the  Egyptians  who  had 
rebelled  against  him. 

Such  is  the  epical,  or  rather  the  religions,  form  which  Hero- 
dotos  has  imparted  to  a  history  of  which  the  most  exact  and 
The  details  searching  criticism  can  never  diminish  the  splendor, 
of  the  buttle.  That  the  great  question  of  Hellenic  freedom  or  barbaric 
tyranny  was  virtually  settled  on  the  field  of  Marathon  ;  that   this 

'  lie  was  thus  a  brother  of  the  time  of  their   leavintr   Sparta, — a 

great  trajjic  poet  ^-Escliylos.  feat  for  a  large  body  of  heavy -armed 

'  This  would  mean  in  Greek  com-  men  even  more    astoundinpf  than 

pntation   that   they   accomplished  that   of  Pbeidippides.     Herod,  vi. 

the  march  of  1.50  miles  in  certainly  130. 
not  more  than  GO  hours  from  the 


Chap.  IV.]         THE   CAMPAIGN   OF   MAl^ATHON.  155 

battle  decided  the  issue  of  the  subsequent  invasion  of  Xerxes; 
and  that  the  glory  of  this  victory  belonged  altogether  to  the  men 
of  Athens  and  Plataiai,  are  facts  which  none  will  dispute.  The 
number  engaged  on  either  side,  the  precise  position  of  the  Athe- 
nians and  the  barbarians,  the  exact  tactics  of  the  battle,  are  points 
of  little  moment  in  comparison.  According  to  the  traditional  ac- 
counts no  cavalry  took  part  in  the  struggle  :  but  every  niglit  from 
tliat  time  forth  might  be  heard  the  neighing  of  phantom  horses 
and  the  clashing  of  swords  and  spears.  With  these  wonders  and 
witli  perplexities  of  a  less  extraordinary  kind  any  elaborate  de- 
scription of  the  battle  and  its  military  incidents  seems  at  best 
a  superfluous  labor.  The  event  of  the  battle  is  made  to  turn  on 
the  rapid  charge  of  the  Athenians  and  on  the  success  gained  by 
their  two  wings  wlule  their  centre  was  broken  by  the  forces  op- 
posed to  it.  This  ill-success  of  the  centre  audits  cause  have  both 
been  debated  by  recent  historians ;  but  although  the  inference 
seems  to  be  fully  warranted  that  their  haste  had  something  to  do 
with  their  repulse,  we  are  scarcely  justitied  in  attempting,  without 
any  distinct  historical  statements,  to  determine  the  extent  of 
ground  over  which  the  Athenian  centre  was  driven  back. 

But  the  tradition  that  the  two  armies  faced  each  other  for 
many  days  at  Marathon  is  more  seriously  impugned  Ijy  the  inci- 
dent which  was  supposed  to  point  to  the  existence  of 
dark  and  mysterious  plots  at  Athens  in  favor  of  Hip-  of  the  white 
pias  and  the  Persians.  The  banished  tyrant,  we  arc  ^'"•'•'^• 
told,  w-as  not  without  partisans  still  in  the  city  which  he  had  ruled  : 
and  the  story  which  Herodotos  had  heard  was  that  these  trai- 
tors had  agreed  with  their  former  master  to  raise  a  white  shield 
on  some  conspicuous  point,  in  all  likelihood  on  the  summit  of  mount 
Pentelikos,  as  a  signal  that  the  Persians  should  at  once  begin  an 
attack  on  Athens  which  they  would  second  to  the  best  of  their 
power  within  the  city.  The  raising  of  this  shield  Herodotos 
regards  as  a  fact  not  to  be  questioned,  although  he  admits  that 
everything  else  connected  with  it  is  hopelessly  uncertain,  except 
the  circumstance  that  it  was  raised  when  the  Persians  were  already 
in  their  ships  after  their  defeat, — in  other  words,  that  it  was  raised 
too  late.  It  would  follow  then  that  the  intention  of  the  traitors 
was  to  give  the  sign  before  any  battle  could  be  fought,  or  indeed 
before  the  Athenian  army  could  reach  Marathon,  and,  as  we  may 
fairly  infer,  with  the  purpose  of  bringing  upon  Athens  a  powerful 
detachment  of  the  barbarian  fleet  and  army,  while  the  rest  re- 
mained to  oppose  the  Athenians  and  Plataians  at  Marathon.  The 
very  choice  of  a  signal  is  proof  conclusive  that  time  was  held  to 
be  of  the  utmost  .CMisequence.  But  for  this  urgent  need,  it  would 


156  THE  STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

tave  been  easier  and  far  more  safe  to  send  by  sea  a  messenger 
who  would  not,  like  the  sliiold,  have  been  seen  by  the  Athenians 
whose  return  they  wished  to  anticipate.    Doubtless  these  partisans 
of  Ilippias  would  have  preferred  to   raise  the  signal  as  soon  as 
Miltiades  and   the   other  generals  had  left  Athens.     The  time 
needed  for  completing  their  preparations  may  have  prevented  their 
doing  this:  but  tliey  could  scarcely  have  formed  a  bolder  or  more 
sagacious  plan  for  furthering  the  interests  of  Hippias  andDareios 
than  that  of  bringing  down  on  the  city  an  overwhelming  Persian 
force,  so  soon  as  the  main  body  of  the  Athenians  had  set  out  on 
their  way  to  the  field  of  Marathon.     If  on  this  momentous  jour- 
ney the  Athenians  had  seen  on  the  heights  of  Pentelikos  a  sign 
which  they  must  have  construed  as  an  invitation  to  their  enemies 
to  fall  on  Aihens  during  their  absence,  the  judgment  of  their  gen- 
erals and  the  courage  of  their  men  must  have  been  alike  paralysed, 
for  they  Avould  remember  that  the  plain  of  Phaleron  (the  Phaleric 
wall  was  not  vet  built)  was  as  serviceable  for  the  action  of  cavalry 
as  the  plain  of  Marathon,  and  that  if  the  men  left  to  guard  Athens 
should  be  defeated  there,  there  would  be  but  faint  hope  of  Iheir 
being  able  to  maintain  the  city  against  the  machinations  of  traitors 
within  it.     All  this  is  perfectly  intelligible  on  the  supposition  that 
not  more  than  about  two  days  passed  from  the  time  when  Miltia- 
des left  Athens  to  the  hour  when  he  returned  to  it  in  the  full  flush 
of  a  victory  which  he  could  scarcely  have  hoped  to  win.     But 
according  to  the  narrative   of  Herodotos  the   armies  faced   each 
other  for  several  days  before   the  battle  Avas  fought :  and  it  be- 
comes impossible  to  understand  why,  after  the  Persians  must  with 
their  own  eves  have  seen  the  Athenian  force  in  front  of  them,  their 
partisans  in  Athens  should  still  have  insisted  on  hoisting  a  signal 
which  was  now  utterly  unnecessary,  and  which,  if  it   had   any 
effect  at  all,  could  only  tend  to  disconcert  their  plans  by  betraying 
them  to  the  Athenian  generals.     It  is  absurd  to  suppose  that  any 
sign  could  under  such  circumstances  be  needed  to  inform  Datis 
that  the  Marathonian  army  was  absent  from  Athens,  wliile  their 
very  absence  would  be  a  bettor  surety  to  Ilippias  for  the  success 
of  ins  schemes  than  any  signal  which  might  be   exhibited  by  his 
friends.      AYe  c;in  far  more  readily  suppose  that  IIip[)ia.s  ])lanncd 
the  landing  at  Marathon  for  the  very  purpose  of  Avithdrawiiig  the 
•nain  Athenian  force  from  the  city  and  thus  leaving  it  defenceless 
against  the  real  attack  to  be  made  from  the  side  of  Phaleron,  than 
that  he  should  idiv  waste  dav  after  day  when  the  visible  presence 
of  Miltiades  and  his  men   showed  him  that  thus  far  things  were 
going  precisely  as  he  would  have  them  go.      If  then  wc  may  con- 
clude that  the  raising  of  the  shield  was  unavoidably  delayed  for 


Chap.  IV.]         THE  CAMPAIGN   OF  MARATHON.  157 

some  few  hours  or  perhaps  for  a  day,  that  during  tliis  time  Mil- 
tiades  was  able  to  complete  liis  march,  to  engage  the  Persian  armv 
and  to  defeat  them,  and  that  he  then  hurried  back  so  rapidly  as  to 
reach  Kynosarges  before  the  Persians  could  get  round  Sounion, 
the  series  of  events  becomes  clear  and  coherent.  But  this 
supposition  makes  the  anxious  debates  and  the  'long  delay  at 
Marathon  an  utter  impossibility.  We  can  scarcely  avoid  the  con- 
clusion that  in  this  instance  Cornelius  Nepos  has  liit  upon  the  fact, 
and  that  Miltiades  and  liis  colleagues  held  in  Athens  the  council 
of  wa.'  which  the  informants  of  Herodotos  transferred  to  the  field 
of  Marathon. 

For  Miltiades  the  battle,  in  which  he  had  won  an  imperish- 
able name,  and  in  which  ^-Eschylos  fought  by  the  side  of  his 
brother  Kynegeiros,  laid  open  a  path  which  led  to  a  The  expedi- 
terrible  disaster.     According  to  the  narrative  of  Hero-   j!°"  of  Mii- 

11  •  <•    m-'?-     Ill  •  tiiidea  to 

dotos,  the  reputation  or  Miltuides,  already  great  smce  Paros :  his 
his  reduction  of  Lemnos,  was  immeasurably  inhauced  deatii!"  "** 
by  the  victory  of  Marathon.  Never  before  had  any  one  489  b.c. 
man  so  fixed  on  hinrself  the  eyes  of  all  Athenian  citizens ;  and 
the  confidence  thus  inspired  in  them  he  sought  to  turn  to  account 
by  an  expedition  which,  he  said,  would  make  them  rich  for  ever. 
Nothing  more  would  he  say.  It  was  not  for  them  to  ask  whither 
he  meant  to  lead  them  :  all  that  they  had  to  do  was  to  furnish 
ships  and  men.  These  they,  therefore,  gave  ;  and  Miltiades  sailed 
to  Paros,  an  island  lying  a  few  miles  to  the  west  of  Naxos,  and, 
laying  siege  to  the  city,  demanded  a  hundred  talents  under  the 
threat  that  ho  would  destroy  the  place  in  case  of  refusal.  But  the 
Parians  put  him  off  under  various  pretences,  until  by  working 
diligently  at  night  they  had  so  strengthened  their  walls  as  to  be 
able  to  set  him  at  defiance.  The  siege  therefore  went  on,  aiul 
went  on  to  no  pui'pose.  This  is  all  that  we  can  be  said  to  know 
of  the  affair,  beyond  the  fact  that  after  a  blockade  of  six-and- 
twenty  days  Miltiades  was  obliged  to  return  to  Athens  with  his 
fleet,  having  utterly  failed  of  attaining  his  object,  and  with  his 
thigh,  or,  as  some  said,  his  knee  severely  strained.  No  sooner 
had  he  reached  Athens  than  the  indignation  of  the  people  who 
professed  to  have- been  deceived  and  cheated  by  him  found  utter- 
ance in  a  capital  charge  brought  against  him  by  Xanthippos,  (the 
father  of  the  great  Perikles).  Miltiades  was  carried  on  a  bed  into 
the  presence  of  his  judges,  before  whom,  as  the  gangrene  of  his 
wound  prevented  him  from  speaking,  his  friends  made  for  him 
the  best  defence,  or  rather  perhaps  offered  the  best  excuses,  that 
they  could.  It  was  urged  that  a  fine  of  fifty  talents,  which  woidd 
perhaps  sufiicc  also  to  meet  the  expenses  of  the  expedition,  might 


158  THE  STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

he  an  adequate  punishment  for  the  great  general  but  for  whom 
Athens  might  now  have  been  the  seat  of  a  Persian  satrapy.  This 
penalty  was  chosen  in  place  of  that  of  death.  Miltiades  died  in 
disgrace,  and  the  citizens  whom  he  wished  to  enrich  recovered 
from  his  family  half  the  sum  which  lie  had  demanded  from  the 
Parians.  But  there  seems  to  be  no  ground  for  thinking  that 
they  subjected  him  to  the  superfluous  indignity  of  imprisonment ; 
and  the  words  of  Pausanias'  might  almost  warrant  the  belief  that* 
his  ashes  were  laid  in  the  tomb  raised  to  his  memory  at  Mara- 
thon. 

If  the  history  of  the  Persian  war  involves  (especially  in  all  that 
relates  to  the  barbarian  world)  the  task  of  sifting  truth  from 
The  alleged  fiction,  difficulties  uf  a  very  different  kind  present 
ofThe  Athe-  themselves  in  the  lives  and  fortunes  of  the  most  emi- 
niaus.  ncnt   of   the   Hellenic    leaders.     They   are   difficulties 

caused  not  by  any  commingUng  of  fiction  with  reality,  but  by  the 
misrepresentations  or  misconceptions  which  ensue  from  changes  of 
public  feeling,  and  which  must  be  especially  powerful  in  an  age 
which  can  make  no  appeal  to  contemporary  history.  In  the  case 
of  Miltiades  the  charge  of  fraud  and  deception  urged  against  the 
general  has  been  almost  thrust  into  the  background  by  that  of 
fickleness  and  levity  commonly  advanced  against  the  people  which 
condemned  him.  Such  an  accusation,  it  must  be  admitted,  is 
eagerly  welcomed  by  all  to  whom  any  form  of  democratical 
government  seems  repulsive.  Unquestionably  a  leader  who  has 
won  for  himself  a  wide  fame  for  his  wisdom  and  for  success  in  war 
cannot  on  the  ground  of  his  reputation  claim  the  privilege  of 
breaking  his  trust  and  leading  his  countrymen  Avith  impunity  to 
their  ruin.  As  little  can  it  be  doubted  that  fickleness  and  ingrati- 
tude, in  the  meaning  commonly  attached  to  these  words,  are  not 
to  be  reckoned  among  the  special  sins  of  democracy,  and,  least  of 
all,  of  such  a  democracy  as  that  of  Athens.  Put  because  in  a 
democracy  a  change  of  opinion,  once  admitted,  must  be  expressed 
freely  and  candidly,  the  expression  of  that  change  is  apt  to  be 
vehement  and  angry  ;  and  the  language  of  indignation,  when  it 
comes  to  be  felt,  may  be  interpreted  as  the  result  of  ingratitude 
when  the  offender  happens  to  be  a  man  eminent  for  former  ser- 
vices. Yet  more  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  ingratitude  and 
injustice  of  democracies  (whatever  they  may  be)aie  neither  more 
frecjuent  nor  more  severe  than  the  iniquities  of  any  other  form  of 
government.  Still  we  may  fairly  ask  whether  there  was  not  in 
the  Athenian  people  a  disposition  to  shrink  from  responsibility 
not  altogether  rcJounding  to  their  honor,  and  a  reluctance  to  take 

'  i.  32,  3. 


Chap.  IV]         THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  MARATHON.  159 

to  themselves  any  blame  for  results  to  which  they  had  deliberate- 
ly contributed.      NVheu  the   Syracusan  e.xpedition   had  ended   iu 
ruin,  they  accused  the  orators  who  had  urged  them  to  undertake 
it.'     When  they  had  condemned  to  death  by  a   single  vote  the 
generals  who  had  just  returned  from  their  victory  at  Argennoussai, 
they  decreed  that  the  men  who  had  intrapped  them  into  the  sen- 
tence should  be  brought  to  trial.''     Yet  citizens,  who  had   been 
trained  in  the  daily  exercise  of  a  judicial  and   critical  power, 
were  surely  not  justified  in  throwing  upon   others  the   blame  of 
their  own  inconsiderate  vehemence  or  greed.'     No  state  or  people 
can,  under  any  circumstances,  be  justified  in  engaging  the  strength 
of  the  country  in  enterprises,  with  the  details  of  which  they  have 
not  been  made  acquainted.     If  their   admii'ation  for  lofty   senti- 
ment or  heroic  courage  tempt  them  to  give  their  sanction  to  such 
a  scheme,  the  responsibility  is  shifted  from  him  who  gives  to  those 
who  adopt  the  counsel, — to  this  extent  at  least,  that  they  cannot, 
in  the  event  of  failure,  visit  him  in  any  fairness  with  penal  conse- 
quences.    Nor  are  we  justified  in  allowing  much  force  to  the  plea 
that  Athenian  polity  was  then  only  in  the  days  of  its  infancy  and 
that  peculiar  caution  was  needed  to  guard   against  a  dispositio  i 
too  favorable  to  the  re-establishment  of  a  tyranny.     Such  a  senti- 
ment could  not  be  expressed  or  felt  at  the  time  :  and  the  imputa- 
tion is  not  flattering  to  men  who  had  lived  for  twenty  years  under 
the  constitution  of  Solon,  as  extended  and  reformed  by  Kleisthc- 
nes.     It  may  be  true  that  the  leading  Greeks  generally  could  not 
bear  prosperity  without  mental  depravation,   and   that  owing  to 
this  tendency  the  successful  leader  was  apt  to  become  one  of  the 

'  Thuc.  viii.  1.  themselves  constrained  to  pay   to 

^  Xenophon,  Hellen.  I.  vii.  39.  Tliemistokles    the    money    which 

^  No  one,  of  course,  will  suppose  they  refused  to  yield  to  Atiltiades. 

that  the  whole  plan  of  Miltiades  In   short,  Miltiades  was  goiujf  ou 

was  confined  to  tlie  expedition  to  an  expedition  by  which  he  thought 

Paros  and  the  paltry  demand  of  a  to  increase   the    revenue   and    to 

hundred  talents  from  the  inhabi-  establish  the  naval   supremacy  of 

tants  of  that  island.     Such  a  sum  Athens.     It  is  n<jt  easy    therelore 

would   scarcely    have   enriched   a  to  suppose  that  the  Athenians  wens 

dozen  Athenians,  far  less  have  cov-  quite  so   ignorant  of  the  object  of 

ered  with  wealth  all  the  Athenians,  his  errand  as  they  pretended  to  be, 

There  can   be  no  doubt  that   the  or  at  the  least  as  tliey  are  said  to 

scheme  which  Miltiades  had  in  his  have  been;  but  when  they  chose 

mind  was  the  same  as  that  which  to  say  that  they  had  been  led  blind- 

Tliemistolvles     carried     out    with  folded    into  the    plan,    it  was   ob- 

greater  success  after  the  battle  of  viously     dangerous     whether    for 

Salamis,  Herod,  viii.  111-3,  and  that  Miltiades  or  for  his  friends  to  con- 

Paros  was  merely  the  first  island  on  tradict  the  Demos  on  a  point  on 

which  the  attempt  was  made.  Then  which    they     could    not    but    be 

at  Andros,  as  now  at  Paros,  the  re-  very    sore.      Regarded    thus,   the 

fusal  to  contribute  money  was  fol-  case  of  Miltiades  presents  a  strik- 

lowed  by  a  blockade  :  and  fearing  ing  parallel  to  that  of  Sir  Walter 

the  consequences,  the  Parians  felt  Raleigh. 


160  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

most  dangerous  men  in  the  community  ;  but  tliis  fact  cannot 
divest  a  people  of  responsibility  for  their  own  resolutions.  It 
would  be  unjust  to  say  less  than  this,  even  on  the  liypothesis  that 
the  popular  tradition  can  be  accepted  as  trustworthy  :  but  a  care- 
ful examination  of  the  story  seems  to  show  that  the  alleged  io-no- 
rance  of  the  Athenians  was  rather  a  veil  thrown  over  a  line  of 
action  ■which,  as  being  unsuccessful,  they  were  disposed  to  regard 
as  discreditable,  and  that  in  the  scheme  itself  tliey  were  the 
accomplices  rather  than  the  dupes  of  Miltiades.  .In  this  instance 
tlie  raid  against  the  islanders  failed,  and  failed  utterly  ;  and  the 
unsuccessful  general  was  crushed.  The  attempt  of  Themistokles 
was  crowned  with  a  larger  measure  of  success,  and  was  accepted 
as  the  earnest  of  a  wide  imperial  sway  for  Athens  in  time  to  come. 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE    INVASION    AND    FLIGHT    OF    XERXES. 

From  the  battle-field  of  Marathon  we  are  carried  back  to  the 
palace  at  Sousaand  the  closing  days  of  king  Dareios, — from  a  land 
Preparation  imperfectly  known  to  one  of  which  we  can  scarcely 
^ion* of  Eu-**"  ^^^'^'^  truth  be  said  to  know  anything.  In  the  long 
rope.  interval   of  ten   years  which   preceded  the   march  of 

Xerxes  against  Hellas  the  character  of  the  drama  is  changed. 
Thus  far  the  contest  between  Greece  and  Persia  exhibits  some- 
thing like  a  connexion  of  political  causes.  But  from  the  return 
of  Datis  to  Sousa  with  his  string  of  P]retrian  captives  the 
macliinery  of  the  tale  becomes  strictly  ethical  and  religious.  By 
Dareios  the  victory  of  Miltiades  is  received  with  a  fierce  outburst 
of  rage  ;  and  his  mind  is  henceforth  concentrated  on  the  one  de- 
sire for  revenge.  All  tlic  might  of  his  empire  must  be  put  forth 
for  the  destruction  of  the  city  which  has  dared  to  withstand  his 
will.  It  is  tlie  crowning  effort  of  human  pride  ;  and  the  gods  come 
forth  at  once  to  curb  and  repress  it.  The  vast  scheme  for  which 
<luring  three  years  gigantic  preparations  are  made  is  first  delayed 
by  the  rebellion  of  Egypt,  and  still  more  seriously  checked  by  the 

dcatli  of  the  king  himself.     The  harder  experience  of 

^'^'       liistarlier  years  bad  taught  Dareios  some  useful  lessons 

of  sobriety  :  but  his  place  was  now  to  be  filled  by  the  spoilt  child 

of  luxury  and  splendor.      The  impulse  of  conquest  has 

^^'^'       carried  the  Persian  power  to  a  height  not  safe  for  man  ; 

and  the  great  king  must  be  driven  by  suiicrnatural   forces  to  tako 


Chap.  V.]       INVASION  AND  FLIGHT  OF  XERXES.  161 

up  a  ruinous  scheme  against  tlie  warning-s  of  liis  better  mind.  For, 
according  to  tlic  not  very  consistent  story  related  by  Herodotos, 
Xerxes  at  first  had  no  wish  to  cai-ry  out  his  father's  designs  against 
Hellas.     During  two  years  he  made  ready  not  for  the  invasion  of 
Europe,  bat  for  the  re-conquest  of  Egypt ;  and  at  the  end  of  that 
time  he  marched  into  that  devoted   land,  and  having 
riveted  more  tightly  the  fetters  which  "liad  been  forged        ^'^' 
for  it  by  Kambyses,  left  it  under  the  rule  of  liis   brother  Achai- 
menes,  who  was  afterwards  slain  by  the  Libyan  Inaros,  tlie  son  of 
Psammetichos.     But  before  Xerxes  set  out  on  his  Egyptian  jour- 
ney, Mardonios,  of  whona   during  the   reign   of  Dareios  we  lose 
sight  altogether  after  his  Makedonian  failure,  had  urged  upon  him 
the  paramount  obligation  of  chastising  Athens,  and  thus  of  getting 
a  footing  on  a  continent  which,  for  its  beauty,  its  fertility,  and  its 
vast  resources,  ought  to  be  the  possession  of  the  great  king  alone. 
The  Peisistratidai  also  brought  forward  the  Athenian  Onomakritos 
who,  as  editor  of  the   prophecies  of   Mousaios,  was  as  ready  to 
promise  victory  to  Xerxes  as  the  prophets  of  Baal  were  to   cheat 
Ahab  with  dreams  of  success  at  Ramoth-gilead  ;  and  the  combined 
effect  of  the  predictions  of  the  soothsayer  and  the  advice  of  the 
Peisistratidai  constrained  Xerxes,  if  we  believe  the  story,  to  sum- 
mon a  council   of  liis  nobles  and  to  lay  before  them  his  whole 
mind.     He   reminded   them,  w^e  are  told,  of  the  conquests  of  his 
predecessors,  and  warned  them    that  the    Persian  power  could 
stand  only  so  long  as  it  remained  aggressive.    No  other  European 
tribes  or  nations  could,  for  strength  of  will  or  keenness  of  mind  or 
readiness  in  resource,  be  compared  with  the  Hellenes  :  and  if  these 
could  be   conquered,  there  Avas  nothing  to   stay  the  triumphant 
progress  of  the   Persian  king  until  he  liad  made  his  empire  com- 
mensurate with  the   bounds  of  the  Ether  itself.     The  sharp  deci- 
siveness of  this  speech  seems  to  leave  little  room  for  doubt  or  dis- 
cussion :  but  Mardonios  is  said  to  regard  it  as  a  mere  invitation  to 
the  assembled  chiefs  to  express   their  independent  opinions,  and 
he  takes  it  up  accordingly  as  an  admission  of  faint-hcartedness  on 
tlie  part  of  Xerxes.     In   his   belief,  there  was  really  no  need  for 
diflidence  or  hesitation. 

The  dead  silence  which  followed  the  speech  of  Mardonios  re- 
mained unbroken  until  Artabanos,  a  brother  of  Dareios  and  uncle 
of  Xerxes,  ventured,  much  after  the  Greek  but  very 
little  after  the  Persian  fashion,  to  urge  that  there  could  tionofArta- 
be  no  decision  on  the  merits  of  a  question  unless  the  ^^^°^- 
arguments  on  both  sides  were  heard  and  weighed.  The  Athenians 
alone  had  defeated  the  army  of  Datis  and  Artaphernes  :  what 
must  the  result  be  when  all  the  Hellenic  tribes  arc  welded  into  a 
single  confederacy  ?     Every  forest  was  eloquent  with  its  warnings. 


162  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

Everywhere  the  tree  which  would  not  bend  to  the  blast  was 
snapped  or  uprooted,  while  the  pliant  sapling-  escaped  ;  and  as  to 
Mardonios  who  much  at  his  ease  in  Sousa  slandered  absent  men 
who  were  better  than  himself,  it  would  be  but  bare  justice  that  he 
should  be  made  to  give  up  his  children  as  hostages  for  the  com- 
plete performance  of  his  boasts  against  the  Greeks,  on  the  under- 
standing that  Artabanos  and  his  children  should  be  slain  if  Mar- 
donios came  back  from  Hellas  in  safety.  No  sooner  had  Arta- 
banos sat  down  than  Xerxes,  bursting  into  rage,  swore  by  the 
whole  stiing  of  his  ancestors  from  the  generation  of  Achaimenes 
himself  that  Artabanos  should  remain  at  Sousa  Avith  the  women 
and  children.  But  while  he  insists  on  the  paramount  duty  of 
taking  vengeance  on  the  Athenians,  he  makes  the  startling  admis- 
sion that  they  will  never  rest  content  with  merely  keeping  the 
invaders  at  bay,  and  that  if  the  great  king  failed  to  invade  Hellas, 
his  carelessness  or  his  neglect  would  be  followed  by  the  invasion 
of  Persia  itself.' 

The  demoniac  impulse"  had  now  driven  Xerxes  to  the  point 
from  wliich  there  was  no  retreating.  The  whole  strength  of  the 
Character  of  empire  Avas  to  be  lavished  on  one  supreme  effort,  and 
the  narra-      ^}jj^^   empire   extended   now   from   the    eastern    limits 

tive  of  He-  ,  .   '■,      ,  i      i  i       /-i  i  <• 

rodotos.  which  it  had  reached  under  Cyrus  to  the  cataracts  or 
the  Nile  and  the  shores  and  islands  of  the  Egean  sea.  The  subju- 
gation of  Thrace  and  Makedonia  involved  the  submission  of  the 
Greek  colonies  on  these  coasts  ;  and  magazines  stored  up  in  places 
along  the  line  of  march  attested  the  vast  resources  of  the  Persian 
monarch.  If  we  arc  to  believe  the  historian,  the  preparations 
were  not  superfluous.  There  was  not  a  single  Asiatic  tribe  unre- 
presented in  the  army  of  Xerxes  :  there  was  not  a  stream  which 
sufficed  for  the  needs  of  his  host  except  the  largest  rivers.  In 
short,  we  arc  brought  into  a  region  where  men  disdain  the  puny 
scale  on  which  mortals  are  ordinarily  compelled  to  work,  while  by 
some  wonderful  means,  in  spite  of  the  lack  of  contemporary  records 
on  either  side,  every  portion  of  the  picture  which  is  drawn  of  it  is 
filled  with  the  most  minute  details.  Personal  anecdotes,  revealing 
the  most  secret  workings  of  the  mind,  light  up  the  dry  catalogues 
of  fleets  and  arniics  ;  and  lists  of  luimbers,  seemingly  interminable, 
are  given  with  a  confidence  which  ini{)lies  that  it  needed  no  effort 
to  retain  them  in  the  memory  for  nearly  half  a  century,  and  that 
no  risk  of  error  was  involved  in  the  process. 

The  expedition  of  Datis  wliich  had  ended  with  the  disaster  of 
Marathon  was  strictly  a  maritime  invasion.     It  was  the  design  of 

'  Herod,  vii.  11.  with  the  notion  of  demoniac  jMisses- 

"  datfioviTj  opfjLT].  Herod,  vii.  18.  eion  which  became  so  fixed  in  the 
The   phrase  has  very  littlo  to  do    Jewish  mind. 


Chap.  V.]       INVASION  AND  FLIGHT  OF  XERXES.  163 

Xerxes  to  overwhelm  the  Greeks  by  vast  masses  poured  into  their 
country  by  land,  while  a  fleet  hugely  larger  than  that  of  Dati? 
should  support  them  by  sea.  For  the  passage  of  the  lyr.  i^  f 
army  across  the  Bosporos  and  the  Strymon  wooden  Xcrxes  to 
bridges  were  constructed  :  to  save  his  fleet  from  the  k*^''*'"'»i- 
catastrophe  which  befell  tliat  ojf  Mardonios  orders  were  given,  it 
is  said,  to  convert  Athos  into  an  island  by  a  canal  which  might 
enable  the  ships  to  avoid  its  terrible  rocks.  At  lengtli  the  host  set 
out  from  Sousa  in  a  stream  wiiicli  doubtless  gathered  volume  as  it 
went  along  ;  but  in  the  story  of  the  march  we  are  at  once  con- 
fronted with  that  exuberance  of  vivid  detail  which  more  than  any- 
thing else  must  awaken  suspicion  of  traditional  narratives.  The 
several  nations  met  at  Kritalla  in  Kappadokia,  and  having  crossed 
the  Halys  marched  to  Kelainai  near  the  sources  of  the  Maiandros, 
where  Pythios,  wlio  had  bestowed  on  Dareios  a  golden  plane-tree 
and  a  golden  vine,  welcomed  the  Persians  with  a  magnificence 
which  excited  the  astonishment  of  Xerxes. 

On  reaching  Sardeis  Xerxes  sent  heralds  to  all  the  cities  of 
Hellas  except  Athens  and  Sparta.'  But  before  his  host  was  to 
cross  into  Europe,  a  stream  of  blood  was  to  flow  on  The  bridge 
the  shores  of  the  Hellespont.  In  making  their  bridges  Hel'iespont 
of  boats  the  Phenicians  had  used  hempen  ropes,  the  480  b.c. 
Egyptians  ropes  made  from  the  fibre  of  papyrus.  A  severe  storm 
destroyed  the  work  of  both.  Xerxes  ordered  the  engineers  of 
the  bridges  to  be  beheaded,  and,  sitting  in  judgment  on  the 
Hellespont  itself,  passed  sentence  that  it  should  receive  three 
hundred  lashes  of  the  scourge,  and  that  it  should  at  the  same  time 
be  branded  by  men  who  Averc  bidden  to  inform  it  that,  whatever 
it  might  choose  to  do,  the  king  would  cross  over  it,  and  that  it 
deserved  no  sacrifice  at  any  human  hands,  as  being  a  treacherous 
and  bitter  water.  His  commands  were  obeyed  ;  but  Xerxes  took 
the  further  precaution  of  having  the  new  bridges  constructed  with 
far  greater  strength  and  care. 

The  scourging  of  the  Hellespont  seems  to  be  as  true  to  Eastern 
instinct  as  the  influence  ascribed  to  Atossa ;  but  these  bridges 
must  have  been  raised  and  the  punishment  of  the 
rebellious  sea  inflicted  in  the  sight  of  European  wit-  gingoftho 
nesses,  if  the  bridges  were  raised  and  the  punishment  Hellespont, 
was  inflicted  at  all.  If  we  put  any  faith  in  the  honesty  of  these 
witnesses,  we  are  scarcely  justified  in  asserting  that  the  latter  story 
sprang  out  of  the  former.  No  room  is  left  for  doubt  that  the 
philosophy  of  Animism,  as  it  has  been  termed,  has  held  sway  at 

■  For  the  reasons  which  seem  to     these   two   exceptions   were    now 
make  it  altogether  unhkely  that     made  for  the  first  time  see  p.  148. 


164  THE  STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

one  time  or  another,  or  perhaps  more  or  less  in  all  times,  over 
every  nation  and  tribe  on  the  face  of  the  eai'th.'  The  impulses 
■which  lead  us  to  treat  inanimate  things  as  living  entities  lie  very 
deep  down  in  our  nature  ;  and  the  man  who  feels  himself  almost 
irresistibly  tempted  to  kick  the  chair  or  table  against  which 
he  has  stumbled  is  neither  more  nor  less  dignified  than  the  Per- 
sian king  who  brands  and  chastises  the  waters  which  have  hurt 
his  bridges.  That  this  impulse  was  felt  with  peculiar  strength 
by  the  Persians,  the  narratives  of  Herodotos  seem  sufficiently 
to  prove.  The  scourging  of  the  Hellespont  is  precisely  paralleled 
by  the  vengeance  of  Cyrus  against  the  river  Gyndes,  and  is  sur- 
passed by  the  horrible  punishment  of  the  horse  which  threw 
Pharnouches.  The  poor  brute,  being  taken  to  the  spot  where 
the  accident  happened,  was  left,  with  its  legs  cut  off,  to  bleed  to 
death.^ 

The  march  of  Xerxes  from  Sardeis  is  presented  to  us  in  a  series 
of  impressive  pictures.  First  came  the  baggage  train  with  the 
The  march  bcasts  of  burden,  followed  by  half  the  force  supplied 
toTbvdos'^'^  ^y  *^*^  tributary  nations, — all  in  confused  masses ; 
480  B.C.  behind  these,  after  a  definite  interval,  a  thousand 
carefully  picked  ]-*ersian  horsemen,  then  a  thousand  spear-bearers 
with  their  lance-heads  turned  towards  the  ground.  These  wei'c 
followed  by  ten  of  the  sacred  horses,  magnificently  caparisoned, 
from  the  Median  plains  of  Nisa,  after  wdiich,  drawn  by  eight  white 
horses,  came  the  sacred  chariot  of  Ahuroniazdao,^  or  Zeus,  on 
which  no  mortal  might  place  his  foot,  the  reins  of  the  horses  being 
held  by  the  charioteer  who  walked  by  the  side.  Then  on  a  car 
drawn  by  Xisaian  isteeds  came  the  monarch  himself,  followed  by  a 
thousand  of  the  noblest  Persians,  then  by  a  thousand  I'ersian 
horsemen,  and  ten  thousand  picked  Persian  infantry  with  golden 
and  silver  apples  or  pomegranates  attached  to  the  reverse  end  of 
their  spears.  Lastly  came  a  myriad  of  l*ersian  cavalry.  Behind 
tliese,  after  an  interval  equal  to  that  which  separated  the  vanguard 
from  the  household  troops,  followed  the  remaining  half  of  the  dis- 
orderly rabble  which  Eastern  kiTigs  are  pleased  to  regard  as  good 
military  material.  The  line  of  march  led  them  across  the  Kaikos 
by  Atarneus  to  Karine,  whence  they  journeyed  on  to  the  Ilian 
land,  kce[)ing  on  the  left  the  heights  of  Ida,  beneath  which  a  storm 
of  thunder  and  lightning  killed  many  in  his  army.  lie  was  now 
in  that  kingdom  in  which,  when  Priam  reigned,  his  enemies  had 
done  deadly  harm.     Here,  therefore,  on  the  lofty  Pergamos  he  is 

'  Tylor,    Primitive  Culture,  di.  brijrlit   Bt-iiig,  who  is  enjri>ff<il  in 

xj.  an    eternal    warfare    with    Anjrro- 

'  Ilerod.  vii.  88.  Maiiiyus,  Ahriman,   the   spirit   of 

'  Ormuzd,  the  wise  spirit,  or  the  darkness.    Myth.  Ar.  Nat.  11.  355. 


Chap.  V.]       INVASION  AND  FLIGHT  OF  XERXES.  165 

said  to  have  sacrificed  a  thousand  cows  to  Athenaia  lilas,  wliile  the 
Mao-jans  poured  libations  to  the  heroes.  The  army,  we  are  told, 
passed  a  night  of  weird  terror,  and  in  the  morning  went  on  its 
way  towards  Abydos.  Here  the  great  king  had  the  delight  of 
sitting  on  the  lofty  throne  of  white  stones  which  at  his  bidding 
the  men  of  Abydos  had  bmlt  for  him.  Beneatli  him  his  vast  fleet 
was  engaged  in  a  mimic  battle  in  wliich  the  Phenicians  of  Sidon 
were  the  victors ;  and  Xerxes,  surveying  the  hosts  which  he  had 
brought  together,  first  pronounced  himself  the  happiest  of  men, 
and  then  presently  wept.  In  the  simple  story  of  Herodotos,  Xerxes 
answers  the  wondering  question  of  Artabanos  by  confessing  that 
the  thought  of  mortality  had  suddenly  thrust  itself  upon  him,  and 
that  the  tears  found  their  way  into  his  eyes  because  at  the  end  of 
a  hundred  years  not  one  of  all  this  great  host  should  remain 
alive.  '  Xay,'  said  Artabanos,  '  there  are  more  woful  things 
than  this.  The  sorrows  that  come  upon  us,  and  the  diseases  that 
trouble  us,  make  our  short  life  seem  long,  and  therefore  from  so 
much  wretchedness  death  becomes  the  best  refuge  ;  and  heaven, 
if  it  give  us  a  taste  of  happiness,  yet  is  found  to  be  but  a  jea- 
lous giver.'  'Let  us  speak  no  more  of  mortal  life,'  answered 
Xerxes,  '  it  is  even  as  thou  say  est.  Yet  let  us  not  bring  evil  things 
to  mind,  when  we  have  a  good  work  in  our  hands.  But  tell  me 
this.  If  thou  hadst  not  seen  the  vision  clearly,  wouldstthou  have 
kept  thine  own  counsel,  or  wouldst  thou  have  changed  ?  Tell  me  the 
truth.'  Artabanos  could  not  but  express  his  liope  that  all  things 
might  go  as  the  king  desired  ;  but  he  added,  '  I  am  still  full  of  care 
and  anxious,  because  I  see  that  two  very  mighty  things  are  most 
hostile  to  thee.'  '  What  may  these  things  be  ? '  asked  the  king, 
'  will  the  army  of  the  Greeks  be  more  in  number  than  mine,  or  will 
our  ships  be  fewer  than  theirs?  for,  if  it  be  so,  we  will  quickly 
biing  yet  another  host  together.'  '  Nay,'  answered  Artabanos, 
'  to  make  the  host  larger  is  to  make  these  two  things  worse  ;  and 
these  arc  the  land  and  the  sea.  The  sea  has  no  harbor  which,  if  a 
storm  come,  can  shelter  so  many  ships  ;  and  we  need  not  merely 
one  haven  but  many  along  the  wliole  coast.  Chance  rules  men, 
and  men  cannot  control  chance.  The  land  too  is  hostile ;  and  if 
nothing  resists  thee,  it  becomes  yet  more  hurtful,  the  further  that 
we  may  go,  for  men  are  never  satisfied  with  good  fortune,  and  so 
the  length  of  the  journey  must  at  last  bring  about  a  famine.  Xow 
that  man  is  bravest  who  is  timid  in  council  and  bold  in  action.' 
'  You  say  well,'  answered  Xerxes,  '  yet  of  what  use  is  it  to  count 
up  all  these  things  ?  for,  if  we  were  always  to  be  weighing  every 
chance,  we  should  never  do  anything  at  all.  It  is  better  to  be  bold 
and  to  suffer  half  the  evil  than  by  fearing  all  things  to  avoid  all 
suffering.  See  how  great  is  the  power  of  the  Persians.  If  the  kings 


166  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH   PERSIA.  [Book  IL 

who  have  gone  before  me  had  followed  counsellors  like  thee, 
it  would  never  have  been  what  it  is  now.  They  faced  the  danger 
and  gained  this  dominion  ;  and  we,  like  them,  go  forth  at  the 
fairest  season  of  the  year  ;  and  whe^i  we  have  subdued  all  Europe, 
we  shall  retuni  home,  having  been  vexed  neither  by  famine  nor  by 
any  other  c\il.  We  carry  great  store  of  food  with  us,  and  we  will 
take  the  corn  of  the  lands  through  which  we  pass.'  But  Artaba- 
nos  was  not  convinced  ;  and  warning  the  king  that  weighty  mat- 
ters  need  many  words,  he  besought  him  not  to  let  the  Asiatic 
lonians  serve  against  their  Idnsfolk.  *  If  they  so  serve,'  he  urged, 
'  they  must  either  be  most  unjust  in  inslaving  the  land  from  which 
they  spring,  or  most  just  by  setting  it  free.  If  they  are  unjust, 
our  gain  is  but  little  :  but  if  they  be  just,  they  can  do  us  great  harm. 
Think  then  on  the  old  saying  that  the  end  of  a  work  is  not  always 
clear  at  the  beginning.'  But  the  king  would  have  it  that  in  this 
Artabanos  was  most  of  all  deceived,  since  to  the  conduct  of  these 
lonians  at  the  bridge  across  the  Danube  Dareios  Avas  indebted  not 
only  for  his  own  life,  but  for  tlie  salvation  of  his  army  and  his 
kingdom  ;  and  having  with  this  assurance  sent  liis  uncle  to  Sousa 
to  guard  his  house  and  his  empire,  he  summoned  liis  chiefs.  '  Be 
strong,'  he  said  to  them,  '  and  of  great  courage.  We  are  march- 
ing against  biave  men  ;  and  if  we  conquer  these,  there  are  none 
on  the  face  of  tlie  earth  who  will  be  able  to  stand  against  us. 
Now  then  let  us  cross  over,  when  we  have  j^rayed  to  the  gods  who 
guard  the  Persian  land.' 

On  the  next  day,  as  the  sun  burst  into  sight,  Xerxes,  pouring 
a  libation  from  a  golden  goblet  into  the  sea,  greeted  the  god  with 
„,  .      the  prayer  that  he  would  suffer  nothino"  to   check  his 

TiiG  crossin*'  i      •  ^  "-^ 

of  the  Hel- "  course  until  he  should  have  carried  his  conquests  to 
lespont.  ^Ijp  uttermost  bounds  of  Europe.  The  cup,  out  of 
which  he  had  poured  the  libation,  he  threw  into  the  sea,  with  a 
golden  mixing-bowl  and  a  Persian  dagger.  From  the  bridges  rose 
the  odor  of  frankincense  :  the  roads  were  strewed  with  myrtle 
branches.  By  the  eastern  bridge  the  infantry  began  to  cross  with 
the  cavalry,  Avhile  the  beasts  of  burden  and  the  camp-followers 
passed  over  on  the  bridge  facing  the  Egean.  Ten  thousand 
Persians,  all  wearing  tiaras,  preceded  the  confused  rabble  which 
crossed  on  the  first  day.  On  the  next  day  Xerxes  himself  passed 
from  Asia  into  Europe  with  the  same  pomp  which  had  marked 
his  departure  from  Sardeis.  For  seven  days  and  seven  nights  the 
procession  swept  incessantly  along  :  and  the  Hellespontian  whose 
eyes  may  well  liave  been  wearied  with  watching  the  endless  train 
gave  utterance  to  abject  fear  or  abject  flattery,  when  he  asked 
why  Zeus   had   come   in   the   guise  of    a   Persian  calling  himself 


Chap.  V.]       INVASION  AND  FLIGHT  OF  XERXES.  167 

Xerxes,  and  bringing  with  him  all  the  nations  of  the  earth  to 
overwhelm  the  Greeks  whom  he  jnight  have  crushed  with  a  few 
myi'iftds. 

Thus,  without  thought  of  coming  woes,  the  fleet  sailed  west- 
wards from  Abydos  to  Doriskos.  Here  on  the  wide  plain,  through 
w-hich  the  Ilebros  finds  its  way  to  the  sea,  Xerxes  thouglit  that 
he  would  do  well  to  see  of  how  many  myriads  he  was  the  master. 
The  sum  total  of  that  host  he  could  ascertain  in  no  The  review 
better  way  than  by  bringing  a  myriad  of  men  into  the  and'fleet"at' 
smallest  possible  space,  and  by  raising  an  inclosurc  Dcn-ii-kos. 
round  this  space,  into  which  other  myriads  were  successively 
brought,  until  the  infantry  alone  were  found  to  amount  to  not  less 
tlian  1,700,000  men.  But  if  the  method  of  enumeration  seem 
rude,  the  details  of  the  physical  characteristics,  the  dress,  the 
weapons,  the  ornaments,  the  dialects,  which  distinguished  the 
several  tribes  or  nations,  are  given  with  a  minuteness  and  a  fulness 
which,  to  be  trustworthy,  nnist  be  the  result  of  contemporary 
registration.  There  is,  however,  no  solid  foundation  for  the  belief 
that  Ilerodotos  in  drawing  up  his  narrative  had  before  him  the 
official  muster-rolls  of  the  Persian  army.  We  have  no  sufficient 
ground  for  thinking  that  such  muster-rolls  ever  existed,  or  that,  if 
they  existed,  they  were  left  in  any  place  where  they  would  become 
accessible  to  the  historian.  The  number  of  tlw  war-vessels  (to 
the  exclusion  of  all  transport  ships  or  small  boats),  belonging  to 
the  fleet  of  Xerxes,  is  said  to  be  stated  both  by  Herodotos  and 
^schylos  at  precisely  1207.  The  sum  seems  to  be  a  departure 
from  the  round  numbers  by  which  the  Persians,  like  all  other 
Eastern  tribes,  seek  to  express  the  notion  of  completeness.  But 
the  familiarity  of  Ilerodotos  with  the  drama  of  the  great  tragic 
poet  will  scarcely  be  questioned  ;  and  it  is,  to  say  the  least,  note- 
worthy that  ^-Eschylos  seems  at  first  sight  to  assert  that  the  whole 
number  of  the  Persian  fleet  was  not  1207,  but  precisely,  as  we 
should  have  expected,  1000.  He  adds  indeed  that  the  number  of 
ships  in  his  fleet  noted  for  their  swift  sailing  amounted  to  207  ; 
but  he  certainly  does  not  say,  as  most  interpreters  have  inferred 
from  his  words,  that  these  207  ships  were  to  be  added  to  the  grand 
total  of  1000.  Even  thus,  however,  the  simple  enumeration  of 
the  total  by  ^schylos  stands  on  a  very  different  footing  from  the 
list  of  factors  which  in  Herodotos  are  made  to  yield  the  same 
result.  With  the  exception  of  the  17  ships  which  the  islanders  of 
the  Egean  are  said  to  have  contributed,  there  is  not  a  single  un- 
even number  to  be  found  among  them.  But  if  the  grand  total  as 
given  by  ^^schylos  was  (as  we  cannot  doubt)  well  known  to 
Athenians  generally,  there  is  nothing  to  surprise  us  in  the  fact,  if 


168  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH   PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

it  should  be  a  fact,  that  some  one  who  misunderstood  the  lines  in 
which  he  suras  up  the  numbers  made  out  the  several  factors  which 
were  to  yield  the  desired  result  and  that  Herodotos  accepted  these 
factors  as  historical.  It  is,  however,  quite  possible  that  a  spurious 
or  forged  list  may  contain  factors  which  are  accurately  given  ;  and 
if  we  may  hazard  a  conjecture  in  the  absence  of  direct  historical 
evidence,  we  should  surely  be  justified  in  supposing  that  the  con- 
tingents of  the  Persian  fleet  which  would  be  best  known  to  the 
Western  Greeks  would  be  those  of  the  Asiatic  Dorians,  lonians, 
and  Aiolians,  together  with  the  ships  furnished  by  the  islanders. 
We  may,  therefore,  fairly  lay  stress  on  the  fact  that  in  the  narra- 
tive of  Herodotos  the  number  of  ships  supplied  by  these  Eastern 
Greeks  with  the  islanders  amounts  to  precisely  the  207  which 
^^schvlos  gives  as  the  number  of  fast-sailing  ships  in  the  service 
of  Xerxes.'  Thus  these  ships  would  probably  be  the  only  vessels 
of  which  ^schylos  would  even  pretend  to  have  anj'^  personal 
knowledge  ;  and  from  his  statement  we  should  infer  that  this  his- 
torical factor  was  merged  in  the  artificial  total  of  1000,  while  a 
certain  Hellenic  pride  may  be  traced  in  the  implied  fact  that  the 
Hellenic  ships  in  the  Persian  fleet  far  surpassed  in  swiftness  the 
vessels  even  of  the  Phenicians.  The  whole  enumeration  becomes 
still  more  suspicious,  when  we  see  that  the  1000  (or,  if  so  it  be, 
1207)  ships  mentioned  by  ^schylos  are  those  which  fought  at  Sa- 
lamis,  whereas  in  Herodotos  this  is  the  number  which  Xerxes  re- 
viewed with  his  land-forces  atDoriskos.  In  the  interval,  accord- 
ing to  the  story  of  Herodotos,  the  Persians  had  lost  647  ships, 
Avhile  the  accessions  made  to  their  fleet  amounted  to  only  120  : 
and  thus  a  further  justification  is  furnished  for  the  conclusion  that 
the  notion  of  completeness  suggested  1000  as  the  fitting  number 
of  a  fleet  which  must  far  exceed  that  which  co-operated  with  the 
army  of  Kambyses  in  Egypt  or  bore  Dareios  to  the  shores  of 
Scythia.  It  is  enough  then  to  say  that  in  the  enumeration  of 
Herodotos  the  ships  conveyed  51  myriadsof  men,whilethe  land- 
force  had  more  than  180  myriads  of  footmen  and  horsemen  and 
of  Arabs  who  rode  on  camels.  To  these  were  added  all  those 
whom  the  king  had  gathered  in  Europe  ;  and  these,  he  maintains, 
could  not  be  less  than  32  myriads.  The  number  of  servants,  tra- 
ders, and  camp-followers  he  regards  as  fully  equal  to  that  of  the 
troops,  so  that  in  all  Xerxes  brought  528  myriads  (5,280,000)  of 
men  as  far  as  Thermopylai  and  the  shore  of  Sepias.  Of  the  wo- 
men, of  all  the  beasts  of  burden,  and  of  Indian  dogs,  it  would,  he 
adds,  be  impossible  to  count  up  the  numbers,  so  that  he  marvelled 

'  Accordiiifr  to  Herodotos,  vii.  89,     and  the  islanders  17— in  alilKaTov 
tbe    lonians  contribute  100  ships,     (5if  Kal  iiTTu. 
tlie  Aiolians   60,  the  Dorians   30, 


CuAi'.  v.]       INVASION  AND  FLIGHT  OF  XERXES.  169 

not  so  much  at  tlie  failing  of  the  streams  as  that  food  could  be 
found  for  so  great  a  multitude,  which  must  have  consumed  daily 
eleven  myriad  pecks  of  corn,  even  if  nothing  were  counted  for 
the  women,  the  beasts  of  burden,  and  the  dogs. 

But  in  truth  Herodotos,  although  without  doubt  convinced  that 
in  speaking  of  the  millions  now  brought  against  Hellas  he  was 
speaking  of  an  historical  fact,  had  an  object  in  view  of  a  still 
higher  and  more  solemn  kind  ;  and  this  purpose  is  set  forth  in  a 
narrative  which  must  be  given  as  he  has  related  it.  No  sooner  was 
the  great  review  ended  than  the  king  sent  for  Dema-  The  confe- 
ratos,  the  Spartan  exile,  and  asked  him  whether  the  xei'xesand 
Greeks  would  venture  to  withstand  him.  '  Thou  art  Dumaratos. 
a  Greek,'  he  said,  '  and,  as  I  hear,  of  no  mean  city.  Now  there- 
fore tell  me,  will  they  lift  their  hands  against  me  ?  fori  think  that 
if  they  were  gathered  together  with  all  the  dwellers  of  the  West, 
they  would  not  be  able  to  resist  me,  because  they  agree  not  one 
with  the  other.'  '  Shall  I  speak  the  truth,'  asked  Demaratos, 
'  or  only  pleasant  things  ? '  Xerxes  gave  his  pledge  that  no  li.irm 
should  befall  him  :  and  the  Spartan  then  assured  the  king  that 
'  poverty  always  dwelt  with  the  Greeks  ;  but  courage  they  have 
won  from  wisdom  and  from  strength  of  law,  by  which  they  keep 
off  both  poverty  and  tyranny.  But,'  he  went  on,  '  though  all  the 
Greeks  are  worthy  of  praise,  yet  now  I  speak  of  the  Spartans  only. 
Be  sure  that  these  will  never  receive  thy  words  Avhich  bring  slavery 
to  Hellas,  and  that  they  will  come  out  against  thee  to  battle,  even 
though  all  the  rest  should  take  thy  side  :  neither  ask  what  their 
numbers  are  that  they  should  do  this,  for  if  a  thousand  set  out, 
these  will  fight  with  thee,  be  they  more  or  be  they  less.'  Xerxes 
laughed.  '  What — will  a  thousand  men  fight  my  great  army  ? 
Tell  me  now — thou  wast  once  their  king — wilt  thou  fight  straight- 
way with  ten  men  ?  Yet  if  each  oi  them  will  match  ten  men  of 
mine,  thou,  their  king,  shouidst  match  twenty  ;  and  then  it  might 
be  as  thou  sayest.  But  if  iii  size  they  be  like  all  other  Greeks 
whom  I  have  se^n,  thy  speech  is  much  like  vain-boasting.  Come, 
let  us  reason  upon  it.  How  could  a  thousand,  or  a  myriad,  or  five 
myriads  who  are  all  free  and  not  ruled  by  one  man  withstand  so 
great  a  host  ?  Nay,  we  arc  more  than  a  thousand  to  one,  even  if 
they  be  five  thousand.  If,  according  to  our  custom,  they  were 
ruled  by  one,  then  through  fear  of  this  one  they  would  becomo 
brave  beyond  their  own  nature,  and  being  driven  by  the  scourge 
would  go  against  a  larger  host  than  their  own.  But  now,  left  to 
their  own  freedom,  they  will  do  none  of  these  things.  Nay,  if 
their  numbers  were  equal  to  ours,  I  doubt  if  they  could  withstand 
us,  for  among  my  spear-bearers  are  men  who  will  fight  with  three 
Greeks    at   once;  and    thus    in    thine    ignorance  thou '  speakest 


170  THE  STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

foolishly.'  The  answer  of  Di^maratos  is  plain-spoken  and  simple. 
'  I  knew  at  the  first,  O  king,  that  the  truth  would  not  please  thee  ; 
but  since  thou  hast  compelled  me,  I  have  spoken  of  the  Spaitans 
as  I  ought  to  speak.  What  love  I  bear  to  them,  thou  knowest 
■well.  They  have  robbed  me  of  my  power  and  of  my  honors  and 
driven  mc  to  a  strange  land,  where  thy  father  received  me  and 
gave  rae  a  home  and  food.  Is  it  likely,  then,  that  I  should  set 
lightly  by  the  kindness  which  he  showed  me  ?  I  say  not  indeed 
that  I  am  able  to  fight  with  ten  men  or  Avith  two,  nor  of  my  own 
will  would  I  fight  with  one  ;  but  if  I  must  fight  and  if  the  stake 
were  great,  then  would  I  choose  to  fight  with  one  of  those  whom 
thou  thinkest  equal  to  three  Greeks.  So  too,  the  Spartans  one  by 
one  are  like  other  men :  but  taken  together  they  are  the  strongest 
of  all  men,  for,  though  they  are  free,  they  are  not  without,  a  lord. 
Law  is  their  master,  whom  they  fear  much  more  than  thy  people 
fear  thee.  Whatever  Law  commands,  that  they  do  :  and  it  com- 
mands always  the  same  thing,  charging  them  never  to  fly  from 
any  enemy,  how  strong  soever  he  be,  but  to  remain  in  their  ranks 
and  to  conquer  or  die.  If  I  seem  to  speak  foolishly,  let  me  keep 
silence  for  the  time  to  come.' 

As  we  may  suppose,  he  was  not  suffered  to  hold  his  peace  ; 
and  for  the  present  Xerxes  is  said  to  have  dismissed  him 
Significance  with  a  kindl}'  smile.  Regarded  as  a  fact,  the  conver- 
tw^^o'nvei-  sation  is  worthless  :  but  if  we  take  it  as  the  expres- 
sationbe-  siou  of  the  historian's  conviction,  it  is  impossible 
xesandDe-  to  exaggerate  its  importance  and  its  value.  This 
maratos.  value  lies  in  the  truth  of  the  lesson  which  it  teaches  : 
and  this  lesson  inforces  the  contrast  between  the  principle  of 
fear  and  the  principle  of  voluntary  obedience.  It  is  profoundly 
true  that  brute  force  driven  by  the  lash  cannot  be  trusted  in 
a  conflict  with  minds  moved  by  the  strength  of  a  deep  moral 
impulse. 

But  the  interest  of  these  conversations  lies  not  merely  in  the 
political  or  moral  truths  which  they  set  forth.  The  career  of 
Demaratos  may  be  said  to  be  significant  in  the  measure  in  which 
it  is  imaginary.  If  his  existence  be  historical  (and  this  is  beyond 
question),  his  story  is  full  of  mystery  from  beginning  to  end. 
There  may  be  nothing  strange  in  his  flight  to  Sousa,  or  wonder- 
Functionsof  ^"^  '"  ^^^^  favor  sliown  to  him  by  the  Persian  king: 
Demaratos  but  it  is  perplexing  that  so  little  should  follow  from 
tiveoftiic  "  his  deep  resentment  against  his  countrymen.  To 
Persian  war.  Xerxes  hc  acts  the  part  of  a  wise  counsellor  and 
a  fearless  friend  :  but  his  counsels  are  never  followed,  and  his 
rivals  for  the  roval   fav^r  see  treachery  in  the  advice  which,  if 


Chap,  v.]      INVASION   AND   FLIGHT   OF  XERXES.  HI 

taken,  must  inevitably  have  involved  the  ruin  of  his  country.  Still 
his  friendly  feelinc;  receives  ample  acknowledijeTnent,  while  yet  it 
is  from  him  (by  a  device  wliich  bears  a  suspicious  likeness  to  that 
of  Ilistiaios)  that  the  Spartans  receive  the  first  intimation  of  the 
dangers  impending  over  t^iem.  In  the  conflicts  ajt  Therraopylai 
he  prepares  the  mind  of  Xerxes  for  a  determined  resistance  from 
his  own  countrymen,  while  the  liistorian  takes  care  that 
with  characteristic  Spartan  pride  lie  shall  make  no  account  of 
the  noble  courage  of  the  Athenians ;'  and  when  the  rejection  of 
his  advice  to  occupy  the  island  of  Kythera  has  sealed  the  doom 
of  the  Persian  expedition,'^  his  name  no  longer  appears  in  a 
history  which  has  no  further  room  for  his  moral  and  religious 
functions. 

Meanwhile  Xerxes  had  been  journeying  through  the  Paionian 
and  Krestonian  land  to  the  banks  of  the  Echeidoros  which,  like 
the  Lissos,  failed  to  supply  the  wants  of  the  barbarians.  Forced  con- 
Bat  if  the  highland  tribes  were  disposed  to  be  submis-  tributions 
sive,  lions  and  wild  cattle,  we  are  told,  more  than  made  Die  and 
up  for  their  degeneracy  ;  and  the  Persian  camels  suf-  °'''"^''  "ties. 
fered  terribly  from  the  onslaught  of  these  unlooked-for  enemies.' 
At  last  the  army  halted  on  the  ground  stretching  from  Tiierme 
to  the  banks  of  the  Haliakmon, — a  distance  of  about  30  miles, 
which  scarcely  corresponds  to  the  huge  numbers  of  the  tradi- 
tional narrative.  Of  the  support  of  this  vast  throng  it  was  neces- 
sary that  some  account  should  be  given  in  their  long  journey  from 
the  Thrakian  Chersonesos.  It  was  scarcely  enough  that  magazines 
of  provisions  should  have  been  filled  long  since  in  forts  or  cities  on 
the  line  of  march.  Possibly  the  invaders,  who  expected  shortly 
to  return  dragging  with  them  myriads  of  Athenian  and  Spartan 
captives,  might  be  expected  to  bestow  a  thought  on  the  food 
which  would  be  needed  for  themselves  and  their  prisoners  on  their 
homeward  journey,  and  may  have  deemed  it  at  the  least  not  worth 
while  to  strip  the  land  through  which  they  passed  or  leave  in  the 
hearts  of  the  people  a  feeling  of  deadly  enmity.  These,  again,  it 
might  l)e  supposed,  would  not  be  sorry  or  slow  to  avail  themselves 
of  the  opportunity  for  retaliation,  when  a  few  months  later  Xerxes 

'  Herod,  vii.  102.  ages  they  had  been  found  in  the 

^  lb.  vii.  234.  Peloponnesos.     But  in  this  narra- 

'  Herodotos  gives,  as  the  boun-  tive  of  Herodotos  the  perplexing 

daiy  of  the  region  within  which  thing  is  that  these  beasts  sliould  be 

lions  at  this  time  ranged,  a  line  allowed  to  get  at  the  camels  at  alb 

drawn  from  the  Thrakian   stream  A  few   Hottentots  will  keep  their 

Nestos    to    the    Akarnanlan    and  encampments  safe  against  the  at- 

Aitolian  Achehlos.     The  myths  of  tacks  of  lions  ;  and  camels  picket- 

the  Nemean  lion  may  perhaps  be  ed   amongst  large  masses  of  men 

taken  as  evidence  that  in  earlier  would  rim  no  risk  whatever. 


172  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  IL 

hurried  tlirougli  their  land  in  his  ignominious  retreat  to  Sousa. 
But  in  this  wonderful  war,  beyond  the  great  issue  between  free- 
dom and  law  on  the  one  side  and  despotism  with  the  scourge  on 
the  other,  everything  turns  out  in  a  way  which  could  never  be 
anticipated,  ^ye  shall  find  Xerxes  with  his  army  starving  in  regions 
where  not  a  hand  is  raised  against  him,  while  Artabazos,  who 
has  to  guard  himself  against  constant  attacks,  makes  his  way 
successfully  through  Makedonia  and  Thrace.  It  might  have  been 
thought  that  the  Persian  invaders  would  leave  among  the  high- 
land tribes  an  accursed  memory  :  but  instead  of  this  we  hear 
only  of  a  singular  worship  paid  to  the  very  road  by  which  the 
king  had  passed  and  which  none  were  ever  allowed  to  break  up 
or  to  till.i 

I>om  Therme,  as  he  looked  westwards  and  southwards,  the 
eyes  of  Xerxes  rested  on  that  magnificent  chain  of  mountains 
Visit,  of  Xer-  which  rises  to  a  head  in  the  crests  of  Olympos  and 
valVof*^^  Ossa,  and  leaving  between  these  two  hills  the  defile 
Tempe.  through  which  the  Peneios  rushes  to  the  sea,  stretches 

under  the  name  of  Pelion  along  the  coast  which  was  soon  to  make 
him  feel  the  wrath  of  the  invisible  gods.  The  tidings  that  the 
channel  of  the  Peneios  was  also  a  gate  of  Thessaly  determined 
liim  to  go  and  see  the  beautiful  vale  of  Tempe.  Here  the  histo- 
rian represents  him  as  gazing  in  wonder  at  the  mighty  walls  of 
rock  which  rose  on  either  side,  and  asking  whether  it  would  be 
possible  to  treat  the  Peneios  as  Cyrus  had  treated  the  Gyndes  or 
the  Euphrates.  Among  the  Hellenic  or  semi-Hellenic  tribes  who 
stooped  to  yield  him  earth  and  water  the  Aleuad  chieftains  of 
Thessaly  had  been  the  most  prominent  and  the  most  zealous. 
From  them  the  question  of  Xerxes  brought  out  the  fact  that  they 
lived  in  a  mere  basin  where  it  was  needful  only  to  stop  the  one 
outlet  of  its  streams  in  order  to  make  the  whole  land  a  sea  and 
destroy  every  soul  within  its  mountain  barriers.  Xerxes  was  not 
slow,  it  is  said,  in  appreciating  the  force  and  meaning  of  Thes- 
salian  ardor.  People  who  live  in  a  country  which  can  be  taken 
without  trouble  do  wisely,  he  maintained,  in  making  a  league 
betimes  with  the  invader. 

Long  before  the  departure  of  Xerxes  from  Sousa  the  course  of 
events  in  Western  Hellas  had  been  determining  the  parts  which 
Athens  and  Sparta  were  severally  to  play  in  the  approaching 
struggle.  The  long  and  uninteresting  feud  or  warfare  between 
Athens  and  Aigina  had  at  least  one  good  result  in  fixing  the 
attention  of  the  Athenians  rather  on  their  navy  than  on  their 
army.  Of  the  need  of  an  eflficient  fleet  Themistoklcs  had  from  the 

'  Herod,  vii.  115. 


Chap.  V.]       INVASION  AND  FLIGHT  OF  XERXES.  1T3 

very  beginning  of  his  career  been  conscious,  and  this  want  he 
persistently  strained  every  nerve  to  supply.  With  him  the  mari- 
time greatness  of  Athens  was  the  one  end  on  which  all  his  efforts 
were  concentrated  ;  and  the  change  of  policy,  on  which  he  was 
thus  led  to  insist,  undoubtedly  embittered  the  anta-  Eivalry  of 
gonism  which  had  already  placed  a  great  gulf  between  kies'and°" 
himself  and  Aristeides.  The  growing  wealth  of  Themi-  Aristeicles. 
stokles,  the  increasing  poverty  of  his  rival  ;  the  rigid  integrity  of 
the  latter,  the  winning  versatility  of  the  former  ;  the  attachment 
of  Aristeides  to  the  old  forms  of  Athenian  life,  the  determination 
of  Themistokles  to  make  Athens  pre-eminently  a  maritime  power 
— all  presented  a  contrast  involving  so  much  danger  to  the  state 
that  Aristeides  himself  (if  we  believe  a  tradition  already  noticed) 
said  that  if  the  Athenians  were  wise  they  would  put  an  end  to 
their  rivalry  by  throwing  them  both  into  theBarathron  ;  and  the 
Demos  so  far  took  the  same  view  that  by  a  vote  of  ostracism 
Aristeides  was  sent  into  exile.  In  him  Athens  lost  a 
citizen  incomparably  superior  to  his  rival  in  every  pri- 
vate virtue  and  in  general  morality  ;  in  Themistokles  she  retained 
the  only  man  who  could  guide  her,  through  seemingly  hopeless 
difficulties,  to  victory  and  imperial  power.  The  ostracism  of 
Aristeides  affirmed  the  adoption  of  the  new  policy  in  preference 
to  the  old  conservative  theory  which  regarded  the  navy  as  the 
seed-bed  of  novelty  and  change  :  and  it  cannot  be  doubted  that 
Themistokles  would  strengthen  this  resolution  by  dwelling  on  the 
certainty  of  a  fresh  effort  on  the  part  of  the  Persian  king  to  carry 
out  the  design  on  which,  as  they  knew,  his  father  Dareios  had  set 
his  heai't.  From  the  petty  strife  with  Aigina  he  would  lead  them 
to  the  momentous  contest  which  awaited  them  with  the  whole 
power  of  Asia.  He  would  not  fail  to  impress  on  them  the  fact 
that  this  mighty  force  was  to  be  directed  especially  against  them- 
selves, and  that  it.  was  as  necessary  to  be  prepared  against  the 
formidable  Phenician  fleet  which  had  crushed  their  eastern  kins- 
folk as  against  any  armies  which  might  assail  them  by  land. 
Nor  would  there  be  any  difficulty  in  persuading  them  that  the 
foundations  of  their  naval  supremacy  should  be  laid  in  the  forti- 
fication of  Peiraieus  with  its  three  natural  harbors'  rather  than 
in  the  open  bay  of  Phaleron  to  the  east  of  the  promontory  of 
Mounychia.  It  was  a  happy  thing  both  for  the  statesman  and  for 
the  city  whose  true  interests  he  had  so  thoroughly  at  heart,  that 
the  proposed  expedition  of  Dareios  was  delayed  first  by  the 
revolt  of  Egypt,  then  by  his  death,  and  lastly  by  the  long  time 
spent  by  Xerxes  before  he  set  out  from  Sousa,  while  the  internal 

'  Time.  i.  93. 


174  THE  STRUGGLE  WITH   PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

resources  of  Athens  were  enormously  increased  by  the  proceeds 
of  the  silver  mines  of  Laurcion,  a  district  lying  between  the 
triangle  of  which  a  line  drawn  from  Thorikos  on  the  east  to 
Anaphlystos  on  the  west  forms  the  base  with  cape  Sounion  for  its 
apex. 

This  quickening  of  the  Athenian  mind  under  the  guidance  of 
Themistokles  was  not  the  only  good  effect  produced  by  the  sha- 
Pan-heilenic  ^*^^^  ^^  ^^^^  storm-cloud  approaching  from  the  East. 
congress  at  Some  at  least  among  the  other  Greeks  began  to  see  that 
ofVorimh.  they  were  not  fulfilling  their  true  mission  by  wasting 
481  B.C.  their  years  in  perpetual  warfare  and  feud;  and  in  an 
assembly  which  deserved  to  be  considered  in  some  degree  as  a 
Pan-hellenic  congress,  they  acknowledged  the  paramount  need  of 
making  up  all  existing  quarrels  in  presence  of  a  danger  which 
threatened  all  alike.  In  face  of  this  common  peril  the  men  of 
Aigina  laid  aside  their  feud  with  the  Athenians ;  but  the  joint 
action  of  the  day  was  in  their  case  followed  unhappily  by  the 
renewed  enmity  of  the  morrow.  In  fact,  %vhatever  might  be  the 
outward  look  of  things,  the  Hellenic  character  was  not  changed ; 
and  although  invitations  were  sent  to  the  Greeks  of  Sporadic' 
Hellas  from  Krete  to  Sicily,  the  summons  was  by  some  disregard- 
ed, while  even  among  the  states  which  were  prepared  to  sacrifice 
most  in  the  common  cause  no  further  approach  was  made  towards 
a  true  national  union.  It  was  a  time  of  high  excitement.  Of  all 
the  Hellenic  cities  the  greater  number  were  Medizing,  or  taking 
sides  with  the  Persian,  while  they  who  refused  to  submit  to 
Xerxes  were  cast  down  at  the  thought  of  tlie  utter  inadequacy  of 
their  navy  to  cope  with  his  Phenician  fleet.  In  this  season  of  su- 
preme depression  the  great  impulse  to  hope  and  vigorous  action 
came  from  Athens.  The  historian  asserts  that  his  words,  which 
he  knows  w'ill  give  great  offence  in  many  quarters,  are  forced  from 
him  by  strong  conviction  of  their  truth  ;  and  his  emphatic  judg- 
ment is  that  if  the  Athenians  had  feared  the  coming  danger  and 
left  their  country,  or,  even  without  leaving  it,  had  yielded  them- 
selves to  Xerxes,  none  else  would  have  dared  to  withstand  the 
king  by  sea,  while  on  land,  even  if  many  walls  had  been  raised 
across  the  isthmus,  the  Spartans  would  have  been  forsaken  by  their 
allies,  as  these  submitted  one  by  one  to  the  Persian  fleet.  Hence 
tlie  Athenians  are  with  him  pre-eminently  the  saviours  of  Hellas. 
With  them  the  scale  of  things  w-as  to  turn  ;  and  they  chose  that 
Hellas  should  continue  free,  and  raised  up  and  cheered  all  those 
who  would  not  yield  to  the  Persian.  Thus  next  after  the  gods,  he 
adds,   they  drove  away  the  king,   because   they  feared  not  the 

1  See  p.  1. 


Chap.  V.]       INVASION  AND  FLIGHT  OF  XERXES.  1T5 

oracles  of  Delplioi  neith(n'  were  scared  by  the  gi-cat  perils  wliicli 
were  coming  upon  their  country.' 

But  for  the  present  the  plan  of  his  narrative  rendered  it  neces- 
sary to  bring  out  in  the  most  striking  contrast  the  seemingly  irre- 
sistible might  of  the  Persian  king  and  the  disunion  and   ,p|,g,jQ. 
vacillation  of  his  adversaries.     This  contrast  becomes   swers  re- 
most  forcible  when  the  Athenians,  who  are  regarded  as   oelphotby 
the  special  objects  of  his  wrath,  betake  themselves  for   the  Athe- 
coiinsel  in  the  hour  of  need  to  the  god  at  Delphoi.  How 
little  worth  are  the  answers  ascribed  to  the  Pythian  priest-ess,  we 
shall  see  at  once  when  wc  remember  that  the  numerical   majority 
of  the  Greek  states  was  decidedly  in  favor  of  submission  to  Xerxes, 
that  the  policy  of  resisting  chiefly  by  sea  was  thoroughly  distaste- 
ful to  the  strictly  conservative  citizens  headed  by  Aristeides,  and 
that  even  those  Greeks  who  were  determined  not  to  submit  to  the 
Persian  were  greatly  depressed  by  tiie  memory  of  the  Ionic  revolt 
and  its  disastrous  issue.     Here,  as  elsewhere,  the  epical  feeling  of 
the  historian  and  his  informants  has  exhibited  itself  in  a  narrative 
of  singular  beauty.     We  have  first  the  very  blackness  of  darkness 
in  the  pitiless  response  of  the   god  to   the  Athenian   messengers 
when  first  they  approached  the  Delphian  shrine. 

O  wretched  people,  why  sit  ye  still  ?  Leave  your  homes  and  the  strong- 
holds of  your  city,  and  tiee  away. 

Head  and  body,  feet  and  hands,  nothing  is  sound,  but  all  is  wretched  ; 

For  fire  and  war,  which  are  liasieaing  hither  on  a  Syrian  chariot,  wilt 
presently  make  it  low  ; 

And  other  strong  places  also  shall  they  destroy  and  not  yours  only, 

And  many  temples  of  the  undying  gods  shall  they  give  to  the  flame. 

Down  their  walls  the  big  drops  are  streaming,  as  they  tremble  for  fear ; 

And  from  their  roofs  the  black  blood  is  poured  down,  for  the  sorrow 
that  is  coming : 

But  go  ye  from  my  holy  place  and  brace  up  your  hearts  for  the  evil. 

The  messengers  were  dismayed  ;  but  they  received  the  first  glim- 
mering of  comfort  from  the  Delphian  Timon  who  bade  them  take 
olive-branches  and  try  the  god  once  more.  To  their  entreaty  for 
a  more  merciful  answer  they  added  that,  if  they  failed  to  receive 
it,  ihey  would  stay  there  till  they  died.  Their  supplication  was 
rewarded  with  these  mysterious  utterances, 

Pallas  cannot  prevail  with  Zeus  who  lives  on  Olympos,  though  she  has 

besought  him  with  many  prayers ; 
And  his  word  which  I  now  tell  you  is  firmly  fixed  as  a  rock. 
For  thus  saith  Zeus  that,  when  all  else  within  the  land  of  Kekrops  is 

wasted,  the  wooden  wall  alone  shall  not  be  taken  ;  and  this  shall 

help  you  and  your  children. 

'  Herod,  vii.  139. 


1T6  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH   PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

But  wait  not  until  tlie  horsemen  come  and  the  footmen  ;  turn  your 
backs  upon  them  now,  and  one  day  ye  shall  meet  them. 

And  thou,  divine  Salamis,  shalt  destroy  those  that  are  born  of  women, 
when  the  seedtime  comes  or  the  harvest. 

These  words,  as  being  more  hopeful,  the  messengers,  we  are  told, 
wrote  down,  and  having  returned  to  Athens  read  them  before  the 
people.'  This  fact  is  distinctly  asserted  by  Herodotos,  and  we 
have  no  reason  for  questioning  it :  but  the  very  ease  with  which 
this  response  was  made  to  coincide  with  the  policy  of  Themisto- 
kles,  seems  to  throw  a  clear  light  on  the  influence  which  produced 
it.  The  mind  of  the  great  statesman  had  long  been  made  up  that 
Athens  should  become  a  maritime  power.  He  had  resolved  not 
less  firmly  that  the  main  work  of  beating  ofl  the  Persians  should 
be  wrought  at  sea,  as  he  saw  little  chance  of  its  being  done 
effectually  by  land  only  ;  and  his  whole  career  supplies  evidence 
that  he  would  with  slight  scruple  or  none  adopt  whatever  measures 
might  be  needed  to  carry  out  his  resolutions.  ~\Ve  have  then  uo 
reason  for  doubting  that  when  the  answer  was  read  out  before  the 
assembled  citizen.s,  Themistokles  could  at  once  come  forward  and 
say,  as  he  is  reported  to  have  said,  '  Athenians,  the  soothsayers 
wlio  bid  you  leave  your  country  and  to  seek  another  elsewhere, 
are  wrong ;  and  so  are  the  old  men  who  tell  you  to  stay  at  homo 
and  guard  the  Akropolis,  as  though  the  god  pointed  to  our  Akro- 
polis  wlien  he  speaks  of  the  wooden  wall,  because  long  ago  there 
was  a  thorn  hedge  around  it.  This  will  not  help  you  ;  and  they 
are  all  leading  you  astray  when  they  say  that  you  must  be  beaten 
in  a  sea-fight  at  Salamis,  and  that  this  is  meant  by  the  words  which 
tell  of  Salamis  as  destroying  the  children  of  women.  The  words 
do  not  mean  this.  If  they  had  been  spoken  of  us,  the  priestess 
would  certainly  have  said  "  Salamis  the  wretched,"  not  "  Salamis 
the  divine,"  if  the  people  of  the  land  were  doomed  to  die  there. 
They  arc  spoken  not  of  us,  but  of  our  enemies.  Ami  then  for  the 
fight  at  sea,  for  the  fleet  is  your  wooden  wall.'  But  if  we  may 
not  question  the  fact  that  the  response  was  susceptible  of  the  in- 
terpretation put  upon  it  by  Themistokles,  and  indeed  that  it  could 
not  well  bear  any  other,  we  have  to  remember  the  means  by  which 
the  responses  Avere  produced  which  bade  Kleomenes  drive  the 
Peisistratidai  from  Athens,"  or  enjoined  the  deposition  of  Dema- 
ratos.^  It  is  notorious  that  Themistokles  was  at  least  as  unscrupu- 
lous as  Kleisthencs  ;  and  it  is  to  the  last  degree  unlikely  that  he 
should  fail  to  avail  himself  of  an  instrument  so  well  fitted  to  fur- 
ther his  designs. 

'  If  we  take  these  words  in  their    to  involve  the  fact  that   that  re- 
strict sense,  they  would  imply  that     sponse  was  of  later  labrication. 
the  previous  answer  was  not  written         '  See  p.  86. 
down, — a  conclusion  which  seems        '  See  p.  149. 


Chap.  V.j       INVASION  AND  FLIGHT  OF  XERXES.  1T7 

But  although  by  adopting  the  policy  of  Themistokles  Athens 
virtually  insured  her  own  supremacy  in  Hellas,  the  time  was  not 
yet  come  when  it  could  be  generally  recognised.  The  ^  ... 
position  of  Athens  and  the  large  number  of  ships  ness  of  the 
which  she  was  able  to  contribute  seemed  to  justify  her  Krltlns', 
claim  to  the  conduct  of  the  war  by  sea  :  but  the  allies  and  liorky- 
assembled  in  the  congress  at  the  isthmus  declared 
bluntly  that  they  would  rather  dissolve  the  confederacy  than  sub- 
mit to  any  other  than  the  Spartan  rule  ;  and  the  genuine  patriot- 
ism of  the  Athenians  led  them  at  once  to  waive  a  clain*on  which 
they  might  fairly  have  insisted.'  From  Argos,  from  Boiotia  gen- 
erally, and  from  Thebes  in  particular  they  had  nothing  to  hope. 
The  Argives  were  content,  as  they  said,  to  be  neutral  in  a  strife  in 
which  their  kinsfolk  on  either  side  were  antagonists.  With  the  ex- 
ception of  Thespiai  and  Plataiai  the  Boiotian  cities,  it  is  clear,  were 
passive  instruments  in  the  hands  of  their  chief  men ;  and  these  men 
were  actuated  by  a  vehement  Medism  which  with  them  became  the 
expression  of  an  anti-Hellenic  feeling  beyond  the  power  of  defeat 
and  disaster  to  repress  or  even  to  check.  The  Kretans  urged  as 
an  excuse  for  not  meddling  in  these  matters  a  Delphian  response 
which  bade  them  remember  how  little  they  had  gained  by  their 
efforts  to  avenge  the  death  of  Daidalos  and  the  wrongs  and  woes 
of  Helen. ^  The  men  of  Korkyra,  carrying  thus  early  into  prac- 
tice the  policy  of  isolation  for  which  they  afterwards  became  no- 
torious,^ met  the  messengers  from  the  Congress  with  eager  assur- 
ances of  ready  help.  They  even  carried  their  words  into  action  : 
but  the  sixty  ships  which  they  manned  were  under  officers  who 
were  charged  to  linger  on  their  way  along  the  southern  coasts  of 
Peloponnesos.  Their  conviction  was  that  the  Hellenic  fleet  and 
armies  mu.st  alike  be  defeated ;  and  thus,  when  Xerxes  had  be- 
come lord  of  Hellas,  they  might  fall  down  before  him  and  take 
credit  for  the  goodwill  which  had  withheld  them  from  exerting 
against  him  a  force  not  altogether  to  be  despised.  The  event 
disappointed  their  expectations  :  but  it  was  easy  to  satisfy  the 
victors  of  Salamis  that  they  were  making  what  haste  they  could 
to  the  scene  of  action  when  the  Etesian  winds  baffled  all  their 
efforts  to  double  cape  Malea.'' 

From  Gelon,  the  tyrant  of  the  great  Corinthian  colony  of 
Syracuse,  the  continental  Hellenes  expected  greater  things.  In 
this  hope  they  were  disappointed  ;  but  the  inconsistent  stories  told 
to  account  for  his  refusal  to  help  them  sufficiently  show  the  stuff 
out  of  which  popular  traditions  arc  made  and  the  processes  by 
which  they  take  shape.    The  city  of  Syracuse  had  risen  to  a  posi' 

'  Herod,  viii.  2,  3.  '  Time.  i.  33-37. 

^  II).  vii.  169.  ■*  Herod,  vii.  168. 

8* 


ITS  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

tion  and  a  power  second  only  to  that  of  Sparta  or  of  Athens  :  and 
it  was  as  natural  to  suppose  that  Gelon  would  stand  un  his  dignity 
Mission  to  and  insist  on  co-ordinate  power  with  those  two  states 
of'sTracu^e"'  ^*  ^hat  they  should  refuse  to  admit  his  claim.  Tliis 
481  B.C.  idea  has  taken  shape  in  the  tale  which  relates  liow  the 
messengers  from  the  Congress  told  him  of  the  coming  of  the 
Persian,  professedly  for  the  purpose  of  taking  vengeance  on 
Athens,  but  really  with  the  design  of  inslaving  all  the  Greeks,  and 
besought  him,  in  his  own  interest  as  well  as  theirs,  to  unite  hand 
and  heart  in  the  effort  to  break  his  power.  '  It  is  vain  to  think,' 
they  urged,  '  that  the  Persian  will  not  come  against  you,  if  we  are 
conquered.  Take  heed  in  time.  By  aiding  us  thou  savest  thy- 
self ;  and  a  good  issue  commonly  follows  wise  counsel.'  The 
answer  of  Gelon  was  a  vehement  outburst  against  their  grasping 
selfishness.  '  When  I  sought  your  aid,'  he  said,  '  against  the  men 
of  Karchedon  (Carthage),  and  proinised  to  open  to  you  markets 
from  which  you  have  reaped  rich  gains, '  ye  would  not  come  ;  and, 
as  far  as  lies  with  you,  all  this  country  had  been  under  the  barbarians 
to  this  day.  But  I  have  prospered  ;  and  now  that  war  threatens 
you,  ye  begin  to  remember  Gelon.  I  will  not,  however,  deal  with 
you,  as  ye  have  dealt  with  me.  I  will  give  you  200  triremes  and 
20,000  hoplites,  with  horsemen  and  archers,  slingers  and  runners. 
I  will  also  give  corn  for  ail  the  army  of  the  Greeks  as  long  as  the 
war  may  last ;  but  I  will  do  this  only  on  condition  that  I  be  the 
chieftain  and  leader  of  the  Greeks  against  the  barbarians.'  This 
demand  over-taxed  the  patience  of  the  Spartan  Syagros.  '  In 
very  deed,'  he  said,  '  would  Agamemnon  the  son  of  Pelops  mourn, 
if  he  were  to  hear  that  the  Spartans  had  been  robbed  of  their 
honor  by  Gelon  and  the  Syracusans.  Dream  not  that  we  shall 
ever  yield  it  to  you.  If  thou  choosest  to  aid  Hellas,  do  so,  under 
the  Spartans  :  if  thou  wilt  not  have  it  so,  then  stay  at  home.' 
But  Gelon  was  ready  with  liis  answer.  '  Spartan  friend,'  he  said, 
'  abuse  commonly  makes  h.  man  angry  ;  but  I  will  not  pay  back 
insults  in  kind,  and  thus  far  I  will  yield.  If  ye  rule  by  sea,  I  will 
rule  by  land  ;  and  if  ye  rule  by  land,  then  must  I  rule  on  the  sea.' 
But  here  the  Athenian  messenger  stood  forth  and  said,  '  King  of 
the  Syracusans,  the  Hellenes  have  sent  us  not  because  they  want  a 
leader,  but  because  they  want  an  army.  Of  an  army  thou  sayest 
little  ;  about  the  command  much.  When  thou  didst  ask  to  lead 
us  all,  we  left  it  to  the  Spartans  to  speak  :  but  as  to  ruling  on  the 
sea,  that  we  cannot  yield.  We  grudge  not  to  the  Spai'tans  their 
power  by  land  ;  but  we  will  give  place  to  none  on  the  sea.  We 
have  more  seamen  than  all  the  Greeks ;  we  are  of  all  Greeks  the 

'  Herod,  vii.  158. 


Chap.  V.]        INVASION  AND  FLIGHT  OF  XERXES.  179 

most  ancient  nation,  and  in  the  war  of  wliicli  Homer  sings,  our 
leader  was  the  best  of  those  who  came  to  Ilion  to  set  an  army  in 
battle  array.'  '  '  Athenians,'  answered  Gelon,  '  you  seem  likely  to 
have  many  leaders,  but  few  to  be  led.  But  since  ye  will  yield 
nothing  and  grasp  evci*ything,  hasten  home  and  tell  the  Greeks 
tliat  the  spring-time  has  been  taken  out  of  their  year.'  Such  is 
the  tale  which  Herodotos  relates  as  most  generally  believed 
among  the  continental  Greeks  about  the  conduct  of  Gelon  during 
the  Persian  war ;  but  he  has  the  candor  to  give  other  accounts 
which  deprive  the  popular  tradition  of  all  its  valuo.  According 
to  one  of  these  stories  Gelon  sent  Kadmos  of  Kos  with  a  charge 
similar  to  that  which  was  given  to  the  commander  of  the  Korky- 
raian  fleet.  He  was  to  go  with  a  large  sum  of  money  to  Delphoi ; 
and  if  the  Persian  gained  the  victory,  he  was  to  present  the 
money  to  Xerxes  as  a  peace-offering.  If  the  Greeks  should  gain 
the  day,  he  was  to  bring  it  back  again.  The  historian,  having 
added  that  to  his  great  credit  he  did  bring  it  back,  goes  on  to  give 
the  Sicilian  version  of  the  affair  which  asserted  that  in  spite  of 
Spartan  supremacy  Gelon  would  still  have  aided  the  Greeks,  had 
not  Terillos  the  banished  tyrant  of  Himera  brought  against  him 
under  Haniilkar  a  host  of  Phenicians,  Libyans,  Iberians  and 
other  tribes  equal  in  number  to  the  Persians  who  fought  under 
Mardonios  at  Pkxtaiai,''  and  that  therefore,  being  unable  to  help 
them  with  men,  he  sent  a  supply  of  money  for  their  use  to 
Delphoi. 

But  if  Argos  and  Korkyra,  Krete  and  Syracuse,  were  not  to  be 
trusted,  and  if  Thebes  with  the  Boiotian  cities  was  bitterly  hostile, 
it  was  still  possible  to  preserve  the  Hellenic  tribes  Abandon- 
which  lay  to  the  south  of  the  pass  of  Tempe  and  to  meut  of  the 
secure  their  aid  against  the  invader.  In  any  effort  to  Teinpe. 
guard  the  defile  of  Tempe  the  Thessalians  declared  4S0b.c. 
themselves  eager  to  take  pare  to  the  utmost  of  their  power  :  but 
tliey  admitted  plainly  that  their  geographical  position  left  them 
absolutely  dependent  on  the  aid  of  their  Hellenic  kinsfolk,  and 
that,  if  tbis  aid  were  withheld,  they  must  secure  their  safety  by 
making  a  covenant  with  the  Persian  king  which  would  assuredly 
constrain  them  to  fight  against  those  whom  they  would  infinitely 
prefer  to  help.  It  might  well  have  been  thought  that  no  post 
could  have  been  more  easily  tenable  than  this  Thessalian  defile, 
along  which  for  a  distance  of  five  miles  a  road  stretches,  nowhere 
more  than  20,  and  sometimes  not  more  than  13  feet  in  width. 
Hence  no  time  was  lost  in  occupying  the  pass  with  10,0UU 
hoplites,  aided  by  the  Thessalian  cavalry,  under  the  command  of 

»  Herod,  ii.  554.  '  lb.  vii.  165. 


180  THE  STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

the  Spartan  Euainetos  and  the  Athenian  Themistokles.     But  they 

held  the  pass  for  a  few  days  only  ;  and  popular   traditions,  as 

usual,  assigned  its  abandonment  to  different  motives.    The  thought 

of  guarding  Terape  being  given  up,  it  was  resolved  that  a  stand 

should   be  made  in  the  detile  of  Thermopylai   while  the   fleet 

should  take  up  its  station  on  the   northernmost   coast   of  Euboia 

which  received  its  name  from  a  temple  of  Artemis.     It  would 

have  suited  better  with  the  Greek  tactics  of  this  day  to  await  the 

Persians  in  the  narrower  pass  of  the  strait  which  separated  Chal- 

kis  from  the  Boiotian  coast :  but  to  do  this  would  have  been  to 

allow  the  Persian  fleet  to  take  the  guardians  of  Thermopylai  in 

the  rear. 

The  accumulation  of  mud  at  the  mouth  of  the  Spercheios  has 

in  the  course  of  three-and-twcnty  centuries  so  changed  the  coast 

_,.       .    .       of  the  Malian  gulf  that  some  of  the  most  material  fea- 
Thc  mission  ,        ,        v        .      .  ,    tt         i  ,  i 

of  Lconidas   tures  in  the   description  of  Herodotos  no  longer  cha- 

to°Thermo-'*   ractcrisc  this  memorable  spot.     In  his  day  the  Sper- 
pyiai.  June,   cheios,  which  drained  the  plain  between  the  ransre  of 

480  B  c 

Tymphrestos  and  Othrys  on  the  north  and  that  of  Oita 
on  the  south  precisely  as  the  Peneios  drained  the  great  Thessalian 
plain  to  the  south  of  Pindos,  ran  into  the  gulf  near  the  town  of  Anti- 
kyra  at  a  point  about  22  miles  due  west  of  the  Kenaian  or  north- 
westernmost  promontory  of  Euboia.  From  its  mouth  the  coast, 
liaving  stretched  southwards  for  somewhat  more  than  two  miles, 
trended  away  to  the  east ;  and  at  short  intervals  the  sea  here  re- 
ceived the  small  streams  of  the  Dyras,  Melas,  and  Asopos.  These 
insignificant  rivers  are  now  discharged  into  the  Spercheios  which, 
flowing  on  the  south  instead  of  on  the  north  side  of  Antikyra, 
reaches  the  sea  at  a  point  considerably  to  the  east  of  Thermopylai. 
We  look  therefore  in  vain  for  the  narrow  space  which,  leaving 
room  for  nothing  more  than  a  cart  track,  gave  access  to  the  pass 
within  which  so  many  Persians  were  to  meet  their  death.  Close 
above  the  town  of  Anthela,  the  ridge  of  Oita,  known  there  by  the 
name  Anopaia,  came  down  so  close  to  the  water  as  to  leave  only 
this  narrow  pathway.  Between  this  point,  at  a  distance  of  perhaps 
a  mile  and  a  half  to  the  east  and  a  little  to  the  west  of  the  first 
Lokrian  hamlet  of  Alpenoi,  another  spur  of  the  mountain  locked 
in  the  wider  space  within  which  the  array  of  Leonidas  took  up  its 
post,  but  which  for  all  practical  purposes  was  as  narrow  as  the 
passes  at  either  extremity  which  received  the  name  of  the  Gates 
or  the  Hot  Gates  (Pylai,  or  Thermopylai).  This  narrow  road  was 
hemmed  in  by  the  precipitous  mountain  on  the  one  side,  and  on 
the  other  by  the  marshes  produced  by  the  hot  springs.  But  to 
render  the  passage  still  more  difficult  than  nature  had  made  it,  the 


Chap.  V.]        INVASION  AND  FLIGHT  OF  XERXES.  181 

Phokians  bad  led  the  mineral  waters  almost  over  the  whole  of  it 
and  had  Jilso  built  across  it  near  the  western  entrance  a  wall  with 
strong  gates.  Mncb  of  this  work  had  fallen  from  age  ;  but  it  was 
now  repaired,  and  behind  it  we  are  told  that  the  Greek  army 
determined  to  await  the'  attack  of  the  Persians.  Here,  about  the 
summer  solstice,  when  Xerxes  had  already  reached  Therme,  was 
assembled  a  force  of  Spartans  and  their  allies  under  Leonidas  who 
to  his  surprise  had  succeeded  to  the  kingly  office.  Of  his  two 
elder  brothers  Dorieus  had  been  killed  in  Sicily,'  and  Kleomenes 
had  died  without  sons.  Thus  Leonidas  became  the  representative 
of  Eurysthenes,  and,  as  Spartan  custom  permitted,  married  his 
brother's  daughter  who  had  foiled  the  efforts  of  the  Milesian 
Aristagoras  to  bribe  her  fatber  into  undertaking  a  wild  and 
desperate  enterprise.^  He  had  set  out  on  this  his  first  and  last 
expedition  as  king  with  three  hundred  picked  hoplites  or  heavy- 
armed  citizens.  On  his  march  he  had  been  joined,  it  is  said, 
by  1000  from  Tegea  and  Mantineia,  by  120  Arkadians  from 
Orchomenos  and  1000  more  from  other  cities,  together  with 
400  Corinthians,  200  from  Phlious  and  80  from  Mykenai,  the 
once  proud  city  of  Agamemnon.  As  he  drew  near  to  the  pass, 
his  army  was  increased  by  1000  Phokians,  by  the  whole  force 
of  the  Lokrians  of  Opous,  by  700  Thespians,  and  lastly  by  400 
Thebans  whom  Leonidas  was  anxious  to  take  with  him  as  host- 
ages for  the  good  faith  of  a  city  strongly  suspected  of  Medism. 
The  fact  remains,  if  the  narrative  generally  deserve  any  credit,  that 
at  a  time  when  they  supposed  the  Persians  to  be  coming  against 
them  almost  with  millions,  they  were  content  to  send  forward  for 
the  maintenance  of  a  pass  second  in  importance  only  to  the  defile 
of  Tempo  a  body  of  troops  not  exceeding  10,000  men.  It  was  the 
month,  Herodotos  tells  us,  of  the  Karneian  festival,  during  which 
it  was  forbidden  to  Dorians  to  go  out  to  war.  It"  was  also  the 
time  of  the  great  Olympic  feast ;  and  the  conclusion  is  forced  upon 
us  that  this  was  regarded  at  Sparta  as  a  sufficient  reason  for  sending 
on  an  advanced  guard  of  only  300  hea\y-armed  citizens,  and  by 
the  Athenians  as  a  reason  for  sending  none  at  all.  But  according 
to  the  story  the  power  of  the  Persians  was  still  too  great  to  allow 
to  the  Greeks  even  the  possibility  of  resistance  ;  and  the  terror 
which  already  oppressed  them  was  deepened  when  they  heard  that 
ten  of  the  fastest  sailing  ships  of  the  Persian  fleet  had  fallen  in 
with  the  three  scout  sliips  which  the  Greeks  had  stationed  off  the 
island  of  Skiathos  about  three  miles  to  the  east  of  the  southernmost 
promontory  of  Magnesia.  At  the  sight  of  the  Persian  vessels  the 
Greek  ships  fled  ;  but  the  Troizenian  ship  was  soon  taken.     The 

'  See  p.  65.  "^  See  p.  138. 


182  THE  STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

Athenian  ship  steered  straight  for  the  mouth  of  the  Peneios,  and, 
wonderful  to  say,  found  its  way  safely  along  a  coast  some  eighty 
miles  in  length  through  the  throng  of  Persian  ships  which  were 
Imrrying  southwards.  The  crew  left  the  stranded  hull  to  the 
barbarians,  and  by  a  good  luck  still  more  wonderful  contrived  to 
march  through  Thessaly  then  occupied  by  some  three  or  four 
millions  of  Persians,  and  so  to  reach  Athens.  But  the  tidings  of 
this  first  encounter  of  Hellenes  and  barbarians  at  sea  had  been 
conveyed  by  fire  signals  from  Skiathos  to  the  fleet  at  Artemision  ; 
and  the  commanders  at  once  sailed  to  Chalkis  with  the  iutention 
of  guarding  the  Euripos. 

Starting  from  Therme,  eleven  days  after  the  departure  of  Xerxes 
with  the  land-forces,  the  Persian  fleet  reached,  we  are  told,  after 
Destruction  a  single  day's  sail  the  southern  part  of  the  strip  of 
of  fhe"per-"  coast  stretching  from  the  mouth  of  the  Peneios  to  the 
8ian  fleet  by  promontory  which  marks  the  entrance  of  the  gulf  of 
theMagne-  Pagasai.  In  utter  unconsciousness  of  danger  the 
siau  coast.  Persian  commanders  moored  upon  the  Magnesian 
beach  those  ships  which  came  first,  while  the  rest  lay  beyond 
them  at  anchor,  ranged  in  rows  eight  deep  facing  the  sea.  At 
break  of  day  the  air  was  clear,  and  the  sea  still :  but  the  breeze, 
here  called  the  wind  of  the  Hellespont,  soon  rose  and  gathered  to 
a  storm.  Those  who  had  time  drew  their  ships  upon  the  shore 
and  escaped  ;  but  all  the  vessels  which  were  out  at  sea  were  borne 
away  and  dashed  upon  the  Ovens  of  Pelion  and  all  along  the 
beach  as  far  as  Meliboia  and  Kasthanaia.  Of  the  corn-ships  and 
other  vessels  that  were  wrecked  the  numbers  were  never  known  : 
but  with  the  wood  obtained  from  them  the  captains  threw  up  a 
strong  fortification  on  the  shore  as  a  precaution,  it  is  said,  against 
attacks  from  the  Thessalians.'  Meanwhile  the  Greeks,  who  on 
the  second  day  of  the  storm  had  heard  of  the  mischief  done  to 
their  enemies,  plucked  up  courage  and  through  the  comparatively 
smooth  waters  of  the  Euboian  sea  sailed  back  to  Artemision. 
The  barbarians,  however,  were  not  so  sorely  crippled  as  the 
Greeks  had  hoped  to  find  them.  AVhen  the  storm  abated,  their 
ships,  drawn  down  from  the  shore,  sailed  to  Aphetai  at  the  en- 
trance of  the  Pagasaian  gulf  and  took  up  their  position  precisely 
opposite  to  the  Greek  fleet  at  Artemision.  Some  hours  later, 
fifteen  ships,  having  taken  longer  to  repair,  mistook  the  Greek 

'  Herod,  vii.  191.    The  statement  ing-  their  vocation  upon  men  whose 

is  singularly  inconsistent  with  the  wrong's  might  be  aveni,'ed  by  an 

conduct  ascribed  to  the  Thessalians  army    of  many    millions   or   even 

after  the  abandonment  of  the  pass  many  myriads  then  passinfj  on  the 

of  Tempt!  by  Theiuistokles.    But  is  other  side  of  tlie  ridge  which  had 

it  credible  that  even  Thessalian  proved  so  fatal  to  the  Persian  fleet? 
wreckers  would  venture  on  practis- 


Chap.  V.]        INVASION  AND  FLIGHT  OF  XERXES.  183 

fleet  for  their  own  and  sailing  straight  to  Artemision  were   pre- 
sently captured. 

Xerxes  in  the  meanwhile  had  advanced  through  Thessaly  to 
the  Achaian  AIos  on  the  western  shore  of  the  Pagasaian  gulf. 
Thence  working  his  wajr  along  the  Pagasaian  shore  The  march 
under  the  southern  slopes  of  Othrys,  he  reached  J^gg^oveT' 
Antikyra,  and  about  twelve  days  after  his  departure  Anopaia. 
from  Therme  incaniped  in  the  Malian  Trachis  between  the  streams 
of  Melas  and  Asopos.  Here  he  was  separated  only  by  a  few  milus 
of  ground  from  the  defenders  of  Thermopylai  which,  if  \vg  may 
believe  Diodoros,'  the  Lokriaus,  who  had  now  gone  over  from  the 
Greek  side,  had  promised  to  keep  open  for  the  passage  of  the 
Persian  army.  At  tliis  point  the  traditional  narrative,  as  given 
by  Herodotos,  breaks  out  into  one  of  thos>3  beautiful  picture i 
which  impart  a  marvellous  life  to  his  history.  There  Avas  enough 
of  disunion  and  dissension  in  the  Greek  camp,  when  a  horseman 
sent  by  Xerxes  came  to  learn  their  numbers  and  see  what  they 
were  doing.  The  Greeks  had  repaired  the  old  Phokian  wall,  and 
the  horseman  could  advance  no  further  :  but  outside  of  it  were 
the  Lakedaimoniaus  with  their  arms  piled  against  the  wall,  whi!  ■ 
some  of  them  were  wrestling  and  others  combing  their  hair.  The 
horseman  having  counted  their  numbers  went  ha'^k  quietly,  for 
none  pursued  hun  or  took  notice  of  him.  His  report  seemed  to 
Xerxes  to  convict  his  enemies  of  childish  folly  :  but  Demaratos 
was  at  hand  to  explain  to  him  that  when  the  Spartans  have  to 
face  a  mortal  danger,  their  custom  is  to  comb  and  deck  out  their 
hair.  *  Be  sure,'  he  added  from  that  Spartan  point  of  view 
which  was  needed  to  throw  a  plausible  coloring  over  the 
story,  '  be  sure  that  if  thou  canst  conquer  these  and  the  rest 
who  remain  behind  in  Sparta,  there  is  no  other  nation  which  shall 
dare  to  raise  a  hand  against  thee,  for  now  thou  art  face  to  face 
with  the  bravest  men  of  all  Hellas.'  '  How  can  so  few  men  ever 
fight  with  my  great  army?'  asked  the  king.  The  only  answer 
which  he  received  was  that  he  might  deal  with  Demaratos  as  a 
liar,  if  things  came  not  to  pass  as  he  said.  Still  Xerxes  could 
not  believe  him,  and  for  four  days  he  waited,  thinking  that  they 
would  assuredly  run  away.  At  last  his  anger  was  kindled  and  he 
charged  the  Medians  and  Kissians  to  go  and  bring  them  all  bound 
before  him.  The  time  for  testing  the  power  of  Hellenic  discipline 
and  the  force  of  Hellenic  weapons  was  now  come.  The  messengers 
of  Xerxes  advanced  to  do  his  bidding.  Many  were  slain,  and 
although  others  to()k  their  places,  their  errand  was  not  done.  At 
last,  like  the  Imperial  Guard  at  Waterloo,  the  Immortals  under 
Hydarnes  advanced  to  the  attack.     But  their  spears  were  shorter 

'  xi.  4. 


184  THE  STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

than  those  of  the  Greeks :  Imen  tunics  could  avail  little  in  an 
encounter  with  iron-clad  men,  and  mere  numbers  were  of  no  use 
in  the  narrow  pass.  On  the  other  hand  the  Spartans  by  pretending 
to  fly  drew  the  barbarians  into  the  pass  where  they  turned  upon 
them  suddenly  and  slew  great  multitudes  until  they  all  fled  back 
to  their  camp.  Thrice  the  king  leaped  from  his  throne  in  terror 
for  his  army  :  but  on  the  next  day  he  sent  them  forth  again, 
thinking  that  the  enemy  would  be  too  weary  to  fight.  The  Greeks, 
however,  were  all  drawn  out  in  battle  array,  save  only  the  Phokians  ; 
and  these  were  placed  upon  the  hill  to  guard  the  pathway.  Again 
the  Persians  fared  as  they  had  done  before,  and  Xerxes  Avas  sorely 
troubled  until  a  Malian  named  Ephialtes  in  hope  of  some  great 
reward  told  him  of  the  path  which  led  over  the  liill,  and  thus 
destroyed  the  Greeks  who  were  guarding  Thermopylai.'  Xerxes 
now  regarded  the  conquest  of  the  pass  as  practically  achieved. 
As  the  daylight  died  away,  Hydarnes  set  out  from  the  camp  with 
the  troops  under  his  command.  All  night  long  they  followed  the 
path  Anopaia  along  the  ridge  which  bore  the  same  name,  with  the 
mountains  of  Oita  on  the  right  hand  and  the  hills  of  Trachis  on 
the  left.  The  day  Avas  dawning  with  the  exquisite  stillness  which 
marks  early  morning  in  Greece,  when  they  reached  the  peak  of 
the  mountain  where  the  thousand  Phokians,  who  had  charged 
themselves  with  this  task,  were  guarding  the  pathway.  Wliile 
the  Persians  were  climbing  the  hill,  the  Phokians  knew  not  of 
their  coming,  for  the  whole  hill  Avas  covered  Avith  oak-trees :  but 
they  knew  Avhat  had  happened  as  soon  as  the  Persians  reached  the 
summit.  Not  a  breath  of  Avind  was  stirring,  and  they  heard  at 
once  the  trampling  of  their  feet  as  they  trod  on  the  fallen  leaves. 
Instantly  they  started  up ;  but  before  they  had  Avell  put  on  their 
arms,  the  barbarians  Avere  upon  them.  The  sight  dismayed  the 
Persians  at  first,  for  Hydarnes  had  not  expected  any  resistance  : 

'  This  pass  Avas  well  known  to  the  g^uard.  These  must  therefore  have 
people  of  Trachis,  avIio  had  guided  pointed  it  out  to  him  from  the  first, 
the  Tliessalians  over  it,  Avhen  tlie  Indeed  they  could  not  fail  to  do  so. 
Phokians  had  bullitheirAvall  across  Between  them  andtheThessalians 
thepassof  Thermopylai.  Leonidas  there  Avas  an  enmity  so  bitter  tliat 
may  have  been  ignorant  of  its  exist-  Herodotos  does  not  hesitate  to  say 
ence  when  he  set  out  for  Sparta  ;  but  that  the  Phokians  would  have 
it  was  Ills  business  to  have  made  taken  sides  Avitli  Xerxes  if  the 
himself  acquainted  with  tlie  geo-  Thessaliana  had  ranged  themselves 
graphy  of  a  spot  which  lie  knew  to  with  the  Greeks.  Like  the  stories 
be  of  supreme  importailce  for  the  of  Demokedes  and  Histiaios,  the  in- 
Greek  cause.  The  Athenians,  ac-  troduction  o'  Epliialies  or  other 
cording  to  the  story,  showed  the  traitors  is  alto^iether  superfluous, 
saineciilpable  ignorance  at  Tempe:  There  was  no  secret  about  thepath- 
but  Leonidas  could  not  have  re-  way ;  and  Leonidas  Avas  guilty  of 
mained  long  unaware  of  this  path  grave  neglect  of  duty  in  notguard- 
which  the  Phokians  volunteered  to  iug  it  more  efficiently. 


CiiAP.  v.]        INVASION  AND  FLIGHT  OF  XERXES. 


185 


but  learning  from  Epliialtcs  that  these  men  were  not  the  Spartans, 
he  drew  out  liis  men  for  battle.  The  Phokians,  covered  with  a 
shower  of  arrows,  fell  back  to  the  highest  ground,  thinking  tliat 
the  Persians  were  coming  chiefly  against  them,i  and  there  they 
made  ready  to  fight  and  die.  But  the  Persians,  taking  no  more 
heed  of  them,  hastened  down  the  mountain. 

In  the  pass  itself  the  soothsayer  Megistias,  as  he  looked  upon 
the  victims,  had  told  them,  the  historian  assures  us,  that  on  the 
next  day  they  must  die.  Deserters  also  came  who  The  heroism 
said  that  the  Persians  were  coming  round ;  and  as  the  of  Leonicias. 
day  was  dawning,  watchmen  ran  to  tell  them  the  same  thing.'^ 
On  receiving  these  tidings   the   Greeks  took  counsel,  and  some 


'  This  statement  may  fairly  be 
thought  incredible.  The  Phokians 
had  volunteered  to  guard  this  path, 
and  they  had  done  so  as  knowing 
that  on  its  occupation  and  mainte- 
nance depended  the  salvation  of  the 
army  in  Thermopylai.  They  knew 
that  if  any  force  of  the  enemy  as- 
cended the  hill,  it  could  only  be  for 
the  one  purpose  of  taking  Leonidas 
and  his  men  in  the  rear,  while  the 
main  body  of  the  Persians  attacked 
them  in  front.  But  no  sooner  do 
they  feel  the  Persian  arrows  tlian 
witliout  a  thought  of  their  allies 
they  at  once  abandon  the  pathway, 
where  their  resistance  would  have 
been  of  the  utmost  value  and  migiit 
have  insured  a  signal  Hellenic  vic- 
tory, and  then  make  ready  to  fight 
to  the  death  a  little  higher  up  where 
their  resistance  was  worth  no  more 
than  the  mimic  campaigning  of 
children.  It  is  impossible  tw  restore 
the  true  history  of  all  these  inci- 
dents :  but  we  are  none  the  less 
driven  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
true  history  has  not  been  handed 
down  to  us.  What  became  of  these 
Phokians  when  Hydarnes  and  his 
men  had  passed  on  ?  We  can 
scarcely  suppose  that  they  remain- 
ed on  the  top  of  the  hill  in  fighting 
attitude,  when  there  were  none 
with  whom  they  could  fight.  We 
are  not  told  how  many  men  were 
under  the  command  of  Hydarnes  : 
but  had  they  been  ten  times  the 
number  of  the  Phokians,  the  latter 
might  have  taken  them  in  the  rear 
and  committed  fearful  havoc  among 


them.  It  is  possible,  but  not  very 
likely,  that  they  might  have  been 
overpowered.  English  soldiers  in 
such  a  position  would  withstand 
twenty  times  their  own  number: 
and  the  very  point  of  the  story  is 
that  the  Phokians  were  prepared  to 
fight  till  not  a  man  of  them  should 
remain  alive.  Tlie  likelihood  is 
that,  had  they  followed  Hydarnes 
at  a  moderate  distance,  they  could 
have  done  so  with  perfect  safety. 
These  Persians  would  then  have 
been  caught  both  in  front  and  rear  ; 
and  not  only  would  the  scheme  of 
Hydarnes  have  failed,  but  the  de- 
struction of  his  whole  force  would 
probably  have  been  insured  before 
the  army  of  Xerxes  could  be  made 
aware  of  what  had  happened,  as  it 
is  obvious  that  when  once  Hydarnes 
had  reached  the  base  of  the  hill,  no 
messenger  could  have  escaped  to 
tell  the  tale,  if  Leonidas  himself  op- 
posed them  in  front  and  if  the  Pho 
kians  occupied  the  higher  and 
therefore  the  safer  ground  in  the 
rear.  Either  then  the  events  are 
inaccurately  related,  or  these  Pho- 
kians were  deliberate  traitors  :  but 
this  latter  hypothesis  is  opposed  to 
other  facts  which  seem  to  be  clear- 
ly ascertained.  Their  fidelity  was 
sufficiently  secured  by  the  presence 
of  the  hated  Thessalians  in  the 
camp  of  Xerxes. 

^  Herod,  vii.  219.  These,  we 
must  suppose,  were  scouts  placed 
on  the  eastern  slopes  of  the  hill,  be- 
neath the  level  of  the  ground  occu- 
pied by  the  Phokians. 


186  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  IL 

urged  flight  and  went  away  eacli  to  his  own  city,  while  others 
made  up  their  minds  to  remain  with  Leonidas.  Another  story 
was  told  that  Leonidas  sent  them  away  himself  lest  they  should 
all  be  slain  :  and  to  this  tale  the  historian  gave  credit,  adding  that 
Leonidas  knew  them  to  he  faint-hearted  and  so  suftered  them  not 
to  stay,  but  that  it  was  not  seemly  for  himself  to  fly.  So  he 
tarried  where  he  was,  and  left  behind  him  a  great  name,  and  the 
happiness  of  Sparta  failed  not.  The  priestess  of  Delphoi  had  told 
the  Spartans,  when  the  war  began,  that  either  Lakedaimon  must 
be  wasted  or  their  king  must  die  ;  and  Leonidas,  remembering  her 
words,  sent  them  away  that  so  the  Spartans  might  have  all  the 
glory.  The  Thebans  and  Thespians  alone  reiuained.  The  m.en  of 
Thebes  Leonidas  kept  sorely  against  their  will,  as  pledges  for  their 
people  :  but  the  Thespians  would  not  save  their  own  lives  by 
forsaking  Leonidas  and  his  men. 

When  the  sun  rose,  Xerxes  poured  out  wine  to  the  god,  and 
tarried  until  the  time  of  the  filling  of  the  market, ^  for  such  was 
The  victory  ^^^^  bidding  of  Ephialtes,  because  the  path  down  the 
of  the  Per-  hill  was  much  shorter  than  the  way  which  led  up  it 
on  the  western  side.  Then  the  barbarians  arose  for 
the  onset ;  and  the  men  of  Leonidas,  knowing  now  that  they  must 
die,  came  out  into  the  wider  part  of  the  path,^  for  thus  far  they 
had  fought  in  the  narrowest  place.  From  the  beginning  of  the 
battle  the  slaughter  of  the  barbarians  was  great,  for  the  leaders  of 
their  companies  drove  every  man  on  with  scourges  and  blows. 
Many  fell  into  the  sea  and  Avere  drowned  ;  many  more  were 
trampled  down  alive  by  one  another.  No  thought  was  taken  of 
those  who  fell,  while  the  Spartans  fought  on  with  all  their  might. 
At  length  their  spears  were  all  broken  and  they  slew  the  Persians 
with  their  sw^ords,  until  at  last  Leonidas  fell  nobly,  and  other 
Spartans  with  him,  whose  names  the  historian   learnt  as  of  men 

*  Probably  not  earlier  than  9  or  what  tliey  suppose  to  be  a  stronger 
10  A.M.  Tlie  precise  time  denoted  position,  looking  simply  to  their 
l)y  this  phrase  is  a  matter  of  some  own  interest,  and  in  utter  forget- 
controversy:  but  it  is  unnecessary  to  fulness,  it  would  seem,  of  the  pur- 
enter  into  it,  as  no  one  will  main-  pose  for  wliicli  they  were  on  the 
tain  that  the  market  was  consi-  mountain  at  all.  Having  made  this 
dered  full  at  an  earlier  hour  than  9  blunder,  or  rather  having  exhibited 
o'clnck.  Taking  it  at  the  earliest,  this  weakness,  they  fail  to  make  the 
wi- shall  thus  have  four,  if  not  five,  best  of  the  splendid  opportunity 
liours  from  the  time  when  Hy-  which  still  remained  ot  falling  on 
dames  left  the  Phokians  on  the  the  Persians  in  their  descent.  Leo- 
heights  of  Anopaia,— a  time  suffi-  nidas  now  gives  up  a  strong  posi- 
cient  to  cripple  his  detachment,  if  tion  for  a  weaker,  in  order,  seem- 
not  to  destroy  it,  if  it  had  been  as-  ingly,  to  make  a  greater  display  of 
sailed  i>y  the  Spartans  in  front,  and  personal  valor,  in  either  case  the 
by  the  Phokians,  who  should  have  generalship,  if  the  story  be  true,  is 
followed  them,  in  the  rear.  little  better  than  that  of  savages. 

'■"  On  Anopaia  the  Phokians  seek 


Chap.  V.]       INVASION  AND  FLIGHT  OF  XERXES.  187 

wliosc  memory  ought  not  to  be  lost.  Over  his  body  there  was  a 
hard  fight  in  which  many  great  men  of  the  Persians  were  slain, 
and  among  them  two  brothers  of  the  king  :  but  the  Spartans 
gained  back  his  body  and  turned  the  enemy  to  flight  four  times, 
until  the  traitor  Ephialtes  came  up  with  his  men.  Then  the  face 
of  the  battle  was  changed,  for  the  Greeks  went  back  into  the 
narrow  part  within  the  wall,  and  there  they  posted  themselves,  all 
in  one  body  except  the  Thebans,  on  the  hillock  on  which  in  the 
days  of  the  historian  the  lion  stood  over  the  grave  of  Leonidas.  In 
this  spot  they  who  yet  had  them  fought  with  daggers,  and 'the  rest 
as  they  could,  while  the  barbarians  overwhelmed  them,  some  in 
front,  some  dragging  down  the  wall,  others  pressing  round  them  on 
every  side.  So  fell  the  Thespians  and  the  Spartans,  the  bravest  of 
the  latter  being  Dienekes,  who,  as  the  tale  ran,  hearing  from  a  man 
of  Trachis  just  before  the  battle  that  whenever  the  Persians  shot 
their  arrows  the  sun  was  darkened  by  them,  answered  merrily, 
'Our  friend  from  Trachis  brings  us  good  news  :  we  shall  be  able 
to  fight  in  the  shade.'  They  were  all  buried  where  they  fell  ;  and 
over  those  who  died  before  Leonidas  sent  the  allies  away  the 
inscription  recorded  that  four  thousand  men  of  Peloponnesos  here 
fonglit  with  three  hundred  myriads.  Over  the  Spartans  by  them- 
selves there  was  another  writing  which  said. 

Tell  the  Spartans,  at  their  bidding, 
Stranger,  here  in  death  we  lie. 

Of  these  three  hundred  Spartans  two,  it  is  said,  were  lying  sick  in 
the  village  of  Alpenoi,  their  names  being  Eurytos  and  Aristodemos. 
The  former,  calling  for  his  arms,  bade  his  guide  lead  him  into  the 
battle,  for  his  eyes  were  diseased,  and  plunging  into  the  fight  was 
slain.  Aristodemos  went  back  alone  to  Sparta  where  he  was 
shunned  by  all.  None  would  kindle  a  fire  for  him,  none  would 
speak  to  him  ;  but  every  one  called  him  Aristodemos  the  Dastard. 
Yet  he  got  back  his  good  name  and  fell  fighting  nobly  at  Plataiai. 
As  for  the  Thebans,  so  long  as  they  were  with  the  Spartans  in  the 
battle,  they  were'  compelled,  it  is  said,  to  fight  against  the  king : 
but  when  Leonidas  with  his  men  hastened  to  the  hillock  within 
the  wall,  they  got  away  and  with  outstretched  arms  went  towards 
the  barbarians  with  the  truest  of  all  tales,  saying  that  not  only 
were  they  on  the  king's  side  but  that  they  were  the  first  to  give 
him  earth  and  water  and  that  they  had  gone  into  this  fight  sorely 
against  their  will.  As  the  Thessalians  bore  out  their  words,  their 
lives  were  spared  :  but  some  had  the  bad  luck  to  be  killed  as  they 
came  near  to  the  Persians,  and  most  of  the  others,  beginning  from 
their  chief  Leontiades,  were  branded  with  the  royal  mark  as 
unfaithful  servants. 


188  THE  STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

The  issue  of  this  battle  set  the  despot  pondering.  Summoning 
Demaratos,  he  asked  him  how  many  Spartans  might  he  left  and 
The  sight-  whether  they  were  all  warriors  like  those  who  had 
ThermoDv-  ^^l'^*^  with  Leonidas.  The  answer  was  that  the 
lai.  Lakedaimonians    had    many   cities,   of   which    Spai'ta 

was  one,  and  that  Sparta  had  about  eight  thousand  men  all  equal 
to  those  who  had  fought  at  Pylai.  To  the  intreaty  of  Xerxes  that 
he  would  tell  him  candidly  how  these  men  were  to  be  conquered, 
Demaratos  replied  that  there  was  no  other  way  than  to  send  a 
detachment  of  the  fleet  to  occupy  the  island  of  Kythera,  of  which 
the  wise  Chilon  had  said  that  it  would  be  better  for  the  Spartans 
if  it  were  sunk  in  the  depths  of  the  sea.  This  counsel,  of  which 
only  an  Eastern  tyrant  would  need  the  suggestion,  Achaimenes, 
the  brother  of  Xerxes,  ascribed  to  the  envy  and  hatred  which  all 
Greeks  felt  for  those  who  were  better  or  more  prosperous  than 
themselves.  They  had  already,  he  urged,  lost  four  hundred  ships 
in  the  storm  ;  and  if  the  fleet  were  further  divided,  the  enemy 
would  at  once  be  a  match  for  them.  But  Xerxes,  though  ready 
enough,  according  to  the  advice  of  his  brother,  to  order  his  own 
matters  without  taking  heed  to  the  counsels,  the  doings,  or  the 
numbers  of  his  enemies,  bade  Achaimenes  beware  how  he  spoke 
evil  of  Demaratos  who,  though  less  wise,  was  still  his  very  good 
friend.  This  praise  of  the  exiled  Spartan  king  was  followed  by  an 
order  to  behead  and  to  crucify  the  body  of  the  worthier  Spartan 
king  who  had  died  in  Thermopylai  fighting  for  freedom  and  for 
law.  Some  time  later,  when  the  Greek  fleet  had  retreated  from 
Artemision  and  the  Persian  sailors  were  taking  their  ease  on  the 
shore  of  Histiaia,  Xerxes  arranged  a  sight  for  their  gratification. 
Twenty  thousand  of  his  men  had  been  slain  at  Thermopylai.  Of 
these  he  left  one  thousand  on  the  ground  :  the  rest  he  buried  in 
trenches  under  leaves  and  earth,  so  that  they  could  not  be  seen. 
All  being  ready,  he  sent  a  herald  who  proclaimed  that  all  who 
pleased  might  leave  their  posts  and  go  to  see  how  the  king  fought 
with  those  foolish  men  who  sought  to  withstand  his  power.  On 
this  so  many  desired  to  go  that  there  was  alack  of  boats  to  carry 
them.  But  even  Persians  were  not  so  easily  cheated  as  Xerxes 
thought  that  they  might  be.  The  trick  was  at  once  seen  through, 
when  they  found  the  thousand  Persians  lying  by  themselves,  and 
tlie  four  thousand  Greeks  gathered  into  a  single  heap.  One  other 
picture  belonging  to  the  struggle  at  Thermopylai  exhibits  some 
Arkadian  deserters  as  seeking  for  work  from  the  king,  who  asks 
them  what  the  Greeks  are  doing.  The  answer  is  that  they  were 
keeping  the  feast  at  Olympia  and  beholding  the  contests  of  wrestlers 
and  horsemen.  On  hearing  this  one  of  the  Persians  asked  what 
the  prize  might  be  for  which  they  strove,  and  was  told  that  it  waa 


Chap.  V.]        INVASION  AND  FLIGHT  OF  XERXES.  189 

an  olive-wreath.  '  Ah  !  Mardonios,'  exclaimed  Tritantaichmes, 
who  could  no  longer  keep  silence,  '  what  men  are  these  against 
whom  thou  hast  brought  us  here  to  fight,  who  strive  not  for  money 
but  for  glory  ? '  and  for  this  saying  the  king  held  him  to  be  a 
coward. 

Such  is  the  traditional  narrative  of  the  battles  within  Tliermo- 
pylai.  It  is  impossible  not  to  feel  the  beauty  and  grandeur  of  the 
epical  form  into  which  it  has  been  thrown  :  but  from  xheffeneral- 
first  to  last  we  must  also  feel  that  in  many  most  ship  of  Leo- 
important  particulars  the  true  history  of  these  events  ' 
has  been  lost,  and  that  of  the  incidents  recorded  not  a  few  involve 
difficulties  which  seem  to  be  insoluble.  Among  these  is  the  alleged 
total  absence  of  the  Athenians  from  a  place  the  maintenance  of 
which  was  not  only  essential  to  their  safety  but  injoined  by  the 
policy  for  which  they  pleaded  all  along  with  the  utmost  eagerness. 
The  barbarian  was  not  to  be  suffered  to  ravage  the  lands  of  Greek 
cities,  if  it  should  be  possible  to  prevent  it.  Yet  here  they  cannot 
spare  the  smallest  force  for  the  defence  of  a  post  which  ten  men 
might  hold  against  a  thousand.  But  even  without  any  Athenians 
Leonidas  brought  with  him  from  Peloponnesos,  if  we  follow  the 
traditional  story,  a  force  of  3,100  heavy-armed  troops,  whose 
numbers  with  the  addition  of  the  Pliokians,  Thespians,  and  Thebans 
were  raised  to  5,200  men.  If  we  allow  to  each  Spartan  citizen 
•the  same  number  of  helots  as  those  which  accompanied  the  force 
sent  afterwards  to  Plataiai,'  and  take  1,000  as  the  lowest  number 
of  light-armed  troops,  there  was  assembled  under  the  command  of 
Leonidas  an  army  of  not  less  than  8,300  men.  With  these  forces 
Leonidas  succeeded  for  ten  or  twelve  days  in  checking  the  advance 
nf  the  whole  Persian  army  and  in  inflicting  on  them  a  very  serious 
loss.  Nothing  could  prove  more  clearly  the  practicability  of  his 
position  and  the  likelihood  of  success,  if  he  kept  his  ground  without 
lessening  his  numbers.  But  still  more  strangely,  the  Greeks  at 
Thermopylai  not  merely  forget  the  Aitolian  passes,  through  which, 
as  they  must  have  known,  an  invader  could  force  his  way  into 
southern  Hellas,  but  guard  most  inefficiently  a  pass  close  at  hand 
which  might  at  any  moment  be  used  to  turn  their  position.  The 
existence  of  this  pass  is  made  known  to  Xerxes  through  the  super- 
fluous treachery  of  EpMalics  :  but  although  the  loss  of  this  path- 
way owing  to  the  absurd,  if  not  incredible,  conduct  of  the  Phokians 
destroyed,  it  is  said,  all  chance  of  ultimate  success,  it  still  left  open 
the  possibility  of  retreat.  The  men  of  Corinth,  of  Phlions,  and 
Mykenai,  with  all  the  Arkadian  forces  (including,  as  it  would  seem, 
their  light-armed  troops),  were  at  once  dismissed  by  Leonidas,  who 

*  Herod,  ix.  10.     If  the  text  of      portion  of  hoplites  to  helots  was 
this  passage  be  authentic,  the  pro-      one  to  seven. 


190  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH   PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

retained  along  with  liis  lielots  the  troops  furnished  by  Thespiai  and 
Thebes.  The  Thebans  in  the  ensuing  conflict  did  as  httle  as  tliey 
could  ;  but  even  without  their  aid  20,000  Persians  are  stated  to 
have  been  slain  by  the  300  Spartans  and  the  700  Thespians.  If  a 
loss  so  enormous  was  caused  to  the  Persians  by  so  scanty  a  band  of 
antagonists,  it  is  difficultto  calculate  the  probable  result,  if  Leonidas 
had  kept  his  allies  to  share  the  danger  and  tlie  glory  of  the  struggle. 
Without  lessening  the  force  which  he  kept  about  himself  to  the 
last,  he  might  have  detached  the  whole  body  of  his  Peloponnesian 
allies  to  aid  the  Phokians  in  guarding  Anopaia.  Four  thousand 
men  on  the  summit  of  the  hill  could  easily  have  kept  back  twenty 
or  forty  thousand  disciplined  troops  ;  and  from  the  nature  of  the 
land  we  may  safely  assume  that  the  detachment  of  Ilydarnes  did 
not  amount  to  anything  like  the  lower  of  these  two  numbers, 
Avhile  their  discipline  was  not  to  be  compared  with  that  of  the 
Greeks.  If,  again,  after  deserting  their  post  they  had  followed, 
as  their  duty  bound  them  to  follow,  the  descending  Persians,  this 
portion  of  the  enemy's  force  must  have  been  cut  off  long  before  the 
hour  at  which  Xerxes  had  ordered  that  the  troops  of  the  main  ar- 
my should  start  from  the  camp.  But  as  they  failed  to  do  this,  it 
is  hard  indeed  to  imagine  how  the  blunder  of  the  Phokians  still 
left  time  for  the  retreat  of  a  body  of  perhaps  5,000  men  along  a 
narrow  strip  of  ground  which  in  sume  parts  was  scarcely  wider  than 
a  cart  track.  Within  an  hour  from  the  time  of  his  leaving  the- 
Phokians  on  the  top  of  the  hill,  Hydarnes  with  his  men  must  have 
reached  the  eastern  gates.  When  he  had  once  come  down  on  the 
more  level  ground,  none  could  possibly  have  retreated  from  the 
Greek  camp  without  fighting  their  way  through  his  troops  ;  and 
the  narrative  clearly  speaks  of  a  peaceable,  or  even  a  leisurely,  de- 
parture, not  of  desperate  efforts  like  those  of  an  army  struggling 
through  a  pass  occupied  by  an  overwhelming  enemy. 

Still  less  easy  is  it  to  understand  the  facts  related  of  the  Thebans 
whom  Leonidas  retained  by  his  side  against  their  will.  Their 
The  motives  presence  cannot  be  explained  by  the  admission  that 
and'his'at^^  the  Thebans  and  Boiotians,  feeling  little  sympathy 
liw.  for   either    side,    were    passive    instruments    in    the 

hands  of  their  leaders,  who  judged  it  imprudent  in  this  instance 
to  refuse  the  request  of  Leonidas  :  nor  can  we  safely  adopt  the 
conclusion  that  they  were  citizens  of  the  anti-Persian  party 
and  so  remained  of  their  own  free  will,  but  that  after  the  fall 
of  the  Spartan  king  they  took  credit  for  a  Medism  which  they 
did  not  feel.  AVe  do  not  know  that  Diodoros  or  Pausanias  had 
access  to  any  information  of  which  Herodotos  was  ignorant :  and 
the  latter  distinctly  contradicts  any  such  supposition.      He  main- 


CiiAP.  v.]        INVASION  AND  FLIGHT  OF  XERXES.  101 

tains  that  their  profession  of  iledism  was  the  truest  of  all  pleas  ;' 
and  it  is  to  the  last  degree  unlikely  that  the  Thessalians  would 
have  upheld  the  credit  of  men  of  whose  Hellenic  sympathies  they 
must  according  to  this  hypothesis  have  been  aware.  If  again  they 
were  thus  kept  wholly  against  their  will,  it  is  scarcely  less  sur- 
prising that  they  should  remain  quiet  until  the  battle  was  at  an 
end,  when  they  might  have  either  openly  joined  Hydarnes,  or 
passively  hindered  the  resistance  of  Leonidas.  The  care  taken  by 
the  commanders  of  the  Athenian  fleet  to  obtain  early  tidings  of  the 
army  at  Thermopylai  may  imply  that  Athenian  citizens  were  not 
lacking  among  the  troops  which  defended  the  pass ;  and  if  we 
admit,  as  we  can  scarcely  avoid  admitting,  that  the  narrative,  as 
we  liave  it,  is  framed  for  the  special  purpose  of  magnifying  the 
Spartans,  we  are  almost  justified  in  inferring  that  the  resistance  in 
Pylai  was  on  a  far  larger  scale  than  Herodotos  has  represented  it. 
A  compulsory  retreat  of  the  allies  might  be  veiled  under  the  de- 
cent plea  that  they  were  dismissed  ;  and  if  tliey  were  conscious  of 
faint-heartedness,  they  would  not  care  to  hinder  the  growth  of  a 
story  which  covered  their  remissness  in  the  Hellenic  cause,  while 
it  inhanced  the  glory  of  Leonidas. 

If  the  account  of  Herodotos  is  to  be  trusted  at  all,  the  Greeks 
on  board  their  ships  heard  of  the  disaster  which  befell  the  Persian 
fleet  off  the  Magnesian  coast  on  the  second  day  after 
the  beginning  of  the  storm;  and  no  sooner  had  they  fleet  at  Ar- 
receivcd  the  tidings  than  they  set  off  with  all  speed  to  temision. 
Artemision,  which  they  would  necessarily  reach  on  that  second 
day.  Their  crews  were  cheerfully  prepared,  if  not  vehemently 
eager,  for  conflict ;  nor  was  there  anything  to  damp  their  courage 
until  the  Persian  ships  hove  into  sight  two  days  later.  The  inva- 
ders had  lieard  already  that  the  scanty  Greek  fleet  was  awaiting 
their  arrival  off  Artemision  ;  and  when  on  reaching  Aphetai  late 
in  the  afternoon  they  saw  them  near  the  opposite  shore,  they  were 
deterred  from  attacking  them  at  once  only  by  tlie  wish  that  not  a 
single  Greek  vessel  should  escape.  This  result  could  be  insured 
only  by  sending  a  detachment  of  two  hundred  Persian  ships  round 
the  east  coast  of  Euboia  to  take  the  Greek  fleet  in  the  rear  at  the 
Euripos.  These  ships  the  Persian  commanders  accordingly  sent  oti 
that  same  afternoon  f  and  on  the  same  day,  it  would  seem,  the 
diver  Skyllias  of  Skione  came  as  a  deserter  from  the  Persian  fleet 
with  the  news  of  the  damage  done  by  the  recent  storm, ^  and  of  the 
mission  of  the  two  hundred  ships  to  pi-event  the  flight  of  the  Greeks 
by  way  of  the  Euboian  strait.     Thus  on  the  very  same  day  on 

'  Herod,  vii.  2"3.  fresli,  as  the  Greeks  had  already  re- 

-  Herod,  viii.  7.  ceived  fiiU  tidings  of  the  disaster, 

^  This  news   cannot   have  been     Herod,  vii.  193. 


102  THE   STRUGGLE  WITPI  PERSIA.  [Book  If. 

which  they  first  saw  the  enemy's  ships,  or  at  the  latest  on  the 
morning  of  the  next  day,  the  Greek  commanders  were  informed 
that  they  could  not  avoid  a  battle  by  retreating  ;  and  until  the 
Persian  fleet  became  visible  off  Aphetai,  it  is  distinctly  implied 
that  they  had  no  intention  of  retreating.  It  is  not  easy  therefore 
to  see  what  room  is  left  for  the  circumstantial  narrative  that  the 
Greeks  on  seeing  the  Persian  ships  resolved  to  retreat  as  they  had 
come,  and  that  the  Euboians  in  their  terror  at  being  abandoned,  as 
the  Thessalians  had  been  abandoned  at  Tempe,  and  having  failed  to 
obtain  from  Eurybiades  a  delay  which  might  enable  tbem  to  remove 
their  families  from  the  island,  prevailed  on  Themistokles  by  a  bribe 
of  thirty  talents  to  prevent  this  cowardly  desertion.  Of  this  sum 
it  is  said  that  he  bestowed,  as  from  himself,  five  talents  on  Eury- 
biades, while  three  sufiiced  to  overcome  the  stouter  opposition  or 
more  craven  spirit  of  the  Corinthian  Adeimantos.  The  remaining 
twenty-two  talents,  we  must  especially  note,  he  kept  for  himself, 
while  the  Spartan  and  Corinthian  leaders  both  thouofht  that  they 
liad  been  bribed  with  Athenian  money.  It  mast  at  least  be  said 
that  the  Euboian  bribers  kept  their  own  counsel  with  astonishing 
secrecy  and  repressed  by  a  silence  not  less  wonderful  the  regret 
which  they  must  have  felt  on  learning,  a  few  hours  later,  that 
their  bribe  had  been  a  superfluous  waste  of  money. 

The  tidings  brought  by  Skyllias  worked  a  sudden  change  in 
the  minds  of  the  Greek  leaders.  After  a  long  debate  they  resolved 
,  -  .  .  to  stay  where  thev  were  until  night  came  on,  and  tben 
action  off  under  cover  of  darkness  to  move  down  the  strait  and 
Artenusion.  jj^gg^  ^]jg  squadron  sent  round  Euboia  to  cut  them  off*. 
Finding,  as  the  day  wore  on,  that  the  Persian  fleet  remained  mo- 
tionless, they  determined  with  greater  vigor  to  use  the  remaining 
hours  of  light  in  attacking  the  enemy  and  thus  gaining  some  expe- 
rience of  their  way  of  fighting.  As  the  Greeks  drew  nigh,  the 
Persians,  as  at  Marathon,  thought  them  mad,  so  it  is  said,  and 
surrounded  them  with  their  far  more  numerous  and  faster  sailing 
ships.  But  on  a  given  signal  the  confederates  drew  their  ships 
into  a  circle  with  their  sterns  inwards  and  their  prows  ready  for 
the  charge.  On  a  second  signal  the  onset  was  made,  and  a  conflict 
ensued  in  which  the  Greeks  took  thirty  Persian  ships. 

On  the  night  which  followed  the  battle  the  storm  again  burst 
forth  with  terrific  lightning  and  deluges  of  rain.  The  wrecks  and 
Destni  f  ^^^^  dead  bodies  were  carried  by  the  waves  to  Aphetai, 
of  the  Per-  where  they  became  intangled  with  the  prows  of  ships 
ron'dm-"''^'  «"<!  the  blades  of  oars.  But  if  the  storm  caused  great 
patched  to  distress  to  the  main  fleet  off  the  Thessalian  coast,  it 
uripos.  ^^^  utter  ruin  for  the  ships  dispatched  round  Euboia 
to  cut  off  the  (ireeks  at  Eiiripos.      On  those  the  tempest  broke  as 


Chap.  V.]        INVASION  AND  FLIGHT  OF  XERXES.  193 

they  were  passing  the  Hollows    of  the  island.       Not   knowing 

whither  they  Avere  going,  they  were  dashed  against  the  rocks,  for 

thns,  the  historian  adds,  the  Divine  Nemesis  had  determined  to 

bring  their  numbers  more  nearly  to  a  level  with  that  of  the  Greek 

tleet'.'i 

The  morning  brought  no  cheering  sight  to  the  barbarians  at 

Aphetai.     For  the  present  they  deemed  it  prudent  to  remain  quiet, 

while  the  Greek  fleet  was  streno-thened  not  merely  by   o 
,        .  ,.  1,1  1  •  ,      •'     Second  ac- 

the  tidings  that  the  squadron  sent  to  intercept  them   tionoifAr- 

had  been  destroyed  but  also  by  a  reinforcement  of  suUi.T"hf^' 
fifty-three  Athenian  ships.  Two  days  later  the  Persian  the  victory 
leaders  determined  to  begin  the  attack  which  should  of  the  "^^ 
decide  whether  they  or  their  enemies  should  remain  ^''''•^^®- 
masters  of  the  Earipos.°  The  Persian  ships  were  drawn  out 
crescent-wise  in  order  to  surround  and  overwhelm  the  confederate 
fleet ;  but  they  failed,  Ave  are  told,  more  from  the  mere  multitude 
of  their  vessels,  which  dashed  against  and  clogged  each  other,  than 
from  any  lack  of  bravery  or  spirit  in  their  crews.  The  battle  was 
a  fierce  one ;  but  although  the  Persians  lost  more  both  in  ships 
and  in  men,  the  Spartans  and  their  allies  had  been  so  severely 
treated  and  found  themselves  so  seriously  weakened  that  retreat 
once  more  appeared  the  only  course  open  to  them.  Themistokles, 
it  would  seem,  was  unable  to  change  their  resolution,  although  pos- 
sibly a  few  more  of  the  Euboian  talents  remaining  in  his  posses- 
sion might  have  been  not  less  potent  than  they  had  been  some 
days  before.  But  if  there  had  been  any  hesitation  thus  far,  all 
doubt  as  to  the  necessity  of  retreat  was  removed,  when  they  heard 
that  Xerxes  was  master  of  the  pass  which  formed  the  gate  of  south- 
ern Hellas.  At  once  the  Greek  fleet  began  to  retreat,  the  Corin- 
thians leading  the  Avay,  the  Athenians  following  last  in  order. 

So  ended  the  double  conflict,  Avhich,  we  are  told,  was  carried 
on  at  the  same  time,  at  Thermopylai  and  Artemision.  The  one 
thought  of  the  Spartans  and  Corinthians  was  now,  it  Thefortifl- 
would  seem,  fixed  on  the  defence  not  of  Boiotia  or  cation  of  the 
Attica  but  of  the  Peloponnesos  alone  ;  and  their  ships  istiimus. 
would,  it  is  said,  have  sailed  at  once  to  the  Corinthian  isthmus, 
had  not  Tliemistokles,  by  words  rather  than  bribes,  persuaded  them 
to  make  a  stand  at  Salainis,  and  thus  to  give  the  Athenians  time  to 
remove  their  households  from  Attica  and  otherwise  to  form  their 
plans.^     Here  then  the  fleet  remained,  while  the  Peloponnesians 

'  This  statement,  Herod,  viii.  13,  were  pretty  much  what  they  had 

is  in  direct  contradiction  with  tlie  been  when  they  reached  the  coast 

subsequent  statement,  ib.  viii.  66,  of  Sepias  before  the  great  storm, 
wliere  Herodotos  says  that  the  num-         "  Herod,  viii.  15. 
bers  of  the  Persian  tieet  at  Salarais         ^  Herod,  viii.  40. 
9 


194  THE  STRUGGLE  WITH   PERSIA.  [Book  II 

were  working  niglit  and  day,  breating  up  the  Skironid  road  and 
raising  the  wall  across  the  isthmus.  But  the  barrier  thus  com- 
pleted imparted  little  confidence  to  its  builders,  and  none,  it  would 
seem,  to  the  Feloponnesian  seamen  in  the  ships  at  Salamis.  We 
have,  in  fact,  reached  the  time  of  the  greatest  depression  on  the 
side  of  the  Greeks  ;  nor  can  we  doubt  that  this  depression  marks 
the  moment  at  which  the  enterprise  of  Xerxes  had  been  brought 
most  nearly  to  a  successful  issue.  The  real  strength  of  liis  army 
lay  in  the  men  whom  Cyrus  had  led  from  conquest  to  conquest, 
and  whose  vigor  and  spirit  remain  unsubdued  after  the  lapse  of 
five-and-twenty  centuries :  and  we  can  the  better  appreciate  the 
character  of  the  struggle  and  its  issiie,  when  we  see  that  the  Greeks 
were  fighting  against  men  little,  if  at  all,  infeiior  to  themselves  in 
any  except  the  one  point  that  the  Eastern  Aryan  fought  to 
establish  the  rule  of  one  despotic  will,  while  hisAVestern  brother 
strove  to  set  up  the  dominion  of  an  equal  law. 

Western  freedom  was,  in  truth,  in  far  greater  danger  than  it 
would  have  been  but  for  this  genuine  element  of  strength  in  the 
„.     ^.         Persian  forces  ;  nor  was  it  necessary  for  the  priestess 

JVii2T3.tion  •/I 

of  theAthe-  of  Athene  on  the  rock  of  Athens  to  announce  that  the 
man  people,  g^jg^e^j  serpent  had  at  last  refused  to  touch  its  food. 
The  tidings  may  somewhat  have  heightened  the  terrors  of  the 
moment :  but  there  was  a  need  for  prompt  action  more  constraining 
than  the  vague  warnings  of  a  Delphian  oracular  response.  Imme- 
diately after  the  arrival  of  the  fleet  from  Artemision  a  procla- 
mation, we  are  told,  was  issued,  warning  all  Athenians  to  remove 
their  families  from  the  countiy  in  all  possible  haste  ;  and  the  task 
of  removal,  to  whatever  extent  it  may  have  been  carried,  was 
accomplished  in  less  than  six  days,  for  within  that  time  after  the 
retreat  of  the  Greek  ships  Xerxes  was  master  of  Athens. 

Meanwhile  the  Persian  king  was  advancing  in  his  career  of 
conquest.  To  the  north  of  Attica  he  liad  overcome  practically  all 
resistance.  With  the  exception  of  the  two  small  cities  of  Thespiai 
and  Plataiai  all  the  Boiotian  towns  had  submitted  to  him,  and 
the  Tliessalians  are  said  to  have  professed  a  zeal  in  his  cause  which 
Herodotos  ascribed  wholly  to  their  hatred  of  tlie  Phokians.  It 
Thedevasta-  ^^^^'  t^'crefore,  not  wonderful  that  the  Phokians  should 
tiouof  rho-  now  meet  with  a  flat  refusal  tlie  proffer  of  the  Thes- 
salians  wlio  pledged  themselves  on  the  receipt  of  fifty 
talents  to  insure  the  safety  of  all  Phokian  territory  against  the 
troops  of  Xerxes.  At  once  the  Tliessalians  led  the  Persians 
through  that  narrow  little  strip  of  Dorian  land,  barely  four  miles 
Ml  width,  which  lay  between  the  Mali  an  and  Phokian  territories, 
and  then  let  them  loose  on  Phokis.  The  Phokian  towns  were  all 
burnt,  and  among  these  Abai,  the  shrine  of  ApoUon,  which  was 


Chap.  V.]        INVASION  AND  FLIGHT  OF  XERXES.  105 

despoiled  of  all  its  magnificent  treasures  without  awaking  the 
vengeance  of  the  god.  The  invaders  had  now  reached  Panopeai,  a 
town  lying  to  the  south  of  the  Euenos,  some  ten  miles  to  the  west 
of  the  point  where  it  empties  itself  into  the  lake  Kopa'is  near 
Orchomenos.  Here  Ihe  forces  were  divided.  The  larger  and 
better  portion,  under  orders  to  join  Xerxes,  went  on  through 
Boiotia.  The  rest,  led  by  local  guides,  marched,  it  is  said, 
towards  Delphoi  to  bear  thence  for  the  Persian  king,  among  other 
treasures,  the  offerings  with  which  the  Lydian  Kroisos  had 
enriched  the  shrine.  Here  they  hoped  to  fare  as  they  had  fared  at 
Abai.  The  tidings  of  their  approach,  as  they  came  on  burning  and 
slaying  everywhere,  so  dismayed  the  Delphians  that  they  asked  the 
god  whether  they  should  bury  his  holy  treasures  or  carry  them 
away.  '  Move  them  not,'  answered  the  god,  '  I  am  able  to  guard 
them.'  Then  taking  thought  for  themselves,  they  sent  their 
women  and  children  across  the  gulf  into  the  land  of  the  Achaians, 
while  most  of  the  men  climbed  up  to  the  peaks  of  Parnassos  and 
the  Korykian  cave  and  others  fled  to  Amphissa.  In  Delphoi  there 
remained  only  sixty  men  with  the  prophet  Akeratos.  As  the 
barbarians  drew  nigh  and  were  now  in  sight,  Akcralos  saw  lying 
in  front  of  the  temple  the  sacred  arms,  which  used  to  hang  in  the 
holy  place  and  which  it  was  not  lawful  for  man  to  touch  ;  and  he 
went  to  tell  the  Delphians  of  the  marvel.  But  there  were  greater 
wonders  still,  as  the  barbarians  came  up  in  haste  to  the  chapel  of 
Athene  which  stood  before  the  great  temple,  for  the  lightnings 
burst  from  heaven  and  two  cliffs  torn  from  the  peaks  of  Parnassos 
dashed  down  with  a  thundering  sound  and  crushed  great  multi- 
tudes, and  fierce  cries  and  shoutings  were  heard  from  the  chapel 
uf  Athene.  In  the  midst  of  this  din  and  uproar  the  barbarians  in 
utter  terror  turned  to  flee  :  and  Avhen  the  Delphians  on  Parnassos 
saw  this,  they  came  down  from  the  mountain  and  slew  many 
more,  while  they  who  escaped  hurried  with  all  speed  to  the 
Boiolian  land  and  told  how  two  hoplites,  higher  in  stature  than 
mortal  men,  had  followed  behind,  slaying  and  driving  them  from 
Delphoi.  These,  the  Delphians  said,  were  the  two  heroes  of  the 
land,  Phylakos  and  Autonoos. 

The  inroad  of  the  Persians  on  Delphoi  is  the  turning  point  of 
the  great  epic  of  Herodotos.  It  is  the  most  daring  provocation  of 
divine  jealousy  and  wrath  by  the  barbarian  despot:  The  attack 
and  while  it  precedes  immediately  his  own  humiliation,  o"  Delphoi. 
it  insures  also  the  final  destruction  of  the  army  which  he  was  to 
leave  behind  with  Mardonios.  But  the  poetical  handling  of  the 
tale  has  shrouded  it  with  an  uncertainty  beyond  that  of  most  other 
incidents  of  the  war.  The  woi'dsput  into  the  mouth  of  Mardonios 
before  the  battle  of  Plataiai  assert  emphatically  that  the  expedition 


196  THE  STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

never  took  place  at  all  ;^  and  in  the  lack  of  any  satisfactory  evi- 
dence that  these  v/ords  were  ever  uttered,  we  can  but  say  that 
here  also  we  are  reading  only  another  part  of  the  great  heroic 
legend,  how  the  gods  made  the  prime  mover  of  all  the  evil  believe 
a  lie  and  utter  words  of  more  than  mortal  pride  in  the  hour  of  his 
doom.  The  fall  of  the  rocks  at  Delphoi  cannot  be  separated 
from  the  other  miraculous  details — from  the  unseen  arm  which 
laid  the  sacred  weapons  before  the  temple  doors  and  from  the  visi- 
ble aid  of  the  deified  heroes  of  the  place.  The  same  supernatural 
intervention  recurs  in  the  story  of  the  later  attack  on  Delphoi  by 
Bran  (Brennus)  and  his  Gauls.''  In  the  narrative  of  Plutarch  the 
Delphian  temple  was  not  only  taken  by  the  Persians  but  under- 
wei  t  the  lot  which  befell  the  kindred  oracle  of  Abai.  On  this 
point,  however,  the  statement  of  Plutarch  has  little  more  weight 
than  that  of  Ktesias.  The  splendid  offerings  of  an  earlier  age,  the 
magnificent  gifts,  bearing  the  names  of  Gyges  and  Kroisos,  which 
were  seen  in  the  Delphic  treasury  by  Herodotus  himself,^  seem 
sufficiently  to  prove  that  the  temple  was  not  plundered,  far  less 
burnt,  by  the  Persians.  But  how  the  expedition  came  to  fail  and 
why  its  failure  was  not  followed  up  by  an  attack  with  forces  far 
more  overwhelming,  are  questions  to  which  no  answer  can  be 
o-iven.  On  the  other  hand,  the  conclusion  that  in  this  miraculous 
narrative  we  have  the  popular  version  of  a  systematic  but  unsuc- 
cessful effort  to  pass  into  southern  Hellas  over  the  Aitolian  roads 
seems  to  be  not  altogether  unwarranted. 

The  wrong  done  to  Phoibos,  the  lord  of  light,  had  been  pun- 
ished in  part  on  the  spot.  The  more  signal  vengeance  of  the  god 
was  reserved  for  the  shores  of  Salamis,  where  the  ships  of  those 
Hellenic  cities  which  had  not  submitted  themselves  to  the  invader 
or  chosen  to  be  neutral  in  the  contest  were  gathered  together.  The 
^  ..  Persian  fleet  had  not  yet  advanced  so  far  to  the 
of  Athens  by  south  ;  and  Xerxes  was  still  moving  on  upon  the  path 
Xerxes.  which,  as  he  fancied,  was  to  lead  him  to  his  final 
triumph.  Four  months  had  passed  away  since  his  army  crossed 
the  bridge  over  the  Hellespont,  when  the  tyrant  set  his  foot  on 
Attic  soil.  But  we  are  told  that  he  found  the  land  desolate.  The 
city  was  abandoned  ;  and  there  remained  on  the  Akropolis*  only  a 
few  poor  people  and  the  guardians  of  the  temples  who,  rather  to 

'  Herod,  ix.  42.  abruptly  to  the  height  of  about  150 

"  It  is,  in  fact,  impossible  to  read  feet  above  the  Burroundinfr  plain. 

thestory  of  the  Gallic  overthrow  as  The    table-land    on    its    summit, 

related  by  Pausanias,  x.  23,  without  which  has  been  graced  by  so  many 

feeling  that  it  is  a  mere  repetition  magnificent  works  of  consummate 

of  the  narrative  of  Ilerodotos.  art,  has  a  measurement,  according 

^  i.  50.  to  M.  Beule,  L'Acropole  d'Athenes, 

*  The  Athenian  Akropolis  rises  of  900  feet  by  400  feet. 


Chap.  V.]        INVASION  AND  FLIGHT  OF  XERXES.  197 

carry  out  the  letter  of  the  oracle  than  from  an}'  serious  notion  of 
defence,  had  blocked  with  wooden  palisades,  planks,  or  doors  the 
only  side  of  the  Akr-opolis  which  was  supposed  to  lie  open  to 
attack.  Behind  these  wooden  walls  this  scanty  garrison,  besieged 
by  Persian  troops  stationed  on  the  opposite  hill  of  Ares,  under- 
went the  dignity  of  a  blockade.  Arrows  bearing  lighted  tow 
were  discharged  against  the  fence  in  vain  :  and  Xerxes  thus  foiled 
gave  himself  up  to  one  of  his  frequent  fits  of  furious  passign.  But 
on  the  northern  side  there  is  a  fissure  in  the  rock,  in  part  subter- 
raneous ;  and  here  some  Persians  managed  to  scramble  up  to  the 
summit  near  the  chapel  of  Aglauros  the  daughter  of  Kekrops.  As 
soon  as  they  saw  their  enemies,  some  of  the  poor  men  who  occu- 
pied rather  than  defended  the  Akropolis  threw  themselves  over 
the  precipitous  rock,  while  others  took  refuge  in  the  temple  of 
the  goddess.  They  might,  like  the  Roman  senators  seated  in  the 
forum,  have  met  their  fate  with  greater  dignity  :  but  the  Persians 
were  not  more  magnanimous  than  Bran  and  his  Gauls,  and  as 
soon  as  they  had  opened  their  gates  to  their  comrades,  they  hur- 
ried to  the  temple  and  cut  down  every  one  of  the  suppliants. 
Xerxes  was  now  for  the  moment  lord  of  Athens  :  and  he  lost  no 
time  in  dispatching  a  horseman  to  Sousa  with  tlie  tidings.  The 
streets  of  the  royal  city  rang  with  shouts  of  exultation  when  the 
news  was  received,  and  were  strewn  with  myrtle  branches.  The 
fears  of  Artabanos  were  falsified,  and  the  harems  of  the  king  and 
his  nobles  could  now  await  patiently  the  advent  of  the  Spartan 
and  Athenian  maidens  whom  Atossa  had  long  ago  wished  to 
have  as  her  slaves. 

But  Xerxes,  though    he    was    eager  to  take  full  revenge  on 
Athens  for  the  wrongs  done  to  the  shrines  of  his  gods  in  Sardeis, 
was  yet  anxious  to  avert  the  anger  of  beings  mightier   .       ,  ^ 
than  man.     The  temples  on  the  Akropolis  were  burnt  ;   abandon- 
but  he  charged  the  Athenian  exiles  who  had  returned   J^misby'the 
with  him  from  Sousa  to  make  their  peace  with  Athene,    confede- 
Oal}'  two  days  had  passed  since  the  capture  of  the 
rock  :  but  when  the  exiles  came  to  offer  sacrifice,  the  sacred  olive- 
tree  of  the  goddess  which  had  been  burnt  with  the  temple  had 
already  sent  up  from  its  roots  a  shoot  of  a  cubit's  height.     The 
Peisistratidai  might  well  interpret  this  as  a  sign  of  the  greeting 
with  which  x\thene   welcomed  them  home  ;  and  probably  they 
chose  to  2;ive  it  this  meaning  when  they  reported  the  sign  to 
Xerxes.     Bat   like  many   another  prodigy,  it  might  be  read  in 
more  than   one  way  ;  and  it  was  time  that  some  cheering  token 
should  be  vouchsafed  to  the  Athenians  in  their  exile  at  Salamis. 
The  fleet  of  the  confederates  had  been  gathered  at  that  island 
rather  to  cover  the  migration  of  the   Athenians  than  with  any 


198  THE  STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

notion  of  making  it  a  naval  station  ;  and  now  not  only  was  the 
Persian  fleet  drawn  np  before  them  in  the  harbor  of  Phaleron, 
but  Athens  itself  had  been  taken.  Hellenic  alliances  were  at  no 
time  very  firmly  cemented  ;  and  on  the  receipt  of  these  tidings 
something  like  panic  fear  drove  not  a  few  of  the  Hellenic  com- 
manders to  dispense  even  with  the  formality  of  an  order.  Tae.se 
hastened  at  once  on  board  their  ships  and  made  ready  for  imme- 
diate flight.  The  rest  assembled  in  council ;  but  their  minds 
were  already  made  up.  A  poor  semblance  of  debate  was  followed 
by  a  decision  to  retreat  on  the  following  day  and  take  up  a  per- 
manent position  off  the  Corinthian  isthmus.  Ilei'e  in  case  of  de- 
feat by  sea  they  might  at  least  fall  back  on  the  help  of  the  land- 
forces.  One  man  alone  felt  that  the  abandonment  of  Salamis 
would  be  a  virtual  confession  that  common  action  could  no  more 
be  looked  for,  and  resolved  that  whether  by  fair  means  or  by  foul 
he  would  not  allow  this  dastardly  retreat  to  be  carried  out.  But 
the  narrative  of  the  subsequent  events  must  be  given  as  it  has  been 
left  to  us  in  the  pages  of  Herodotos. 

The  council  was  over,  and  Themistokles  returned  to  liis  sbip. 
Here  an  Athenian  named  Mnesiphilos,  on  hearing  the  result, 
The  policy  besought  liiui  at  all  cost  to  bring  every  power  of  per- 
ofThemi-  suasion  to  bear  on  Eurvbiades  and  thus  to  get  the 
order  rescinded.  Mnesiphilos  saw  clearly  that  retreat 
meant  utter  dispersion,  and  that  dispersion  must  bring  after  it  the 
complete  ruin  of  Hellas.  Without  answering  a  word  Themistokles 
hastened  back  to  the  ship  of  Eurvbiades  and  by  many  arguments 
of  his  own  added  to  those  suggested  by  IMnesiphilos  prevailed  on 
the  Spartan  leader  to  summon  the  chiefs  to  a  .second  council.  On 
their  assembling  Themistokles,  too  impatient  to  wait  for  the  formal 
opening  of  the  debate,  began  eagerly  to  address  the  commanders, 
until  Adeimantos  the  Corinthian  reminded  him  sharply  that  they 
who  rise  up  in  the  games  before  the  signal  are  beaten.  '  Yes,'  said 
Themistokles  gently ;  '  but  those  who  do  not  rise  when  the  signal 
is  given  are  not  crowned.'  Then,  turning  to  Eurybiades,  he  began 
in  a  different  strain,  not  dwelling  now  on  the  certainty  of  further 
dispersion  if  the  fleet  fell  back  on  the  isthmus,  but  telling  him 
plainly  that  the  safety  of  Hellas  was  in  his  hands.  At  the 
isthmus,  he  insisted,  they  would  have  to  fight  in  the  open  sea  to 
the  great  disadvantage  of  their  own  heavier  and  fewer  ships ;  and 
there  they  would  lose  the  aid  of  the  men  of  Salamis,  Megara,  and 
Aigina,  for  these  must  look  each  to  the  protection  of  their  own 
land,  while  the  advance  of  the  Persian  fleet  to  the  Peloponnesos 
would  certainly  be  followed  by  the  advance  of  the  Persian  array. 
On  the  other  hand  he  urged  that  a  combat  in  closed  waters  would 
probably  end  in  their  winning  the  victory,  and  that  a  victoi'y  at 


Chap.  V.]        INVASION  AND  FLIGHT  OF  XERXES.  199 

Salamis  would  cover  the  Peloponnesos  more  effectually  than  a 
victory  at  the  isthmus.  At  this  point  Adeimantos  broke  in  again 
upon  his  vehement  eloquence,  and  with  savage  rudeness  told  him 
that,  as  since  the  fall^of  Athens  he  had  now  no  country,  he  could 
have  no  vote  in  the  council,  and  that  Eurybiades  was  debarred 
from  even  taking  his  opinion,  much  more  from  following  it.  To 
this  brutal  speech  Themistokles  answered  quietly  that  he  had  a 
better  city  than  Adeimantos  so  long  as  the  Athenians  had  two 
hundred  ships  which  were  fully  able  to  bear  down  the  rjcsistance 
of  any  Greek  city,  whatever  they  might  do  against  the  Persian 
power.  For  Eurybiades  he  had  yet  one  more  argument.  It  was 
couched  briefly  in  the  form  of  a  warning  that,  if  the  allies 
abandoned  Salamis,  the  Athenians  with  their  ffmiilies  would  at 
once  sail  away  to  Italy  and  find  a  new  liome  in  their  own  city  of 
Siris.  The  Spartan  chief  saw  at  once  that  without  the  Athenians 
the  confederates  could  not  resist  the  Persians  even  for  a  day  ;  and 
he  issued  the  order  for  remaining.  Thus  instead  of  preparing 
for  flight  the  allies  now  made  ready  for  battle  :  but  their  formal 
obedience  could  not  kill  their  fears.  In  their  eyes  Eurybiades  was 
a  madman  ;  and  when  on  the  foUovving  day,  after  an  earthquake 
by  sea  and  land,  tliey  saw  in  the  Persian  fleet  movements  in 
manifest  preparation  for  a  conflict,  their  discontent  broke  out  into 
open  murmurs,  if  not  into  mutiny.  It  became  clear  that  Eury- 
biades must  ^ive  way  :  and  Themistokles  resolved  to  hazard 
everything  on  a  final  throw.  With  the  Hellenic  leaders  there  was 
nothing  more  to  be  done  :  it  might  be  of  more  use  to  address  him- 
self to  the  Persians.  Without  losing  a  moment,  Themistokles 
passed  quietly  from  the  council  and  dispatched  Sikinnos,  his  slave 
and  the  tutor  of  his  children,  in  a  boat  to  the  Persian  fleet.  ^      The 

'  The  contemporary  poet  jEscliy-  fact,  which  Phitarch  states,  that 
Ids  represents  Themistokles  as  the  ostracism  of  Aristeides  and 
sending  his  messenger  not  to  the  other  exiles  had  been  revoked  be- 
Persian  generals  but  to  Xerxes  him-  fore  the  fight  at  Salamis  at  the  ur- 
self,  and  speaks  of  Xerxes  as  cliarg-  gent  desire  of  Themistokles  liira- 
ing  his  officers  on  their  lives  to  see  self.  The  language  of  Herodotos 
that  none  of  the  enemy  escaped  even  contradicts  the  supposition, 
them.  If  the  message  was  sent  (and  He  makes  Aristeides  speak  as  a  man 
of  this  there  seems  to  be  no  doubt),  still  under  sentence  of  ostracism, 
the  statement  of  the  poet  in  this  in-  and  represents  tlie  oifer  for  the  sus- 
stance  exceeds  that  of  Herodotos  in  pension  of  personal  enmity  as  origi 
likelihood  as  much  as  his  story  of  natiug  with  himself  and  not  with 
the  passage  across  the  Strymou  his  more  fortunate  rival.  It  is  im- 
passes beyond  the  region  of  fact  possible  iliat  lie  could  talk  of 
into  that  of  fiction.  But  through-  Themistokles  as  being  still  the  bit- 
out  the  narrative  we  are  constantly  ter  enemy  of  Aristeides  the  exile,  if 
obliged  to  resort  to  a  balancing  of  ho  had  known  that  the  decree  of 
probabilities.  The  orator  Isokrates  banishment  had  been  cancelled, 
seems  to  know  nothing  of  the  stra-  and  this  at  the  prayer  of  Themis- 
tagem  of  Themistokles  :  Herodotos  tokles  himself, 
seems  to  be  as  little  aware  of  the 


200  THE  STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

message  which  he  charged  him  to  deliver  was  that  Themistotles 
really  desired  the  victory  not  of  the  Greeks  but  of  the  Pereians, 
and  that  on  this  accomit  he  now,  without  the  knowledge  of  his 
colleagues,  took  this  means  of  informing  them  that  the  Greeks 
were  on  the  point  of  running  away  and  that  in  their  present  state 
of  utter  dismay  as  well  as  disunion  they  could  be  taken  and 
crushed  almost  without  an  effort.  The  Persian  leaders,  putting 
implicit  fi'ith  in  the  message,  at  once  lauded  a  large  force  on  the 
islet  of  Psyttaleia  off  the  southeastern  promontory  of  Salamis  and 
precisely  opposite  to  the  harbor  of  the  Peiraieus,  the  object  of 
this  disposition  being  that  they  might  save  the  wrecks  of  ships 
and  slay  such  of  the  enemy  as  might  in  the  battle  be  driven  upon 
the  islet.  Towaids  midnight  a  portion  of  the  fleet  lying  off  Phaleron 
began  to  move  along  the  Attic  coast  until  the  line  extended  to  the 
northeastern  promontory  of  Salamis.  It  was  thus  no  longer  possi- 
ble for  the  Greeks  to  escape  into  the  bay  of  Eleusis  and  so  retreat 
to  the  isthmus  without  fighting.  But  of  this  fact  they  were  still 
miconscious ;  and  the  hours  of  the  night  were  being  wasted  in 
fierce  dissensions,  when  Themistokles  was  suddenly  summoned 
from  tlie  council  to  speak  with  his  rival  and  enemy  Aristeides,  who 
had  just  crossed  over  from  Aigina.  In  few  words  Aristeides  said 
that  the  only  rivalry  now  befitting  them  was  that  of  determining 
which  could  most  benefit  their  common  country.  As  to  the  no- 
tion of  retreat,  it  mattered  not  whether  they  said  much  about  it 
or  little.  The  thing  was  impossible.  He  knew  from  his  own 
knowledge  that  the  Greek  fleet  Avas  surrounded  beyond  all  chance 
of  escape.  The  reply  of  Themistokles  was  not  less  terse.  He  re- 
joiced at  the  tidings,  and  informed  his  rival  that  the  movements 
of  the  Persian  leaders  were  the  consequence  of  the  message  sent  by 
himself  thi'ough  Sikinnos.  He  begged  him  further  to  repeat  be- 
fore the  council  news  to  which  in  all  likelihood  they  would  give 
no  credit  if  they  heard  it  from  the  lips  of  Themistokles.  Even 
as  coming  from  Aristeides,  it  was  well-nigh  rejected  as  false,  when 
a  Tenian  vessel  deserting  frcm  the  Persian  fleet  established  the 
fact  beyond  all  doubt.  Once  more  they  made  ready  to  fight ; 
and  as  the  day  dawned,  Themistokles  addressed  not  the  chiefs 
but  the  crews,  laying  before  them  all  the  lofty  and  ignoble  mo- 
tives by  which  men  may  be  stimulated  to  action,  and,  beseeching 
them  to  choose  the  higher,  sent  them  to  their  ships. 

The  die  was  cast.  The  command  of  the  king  had  already  gone 
forth  for  battle  on  the  following  day,  when  Sikinnos  delivered  to 
The  battle  ^^i™  C)r  to  his  generals  the  message  of  Themistokles. 
of  Salamis.  Qy^  the  one  side  the  Greeks  put  themselves  under  the 
guardianship  of  the  Salaminian  heroes  Aias  and  Telamon,  and  sent 
a  ship  to  Aigina  to  beseech  the  aid  of  Aiakos  and  his  children. 


iTlcfccJr  c:^y>^--^ 


Chap.  V.J       INVASION  AND  FLIGHT  OF  XERXES.  201 

On  the  other,  a  great  throne  was  raised  on  one  of  the  spurs  of 
mount  Aigaleos  close  to  the  sea,  whence  the  Persian  king  might 
see  how  his  skives  fought  on  his  behalf,  i  The  day  was  still 
young  when  the  trireme  came  from  Aigina  which  had  been  sent  to 
fetch  the  children  of  Aiakos  ;  and  at  once  the  Greeks  put  out  to 
sea,  while  the  barbarians  came  forward  to  meet  them.  According 
to  the  Aiginetan  tradition  it  was  this  trireme  Avhich  after  some 
hesitation  began  the  fight,  the  form  of  a  woman  having  been  seen 
which  cried  out  in  a  voice,  heard  by  all  the  amiy  of  the  Greeks, 
'  Good  men,  how  long  will  ye  back  water  ? '  The  Athenians  had 
their  story  that  one  of  these  men  named  Ameinias  ran  his  ship  into 
the  enemy,  and  that,  as  it  was  thus  entangled  and  could  not  get 
free,  the  rest  came  up  to  help  him.  So  began  the  conflict,  in 
which  the  Athenians  found  themselves  opposed  to  the  Phenicians 
who  had  the  wing  towards  Eleusis  and  the  west,  while  the  loni- 
ans  towards  the  east  and  the  Peiraieus  faced  the  Lakedaimonians. 
Beyond  this  general  arrangement  and  the  issue  of  the  fight  the 
historian  himself  admits  that  of  this  memorable  battle  we  know 
practically  nothing.  The  event  in  his  belief  was  determined  by 
the  disclipine  and  order  of  the  Greeks,  while  their  enemies  fell 
out  of  their  ranks  and  did  nothing  wisely  ;  but  if  the  popular  story 
may  be  trusted,  it  may  have  depended  partly  on  the  fact  that  the 
Persian  seamen  had  been  working  all  night,  carrying  out  the 
movements  for  the  complete  circumvention  of  the  Hellenic  fleet, 
while  the  Athenians  and  their  allies  went  on  board  their  ships  on 
the  morning  of  the  fight,  fresh  from  sleep  and  stirred  by  the 
vehement  eloquence  of  Themistokles.  But  in  spite  of  his  general 
lack  of  information  Herodotos  notes  that  the  Persians  as  a  whole 
fought  far  more  bravely  at  Salamis  than  at  Artemision,  each  man 
thinking  tliat  the  eye  of  the  king  was  upon  him,  and  that  few  of 
the  lonians  followed  the  advice  of  Themistokles  by  hanging  back 
from  the  fight.  Indeed  many  of  the  Greek  ships,  he  adds,  were 
taken  by  them,  the  Samians  Theomestor  and  Phylakos  being 
specially  distinguished  by  their  zeal  for  the  king.  Such  action,  if 
coming  from  Thessalians  against  Phokians,  would  be  intelligible 
enough  :  in  the  case  of  the  lonians  it  would  seem  to  show,  if  the 
facts  be  true,  that  the  desertion  of  the  Spartans  and  Athenians  in 
the  revolt  of  Aristagoras  still  rankled  in  their  minds  and  blinded 
them  to  the  shame  of  revenge  taken  at  the  cost  of  defeat  and  ruin 
to  their  common  country.  But  that  there  existed  a  counter-tradi- 
tion seems  to  be  clear  from  the  charge  which  in  the  tumult  of  the 
fight  the  Phenicians  brought  against  these  Asiatic  Greeks.  They 
had  destroyed,   it  was  said,  the  Phenician  ships  and  betrayed 

'.^cliylos,  Persai,  473.     Herod,  viii.  90. 
9* 


203  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

the  Phenicians  themselves.  Happily  for  the  lonians,  the  words 
were  scarcely  out  of  the  mouth  of  their  accusers,  when  a  Samo- 
thrakian  vessel  rati  into  an  Athenian  ship  and  sank  it,  while  one 
from  Aigina  ran  into  the  Samothrakian,  Avhose  crew  with  their 
javelins  drove  the  men  of  the  conquering  ship  into  the  sea  and 
took  their  vessel.  With  this  conclusive  proof  of  Ionic  fidelity, 
Xerxes  in  towering  rage  commanded  the  heads  of  the  Phenicians 
to  be  struck  off  that  they  might  not  lay  their  own  cowardice  to 
the  charo-e  of  braver  men.  The  general  character  of  Phenician 
seamen  may  well  warrant  the  suspicion  that  their  charge  against 
the  lonians,  if  really  made,  was  not  altogether  groundless.  In 
truth,  there  is  scarcely  a  single  alleged  incident  of  the  fight  of 
which  we  have  not  accounts  more  or  less  inconsistent  with,  if  not 
exclusive  of,  each  other.  The  Athenians  would  have  it  that  at 
the  beginning  of  the  fight  the  Corinthian  Adeimantos  fled  in  a 
terror  which  belied  his  name  and  that  the  rest  of  the  Corinthians 
lost  no  time  in  following  his  example.  They  were  opposite  to  the 
temple  of  Athene  Skiras — so  the  story  ran — when  a  boat  which 
no  one  was  known  to  have  sent  met  them,  and  the  men  in  it  cried 
out,  '  So,  Adeimantos,  thou  hast  basely  forsaken  the  Greeks  who 
are  now  conquering  their  enemies  as  much  as  they  had  ever  hoped 
to  do.'  Adeimantos  would  not  believe  :  but  when  the  men  said 
that  they  would  go  back  with  him  and  consent  to  die  if  their 
words  were  not  true,  he  turned  his  sliip  and  reached  the  scene  of 
action  when  the  issue  of  the  fight  was  already  decided.  This 
circumstantial  tale  the  Corinthians  met  by  the  stout  assertion  that 
they  were  amongst  the  foremost  in  the  battle  ;  and  their  rejoinder 
was  borne  out,  we  are  told,  by  all  the  rest  of  the  Greeks. 

Another  circumstantial  story  is  related  of  the  conduct  of 
Artemisia.  A  prize  of  ten  thousand  drachmas  had  been  promised 
Artemisia  to  the  man  who  should  take  lier  alive,  so  great,  we  are 
fyndian^^  told,  being  the  irritation  that  a  woman  should  come 
ship.  against   Athens.     As   it   so   chanced,    her    ship    was 

cliased  by  the  trierarch  who,  according  to  the  Athenian  story,  had 
begun  the  battle  and  who,  had  he  known  wliom  he  had  before  him, 
would  never  have  stopped  until  he  had  taken  her  or  been  taken 
himself.  But  before  Artemisia  there  were  only  ships  of  her  own 
side  ;  and  as  Ameinias  came  close  upon  her,  she  ran  into  a  Kalyn- 
dian  vessel  commanded  by  the  king  Damasithymos.  We  are  not 
told  that  the  Avhole  Kalyndian  crew  perished  ;  but  Ameinias,  it  is 
said,  on  seeing  this  action  thought  that  her  ship  was  a  Greek  one 
or  else  was  deserting  from  the  Persians,  and  so  turned  away  to 
chase  others,  while  Xerxes,  who  chanced  to  see  what  was  done, 
cried  out,  on  being  assured  that  the  ship  was  that  of  Artemisia, 
'  My  men  are  women,  and  tlie  women  men.'     Yet  although  the 


Chap.  V.]       INVASION  AND  FLIGHT  OF  XERXES.  203 

historian  represents  her  bravery  or  lier  good  faith  as  by  no  means 
equal  to  her  wisdom  and  foresight,  it  is  almost  incredible  that 
such  shallow  seltishness  should  be  successful.  If  we  may  not 
accept  the  grounds  on  which  she  is  said  to  have  urged  her  former 
advice  to  Xerxes,  and  if  his  remarks  on  her  collision  with  the 
Kalyndian  ship  read  like  nothing  but  romance,  little  is  gained 
by  asserting  that  the  story  of  her  exploit  has  the  air  of  truth.  If 
again  we  reject  the  other  parts  of  the  tale,  it  seems  impossible  that 
even  the  total  destruction  of  the  ship  and  crew  could  have  saved 
her  from  detection.  We  arc  expressly  told  that  otl^er  friendly 
ships  checked  her  flight  no  less  than  that  of  the  Kalyndian  king.^ 
They  were  present  to  see  what  was  done  ;  and  we  cannot  suppose 
that  all  were  tricked  by  the  selfish  device  of  Artemisia,  and  that 
none  would  have  the  courage  or  the  indignation  to  denounce  it. 

But,  as  at  Marathon,  whatever  may  have  been  the  order  and 
incidents  of  the  battle,  the  issue  was  clear  enough.  The  Persian 
fleet  was  practically  ruined.  On  the  Greek  side  not  Ruin  of  the 
many  were  killed.  Unlike  the  Greeks,  the  barbarians  I'ersian fleet, 
were  for  the  most  part  unable  to  swim  ;  and  the  greatest  slaughter 
took  place  just  when  their  ships  first  turned  to  flee.  Those  which 
were  drawn  up  behind  pressed  forward  to  reach  the  front,  and  so 
became  entangled  with  the  vessels  which  were  hurrying  away.  In 
the  midst  of  the  frightful  confusion  thus  caused  Aristeides  landed 
a  large  number  of  hoplites  on  the  islet  of  Psyttaleia  and  slew  every 
one  of  the  Persians  who  Averc  upon  it.  So  ended  the  battle.  The 
Greeks  drew  up  all  the  disabled  ships  on  the  shore  of  Salamis,  and 
made  ready  for  another  fight,  thinking  that  the  king  would  order 
the  ships  still  remaining  to  him  to  advance  against  them. 

Their  fears  were  not  to  be  realised.  The  fancy  of  Xerxes  that 
under  his  own  eye  the  seamen  would  be  invincible  had  been  dis- 
placed by  a  conviction,  which  nothing  now  could  Thg  counsel 
shake,  that  no  faith  whatever  was  to  be  put  in  the  of  Mardo- 
subject  tribes  or  nations  which  manned  his  navy,  and 
that  all  hope  of  carrying  on  the  war  by  sea  was  practically  at  an 
end.  For  such  fragments  of  his  fleet  as  might  yet  remain  Xerxes 
had  a  more  immediate  and  pressing  task  in  guarding  the  bridges 
across  the  Hellespont.  Like  Dareios,  he  looked  upon  the  safety  of 
the  bridges  as  the  condition  of  his  own  return  home  ;  and  he  could 
brook  no  delay  in  the  carrying  out  of  the  measures  which  might  be 
needed  to  secure  it.  The  messenger  had  already  set  out  with  the 
message  which,  like  the  torch  in  the  feast  of  Hephaistos,  was  to  be 
handed  on  from  one  horseman  to  another  until  the  songs  and  shouts 
of  triumph  at  Sousa  should  be  exchanged  for  ciies  of  grief  for  the 
king  and  of  indignation  against  the  stirrer-up  of  the  mischief.  This 
"'  Herod,  viii.  87. 


204  THE  STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

issue  Mardonios  clearly  foresaw  ;  and  at  once  his  mind  was  made 
up  to  carry  on  the  war  and  cither  to  succeed  in  it  or  die.  For 
himself  except  as  a  conqueror  there  could  be  no  return  :  and  he 
miojht  well  suppose  that  his  own  chances  of  success  would  be 
indefinitely  increased  by  the  absence  of  a  ruler  so  absorbed  by  the 
thought  of  his  own  personal  safety  as  to  be  incapable  of  bearing  up 
against  reverses  which  still  left  liim  ample  means  of  retrieving  his 
fortunes.  He  pledged  himself,  therefore,  to  subjugate  Hellas,  if 
Xerxes  would  leave  him  three  hundred  thousand  men,  while  he 
took  all  the  rest  away  to  Asia.  Such  a  proposal  was  not  likely  to 
be  rejected  by  a  tyrant  quaking  in  abject  terror  :  but  the  historian 
adds  that  Xerxes  submitted  it  to  Artemisia,  who  urged  him  by  all 
means  to  accept  it.  If  Mardonios  succeeded,  the  glory  would  go 
to  his  master  :  if  he  and  his  men  were  all  slain,  it  would  be  but 
the  loss  of  a  horde  of  useless  slaves.  The  safety  of  Xerxes  and  his 
house  would  more  than  make  up  for  all ;  and  the  Greeks  would  yet 
have,  many  times,  to  face  a  struggle  for  life  or  death  with  the 
power  of  Persia.  Such  is  said  to  have  been  her  counsel ;  we  may 
assure  ourselves  that  it  was  never  given.  Xerxes  knew  well  that 
in  leaving  with  Mardonios  his  native  Persian  troops  he  was  leaving 
behind  the  hardy  soldiers  on  whom  the  very  foundations  of  his 
empire  rested  ;  and  it  is  impossible  that  he  should  have  rewarded 
with  special  praise  and  special  honors  the  words  of  a  woman  who 
could  speak  of  them  as  toys  to  be  trifled  with  and  flung  aside 
without  a  thought. 

That  very  night  the  fleet  sailed  from  the  scene  of  its  disaster, 
to  guard  the  bridge  across  the  Hellespont  for  the  passage  of  the 
Allc-ed  l^i"»  ^"<i  liis  army.  When  the  day  dawned,  the 
secondmes-  Greeks  saw  the  Persian  land-forces  in  the  same 
mrstokies  to  position  which  they  had  occupied  the  day  before,  and 
Xtrxes.  made  ready  for  an  attack  from  their  fleet  which  they 
supposed  to  be  still  otiE  Phaleron.  The  discovery  of  its  flight  was 
followed  by  immediate  pursuit.  The  Greeks  sailed  as  far  as  Andros 
without  catching  sight  even  of  the  hindermost  among  the  Persian 
vessels.  At  Andros  a  council  Avas  called.  To  the  intreaty  of 
Themistokles  that  they  should  sail  at  once  to  the  Hellespont  and 
there  destroy  the  bridge  Eurybiadcs  replied  by  pointing  out  the 
folly  of  driving  a  defeated  enemy  to  bay.  Out  of  Europe  Xerxes 
could  do  little  mischief  :  but  if  hindered  in  his  retreat,  he  might 
turn  with  something  like  the  spirit  of  Cyrus  and  take  an  ample 
vengeance  for  his  recent  disasters,  while  his  forces  could  be  sus- 
tained with  the  yearly  harvests  of  Hellas.  ^      Silenced  by  this  re- 

'  Ilerod.    viii.  108.     Eurybiades     under  permanent  invasion  refuse  to 
must  have  been  aware  that  this  was     till  or  sow  their  ground, 
impracticable.     Nations   sufiFering 


Chap.  V.]        INVASION  AND  FLIGHT  OF  XERXES.  205 

joinder,  if  not  convinced,  Themistoldes  made  a  virtue  of  necessity, 
and  repeating  to  liis  country  men  the  advice  of  Eurybiades  be- 
sought them  to  turn  their  minds  to  the  more  pressing  need  of  re- 
building their  houses  and  sowing  the  seed  for  the  next  harvest.  ^ 
As  to  Xerxes  he  took  up  the  strictly  religious  ground.  The  inva- 
der was  an  impious  man  who  by  his  pride  had  wearied  out  the 
patience  of  the  gods  and  provoked  their  utmost  wrath  by  the  pro- 
fanation and  the  burning  of  their  shrines;  and  his  punishment 
had  been  inflicted  not  by  the  Athenians  but  by  the  gods  and 
heroes.  Having  given  this  counsel,  he  dispatched  Sikinnos  on  a 
second  embassy :  but  this  time  his  message  was  addressed  to 
Xerxes,  not  to  his  generals.  It  informed  him  brietiy  that  the 
Greeks  had  wished  to  pursue  his  fleet  and  break  up  the  bridge  at 
the  Hellespont,  but  that  Themistokles  had  turned  them  from  their 
purpose  and  insured  to  the  tyrant,  if  he  wished  to  go  home,  a 
peaceful  and  leisurely  retreat.  The  historian  so  far  anticipates 
the  future  history  of  the  great  Athenian  leader  as  to  ascribe  both 
his  counsel  to  his  countrymen  and  his  message  to  Xerxes  to  a  de- 
liberate design  of  establishing  a  title  to  the  favor  of  the  Persian 
king,  if  the  need  of  so  doing  should  at  any  time  arise. '^ 

A  few  days  later  Mardonios  chose  out  on  the  plains  of  Thessaly 
the  forces  with  which  he  had  resolved  to  conquer  or  to  die.  Here 
with  an  equal  number  of  Persians  and  Medes  and  Thnnio-ht 
with  the  Sakian,  Baktrian,  and  Indian  troops,  he  took  of  Xerles. 
up  his  quarters  for  the  winter,  while  Xerxes  hurried  onwards. 
But  before  they  parted  not  to  meet  again,  a  messenger  from  Sparta 
had  come  to  bid  the  king  of  the  Medes  stand  his  trial  for  the 
murder  of  Leonidas  and  make  atonement  for  that  crime.     '  The 

'  Whatever  else  lie  may  have  said,  hisfleet.  We  are  not,  then,  justified 
it  is  clear  that  he  could  not  have  even  in  saying  that  the  second  mes- 
urofed  this  duty  upon  them  at  a  time  sage  would  have  the  effect  of  hurry- 
wlieu  the  Persian  army  was  still  in  ing  his  flight.  If  he  gave  any  heed 
Attica,  and  when  as  yet  he  had  no  to  his  words  at  all,  lie  would  as- 
reason  to  suppose  that  the  invaders  suredly  interpret  them  by  contra- 
had  any  intention  of  quitting  it.  ries,  for  the  memory  of  his  first 

^  So  far  as  it  affects  the  character  deadly  wrong  would  be  fixed  in  his 

of  Themistokles,  tliis  charge  cannot  mind  with   a  strength   which   no 

be  examined  here.    But  human  na-  lapse  of  time  could  weaken.     The 

ture  is  much  the  same  in  all  ages  ;  message  in  truth  is  as  superfluous 

and  the  degree  of  faith  which  Xer-  as  tlie  stratagems  of  Histiaios.  The 

xes  would  be  likely  to  put  in  this  se-  tyrant  had  set  his  face  like  a  flint 

cond  message  may  be  measured  by  against  any  further  sojourn  in  Eu- 

tlie  caution  of  the  child  who  has  rope  ;  and  although  tiiis  could  n')t 

learnt  to  dread  the  fire  by  being  at  the  moment  be  known  to  Tliemi- 

l)urnt.    Tlie  stupidest  savage  is  not  stokles,  we  m;iy  s..fely  assen  that 

likely  to  be  trapped  twice  in   the  the  idea  of  cutimg  off  his  retreat  at 

same  snare  by  tlie  same  man  ;  and  the  Hellespont  could  not  so  much 

for  Xerxes  it  is  enough  to  say  tlmt  as  cross  his  mind,  so  long  as  the 

he   had  already   acted   upon   one  Persian  host   lay  incamped    upon 

message  from  Themistokles,  and  Hellenic  soil. 
that  the  result  had  been  the  ruin  of 


200  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH   PERSIA.  [Book  IL 

atonement  sliall  be  made  by  Mardonios,'  answered  Xerxes  with  a 
laugh,  pointing  to  the  general  by  liis  side  ;  and  the  Spartan  taking 
him  at  his  word  went  his  way.  The  tale  might  be  dismissed  as 
theatrical  bravado,  if  it  be  not  regarded,  rather,  as  springing  from 
the  religious  sentiment  Avhich  imparted  to  the  narrative  of  the 
whole  war  a  strictly  epical  character.  Whatever  may  have  been 
his  losses  by  sea,  his  land-forces  remained  as  formidable  as  ever : 
but  the  lord  of  this  mighty  host  must  be  told  that  he  is  a  criminal, 
and  that  the  price  of  his  crime  must  be  paid.  The  summons  of  the 
Spartans  is  followed  by  a  sudden  plunge  into  utter  misery.  For 
five-and-forty  days,  we  are  told,  the  forces  or  rather  the  hordes 
rejected  by  Mardonios  struggled  onwards  over  their  road  to  the 
Hellespont,  thousands  and  tens  of  thousands  falling  as  they  went 
from  hunger,  thirst,  disease,  and  cold.  A  few  might  live  on  the 
harvests  of  the  lands  through  which  they  passed:  but  the  vast 
crowds  for  which  these  lands  could  afford  no  sustenance  were  dri- 
ven to  feed  on  grass  or  the  leaves  and  bark  of  trees.  Disease 
came  quickly  in  the  track  of  famine  ;  and  in  Thessaly  as  well  as 
in  Makedonia  Xerxes  was  constrained  to  intrust  the  sick  whom  he 
left  behind  him  to  the  tender  mercies  of  the  natives.  Humiliation 
followed  on  humiliation.  The  sacred  chariot  of  Zeus,  which  he 
had  left  in  the  Paionian  Siris,  was  now  not  forthcoming  ;  and 
■when  he  reached  the  Hellespont  just  eight  months  after  he  had 
crossed  over  it  to  Sestos,  the  brid2;e  over  which  he  had  passed  in 
the  plenitude  of  luxury  and  pride  had  been  shattered  by  storms 
and  rendered  useless.  Boats  conveyed  across  the  strait  the  lord  of 
all  Asia  with  the  scanty  remnant  of  his  guards  and  followers  :  but 
the  sudden  change  from  starvation  to  plenty  was  not  less  deadly 
than  the  worst  of  the  evils  against  which  they  had  thus  far  had  to 
struggle,  and  the  multitude  so  fearfully  thinned  in  Europe  dwindled 
more  rapidly  away.  Such,  in  the  belief  of  Herodotos,  Avas  the 
true  story  of  the  retreat  of  Xerxes  :  but  he  mentions  another 
account  which  asserted  that,  having  reached  Eion  on  the  Strymon, 
he  left  Hydarnes  in  charge  of  his  army  and  embarked  with  his 
bodyguard  on  board  a  Phenician  ship.  The  vessel  was  soon  over- 
taken by  a  heavy  storm  ;  and  the  king  in  dismay  asked  the  pilot  if 
there  was  any  hope  of  safety.  '  Xone,'  was  the  answer,  '  unless 
we  can  ease  the  ship  of  the  crowd  within  it.'  Xerxes  turned  to 
his  Persians,  telling  them  simply  that  his  life  depended  on  them. 
In  an  instant  they  had  done  obeisance  and  leaped  into  the  sea ; 
and  the  ship  thus  lightened  reached  Asia  in  safety.  On  landing, 
Xerxes  gave  the  pilot  a  golden  crown  for  saving  the  king's  life  and 
then  cut  ofi"  his  head  for  losing  the  lives  of  his  men.  This  story 
Herodotos  without  hesitation  rejects  on  the  ground  that,  even  if 
the  pilot  had  so  spoken,  Xerxes  would  assuredly  have  sent  his 


Chap.  V.]        INVASION  AND  FLIGHT  OP  XERXES.  207 

Persians  down  from  the  deck  into  the  body  of  the  ship  and  cast 
out  into  the  sea  a  number  of  Pheuician  sailors  equal  to  that  of  the 
Persians.  Nor  could  he  bring  himself  to  believe  the  story  of  the 
men  of  Abdera  that  Xerxes  there  loosed  his  girdle  for  the  first 
time  since  he  left  Athens,  as  thinking  himself  at  last  in  safety, 
although  he  regards  the  fact  of  his  rewarding  their  hospitality 
with  a  golden  dagger  and  turban  as  conclusive  proof  that  he  had 
not  embarked  at  Eion.  With  equal  decision  probably  he  rejected, 
for  we  can  scarcely  suppose  that  he  had  not  heard,  the  marvellous 
story  of  the  crossing  of  the  !3trymon  as  related  by  ^schylos  in  his 
drama  of  the  Persians.  A  frost  unusual  for  the  season  of  the 
year!  had  frozen  firmly  the  whole  surface  of  a  river  nearly  two 
hundred  yards  in  width  ;  and  on  this  frozen  surface  the  army 
crossed  in  safety  until  the  heat  of  the  sun  thawed  the  ice  and  the 
crowds  were  plunged  between  the  shattered  masses  into  the  water. 
Ice  capable  of  bearing  tens  of  thousands  for  even  two  or  three 
hours  must  be  at  least  twelve  or  eighteen  inches  in  uniform  thick- 
ness :  and  the  formation  of  such  ice  in  a  single  night  in  the  latitude 
and  climate  of  the  mouth  of  the  Strymon  is  an  impossibility.  Th^^ 
story  is  simply  the  growth  of  the  religious  conviction  that  Zeus 
himself  fought  against  Xerxes  as  the  stars  in  their  courses  fought 
against  Sisera.  It  implies  furtherthat  the  Persians  were  hurrying 
away  in  frantic  haste  from  an  enemy  almost  at  their  heels  :  but 
there  was,  in  fact,  no  pursuit,  and  for  many  years  later  Eion  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Strymon  remained  in  the  hands  of  the  Persians  and 
was  wrested  from  them  only  after  a  severe  struggle  by  Kimon. 

If  the  account  given  by  JEschylos  is  obviously  impossible, 
there  are  difficulties  fully  as  great  in  following  the  story  of  llero- 
dotos.  If  we  take  his  numbers  as  furnishing  even  a  General  cre- 
relative  proportion,  Xerxes  must  have  led  back  from  f^e'^'i^rni! 
Athens  a  larger  army  than  that  which  he  left  behind  tive. 
him  with  Mardonios.  Yet  his  numbers  were  so  far  lessened  that 
great  suspicion  is  thrown  on  the  tale  of  utter  starvation  and  misery 
which  his  people  are  said  to  have  endured  from  the  time  that  he 
entered  ^Makedonia.  On  his  former  march  from  Doriskos  westward 
his  men  were  fed,  we  are  told,  from  the  accumulated  stores  of  three 
years  as  well  as  from  the  forced  or  voluntary  contributions  of  the 

'  XELjiuv,  dcjpov.  496.   If  we  follow  says,  had  made  its  escape  from  Sa- 

tlie  clironoloo-y  of  Herodotos,  this  laiiiis  ;  and  lie  adds, 
could  not  have  been  later  than  No-  >„v'<;i   ,_v'.-„t}„,    --..,fl^„ 

vember  ;  but  the  poet  may  be  allow-  x  'ii.  aqo 

ed  a  wider  license,  and  seemingly 

lie  places  this  incident  after  the  bat-  Compare  also  line  187.  But  the  fact, 

tleof  Plataiai.   The  expression  that  as  he  relates  it,  would  be  inipossi- 

alniost  the  whole  army   was  de-  ble,  to  whatever  season  of  the  year 

stroyed  in  Boiotia  can  scarcely  refer  it  may  be  assigned,  even  in  places 

to  any  other  event.     The  fleet,  he  twenty  degrees  farther  north. 


208  THE  STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  IL 

inhabitants.  Of  these  niagazines  the  story  of  the  retreat  in  Hero- 
dotos  says  nothing  ;  nor  are  we  told  that  their  contents  were  all 
consumed  on  the  march  into  Greece.  Yet  Xerxes,  as  he  journeyed 
westwards,  unquestionably  contemplated  a  speedy  return  to  his 
own  land,  and  had  his  dreams  of  leading-  back  a  long  line  of 
Athenian  and  Spartan  slaves  in  addition  to  the  hosts  which  he  was 
driving  on  to  conquest.  His  need  of  food  would  be  increased  by 
the  measure  of  liis  success  ;  and  his  care  to  preserve  and  to  extend 
these  stores  would  be  stimulated  by  his  hopes  of  immediate  victory. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  proportion  to  the  fewness  of  his  attendants 
would  be  the  ease  of  maintaining  them  from  these  unexhausted  or 
replenished  magazines.  Yet,  as  though  submitting  to  an  ordinary 
necessity,  he  leaves  his  army  to  subsist  by  plunder  or  to  die  by 
famine,  in  a  land  where,  as  it  would  seem,  not  a  single  arm  was 
raised  against  him  in  spite  of  all  this  robbery  and  pillage,  and 
where  we  are  told  that  he  left  liis  sick  in  the  cities  through  which 
he  passed,  not  without  confidence  in  the  kindly  feeling  of  the 
inhabitants.  Still,  with  this  friendliness  or  at  least  neutrality  of 
the  people,  perplexing  though  it  be,  his  passage  is  more  disastrous 
than  that  of  Artabazos  who,  as  we  shall  see,  fought  his  way  after 
the  battle  of  Plataiai  through  the  Avild  tribes  of  the  Thrakian 
highlands.  The  story  of  Hcrodotos  would  give  some  countenance 
to  the  Makedonian  boast,  of  which  probably  he  never  heard,  that 
they  had  slaughtered  and  almost  cut  off  the  whole  anny  in  its 
flight ;  and  unless  we  assume  some  great  hostility  whether  of  Make- 
donians  or  Thrakians,  as  accounting  for  the  scanty  numbers  with 
which  Xerxes  is  said  to  have  reached  the  Hellsspont,  we  might  be 
tempted  to  draw  the  conclusion  that  he  had  brought  with  him  into 
Europe  not  many  more  troops  than  those  which  he  left  under  the 
command  of  Mardonios,  and  that  he  journeyed  from  Thessaly  only 
with  a  moderate  bodyguard.  We  have,  however,  the  distinct 
assertion  that  he  was  attended  as  far  as  the  Hellespont  by  60,000 
men  commanded  by  Artabazos,  whose  conduct  after  the  fight  at 
Plataiai  won  for  him  a  high  reputation  for  decision  and  adroitness.  ^ 
But  however  this  may  have  been,  the  change  which  comes  over 
the  spirit  of  the  narrative  as  soon  as  Xerxes  is  safely  restored  to 
the  luxurious  tyranny  of  his  own  land  tends  more  than  anything 
else  to  call  into  question  the  tale  of  misery  and  ruin  which  precedes 
it.  From  the  moment  that  Artabazos  has  dismissed  his  ma^ster 
he  appears  as  a  man  well  able  to  hold  his  ground  against  all 
efforts  of  his  enemies  without  calling  on  his  troops  to  undergo  any 
special  privations.  We  hear  no  more  of  famine  or  disease,  of  men 
plucking  grass  and  roots  and  then  lying  down  to  die.     Instead  of 

'  Herod,  viii.  120. 


Chap.  V.]        INVASION  AND  FLIGHT  OF  XERXES.  209 

this,  we  find  him  deliberately  resolving  to  remain  in  Makedonia, 
until  the  return  of  spring  should  allow  Mardonios  to  move  his 
army  in  Boiotia.  So  completely  is  he  master  of  his  position  and 
his  movements  that  he  determines  to  attack  the  Greek  colonies 
which  had  dared  to'revolfc  after  the  king  had  passed  them  on  his 
retreat  and  when  they  had  heard  of  the  hurried  departure  of  the 
fleet  from  Salamis.  In  truth,  the  real  source  of  weakness  was 
gone  with  Xerxes  :  and  thus  Artabazos  had  no  hesitation  in  laying 
siege  to  Olynthos  and  no  compunction  in  slaughtering  its  inhabi- 
tants when  it  fell  and  in  handing  the  place  over  to  the  Chalkidians 
of  Torone.i  His  next  step  was  not  that  of  a  leader  who,  alarmed 
for  his  own  safety  or  for  that  of  his  men,  was  anxious  to  fall  back 
upon  the  main  army.  From  Olynthos  he  turned  his  arms  against 
Potidaia.  Daring  his  siege  of  three  months  he  was  encouraged  by 
the  hope  that  Timoxenos  the  Skionaian  general  might  succeed  in 
betraying  the  town,  as  he  had  pledged  himself  to  do.  But  the 
correspondence  which  by  means  of  letters  twined  round  arrows  he 
had  carried  on  with  Timoxenos  was  discovered  ;  and  he  was  glad 
to  avail  himself  of  an  extraordinary  ebbing  of  the  sea  to  march 
across  the  ground  which  the  waters  had  thus  left  bare  between  his 
camping-place  and  the  walls  of  the  city.  But  before  they  could 
reacla  the  other  side  the  sea  came  back  with  a  flow  as  astonishing 
as  its  ebb,  and  all  who  could  not  swim  were  drowned,  while  those 
Avho  escaped  by  swimming  were  slaughtered  by  the  Potidaians 
who  came  in  boats  to  complete  the  work  of  destruction.  Of  the 
extent  of  his  loss  by  this  disaster  we  are  not  informed  :  but  as  we 
find  him  after  the  battle  of  Plataiai  with  40,000  men  still  under 
his  command,'^  we  must  suppose  that  these  were  a  portion  of  the 
60,000  who  escorted  Xerxes  to  the  Hellespont,  and  that  20,000 
represent  the  losses  sustained  in  the  siege  of  Potidaia  and  perhaps 
in  the  fatal  fight  which  destroyed  the  army  of  Mardonios.  This 
loss  can  scarcely  be  considered  out  of  proportion  with  the  great- 
ness of  his  efforts  and  of  his  disasters.  But  the  history  of  Arta- 
bazos  is,  in  truth,  conclusive  evidence  that,  however  intense  may 
have  been  the  hatred  of  the  native  tribes  for  their  Asiatic  invaders, 
they  were  unable  to  place  any  serious  hindrance  in  his  path,  and 
that  though  the  Persians  may  not  have  enjoyed  the  luxuries  of 
Sousa,  they  were  not  reduced  to  the  hard  lot  of  an  Arabian  cara- 
van in  lack  of  food  and  water.  Whatever  wretchedness  the 
tyrant  underwent  Avas  a  wretchedness  of  his  own  causing ;  and 
probably  not  even  the  ignominy  of  his  retreat  was  allowed  to  intex*- 
fere  with  his  sensual  enjoyments. 

The  alleged  operations  of  the  Greek  fleet  after  the  battle  of 

'  Herod,  viii.  127.  ""  lb.  ix.  66. 


210  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  IL 

Salarnis  seem  to  show  that  the  aim  of  the  commanders  Avas  not  to 
dissipate  their  strength  by  expeditions  to  the  Hellespont  (which, 
Siege  of  however,  they  refused  to  undertake  solely  on  the  score 
the  con-''^  of  their  inutility)  but  to  repair  their  losses  whether  by 
federates.  the  forced  or  the  voluntary  contributions  of  Hellenic 
cities.  Themistolvles  was  acting  as  spokesman  for  the  Greeks 
generally,  when  he  told  the  Andriansthat  the  Athenians  had  come 
to  them  under  the  guidance  of  two  very  mighty  deities,  ^  Faith  and 
Necessity,  and  therefore  pay  they  must.  The  rejoinder  of  the 
Andrians  that  they  likewise  had  two  deities,  Poverty  and  Help- 
lessness, which  would  never  leave  their  island  and  made  it  im- 
possible for  them  to  pay  anything,  was  followed  by  a  blockade. 
The  result  verified  the  prediction  of  the  Andrians  that  the  power 
of  Athens  could  never  exceed  their  own  impotence  ;  and  the 
Greeks,  compelled  to  abandon  the  siege,  ravaged  the  lands  of 
Karystos  ut  the  southern  extremity  of  Euboia  and  then  sailed 
back  to  Salamis.  This  fact,  if  it  took  place,  sufficiently  refutes  the 
story  that  Themistokles  had  already  extorted  large  sums  from  the 
Karystians  and  Parians  under  the  pledge,  it  must  be  assumed, 
that  he  would  hold  them  scathless  in  person  and  property  ;  but 
we  are  told  further  that  while  the  siege  of  Andros  was  still  being 
carried  on,  Themistokles  by  threatening  the  otlier  islands  with 
summary  measures  in  case  of  refusal  collected  large  sums  of 
money  without  the  knowledge  of  the  other  leaders  and  retained 
them  for  himself."  The  charge  is  incredible.  Themistokles  and 
tlie  agents  of  his  extortions  might  keep  the  secret :  but  there 
was  nothing  to  stop  the  mouths  of  his  victims,  and  Athens  was  not 
so  popular  with  the  confederates  as  to  make  them  deaf  to  charges 
which  accused  Themistokles  of  crippling  the  resources  of  the 
allies  for  his  own  personal  advantage. 

The  work  of  a  memorable  year  was  now  ended.  It  only  remained 
to  d3dicate  to  the  gods  the  thank-offerings  due  to  them  for  their 
Distribution  guardianship  and  active  aid,  and  to  distribute  the 
of  honors       rewards  and  honors   which   the   conduct  of  the  con- 

aniong  the  ,     .      „ 

Greeiis.  federates  might  deserve.  Iheir  first  act  was  to  con- 
secrate three  Phenician  ships,  one  to  the  honor  of  Aias  at  Salarnis, 
another  at  Sounion,  and  the  third,  wliich  Herodotos'  himself  had 
seen,  at  the  isthmus.     At  the  isthmus  the  question  of  personal 

'  Peitho,  which  is  etymolotrically  besiejred  it  with  the  deliberate  de- 

theEn£^lish_/>/«7//,isherethe  power  sisn  of  destroyinpr  the  city  altoge- 

which  produces  obedience  or  trust,  ther.      The     farther     charge     of 

Tlie  refusal  of  tiie  Andrians  to  cou-  Medism,    Herod     viii.  112,   would 

tribute  to  the  expenses  of  the  war  prnbaljly  havw   been  condoned,  if 

was   refjardcd,  we  are  told,  as  so  the  money  had  been  paid, 

serious  an  offence  atjainst  the  wel-  ^  Herod,  viii.  113. 

fare  of  Hellas  that  the  confederates  ^  viii.  121. 


Chap.  V.]        INVASION  AND  FLIGHT  OF  XERXES.  211 

merit  in  the  war  was  decided,  it  is  said,  by  tlie  written  votes  of 
the  generals,  each  of  whom  claimed  the  first  place  for  himself, 
while  most  of  them  (Plutarch  says,  all)  assigned  the  second  to 
Thcmistokles.  Bnt  the  incredibly  silly  vanity  which  thus  deprived 
the  Athenian  general  of  his  formal  pre-eminence  in  no  way 
lessened  his  glory  or  interfered  with  the  honors  paid  to  him.  If 
an  olive-crown  was  given  to  Eurybiades  as  the  commander-in- 
chief,  the  same  prize  was  bestowed  on  Thcmistokles  expressly  for 
his  unparalleled  wisdom  and  dexterity.  The  most  beautiful  cha- 
riot in  Sparta,  the  gift  of  the  citizens,  conveyed  him  from  that 
city,  three  hundred  chosen  Spartiatai  being  his  escort  as  far  as 
the  boundaries  of  Tegea.  No  other  man,  it  is  said,  ever  received 
such  honors  from  the  Spartans.  So  ended  the  triumph  of  the 
confederates  for  that  victory  in  which  the  names  of  Aigina  and 
Athens  were  associated  in  pre-eminent  lustre. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE    BATTLES    OF    PLATAIAI    AND    MYKALE. 

The  winter  which  followed  the  defeat  at  Salamis  was  spent  by  the 
Persian  fleet  at  the  Aiolic  Kyine  en  the  Elaiatic  gulf,  about  ten 
miles  to  the  east  of  the  ill-fated  city  of  Phokaia.  Early  Movements 
in  the  spring  it  moved  forwards  as  far  as  Samos  under  and^p^-gifn 
the  command  of  Mardontes  and  Artayntes.  There  fluecs. 
was  no  intention  of  renewing  the  struggle  in  the  waters  of  Western 
Hellas.  Their  whole  attention  was  tixed  on  the  repression  of 
re\t)lt  in  Asiatic  Ionia,  if  the  people  who  had,  as  it  was  said,  shown 
so  much  zeal  in  behalf  of  the  king  at  Salamis  should  be  disposed 
to  renew  the  trouble  which  they  liad  given  in  the  days  of  Arista- 
goras.  Of  any  attack  from  the  fleet  of  the  Western  Greeks  they 
had  no  fear.  Any  such  danger  had  in  their  belief  passed  away 
when  their  enemies  gave  up  the  idea  of  pursuing  them  from 
Salamis;  and  they  believed  further  that  by  land  Mardonios  would 
succeed  in  taking  ample  vengeance  for  the  mishaps  of  the  Persian 
navy.i  The  Greek  fleet  at  the  same  time  assembled 
at  Aigina,  110  ships  in  all, — the  Athenians  mider  ^79  b.c. 
Xanthippos,  and  the  Peloponnesians  under  Leoty  chides.  They 
had  scarcely  taken  up  their  station  off  the  island,  when  an  embassy 

'  Herod,  viii.  130. 


212  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

came  from  Chios  praying  them  to  hasten  at  once  to  the  help  of 
the  lonians.  The  confederates  in  comphance  with  their  request 
sailed  as  far  as  Delos,  beyond  which  they  resolutely  refused  to  ad- 
vance. The  waters  which  stretched  away  to  the  east  were  in  their 
eyes,  we  are  told,  swarming  with  Persian  or  Phenician  cruisers  ; 
and  Samos  appeared  to  them  as  distant  as  the  pillars  of  Herakles 
and  the  gates  of  the  Atlantic  ocean.  Respecting  this  singular 
statement  something  has  been  said  already  'A  it  is  unnecessary  to 
say  more  here  than  that  when,  a  few  months  earlier,  these  hostile 
ships  were  in  the  waters  to  the  west  of  Delos,  no  such  fears  were 
expressed,  if  the  story  be  true  that  Themistokles  proposed  an  im- 
mediate pursuit  of  the  retreating  Persians  as  far  as  the  Hellespont 
and  that  the  proposal  was  rejected  only  as  being  impolitic.  It  is 
impossible  that  the  history  of  fifteen  years  should  obliterate  the 
associations  and  traditions  of  ages,  or  that  a  state  of  feeling  should 
have  sprung  up  six  months  after  the  fight  of  Salamis  which  was 
not  in  existence  when  Xerxes  sent  away  his  fleet  to  guard  the 
bridge  over  the  Hellespont. 

The  occupation  of  Mardonios  in  his  Thessalian  winter-quarters 
consisted  chiefly  of  attempts  to  ascertain  the  feelings  of  the  Greek 
Offers  of  al-  states  towards  him sclf  and  his  master.  The  informa- 
I'a'iccmade  tiou  which  he  received  probably  encouraged  him  to 
nioi  to  the  make  the  greater  venture  which  betrayed  a  significant 
Atheuians.  change  iu  Persian  policy.  Mardonios  had  learnt  that 
the  aid  of  Thessaliaus  and  Boiotians  was  as  nothing  in  compari- 
son of  the  advantage  which  he  would  gain  by  an  alliance  with 
Athens  :  nor  could  he  have  failed  to  ascertain  that,  if  the  decision 
had  rested  with  the  Athenians,  the  decisive  struggle  between  the 
two  fleets  would  have  been  at  Artemision,  not  at  Salamis.  It  was 
Athens  therefore  which  stood  in  the  way  ;  and  until  this  hindrance 
should  be  removed,  tribute,  the  true  end  of  Persian  conquest, 
would  never  flow  from  AVestern  Hellas  into  the  treasuries  of 
Sousa.  It  was  worth  while  then  to  sacrifice  much  to  turn  a  people 
so  resolute  from  an  enemy  into  a  friend  ;  and  if  the  proposal  as- 
cribed to  Mardonios  was  really  made,  the  sacrifice  which  he  pro- 
fessed himself  ready  to  make  must  have  cost  his  master,  if  not 
himself,  no  slight  struggle.  Nor  was  it  a  scanty  recognition  of 
Athenian  greatness  when  the  Makedonian  chief  Alexandros  came 
to  tell  them  that  the  great  king  was  willing  not  merely  to  foi'give 
all  their  sins  against  him  if  they  would  become  not  his  servants 
but  his  friends,  but  to  bestow  upon  them  in  addition  to  their  own 
land  any  territory  which  they  might  choose  for  independent  oc- 
cupation and,  further,  to  rebuild  all  the  temples  which  his  fol- 
lowers had  burnt. 

^  See  note  1,  p.  153. 


Chap.  VI.]     BATTLES  OF  PLATAIAI  AND  MYKALfi.  213 

The  tidings  of  this  change  in  Persian  poUcy  had  reached  Sparta 
and  awakened  there  the  liveliest  alarm.  The  counter-proposal 
which  they  made  through  ambassadors  hurriedly  sent  j;n^,,assy  of 
was  that  they  would  maintain  the  households  of  the  the  Sparians 
Athenians  as  long  as  the  war  should  last,  if  only  they  °  '  ^^^' 
would  liold  out  stoiTtly  against  Mardonios.  The  alleged  reply  of 
the  Athenians  to  both  their  suitors  is  marked  by  that  real  dignity 
which  springs  from  the  consciousness  of  thoroughly  disinterested 
motives.  Whether  it  has  been  handed  dowu  as  it  was  uttered,  or 
not,  we  can  well  miderstand  the  glow  of  pride  with  which  the 
Athenians  of  a  later  day  recalled  these  utterances  of  exalted 
patriotism.  To  Alexandres  they  said,  '  We  know  that  the  army 
of  the  Medes  is  much  larger  than  ours,  and  there  is  no  need  to 
cast  this  in  our  teeth :  but  in  the  struggle  for  freedom  we  will 
beat  them  off  with  all  our  might.  And  now  tell  Mardonios  what 
we  say,  "  As  long  as  the  sun  shalT  keep  the  same  path  in  the 
heaven,  we  will  never  make  peace  with  Xerxes  :  but  wc  will  face 
him,  trusting  in  the  help  of  gods  and  heroes,  whom  lie  has  in- 
sulted by  burning  their  homes  and  shrines."  '  Then  turning  to 
the  Spartans  they  said,  '  It  w:is  perhaps  natural  that  you  should 
dread  our  making  peace  with  the  barbarian  ;  but  you  know  little 
of  the  mind  of  the  Athenians,  for  not  all  the  gold  throughout  all 
the  world  could  tempt  us  to  take  the  part  of  the  Medes  and  help 
to  inslave  Hellas.  Even  if  we  were  willing  to  do  so,  there  are 
many  things  to  hinder  us,  and  chietly  the  shrines  and  dwellings 
of  the  gods  which  they  have  burnt  and  thrown  down.  Yet  more, 
the  whole  Hellenic  race  is  of  the  same  blood  and  speech  with  us ; 
we  share  in  common  the  temples  of  our  gods ;  we  have  the  same 
sacrifices  and  the  same  way  of  life ;  and  these  the  Athenians  can 
never  betray.  Be  assured  now,  if  you  knew  it  not  before,  that  so 
long  as  but  one  Athenian  shall  remain,  wo  will  never  make  any 
covenant  with  Xerxes.  For  your  goodwill  to  us  we  thank  you  : 
but  we  will  struggle  on  as  well  as  we  can  without  giving  you 
trouble.  All  that  we  pray  you  to  do  is  to  send  out  your  army 
with  all  speed,  for  assuredly  the  barbarian  will  soon  be  in  our 
land,  when  he  learns  that  we  will  not  do  as  he  would  have  us ; 
and  we  ought  to  meet  him  in  Boiotia  before  he  can  advance  as 
far  as  Attica.' 

Beautiful,  however,  though  these  words  may  be,  yet  either 
they  were  put  together  at  a  later  day,  or  the  sequel  of  the 
narrative  has  been  falsified.  At  the  time  of  the  Re-occupa- 
embassy  to  Athens  the  Isthmian  wall  remained  un-  ^°i"g°g ],„ 
finished,  as  it  had  been  when  Xerxes  began  his  Mardonios. 
homeward  journey  :  but  the  pledges  which  they  had  received  of 
Athenian  steadfastness  encourao;ed  them  to  the  most  strenuous 


214  THE  STRUGGLE  WITH   PERSIA.  [Book  IL 

efforts  for  its  immediate,  completion.  With  its  completion  came 
back  seemingly  tlie  old  indifference  ;  and  the  Persians  were  again 
in  Attica  before  a  single  Spartan  troop  had  advanced  beyond  the 
isthmus.  Nay  more,  no  sooner  had  the  wall  been  finished,  than 
Kleombrotos  led  the  Spartan  army  hurriedly  back  to  Sparta* 
because  an  eclipse  of  the  sun  had  taken  place.  On  his  death, 
which  happened  almost  immediately  after,  his  son  Pausanias  was 
appointed  general,  and  guardian  of  iiis  cousin  Pleistarchos  the 
young  son  of  Leonidas.  Taken  altogether,  things  looked  better  for 
Mardonios  than  ever  they  had  looked  for  Xerxes.  He  was  at  the 
head  of  a  more  compact  and  manageable  army  ;  and  his  Hellenic 
allies  seemed  to  be  stirred  by  redoubled  zeal  in  his  cause.''  But 
Mardonios,  as  Herodotos  believed,  v/as  feverishly  anxious  to  re- 
possess himself  of  Athens,  partly  because  he  was  suffering  from 
divinely  inflicted  frenzy,  and  partly  because  he  wished  to  send  the 
tidings  of  his  own  glorification  to  Sousa.  His  caution  in  avoiding 
acts  of  violence  on  retaking  the  city  suflSciently  disproves  these 
inferences.  Mardonios  was  as  steadily  intent  on  winning  over  the 
Athenians  as  Xerxes  had  been  on  punishing  them.  There  was  yet 
the  chance  that  their  stubborn  will  might  give  way  when  they  saw 
their  soil  again  trodden  by  invading  armies,  while  the  care  of  the 
general  in  protecting  their  city  might  justify  them  in  trusting  to 
any  covenant  which  they  might  make  with  him.  To  carry  out  this 
plan  he  crossed  the  frontiers  of  Attica.  Once  more  the  Athenians 
conveyed  their  families  and  household  goods  to  Salamis ;  and  ten 
months  after  the  capture  of  the  Akropolis  by  Xerxes  Mardonios 
entered  a  silent  and  desolate  city.  Still  hoping  that  his  scheme 
might  succeed,  he  dispatched  a  Hellespontian  named  Mourychides 
to  Salamis  with  the  same  terms  which  he  had  already  offered 
through  Alexandros.  The  terms  were  rejected  :  but  the  Athenian 
joeople  at  once  informed  the  Peloponnesians  that,  unless  they 
received  immediate  aid,  they  must  devise  some  means  of  escape 
from  their  present  troubles.  That  these  words  indicate  submission 
to  Persia,  is  patent  from  the  speech  which  at  this  point  the  histo- 
rian puts  into  the  mouth  of  the  Athenian,  Plataian,  and  Megarian 
ambassadors  at  Sparta.  Here  we  have  a  recapitulation  of  the 
terms  offered  by  Mardonios :  but  this  is  no  longer  followed  by 
the  impassioned  declaration  that  the  sun  should  fall  from  heaven 
sooner  than  Athens  would  submit  to  the  enemy  and  that,  if  but 
one  Athenian  survived,  that  Athenian  would  rather  die  than 
make  any  paction  with    the  tyrant.     Instead  of  this,   we   have 

'  Such  a  fact  as  tliis  shows  liow  impossibility  for  a  Spartan  leader. 

little  reliance  is  to  be  placed  on  the  Herod,  ix.  10. 

words  which,  put  into  the  mouth  of  ^  Herod,  ix.  1. 
Jjconidas,  represent  retreat  as  an 


Chap.  VI.]     BATTLES  OF  PLATAIAI  AND  MYKALE.  215 

the  tranquil  declaration  that  they  heartily  desire  the  weirare  of 
Hellas,  and  that  they  will  make  no  paction  with  the  enemy,  if 
they  can  avoid  the  so  doing.  The  speech  is  a  wretched  bathos 
after  the  lofty  protestations  uttered  in  the  hearing  of  the  Make- 
donian  chieftain,  and  the  two  traditions  exclude  each  other. 

The  reproaches  of  the  Athenians,  so  the  story  runs,  fell  for  the 
present  on  deaf  ears.     The  Lakedaimonians  were  keeping  the  feast 
of  the   Hyakinthian   Apollon  ;    and  exactness    of   re- jyiarohofthe 
ligious  ceremonial   was   to  them   of    greater   moment  Spartans 
than   resistance  to  the   barbarian.      They   could    also  sanias  from 
comfort  themselves  with   the   thought  that   the   Isth-  '^P'^'"'^^- 
mian  wall  had  all  but  received  its  coping  stones  and  battlements. 
They  could  afford  therefore  to  put  off  the  Athenian  ambassadors 
by  specious  excuses  from  day  to  day ;  and  they  succeeded  in  so 
putting  them  off  for  ten  days  until  Chileos  of  Tegca,  hearing  from 
the  ephors  the  substance  of  the  Athenian  demands,  assured  them 
that  their  wall  would   be  of  very  little  use,  if  by  virtue  of  any 
covenant  made  with   Mardonios  the  Athenian  tieet  should  co- 
operate with  the   Persian   land-army.     As   if  this  very  obvious 
remark  came  with  the  merit  of  absolute  novelty,  the  ephors,  we 
are  told,  took  the  words  of  Chileos  seriously  to  heart,  and  on  that 
very  night  dispatched  from  Sparta  five  thousand  hoplites  under 
Pausanias,  son  of  Kleombrotos,  each  hoplite  being  attended  by 
seven  helots — in  other  words,  a  force  amounting  to  40,000  men. 
Early  the  following  morning  the  ambassadors  of  the  extra-Pelo- 
ponnesian    cities    informed  the  ephors  in  few  words  that  they 
were  free  to  remain  at  home  and  keep  festival  to  their  hearts' 
content,  but  that  the   Athenians  would  at  once  make  with  the 
Persians  the  best  terms  which  could  now  be  obtained.     '  They  are 
gone,'  replied  the  ephors,  '  and  are  already  in  the  Oresteion  on 
their  march   to  meet  the  strangers.'     '  Who  are  gone,  and  who 
are  the  strangers  ? '  asked  the  Athenians  in  reply  to  these  mysteri- 
ous tidings.     '  Our  Spartans  have  gone  with  their  helots,'  they  an- 
swered, '  forty  thousand  men  in  all,  and  the  strangers  are  the  Per- 
sians.'   In  utter  amazement  the  ambassadors  hastened  away,  accom- 
panied by  5,000  picked  hoplites  from  the  Lakedaimonian  Perioikoi. 
The  explanation  of  all  this  mystery  is  found  in   the  simple 
statement  that  the  Argives  were  under  a  promise  to  Mardonios  to 
prevent  by  force,   if  force  should  be  necessary,  the   Paction  of 
departure  of  any  Spartan  army  from  the  Peloponnesos,-  ^"^thlvilr-^^ 
If  any  part  of  the  narrative  deserve  credit,  it  would   donios. 
be  the  unadorned  and  simple  story  of  the  conduct  of  Mardonios  on 
the  second  invasion  of  Attica.     Feeling  that  with  the  submission 

'  Herod,  ix.  12. 


216  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH   PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

or  the  independent  alliance  of  Athens  his  task  would  be  practi- 
call}'  done,  he  saw  mither  that  the  Athenians  would  be  best  won 
over  if  the  pressure  put  upon  them  should  stop  short  of  the  devas- 
tation of  their  country  and  the  burning  of  their  houses.  But  there 
would  be  no  chance  of  preventing  pillage  and  plunder,  if  Attica 
should  be  made  a  battle-field.  Hence  it  became  of  the  utmost  im- 
portance to  him  that  no  Peloponnesian  force  should  be  allowed  to 
advance  beyond  the  Isthmus  ;  and  the  pledge  given  by  the  Argives 
seemed  to  assure  him  that  from  this  quarter  there  was  no  danger 
to  be  feared.  That  the  agreement  between  the  Argives  and  Mar- 
donios  should  come  to  the  knowledge  of  the  Spartan  epliors,  is 
not  very  surprising.  Argos  had  from  the  first  stood  aloof  in  the 
contest;  and  her  sympathies  were  known  to  be  rather  with  the 
Persians  than  with  their  opponents.  But  the  knowledge  of  this 
secret  covenant  between  the  Argives  and  the  Persian  general 
imposed  on  the  ephors  the  need  of  absolute  secrecy  on  their  side  in 
any  military  plans  which  they  might  desire  to  carry  out,  and  made 
it  scarcely  less  necessary  to  keep  these  plans  from  the  knowledge 
of  the  Athenians  than  to  prevent  their  being  discovered  by  the 
Argives.  If  the  latter  were  under  any  such  pledge,  nothing  but 
secrecy  could  enable  the  Spartans  to  leave  the  Peloponnesos  with- 
out fighting  their  way  through  Argive  territory  ;  and  when  owing 
to  this  secrecy  their  plan  succeeded  and  the  Argives  sent  word  to 
Athens  to  say  that  they  had  failed  to  prevent  the  departure  of  the 
Spartans,  Mardonios  felt  that  his  own  scheme  had  likewise  become 
hopeless.  At  once  the  whole  land  was  abandoned  to  his  soldiers. 
Athens  was  set  on  fire ;  and  any  walls  and  buildings  which  had 
escaped  the  ravages  of  the  first  invasion  were  dismantled  and 
thrown  down.  He  could  not  afford  to  stay  and  fight  in  a  country 
which  was  ill-suited  for  cavahy  and  from  which  in  case  of  defeat 
he  would  have  to  lead  his  army  through  narrow  and  dangerous 
passes.  The  order  for  retreat  was  therefore  given  ;  and  Mardo- 
nios in  a  little  while  found  himself  once  again  on  the  plain  of  Thebes. 

The  epical  method  of  Herodotos  is  again  disclosed  as  he 
approaches  the  great  battle  in  which,  according  to  the  promise  of 
„,  f  ^j  f  Xerxes,  Mardonios  was  to  give  to  the  Spartans  satis- 
Attasrinos.     faction  for  the  death  of  Leonidas.     The  pride    and 

4i9B.c.  aiTogance  of  the  Persian  leader  are  strengthened, 
while  the  hopes  of  his  followers  are  represented  as  dying  away. 
But  the  tale  which  tells  how  a  blindness  sent  by  the  gods  was  on 
his  eyes,  while  others  foresaw  the  ruin,  can  be  given  only  in  the 
words  of  the  historian. 

'  While  the  barbarians  were  working  on  their  fortified  camp, 
Attaginos  the  son  of  Phrynon,  a  Theban,  called  Mardonios,  with 
fifty  of  the  chief  men  among  the  Persians,  to  a  great  banquet 


Chap.  VI.]    BATTLES  OF  PLATAIAI  AND  MYKALfi.  217 

whicli  he  had  made  ready  in  Thebes.  The  rest  of  this  story  T 
heard  from  Thersandros,  a  great  man  among  the  Orchomenians, 
who  told  me  that  he  had  been  invited  to  this  feast  with  fifty  men 
of  the  Thebans  and  that  they  lay  down  to  meat,  not  separately, 
but  one  Persian  and.one  Theban  together  on  each  couch.  When 
the  feast  was  ended,  as  they  were  drinking  wine,  the  Persian  who 
lay  on  the  couch  with  him  asked  him  in  tlie  Greek  language  who  he 
was :  and  when  he  answered  that  he  was  a  man  of  Orchomenos, 
the  Persian  said,  "  Thou  hast  sat  at  the  same  table  and  shared  the 
same  cup  with  me,  and  I  wish  to  leave  thee  a  memorial  of  my 
foresight,  that  thou  mayest  be  able  by  wise  counsel  to  provide 
also  for  thyself.  Thou  seest  the  Persians  who  are  with  us  at  this 
banquet,  and  the  army  which  we  have  left  encamped  on  the  river's 
bank.  Yet  a  little  while,  and  of  all  these  but  a  very  few  shall 
remain  alive."  As  the  Persian  said  this,  he  wept  bitterly  ;  and 
Thersandros,  marvelling  at  him,  answered,  "  Is  it  not  right  that 
Mardonios  should  hear  this  and  the  Persians  who  are  of  weight 
with  him  ?"  But  the  other  replied,  "  O  friend,  that  which  Ilcjiven 
is  biinging  to  pass  it  is  impossible  for  man  to  turn  aside,  for  no 
one  will  believe  though  one  spake  ever  so  truly.  All  this  many  of 
ns  Persians  know  well,  but  yet  we  follow,  bound  by  a  strong 
necessity :  and  of  all  the  pains  which  men  may  suffer  the  most 
hateful  and  wretched  is  this,  to  see  the  evils  that  are  coming  and 
yet  be  unable  to  overcome  them."  This  story  I  heard  from  Ther- 
sandros himself,  who  also  added  that  he  had  told  the  tale  to 
many  others  before  the  battle  was  fought  in  Plataiai.' 

The  sentiment  put  into  the  mouth  of  the  Persian  at  the  banquet 
of  Attaginos  seems  to  be  not  less  distinctively  Greek  than  those 
which  are  uttered  by  the  seven  con.«pirators  against  jjigtoncal 
the  usurpation  of  the  Magians.i  The  expression  of  value  of  the 
any  foreboding  however  slight,  of  any  remark  on  the  ^'*"^^' 
uncertainty  of  life  as  vague  and  general  as  that  which  is  ascribed 
to  Xerxes  when  he  surveyed  his  fleet  in  its  glory ,^  would  un- 
consciously shape  itself  in  the  mind  of  Thersandros  into  that  moral 
or  religious  form  which  imparts  to  the  tale  its  perpetual  freshness. 
But  if  we  may  not,  on  such  testimony,  assume  that  this  antici- 
pation of  utter  ruin  was  present  to  the  mind  of  the  Persian  lead- 
ers (and  that  it  oppressed  the  Persians  generally  we  have  no  evi- 
dence whatever),  the  anecdote  from  every  other  point  of  view  be- 
comes superfluous.  In  the  ethical  conception  of  the  history  Mar- 
donios was  already  doomed  from  the  hour  when  Artabanos  warned 
him  that  from  his  westward  journey  there  would  for  him  be  no 
return  f    and    the    parting    words    of    Xerxes    consecrated    him 

'  See  p.  124.  -  Se    p.  165.  ^  Herod,  vii.  10. 

10 


218  THE  STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II 

afresh  as  the  victim  destined  to  expiate  the  slaugliter  of  Leonidas. 
Nor  can  it  be  said  that  the  remark  of  the  Persian  has  force  or 
meaning,  if  viewed  in  reference  to  the  conduct  or  duty  of  Mar- 
donios.  To  listen  to  vague  presentiments  of  coming  evil  and  in 
obedience  to  such  presentiments  to  break  up  an  army  of  over- 
whelming strength  and  fully  supplied  with  tlie  materials  of  war 
would  in  a  general  be  an  unpardonable  offence.  If  the  Persian 
who  addressed  Thersandros  had  any  reasons  or  arguments  to  ad- 
dress to  his  chief,  Mardonios  would  assuredly  be  bound  to  hear 
and  weigh  them  ;  but  it  is  of  the  very  essence  of  the  story  that 
he  had  none,  and  it  would  be  the  duty  of  Mardonios  to  disregard 
presages  and  fears  which  to  him  must  appear  to  have  no  other 
source  than  a  diseased  and  unmanly  mind. 

The  prophecy  of  the  Persian  at  the  fer.st  of  Attaginos  is  the 
prelude  to  the  great  fight  which  broke  the  poAver  of  the  barbarian 
Advance  of  ^T  1^"*^  ''^^  ^^i^  battle  of  Salamis  had  crushed  his  hopes 
the  confede-  by  sea.  But  the  narratives  of  the  two  battles  stand 
Boiotia.  ^  by  no  means  on  the  same  level  in  point  of  trustworthi- 
479  B.C.  ness.  Of  the  engagement  at  Salamis  w'e  know  practi- 
cally nothing  but  its  issue.  The  story  of  Plataiai,  though  not  less 
graphic  and  vivid  in  details,  not  a  few  of  which  are  suspicious  or 
even  incredible,  brings  before  ns  a  scries  of  movements  which  ex- 
plain themselves  and  which  seem  to  be  reported  with  tolerable 
accuracy.  From  the  Corinthian  isthmus  the  Spartans  with  their 
Peloponnesian  allies  advanced  to  Eleusis  where  they  were  joined 
by  the  forces  of  the  Athenians  who  had  crossed  over  from  Sala- 
mis, and  thence,  cheered  by  favorable  omens,  resumed  their 
march  until  from  the  slopes  of  Kithairon  they  looked  down  on 
the  Persian  camp  near  the  northern  bank  of  the  Asopos. 

Here,  then,  on  the  plain  beneath  the  mighty  mass  of  Kithairon, 
Mardonios  with  liis  host,  it  is  said,  of  600,000  men,  awaited  with 
Attack  of  impatience  the  attack  which  he  trusted  that  the 
the  Persian  Greeks,  numbering  in  all  110,000,  would  begin.  If 
delthTf""'  Persian  boastfulness  exaggerated  his  own  numbers, 
Masietios.  those  of  his  enemies  were  swollen  not  so  much  from 
carelessness  of  falsehood  as  from  the  desire  that  all  the  states 
which  had  not  Medized  should  be  represented  as  taking  part  in  the 
final  struggle  with  the  servants  of  the  Asiatic  despot.  But  what- 
ever their  numbers  may  liave  been  when  Mardonios  threw  the  die 
^for  battle,  they  were  less  formidable  when  they  first  incamped  on 
the  lower  slopes  of  Kithairon.  Still  no  time  was  to  be  lost  in  dis- 
lodging them  from  their  vantage-ground :  and  on  this  errand  the 
whole  Persian  cavalry  was  dispatched  under  Masistios,  a  leader 
noted  for  his  bravery.  Riding  on  a  golden-bitted  Nisaian  steed 
magnificently  caparisoned,  Masistios  led  his  horsemen  on  ;  and  the 


Chap,  VI.]     BATTLES  OF  PLATAIAI  AND  MYKAL^.  219 

nature  of  the  ground  made  their  attack  specially  felt  by  the  Me- 
garians,  who  sent  a  message  to  Pausanias  to  say  that,  unless  tliey 
could  be  speedily  supported,  they  must  give  way.  The  rigidity  of 
Spartan  discipline  Wi)uld  lead  us  to  suppose  that  Pausanias  issued 
an  order  and  that  this  order  was  obeyed  ;  but  instead  of  this  we 
have  the  mere  intreaty  for  the  help  of  volunteers.  All,  it  is  said, 
including,  it  would  seem,  tlie  Spartans, ^  held  back,  although  the 
Persian  horsemen  rode  up  and  reviled  them  as  women  ;  and  three 
hundred  picked  Athenians  could  alone  be  found  to  undertake  the 
dangerous  task.  Aided  by  some  bowmen,  they  moved  to  the  Me- 
garian  gruund,  where  presently  the  horse  of  Masistios  struck  by  an 
arrow  in  its  side  reared  and  threw  its  rider.  Throwing  themselves 
upon  him,  the  Athenians  seized  his  horse  :  but  his  golden  breast- 
plate protected  him  from  his  enemies  until  a  spear  was  thrust  into 
his  eye.  So  died  Masistios,  unseen  by  his  men  who  at  the  time 
were  falling  back  to  make  ready  for  another  charge.  When  on 
lialting  they  learnt  their  loss,  with  a  fierce  cry  they  rushed  back  to 
recover  his  body,  of  which  for  a  little  while  they  gained  possession  ; 
but  the  three  hundred  Athenians  were  now  supported  by  the  main 
body  of  their  countrymen,  and  the  Persian  cavalry  was  definitely 
beaten  back.  All  Boiotia,  it  is  said,  resounded  with  the  Persian 
wail  which  went  up  for  the  loss  of  Masistios,  while  the  body  of  the 
fallen  general,  stretched  on  a  chariot,  was  carried  along  the  ranks 
of  the  Greeks  who  crowded  to  sec;  his  grand  and  beautiful  form. 

To  these  the  death  of  Masistios  and  the  repulse  of  his  cavalry 
brought  great  encouragement ;  and  they  resolved  to  move  from 
Erythrai  nearer  to   Plataiai,  as   a  position   far  better   (.^^„„g  ^f 
both  for  incamping  and  for  watering.     Their  road  led   the  Greek 
them  by  Hysiai  to  ground  stretching  from  the  foun-  P^^^'^'^"- 
tain    of  Gargaphia  to  the  shrine  of  the  hero  Androkrates,^  and 
broken  by  low  hills  rising  from  the  plain. 

Although  the  two  armies  were  brought  thus  near  to  each 
other,  the  final  conflict  was  delayed  by  the  omens  which  were 
interpreted  by  the  soothsayers  on  either  side  as  un-  ,j,|,p  (.o„,jgei 
favorable  to  the  aggressor.  But  if  a  pitched  battle  of  Timage- 
was  not  to  be  thought  of,  Timagenidas  the  Theban  "^  ^*" 
warned  Mardonios  against  wasting  more  time  in  addition  to  the 
eight  days  which  had  already  passed  away.  There  were  other 
things  which  might  safely  be  undertaken.  Every  day  the  Greeks 
were  receiving  fresh  convoys  through  the  passes  of  Kithairon  ;  and 
it  was  easy  by  occupying  these  passes  to  enrich  the  Persians  and 

*  See  note  1,  p.  214.     We  have  ^  Thucydides,  iii.   24,    speaks  of 

liere   another   incident,  wliidi,   if  this  shrine  as  being  within  a  dis- 

true,  contradicts  the  supposed  in-  tance  of  six  or  seven  furlongs  from 

flexible  practice  of  the  Spartans.  Plataiai  on  the  road  to  Thebes. 


220  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

starve  their  enemies.  His  advice  was  promptly  acted  upon. 
Night  had  no  sooner  set  in  than  the  Persian  cavalry  were  dis- 
patched to  the  pass  of  the  Oak  Heads  ;  and  there  500  beasts 
laden  with  corn  were  cut  ofi  with  the  men  who  had  brought  them 
from  the  Peloponnesos. 

Two  days  more  passed  by,  each  adding  to  the  numbers  of  the 
Greeks.  On  the  morning  of  the  eleventh  Mardonios,  wearied  out 
Theinfatua-  ^'i^h  the  delay,  consulted  Artabazos, .  v.'ho  advised 
ti<tiiofMar-  him,  it  is  said,  to  fall  back  on  Thebes  and  there  to 
ouios.  trust  rather  to  money  than  to  men.     In  open  battle, 

ho  urged,  they  were  no  match  for  their  enemies  ;  but  not  a  Greek 
was  to  be  found  who  would  not  sell  his  freedom  for  money,  and 
Persian  gold  freely  scattered  among  the  chief  men  of  all  the  non- 
Me  lizing  cities  would  soon  make  them  hearty  in  the  Persian 
cause.  It  is  possible,  of  course,  that  Artabazos  may  have  had  other 
reasons  for  difiering  with  Mardonios  ;  but  the  latter  was  certainly 
justified  in  depending  on  the  bravery  of  his  countrymen  and  in 
deploring  the  inaction  which  was  daily  increasing  the  number 
and  strength  of  his  enemies. 

From  this  point  the  narrative  which  Herodotos  followed 
resolves  itself  into  a  series  of  pictures  as  vivid  as,  it  is  to  be  feared, 
The  confer-  they  are  untrustworthy.  The  council  was  ended,  and 
ence  of  the     ^|jg  nijrjjt  came  On,  and  the  guards  stood  at  their  posts. 

Makedonian  f  .'  ^^  r 

Aiexanciros  W  heu  all  was  quiet  through  tne  camp  and  the  men 
Athenian  were  in  a  deep  sleep,  the  Makedonian  Alexandros  rode 
generals.  jn  the  dead  of  night  to  the  outposts  of  the  Athenians 
and  asked  to  speak  with  their  leaders.  When  these  had  come,  he 
briefly  but  earnestly  besought  them  to  keep  the  fact  of  his  visit  a 
secret  from  all  except  Pausanias.  He  had  come  only  because  he 
had  the  welfare  of  Hellas  at  heart,  as  being  by  lineage  a  Hellcn 
himself  ;  and  his  errand  was  to  tell  them  that  Mardonios  had  made 
up  his  mind  to  light  on  the  coming  day  and  to  leave  omens  and 
oracles  to  take  care  of  themselves.  But  he  added  that  even  if  any 
reason  should  still  constrain  Mardonios  to  inaction,  it  would  be 
their  wisdom  to  remain  where  they  were,  for  his  supplies  were  all 
but  exhausted  ;  and  so  he  bade  them  farewell,  saying, '  If  the  war 
end  as  ye  would  have  it,  then  remember  to  deliver  me  also,  for  in 
my  zeal  for  the  Greeks  I  have  run  this  great  venture,  because  I 
wished  to  show  you  the  purpose  of  Mardonios,  that  so  he  might 
not  take  you  at  unawares.  I  am  Alexandros  the  Makedonian.' 
The  picture  is  full  of  life:  but  Aristeides  at  least  could  not  have 
needed  the  announcement  of  his  name.  He  must  surely  have  re- 
membered the  man  who  but  a  little  while  ago  had  come  to  Athens 
as  the  envoy  of  Mardonios  and  had  then  as  earnestly  besought 
them  to  submit  to  Xerxes  as  now  he  prayed  them  to  hold  out. 


Chap.  VI.]     BATTLES  OP  PLATAIAI  AND  MYKALfi.  221 

The  next  picture  brings  before  us  the  Greek  commanders  in 
council.  From  Aristeides  and  liis  colleagues  Pausanias  learnt 
that  the  morrow  would  see  the  decisive  struggle  ;  and  changes  of 
his  request,  urged  without  a  moment's  hesitation,  was  position  ia 
that  they  should  change  places.  'You,'  he  said,  'have  and  Persian 
encountered  these  Persians  at  Marathon  and  know  armies, 
their  method  of  fighting.  We  have  had  no  such  experience,  for 
no  Spartan  has  yet  been  engaged  with  the  Medes.'^  The  veracity 
of  the  historian  can  be  maintained  only  on  the  supposition  that  he 
had  really  heard  this  tale,  which  adds  that  the  Athenians  eagerly 
carried  out  at  the  prayer  of  Pausanias  an  arrangement  which  they 
had  as  eagerly  desired,  yet  scarcely  dared  to  propose  ;  that  when 
Mardonios  became  aware  of  the  change,  he  likewise  altered  the 
disposition  of  his  troops ;  that  Pausanias,  seeing  his  device  dis- 
covered, led  his  own  men  back  again  to  the  right  wing  ;  and  that 
the  Persians  were  thereupon  brought  back  to  their  old  position, 
and  things  were  again  put  as  they  were  before  the  conference  with 
Aristeides.  But  that  such  a  tradition  could  have  come  into  ex- 
istence without  betraying  its  glaring  inconsistency  with  the  whole 
history  of  the  war,  is  indeed  astounding.  If  the  narrative  of  the 
war  be  not  a  fiction  throughout,  Spartans  liad  not  only  fought  with 
Persians  at  Artemision,  at  Sa'.amis,  and  at  Thermopylai,  but  in 
each  place  they  had  conquered  ;  for,  if  we  adopt  the  traditional 
view,  the  struggle  at  Thermopylai  was  for  them  the  most  mag- 
nificent of  victories.  The  heroism  of  Leonidas  and  his  men  had 
thrice  made  Xerxes  leap  from  his  throne  in  dismay  ;  and  yet  this 
later  story  could  assert  with  unblushing  effrontery  that  no  Spartan 
had  ever  yet  fought  with  a  Persian.^  But  whatever  may  be  the 
amount  of  romance  worked  into  the  narrative,  the  fight  at  Thermo- 
pylai remains  a  fact ;  and  whatever  may  have  been  the  changes  of 
arrangement  before  the  fight  at  Plataiai,the  conference  of  Pausanias 
with  x\risteides  and  his  colleagues  remains  a  fiction.  It  is  more- 
over a  fiction  with  a  purpose ;  and  this  purpose  the  author  of  it 
souofht  with  no  mean  adroitness  to  conceal.  If  Pausanias  could 
be  made  to  admit  the  superiority  of  the  Athenian  forces,  the 
glorification  of    Athens  would  be  insured  :  but  if    it  had  been 

^ 'LTvapTiTjTiuv  ovSelg  TTeircipT/Tai  is  found  in  the  text  of  the  historian. 
Mr/dcji'.  Herod,  ix.  46.  The  words  See  note  1,  pp.  153,313. 
are  an  unqualified  statement  whicli  "^  No  one  will  seriously  maintain 
becomes  untrue  if  exceptions  be  that  Pausanias  wished  to  avoid  not 
made  to  it,  and  words  may  be  made  the  Persians  but  the  Medes.  Xerxes 
to  mean  anytliinjy,  if,  as  someliave  is  himself  'The  Mede  ; '  and  al- 
aaserted,  Pausanias  only  meant  to  though  the  bravery  of  the  Medes  is 
speak  of  the  Spartans  there  present,  nowhere  disparaged,  still  the  Per- 
Even  with  regard  to  them  the  sians  are  always  spoken  of  as  the 
statement  would  in  all  probability  better  soldiers, 
be  untrue  ;  but  no  such  limitation 


222  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

asserted  that  the  changed  arrangement  for  the  battle  was  also  the 
real  arrangement  during  the  battle,  this  version  would  have  found 
its  way  to  Sparta  and  there  roused  an  indignant  protest  for  its 
falsification  of  fact.  By  bringing  the  Spartans  back  to  their  old 
position  after  the  fashion  of  the  shot  exercise  in  military  prisons, 
this  danger  would  be  avoided.  Few  Spaitans  probably  Avould 
hear  this  tradition  ;  and  as  it  left  untouched  the  fact  which  was  of 
most  importance  to  them,  they  would  not  much  care  to  notice  it. 
Hence  it  became  necessary  to  represent  the  change  of  arrange- 
ment as  begun  before  daybreak.  As,  further,  the  change  is  as- 
cribed to  the  tidings  that  Mardonios  intended  to  fight  on  the  mor- 
row, it  became  necessary  to  provide  a  bearer  of  this  news  :  and 
thus  the  fictions  of  the  conference  and  the  change  made  it  neces- 
sary to  invent  lastly  the  night-ride  of  Alexandros. 

On  the  morning  of  the  eleventli  day  the  battle  of  Plataiai  may 
be  said  practically  to  have  begun,  although  the  traditional  narrative 
The  resist  Confines  it  to  the  day  on  which  the  infantr}-  of  the 
ance  of  Persians  came  to  close  combat  with  the  Hellenic 
retos"/o'the  l^ophtcs.  During  the  whole  of  the  day  preceding  this 
orders  of  final  conflict,  the  Greek  army  was  terribly  i)ressed  by 
constant  charges  of  the  Persian  cavalry  ;  and  early  in 
the  day  it  became  clear  to  the  confederate  generals  that  a  change 
of  position  was  indispensably  necessary.  The  stream  of  Asopos  in 
front  of  the  Greeks  had  all  along  been  useless  for  watering,  as  it 
was  within  range  of  the  Persian  bowiiien.  The  whole  army  was 
forced,  therefore,  to  obtain  its  supplies  from  the  fountain  or  stream 
of  Gargaphia,  which  is  said  by  Herodotos  to  have  been  two  miles 
and  a  half  distant  from  the  town  of  Plataiai.  This  fountain  was 
now  completely  fouled  and  choked  up  by  the  trampling  of  the 
Persian  horses :  but  about  half-way  between  Gargaphia  and 
Plataiai^  was  a  spot  of  ground  called  the  Island,  as  lying  between 
two  channels  into  which  for  a  short  space  the  little  stream  of  Oeroe 
is  divided  in  its  descent  from  Kithairon.  The  ground  thus  inclosed 
between  the  points  where  the  waters  divided  and  again  met 
was  barely  half  a  mile  in  width,  and  it  may  be  supposed  (for  the 
mea.surement  is  not  given)  about  a  mile  and  a  half  or  two  miles 
in  length.  Here,  liowever,  they  would  have  not  only  an  abundant 
supply  of  water,  for  the  Persian  cavalry  could  not  reach  the  channel 
in  their  rear,  but  they  would  be  protected  from  their  attacks  by  the 
stream  in  front.  To  this  spot  therefore  the  generals  resolved  thv.t 
the  army  should  be  transferred  on  the  coming  night :  but  whether 
from  confusion  or  from  fear  the  Peloponncsian  allies,  when  the 
time  for  retreat  came,  fell  back  not  on  this  so-called  island,  but  on 

'  Herod,  is.  51,  58. 


Chap.  VI.]    BATTLES  OF  PLATAIAI  AND  MYKAL6.  223 

Plataiai  itself,  about  a  mile  and  a  half  further  from  the  Asopos, 
and  took  up  their  position  by  the  temple  of  Here.  Seeing  these 
in  retreat  (and  as  he  supposed,  for  the  Island),  Fausanias  gave  the 
order  to  the  Spartans  also  :  but  he  encountered  an  unexpected 
opposition  from  Amompharetos,  the  captain  of  the  Lochos  of  Pi- 
tana.  This  officer  complained  that,  not  having  been  summoned 
to  the  previous  council,  he  was  now  commanded  to  retreat  not 
merely  against  his  better  judgment  but  in  violation  of  duty  which 
forbade  retreat  to  all  Spartans  under  any  circumstanges.  The 
former  plea  might  be  valid  :  the  latter  has  a  somewhat  ludicrous 
air,  when  we  remember  the  conduct  of  Eurybiades  at  Aitemision 
and  Salamis  and  tlie  retreat  of  Kleombrotos  with  his  army  from 
the  Isthmian  wail  :  but  if  this  plea  was  urged,  it  furnishes  addi- 
tional evidence  of  the  falsehood  of  the  traditions  which  immedi- 
ately precede  the  account  of  his  resistance.  If  lie  objected  now 
to  fall  back  on  Oeroe,  with  what  fierce  indignation  must  lie  not 
have  resisted  the  ignominious  change  which  was  to  leave  Spartans 
face  to  face  with  Persian  slaves  ?  Yet  in  that  tradition  Amom- 
pharetos offers  no  resistance  to  arrangements  in  the  carrying  out 
of  which  he  must  himself  have  taken  part. 

With  this  obstacle  to  retreat  it  became  impossible  for  Pausanias 
to  carry  out  the  decision  of  the  council ;  and  the  Athenians,  be- 
ginning to  suspect,  it  would  seem,  that  Spartan  vacil-  The  battle 
lation  might  end  in  open  Medism,  sent  a  herald  to  of  Plataiai. 
\  ascertain  the  state  of  affairs.  He  found  the  Spartan  leaders  in  hot 
dispute  with  Amompharetos  who,  taking  up  a  huge  stone  with 
both  hands,  placed  it  at  the  feet  of  Pausanias  and  said  that  thus  he 
gave  his  vote  against  the  dastardly  proposal  to  turn  their  backs 
upon  the  enemy.  Having  bestowed  on  him  the  epithet  of  madman, 
Pausanias  turned  to  the  Athenian  messenger,  and  bidding  him  to 
report  to  Aristeides  how  matters  stood  urged  the  immediate  union 
of  the  Athenian  with  the  Spartan  forces.  Amidst  these  disputes 
the  night  had  passed  away  ;  and  the  sky  was  already  lit  with  the 
dawn,  when  Pausanias,  wearied  out  with  the  folly  of  Amom- 
pharetos, gave  the  order  for  retreat.  The  Spartans  immediately 
fell  back,  keeping  as  near  as  they  could  to  the  heights  of  Kithairon 
in  order  to  avoid  the  attacks  of  the  Persian  horsemen,  while  the 
Athenians,  less  cautious  or  less  timid,  moved  along  the  plain.  ^ 
Having  gone  about  a  mile  and  a  half  they  halted  to  see  whether 
Amompharetos  would  follow.  The  departure  of  the  Spartans  and 
Tegeatans  had  soon  convinced  him  that  he  could  do  but  little  good 
by  imitating  the  example  of  Leonidas  ;  and  the  Lochos  of  Pitana 
accordingly  joined  the  main  body.     But  their  retreat  had  now 

'  Herod,  ix.  56. 


224  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH   PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

become  known  in  the  Persian  camp  ;  and  the  Persian  cavahy  at 
once  advanced  to  harass  them  as  they  had  done  the  day  before. 
Hurriedly  crossing  the  Asopos,  Mardonios  hastened  with  his 
Persians  towards  the  liigher  ground  where  the  Spartan  troops 
might  be  seen  winding  along  under  the  hillside,  for  from  the 
river's  banks  he  could  not  catch  sight  of  the  Athenians,  who  were 
hidden  among  the  low  hills  which  rose  from  the  level  plain. 
Without  order  or  discipline,  the  hordes  of  the  Persian  subject 
tribes  rushed  after  him,  as  though  nothing  more  remained  for  them 
to  do  beyond  the  butchering  of  unresisting  fugitives.  The  last 
momentous  strife  was  now  begun.  Hard  pressed  by  the  Persian 
horsemen,  Pausanias  sent  to  beg  instant  succor  from  the  Athenians 
on  the  lower  ground.  But  the  attack  of  the  Greeks  in  the  Persian 
amiy,  who  now  flung  themselves  on  the  Athenians,  rendered  this 
impossible.  To  the  Spartans  and  Tegeatans,  thus  cut  off  from 
their  allies,  it  was  a  moment  of  supreme  distress.  Fifty-three 
thousand  in  all,  they  were  opposed  to  the  overwhelming  numbers 
of  Mardonios  ;  and  the  sacrifices  even  now  forbade  any  action  except 
in  the  way  of  self-defence.  This  merely  passive  resistance  enabled 
the  Persians  to  make  a  rampart  of  their  wicker-work  shields,  from 
behind  Avhich  they  shot  their  arrows  with  deadly  effect.  At  last 
Pausanias,  looking  in  agony  towards  the  temple  of  Here,  besought 
the  queen  of  heaven  not  to  abandon  them  utterly.  Scarcely  had 
his  prayer  been  offered,  when  the  sacrifices  were  reported  to  be 
favorable  ;  and  the  charge  of  the  Tegeatans  was  followed  by  the 
onset  of  the  Spartans.  After  a  fierce  fight  the  hedge  of  shields 
was  thrown  down,  and  the  defeat  of  the  barbarian  host  virtually 
insured.  The  Persians  fought  with  almost  more  than  Hellenic 
heroism.  Coming  to  close  quarters,  they  seized  the  spears  of  their 
enemies,  and  broke  off  their  heads  ;  but  they  wore  no  body -armor, 
and  they  had  no  discipline.  Ptushing  forward  singly  or  in  small 
groups,  they  were  borne  down  in  the  crush  and  killed.  Still  they 
were  not  dismayed  ;  and  the  battle  raged  most  fiercely  on  the  spot 
where  Mardonios  on  his  white  war-horse  fought  with  the  flower 
of  his  troops.  But  at  length  Mardonios  was  slain,  and  when  his 
chosen  guards  had  fallen  round  him  the  issue  was  no  longer  doubt- 
ful. Tiie  linen  tunics  of  the  Persian  soldiers  were  of  no  avail  in 
a  conflict  with  brazen-coated  hoplites.  With  the  utmost  speed 
the  defeated  barbarians  made  their  way  to  their  fortified  camp, 
and  took  refuge  behind  its  wooden  walls. 

Artabazos  had  awaited  the  battle  with  very  definite  resolutions. 
He  despised  with  good  reason  the  military  arrangements  of  Mar- 
The  retreat  donios  ;  and  he  had  no  intention  of  allowing  himself 
of  Artabazos.  ^nd  his  men  to  be  slaughtered,  if  Mardonios  should, 
as  he  foreboded,  lose  the  day.     His  troops,  therefore, — the  forty 


Chap.  VI.]    BATTLES  OF  PLATAIAI  AND  MYKAL6.  225 

thousand  still  remaining  to  him  of  the  six  myriads  who  guarded 
Xerxes  on  his  retreat  to  the  Hellespont, — received  strict  orders  to 
look  only  to  him  and  to  follow  his  mov^ements  with  the  utmost 
promptness  ;  and  no  sooner  had  the  battle  begun,  it  is  said,  than, 
inviting  his  men  verbally  to  follow  him  into  it,  he  led  them  from 
the  field.  The  flight  of  the  Persians  soon  showed  him  that  the  day 
was  lost ;  and  putting  spurs  to  his  horse  he  hurried  away  with  all 
speed  into  Phokis.  Without  pausing  to  answer  the  questions  of 
the  people,  he  rode  on  into  Thessaly,  where  the  chiefs  insisted  on 
having  him  as  their  guest  at  a  banquet,  and  prayed  for  news  of  the 
army  of  Mardonios.  But  whatever  faith  he  could  put  in  the  good 
will  of  the  oligarchs,  he  had  by  no  means  the  same  confidence  in 
the  disposition  of  the  people,  and  he  felt  that  a  true  confession 
might  seriously  endanger  the  safety  of  his  men.  He  told  them, 
therefore,  that  he  had  been  dispatched  on  an  urgent  errand  into 
Thrace,  and  admitting,  it  is  said,  that  he  would  soon  be  followed 
by  Mardonios  and  his  army,  begged  them  to  welcome  him  with 
their  usual  hospitality.  In  his  onward  march  through  Makedonia 
and  Thrace  he  lost  many  men, — we  must  suppose,  in  conflicts 
with  the  wild  mountaineers,  as  well  as  by  hunger  and  disease. 
He  had  no  time  now  to  tarry  and  punish  them  as  he  had  punished 
the  Olyntbians  ;'  but  in  spite  of  all  that  his  enemies  could  do,  he 
brought  the  bulk  of  his  troops  safely  to  Byzantion,  and  thence 
crossed  over  with  them  into  Asia.  Mardonios  was  no  longer  alive 
to  carry  out  the  threat  which  he  had  uttered  on  the  morning  of 
the  fight  at  Plataiai ;  and  Artabazos  succeeded  so  well  in  justify- 
ing his  acts  to  his  master  that  we  shall  find  him  satrap  of  Dasky- 
leion  in  the  later  history  of  the  Spartan  Pausanias. 

One  body  of  men  alone  held  their  ground  when  on  the  death  of 
Mardonios  and  the  defeat  of  his  Persians  all  the  rest  of  his  army 
fled  in  utter  confusion.  These  were  the  Theban  obstinate  rc- 
oliofarchs.     They    felt  doubtless  that  they   had  gone  sistanceof 

.     ®  <•       .      1  1  e  1  •        ii_    •  -ii    thcThebans. 

too  far  to  leave  any  hope  of  making  their  peace  with 
the  Spartans  and  their  allies,  and  we  may  do  them  the  justice  to 
say  that  without  the  tyranny  which  the  victory  of  Xerxes  might 
have  enabled  them  to  exercise,  life   was  to  them  scarcely  worth 
the  living  for.     Three  hundred  of  these  patricians  fell  fighting  on 
the  field.     The  rest  made  their  way  as  best  they  could  to  Thebes. 
If  the  Persians  on  finding  themselves  within  their  fortified  camp 
hoped  that  its  wooden  walls  would  keep  out  the  enemy,    The  storm- 
they  were  soon  to  be  disappointed.     To  the  Spartans,    pfrSlu^® 
whose  incompetence  in  all  siege  operations  was  no-   camp, 
torious,  they  opposed  an  effectual  barrier  ;  but  Athenian  skill  and 

10*  'See  p.  209. 


226  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

resolution  effected  a  breach  after  a  terrible  struggle.  Headed  by 
the  Tegeatans,  the  allies  burst  like  a  deluge  into  the  incampraent ; 
and  the  Persians,  losing  all  heart,  sought  wildly  to  hide  themselves 
like  deer  flying  from  lions.  Then  followed  a  carnage  so  fearful 
that  of  260,000  men  not  3,000,  it  is  said,  remained  alive.  On 
the  side  of  the  Greeks  we  are  told  that  only  91  Spartan  citizens 
had  fallen,  while  the  Tegeatans  lost  only  16,  and  the  Athenians 
only  52.  It  may,  of  course,  be  urged  that  this  list  does  not  in- 
clude those  of  the  Lakedaimonians  who  were  not  Spattiatai ;  but 
all  the  figures  seem  alike  unworthy  of  credit.  The  narrative  has 
exhibited  the  Spartans  as  terribly  pressed  by  the  Persian  horse- 
men on  both  days  of  the  battle,  especially  during  the  time  of 
passive  resistance  before  the  omens  were  pronounced  favorable  ; 
and  the  Athenians  were  fighting  with  no  contemptible  enemies 
when  they  encountered  the  Theban  oligarchs. 

The  next  task  of  the  Greeks  was  that  of  burying  their  dead. 
Of  the  disposal  of  the  Persian  bodies  not  a  word  is  said,  although 
The  graves  the  burial  of  nearly  400,000  corpses  would  be  no  light 
at  piataiiii.  q^  q^^j  task.  For  the  Lakedaimonian  dead  there  were 
three  graves,  while  the  Tegeatans,  the  Athenians,  and  the  Mega- 
rians  with  the  Phliasians,  had  severally  one.  These,  the  historian 
adds,  were  real  graves  :  but  empty  tombs  bore  the  names  of  towns 
whose  citizens  were  not  present  at  the  battle.  The  fact  speaks 
volumes  on  the  value  of  public  monuments  for  which  we  cannot 
adduce  further  evidence  from  contemporary  writings.  The  Pla- 
ta) ans  had  well  deserved  the  gratitude  of  the  non-Medizing  states 
for  the  zeal  Avith  which  in  spite  of  all  obstacles  they  had  clung  to 
the  Hellenic  cause.  For  the  present  this  gratitude  was  sincerely 
felt  and  largely  manifested.  The  sacrifice  of  thanksgiving  for 
the  great  victory  over  Mardonios  was  offered  by  Pausanias  to 
Zeus  the  Deliverer  in  their  Agora.  The  Plataians  were  declared 
autonomous,  or,  in  other  words,  were  freed  from  all  connexion 
with  the  Boiotian  confederacy,  while  from  the  spoil  they  received 
80  talents,  to  enable  them  to  celebrate  fitly  the  yearly  commemo- 
rative feast,  to  keep  up  the  tombs,  and  to  build  a  temple  to 
Athene.  Finally,  the  allies  bound  themselves  to  regard  the  Pla- 
taian  territory  as  inviolable  themselves  and  to  combine  for  the 
prevention  of  any  invasions  of  that  territory  by  others. 

Eleven  days  after  the  battle  the  allied  forces  appeared  before 
the  walls  of  Thebes,  and  demanded  the  surrender  of  the  citizens 
The  siege  of  wlio  were  responsible  for  the  Medism  of  the  country, 
Thebes.  ^nd  morc  especially  of  Timagenidas  and  Attaginos. 
Tne  refusal  of  the  Thebans  was  followed  not  only  by  a  blockade 
but  by  the  systematic  devastation  of  the  land.  Nine  days  later  Ti- 
magenidas urged  his  fellow-citizens  to  ascertain  whether  Pausanias 


Chap.  VI.]     BATTLES  OF  PLATAIAI  AND  MYKALE.  227 

wanted  money,  and  in  this  case  to  pay  it  to  him  out  of  the  puhUc 
treasury,  inasmuch  as  tlie  JNIedism  with  which  they  wei'e  charged 
was  the  common  act  of  all  the  citizens  (a  statement,  probably, 
strictly  true)  ;  blit  he  added  that  if  this  would  not  content  the 
Spailaus,  he  and  the  others  who  had  been  demanded  were  ready 
to  surrender  themselves.  Attaginos,  it  seems,  was  of  a  different 
opinion.  lie  made  his  escape ;  and  his  children  were  handed 
over  in  his  stead  to  Pausanias,  who  refused  to  punisli  tliem  for  an 
offence  of  which  they  had  not  been  guilty.  The  citizens  surren- 
dered relied,  it  is  said,  on  their  wealth  :  but  Pausanias  hastily  dis- 
missed his  allies,  and  taking  these  Thebans  to  the  isthmus,  there 
put  them  all  to  death. 

The  Persian  army  had  been  destroyed,  and  no  hope  remained 
of  retrieving  the  disasters  which  left  them  powerless  on  European 
ground.       But   the    Persian    fleet    still    watched   ihe  Movements 
Ionian  coasts,  and  Tigranes  with  an  army  of  60,000  of  the  Greek 

...  .         fleet  to 

men  kept  guard  in  Ionia  itself.'  That  the  Persian  samosand 
fleet  had  been  seriously  crippled,  if  not  left  unservice-  ^ykaie. 
able,  by  the  defeat  at  Salamis,  was  well  known  to  tlic  Asiatic 
Greeks  and  to  the  islanders  of  the  Egean.  In  the  previous  autumn, 
much  as  Themistokles  may  have  wished  to  sail  straight  to  the 
Hellespont  and  there  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  Persians  by  a 
movement  which  might  even  throw  the  despot  into  his  hands, 
there  was  an  obstacle  to  this  plan  which  both  he  and  the  allied 
commanders  regarded  as  insurmountable.  Mardonios  still  remained 
in  Western  Hellas  with  his  huge  army  ;  and  the  Athenians  might 
at  any  moment  be  compelled  to  quit  their  homes.  But  when  after 
the  second  burning  of  Athens  the  Persian  leader  had  withdrawn 
his  hosts  into  Boiotia  and  had  been  followed  by  an  adequate  Hel- 
lenic force,  the  Greek  fleet  was  no  longer  needed  to  co-operate  witn 
the  army  on  land ;  and  the  commanders  were  free  to  comply  with 
the  prayers  of  the  Asiatic  lonians  for  help  against  their  bai'barian 
masters.  They  sailed,  accordingly,  as  far  as  Delos  ;  and  here  for 
some  time  they  remained,  not  certainly  from  the  absurd  fancy 
which  the  tradition  of  a  later  day  assigned  to  them,"  but  from 
the  more  reasonable  desire  for  information  which  might  justify 
them  in  venturing  further.  If  Mardonios  had  been  victorious  in 
Boiotia  as  Xerxes  had  been  at  Thermopylai,  the  fleet  would  at 
once  be  needed  for  the  protection  of  the  Peloponnesos,  even  if  the 
task  of  guarding  Athens  should  be  given  up  as  hopeless.  It  would 
be  rash  also  to  infer  from  the  mere  departure  of  the  Persian  fl3et 
that  its  strength  was  permanently  broken,  or  even  that  it  might 
not  reappear  as  formidable  as  ever.     On  this  point  tliey  received 

'  Hercd.  jx.  9G.  ^  See  notes  pp.  153.  221. 


228  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH   PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

from  a  Samian  embassy  tidings  Avbich  seemed  to  make  their  way 
sufficiently  clear.  The  ambassadors,  who  had  got  off  from  Samos 
without  the  knowledge  of  the  Persians,  assured  them  that  the 
spirit  of  the  Persian  troops  was  broken  ;  that  the  mere  sight  of 
their  western  kinsnien  would  rouse  the  Asiatic  Greeks  ;  that  in  all 
likelihood  the  barbarians  would  not  remain  to  be  attacked,  and 
that,  if  they  should  remain,  the  allies  could  never  hope  to  have 
hereafter  a  more  favorable  opportunity  for  crushing  them  utterly  ; 
that  the  Persian  fleet  was  scarcely  seaworthy,  and  at  best  was  no 
match  for  that  of  the  Greeks  ;  and,  finally,  that  they  Avere  per- 
fectly willing  to  surrender  themselves  as  hostages  for  the  good 
faith  of  their  report.  Turning  round  to  the  speaker,  Leotychides 
asked  his  name.  '  I  am  called  Hegesistratos  (the  leader  of 
armies),' was  the  reply.  '  I  accept  the  omen  of  your  name,'  cried 
the  Spartan,  '  and  I  ask  only  for  your  pledge  that  the  Samians 
will  deal  truly  by  us.'  The  promise  was  eagerly  given,  and  the 
allied  fleet,  sailing  to  Samos,  took  up  its  position  in  battle  array 
off  Kalamoi,  the  southern  jjoint  of  the  island  facing  a  temple  of 
Here.  The  challenge  was  deliberately  declined  by  the  Persian 
admiral.  The  result  of  the  fight  at  Salamis  left  him  but  slight 
hope  of  victory  by  sea ;  and  he  determined  to  disembark  his  men 
and  join  Tigranes  for  operations  on  land.  Sailing  therefore  to  the 
mainland  barely  ten  miles  distant,  he  drew  up  his  ships  on  tlie 
shore  beneath  the  heights  of  Mykale.  Here  behind  a  rampart  of 
stones,  strengthened  by  stout  stakes,  which  he  cast  up  round  his 
ships,  he  made  ready  at  once  to  sustain  a  siege  and  to  win  a  victo- 
ry, for  on  the  latter,  it  is  said,  he  counted  as  surely  as  on  the  fomier. 
The  withdrawal  of  the  Persians  perplexed  the  Greek  com- 
manders :  but  the  doubt  Avhether  they  should  return  home  or  sail 
The  battle  to  the  Hellespont  was  solved  by  a  speedy  decision  to 
of  Mykale.  jj^^^j  their  forces  and  decide  the  quarrel  on  shore. 
Each  step,  Avhich  showed  that  their  enemies  thought  more  of 
defence  than  attack,  naturally  raised  their  hopes  and  their  courage  ; 
and  Avith  their  gangways  ready  for  landing  their  men  they  sailed 
towards  Mykale.  On  ncaring  the  promontory  they  saw  the  Persian 
ships  stowed  away  behind  tlie  rampart  and  the  shore  lined  with 
troops.  Repeating  the  device  of  Themistokles  off  the  Euboian 
coast,  Leotychides,  it  is  said,  ordered  a  loud-voiced  herald  to  sail  as 
near  the  sliore  as  he  could  and  pray  the  lonians  in  the  coming  fight 
to  strike  boldly  not  for  their  Persian  oppressors  but  for  their  own 
freedom  and  for  the  aid  of  their  kinsfolk.  The  device  was  scarcely 
needed  to  rouse  the  suspicions  of  the  Persians.  The  charge  brought 
against  the  lonians  by  the  Phenicians  at  Salamis  had  probably 
a  fair  foundation  in  fact ;  and  it  would  be  rash  to  look  to  them 
for  faithful  service  in  the  scene  of  their  old  revolt.     The  Samians  at 


CiiAP.  VI.]    BATTLES  OF  PLATAIAI  AND  MYKALfi.  229 

best  wei'e  not  to  be  trusted.'  These  were  accordingly  disarmed, 
while,  to  get  them  out  of  the  way,  the  Milesians  were  sent  to 
guard  the  paths  leading  up  to  the  heights  of  My  kale.  Thus  having 
taken  precaution's  against  dangers  on  their  own  side,  they  awaited 
the  attack  of  the  Greeks  behind  the  hedge  of  wicker  shields  on 
which  Mardonios  and  his  men  relied  at  Plataiai.  Their  enemies 
were  now  fast  advancing  against  them  :  but  the  Athenians  with 
the  allies  wlio  came  next  to  them,  moving  along  the  more  level 
ground  near  the  sea,  Avere  able  to  begin  the  fight,  while  the  Spar- 
tans were  making  their  way  with  difficulty  on  the  rugged  slopes  of 
the  mountain.  Here,  as  elsewhere,  the  Persians  fought  as  they 
had  fought  in  the  days  of  Cyrus.  But  the  conditions  of  the  con- 
flict were  changed.  They  had  now  to  face  the  orderly  ranks  of  the 
Athenians,  and  of  Athenians  spurred  to  redoubled  efforts  by  their 
eagerness  to  decide  the  day  before  the  Spartans  could  come  up 
and  share  the  fight.  After  a  desperate  struggle  the  shield-wall  of 
the  Persians  shared  the  fate  of  the  English  shield-wall  atSenlac  :^ 
nor  is  it  any  disparagement  to  the  countrymen  of  Harold  to  com- 
pare them  with  men  whose  bravery  would  have  won  them  lasting 
fame  in  a  better  cause.  The  rampart  of  shields  was  broken,  and 
the  mighty  mass  of  the  Atlicnians  burst  in  :  but  the  Persians  still 
fought  on,  imtil  they  were  borne  back  to  the  wall  of  wood  and 
stone  which  sheltered  the  ships  of  the  fleet.  The  issue  of  the  fight 
was  now  virtually  decided.  Behind  this  last  ramj)art  the  Persians 
again  made  a  stand  :  but  Athenian  determination  and  discipline 
burst  this  barrier  also,  and  the  main  body  of  the  barbarians  fled 
in  dismay.  Still  the  Persians  maintained  the  conflict,  and  in  small 
knots  strove  as  they  might  to  stem  the  iron  torrent  which  was 
bursting  through  the  breached  wall.  But  the  Spartans  had  now 
joined  in  the  fight.  The  disarmed  Samians,  probably  seizing  the 
weapons  of  the  dead,  took  part  with  the  Western  Greeks,  and  with 
the  Asiatic  lonians  openly  fell  upon  the  barbarians.  These,  it  is 
said,  had  intended  in  case  of  defeat  to  intrench  themselves  on  the 
heights  of  Mykale,  a  perilous  post  for  men  who  could  obtain  no 
supplies  while  their  enemies  held  the  land  beneath  them  :  but  to 
such  straits  they  were  never  to  be  put.  The  Milesians,  to  whom 
they  had  trusted  for  guidance  to  these  mountain  strongholds,  led 
them  by  paths  which  brought  them  down  among  their  enemies, 
and  at  last,  tnrning  fiercely  upon  them,  massacred  them  without 
mercy. 

The  victory  was  achieved,  and,  as  the  story  runs,  achieved  on 

^  They  had  set  free  and  sent  back  him  as  prisoners  to  Asia.     Herd, 

to  Attica  the  Athenians  who  had  x.  99. 

been  f(nind  by  Xerxes  in  Athens  or  ^  Freeman,    Norman    Conquest 

Attica  and  who  had  been  sent  by  ill.  492. 


230  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  H 

the  evening  of  the  very  day  whicli  had  seen  the  destruction  of 
Mardonios  and  his  people  at  Plataiai.  The  glory  of  the  fight 
Foundation  belonged  chiefly  to  the  Athenians.  The  Persian  ships 
time  empire  '^'^^^'^  '^"  burnt ;  and  with  the  booty,  which  included 
of  Athens,  somc  hoards  of  money,  the  allies  sailed  to  Samos. 
Here  a  grave  question  demanded  their  care.  Ionia  was  again  in 
revolt  against  the  Persians  :  how  were  the  AVestern  Greeks  to 
defend  their  kinsfolk  on  the  Asiatic  continent?  Insisting  that 
such  a  task  was  beyond  their  power,  the  Peloponnesian  commanders 
strongly  urged  the  adoption  of  an  Eastern  fashion  and  the  trans- 
ference of  the  Asiatic  Greeks  bodily  to  the  lands  which  the  Me- 
dizing  Greeks  had  righteously  forfeited.  Whatever  might  be  the 
difficulty  of  carrying  out  so  vast  a  plan,  the  Athenians  expressed 
an  invincible  repugnance  to  the  plan  itself.  They  could  not  bear 
that  Ionia  should  be  abandoned  to  barbarians ;  and  they  denied 
the  right  of  their  allies  to  arrange  the  affairs  of  Athenian  colonists. 
Deiig-lited  to  be  thus  armed  with  a  valid  excuse  for  withdrawing 
from  all  interference  in  the  matter,  the  Spartans  at  once  gave 
way  ;  and  the  oath  of  faithful  and  permanent  alliance  immediately 
given  by  the  Samians,  Chians,  Lesbians,  and  other  islanders,  laid 
the  foundation  of  the  maritime  empire  of  Athens. 

Having  finished  its  work  at  Mykale,  the  Greek  fleet  departed 
on  the  main  errand  which  had  brought  it  eastwards, — the  destruc- 
Theeiegeof  tion,  namely,  of  the  bridges  across  the  Hellespont. 
Sestos.  -jjjg  mere   statement  of  this  fact  is  enough  to  show 

that  they  had  not  been  deterred  from  undertaking  the  same  task 
immediately  after  the  battle  of  Salamis  by  any  fear  that  Xerxes, 
thus  cut  oft'  from  retreat,  might  become  dangerous  like  a  stag  at 
bay.  So  far  as  they  knew,  the  army  of  Mardonios  still  retained  its 
power  of  mischief  in  Boiotia  ;  but  yet  there  was  no  hesitation  in 
depriving  his  forces  of  the  means  of  escape  from  Europe  into  Asia.* 
It  seems  clear  that  they  had  been  deterred  from  the  work  then, 
solely  by  their  inability  to  leave  the  Attic  coast,  while  Mardonios 
still  remained  master  of  the  country  as  far  as  Peiraieus  and  Pha- 
leron.  On  reaching  the  Hellespont  they  learnt  that  winds  and 
storms  had  shattered  the  bridges  and  rendered  them  useless  before 
the  Persian  king  presented  himself  on  its  western  shore  ;  and  Leo- 
tychides  felt  that  here  he  had  nothing  n:ore  to  do.  But  the 
Athenians  could  not  thus  abandon  the  C'hersoiiesos.  The  lieirs  of 
its  former  Athenian  occupants  wonid  be  anxious  to  recover  the 
possessions  of  which  Persian  conquest  had  deprived  them  ;  and 
the  Athenians  generally  would  need  no  arguments  to  convince 
them  that  they  would  do  well  to  make  themselves  masters  of  the 

'  See  note  2,  p.  205. 


Chap.  VI.]    BATTLES  OF  PLATAIAI  AND  MYKALE.  231 

highway  of  trade  between  Western  Hellas  and  the  corn-growing 
lands  of  the  Danube  and  the  Euxine. 

A  fesv  of  the  Persians  succeeded  in  reaching  the  heights  of 
Mykale  after  the  battle  ;  and  these  escaped  afterwards  to  Sardeis, 
where  Xerxes  was  still  sojourning  after  his  retreat  rpj^g  rewards 
from  Attica.  As  they  marched  on,  Masistes,  the  son  of  Masistes. 
of  Dareios  and  brother  of  Xerxes,  bitterly  reviled  the  general 
Artayntes  as  worse  than  a  woman  for  bringing  this  disaster  upon 
the  king.  Artayntes  had  listened  patiently  for  some  time  ;  but 
these  words  exhausted  his  forbearance,  and  he  had  drawn  his 
dagger  to  kill  Masistes,  when  he  was  dashed  to  the  ground  by  the 
Halikarnassian  Xeinagoras.'  Yet  one  more  picture  completes  the 
wonderful  narrative  in  which  Ilerodotos  has  given  to  us  the  history 
of  the  world  down  to  his  own  day.  In  Sardeis  Xerxes  saw  and 
sought  to  gain  possession  of  the  wife  of  Masistes.  Failing  in  this, 
he  betrothed  the  daughter  of  Masistes  to  his  own  son  Dareios 
and  then  departed  to  Sousa,  where  he  brought  the  bride  into  his 
palace.  The  despot's  lust  was  now  turned  from  the  mother  to  the 
child,  the  wife  of  his  son  :  but  the  Sultana  Amestris,  happening 
to  see  the  girl  with  a  robe  which  she  had  made  and  given  to  thj 
king,  determined  to  destroy  not  the  young  bride  but  her  mother. 
On  the  birthday  of  Xerxes,  when  her  request  could  not  be  refused, 
Amestris  demanded  the  wife  of  Masistes  ;  and  Xerxes  after  a  long 
dispute  had  to  give  way.  Sending  for  Masistes,  he  requested  him 
to  yield  up  his  wife  and  take  the  daughter  of  Xerxes  in  her  stead. 
*  My  wife,'  answered  Masistes,  '  is  the  mother  of  my  sens  and  of 
my  daughters,  one  of  whom  thou  hast  given  in  marriage  to  thine 
own  son.  Why  then  should  I  give  up  my  wife  whom  I  love  ? 
There  are  others  who  deserve  thy  daughter  better :  leave  me  to 
dwell  with  my  wife  in  peace.'  '  Then,' cried  Xerxes,  bursting 
into  rage,  'thou  shalt  neither  marry  my  daughter  nor  keep  thy 
wife.'  Before  Masistes  could  reach  his  home,  Amestris  had  seized 
and  mutilated  his  wife  and  sent  her  back  shamefully  mangled. 
Taking  hasty  counsel  Avith  his  sons,  the  unhappy  man,  whose  zeal 
in  his  brother's  service  had  received  this  rich  reward,  set  out  for 
Baktra ;  and  Xerxes,  well  knowing  that  this  journey  was  only  a 
prelude  to  war,  sent  after  him  and  slew  him  with  his  children  and 
all  his  army.  So  fared  it  with  the  loves  of  king  Xerxes.  Unhappily, 
we  have  but  little  reason  for  calling  into  question,  at  least  in  its 
general  o-utlines,  this  disgusting  tale  of  miserable  weakness  and 
loathsome  brutality  ;  but  whatever  be  the  measure  of  its  truth,  the 
scene  is  a  striking  close  to  the  chronicle  of  a  man  who  had  sought 

'  In  requital  for  this  service  from  Xeinagoras,  Herodotos,  like 
Xerxes  made  Xeinafroras  satrap  of  him  a  Halikarnassian,  obtained  the 
KH-^kia.     It   is   not   unlikely  that    narrative  of  these  incidents. 


232  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  IL 

to  repress  in  the  deadly  bonds  of  Persian  thraldom  the  intellect 
and  freedom  of  the  world.  The  contrast  must  likewise  have  }>re- 
sented  itself  to  the  mind  of  the  liistorian  unless,  on  little  evidence 
or  none,  we  hold  that  he  did  not  intend  here  to  end  his  narrative. 
If  we  cannot  so  believe,  then  we  may  think  that  Herodotos  did 
well  to  portray  in  his  last  picture  the  physical  and  moral  degra- 
dation of  the  despot  who  had  sought  to  decide  the  long  quarrel 
which  began  with  the  wrongs  of  lo  and  Medeia,  of  Europe  and 
Helen,  and  who  decided  it  to  his  own  cost. 

Thus  in  this  history  of  the  Persian  wars  we  liave  the  narrative 
of  a  struggle,  the  general  features  of  which  stand  out  with  sufficient 
General  cha-  clearness.  But  it  is  a  tale  in  which  the  most  plausible 
racterofthe  statements  Avill  not  unfrequently  be  found  the  least 
thep7rs?an  trustwortliy.  From  the  beginning  to  the  end  we  trace 
^*^''-  an  ethical  or  religious  purpose  overlying  or  putting  out 

of  sight  all  political  causes  and  motives,  and  substituting  appeals 
to  exploits  done  in  the  mythical  ages  for  less  fictitious  but  more 
substantial  services.  Throughout  we  find  narratives  constructed 
to  meet  a  popular  saying  or  illustrate  a  popular  belief.  We  find 
national  struggles  which  are  beyond  doubt  historical  enlivened  by 
imaginary  combats  of  Avell-chosen  champions,  and  momentous 
national  changes  in  which  a  contradiction  runs  through  the  most 
important  features.  We  find  a  sequence  of  events  in  which  every 
step  and  every  turn  is  ushered  in  by  tokers  and  Avondersorby  the 
visible  intervention  of  gods  and  heroes.  But  we  find  also  in  the 
great  men  of  that  city  in  which  was  centred  the  salvation  of  the 
Hellenic  world  a  distinct  and  deliberate  policy  which  neither  sign 
nor  portent,  seer  nor  soothsayer,  dream  nor  marvel,  can  avail  to 
crush  or  even  to  turn  aside, — a  foresight  which  takes  the  true 
measure  of  their  enemy's  power  and  their  own, — a  character  as  real 
and  as  tangible  as  that  of  any  of  the  great  men  who  have  done  good 
service  to  our  own  country  or  to  any  other  land  in  Christendom. 


CHAPTER  VH. 

THE    CONFEDERACY    OF    DELOS. 


The  destruction  of  the  Persian  power  in  Europe  was  followed  by 

There-  the   raj)id   growth   of    Athenian    empire;  and   in   the 

hnikiiiiKof  events  which  led  to  the  ao:iri'''^ndipenient  of  Athens  the 

Atliclis  iiiul  .  .       J^f^        •    .     1  1  It      1       1  1 

the  fori iiica-  most  prominent  actor  is  Ihemistokles.      lie  iiail  made 

PdrnieuH.*'  "P    ^''^   "^I'l^l   tiiat    Athens    should    be    great  ;  and  he 

479  B.C.  knew  that  she  could  not  be  great  unless  she  were  also 

wealthy.  For  the  sake  of  her  trade  and  commerce,  it  was  indis- 


Chap.  VII.]         THE   CONFEDERACY  OF  DELOS.  233 

pensably  necessary  that  Athens  should  be  itself  fortified  and 
should  also  possess  an  impregnable  harbor;  and  Themistokles  set 
himself  to  supply  both  these  wants  with  a  quiet  resolution  which 
carried  him  over  all  obstacles.  Of  the  Spartan  request,  that  the 
Athenians  sliould  not  only  abstain  from  rebuilding  their  own  walls 
but  should  join  them  in  dismantling  the  walls  of  all  other  cities  to 
the  north  of  the  Corinthian  isthmus,  he  took  no  notice  :  and  by  his 
advice  the  Spartans  were  dismissed  with  the  promise  that  the 
Athenians  would  send  their  own  ambassadors  to  discuss  the  mat- 
ter. No  sooner  had  they  departed  tiian  Themistokles  at  his  own 
Avish  was  intrusted  with  the  mission,  his  colleagues  being  Abro- 
nychos,  the  son  of  Lysikles,  and  Aristeides  the  victorious  general 
of  Plataiai.  Themistokles  set  out  at  once  on  his  errand,  charg- 
ing his  countrymen  to  strain  every  nerve  in  rebuilding  the  walls, 
and  not  to  dispatch  his  colleagues  until  the  walls  had  reached  a 
height  which  would  enable  them  to  bid  defiance  to  attack.  Young 
and  old,  women  and  children,  must  all  take  part  in  the  great 
work,  and  hand  down  to  coming  generations  the  memory  of 
efforts  which  were  needed  to  secure  not  merely  their  power  but 
their  very  existence  as  a  state.  For  the  accomplishment  of  this 
task  nothing  was  to  be  spared.  The  gods  themselves  would  not 
grudge  the  stones  of  tlieir  temples  for  a  work  without  which  they 
migiit  lack  both  worshippers  and  offerings.  In  short,  to  raise  these 
Avails  as  if  by  the  speed  of  magic,  everything  else  might  be  thrown 
down.  But  while  at  Athens  the  people  outdid  themselves  in  their 
eagerness  to  achieve  the  task,  Themistokles  at  Sparta  declined  all 
official  audiences  until  he  could  be  supported  by  his  colleagues,  of 
whose  early  arrival,  whatever  might  be  the  cause  of  tlieir  delay, 
he  professed  to  have  no  doubt.  The  feeling  of  friendship  for  the 
victor  of  Salamis  was  still  strong  at  Sparta.  But  it  underwent  a 
severe  strain  when  tidings  came  (in  all  likelihood,  if  not  certainly, 
from  the  Aiginetans),  that  the  walls  of  Athfns  had  already  been 
raised  to  a  formidable  height;  ard  Themistokles  felt  that  he  must 
take  one  step  further.  To  the  charge  brought  against  the  Athe- 
nians he  gave  a  positive  denial  ;  but  he  urged  the  Spartans,  if 
they  doubted  his  words,  to  send  ambassadors  to  ascertain  the 
facts.  These  messengers  lost  no  time  in  making  their  way  to 
Athens :  but  before  they  could  reach  it,  the  Athenians  had  re- 
ceived from  Themistokles  the  charge  to  detain  these  Spartans  until 
his  colleagues  who  had  now  reached  Sparta  should  with  himself 
have  returned  home.  No  sooner  was  he  assured  that  liis  country- 
men lield  these  men  as  hostages  for  his  safety  than  he  made  to  the 
Spartan  ephors  a  full  confession  of  his  motives  and  his  plans. 
The  walls  of  Athens,  he  told  them,  liad  been  raised  to  a  height 
which  would  enable  the  Athenians  to  undergo  a  blockade  without 
fear :  and  Athens,  he   insisted,  had  a  full   right  to  be  girt  about 


234  THE  STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

witli  walls,  unless  this  right  was  to  be  denied  to  eveiy  city  in  the 
Peloponnesos.  Anything  like  freedom  of  speech  and  independence 
of  action  would  be  impossible,  if  any  one  member  of  the  con- 
federacy stood  on  a  vantage-ground  with  respect  to  the  rest ;  and 
if  Athens  now  happened  to  be  without  walls,  it  was  only  because 
she  had  chosen  to  suffer  all  that  could  befall  her  rather  than  aban- 
don the  common  cauae.  In  short,  the  work  of  Thetnistokles  was 
done.  If  the  Spartans  had  dreamed  of  liood winking  the  Athe- 
nians, they  were  fairly  caught  in  their  own  trap.  They  had  pro- 
fessed to  offer  only  friendly  advice  ;  and  they  could  not  in  decency 
express  anger  when  that  advice  was  rejected.  But  they  felt  keen- 
ly the  vexation  to  which  for  the  time  they  dared  not  give  vent ; 
and  the  ambassadors  on  each  side  returned  to  their  several  liomes 
without  a  formal  recall. 

Athens  had  been  saved  by  her  wooden  walls  ;  and  Themi- 
stokles,  who  had  insisted  that  they  could  effectually  withstand  the 
The  public  barbarians  only  within  these  floating  bulwarks,  now 
Themisto-  insisted  that  nothing  must  be  left  undone  to  make  her 
kles,  navy  irresistible.     Wo   cannot  doubt  that  in  his  eyes 

the  most  judicious  plan  Avould  have  been  the  total  abandonment 
of  Athens.  Between  the  city  and  its  nearest  sea-coast  lay  a  space 
of  more  than  four  miles  ;  and  twice  within  the  limits  of  u  single 
year  the  inhabitants  liad  been  compelled  to  leave  their  homes  and 
seek  a  refuge  elsewhere.  During  his  year  of  oflfice,  shortly  before 
the  Persian  invasion,  he  had  begun  to  fortify  the  harbor  of 
Peiraieus,  a  safe  liaven  on  the  western  side  of  the  promontory 
which  on  its  eastern  side  is  indented  by  the  two  basins  of  Mouny- 
chia.  The  open  waters  of  Phaleron  lie  regarded  as  pi-actically 
useless  for  his  purpose  ;  but  in  the  three  harbors  of  Peiraieus 
and  Mounychia  he  discerned  the  stronghold  of  a  greater  mari- 
time power  than  any  which  the  world  had  yet  seen,  and  these 
were  now  by  his  advice  inclosed  within  a  wall  nearly  seven  miles 
in  circuit.  As  regards  its  height,  the  design  of  Theiuistokles  was 
only  half  carried  out ;  but  even  thus  his  purpose  was  effectually 
achieved. 

The  Spartans  were  not  more  likely  for  tlu^  present  to  protest 
against  tlie  forti titration  of  the  Peiraieus  than  against  tlie  alleged 
Change  in  annual  addition  of  thirtv  ships  to  the  Athenian  navy.' 
of'i'mm-''''  Whether  with  snch  a.lditions  or  without  them,  this 
nias.  fleet  had  yet  more  work   to  do  before  it  could  be  said 

that  the  barbarians  had  been  fairly  driven  back  into  Asia.  Sestos 
had  fallen  :  but  Ilyzantion  and  the  Thrakian  Doriskos,  with 
Eion  on  the  Strymon  and  many  other  [)laces  on  the  nurtheru  shores 

'  Diod.  xi.  43. 


Chap.  VII.]        THE  CONFEDERACY  OF  DELOS. 


235 


of  the  Egean/  were  still  held  by  Persian  garrisons,  when,  in  the 
year  after  the  battle  of  Plataiai,  Pausanias,  as  comniaiider  of  the 
confederate  fleet,  sailed  with  20  Peloponnesian  and  30 
Athenian  ships  to  Kypros  (Cyprns)  and  thence,  having 
recovered  the  greater  part  of  the  island,  to  Byzaution.  The  re- 
sistance here  was  as  obstinate  perhaps  as  at  Sestos  ;  but  the  place 
was  at  length  reduced,  and  Sparta  stood  for  the  moment  at  the 
head  of  a  triumphant  confederacy.  It  was  now  in  her  power  to 
weld  the  isolated  units,  which  made  up  the  Hellenic  \vorld,  into 
something  like  an  organised  society,  and  to  kindle  in  it  something 
like  national  life.  But  to  do  her  justice,  her  present  position  had 
been  rather  thrust  upon  her  by  circumstances  than  deliberately 
sought.  Her  systematic  discipline  and  the  stability  of  her  consti- 
tution, which,  though  rigidly  oligarchical,  presented  a  striking 
contrast  to  the  tyranny  of  J-'eisistratos  or  Polykrates,  pointed  her 
out  as  the  one  city  in  which  the  Hellenic  states  might  find  an 
efficient  aid  against  a  common  enemy.  But  she  had  no  statesman 
capable,  like  Themistokles,  of  seizing  on  a  golden  opportunity, 
Avhile  in  her  own  generals  she  found  her  greatest  enemies.  Pau- 
sanias had  already  roused  the  indignation  of  his  own  people  by 
having  his  name  inscribed,  as  leader  of  all  the  Greek  forces,  on  the 
tripod  which  was  to  commemorate  the  victory  of  Plataiai  :'"  and 
now  his  arrogance  and  tyranny  were  to  excite  at  Byzantion  a  dis- 
content and  impatience  destined  to  be  followed  by  more  serious 
consequences  to  his  country  as  well  as  to  himself.  On  the  fall  of 
Byzantion  he  sent  to  the  Persian  king  the  prisoners  taken  in  the 
city,  and  spread  the  report  that  they  had  escaped.  He  forwarded 
at  the  same  time,  it  is  said,  by  the  hand  of  the  Eretrian  Gongylos 
a  letter  in  which  he  informed  Xerxes  that  he  wished  to  marry  his 
daughter  and  to  make  him  lord  of  all  Hellas,  adding  that  with  the 
king's  aid  he  felt  sure  of  success,  and  requesting  that  some  trust- 
worthy agent  should  be  sent  down  to  arrange  the  details  of  the 
scheme.  The  spirit  of  Cyrus  or  Dareios  would  have  been  roused 
to  rage  at  the  presumption  of  the  petty  chief  who  aspired  to  an 
alliance  with  the  royal  house  of  Persia  on  the  score  not  of  what 
he  had  done  but  of  what  he  hoped  to  be  able  to  do  by  and  by. 
But  the  spurionsness  of  the  letter  may  not  necessarily  discredit  the 
fact  that  some  message  was  sent  to  which  Xerxes  returned  an 
answer  telling  Pausanias  that  his  name  was  enrolled  in  the  list  of 
his  benefactors  for  his  good  deed   in  freeing  the  Byzantian  pris- 

'  Herod,  vii.  106.  Herodotoshere  ^  His  name  was  erased;  and  in 

asserts  that  down  to  the  time  when  place  of  it  were   substituted   the 

he  wrote  this  portion  of  liis  history  names  of  the  cities   wliose  troops 

Doriskos  still  remained  a  Persian  liad  talien  part  in  the  battle.  Thuc. 

fortress.  i.  132. 


236  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

oners  and  beseeching  liim  to  spare  ncitlier  time,  men,  nor  money 
for  the  immediate  accoinpiishment  of  hi8  schemes.  The  head  of 
this  miserable  man  was  now  fairly  turned.  Chui  in  Persian  garb, 
he  aped  the  privacy  of  Asiatic  despots  ;  and  when  he  came  forth 
from  his  palace  it  was  to  make  a  royal  progress  through  Thrace, 
surrounded  by  Median  and  Egyptian  life-guards,  and  to  show  his 
insolence  to  men  who  Avere  at  least  his  equals.  The  reports  of 
this  significant  change  in  the  behavior  of  Pausanias  led  to  his  re- 
call. He  was  put  on  his  trial  ;  but  liis  accasers  failed  to  establish 
the  personal  charges  brought  against  him,  wliile  liis  Medism  also 
was  dismissed  as  not  fully  proved.  The  suspicion,  however,  was 
so  strong  that  he  was  deprived  of  his  command.  ^  But,  like  De- 
maratos,  Pausanias,  although  not  king,  could  not  brook  degrada- 
tion from  a  power  which  Spartan  kings  had  rarely  enjoyed.  We 
soon  find  him  again  at  Byzantion  which  lie  had  reached  in  a  Her- 
niionian  ship.  Here  it  would  seem  that  he  took  up  a  fortified 
position  from  which  he  was  forcil)ly  dislodged  by  the  Atlienians  ; 
and  crossing  the  strait,  he  carried  on  at  Kolonai  in  the  Troas  his 
traitorous  dealings  with  the  Persian  satraj). 

All  these  events  were  tending  to  alienate  the  Asiatic  Greeks 
and  the  islanders  of  the  Egean  from  a  state  which  showed  itself 
Formfttion  incapable  of  maintaining  its  authority  over  its  own  ser- 
fedei-acy  of  vants.  In  short,  it  liad  become  clear  that  all  Hellas 
Deios.  was  divided  into  two  great  sections,  the  one  gravitating 

as  naturally  to  Sparta,  the  great  land  power,  as  the  other  gravi- 
tated to  Atliens  with  her  maritime  preponderance.'  AVhen 
therefore  a  Spartan  commission  headed  by  Dorkis  arrived  Avith  a 
small  force  to  take  the  place  of  Pausanias,  they  were  met  by 
passive  resistance  where  they  had  looked  for  submission  ;  and 
their  retirement  from  the  field  in  which  they  were  unable  to 
compel  obedience  left  the  confederacy  an  acct)mi)lished 

477  B.C.  n        .  J  l 

fact. 
It  now  fell  to  the  lot  of  Aristeides  to  regulate  the  terms  of  the 
new  confederacy.     The  work  before  it  was  not  merely  that  of  self- 
„,  defence.     The   mischief   done    to    Hellas   wius   to    be 

meiit  of  requited  upon  tlic  barbarians.  It  became  necessary, 
Aristeides.  therefore,  to  determine  the  proportions  in  wliich  the 
allies  should  contribute  men,  ships,  and  money  for  the  common 
cause.  The  sum  total  of  this  assessment  on  the  allies  amounted 
.to  4(30  talents  ;  but  the  items  are  not  given.  As  the  management 
of  this  finid  was  intrusted  to  Ilellenotamiai,  treasurers  elected  by 
the  allies  generallv,  and  as  they  met  on  terms  of  perfect  equality  in 
the  sacred  island  of  Dclos,  we  nuist  suppose  that  the  distribution 

'  Tliur.  i.  95.  "  Tliuc.  i.  19. 


Chap.  VIL]        THE  CONFEDERACY  OF  UELOS.  237 

of  burdens  was  accepted  by  all  as  just  and  equitable.  In  truth 
tlie  fairness  of  the  arrangement  is  conclusively  proved  by  the 
mere  fact  of  its  acceptance.  Athens  had  not  at  this  time  means 
of  compulsion  more  formidable  than  those  of  Sparta,  while  the  help 
which  she  was  able  to  afford  told  more  immediately  for  the  benefit 
of  the  exposed  members  of  the  confederacy  than  for  herself.  But 
as  only  union  could  enable  them  to  hold  their  own,  so  union  im- 
plied some  sort  of  central  government,  and  such  a  government 
involved  subordination.  The  allies  were  free  ;  but  their  circum- 
stances differed  indefinitely.  Some  who  could  not  contribute 
ships  or  men  would  have  escaped  all  burdens  if  they  had  not  been 
called  on  for  contributions  in  money  ;  and  the  option  of  refusal 
would  have  secured  to  those  who  gave  nothing  all  tlie  advantages 
enjoyed  by  the  most  earnest  and  self-sacrificing  of  the  allies. 

Meanwhile  Pausanias  was  busy  at  Kolouai,  thwarting  the  plans 
of  Aristeides.  The  constant  complaints  brought  against  liim  at 
leno'th  wearied  out  the  patience  of  the  Spartans,  who   „,    . 

o  1  i  '.  The  treason 

charged  him  to  follow  their  messenger  on  pain  or  and  death  of 
being  declared  the  enemy  of  the  people.  If  he  put  P^"*''"!''*- 
little  trust  in  their  kindly  feefing,  he  had  more  confidence  in  the 
power  of  money  ;  and  relying  on  the  effects  of  bribes,  he  returned 
to  Sparta  where  the  ephors  threw  him  into  prison.  But  on  these 
magistrates  he  so  pressad  their  lack  of  evidence  against  him  that 
he  was  set  free  :  and  his  next  step  was  an  instant  challenge  to  his 
accusers  to  prove  their  charge.  No  proof,  it  would  seem,  was 
forthcoming,  for  a  descendant  of  Herakles  and  the  regent  for  the 
young  son  of  Leonidas  was  not  to  be  condemned  except  on  testi- 
mony beyond  suspicion.  All  that  could  be  ascertained  amounted 
to  presumption  and  no  more,  for  Spartan  law  could  trust  nothing 
less  than  the  actual  confession  of  the  prisoner.  Helots  came  for- 
ward who  said  that  Pausanias  had  been  tampering  with  the  whole 
body  of  their  fellow-slaves,  promising  them  not  freedom  merely 
but  the  rights  of  citizenship,  if  they  would  only  give  their  help  in 
making  him  a  despot :  but  he  had  not  been  heard  to  tempt  thein, 
and  their  testimony  went  for  nothing.  These  were  followed  by 
an  Argilian  slave,  a  man  who  had  won  such  affection  as  Pausa- 
nias had  to  offer  in  an  utterly  infamous  relationship,  and  to  whom 
he  intrusted  his  latest  letters  for  Artabazos.  This  slave  remem- 
bering, it  is  said,  that  no  previous  messenger  (Gongylos,  it  would 
seem,  excepted)  had  ever  come  back,  opened  the  letter,  in- 
tending to  close  it  again  with  a  forged  seal  and  to  carry  it  to  its 
destination  if  it  involved  no  danger  to  himself.  But  the  letter 
contained  a  strict  charge  to  kill  the  bearer,  and  the  Argilian  car- 
ried it  not  to  Artabazos  but  to  the  ephors,  who,  staggered  though 
they  were  by  this  further  evidence  of  his  treachery,  could  not  rest 


238  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH   PERSIA.  [Book  11. 

content  until  tliey  liad  tlie  testimony  of  tlieir  own  ears.  By  theii" 
advice  the  slave  took  refuge  as  a  suppliant  in  the  Temenos  of 
Poseidon  at  cape  Tainaron  in  a  hut  with  double  walls  between 
which  some  of  the  cphors  hid  themselves.  No  long  time  had 
passed  before  Pausanias  came  to  ask  what  had  led  the  Argilian  to 
a  step  so  strange.  Then  recounting  all  his  services,  Ihe  slave  asked 
in  his  turn  what  he  had  done  to  deserve  the  treachery  with  which 
Pausanias  had  sought  his  death  for  adding  yet  one  more  to  the 
boons  which  he  had  received  from  him.  Soothing  him  as  well  as 
he  could,  Pausanias  admitted  his  offence,  but  assuring  him  solemnly 
that  no  mischief  should  happen  to  him  begged  him  to  lose  not  a 
moment  in  setting  out  on  his  errand.  The  ephors  departed,  all  of 
them  satisfied  of  his  guilt  and  some  of  them  with  their  minds 
made  up  to  arrest  him  in  the  city.  The  rest  were  not  so  earnest  in 
the  matter ;  and  as  they  approached  Pausanias  in  the  street,  one 
of  them  contrived  by  a  glance  or  sign  to  apprise  liim  of  liis  danger 
and  then  pointed  to  the  shrine  of  Athene  of  the  Brazen  House 
(Chalkioikos.)  Their  kindly  offices,  it  would  seem,  could  be 
carried  no  further.  Pausanias  had  taken  refuge  in  the  little  cell 
of  the  temple  ;  but  he  was  absolutely  Avithout  the  means  of  sus- 
taining life,  and  his  partisans  could  not  withhold  the  magistrates 
from  taking  oft'  the  roof,  walliug  up  the  doors,  and  then  waiting 
patiently  until  thirst  and  hunger  should  have  done  their  work. 
As  the  end  drew  near,  he  was  taken,  still  breathing,  from  the 
sanctuary.  Their  first  intention  was  to  hurl  his  body  into  tho 
Kaiadas  or  chasm  into  which  the  bodies  of  crimiuals  were  cast : 
but  they  changed  their  mind  and  buried  him  not  far  from  the 
sanctuary.  The  cphors,  however,  had  now  placed  themselves  in 
the  wrong  by  removing  a  su{)pliant  of  the  gods  ;  and  the  order 
came  from  Delphoi  not  only  that  the  body  of  Pausanias  must  be 
taken  up  and  buried  where  he  died,  but  that  the  deity  of  the 
Brazen  IIon?e  must  bo  appeased  with  two  bodies  in  place  of  one. 
At  an  earlier  time  this  would  have  I)een  followed  by  the  slaughter 
of  two  human  victims.  The  scruples  of  a  more  merciful  age  were 
satisfied  by  offering  two  brazen  statues. 

At  Sparta  Theinistokles  after  the  victory  of  Salamis  had  been 
welcomed  with  such  honors  jus  in  that  city  no  stranger  whether 
Traditional  before  or  after  him  ever  received.  The  determination 
imrnitivrof  with  whicli  lic  maintained  the  right  of  the  /.theniaus 
toTy'ofTire^  to  fortify  their  city  and  to  manage  their  ov,  n  affairs 
mistokicB.  turned  the  admiration  of  the  Spartans  into  liatred  ; 
and  their  diligence  in  spying  out  the  weak  points  in  his  character 
and  conduct  was  not  surpassed  by  that  of  some  who  were  watching 
him  in  Athens.  He  was  accused  by  the  Spartans  of  com[)licity  in 
the  schemes  of   Pausanias,  because   they  could   not  enduie  that, 


Chap.  VII.]         THE  CONFEDERACY  OF  DELOS.  239 

while  one  of  their  generals  was  charged  with  Medism,  the  Athe- 
nians should  be  free  of  the  same  disgrace,  and  because  they  bribed 
some  Athenians' to  bring  the  charge,'  The  time,  however,  was  not 
yet  ripe  for  his  conviction  ;  and  for  the  present  he  not  only  escaped 
but  was  more  popular  than  ever.  The  next  incident  in  his  life  is 
his  ostracism,  which,  it  must  be  remembered,  points  not 
to  personal  accusations  but  to  a  mere  trial  of  strength 
in  which  the  partisans  of  ThemistoMes  may  havefully*coiinted  on 
a  majority  oyer  those  of  Aristeides.  After  his  ostracism,  while  he 
was  living  in  exile  atArgos,  he  was  again  charged  by  the  Lakedai- 
monians  with  having  shared  the  treasons  of  Fausanias.  Themi- 
stokles,  learning  that  the  Athenians  had  issued  orders 
for  h'..-;  arrest,  tied  to  Korkyra,  an  island  over  which 
he  is  said  to  have  had  the  claims  of  a  benefactor.  Unwilling  to 
give  him  up  but  afraid  to  defend  him,  the  Korkyraians  conveyed 
him  over  to  the  mainland,  where  in  his  perplexity  he  found  himself 
driven  to  enter  the  house  of  the  Molossian  chief  Admetos,  to  whom 
at  some  previous  time  he  had  given  just  cause  of  offence.  Admetos 
was  not  at  home  ;  but  his  wife  placed  her  child  in  his  arms,  and 
bade  him  take  his  place  as  a  suppliant  at  the  hearth.  When  the 
chief  returned,  Themistokles  put  before  him  candidly  the  exact 
state  of  his  fortunes,  and  appealed  to  the  generous  impulses  which 
restrain  brave  men  from  pressing  hard  on  fallen  enemies.  Admetos 
at  once  forgave  the  old  wrong,  and  then  conveyed  him  safely  to 
Pydna,  a  stronghold  of  the  Makedoiiian  Alexandros.  Here  he  took 
passage  in  a  merchant-shipgoing  to  Ionia  ;  but  a  storm  carried  the 
vessel  to  Naxos  which  was  then  being  besieged  by  an  Athenian 
force.  Themistokles  at  once  revealed  himself  to  the  captain,  and 
said  that  he  would  charge  him  with  shielding  traitors  for  the  sake 
of  a  bribe,  unless  he  kept  his  men  from  landing  until  the  weather 
should  suffer  them  to  proceed  on  their  voyage.  In  about  thirty- 
six  hours  the  wind  lulled  ;  and  the  ship  made  its  way  to  Ephesos, 
where  Themistokles  rewarded  him  liberally  out  of  moneys  which 
his  friends  had  sent  over  to  him  from  Athens.  Journeying  on 
thence  into  the  interior,  he  sent  to  Artaxerxes,  who  had  just  suc- 
ceeded the  murderer  of  Masistes,  a  letter,  it  is  said,  thus  worded, 
'  I,  Tiiemistokles,  have  come  to  thee, — the  man  who  has  done  most 
harm  to  thy  liouse  while  I  was  compelled  to  resist  thy  father,  but 
who  also  did  him  most  good,  by  withholding  the  Greeks  from 
destroying  the  bridge  over  the  Hellespont  while  he  was  journeying 
from  Attica  to  Asia :  and  now  I  am  here,  able  to  do  thee  much 
good,  but  persecuted  by  the  Greeks  on  the  score  of  my  goodwill 
to  thee.     1  wish  to  tarcj'  a  year  and  then  to  talk  with  thee  about 

'  Diod.  xi.  54. 


240  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH   PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

mine  errand.'  The  yo^^"g  king,  we  are  told,  at  once  granted  his 
request ;  and  when  Theniistokles,  having  spent  the  year  in  tho- 
roughly learning  Persian,  went  up  to  the  court,  he  acquired  over 
the  monarch  an  influence  far  surpassing  that  which  Demaratos  had 
exercised  over  Xerxes.  This  influence  rested,  it  is  said,  on  the 
promise  that  he  would  make  the  Persian  rule  monarch  of  all  Ilellas, 
After  a  time,  we  know  not  how  long,  he  returned  to  Asia  Minor, 
to  do  what  might  he  needed  to  fulfll  his  promise  to  the  king. 
Here  he  lived  in  great  magnificence,  having  the  three  cities,  Mag- 
nesia, Lampsakos,  and  Myous,  to  supply  him  with  bread,  wine, 
and  vegetables.  At  Magnesia,  so  the  story  runs,  he  died,  Avhether 
from  disease  or  from  a  draught  of  bull's  blood  which 

^■*'"  he  drank  because  he  knew  that  he  could  not  accom- 

plish what  he  had  undertaken  to  do  for  the  king.  His  bone.;  were 
brought  away  by  his  kinsmen  and  buried  secretly  in  Attica,  be- 
cause the  bones  of  a  traitor  had  no  right  to  the  soil  which  he 
had  betrayed  :  but  the  Magnesians  asserted  that  they  still  lay  in 
their  market-place,  in  the  splendid  sepulchre  which  they  exhibited 
as  the  tomb  of  Themistokles. 

Such  was  perhaps  the  most  popular  form  of  a  story  of  which 
other  versions  related  tha%  far  from  regarding  him  as  a  benefactor 
Alleged  to  the  royal  house,  the  Persian  king  had  put  a  price  of 
jouiney  of      ^^^q  hundred  talents   upon   his   head ;  and   that  when 

Tneniisto-  ■        i  i  i      i    i       •       i       r  i   •     •  -i  i 

kles  to Sousa.  Themistokles  reached  loma,  lie  found  it  impossible  to 
get  to  Sousa  except  by  availing  himself  of  the  offer  of  Lysitheides 
who,  pretending  that  he  was  conveying  to  Sousa  a  stranger  for  the 
king's  harem,  brought  thither  in  this  strange  disguise  the  conqueror 
of  Salainis  and  the  founder  of  the  maritime  empire  of  Athens. 

Of  these  versions  of  the  popular  tradition  the  one  is  perhaps  as 
trustworthy  as  the  other.  The  absence  of  all  evidence  which  may 
Uniform  tend  to  show  that  the  people  generally  apjiroved  the 
policy^of  judgment  passed  upon  Themistokles  is  especially 
kles.  striking.     In  all  the  accounts  preserved  by  the  several 

writers  there  is  not  a  word  to  show  that  the  common  people 
shared  the  opinions  of  the  knot  of  his  persecutors,  while  expres- 
sions are  not  lacking  which  show  the  strength  of  their  atfection  for 
liim.  But  for  the  life  of  Themistokles  we  have  no  strictly  contem- 
porary history  ;  and  when  Thncydides  was  old  enough  to  form  a 
judgment  upon  it,  nearly  a  quarter  of  a  century  had  passed  from  the 
time  of  his  ostracism,  a  period  during  which  hiso})ponentshad  done 
their  best  to  heighten  the  prejudice  which  delights  in  exaggerated 
contrasts.  Themistokles  began  life  in  poverty  :  he  closed  it  in 
wealth  and  dishonor.  Aristeides  was  j)re-ei4iincnt  for  the  purity  of 
liis  motives  :  and  his  justice  was  proved  by  the  absolute  want 
which  left  his  familv  doi.i'ndcnt  on  the  public   bounty.      A  bribe 


CuAP.   VII.]        THE   CONFEDERACY   OF   DELOS.  24:1 

had  for  Aristeides  no  temptation  :  but  the  lust  of  gold  served  to 
account  iu  Themistokles  for  a  simultaneous  action  of  contradictory 
motives  such  asr  no  other  man  ever  exhibited.  The  absence  of  a 
pure  and  lofty  unselfishness,  to  which  perhaps  lie  never  laid  a  claim, 
made  his  political  opponents,  not  the  people,  ready  to  believe  of 
him  any  degree  of  personal  corruption  ;  and  the  charge  of  such 
corruption  was  taken,  without  evidence,  as  proof  that  he  was  pre- 
pared to  undo  the  work  of  his  whole  life  for  the  sake*  of  that  of 
which  he  had  already  an  abundance.  Yet  nothing  less  than  this 
are  we  called  upon  to  believe  with  regard  to  a  man  who  displayed 
a  fixity  of  purpose  and  a  concentration  of  will,  which  a  few  perhaps 
may  have  equalled  but  none  certainly  have  surpassed.  So  miglity 
had  been  the  impulse  which  he  gave  to  Athenian  enterprise,  so 
completely  had  it  strengthened  the  Athenian  character,  that  his 
great  rival  gave  his  aid  in  the  working  of  that  maritime  policy,  the 
introduction  of  which  he  had  opposed.  In  this  business  of  his  life 
he  had  displayed  wonderful  powers, — a  rapidity  of  perception 
which  gave  to  his  maturest  judgments  the  appearance  of  intuition, 
— a  fertility  of  resource  and  a  readiness  inaction  which  were  more 
than  equal  to  every  emergency.  He  had  shown  a  courage  rising 
in  proportion  to  the  dangers  which  he  had  to  face,  a  calmness  of 
spirit  which  turned  to  his  own  purpose  the  weakness  and  the 
selfishness  of  other  men.  He  had  kept  those  about  him  in  some 
degree  true  to  the  common  cause,  when  a  blind  and  stupid  terror 
seemed  to  make  all  possibility  of  union  hopeless.  These  were 
great  qualities  and  great  deeds  :  they  argued  mucb  love  of  his 
country  and  more  appreciation  of  her  real  interests.  They  were 
the  virtues  and  exploits  of  a  man  who  discerned  all  the  strength 
and  flexibility  of  her  political  constitution  and  the  mission  which 
his  city  was  charged  to  fulfil.  But  this  indomitable  energy  in  her 
service  implies  no  fastidious  integrity  of  character.  His  patriotism 
was  not  hostile  to  his  self-love.  His  political  morality  allowed 
him  to  make  use  of  the  fears  or  the  hopes  of  others  to  increase  his 
own  wealth  while  they  furthered  the  interests  of  his  countrymen. 
He  was  a  great  leader,  but  not  the  most  uncorrupt  citizen  :  a  wise 
counsellor,  but  no  rigid  and  impartial  judge  :  a  statesman  formid- 
able to  the  enemies  of  his  country,  but  not  especially  scrupulous  in 
the  choice  of  the  weapons  to  be  employed  against  them.  And  yet 
of  this  man  Ave  are  asked  to  believe,  not  that  he  yielded  to  some 
mean  temptation, — not  tliat  he  began  his  career  in  poverty  and 
ended  it  in  ill-gotten  wealth, — not  that  he  made  use  of  his  power 
sometimes  to  advance  his  own  fortune  and  sometimes  to  thwart 
and  oppress  others  ;  but  that  from  the  beginning  he  distinctly  con- 
templated the  prospect  of  destroying  the  house  which  he  was 
building  up,  and  of  seeking  a  home  in  the  palace   of  the  king  on 


2i2  THE   STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  H. 

■whose  power  and  hopes  he  was  first  to  inflict  a  deadly  blow.  We 
are  told  that  at  tlie  very  time  when  by  an  unparalleled  energy  of 
character  and  singleness  of  purpose  he  was  driving  the  allies  into 
a  battle  which  they  dreaded,  he  was  sending  to  the  Persian  king  a 
message  which  might  stand  him  in  good  stead  when  he  should 
come  as  an  exile  to  the  court  of  Sousa  ;  that  he  deceived  his 
enemv  to  his  ruin  in  order  to  win  his  favor  against  the  time  of 
trouble  which  he  knew  to  be  coming  ;  that  he  looked  indulgently 
on  the  guilt  of  Pausanias,  although  he  despised  the  weakness  of 
his  intellect ;  and  that  on  the  death  of  the  Spartan  regent  he  took 
up,  or  carried  on,  the  work  of  treachery  which  in  his  hands 
had  come  to  nothing.  We  are  asked  further  to  believe  that  in  the 
Persian  palace  he  actually  found  tlie  refuge  which  he  had  con- 
templated,— that  his  claim  to  favor  was  admitted  without  ques- 
tion,— that  he  pledged  himself  to  inslave  his  country,  and  for 
twelve  or  fourteen  years  received  the  revenues  of  large  towns  to 
enable  him  to  fulfil  his  word  ;  and  yet  that  he  died,  not  having 
made  a  single  effort  to  fulfil  even  a  part  of  the  promise  which  he 
had  made  to  the  Persian  king.  It  Is  a  conclusion  wliich  cannot 
be  admitted  without  satisfactory  evidence. 

If  after  sweeping  away  the  tales  which  fall  before  the  ordinary 
tests  of  historical  criticism  a  scanty  foundation  seems  to  be  left  for 
Araonnt  of  SO  great  a  charge  of  long-planned  yet  ineffectual  treason, 
aeainsf  The-  '^  ^^^^  nevertheless  sufficed  to  establish  a  general  con- 
mistokles.  viction  of  his  guilt.  In  some  minds  this  conviction  is 
deepened  by  reflexions  on  the  common  tendency  of  Greek  leaders 
and  statesmen  to  yield  to  temptations  of  wealth  and  power.  So 
strong  and  so  common  was  this  miserable  tendency  that  a  reputa- 
tion for  personal  integrity  served  to  keep  up  public  confidence  in 
men  Avho  were  in  every  other  respect  quite  undeserving  of  it :  and 
in  Themistokles  there  was  unquestionably  a  self-consciousness  and 
an  eager  love  of  money,  perhaps  also  an  ostentation,  which  it  is  un- 
necessary to  palliate  and  which  makes  it  ridiculous  to  speak  of  him 
as  a  man  of  strict  and  discriminating  equity.  On  the  other  hand, 
his  whole  career  (ixhibits  an  unbroken  and  uniform  line  of  conduct 
to  the  time  of  his  expulsion  by  the  vote  of  ostracism.  In  spite  of 
the  wealth  which  he  amassed  and  the  acts  of  personal  injustice 
which  are  laid  to  his  charge,  there  is  no  proof  that  he  had  aban- 
doned the  policy  of  his  life,  not  a  shade  of  evidence  that  he  had 
given  to  his  countrymen  any  counsel  which  he  believed  likely  to 
do  them  harm  :  and  the  problem  which  remains  to  be  solved  is 
not  that  such  a  man,  thus  driven  into  banishment,  should  fall  in- 
definitely lower  in  his  personal  morality,  but  that,  without  an  effort 
to  resist  it,  he  should  yield  to  the  temptation  to  undo  that  which 
had  been  thus  far  the  aim   and  the  passion  of  liis  life,  nay  that 


CiiAP.  VII.]        THE   CONFEDERACY   OF   DELOS.  243 

years  before,  when  be  had  scarcely  more  than  begun  that  work,  he 
foresaw  that  temptation  and  calmly  made  his  preparations  for  yield- 
ing to  it. 

Yet  the  facts  of  his  exile  and  of  his  flight  into  Asia  cannot  be 
called  into  question.  It  is  possible  that  his  ready  wit  might  de- 
vise some  plan  of  winnii>g  the  favor  of  Artaxerxes  :  nor  Relations  of 
is  it  altogether  unlikely  that  the  revenues  bestowed  ?',''';°".?^,''" 
upon  him,  if  they  were  bestow^ed  at  all,  may  have  ber^n  the  Persian 
granted  on  no  other  profession  than  that  of  a  general  ^"^s- 
desire  to  further  the  Persian  interests.  His  voluntary  submission 
might  stand  in  the  place  of  defeat  in  war :  his  very  banishment 
was  something  .'ike  a  sign  that  the  temporary  union  of  Hellas  and 
the  confederacy  of  Delos  would  soon  be  broken  up.  For  the  rest, 
liis  mere  presence  at  Sousa,  if  ever  he  went  thither,  was  no  slight 
lionor  to  the  Persian  king  who  might  well  suppose  that  other 
Hellenic  leaders  might  bo  led  to  follow  his  footsteps.  If  this 
may  be  taken  as  sutRcicntly  explaining  his  welcome  in  Persia, 
the  idea  of  a  deeper  and  more  deliberate  treachery  must  be  modi- 
fled  or  abandoned.  The  charges  of  mean  and  undignifled  selfish- 
ness, of  unscrupulous  equivocation  or  even  lying,  may  yet  re- 
main :  but  there  will  be  no  need  to  suppose  that  while  he  arranged 
the  positions  of  the  ships  at  Salamis  he  was  loolcing  forward  to  the 
day  when  he  should  befriend  the  barbarian  king  as  heartily  as  he 
was  then  aiding  the  free  land  of  his  birth. 

If  the  evidence  before  us  fails  to  warrant  a  harsher  judgment, 
it  appears  without  difficulty  to  fall  in  witli  this  one.  In  the  first 
message  whicli  he  is  said  to  have  sent  by  Sikinnos  to  Alieo-cd 
the  Persian  generals  or  to  Xerxes  liimself  no  one  pro-  personal 
fesses  to  see  a  double  motive.  The  stratagem  seems  ofThemis- 
at  first  siglit  a  masterly  device  for  bringing  about  the  ^°'^^'^^- 
destruction  of  the  Persian  fleet ;  but  its  value  is  not  a  little  im- 
paired, when  we  see  that  it  is  practically  superfluous.  Nothing  in 
the  previous  history  of  the  war  justifies  the  supposition  that 
Xerxes  was  likely  to  retreat  from  Salamis  without  fighting  or  that 
he  intended  to  delay  the  battle.  Still  the  disposition  of  Adeimantos 
and  the  Peloponnesian  allies  of  Sparta  may  have  made  it  indispen- 
sably necessary  to  deprive  them  at  once  of  all  cliances  of  escape  ; 
and  the  message  of  Themistokles  w-as  admirably  framed  to  effect 
this  purpose.  For  the  second  message  the  several  accounts  assign 
different  objects,  the  most  circumstantial  affirming  that  for  himself 
Themistokles  sought  by  means  of  it  to  win  the  gratitude  of  the 
kino-  and  a  refuge  in  the  time  of  trouble  which  even  then  he  anti- 
cipated. Assuredlv,  such  a  fact,  if  proved,  would  be  one  of  the 
most  astonishing  in  all  history  ;  for  we  are  asked  to  believe  that  a 
man,  engaged  in  saving  his  country  from  dangers  apparent!}'  over- 


244:  THE  STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  IL 

whelming,  and  struggling  witli  the  jealousy,  or  selfishness,  or  dis- 
afiection  of  his  confederates,  was  actuated  at  one  and  the  same 
moment  by  two  entirely  distinct  and  conflicting  motives.  With 
his  whole  soul  he  was  bent  on  setting  his  country  free  :  and  yet 
not  less  earnestly  was  he  bent  on  securing  a  place  of  retreat  among 
the  very  enemies  whom  he  was  driving  out.  Such  a  condition  of 
mind  could,  assuredly,  have  produced  nothing  but  distraction  of 
purpose  and  utter  weakness  in  action,  a  turmoil  of  contrary  de- 
sires with  which  the  calm  judgment  and  profound  energy  of  the 
man  stand  out  in  incomprehensible  contrast.  Such  treachery  it  is 
beyond  our  power  to  realise.  Some  notion  of  it  may  be  formed 
if  we  should  suppose  that  when  Nelson  before  the  fight  at  Tra- 
falgar warned  every  man  that  England  looked  to  him  to  do  his 
duty,  he  had  already  done  his  best  to  secure  the  future  good-will 
of  the  tyrant  Bonaparte  whose  fleets  he  Avas  advancing  to  en- 
counter. Bat  if  Herodocos  represents  Themistokles  as  holding 
out  to  Xerxes  the  prospect  of  an  unmolested  march,  there  were 
other,  and  seemingly  more  popular,  versions  which  spoke  of  him 
as  terrifying  the  king  by  a  warning  that  lie  might  be  intercepted 
on  the  road.  With  statements  so  inconsistent,  the  double  mean- 
ing which  is  said  to  lie  in  the  message  must  be  rejected.  It  may 
indeed  be  said  that  the  sending  of  this  second  message  may  be 
accounted  for  by  the  love  Avhich  a  man  like  Themistokles  would 
feel  for  the  arts  in  which  he  excelled,  for  their  own  sake,  and 
that  the  delight  of  conducting  an  intrigue  might  be  in  itself  a 
sufficient  motive  for  action.  Such  a  supposition  would  impute  to 
him  a  childishness  scarcely  less  than  that  which  he  is  said  to 
have  shown  in  his  inordinate  vanity  :  but  here  again  it  is  needless 
to  say  more,  for  with  almost  complete  assurancf.  it  may  be  as- 
serted that  this  second  message  was  never  sent.' 

But  while  he  sojourned  near  the  coast,  he  is  said  to  liave  sent 
to  the  despot  of  Persia  a  letter  couched  in  terms  of  intolerable 
Extent  of  insolence.  This  letter,  as  we  liave  seen,  is  a  manifest 
Themlsto-  forgery  ;  and  it  is  therefore  scarcely  necessary  to  say 
kles.  that,  if  the  epistle  Avhich  the  Eretrian  Gong}dos  con- 

veyed from  the  Spartan  regent  was  too  presuming  and  boastful  to 
be  altogether  palatable  to  an  Eastern  king,  it  Avas  yet  free  from 
the  falsehoods  Avhich  form  the  substance  of  this  letter  of  Themi- 
stokles. The  plea  that  the  instinct  of  self-preservation  alone  had 
led  him  to  resist  and  repel  the  invasion  of  Xerxes  must  to  his  son, 
who  was  not  altogether  ignorant  of  the  phenomena  of  Medism, 
have  appeared  not  less  ridiculous  than  false  :  the  beast  that  as 
soon  as  he  could  safely  do  so  he  had  compensated  his  injuries  with 

■  See  page  205. 


Chap.  VII.]        THE  CONFEDERACY  OF   DELOS.  245 

greater  benefits  must  have  seemed  an  extravagant  and  shameless 
lie.  But  whether  this  letter  was  sent  or  not,  the  details  of  his 
journey  to  Sousa  as  well  as  of  his  sojourn  in  the  palace  are  purely 
fictitious ;  and  hence  we  cannot  venture  to  determine  the  motives 
which  led  Artaxerxes  to  befriend  the  Athenian  exile,  or  the  terms 
on  which  he  extended  to  him  his  lavish  bounty,  if  lavish  it  was. 
The  mere  fact  that  during  his  long  residence  at  Magnesia  lie 
made  no  effort  to  fulfil  the  promise  which  he  is  said  to  have 
given,  must  go  far  to  prove  that  no  oirect  enterprise  against  the 
freedom  of  the  Hellenic  world  could  have  been  involved  in  it. 
The  supposition  of  such  an  engagement  gave  rise  to  the  tale  that 
his  death  was  caused  by  taking  poison  ;  but  this  story  obtained 
no  credit  with  Thucydides  whose  account  would  seem  to  justify 
the  inference  drawn  from  his  inactivity  at  Magnesia.  By  a  version 
scarcely  less  extravagant  than  his  tale  of  the  rebuilding  of  the 
Athenian  walls,  Diodoros  represents  his  death  as  a  crowning 
stratagem  to  preclude  all  further  attacks  from  Persia  on  the  lib- 
erty of  his  country.'  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  if  he  had  en- 
tered into  any  such  compact  with  the  Persian  king  with  any  in- 
tention of  fulfilling  it,  he  had  it  in  his  power  to  inflict  enormous 
damage  on  the  growing  empire  of  Athens.  That  not  a  single 
injurious  act  can  be  laid  to  his  charge  would  seem  to  prove, 
not  that  he  cheated  the  king  by  a  series  of  gratuitous  falsehoods, 
but  that  Artaxerxes  imposed  no  such  obligations  as  the  price  of 
his  hospitality.  His  degradation  was  great  enough  already  without 
adding  to  it  a  larger  measure  of  infamy.  But  it  is  no  light  thing 
to  have  solid  grounds  for  believing  that  Themistokles  was  not  guilty 
of  the  inveterate  treachery  which  has  given  to  the  story  of  his  life 
a  character  of  inexplicable  mystery  ;  that,  with  much  to  mar  its 
ancient  strength,  he  yet  carried  the  love  of  his  country  to  the 
grave  ;  and  that  no  pledge  to  work  tlie  ruin  of  that  country  laid  on 
him  the  guilt  of  superfluous  hypocrisy  towards  the  despot  who  is 
said  to  have  given  him  a  home  in  his  dishonored  old  age. 

Long  before  the  life  of  Themistokles  had  reached  its  close  in 
his  splendid  Magnesiaii  retreat,  Aristeides  the  righteous  had  died 
in  poverty,  either  at  Athens  or  in  battle  somewhere  rpj^^  ^^^^^.j^  ^^ 
on  the  coasts  of  the  Black  Sea — in  short,  where  or  Aristeides. 
how,  we  know  not.     Stories  were  not  lacking  which  ^'°'    ' 

called  even  his  incorruptibility  into  question  ;  and  it  was  main- 
tained that  he  too,  being  unable  to  pay  a  heavy  fine  on  a  convic- 
tion for  bribery,  took  refuge  in  the  land  where  Themistokles  had 
found  a  shelter,  and  that  there  he  died. 

'  Died.  xi.  58. 


246  THE  STRUGGLE  WITH   PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

CHAPTER   VIII. 

THE    GROWTH    OF    THE    ATHENIAN    EMPIRE. 

A  PERIOD  of  less  tlmn  lialf  a  century  separates  the  close  of  tlie 
ptruggle  with  Persia  from  tliat  disastrous  strife  between  the  two 
Objects  of  foremost  states  of  Hellas  which  prepared  the  way  first 
confedera-  ^^^  Makedonian  and  then  for  Roman  conquest.  Nay, 
tion.  although  that  brief  period  saw  the  rise    and    culmina- 

tion of  Athenian  empire  and  even  the  first  stages  of  its  downward 
course,  we  cannot  speak  of  the  beginning  of  it  as  marking  the 
close  of  the  struggle  Avith  Persia  except  in  so  far  as  the  issue  of 
it  was  virtually  decided  in  the  waters  of  Salamis  and  under  the 
heights  of  Kitliairon  and  iSIykale.  Persian  garrisons  still  remained 
in  towns  along  the  Thrakian  coasts  :  Persian  fleets  still  threatened 
to  renew  the  contest  by  sea ;  Persian  armies  still  hung  behind  the 
scanty  strip  of  land  which  had  been  the  brightest  jewel  in  the 
empire  of  Kroisos.  AVhether  on  the  Asiatic  continent  or  in  the 
Egcan  islands  the  Hellenes  looked  to  Athens  for  the  further  con- 
duct of  a  war  in  which  they  were  ready  to  give  such  help  as 
might  be  in  their  power.  But  it  can  scarcely  be  said  that  the 
brilliant  vision  of  Athenian  empire,  as  contrasted  with  the  head- 
ship of  a  free  confederacy,  had  yet  dawned  on  the  minds  of 
Athenian  statesmen.  The  most  far-seeing  of  these,  beyond  doubt, 
was  Themistokles  :  and  the  whole  policy  of  Tlicmistokles  Avas 
shaped  by  the  conviction  that,  if  Athens  was  ever  to  be  grent,  she 
nmst  be  great  by  sea.  When  be  told  his  fclloAV-citizensthat  Avith 
their  ships  they  might  bid  defiance  to  all  assailants,  but  that  in 
such  struggles  their  old  city  under  the  rock  of  the  Virgin  God- 
dess would  be  of  little  use  or  none,"  we  cannot  suj^pose  that  lie  waa 
looking  forward  to  a  time  when  the  dominion  of  Athens  sliould 
stretch  from  Mcgaraand  its  harbors  to  the  pass  of  Theimopylai,  or 
that  he  would  have  failed  to  deprecate  eUorts  designed  to  bring 
about  such  a  result  as  mischievous,  if  not  fatal,  to  her  real  welfare. 
Yet  witliin  a  few  years  Athenian  energy  brought  about  results 
Avliich.  while  the  victories  of  Salamis  and  Plataiai  were  fresh. 
Chaiipcin  would  liave  been  set  down  as  extravagimt  dreams, 
•hereia'ions  The  events  which  led  to  these  results  Avcre  shaped  by 
with  her  circumstances  Avhich  could  not  have  been  anticipated  ; 
allies.  j,„^|  (jf  ^]jg    course  of  tlieso  events  avc   have   unfortu- 

nately a  singularly  bare  and  meagre  record.  It  is  not  that  the 
history  of  this  most  important  time  has  been  lost,  but  that  it  never 

'  Seo  p.  234. 


Chap.  VIII.]     GROWTH  OF  ATHENIAN  EMPIRE.  247 

was  written  ;  and  our  knowledge  of  the  course  of  events  must  be 
derived  from  a  comparison  of  the  statements  of  Timcydides  with 
those  of  llerodotos.  From  the  former  Ave  learn  that  the  con- 
federacy of  Delos  was  at  first  an  association  of  independent  states 
whose  representatives  met  in  the  synod  on  a  footing  of  perfect 
equality.  By  the  latter  we  are  told  that,  when  Sestos  and 
Byzantion  had  fallen,  a  vast  amount  of  work  still  remained  to  be 
done  before  Europe  could  be  rid  of  the  barbarian.  Lastly  we 
learn  from  Thucydides  that  at  the  end  of  this  time  a  change 
became  manifest  in  the  attitude  of  Athens  towards  the  other 
members  of  the  confederation  ;  that  at  first  all  contributed  slyps 
and  men  for  the  common  service,  whether  with  or  without  further 
contributions  in  money  ;  and  that  the  change  in  the  relative 
positions  of  Athens  and  her  allies  was  brought  about  wholly  by 
the  acts  of  the  latter.  It  may  be  true,  as  Thucydides  asserts,  that 
Athens  was  firm,  even  to  harshness,  in  insisting  that  all  should 
discharge  to  the  full  their  duties  as  confederates.  But  with  the 
loiiians  it  was  the  old  story.  The  demands  of  Athens  seemed 
hard  only  because  they  loathed  the  idea  of  long-continued 
strenuous  exertion.'  But  they  Avere  dealing  now  with  men  Avho 
were  not  to  be  trifled  with  ;  and  as  in  some  shape  or  other  they 
must  bear  their  full  measure  of  the  general  burden,  the  thought 
struck  them  that  their  end  might  be  gained  if  they  paid  more 
money  and  furnished  fewer  ships  and  men,  or  none.  Their  pro- 
posal was  accepted  ;  and  its  immediate  result  was  to  inhance 
enormously  the  power  of  Athens,  while  in  case  of  revolt  they 
became  practically  helpless  against  a  thoroughly  disciplined  and 
thoroughly  resolute  enemy. 

Sestos  and  Byzantion  had  fallen  :  but  Boges  the  governor  of 
Eion  on  the  mouth  of  the  Strymon  offered  to  the  assaults  of  the 
allies  a  desperate  resistance.     The  capture  of  Eion  Avas  . 

either  preceded  or  followed  by  the  reconquest  of  operations  to 
Lemnos  ;  and  probably  the  convenience  of  Skyros  as  a  theEury-'*"'^ 
station  on  the  voyage  to  Lemnos  led  to  the  attack  of  medon. 
that  island  and  the  reduction  of  its  people  to  slavery.'^ 
From  Skyros  Thucydides  takes  us  to  the  Euboian  Karystos  Avhich 
was  treated  Avith  the  same  severity.  The  fleet  of  the  Naxians, 
who  revolted  at  this  time  and  were  subdued,  Avent  to  swell  the 
numbers  of  the  Athenian  navy,  Avhich  Avas  noAv  to  strike  another 
oTcat  bloAv  on  the  maritime  poAver  of  the  Persian  kina;.    _^ 

^  *■  "^      466  B.C. 

The  victory  of  Kimon  destroyed,  it  is  said,  on  one  and 

the  same  day  the  Phenician  fleet  of  200  ships  at  the  mouth  of  the 

'  'kdT]valoL  .  .  .  /.vTTTjpol  i/aav,  ovk  irpoadyovTeg  rdf  avajKac.  Thuc.  i. 
e'ludoaiv  ov6l  liov}.ofi£voi.qra7iaL-KupEi,v    91,1.  ^  Thuc.  i.  98. 


248  THE  STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

Eurymedon,  ia  Pampliylia,  and  tlie  land-forces  with  which  it  was 
destined  to  co-operate. 

The  history  of  the  DcHan  confederation  was  determined  by  the 
character  of  the  Asiatic  Greeks.  The  continued  strugjrle  with 
The  Deiian  Persia  after  the  battle  of  Mykale  involved  the  need  of 
fhe'revokof  strenuous  exertions :  and  for  this  the  lonians  were  not 
Thasos.  prepared.  The  Athenians  on  the  other  hand  were  not 
less  resolved  that  the  effort  should  be  made  ;  and  as  suon  as  this 
radical  difference  of  view  began  to  find  expression,  the  Delian 
synod  was  doomed.  The  days  of  Athenian  Hegemonia,  or  leader- 
ship), were  now  ended :  the  empire  or  tyranny  of  Athens  had 
begun,  and  whether  in  laying  its  foundations  or  in  raising  the 
fabric  the  Athenians  assuredly  cannot  be  charged  with  any  lack  of 
promptitude.  Not  many  months  after  the  conquest  of  Naxos  and 
the  victories  of  the  Eurymedon  a  quarrel  with  the 
Thasians  about  their  mines  and  trade  on  their  Thrakian 
settlements  was  followed  by  open  war.  Xot  content  with  block- 
ading Thasos,  the  Athenians,  to  make  all  further  rivalry  impossi- 
ble, sent  10,000  men  as  settlers  to  the  spot  called  the  Nine  Roads, 
the  site  of  the  future  Amphipolis.  This  post  they  succeeded  in 
occupying  ;  but  in  an  evil  hour  they  were  tempted  by  the  hope 
of  large  profits  from  mines  to  advance  further  inland  towards  the 
northeast,  and  at  or  near  Drabeskos  t]jeir  whole  force  was 
practically  swept  away  by  the  Edoiuan  Thrakians.  This  terrible 
disaster  brought  no  relief  to  the  Thasians.  Tlie  Athenians  still 
blockaded  their  port,  and  maintained  their  lodgement  on  the 
island  ;  but  although  the  siege  had  lasted  for  two  years,  the 
spirit  of  the  Thasians  was  not  yet  broken.  They  saw  that  the 
quarrel  between  themselves  and  the  Athenians  was  one  which 
must  be  decided  in  a  struggle  between  Athens  and  Sparta.  From 
Sparta  therefore  they  besought  aid  in  their  distress;  and  the 
Spartans  entered  into  a  secret  engagement  to  invade  Attica, 
which  proved  that,  apart  from  specific  causes  of  ofi'ence,  the 
mere  greatness  of  Athens  was  a  wrong  which  they  could  not  for- 
give. To  this  fear  of  Athens  and  to  this  alone  we  must  trace  the 
outbreak  of  tlie  Peloponnesian  war. 

While  the  Thasians  were  holding  out  against  the  fleet  and 
army  of  Athens,  their  Spartan  friends  were  busied  in  blockading 
The  revolt  of  Illiome.  A  terrible  earthquake,  which  had  shaken  the 
ami  Uie°'^ '  ^^^Y  ^^  Sparta  and  its  neighborhood,  was  ascribed  to 
alliance  of  the  vengeance  of  Poseidon  for  the  impious  withdrawal 
Argos.^^'  of  the  dying  Pausanias  from  his  sanctuary;  and  to 
464  B.C.  the  Helots  it  seemed  a  call  to  rise  against  their 
masters.  Breaking  out  into  open  revolt,  they  marched  or  were 
gradually  pushed  back,  with  a  large  body  of  Perioikoi  who  had 


Chap.  VIII.]     GROWTH  OF  ATHENIAN  EMPIRE.  249 

joined  them,  to  the  old  Messeniau  stronghold,  and  were  there 
blockaded  by  the  Spartans.  Fearing  that  the  siege  might  in 
length  rival  that  of  Eira,  the  Spartans  besought  help  from  the 
people  against  whom  they  had  made  a  secret  pact  with  the 
Thasians.  Their  application  at  Athens,  opposed,  it  is  said,  by 
Perikles  and  Ephialtes,  was  warmly  seconded  by  Kimon  who  was 
himself  sent  with  a  large  force  to  take  part  in  the  reduction  of 
Illiome.  But  the  place  was  too  strong  to  be  carried  even  by  the 
most  skilful  of  the  Greeks  in  the  conduct  of  blockades  :  and  the 
consciousness  of  their  own  premeditated  treachery  led  them  to 
ascribe  the  like  double-dealing  to  the  Athenians  and  the  Plataians 
who  accompanied  them,  and  to  dismiss  them  on  the  plea  that  their 
services  were  no  longer  needed.'  The  indignation  stirred  up  in 
the  Athenians  by  this  manifest  falsehood  was  no  mere  feeling  of 
the  moment.  The  policy  of  Kimon  and  his  philo-Lakonian 
adlierents  was  cast  to  the  winds  :  and  proposals  for  a  treaty  of 
alliance  were  at  once  made  to  Argos,  the  ancient  rival  and  enemy 
of  Sparta.  The  Argives  welcomed  the  alliance  as  one  which 
might  go  far  towards  the  recovery  of  their  old  supremacy.  The 
fire  thus  kindled  spread  swiftly.  The  Thessalians 
were  brought  into  the  new  confederacy  ;  and  Megara, 
tired  out  with  Corinthian  incroachments  on  her  boundaries,  flung 
herself  into  the  arms  of  Athens.  Her  friendship  was  eagerly 
welcomed,  for  the  Athenians  thus  became  possessed  of  the  two 
Megarian  ports,  Nisaia  on  the  Saronic  gulf  and  Pegai  on  that  of 
Corinth,  while  their  occupation  of  the  passes  of  Geraneia  rendered 
Spartan  invasionsof  Attica  practically  impossible.  Still  furtherto 
strengthen  their  hold  on  Megara,  they  joined  the  city  by  long  walls 
to  its  southern  port  of  Nisaia,  and  within  the  fortress  thus  made 
they  placed  a  permanent  garrison.  These  walls  probably  sug- 
gested the  greater  enterprise  which  was  soon  to  make  Athens,  so 
far  as  she  could  be  made,  a  maritime  city.  Meanwhile  the  siege 
of  Ithome  went  on  ;  but  at  length  the  Helots  and  Perioikoi  came 
to  terms  with  their  besiegers.  They  were  to  leave  the 
Peloponnesos,  under  the  pain  of  becoming  the  slaves 
of  any  who  might  catch  them  if  they  dared  to  set  foot  there 
again.  On  these  terms  men,  women,  and  children  all  departed 
in  peace  and  found  a  refuge  in  Naupaktos,  which  the  Athenians 
had  lately  taken  from  the  Ozolian  Lokrians.  Thus  at  the 
northern  entrance  of  the  Corinthian  gulf  a  population  was  esta- 
blished bitterly  hostile  to  Sparta  and  devoted  to  the  interests 
of  Athens. 

The  Aiginetans  now  resolved  to  measure  themselves  in  earnest 

"  Thuc.  i.  103,  4. 
11* 


250  THE   STRUGGLE   WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  H 

with  the  men  who  had  robbed  them  of  their  ancient  maritime 
supremacy.  Tiiey  went  into  battle,  relying  probably  on  the  tactics 
Siege  of  which  had  destroyed  the  Persian  fleets  at  Salamis 
:^'?}5?-      ,    and   MvkalO  :  they   came   out  of   it,  utterly  ruined   as 

Building  of  .  •.  •'  -,.',.•  , 

the  Long  a  maritime  power,  oevonty  ot  tlieir  ships  were  taken, 
Athens!^        ^^^  Aigina    itself   was    blockaded   by  sea   and    land. 

459-8  B.C.  Meanwhile  a  large  Athenian  fleet  and  army  had  gone  to 
aid  the  Egyptians  in  their  revolt  against  Artaxerxes  ;  and  Mega- 
bazos,  as  the  envoy  of  the  great  king,  had  come  to  Sparta,  to  in- 
force  with  large  bribes  the  immediate  invasion  of  Attica.  His 
money  was  spent  in  vain  ;'  but  the  Corinthians  by  an  attack  on 
Megara  and  by  occupying  the  heights  of  Geraneia  thought  to 
achieve  that  which  the  Spartans  had  not  been  able  to  attempt. 
To  their  surprise  no  forces  were  withdrawn  from  Aigina  ;  but  an 
army  consisting  of  the  oldest  and  the  youngest  men  who  had  been 
left  to  guard  the  city  marched  from  Athens  to  ^Nlegara  under  the 
command  of  Myronides.  The  battle  which  followed  was  inde- 
cisive ;  but  the  Athenians  setup  a  trophy  on  the  departure  of  the 
Corinthians  who  were  received  at  home  with  jeers  for  retreating 
from  a  rabble  of  old  men  and  boys.  Smarting  under  the  abuse, 
they  hastened  back  to  the  field,  and  there  as  they  were  setting  up 
a  trophy  on  their  side  they  were  attacked  by  the  same  force  and 
defeated.  Unhappily  in  their  retreat  a  large  body  found  their 
way  by  the  only  entrance  into  a  piece  of  private  ground  inclosed 
by  a  deep  trench.  Myronides  instantly  blocked  up  the  entrance 
with  his  hoplites,  while  his  light-armed  troops  shot  down  all  who 
had  fallen  into  this  fatal  snare  till  not  a  man  remained  alive.  The 
day  was  a  black  one  for  the  Corinthians,  although  the  buik  of 
tlieir  army  returned  home  in  safety.  On  the  Athenian  side  the 
history  of  this  time  with  its  rush  of  events  and  its  startling 
changes  exhibits  a  picture  of  astonishing  and  almost  preternatural 
energy.  One  Athenian  army  was  besieging  Aigina  ;  another  was 
absent  in  Egypt.  Yet  this  Avas  the  time  chosen  by  Perikles  for 
carrying  out  at  home  the  plan  which  on  a  very  small  scale  had 
been  adopted  at  Megara.  To  join  Athens  with  Peiraieus  on  the 
one  side  and  Phaleron  on  the  other,  one  wall  was  needed  of  about 
4^,  and  another  of  about  4  English  miles  in  length.  Such  an  en- 
terprise could  not  fail  to  excite  to  the  utmost  the  jealous  fears  of 
the  Peloponnesian  cities.  It  became  evident  to  the  Spartans  that 
if  the  growth  of  Athens  was  to  be  arrested,  it  could  be  done  onlj' 
by  .'letting  up  a  counterpoise  to  her  influence  in  northern  Hellas. 

Hence  for  the  sake  of  checking  her  they  overcame  their  almost 
invincible  dislike  of  regularly  organised  federations,  and  set  to 

'Thuc.  i.  109. 


Chap.  VIII.]     GROWTH  OF  ATHENIAN  EMPIRE.  251 

work  to  restore  the  supremacy  of   Thebes  which  had  been  most 
disgracefully  zealous  in  the  cause  of  Xerxes. 

The  fortress  of  Itliomc  had  not  yet  fallen  when  the  Spartans 
sent  across  the  Corinthian  gulf  a  large  force  under  the  command  of 
Nikomedes  who  was  then  acting  as  regent  for  the  Battles  of 
young  king  Pleistoanax  the  son  of  Pausanias.  Their  J,^^'*q[,jq. 
nominal  errand  was  to  rescue  from  the  Phokians  one  phyta. 
of  the  three  Dorian  towns  which  formed  the  Lake-  Aiginl 
daimonian  metropolis.'  The  task  was  easily  accom-  457  b.c. 
plished,  and  we  are  told  that  they  had  already  begun  their 
homeward  march  when  they  found  that  an  Athenian  fleet  was 
stationed  in  the  Krissaian  gulf  to  prevent  their  crossing  by 
sea,  while  an  Athenian  garrison  occupied  the  passes  of  Geraneia. 
Hither  also  hastened  the  unwearied  Demos,  aided  by  a  thousand 
Argives  as  well  as  by  other  allies.  The  battle  was  fought  at 
Tanagra,  within  sight  of  the  Euripos  :  and  the  Athenians  were 
defeated  after  a  severe  and  bloody  fight.  On  the  sixty-second 
day^  after  the  battle  (the  exactness  of  the  chronology  shows  how 
firmly  these  incidents  had  fixed  themselves  in  the  memory  of  the 
people)  Myronides  marched  into  Boiotia,  and  by  his  splendid  vic- 
tory among  the  vineyards  of  Oinophyta  raised  the  empire  of 
Athens  to  the  greatest  height  which  it  ever  reached.  Utterly 
defeated,  the  Boiotians  and  Phokians  became  the  subject  allies  of 
the  Athenians  who  set  up  democracies  everywhere,  taking  a  hun- 
dred hostages  from  the  Lokrians  of  Opous  as  pledges  of  their 
fidelity.  Thus  from  Megara  and  its  harbors  to  the  passes  of 
Thermopylai  Athens  Avas  supreme  ;  and  this  great  exaltation  was 
followed  almost  immediately  by  the  humbling  of  her  ancient  foe 
Aigina.  The  walls  of  this  ill-fated  city  were  razed,  her  fleet  was 
forfeited,  and  the  conquest  crowned  by  the  imposition  of  the  tri- 
bute for  maintaining  the  Athenian  confederacy.  Nor  was  this 
all.  Great  success  was  followed  in  some  instances  by  failure  :  but 
failure  did  not  leave  them  without  spirit  for  further  enterprise. 

Of  these  reverses  the  most  terrible  was  the  disaster  which  befell 
the  fleet  dispatched  to  the  aid  of  the  Libyan  Liaros,  the  son  of 
Psammetichos,    who  had,  on    the    death    of    Xerxes,    Disasters  of 
excited  the  greater  part  of  Egypt  to  revolt  against  the   I,'|!j,;'^'iJf" 
power  of   Persia.^     Two  hundred    Athenian    triremes   Egypt, 
happened  at  the   time  to  be  on  their  way  to  Kypros 
(Cyprus)  ;  and  these  were  ordered  to   make  their  way  at  once  to 
Egypt.     The  fleet  was   lost ;  and  of  the  crews  a  few  only  made 
their  way  through    Libya    to    Kyi'ene.     The    Libyan    chief  was 
betrayed  to  the  Persians  and   crucified  ;  and  a  reinforcement  of 

'  Thuc.  i.  107.  '  Thuc.  i.  108,  2. 

'  lb.  i.  104.     Diod.  xi.  71. 


252  THE  STRUGGLE  WITH  PERSIA.  [Book  II, 

fifty  triremes  from  Athens,  liaving  reached  the  Mendesian  mouth 
of  the  Nile,  was  attacked  and  almost  wholly  destroyed  by  a  com- 
bined attack  of  the  Phenician  Hect  and  the  Persian  land-forces. 

Still  Athens  was  resoh-ed  to  carry  on  the  war  against  Persia, 
and  Kinion  was  sent  to  Kypros  with  200  ships.  Here  Thueydidcs 
Final  vie-  ^"^"^  ^^*  that,  while  the  blockade  of  Kition  was  still 
torics  and  ffoinff  on,  Kimon  died  ;  that  the  Athenians  were  then 
Kimon.  from  lack  of  food  compelled  to  withdraw  from  Kition, 

455  B.C.  and  that,  sailing  to  Salamis  about  70  miles  furtlier 
to  the  east,  they  there  obtained  a  victory  both  by  sea  and  land 
over  the  Phenicians  and  Kilikians.  According  to  Diodorosi 
Kimon  not  merely  blockaded  but  succeeded  in  taking  both  Kition 
and  Malos,  and  then  engaging  the  coi-nbined  Phenician  and  Kili- 
kian  fleets  chased  to  the  Phenician  coast  the  ships  which  escaped 
from  the  conflict,  while  in  another  battle  the  Athenian  commander 
Anaxikrates  fell  fighting  bravely  against  the  Persians,  Nay  more, 
in  the  following  year,  Kimon  resolved  to  strike  a  more  decisive 
blow  by  besieging  Salamis,  where  the  Persians  had  stored  their 
corn  and  their  munitions  of  war.  Unable  to  stand  out  against 
this  series  of  disasters,  Artaxerxes  sent  to  Athens  ambassadors 
charged  with  proposals  for  })eacc,  and  the  Athenians,  dispatching 
their  own  envoys  to  Sousa  headed  by  Kallias  the  son  of  Hippo- 
nikos,  concluded  the  treaty  which  bears  his  name.  By  this  con- 
vention the  Persian  king  bound  himself  to  send  no  ships  of  war 
westward  of  Phaselis  or  the  Chelidonian  islands,  in  other  words, 
beyond  the  eastern  promontory  of  Lykia,  and  to  respect  the 
Thrakian  Bosporos  as  the  entrance  to  Hellenic  waters  ;  nor  did 
the  death  of  Kimon  take  place,  if  we  may  follow  Diodoros,  until 
after  this  treaty  had  l)een  ratified. 

Thus  liad  Athens  reached  the  zenith  of  lier  greatness,  not  by 
an  unbroken  series  of  victories  such  as  may  be  recorded  in  the 
Evacuation  career  of  mvthical  concjuerors,  but  by  the  persistent 
"/^*'/'"^"' ''y  resolution  which  will  draw  from  success  the  utmost 
nians.  possil)le    encouragement,  while  it  refuses  to  bend  even 

beneath  great  disasters.  On  a  foundation  of  shifting  and  uncer- 
tain materials  she  iiad  rai.sed  the  fabric  of  a  great  empire,  and 
slie  had  done  this  by  compelling  the  several  members  of  her  con- 
federation to  work  together  for  a  common  end, — in  other  words, 
to  sacrifice  their  independence,  so  far  as  the  sacrifice  might  be 
needed  ;  and  refusal  on  their  part  had  been  followed  by  prompt 
and  summary  cliastisement.  In  short,  she  was  throughout  offend- 
ing, and  offending  fatally,  the  profoundest  instinct  of  the  Hellenic 
mind,  that  instinct  which  had  been  impressed  on  it  in  the  very  in- 

'  xii.  3. 


Chap.  VIII.]     GROWTH  OF  ATHENIAN  EMPIRE.  253 

fancy  of  Aryan  civilisation.  Whatever  might  be  the  theories  of 
her  philosophers  or  the  language  of  her  statesmen,  Athens  was 
doino-  violence  to  the  sentiment  which  regarded  the  city  as  the 
ultimate  unit  of  society  :  and  of  this  feeling  Sparta  availed  her- 
self in  order  to  break  np  the  league  which  threatened  to  make 
her  insignificant  by  land  as  it  had  practically  deprived  her  of  all 
power  by  sea.  The  designs  of  Athens  were  manifested  by  the 
substitution  of  democracy  for  oligarchy  in  the  cities  subjected  to 
her  rule.  Tliese  democracies,  it  is  clear,  could  not  be  set  up 
except  by  expelling  the  Eupatrid  citizens  who  ipight  refuse  to 
accept  the  new  state  of  things  ;  and  as  few  were  prepared  to 
accept  it,  a  formidable  body  of  exiles  furious  in  their  hatred  of 
Athens  was  scattered  through  Hellas,  and  was  busily  occupied 
nearer  home  in  schemes  for  upsetting  the  new  constitu- 
tion. Ni ne  years  after  the  battle  of  Oinophyta  the  storm 
burst  on  the  shores  of  the  lake  Kopai's.  The  banished  Eupatrids 
were  masters  of  Orchomenos,  Chaironeia,  and  some  other  lioio- 
tian  cities  :  and  against  these  an  Athenian  army,  aided  l)y  their 
allies,  marched  under  Tolmidcs,  a  general  whose  zeal  outran  hi ; 
discretion.  He  had  taken  Chaironeia,  and  having  left  a  force  t  > 
guard  it,  was  marching  southwards  when  he  was  attacked  in  th?, 
territory  of  Koroneia.  The  result  w!is  a  ruinous  defeat  for  the 
Athenians,  those  who  survived  the  battle  being  for  the  most  part 
taken  prisoners.  Roman  feeling  would  probably  have  left  these 
unhappy  men  to  their  fate,  as  it  refused  to  ransom  the  prisoners 
taken  at  Cannae.  The  Athenians  could  not  afford  thus  to  drain 
their  strength,  and  to  recover  them  they  made  no  less  a  sacritice 
than  the  complete  evacuation  of  Boiotia. 

The  land-empire  of  Atliens  was  doomed  to  fall  as  rapidly  as  it 
rose.  The  revolt  of  Euboia  was  the  natural  fruit  of  revived  oli- 
ffarchy  ;  but  scarcely  had  Perikles  with  an  Athenian  _,.  ,.   , 

^  1       1     1   •        1       •   7        1        1  1  •  1  I        •  1    ^hc  revolt  of 

army  landed  m  the  island,  when  the  more  terrible  tid-  Euboia  und 
ings  reached  them   that   Megara  also   was  in    revolt,  qJiiethlity 
and  that  the  Athenian  garrison  had  been  massacred,  yeai>'  niice. 
a  few  only  making  their  escape  to  Nisaia.     A  Pelopon- 
nesian  army  was  already  in  Attica  and  was  ravaging  the  fruitful 
lands  of  Eleusis  and  Thrious,  when  Perikles  returned  in  haste  with 
his  army  from  Euboia.     For  whatever  reason,  the  king  Pleistoanax 
advanced  no  further.     It  is  more  than  possible  that  he  found  his 
force  inadequate  to  the  task  before  them  ;'  but  at  Sparta  the  be- 
lief was  that  he  had  been  vanquished  by  Athenian  bribes,  and  he 
atoned  for  his  sin  or  his  misfortune   by  years  of  banishment  at 

'  Archidamos  was  compelled  to     Pelopounesian  war.     Thuc.  ii.  18 
be  equally  cautious  in  his  invasion     et  seq. 
of  Attica  at  the  beginning  of  the 


254  THE  STRUGGLE  WITH   PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

Tegoa.  The  retreitt  of  the  Peloponnesians  left  Perikles  free  to 
deal  with  tlie  Euboians  as  he  thought  fit.  The  whole  island  was  sub- 
dued, and  definite  treaties  Avcre  made  with  all  the  cities  except 
Histiaia.  The  inhabitants  of  this  town  were  all  expelled,  and 
Athenian  Klerouchoi,  or  settlers,'  introduced  in  their  place.  But 
although  it  was  thus  made  clear  that  Athens  liad  lost  nothing  of 
her  ancient  spirit,  it  was  not  less  certain  that  the  idea  of  an  Athe- 
nian empire  by  land  must  take  its  place  in  the  ranks  of  dreams 
which  are  never  to  be  realised.  Her  hold  on  the  Peloponnesos 
was  to  all  intents  already  gone  ;  and  hence,  like  the  so-called 
treaty  of  Kimon  and  Kallias,  the  thirty  years'  truce  between 
Sparta  and  Athens  which  followed  the  re-conquest  of 
Euboia  gave  only  a  formal  sanction  to  certain  accom- 
plished facts.  As  things  had  now  gone,  the  Athenians  gavo  up 
little  when  they  surrendered  Troizen  and  Acliaia  together  with 
the  Mcgarian  harbors.  But  it  was  easier  to  evacuate  Megara,  as 
Boiotia  liad  been  evacuated  already,  than  to  forgive  the  Mega- 
rians  to  whom  ten  years  of  friendship  had  given  the  power  of  in- 
fiicting  a  deadly  blow  on  the  imperial  city  witli  Avhich  of  their 
own  free  will  they  had  allied  themselves. 

In  the  days  of  the  old  Eupatrid  tyranny  as  well  as  under  the 
despotism  of  the  Peisistratidai  the  most  marked  characteristic  of 
Gradual  de-  the  Athenians  generally  was  a  political  indifference 
of  Athenian  almost  amounting  to  apathy.  This  besetting  sin  Solon 
Democracy.  ]^ad  denounced  by  his  law  or  proclamation  against 
neutrality  in  times  of  sedition  :  but  it  was  not  until  the  tyrants 
had  been  driven  out  from  the  Akropolis  that  the  sudden  outburst 
of  energy  in  the  Athenian  demos  showed  the  wholesome  and 
bracing  effects  of  freedom. °  This  impulse  was  greatly  strengthened 
by  each  fresh  departure  from  that  exclusive  Eupatrid  polity  which 
derived  itssj)irit  from  the  days  when  the  primitive  Aryan  was  little 
better  than  the  wild  beast  in  his  den.^  Tlie  struggle  with  Persia 
had  supplied  a  fresh  impetus,  and  the  spur  thus  given  led  to  an  acti- 
vity still  more  marvellous,  when  the  formation  of  the  Delian  confede- 
racy insured  to  Athens  the  supremacy  of  the  sea.  Hence  the  periods 
in  wliich  Athens  was  most  aggressive  abroad  were  the  periods  in 
whicli  t'ne  principles  of  democracy  were  being  most  rapidly  de- 
veloped at  home.  The  first  great  blov/  was  struck  on  the  religious 
exclusiveness  of  the  ancient  Eupatrid  houses  when  Solon  gave  to 
the  peasant  cnhivators  a  permanent  interest  in  the  land,*  and  when 
he  followed  u|)  this  momentous  reform  by  introducing  a  classifi- 
<'Mtion  of  citizens  based  not  upon  religion  an<l  blood  but  upon 
pro[)erty.     The  stone  had  been  set  rolling,   but  it  had  not  yet 

'  See  p.  94.  ^  See  p.  G. 

^  Herod,  v.  78.    See  p.  94.  *  See  p.  79. 


Chap.  VIII.]     GROWTH  OF   ATHENIAN   EMPIRE.  255 

moved  far.  Hence  Kleistlicncs  found  himself  summoned  to  ii 
warfare  in  whicli  lie  had  still  to  fight  against  the  old  enemies.  If 
only  members  of  the  religious  tribes  could  fill  the  public  offices, 
Athens  must  remain  as  insignificant  as  she  had  been  before  the 
days  of,  Solon.  Kleisthenes  cut  the  knot  by  inrollingall  the  citi- 
zens into  ten  new  tribes,  ^  against  the  local  aggregation  of  which 
he  made  most  careful  provision.  ]>ut  although  the  religious  ex- 
clusiveness  of  the  old  Eupatrida  could  no  longer  be  maintained, 
another  oligarchic  influence  remained  in  the  preponderance  of 
wealtli.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  was  unlikely  that  even  if  all  re- 
strict! jns  were  removed  poor  men  would  except  in  rare  instances 
be  chosen  to  fill  high  public  oflices  :  but  by  the  constitution  of 
Kleisthenes  the  members  of  the  fourth  class, — in  other  words,  the 
main  body  of  Athenian  citizens, — were  declared  ineligible  for 
the  Archonship,  and  it  was  reserved  for  the  conservative  Ari- 
steides  to  propose  the  removal  of  this  restriction,  when  the  growth 
of  a  large  maritime  population  at  the  Peiraieus,  animated  by  a 
hearty  obedience  to  law,  and  exhibiting  a  marked  contrast  to  the 
turbulence  of  the  wealthier  Iloplites,  proved  the  wisdom  of  abolish- 
ing it.'^  The  result  showed  that  eligibility  was  not  always  or  often 
followed  by  election,  while  the  course  of  events  continued  to 
bring  the  functions  of  the  archon  more  and  more  to  the  level  of 
the  capacities  of  ordinary  Athenian  citizens.  It  was  certain, 
therefore,  that  the  party  of  progress  would  seek  to  devise  some 
means  for  securing  to  the  poorer  citizens  the  privileges  and  powers 
of  which  they  had  shown  themselves  deserving,  while  the  con- 
servative statesmen  would  seek  to  keep  things  as  they  were.  The 
former  party  was  headed  by  Perikles  and  Ephialtes  ;  at  the  head 
of  the  latter  stood  Kimon,  the  son  of  the  victor  of  Marathon. 

Of  Perikles  it  may  be  said  that  he  was  endowed  with  all  the 
wisdom  and  foresight  of  Themistokles,  and  with  a  personal  in- 
tegrity of  whicli  we  should  be  saying  little  if  we  spoke  . 
of  it  as  altogether  beyond  that  of  his  great  master,  of  Kimon 
If  the  smallest  chink  had  been  left  in  his  armor,  his  ^"'^^*^"'^®^- 
enemies  would  not  have  failed  to  pierce  it.  Having  little  in  com- 
mon with  the  political  temper  of  Kimon,  lie  had  about  him  even 
less  of  the  spirit  of  the  demagogue.  A  dignity  somewhat  cold 
and  repellent  might  with  more  reason  be  ascribed  to  a  man  whose 
time  and  thoughts  were  given  chiefly  to  his  work  as  a  statesman 
and  whose  leisure  was  reserved  for  the  pleasures  of  philosophy  and 
art.  Seeing  clearly  from  the  first  that  Themistokles  had  taken 
the  true  measure  of  the  capabilities  of  his  countrymen,  and  that 
he  had  turned  their  energies  in  the  right  direction,  Perikles  set 
himself  to  the  task  of  carrying  out  his  policy  with  an  unflinching 
a.nd  unswerving  zeal  ;  and  thus  when  the  conqueror  of  Salamis 
'  See  p.  88.                             ''  Xen.  3fem.  iii.  5,  18. 


25G  THE  STRUGGLE  WITH   PERSIA.  [Book  II. 

was  ostracized,  a  yoniiger  statesman  was  at  hand  to  take  up  his 
work  and  complete  the  fabric  of  which  lie  had  laid  the  founda- 
tions, and  gone  far  towards  raising  the  superstructure. 

The  form  of  Ephialtes  is  overshadowed  l»y  the  commanding 
tiguro  of  I'erikles  :  but  it  is  no  light  praise  to  say  of  him  that  he 
The  reforms  was  both  poor  and  trustworthy.  With  an  earnestness 
of  Ephialtes.  equal  to  that  of  his  great  ally,  he  joined  a  keener  sense 
of  political  Avrongs  and  a  more  vehement  impatience  of  political 

abuses.     The  legislation  of  Aristeides  had  made  all  citizens  eliffi- 

.  .  .  ^ 

ble  for  the  Archonship  :  but  the  poorer  citizens  were  little  the 

nearer  to  being  elected  archons,  and  the  reforms  both  of  Aristei- 
des and  of  Kleisthenes  had  left  in  the  large  judicial  powers  of  pub- 
lic officers  a  source  of  evils  which  became  contiiuially  less  and  less 
tolerable.  The  Strategoi,  as  well  as  the  archons,  dealt  with  all 
cases  of  disobedience  to  their  own  authority  ;  and  the  practically 
irresponsible  Court  of  Areiopagos,  while  it  possessed  a  strictly  reli- 
gious jurisdiction  in  cases  of  homicide,  exercised  also  a  censorial 
authority  over  all  the  citizens,  and  superseded  the  Probouleutic 
council  by  its  privilege  of  preserving  order  in  the  debates  of  the 
Ekklcsia.  This  privilege  involved  substantially  the  determination 
of  the  subjects  to  be  discussed,  as  inconvenient  questions  might 
for  the  most  part  without  difficulty  be  ruled  to  be  out  of  order. 
To  Ephialtes  tirst,  and  to  Perikles  afterwards,  it  became  evident 
that  attempts  to  redress  individual  cases  of  abuse  arising  from  this 
state  of  things  were  a  mere  waste  of  time.  The  public  officei's 
must  be  deprived  of  their  discretionary  judicial  powers  ;  the  Arei- 
opagos must  lose  its  censorial  privileges  and  its  authority  in  the 
public  assembly  of  the  citizens,  while  the  people  themselves  must 
become  the  hiial  judges  in  all  criminal  as  well  as  civil  causes. 
To  carry  out  the  whole  of  this  scheme!  thev  had  a  machinery  ready 
to  liand.  The  lleliuia  in  its  Dikasteries  had  partially  exercised 
tills  jurisdiction  already  ;  and  nothing  more  was  needed  now 
than  to  make  these  Dikasteries  permanent  courts,  the  members 
of  which  should  receive  a  regular  pay  for  all  days  spent  on  such 
service.'  The  adoption  of  these  measures  would  at  once  sweep 
away  tlie  old  evils ;  and  Ephialtes  with  the  support  of  I'erikles 
carried  them  all.  The  Athenian  constitution  thus  reached  its  ut- 
most growth  ;  and  the  liistory  of  the  times  which  follow  tells  only 
of  its  conservation  or  of  its  decay. 

These  measures  were  preceded,  as  we  might  expect,  by  the 
ThomnrciiT  Ostracism  of  Kimon  ;  and  all  hindrances  were  removed 
<.f  Ephialtes.  f,.^,„  ti,(.  p.^tjj  „j.-  Kpiiiiiites.  The  formidable  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  archons  was   cut  down  to  the   power    of   inflicting   a 

'  For  the  method  by  which  these  Dikasteries  were  annually  supplied 
witli  .Jurymen,  see  \^.  89. 


Chap.  VIII.]     GROWTH   OF   ATHENIAN   EMPIRE.  257 

small  fine,  and  tliey  became  simply  officers  for  managing  the  pre- 
liminary business  of  cases  to  be  brought  before  the  Jury  Courts. 
The  majesty  of  the  Areiopagos  faded  away,  and,  retaining  its 
jurisdiction  only  in  cases  of  homicide,  it  became  an  assembly  of 
average  Athenian  citizens  who  had  been  chosen  archons  by  the 
lot.i  In  short,  the  old  times  were  gone  ;  and  the  rage  of  the 
oligarchic  faction  (for  such  it  must  still  be  termed)  could  be  ap- 
peased only  with  blood.  Ephialtes  was  assassinated, — by  a  mur- 
derer hired,  it  is  said,  from  the  Boiotian  Tanagra.  Kimou  was 
in  banishment :  and  it  is  pleasant  to  think  thatJ  this  brave  and 
able  general  had  no  hand  in  a  dastardly  crime,  happily  rare  in 
Athenian  annals. 

'  See  p.  90, 


BOOK    III. 
TEE  EMPIRE   OF  ATHENS. 

THE  STRUGGLE  BETWEEN  ATHENS  AND  SPARTA. 

CHAPTER  I. 

THE    THIRTY    YEARS'    TRUCE. 

Ephialtes  was  dead  ;  but  tlic  opposition,  which  liad  not  shrunk 
from  employing'  the  weapon  of  assassination,  hccanie  even  more 
intense,  as  Pcriklcs  matured  his  designs  for  the  embellishment  of 

the  imperial  city.  The  ])lace  of  Kimon  was  now  filled 
works  of  by  his  kinsman  Thoukydides  the  son  of  Melesias,  who, 
Penkles.  jj^^  Kiiuon,  held  that  the  revenues  of  Athens  should 
still  be  used  in  distant  enterprises  against  the  power  of  Persia. 
This  policy  was  resisted  by  l*erikles,  whose  influence  with  the 
people  was  probably  strengthened  by  the  remembrance  that  he  had 
likewise  opposed  the  rash  expedition  of  Tolmidcs  into  Boiotia. 
The  political  atmosphere  at  Athens  was  now  again  so  far  clouded 
and  threatening  that  both  parties  turned  instinctively  to  the  remedy 
of  ostracism.  Like  Kimon,  Thoukydides  fully  thought  that  tlic  vote 
443       f»)  would  send  liis  great  rival  into   exile.     Tlie   result  was 

liis  ow  n  banishment ;  and  the  way  was  cleared  for  tlie 
carrying  out  of  the  vast  public  works  on  whieh  Pcrikles  liad  set 
his  mind.  The  long  walls  which  joined  Athens  with  lier  liarbors 
inclosed  between  them  a  large  sj)ace  of  ground,  wliich,  if  occu- 
pied by  an  enemy,  might  be  a  source  of  serious  danger  as  well  as 
of  annoyance.  Hence  a  third  wall  was  carried  from  tlie  city 
])arallel  to  the  western  or  Peirai(.'  wall,  at  a  distance  of  550  feet, 
turning  to  the  soutli  about  400  vards  before  it  reached  Mouny 
cilia,  for  the  purpose  of  defending  that  liarbor.  But  the 
costliest  works  of  Perikles  were  confined  within  a  imich  nar- 
rower circuit.  A  new  tlieatro,  called  the  Odeion,  rose  in  tlie 
city,  as  a  woi-thy  liome  for  the  drama  in  the  great  Panatlu'naic 
festival,  wliile  under  the  name  Propylaia  gigantic  portals  guarded 
the  entrance  to  the  summit  of  the  rock  on  which  art  of  every 
kind  acliieved  its  highest  triumplis.     The  Ereclitheion,  or  slu'ine  of 


Chap.  I.J  THE   THIRTY   YEARS'  TRUCE.  259 

Athene  Policas,  which  had  been  burnt  during  the  Persian  occu- 
pation of  the  city,  rose  to  more  than  its  ancient  grandeur,  iv 
spite  of  the  vow  that  the  ruined  temples  should  be  left  as  raemo' 
rials  of  the  invader's  sacrilege.  But  high  above  all  the  sur' 
rounding -buildings  towered  the  magnificent  fabric  of  the  Parthc 
non,  the  home  of  the  virgin  goddess,  whose  colossal  form,  stand- 
ing in  front  of  the  temple,  might  be  seen  by  the  mariner  as  ho 
doubled  the  Cape  of  Sounion.  The  worshipper,  who  passed  within 
its  massive  walls,  saw  before  him  a  statue  of  the  goddess  still  more 
glorious,  the  work  of  the  great  sculptor,  Pheidiias,  whose  genius 
embodied  in  gold  and  ivory  at  Olympiathe  majesty  of  Zeus  himself. 
The  great  aim  of  Perikles  was  to  strengthen  the  power  of 
Athens  over  the  Avhole  area  occupied  l)y  her  confederacy.     The 

establishment  of  settlers  or  Klerouchoi,  who  retained  t.  ,     ■       « 
..  41-  ■•  11  1  n  Extension  or 

their  rights  as  Athenian  citizens,  had  answered  so  well  Athenian 
in  the  Lelantian  plain  of  Euboia'  that  it  was  obviously  seitiemeuts. 
good  policy  to  extend  the  system.  The  territory  of  Hestiaia  in 
the  north  of  Euboia,  and  the  islands  of  Lemnos,  Imbros,  and 
Skyros,  were  thus  occupied  ;  and  Perikles  himself  led  a  body  of 
settlers  to  the  Thrakian  Chersonesos  and  even  to  Sinope  which 
now  became  a  member  of  the  Athenian  alliance.  A  generation 
had  passed  from  the  time  when  Athens  lost  10,000  citizens  in  the 
attempt  to  found  a  colony  at  the  mouth  of  the  Strv- 

4S7  B  c 

mon.^     The  task  was  now  undertaken  successfully  by 
Hagnon,^  and  the  city  came  into  existence  vv^hich  was  to  be  the 
cause  of  disaster  to  the  historian  Thucydides  and  to  witness  the 
death  of  Brasidas  and  of  Kleon.     Of  less  importance  to  the  inte- 
rests of  Athens,  yet  notable  in  other  ways,  was  the  revival  of  the 
ruined   Sybaris   under  the   name  of   Thourioi,  about 
seven  years  before  the  founding  of  Amphipolis.  Among     "^^^  ^■'^• 
its  citizens  was  the  rhetor  Lysias,   and  one  far  more  illustrious 
man.     Here  Hcrodotos  found  a  home  for  his  latter  years  ;  here 
he  wrote  much,  if  not  all,  of  his  invaluable  history  ;  and  here, 
{ifter  a  life  spent  in  the  honest  search  of  truth,  he  died. 

Two  years  before  the  founding  of  Amphipolis  Samos  revolted 
from  Athens.     In  one  sense  it  is  true  to  say  that  this  revolt  was 
caused  by  a  feeling  of    impatience    under   Athenian 
supremacy,  and  quite  true  also  that   Athenian  citizens   oflamos. 
sometimes  spoke  of  their  relations  with  their  allies  as      •wob.c. 
those  of  a  tyrant  with  his  subjects,  and  even  made  a  parade  of 
exercising  over  them  a  despotic  authority.     But  it  is  not  the  less 
true  that  this  radical  opj)osition  of  feeling  and  interest  was  con- 
fined for  the  most  part  to  a  small,  although  always  powerful  and 

'  See  p.  94.  '  See  p.  248.  »  Time.  iv.  103. 


260  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

sometimes  preponderant,  party  in  the  subject  cities.  But  there 
was  also  in  every  city  a  class  which  had  not  only  no  positive 
grievance  against  Athens,  but  a  strong  community  of  interest  with 
her  :  and  this  class,  necessarily,  was  the  Demos.  In  almost  every 
case,  therefore,  we  shall  find  the  people  passive  or  indifferent  under 
Athenian  supremacy,  so  long  as  there  was  no  opposition  between 
the  subject  city  and  its  mistress  ;  but  we  shall  also  see  that  when 
the  oligarchy  broke  out  into  open  rebellion,  the  demos  not  mifre- 
quently  took  the  first  opportunity  of  going  over  to  their  natural 
protectors. 1  The  tidings  that  Byzantion  had  joined  in  this  revolt 
left  to  the  Athenians  no  room  to  doubt  the  gravity  of  the  crisis. 
A  fleet  of  sixty  ships  was  dispatched  to  Samos  under  Perikles  and 
nine  other  generals,  of  whom  tlie  poet  Sophokles  is  said  to  have 
been  one  ;  and  the  Samian  oligarchy  were  compelled  to  submit 
in  the  ninth  month  after  the  beginning  of  the  revolt,  the  terms 
being  that  the}'  should  raze  their  walls,  give  hostages,  surrender 
their  ships,  and  pay  the  expenses  of  the  war.  Following  their 
example,  the  Byzantines  also  made  their  peace  with  Athens.'^  The 
Athenians  escaped  at  the  same  time  a  far  greater  danger  nearer 
home.  The  Samians,  like  the  men  of  Tbasos,^  had  applied  for  aid 
to  the  Spartans,  who,  no  longer  pressed  by  the  Helot  war,  sum- 
moned a  congress  of  their  allies  to  discuss  the  question.  For  the 
truce  which  had  still  five-and-tv,enty  years  to  run  Sparta  cared 
nothing  :  but  she  encountered  an  opposition  from  the  Corinthians 
which  perhaps  she  nov.-  scarcely  expected.  In  the  synod  at  which 
Hippias  had  pleaded  his  cause  the  Corinthians  had  raised  their 
voice  not  so  much  against  the  restoration  of  the  despot,  as  against 
the  principle  of  interference  witli  the  internal  affairs  of  an  auto- 
nomous city.  They  now  insisted  in  a  like  spirit  on  the  right  of 
every  independent  state  to  deal  as  it  pleased  with  its  free  or  its 
subject  allies.  The  Spartans  were  compelled  to  give  way  ;  and 
there  can  be  no  doubt  that  when  some  years  later  the  Corinthians 
claimed  the  gratitude  of  the  Athenians  for  this  decision,*  they 
took  credit  for  an  act  of  good  service  singularly  opportune.  Had 
they  voted  as  Sparta  wished,  Athens  might  by  the  extension  of 
revolt  amongst  her  allied  cities  have  been  reduced  now  to  the  con- 
dition to  which,  in  consecjuence  {)erliaps  of  this  respite,  she  was 
not  brought  until  the  lifetime  of  a  generation  had  been  spent  in 
desperate  warfare. 

'  This  is  emphatically  asserted  by  vor.      If   innocent   and    pcnilly  be 

Diodotos,  whose  arjjfunient,  Time,  alike  punished,  they  must  expect 

iii.  47,  is  that  the  i)ro])osal  of  Kleoii  to  find  tlieir  friends  converted  into 

is  not  only  unjust  Imt  most  impoli-  enemies, 

tic,  as  it  confounds  friends  with  foes.  "Time.  i.  117. 

At  present,  Athens,  he  urrres,  may  '  See  p.  248. 

in  every  case  of  revolt  count  on  hav-  *  Thuc.  i.  40. 
ing  the  Demos  strongly  in  her  fa- 


Chap.  I.]  THE  THIRTY   YEARS'  TRUCE.  261 

When  the  Corinthians  apscrtcd  that  the  Athenians  had  an 
absohito  right  to  punish  the  Samians  or  any  other  allies  who 
might  be  in  revolt,  it  is  possible  that  their  motives  rp|,g  q„j,rrel 
may  have  been  more  selfish  than  when  they  protested  }'  twL-en 
against  ^ntcrierence  with  tlie  attairs  ot  autonomous  auciKor- 
citics  in  the  days  of  Hippias.  They  had  important  ^y^- 
interests  to  guard  on  the  coasts  of  Epeiros,i  Makedonia  and  Thrace ; 
and  they  were  fully  aware  that  their  own  navy  in  point  of 
efficiency  remained  where  it  had  been  two  generations  ago,  while 
the  Athenians  had  by  long  experience  attained  fv  skill  in  naval  war 
whicli  no  Peloponnesian  state  had  yet  put  to  the  test  of  experience. 
The  dread  of  such  an  ordeal  averted  for  a  time  the  inevitable 
conflict :  but  unhappily  this  fear  was  at  length  overpowered  by 
feelings  which  left  little  room  for  the  exercise  of  sober  reason. 
We  have  seen  some  results  of  oligarchical  intrigues  amongst  the 
Athenian  allies  in  the  East :  we  have  now,  as  the  scene  shifts  to 
Western  Hellas,  to  follow  the  actions  of  states  which  exhibit  the 
worst  features  of  the  Greek  character.  The  tradition  which  as- 
serted that  the  first  sea-fight  among  Greeks  was  a  battle  between 
the  Corinthians  and  their  colonists  of  Korkyra  forecasts  exactly 
the  relations  of  these  two  great  maritime  states.  The  fierce 
hatred  which  divided  them  may  have  sprung  from  jealousies  of 
trade  f  but  it  certainly  cannot  be  traced  to  any  deep  political  con- 
victions. The  city  of  Epidamnos  had  been  founded  by  settlers 
from  Korkyra  :  but  even  hatred  for  the  mother  city  could  not 
embolden  them  to  dispense  with  the  rule  which  compelled  them 
to  go  to  her  for  the  Oikistes  or  leader  of  the  colony.  Corinth  had 
thus  certain  parental  rights  over  the  Epeirotic  city  ;  but  Corinth 
was  now  ruled  by  an  oligarchy,  while  the  Demos  was  supreme  at 
Korkyra.  Whether  the  constitution  of  Korkyra  had  undergone  a 
change  since  the  foundation  of  the  colony,  we  know  not ;  but  if 
the  Korkyraian  oligarchy  liad  been  put  down  before  that  time, 
then  either  the  oligarchic  families  of  the  island  welcomed  the  op- 
portunity of  finding  a  more  congenial  home  elsewhere,  or  colonists 
belonging  to  the  demos  in  Korkyra  became  an  oligarchy  in  their 
new  abode.  With  a  people  notorious  for  their  political  immorality 
there  is  in  tliis  nothing  surprising,  Certain  it  is  that  the  demos  of 
Epidamnos  could  point  to  no  evidences  of  kinship  witli  the  demos 
of  Korkyra  ;  and  thus  it  may  have  grown  up  from  a  concourse  of 
aliens  from  many  lands.  At  first  the  colony  seems  to  have  been 
prosperous ;  but  some  defeats  sustained  in  a  struggle  Avith  their 
barbarous  neighbors  the  Taulantians  broke  the  strength  of  the 
oligarchic  faction,  and  the  demos  rising  to  power  drove  many  of 

'  See  p.  61.  ""  See  p.  61. 


262  THE   EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  HI. 

their  opponents  into  banishment.  Tliese  exiles  took  their  revenge 
by  allying  themselves  with  the  Taulantians  and  ravaging  the  lands 
of  the  rival  faction.  The  mischief  done  was  so  great  that  the 
Epidanmian  demos  sent  ambassadors  to  Korkyra  to  beg  for  aid 
in  their  distress.  But  they  could  point  to  no  tombs  of  common 
ancestors  ;  and  their  prayer  was  contemptuously  rejected.  To 
remain  without  help  was  to  be  ruined  :  and  the  question  put  to 
the  Delphian  god  whether  in  this  strait  they  might  betake  them- 
selves to  the  Corinthians  drew  forth  his  distinct  permission.  A 
Corinthian  army  marched  by  land  to  Apollonia,  to  avoid  the  risk 
of  an  encounter  with  the  Korkyraian  fleet,  and  thence 
^■'^'  made  its  way  to  Epidamnos.  In  great  wrath  the  Kor- 
kyraians  sailed  thither  with  a  fleet  of  five-and-twenty  ships,  and 
by  a  message  couched  in  terras  of  studied  insult  insisted  on  in- 
gress for  themselves  as  well  as  on  the  expulsion  of  the  Corinthian 
garrison.  On  the  refusal  of  the  Epidamnians  the  Korkyraians 
prepared  to  blockade  the  isthmus  on  which  Ihe  city  Avas  built,  at 
the  same  time  sending  word  that  any  Epidamnians  or  strangers 
who  nught  wish  to  leave  the  place  should  be  suffered  to  depart 
in  peace,  but  that  all  who  remained  should  be  treated  as  enemies. 
The  Corinthians  by  way  of  retaliation  invited  a  fresh  emigration 
to  Epidamnos,  and  a  tleet  of  40  Corinthian  ships  Avith  3,000  hop- 
lites,  supported  by  38  ships  of  their  allies,  made  ready  to  convey 
or  escort  the  new  colonists  to  their  homes.  To  avert  the  storm 
gathering  over  their  lieads,  the  Korkyraians  noAv  sent  envoys  to 
Corinth,  insisting  on  the  withdrawal  of  the  Corinthian  garrison 
from  Epidamnos  and  expressing  their  willingness  to  submit  mat- 
ters to  arbitration.  To  the  reply  of  the  Corinthians  that  they 
could  not  even  debate  the  point  unless  the  siege  of  Epidainnos 
were  first  raised,  the  Korkyraians  answered  that  tlie  siege  should  be 
raised  if  the  Corinthians  would  themselves  quit  the  place,  or  that, 
failing  this,  they  would  leave  matters  as  they  were  on  bolh  sides, 
a  truce  being  entered  into  until  the  arbiters  should  decide  whe- 
ther Epidamnos  should  belong  to  Corinth  or  Korkyra.  Jb)wever 
unprincipled  the  conduct  of  the  Korkyraians  may  have  been,  they 
had  now,  technically  at  least,  ])ut  themselves  in  the  right :  and 
the  Corinthians  were  without  excuse  in  the  declaration  of  war  by 
which  they  replied  to  these  proposals.  Their  armament  had 
already  reached  Aktion^  when  a  Korkyraian  herald,  sent  in  a 
small  skiflf,  forbade  them  to  advance  further.  This  connnand  was, 
of  course,  unheeded  ;  and  the  Korkyraian  fleet  of  eighty  sliips, 
advancing  to  the  encounter,  put  the  enemy  to  flight  with  the  loss 
of  fifteen  vessels.  The  retreat  of  the  Corinthian  fieet  had  left  the 
Korkyraians  masters  of  the  sea  ;  and  these  now  took  their  revenge 

'  See  p.  61. 


Chap.  I.]  THE  THIRTY  YEARS'  TRUCE.  263 

by  ravaging  the  Corinthian  colony  of  Leukas  and  burning  Kyliene, 
the  port  and  dock  of  the  Eleians  who  had  taken  part  in  the  recent 
expedition.     Two  years  had  passed  away  without  any 

J      •   •  •  X      ^  i-  1  *.^  C         A      435-133B.C. 

decisive    or   important   operations,   when    tuey   lound 

that  the  Corinthians  had  enhsted  as  mercenaries  a  large  number  of 

seamen  from  cities  belonging  to  the  Athenian  confederacy.     The 

gathering  of  a  force  which  must  crush  them  could  be  arrested  only 

by  an   alliance   with   Athens ;   and  there  accordingly 

Korkyraian  envoys  appeared  to  plead  the  cause,  not  of 

justice   or  truth,  but  of   expediency  and  self-iijterest.     But  the 

Corinthians  had  been  well  informed  of  what  was  going  on,  and 

their  ambassadors  also  hastened  to  Athens  in  the  hope  of  turning 

the  scale  against  their  enemies. 

The  quarrel  between  Corinth  and  Korkyra  was  no  work  of  the 
Athenians ;  nor  can  these  be  blamed  if,  on  resolving  to  act  at  all, 
they  resolved  to  act  wholly  with  regard  to  their  own    „ 

•'  T^     1  •  c  i   1  1      Proposals 

interests.     Korkyra,    again,   was    tree    to    take    such    for  an 
measures   as  the    instinct    of    self-preservation    might   l^eJfveen 
suggest :  and  to  the  credit  of  her  envoys  it  must  be   Korkyra 
admitted,  that  their  speech,  if  the  historian  faithfully 
gives  its  substance,  is  confined  solely  to  the  principles  of  com- 
mercial exchange.     To  any  gratitude  for  benefits  done  to  the 
Athenians  they  could  lay  no  claim.     They  had  carefully  kept  out 
of  the  way  when  their  fleet  was  sorely  wanted  at  Salamis  ;i   and 
since  the  flight  of  Xerxes  they  had  not  less  carefully  avoided  all 
alliances.     The   result   of   this  policy,   they  admitted,    was    not 
pleasant.     They  had  drawn  down  on  themselves  the  full  power  of 
the  Corinthians  and  their  allies  aided  by  a  large  force  enlisted  in 
cities  belonging  to  the  Athenian  dominion  ;  and  with  these  ene- 
mies they  were  wholly  unable  to    cope   single-handed.     On  the 
other  hand,  the  Athenians  would  do  well  to  seize  the  opportunity 
of  alliance  with  a  state  whose  navy,  second  only  to  that  of  Athens, 
would  otherwise,  in  the  immediately  impending  war,  be  found  in 
the  ranks  of  their  enemies. 

In  their  reply  the   Corinthians  naturally  tried  to  blacken  their 
enemies  and  to  whitewash  themselves.     In  the  latter  task  they 
achieved  at  best  a  very  partial  success.     By  rejecting   counter- 
arbitration  under  conditions  which  were  undoubtedly   ofTh™c^-^ 
fair  they  had  put  themselves  in  the  wrong  ;  and  to  get   rinthians. 
rid  of  this  difficulty  they  could  only  resort  to  hair-splitting.     The 
arbitration,  they  urged,  was  proposed   too  late  ;  it  should   have 
been  offered  before  the  Korkyraian  blockade  of  Epidamnos  was 
begun.     This  plea  might  have  been  reasonable  if  arbitration  were 
a  means  for  preventing  the  commission  of  wrongs  rather  than  of 

'  See  p.  177. 


264  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  HI. 

redressing  them  when  committed.  With  more  of  truth  they  painted 
the  Korkyraians  as  men  who  had  kept  aloof  from  all  association 
with  other  Hellenic  states  because  their  geographical  position 
favored  the  course  of  piracy  and  plunder  which  was  most  conge- 
nial to  them.  Ungrateful  as  colonists,  and  treacherous  in  their 
friendships,  they  were  now  templing  the  Atlienians  to  a  direct 
breach  of  the  Thirty  Years'  Truce,  the  terms  of  which  were  never 
intended  to  iiichide  the  case  of  states  who  sought  admission  into 
one  confederacy  for  the  deliberate  purpose  of  injuring  a  city  be- 
longing to  the  other.  To  their  own  conduct,  as  showing  a 
friendly  spirit  to  Athens,  they  appealed  without  fear.  They  had 
aided  the  Athenians  in  their  war  with  Aigina.  ^  They  might  have 
turned  the  scale  in  favor  of  the  revolted  Samians.  They  had  not 
only  refused  to  do  this,  but  had  grounded  their  refusal  on  the 
broad  principle  that  there  ought  to  be  no  interference  between  an 
imperial  city  and  her  free  or  subject  allies ;  and  all  that  they 
demanded  now  was  that  this  principle  should  be  obseiTcd  by  the 
Athenians  in  thoir  turn. 

Such  was  the  great  question  submitted  to  the  general  assembly 
of  Athenian  citizens  who,  for  two  days,  debated  a  point  which 
Deffcnslve  modern  custom  reserves  for  the  decision  of  the  sovc- 
alliance  reigu  or  the  executive  government.  Their  decision 
Athens  and  ^^as  determined  by  Perikies  who  saw  as  clearly  as  the 
Korkyra.  Korkyraiaiis  that  the  great  struggle  with  Sparta  could 
not  now  be  very  far  off.  But  although  Korkyra  became  the  ally 
of  Athens,  the  force  sent  to  her  aid  was  confined  to 
the  small  number  of  ten  ships,  for  the  express  purpose 
of  making  it  clear  to  the  Corinthians  that  no  aggressive  measures 
were  intended  ;  and  the  generals  received  precise  instructions  to 
remain  strictly  neutral  unless  the  Corinthians  sIkmiUI  attempt  to 
effect  a  landing  either  on  Korkyra  or  on  any  Korkyraian  settle- 
ments. 

The  Corinthians  lost,  no  time  in  bringing  the  (piarrel  to  an  issue. 
AVith  a  fleet  of  150  ships,  of  which  (50  were  furnished  by  their 
Battle  be-  allies,  they  sailed  to  the  harbor  of  Cheiuierion  iiear 
("rinthian  ^''^  ''^'^^  through  whicli  the  river  Acheron  finds  its  way 
aii<i  Korky-  iuto  the  sca  about  thirty  miles  to  the  east  of  the 
I'lr't'iK^  Wand  southernmost  promontory  of  Korkyra.  The  conflict 
of  sybota.  which  ensued  exhibited  a  scene  of  confusion  which  the 
Athenian  seamen  probably  regarded  with  infinite  contempt.  After 
a  hard  strugo;le  the  Korkyraians  routed  the  right  w^ng  of  the 
enemy's  fleet,  and  chasing  it  to  its  camp  on  shore,  lost  time  in 
plundering  it  and  burning  the  tents.  For  this  folly  they  paid  a 
terriltic  price.  The  reinninder  of  the  Korkyraian  fleet,  borne  down 

'  Hf-iod.  vi.  89. 


Chap.  I.]  THE  THIRTY  YEARS*  TRUCE.  205 

by  sheer  force  of  numbers,  was  put  to  fligbt,  and  probably  saved 
from  utter  ruin  only  by  the  open  interference  of  the  Athenians, 
wlio  now  dashed  into  the  fight  without  scruple,  and  came  into 
direct  conflict  with  the  Corinthians.  The  latter  were  now  resolved 
to  press  their  advantage  to  the  utmost.  Sailing  through  the  ene- 
my's ships,  they  applied  themselves  to  the  task  not  of  taking  prizes, 
but  of  indiscriminate  slaughter,  to  which  not  a  few  of  their  own 
people  fell  victims.  After  this  work  of  destruction,  they  conveyed' 
their  disabled  ships  with  their  dead  to  Sybota,  and,  still  unwearied, 
advanced  again  to  the  attack,  although  it  was  row  late  in  the  day. 
Their  Paian,  or  battle  cry,  had  already  rung  through  the  air,  when 
they  suddenly  backed  water.  Twenty  Athenian  ships  had  come 
into  sight,  and  the  Corinthians,  supposing  tliem  to  be  only  the  van- 
guard of  a  larger  force,  hastily  retreated.  The  Korkyraians,  igno- 
rant of  the  cause  of  this  movement,  marvelled  at  their  departure: 
but  the  darkness  was  now  closing  in,  and  they  also  withdrew  to 
their  own  ground.  So  ended  the  greatest  sea-fight  in  which 
Hellenes  had  thus  far  contended  not  with  barbarians  but  with  their 
own  kinsfolk.  1  On  the  following  day  the  Korkyraians  sailed  to 
Sybota  with  such  of  their  ships  as  were  still  fit  for  service,  sup- 
ported by  the  thirty  Athenian  ships.  But  the  Corinthians,  far 
from  -wishing  to  come  to  blows  with  the  new-comers,  were  anxious 
rather  for  their  own  safety.  Concluding  that  the  Athenians  now- 
regarded  the  Thirty  Years'  Truce  as  broken,  they  were  afraid  of 
being  forcibly  hindered  by  them  in  their  homeward  voyage.  It 
became  necessary  therefore  to  learn  Avhat  they  meant  to  do.  The 
answer  of  the  Athenians  was  plain  and  decisive.  They  did  not 
mean  to  break  the  truce,  and  the  Corinthians  might  go  where  they 
pleased,  so  long  as  they  did  not  go  to  Korkyra  or  to  any  city  or 
"ettlement  belonging  to  her.  This  declaration  implied  that  the 
Corinthians  were  free  to  return  home  unmolested  ;  and  they  were 
not  slow  to  avail  themselves  of  the  permission.  For  the  present 
the  conflict  was  at  an  end  ;  but  it  was  to  be  followed  by  terrible 
consequences  at  a  later  time.  Upwards  of  a  thousand  prisoners 
had  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  Corinthians.  Of  these  250  were 
conveyed  to  Corinth,  and  treated  with  the  greatest  kindness  and 
care.  Like  the  Athenians,  the  Corinthians  were  acting  only  from 
a  regard  to  their  own  interests.  Their  object  was  to  send  these 
prisoners  back  to  Korkyra,  nominally  under  pledge  to  pay  a  heavy 
ransom  for  their  freedom,  but  having  really  covenanted  to  put 
down  the  Demos,  and  thus  to  insure  the  hearty  aUiance  of  Kor- 
kyra with  Corinth.  These  men  returned  home  to  stir  up  the  most 
savage  seditions  that  ever  disgraced  an  Hellenic  city. 

From  this  time  the  Corinthians   regarded  the  Pelopounesian 
^  TLuc.  i.  50,  2. 


^QQ  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

truce  with  Athens  as  virtually  at  an  end.  At  Korkyra  their 
schemes  had  failed  ;  but  they  might  strike  perhaps  a  still  heavier 
The  revolt  of  b^o^^'  ^^  her  dominion  elsewhere.  The  Corinthi<an 
Potidaia.  town  of  Potidaia/  although  now  a  tributary  ally  of 
Athens,  had  still  some  connexion  with  the  mother  city,  and  the 
Makedonian  Perdikkas  Avas  courting  the  friendship  of  Corinth  in 
order  to  bring  about  the  revolt  of  this  city,  while  he  stirred  up  the 
Spartans  to  an  invasion  of  Attica  in  order  to  keep  the  Athenians 
busied  at  home,  and  strove  to  sow  the  seeds  of  revolt  among  the 
Hellenic  cities  generally  on  the  northern  shores  of  the  Egean.  To 
foil  these  plots,  a  fleet  was  sent  from  Athens  with 
orders  to  insist  on  obedience  to  commands  by  which 
the  Potidaians  had  been  already  ordered  to  pull  down  their  sea- 
ward walls  and  to  give  hostages  for  their  good  behavior.  An 
embassy  was  at  once  sent  from  Potidaia  to  Athens.  At  Athens, 
of  course,  they  failed.  From  the  Spartans  they  received  a  positive 
promise  that  any  attack  made  on  Potidaia  should  be  followed 
by  an  immediate  invasion  of  Attica  ;  and  thus  for  the  third  time 
Sparta  either  pledged  herself  to  break  the  truce  with  Athens  or 
showed  her  readiness  to  do  so.^  This  pledge  Avas  followed  by  the 
immediate  revolt  not  only  of  Potidaia,  but  of  the  Chalkidians  and 
Bottiaians.  Against  this  combined  revolt  the  Athenian  com- 
manders felt  that  until  reinforcements  should  reach  them  they  could 
do  little  ;  but  their  resolution  to  transfer  the  war  to  Makedonia  in- 
volved the  imprudence  of  leaving  Potidaia  unguarded.  Nor  did 
the  Corinthians  fail  to  seize  the  opportunity  of  throwing  into  it  a 
powerful  force  under  the  command  of  Aristeus,  the  son  of  Adei- 
mantos,^  a  man  especially  popular  with  the  Potidaians.  Some  little 
time  afterwards,  the  arrival  of  Phormion  with  fresh  troops  from 
Athens  supplied  the  force  which  was  needed  for  the  complete  in- 
vestment of  the  place  ;  and  Aristeus  saw  at  once  that  the  safety 
of  Potidaia  could  be  insured  only  by  the  departure  of  ail  who 
were  not  absolutely  needed  for  its  defence.  His  proposal  to  re- 
main himself  with  the  500  chosen  for  this  service  was  set  aside  ; 
and  watching  his  opportunity,  he  succeeded  in  making  his  escape 
from  tlie  harbor.  This  lessening  of  their  numbers  enabled  the 
Potidaians  to  stand  out  for  two  years;  and  before  its 
fall  Athens  and  Sparta  had  begun  the  fatal  war  which 
was  to  end  in  the  ruin  of  the  great  imperial  city.  • 

'  See  p.  64.  of  the  congress  is  eufBcient  proof  of 

^  We  <lo  not  know  what  Sparta  her  disposition  in  the  matter.     To 

did  in  the  congress  suinmoniul  to  the  Thasians  they  made  a  distinct 

consider  the  ai)plication  of  the  Sa-  promise  ot  help,  which   tlie  Helot 

mians,  p.  260  ;  but  in  all  likcliliood  war  prevented  them  from  fulfilling, 

the   opposition  of  the  Corinthians  See  ]).  248. 

made  any  decision  on  her  ])art  su-  ^  Probably  the  doughty  Adeiman- 

perfluoue,  and  themeresummoning  tos  of  the  days  of  Themistokles. 


Chap.  I.]  THE  THIRTY  YEARS'  TRUCE.  267 

In  truth,  men's  minds  were  becoming  exasperated  on  botli  sides. 
The  Corinthians,  far  from  interfering  between  Sparta  and  Athens, 
as  they  had  done  before  the  Korkyraian  tronbles,  were  couik  ii  of 
now  doing  all  that  they  could  to  hurry  the  Spartans  nigif^^a\Hes 
into  waj*;  and  the  Megarians  were  smarting  under  the  at  sparta. 
chastisement  inflicted  by  the  Atlienians  on  enemies  who  had  once 
been  friends.  Runaway  slaves  from  Athens  found,  it  was  said,  an 
asylum  at  Megara  :  and  the  Megarians  had  daredto  till  the  pasture 
land  which  was  sacred  to  the  Eleusinian  goddesses,  and  which 
formed  also  a  common  or  neutral  ground  betw^een  the  two  states. 
For  these  offences  a  decree  was  passed  excluding  the  Megarians 
from  all  Athenian  ports  ;  and  so  keenly  was  this  prohibition  felt 
by  them  that  they  insisted  upon  it  at  Sparta  as  a  direct  breach  of 
the  truco.  But  although  in  this  matter  Athens  may  have  shown 
not  much  of  forbearance  or  generosity,  she  had  done  nothing  which 
she  had  not  a  full  right  to  do.  Sparta  banished  strangers  sum- 
marily at  her  will ;  and  the  morality  of  the  ancient  world  had  not 
reached  a  stage  in  which  it  could  fairly  profess  to  be  shocked  by 
acts  not  in  accordance  with  modern  theories  of  free  trade.  Nor 
can  it  with  any  justice  be  said  that  Athens  had  done  any  wrong  to 
the  Peloponnesian  confederacy  in  any  of  the  other  matters  laid  to 
her  charge.  The  quarrel  between  Korkyra  and  Corinth  was  a 
quarrel  between  two  single  cities,  and  affected  the  Spartan  league 
by  the  mere  accident  that  Corinth  happened  to  belong  to  it ;  and 
whether  by  the  terms  of  the  truce  or  by  the  international  morality 
of  the  time,  Athens  was  justified  in  making  a  strictly  defensive 
alliance  with  a  state  not  included  in  the  Spartan  confederacy. 
On  the  other  hand,  by  bringing  about  the  revolt  of  Potidaia  the 
Corinthians  had  done  to  Athens  a  wrong  which  came  directly 
within  tlie  terms  of  the  Thirty  Years'  Truce.  They  had  interfered 
between  her  and  a  city  which  had  been  included  in  the  Athenian 
alliance,  and  had  striven  to  detach  from  her  the  other  allied  cities 
on  the  northern  shores  of  the  Egean.  In  other  words,  they  had 
made  a  deliberate  effort  to  break  up  the  Athenian  empire ;  and 
thus  in  the  council  summoned  by  the  Spartans  for  the  purpose  of 
ascertaining  the  grievances  of  their  allies,'  they  could  only  slur 
over  the  injustice  done  by  themselves  and  misrepresent  the  conduct 
of  the  Athenians.  This  they  did  in  one  short  sentence  which 
affirmed  that  the  Athenians  had  seized  Korkyra  for  the  sake  of  its 
fleet,  and  were  holding  it  by  force,  wliile  they  had  blockaded 
Potidaia  as  being  a  most  useful  station  for  their  dealings  with  the 
Thrace-ward  settlements.  The  statement  clearly  implied  that  in 
both  cases  the  action  came  from  the  Athenians,  and  that  Potidaia 

Thuc.  i.  67. 


268  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  HI. 

in  particular  had  done  nothing  to  provoke  the  blockade.  The  rest 
of  their  speech  resolves  itself  into  a  series  of  pictures  vigorously 
contrasting  Athenian  energy,  versatility,  and  foresight  with  Spar- 
tan dilatoriness,  obstinacy,  and  stupid  self-complacence.  It  painted 
in  strong  colors  the  courage  of  a  people  whom  no  defeats  could 
render  submissive,  and  who,  while  they  looked  on  their  high  men- 
tal powers  as  endowments  to  be  used  in  the  interests  of  their 
country,  regarded  their  bodies  as  things  to  be  flung  away,  if  need 
be,  in  her  service.  Unwearied  in  enterprises  from  which  they  felt 
sure  of  reaping  substantial  fruits,  they  could  afford  to  look  with 
contempt  on  the  laborious  idleness  of  the  Spartans  ;  and  thus  they 
fulfilled  the  purpose  of  their  birth  by  never  resting  themselves  or 
lea\  ing  their  neighbors  at  peace.  Whatever  might  be  the  truth 
of  the  picture  thus  drawn,  the  speech,  so  far  as  the  existing  truce 
was  concerned,  was  invective,  not  argument.  Hence  the  Athenian 
envoys,  who  happened  to  be  present  on  some  other  errand,  having 
received  permission  to  speak,  pointedly  disclaimed  the  intention 
of  defending  Athens  against  the  accusations  of  the  Corinthians, 
and  addressed  themselves  to  the  task  of  explaining  her  real  posi- 
tion and  the  motives  of  her  policy.  Passing  briefly  in  review  the 
history  of  the  last  sixty  years,  they  asserted  that  in  the  invasions 
whether  of  Datis  or  of  Xerxes  the  safety  of  Hellas  had  been  mainly 
insured  by  the  resolution  and  energy  of  Athens,  and  that  the  flight 
of  the  Persian  king  immediately  after  the  fight  at  Salamis  showed 
the  wisdom  of  hazarding  everything  on  the  issue  of  a  battle  by 
sea.  But  they  reminded  the  Spartans  that  after  Salamis,  Plataiai 
and  Mykale,  there  was  still  much  work  to  be  dune,  and  that  they 
liad  delil)crately  declined  the  task  which  the  Asiatic  Hellenes  had 
of  their  own  free  will  besought  the  Athenians  to  undertake.  They 
bade  them  remember  that  great  schemes  begun  in  pure  self- 
defence  cannot  always  be  laid  asi<]e  when  their  immediate  purpose 
has  been  attained.  But  they  insisted  more  particnlarly  that,  al- 
thougli  the  states  belonging  to  the  Athenian  alliance  must  feel  in 
greater  or  less  degree  the  pressure  of  a  common  burden,  yet  the 
solid  benefits  secured  to  them  far  outweighed  this  annoyance.  It 
was,  of  course,  true  that  the  allies  had  been  constrained  to  sacrifice 
in  some  )neasure  their  independence.  This  was  inevitable  if  the 
confederation  was  to  be  preserved  at  all.  The  subjects  of  Athens 
might  chafe  now  at  the  slight  constraint  imposed  on  them  as  her 
allies:  but  the  yoke  was  light  indeed  in  comparison  of  that  which 
they  had  borne  as  subjects  of  the  Persian  king,  or  of  that  which 
would  be  laid  upon  them,  if  Sparta  .should  succeed  in  ruining  her 
rival.  They  would  then  feel  how  vast  was  the  dilference  between 
the  system  which  allowed  to  all  the  allies  whether  against  each 
otlier  or  against  their  rulers  an  appeal  to    a  common  law,  and  a 


Chap.  I.]  THE  THIRTY  YEAES'  TRUCE.  -39 

sy.stem  which,  Uke  that  of  Sparta,  placed  every  city  under  the  iron 
ride  of  au  autocratic  oligarchy. 

This  speech,  it  must  be  admitted,  stands  out  in  striking  contrast 
with  the  malignant  sophistry  of  the  Corinthians.  But  if  we  may 
take  these  speeches  as  fairly  representing  what  was 
actually  said  in  this  open  debate,  we  must  feel  greater  bate  of  the 
hesitation  in  accepting  the  speeches  which  follow  as  a  ^P*^''"^"^- 
substantially  correct  report  of  the  secret  council  from  which  not 
:  merely  all  strangers  but  even  the  allies  were  excluded.  In  any  case 
the  fact  would  become  known  that  Archicfamos  had  earnestly 
deprecated  the  course  on  which  the  Corinthians  had  set  their 
hearts  ;  and  the  arguments  by  which  he  sought  to  postpone,  if  not 
to  avert  the  struggle,  were  those  which  would  be  used  by  a  man 
whose  political  life  began  about  the  time  when  Themistokles  was 
ostracised,  and  who  had  not  allowed  the  military  conceit  of  his 
countrymen  to  blind  his  eyes  to  the  real  state  and  tendency  of 
things.  Without  noticing  the  accusations  and  arguments  of  the 
Corinthians,  this  wise  and  sober-minded  prince  is  said  to  have 
placed  side  by  side  the  strong  and  the  weak  points  in  the  system 
and  resources  of  Sparta.  In  ships,  in  money,  in  population  and 
extent  of  empire,  she  was  no  match  for  her  great  rival ;  and  the 
preparation  which  might  place  her  on  a  level  with  Athens  must  bo 
a  work  of  time.  Unless  her  maritime  empire  could  be  put  down, 
it  would  be  mere  folly  to  look  for  the  speedy  ending  of  a  war  which 
in  all  likelihood  they  would  leave  as  a  legacy  to  their  children. 
Prudence,  therefore,  would  dictate  delay  until  they  could  begin  the 
struggle  with  a  reasonable  hope  of  soon  winning  the  victory.  In 
the  meanwhile,  the  Athenians  had  offered  to  submit  all  disputes  to 
arbitration  ;  and  to  that  tribunal  it  would  be  wise  for  the  present 
to  leave  the  issue.  The  effect  of  this  wholesome  advice,  if  the 
account  of  the  historian  may  he  trusted,  was  at  once  neutralised 
by  a  speech  of  the  ephor  Sthenelaidas,  who  did  his  best  to  hound 
on  his  countrymen  to  take  a  leap  in  the  dark.  Sneering  at  the 
Athenians  aspraisersof  themselves,  he  charged  them  with  making 
no  defence  against  the  charges  of  wrongs  done  to  the  Peloponne- 
sian  confederacy,  although  he  knew  that  these  were  topics  on  which 
the  envoys  who  were  present  on  other  business  had  no  authority 
to  enter.  It  was  no  part  of  his  purpose  to  suggest  that  it  might 
be  well  to  learn  what  the  Athenian  people  had  to  say  in  the  mat- 
ter. Assuming  that  the  wrongs  had  been  committed,  he  insisted 
that  the  good  behavior  of  the  Athenians  during  the  Persian  wars 
was  only  a  reason  for  visiting  their  recent  iniquities  with  double 
chastisement.  It  was  for  wrongdoers  to  consider  beforehand  the 
effect  of  the  crimes  which  they  intended  to  commit :  it  was  for  the 
Spartans  to   decree  without  further  thought  a  war  in  which  the 


270  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  HI. 

gods  would  defend  the  riglit.  This  douglity  speech  was  followed 
by  the  cries  of  Aye  and  No  by  which,  like  the  English  House  of 
Conunons,  the  Spartans  pronounced  their  decision  on  the  questions 
submitted  to  them.  Feeling  or  afiecting  inability  to  determine 
whether  the  Ayes  or  Noes  had  it,  Sthcnela'idas  ordered  a  division. 
Possibly  some  who  had  cried  out  in  the  negative  did  not  care  to 
be  known  personally  as  opposing  the  popular   sentiment ;  and  a 

482  B.C.  large  majority  went  over  to  the  side  of  the  chamber 
Autumn,     assigned  to  those  who  approved  of  war. 

Sthenelaidas  had  tunied  the  scale  in  favor  of  war,  and  it  now 
became  competent  for  the  allies  to  say  whether  they  would  have 
Formal  con-  war  or  not.  The  debates  in  this  synod  seem  to  have 
^Hesat'^''*^  been  protracted  ;  but  Thucydides  takes  no  notice  of 
Sparta.  any  speech   except  that  of  the   Corinthians,    beyond 

saying  that  the  greater  part  were  for  war.  The  speech  of  the 
Corinthians  was  intended  to  encourage  them  with  convenient 
hopes  and  to  quicken  their  energies  by  wholesome  terrors.  The 
Delphian  god  had  promised  that  if  they  went  to  war  vigorously 
they  would  be  conquerors,  and  that  he  himself  would  aid  them 
with  all  his  might;'  and  lastly,  they  had  a  sacred  mission  to  fulfil, 
nothing  less,  namely,  than  the  liberation  of  Hellas  from  an  all- 
embracing  despotism.  It  was  needless  to  say  more.  The  spirit 
Bpfrinninc  ^'^*i  the  fears  of  the  representatives  had  been  excited 
of  431  B.C.  to  the  necessary  point ;  and  the  decree  of  the  Spartan 
assembly  was  accepted  by  a  large  majority. 

But  neither  the  Spartans  nor  their  allies  were  yet  ready  to  go 
to  war ;  and  the  time  during  which  they  Avere  making  ready  for 
Eff  rt  f  ^^^  struggle  was  further  occupied  in  efforts  to  introduce 
the  Spartans  disunion  in  the  Athenian  councils,  and,  if  possible,  to 
aboiit'uic  deprive  thera  of  their  master-s[)irit,  Perikles.  No  for- 
dowiifail  of  mal  declaration  of  war  liad  been  yet  sent  to  Athens. 
Indeed,  it  was  never  sent  at  all  ;  but  the  Athenians 
must  have  been  more  or  less  fully  informed  of  wiiat  had  taken  place 
at  the  last  congress  in  Sparta,  when  the  tirst  blow  was  struck 
against  the  ascendency  of  the  great  Athenian  leader.  Perikles  was 
an  Alkmaionid  ;  and  the  curse  of  Kylon,  as  the  Spartans  chose  to 
say,  still  clave  to  that  illustrious  family.^  This  curse  they  now 
called  on  the  Athenians  to  drive  out :  in  other  words,  Perikles 
must  be  banished.  The  demand  was  met  by  the  rejoinder  that  the 
Spartans  must  first  drive  out  the  curse  which  brooded  over  Taina- 
ron  for  the  murder  of  some  Helots  torn  from  the  sanctuary  of  Po- 

'  Thucj-didos,  i.  118,  4,  carefully  the  first  instance  of  a  response  ex- 
guards  himself  against  tlie  conclu-  torted  by  political  iufluenco  or  bri- 
Bion  that  this  answer  was  delivered  bery.     See  p.  86. 
at  all.     If  it  was  given,  it  was  not  *  See  p.  92. 


Chap.  I.]  THE  THIRTY  YEARS'  TRUCE.  271 

seidon,  and  more  especially  the  curse  which  rested  on  them  for  the 
removal  of  Pausaiiias  from  the  Brazen  House  of  Athene. i  A 
second  embassy  insisted  that  the  Athenians  should  raise  the  block- 
ade of  Potidaia,  leave  Aigina  independent,  and  withdraw  the 
decree'of  exclusion  passed  against  the  Mrgarians.  To  tlie  last  of 
these  three  requests  the  Athenians  replied  by  specifying  the 
grounds  on  which  the  Megarians  had  been  thus  punished  ;'^  the 
other  two  they  peremptorily  refused.  A  third  embassy  demanded 
briefly  the  autonomy  of  all  Hellenes  now  included  in  the  Athenian 
confederacy  :  and  on  the  receipt  of  this  sweeping  demand,  to  which 
was  added  the  expression  of  a  wish  on  the  part  of  the  Spartans  for 
the  maintenance  of  peace  on  this  one  indispensable  condition,  a 
general  assembly  was  convened  for  the  final  reconsideration  of  the 
whole  question.  The  issue  of  the  debate  was  determined  by  Pe- 
rikles.  He  simply  expressed  his  unshaken  conviction  that  the  with- 
drawal of  the  decree  against  the  Megarians  would  not  have  the 
slightest  effect  on  the  controversy,  far  less,  as  some  supposed,  that 
it  would  remove  all  risk  of  war.  Sparta  was  at  best  no  more  than 
the  equal  of  Athens,  and  the  concession  of  even  the  slightest  de- 
mand from  an  equal  not  on  the  score  of  justice  but  at  his  arbitrary 
fiat  involved  a  subjection  as  complete  as  if  they  surrendered  every- 
thing at  once/  But  although  he  sought  to  encourage  a  confident 
and  even  a  fearless  temper,  Perikles  wasto  the  last  careful  that  no 
provocation  should  come  from  Athens  ;  and  by  bis  advice  an  an- 
swer was  given  to  the  Spartan  demands  as  moderate  as  it  was 
dignified.  The  Athenians  were  as  fully  justified  by  Hellenic  in- 
terpolitical  law  in  excluding  the  Megarians  from  their  ports,  as 
were  the  Spartans  in  intrusting  to  the  ephors  the  power  of  driving 
all  strangers  from  Sparta  attheir  will  without  assigning  any  reason 
for  their  decrees.  If  they  would  give  up  these  Xenelasiai  or  ex- 
pulsions of  strangers,  the  decree  against  the  Megarians  should  be 
withdrawn.  The  allies  of  Athens  should  also  be  left  wholly  free 
or  autonomous,  if  they  were  in  this  condition  at  the  time  when 
the  Thirty  Years'  Truce  was  made,  and  also  if  the  Spartans  would 
leave  to  their  own  allies  generally  the  power  of  settling  their  in- 
ternal affairs  after  their  own  inclinations  ;  and  lastly,  Athens  was 
as  ready  now,  as  she  had  ever  been,  to  refer  the  whole  dispute  to 
the  judgment  of  arbiters  approved  by  both  the  cities. 

In  the  conduct  of  Perikles  at  this  decisive  crisis  it  is  difficult 
to  determine  whether  we  should  admire  most  the  prosecutions 
determined  energy  with  which  he  prepared  to  meet  of  Anaxago- 
a  conflict  assuredly  terrible  in  its  course  even  if  it  djas,  and' 
should  be  happy  in  its  issue,  or  the  generous  and  Aspasia. 
unselfish  patriotism  which  could  stir  him  to  efforts  thus  sus- 
'  See  p.  238.  "^  See  p.  253.  *  Thuc.  i.  141,  1. 


272  THE   EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

tained  in  spite  of  personal  wrongs  not  easily  to  be  forgotten.  His 
own  integrity  was  beyond  attack  ;^  but  he  might  be  assailed 
through  those  whom  he  honored  or  loved.  Among  these  friends 
were  the  philosopher  Anaxagoras,  the  rhetor  Damon,  the  sculptor 
Pheidias  and  the  beautiful  Hetaira  who  became  the  mother  of  his 
son  Pcrikles.  The  traditions  relating  to  the  first  of  these  are  so 
inconsistent  that  little  can  be  gathered  from  them  beyond  the 
facts  of  his  prosecution  and  his  exile.  Nor  have  we  any  surer 
evidence  in  the  case  of  Pheidias,  who  on  liis  return  from  Olympia 
after  finishing  his  splendid  statue  of  Zeus  was  thrown  into  prison 
on  the  charge  of  defrauding  the  public,  and  there  died  before  the 
time  of  trial  came  on.  In  the  union  of  Perikles  with  Aspasia  the 
^omic  poets  found  a  fruitful  source  of  slander,  which  exhibited  her 
as  an  accomplice  of  Anaxagoras  in  undermining  the  faith  of  the 
people.  She  was  put  upon  her  trial,  and  Perikles  defended  her 
with  a  vehement  earnestness  which  attested  the  depth  of  his  affec- 
tion. So  far  as  Ave  may  judge  from  the  vague  and  contradictory 
statements  which  have  come  down  to  us,  the  evidence  was  worth 
little  ;  and  in  this  instance  Perikles  was  enabled  to  secure  a  ver- 
dict of  acquittal. 

When  a  man  who  has  thus  suffered  from  the  attacks  of  his 
political  antagonists  can  devote  himself  to  the  interests  of  his 
^  ^^  .  country  with  the  single-minded  generosity  of  Perikles, 
policy  of  we  can  understand  in  some  degree  the  fulness  with 
reference"to  w^ich  Athens  satisfied  the  highest  aspirations  of  her 
the  alleged  most  gifted  children.  With  a  man  like  Perikles  wc 
Peioponne-  niay  Safely  say  that  she  could  not  have  satisfied  them, 
siau  war.  j£  (Jevotiou  to  her  service  had  involved  the  sacrifice  of 
truth.  We  have  seen  the  Corinthians  resorting  to  systematic 
misrepresentation  of  facts ;  we  have  seen  the  ephor  Sthenelaidas 
plunging,  or  blundering,  into  positive  falsehood  ;  but  in  the  case 
of  Athens  we  can  trace  no  actual  wrongs  done  to  the  Peloponnesian 
confederacy,  nor  can  we  impute  to  her  the  shufiling  and  disin- 
genuous conduct  of  her  adversaries.  Beyond  all  doubt,  she  had  at 
no  time  entertained  any  desire  of  reducing  Sparta  or  her  confederate 

^  FlutHTch  inlus  Life  of  Perikles  he  knew  that  such  a  charfje  had 

mentions  a  proposal  made  by  Dra-  been  brought  against  him  ;  and  the 

koutides  that  the  greai  statesman  accusation  is  virtually  set  at  naught 

should  be  put  upon  his  trial  for  em-  by  Aristophanes  himself,  who  tells 

bezzlement  of  public  moneys,  but  us  that  Perikles  precipitated  the 

he  says  nothing  of  the  result  of  the  war  with  Sparta  in  order  to  escape 

trial  or  of  its  taking  place  at  all.  If  being  put  upon  his  trial,  and  who 

he  was  brought  before  the  Dikas-  also  treats  the  notion  that  Perikles 

tery,  he  must  have  been  acquitted  ;  '  blew  up  the  war '  from  such  per- 

butTliucydidescould  nothave  ven-  sonnl    motives,    as    mere    gossip 

tared  to  speak  as  he  has  spoken  of  which  must  be  taken  for  what  it 

the  incorruptibility  of  Perikles,  if  may  be  worth.     Pmcc,  614,  618. 


Chap.  I.]  THE  THIRTY   YEARS'  TRUCE.  273 

cities  to  tlie  condition  of  her  own  subject  allies.  Her  maritime 
empire  in  no  way  endangered  the  position  of  Sparta ;  nor  could 
it  be  said  that  it  had  either  directly  or  indirectly  done  her  any 
harm.»  The  real  breach  of  the  peace  had  come  not  from  Athens  but 
from  Corinth  ;  and  the  revolt  of  Potidaia,  stirred  up  by  Corin- 
thians, was  a  formal  violation  of  the  terms  of  the  Thirty  Years' 
Truce.  The  Athenians  might  therefore  enter  on  the  war  with  a 
good  conscience  ;  and  after  the  disaster  at  Sphakteria  the  Spar- 
tans were  ready  to  admit  that  in  the  controversy  which  preceded 
the  outbreak  of  the  strife  Athens  was  in  no  way  to  blame. ^  Iler 
strict,  perhaps  even  her  fastidious,  moderation  was  shown  by  the 
steadiness  with  which  to  the  last  she  refrained  from  doing  any- 
thing which  might  be  construed  as  an  act  of  war.  Between  the 
gathering  of  the  second  Congress  at  Sparta  and  the  first  act  of 
open  conflict  nine  or  ten  months,  perhaps,  passed  away.  During 
these  months  Athens  might  have  anticipated  matters  with  her  un- 
prepared enemies,  and  crushed  them  when  they  were  comparative- 
ly powerless.  She  could  not  do  this  without  making  herself  as 
unjust  as  her  rival ;  and  this  she  would  not  do.  Sparta  had  pro- 
mised re[)eatedly  to  aid  the  enemies  of  Athens  if  she  could  ;  and 
one  of  these  promises  she  made  while  Athenian  citizens  were 
helping  her  against  the  revolted  Helots. 


CHAPTER  H. 

THE    PELOPONNESIAN    WAR    FROM    THE    SURPRISE     OF     PLATAIAI    TO 
THE    CLOSE    OF    THE    PUBLIC    LIFE    OF  PERIKLES. 

The  special   danger  of  Athens  lay  everywhere  in  the   virulent 
opposition  of  the  oligarchical  factions.     Even  in  Plataiai^  which 
had  now  for  nearly  eighty  years  been  in  the  closest  Night  attack 
friendship  with  Athens  this  party  was  on  the  look-out  ^y  Jhe'*^'^^ 
for  any   means    of   escaping   from   the   alliance  :  and  Thebans. 

•    1  •  431 B  c 

Plataiai  was  little  more  than  eight  miles  distant  from 
Thebes,  the  stronghold  of  that  reckless  oligarchy  which  after  the 
fall  of  Mardonios  had  deliberately  preferred  death  to  the  abandon- 
ment of  the  cause  of  despotism.  Such  an  opportunity  these  Plataian 
oligarchs  now  discovered  in  a  month  of  festival  during  which  even 
usual  precautions  were  disregarded  f  and  a  force  of  about  three 
hundred  Thebans  was  admitted  on  a  dark  and  rainy  night  into 

»  Thuc.  iv.  21 ;  vii.  18.  *  See  p.  93.  '  Time.  iii.  56. 

12* 


aH  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

Plataiai.  The  citizens  were  asleep,  and  the  invaders  encountered 
no  resistance  on  their  way  to  the  Agora,  where  they  grounded 
their  arms  and  by  the  proclamation  of  a  herald  invited  the  Plataians 
to  arm  themselves  and  take  their  stand  by  the  side  of  their  ancient 
allies  according  to  the  good  old  Boiotian  customs.  Roused  from 
their  slumbers  to  learn  that  an  armed  force  was  in  possession  of 
their  city,  and  thinking  that  all  opposition  would  be  useless,  the 
chief  Plataian  citizens  accepted  these  terms,  or  in  other  words  re- 
nounced the  alliance  of  Athens.  But  the  course  of  tTie  negotiation 
showed  the  scanty  numbers  of  the  assailants ;  and  the  Plataian 
demos,  loathing  th^  convention  which  had  been  made,  set  to  work 
to  barricade  with  waggons  their  narrow  and  crooked  streets  and 
then  by  piercing  the  internal  walls  of  their  houses  to  provide  the 
means  of  combined  action  without  rousing  the  suspicions  of  the 
Thebans.  The  town  was  wrapped  in  that  blackest  darkness  which 
goes  immediately  before  the  dawn,  when  the  Plataians  burst  upon 
them.  The  Thebans  resisted  stoutly,  and  even  gained  some  small 
advantatre  over  their  enemy  ;  but  showers  of  stones  and  tiles  hurled 
on  thejn  from  the  roofs  by  screaming  women  and  howling  slaves 
filled  them  with  dismay,  and  their  want  of  acquaintance  with  the 
town  left  them  like  a  iiock  of  routed  sheep.  If  any  made  their 
way  to  the  gate  by  which  they  had  entered,  it  was  only  to  find  it 
barred  by  a  javelin  pin  which  closed  it  as  effectually  as  a  nail  spikes 
a  gun.  Others  in  their  terror  rushed  to  the  walls  and  threw  them- 
selves over,  mostly  to  an  instant  death.  Meanwhile  the  reinforce- 
ment which  was  to  support  the  assailants  had  been  detained  on 
the  road  partly  by  the  darkness  and  the  rain  and  still  more  by  the 
swollen  stream  of  the  Asopos,  and  they  arrived  before  Plataiai 
only  to  learn  that  their  scheme  had  utterly  miscarried.  Their  first 
imjDulse  was  to  seize  every  Plataian  found  without  the  Avails  :  but 
giving  them  no  time  for  delibei-ation,  the  Plataians  sent  a  herald 
to  warn  them  that  if  they  did  any  harm  to  person  or  property  in 
Plataian  territory,  the  prisoners  should  be  instantly  slain,  but 
tliat,  in  spite  of  their  shameful  breach  of  the  truce,  their  depart- 
ure should  be  followed  by  the  restoration  of  their  countrymen. 

On  this  promise,  ratified,  as  they  declared,  by  a  solemn  oath, 
tlie  Thebans  returned  home.  Tlae  Plataian  version  of  the  story  was 
that  they  made  no  positive  pact,  but  merely  said  that 
the  f  heban  the  prisoners  should  not  be  killed,  until  negotiations 
prisoners.  f^j,  ^  g^^j^^^  settlement  should  have  failed.  The  equivo- 
cation was  contemptible  ;  but  the  Plataians  even  thiis  stand  con- 
victed out  of  their  own  mouth.  They  entered  into  no  negotia- 
tions ;  and  no  sooner  had  the  Theban  reinforcement  turned  their 
backs  on  the  city,  than  every  jnan  who  had  been  seized  within  it 
was  put  to  death.     The  Plataians  had  lied  on  their  own  showing, 


Chap.  II.]  LAST  YEARS  OP  PERIKLES.  275 

and  the  flood-gates  were  opened  for  that  exasperated  warfare 
which  was,  it  might  almost  be  said,  to  leave  Hellas  little  rest  so  long 
as  it  continued  to  have  any  history  at  all. 

One  messenger  had  been  sent  to  Athens  when  the  Thebans 
entered  the  town.  Another  had  followed  when  the  surprise  had 
failetl  and  the  surviving  Thebans  had  been  made  pri-  impolicy 
soners.  On  receiving  these  tidings  the  Athenians  at  raiuy^of  "this 
once  issued  orders  for  seizing  all  Boiotians  found  in  act. 
Attica,  and  sent  a  herald  to  the  Plataians  begging  them  to  do 
nothing  with  their  prisoners  until  they  could  well  consider  the 
matter  with  their  old  allies.  Perikles,  it  cannot  be  doubted,  saw 
at  once  that  these  prisoners  furnished  a  hold  on  Thebes  and  through 
Thebes  on  Sparta  which  was  worth  far  more  than  their  weight 
in  gold.  The  Athenian  messenger  reached  Plataiai  only  to  tind 
that  the  Plataians  had  thrown  away  a  splendid  opportunity  to 
satisfy  a  savage  rage.  The  mischief  could  not  be  undone  ;  and 
the  Athenians,  taking  away  all  Plataians  unfit  for  military  service 
together  with  the  women  and  children,  left  the  town  provisioned 
simply  as  a  fortified  post. 

The  die  was  now  cast :  and  both  sides  prepared  vigorously  for 
the  conflict.     Not  content  with  their  Hellenic  allies,  the  Spartans 
did   not  shrink   from    inviting  the    aid    e\*n    of    the  Spartan 
Persian  king.     So  thoroughly  had  the    self-sacrificing  thePersiaif 
energy  of  Athens   during  the   Persian  wars   failed   to  king, 
make  any  permanent  impression  on  the  Greek  mind,  that  a  feeling 
of  regret  may  almost  be  pardoned  for  the  refusal  of  the  Athenians 
to  accept  the  proffered  alliance  of   Mardonios.     But  in  this  step 
of  the  Spartans  we  have  at  the  least  further  evidence  of  the  self- 
ishness and  the  lack  of  patriotism  which  characterise  the  rule  of 
oligarchical  bodies.      Had  Athens   chosen,  she   might  long  ago 
have   inslaved  the    whole   Hellenic   world ;  but  her  warfare  was 
not  with  the  constitutions  of  individual  states,  but  against  a  com- 
mon enemy,  and  she  could  not  do  that  which  Spartans  felt  that 
they  might  do  without  shame. 

On  both  sides  it  was  a  time  of  fierce  excitement.     The  Corin- 
thians at  least  had  shown  that  they  were  acting  from  the  impulse 
of  an  unreasoning  fury  ;  and  at  Athens  a  large  popula- 
tion  had  grown  up  which  knew  nothing  of  warfare  Athens  and 
carried  on  at  their  own  doors.     But  the  historian  ad-  °^  ^P^rta. 
mits  that  the  general  feeling  of  the  Hellenic  states  ran   against 
Athens.     The  mere  desire  for  change  made  them  willing  victims 
of  Spartan  claptrap,  and  led  them  to  indulge  in  golden  visions  of 
the  time  when  Hellas  should  be  really  free,  in  other  words,  should 
find  itself  under  the  ])aternal  rule  of  Eupatrid  oligarchs.     At  the 
outset,  the  Spartan  alliance  included  all  the  Peloponnesian  states, 


276  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  IIL 

except  tlie  neutral  Argives  and  Achaians,  Pellene  being  the  only 
Achaian  city  which  joined  them  at  first.  Among  their  alhes  be- 
yond the  isthmus  were  the  Megarians,  Phokians,  Lokrians,  Boio- 
tians,  Ambrakiots,  Leukadians  and  Anaktorians.  The  Athenians 
could  reckon  on  hearty  co-operation  from  the  Korkyraians  and  the 
Helots  of  Naupaktos  ;*  but  Plataiai  was  now  rather  a  burden  than 
a  help.  The  efforts  of  Athens  against  Peloponnesos  would  be 
seconded  further  by  the  Akarnanians  and  Zakynthians.  But  her 
main  strength  lay  in  the  great  body  of  allies  which,  had  formed 
the  Delian  confederacy.  Of  these  the  Chians  and  Lesbians  were 
still  free  ;  but  Samos  had  since  her  revolt  been  reduced  to  the 
ranks  of  those  which  were  merely  tributary,  her  fleet  having  been 
forfeited  to  Athens.^  Kypros  (Cyprus)  had  been  abandoned  to 
the  Persians  by  the  convention  of  Kallias  f  but  over  the  Karians, 
Dorians,  and  lonians  of  the  Asiatic  coast,  and  over  all  the  Egean 
islands  to  the  north  of  Krete,  except  Melos  and  Thera,  Athens 
was  still  supreme. 

At  length  a  force  consisting  of  two-thirds  of  the  contingents 
demanded  from  the  Peloponnesian  allies  was  gathered  at  the 
There-  isthmus;  and  Archidamos  in  a  short  speech  sought  to 
sources  of  moderate  the  high-wrought  expectation  of  the  men 
who  served  in  it.  He  was  leading  them  forward,  he 
said,  in  the  firm  conviction  that  they  would  meet  with  a  terrible 
resistance  in  the  open  field,  for,  if  he  knew  the  Athenians  at  all, 
they  were  not  men  Vv'ho  would  look  on  tamely  while  their  highly 
cultivated  lands  were  being  turned  into  a  desert.  His  general 
estimate  of  Atheniau  valor  and  perseverance  was  right :  in  this 
particular  anticipation  he  was  wrong.  But  it  needed  all  the  in- 
fluence of  Perikles,  supported  by  the  most  impassioned  eloquence, 
to  falsify  the  hopes  or  the  fears  of  the  Spartan  king.  It  had  been 
his  great  effort  to  induce  the  Athenians  to  adopt  the  one  settled 
plan,  the  old  plan  of  Themistoklcs,  of  resisting  the  enemy  by  sea, 
and  leaving  him  to  do  much  as  he  might  choose  on  land.  By 
bringing  within  the  Long  Walls  which  joined  Athens  with 
Peiraieus  and  Phaleron  their  women,  their  chiidrcn,  their  mov- 
able goods,  and  even  the  wooden  framework  of  their  farmhouses, 
and  by  sending  away  their  beasts  and  cattle  to  Euboia  and  the 
neighboring  islands,''  they  might  weary  out  any  enemy.  But  in 
spite  of  all  grounds  for  confidence  it  was  with  a  heavy  heart  that 
the  dwellers  in  ihe  country  broke  up  their  pleasant  homes.  Fifty 
years  before,  their  farms  had  been  left  desolate  by  the  Persians; 
since  that  time,  their^kill  and  energy  had  again  converted  thera 
into  a  garden  such  as  could  be  seen  perhaps  nowhere  else.  These 

*  See  p.  249.  '  See  p.  252. 

»  See  p.  260.  "  Thuc.  ii.  14. 


Chap.  II.]  LAST  YEARS  OF  PERIKLES.  2T7 

must  now  bo  left  to  the  mercies  of  enemies  more  unpitying  th;in 
even  Persians,  while  they  sought  a  shelter  in  the  houses  of  friends 
within  the  city,  if  they  were  lucky  enough  to  have  any,  or  in 
vacant  spaces  within  the  walls  as  well  as  in  the  temples  and  shrines 
of  the-  heroes,  except  only  in  those  which,  like  the  Akropolis  and 
the  Eleusinion  with  a  few  others,  were  carefully  guarded  from  all 
profanation. 

This  mournful  and  irksome  task  was  not  yet  finished,  perhaps 
it  was  not  far  advanced,  when  Archidamos  made  a  last  effort 
to  avcit  war  by  dispatching  to  Athens  a  horald  who  Attack  of 
by  the  advice  of  Perikles  was  sent  back  without  an  ,^jvaswii°(?f 
audience,  under  strict  orders  to  be  beyond  the  Attic  Attica, 
border  before  sundown,  and  attended  by  an  escort  of  men  who 
were  to  see  that  he  spoke  to  no  one  by  the  way.  The  return  of 
the  herald  convinced  Archidamos  that  nothing  further  could  be 
looked  for  from  negotiation  ;  and  he  at  once  advanced  to  Oinoe 
near  the  little  .stream  of  Kephisos  and  beneath  the  great  mass  of 
Kithairon.  This  place,  as  being  on  the  border,  had  been  strongly- 
fortified  ;  and  Archidamos  spent  many  days  before  it  in  vain 
attempts  to  carry  it  by  assault.  Eighty  days  had  passed  from  the 
night  attack  on  Plataiai,  and  the  corn  was  fully  ripe,  when  Archi- 
damos led  his  men  on  to  ravage  Eleusis  and  the  Thriasian  plain. 
Close  to  Eleusis  lie  the  lakes  called  Rheitoi  through  which  some 
streams  of  salt  water  find  their  way  to  the  sea.  Here,  hard  by  the 
Sacred  Road  which  ran  at  the  head  of  the  lakes,  the  first  conflict 
of  this  war  on  Athenian  soil  ended  in  the  defeat  of  a  small  body  of 
Athenian  horsemen  sent  out  to  check  them.  Archidamos  now 
moved  northwards,  and  at  once  put  to  the  test  the  endurance  of 
the  Acharnians,  the  sturdiest  and  most  excitable  of  the  Athenian 
Demoi  ;i  and  the  Spartan  king  felt  assured  that  a  demos  which 
furnished  3,000  hoplites  would  never  remain  passively  within  the 
walls  of  Athens  while  their  luxuriant  fields  were  being'made  a  de- 
sert. They  did  so  remain,  but  only  at  the  cost  of  a  terrible  struggle 
which  taxed  the  influence  and  the  powers  of  Perikles  to  the  ut- 
most. The  city  was  in  a  state  of  fierce  tumult.  For  the 
moment  the  sceptre  seemed  to  have  fallen  from  his  hands,  and  he 
became  to  them  the  cause  of  all  the  evils  which  had  befallen  them. 
Still  Perikles  would  not  swerve  from  the  course  which  he  had 
marked  out  for  himself.  His  office  as  Strategos  gave  him,  it 
seems,  the  power  of  prohibiting  the  assemblies  of  the  people  which 
in  times  of  peace  were  convened  by  the  Prytaneis  of  the  Probou- 
leutic  Council  ;^  and  he  hesitated  not  to  avail  himself  of  it.     But 

■  According    to     Aristophanes,      men   made   of  ilex  and  nnple, — 
AcJiarn.  180,  tlie  Acharnians  are      tough  as  oak.  ^  See  p.  89. 


278  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  HI. 

the  time  at  length  came  when  Perikles  could  furnish  elsewhere  an 
outlet  for  the  pent-up  energies  of  his  countrymen.  The  Spartans 
were  moving  to  the  coast-land  of  Oropos,  when  an  Athenian  fleet 
of  a  hundred  ships  sailed  from  Athens  to  ravage  the  coasts  of 
Peloponnesos.  Joined  by  50  Korkyraian  vessels,  the  Athenians, 
having  reached  Methone  on  the  southwesternmost  promontory  of 
Messene,  landed  in  order  to  carry  the  place  by  storm.  Not  only 
were  the  walls  weak,  but  men  were  lacking  to  guard  them  ;  and 
the  town  must  speedily  have  been  captured,  had  not  Brasidas,  who 
held  a  Spartan  outpost  in  the  neighborhood,  dashed  through  the 
Athenian  force  and  with  some  little  loss  to  his  men  thrown  himself 
into  the  city.  The  Athenians  were  scattered  carelessly  about  the 
place,  not  looking  for  such  sudden  and  impetuous  movement ;  but 
the  promptitude  now  displayed  by  this  young  officer  was  an  earnest 
of  military  exploits  such  as  no  other  Spartan  general  ever  equalled. 
Of  men  like  Leonidas  and  Archidamos  there  had  never  been  any 
lack  ;  Brasidas  was  perhaps  the  first  Spartan  in  whom  a  rigid  disci- 
pline had  sharpened  instead  of  repressing  genius  of  no  mean  order. 

But  the  Athenians  were  bent  on  doing  steraer  work  before  the 
summer  should  draw  to  its  close.  Aigina  had  long  been  called 
The  exDui  ^^^^  cycsorc  of  Peiraicus  ;  and  so  long  as  its  old  people 
eion  of  the  were  Suffered  to  dwell  in  it,  it  would  remain  an  eyesore 
Aiginetans.  g^jjj_  rpj^^  decree  went  forth  for  their  banishment; 
and  the  wretched  inhabitants,  powerless  after  the  forfeiture  of  their 
fleet  and  the  dismantling  of  their  walls,  were  cast  out  upon  the 
Peloponnesian  coast,  to  find  such  refuge  as  the  Spartans  might 
give  them  in  gratitude  for  their  help  iiytlie  war  which  had  ended 
in  the  settlement  of  the  Helots  at  Naupaktos.  This  refuge  some 
of  them  found  in  Thyrea ;  and  thus  it  came  to  pass  that  the 
Spartans  had  a  bitterly  hostile  population  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Corinthian  gulf,  and  the  Athenians  a  population  not  less  resentful 
on  the  march  lands  of  Lakonia  and  Argolis.  Lastly,  their  hand 
fell  without  compunction  on  the  Megarians  who  had  done  so  much 
first  to  help  and  then  to  thwart  them.  The  work  of  devastation 
had  already  begun,  when  the  fleet  which  was  on  its  homeward 
voyage  from  the  Corinthian  gulf  effected  a  junction  with  the  land 
army,  and  thus  exhibited  the  largest  Athenian  force  ever  brought 
together  before  the  outburst  of  the  terrible  plague  which  saddened 
the  last  years  of  the  life  of  Perikles. 

It  was  now  obvious  that  a  struggle  had  begun  which  might 
bring  either  side  to  desperate  straits  before  it  came  to  an  end. 
Measures  for  Ilencc  the  Athenians  determined  not  only  to  take 
AUic?/aiid"^  effectual  measures  for  guarding  Attica  by  land  and 
Athens.  sca,  but  to  put  aside  a  large  reserve  fund  not  to  be 
touched  before  they  found  themselves  face  to  face  with  a  supreme 


Chap.  II.]  LAST  YEARS  OF  PERIKLES.  279 

necessity.  The  form  under  which  they  chose  to  set  apart  this 
fund  of  1,000  talents  in  the  AkropoUs  was  a  solemn  sentence  that 
any  citizen,  asking  a  vote  to  dispose  of  this  money  for  any  other 
purpose  than  that  of  resisting  a  maritime  attack  hy  the  enemy  on 
the  Peiraieus  itself  should  be  punished  with  instant  death.  Much 
pains  have  been  spent  in  the  effort  to  convict  the  Athenians  of 
barbarism  for  so  much  as  thinking  of  such  a  measure.  To  this 
charge  we  have  a  sufficient  answer  in  the  fact  that  it  was  a  mere 
form  and  that  it  was  known  to  be  nothing  more.  Probably  of 
those  who  passed  the  decree  there  was' not  a  man  who  dreamed 
that  a  day  would  come  when  Spartan  ships  should  be  anchored, 
except  as  prizes,  in  the  Peiraieus;  and  certainly  none  was  ignorant" 
that  if  anyone  should  at  any  time  wish  to  divert  the  fund  to 
other  uses,  he  had  nothing  more  to  do  than  to  propose  the  repeal 
of  the  existing  Psephisma,  or  decree.  In  the  meanwhile  the  effect 
of  the  anathema,  even  though  confessedly  it  could  not  be  carried 
out,  would  be  to  mark  with  the  strongest  condemnation  of  the 
state  anyone  who  might  even  dream  of  using  the  money  except 
as  a  resource  in  the  last  resort  for  the  salvation  of  the  city.  The 
act  was  one  not  of  barbarism,  but  of  the  clearest  foresight  and  of 
the  most  judicious  adjustment  of  means  to  ends. 

But  there  were  other  dangers  to  be  provided  against  on  tlie 
Thrakian  and  Chalkidian  shores.  Perdikkas  was  still  the  enemy 
of  Athens  because  Philip  and  Derdas  were  her  friends;    .,,.         , 

1    T-»     •  1    •  Ml    1     1  1  1      •  1  TT  I        Alliance  of 

and  Potidaia  still   held   out  obstinately,     iience  the   theAthe- 
Athenians  embraced  eagerly  an  opportunity  for  securing   file'Thra-*^ 
the  alliance  of  the  powerful  Odrysian  chief  Sitalkes,   kjan  chief 
which   now  offered  itself  through  a  citizen  of  Abdera 
named  Nymphodoros,  who  pledged  himself  to  use  his   utmost  in- 
fluence with  the  Thrakians  so  as  to  bring  the  Chalkidian  war  to 
an  immediate  end.     He  succeeded  so  far  as  to  bring  back  Perdik- 
kas to  the  alliance  of  Athens  and  to  secure  the  moi*e  trustworthy 
friendship  of  Sitalkes. 

The  first  year  of  the  fatal  struggle  between  Athens  and  Sparta 
was  now  drawing  towards  its  end.  To  the  Athenians,  apart  from 
the  disaster  of  war  itself,  it  had  been  a  year  of  no  ecreat 

.  .  Public  bu- 

reverses  and  no  great  victories ;  but  some  of  her  citizens  rial  at 
had  already  fallen  in  the  service  of  their  country,  and  f^j^^er^tora*^ 
these  deserved  the  honors  of  a  public  funeral  as  much  tionofPeri- 
as  if  they  had  fallen   at  Marathon  or  Salamis.     Ac-     °^' 
cording  to  the  usual  custom  in  times  of  war  the  bones'   of  the 

'  The    word     otrrd,     bones,    can  tain  the  wliole  skeletons  of  lartje 

scarcely  mean  more  than  the  residue  numbers  of  men  slain  in  a  battle  in 

of  bones  remaining  after  burning,  which  the  losses  were  serious. 
No  one  chest  or  coffin  would  con- 


280  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

3ead,  placed  in  ten  chests,  one  for  each  tribe,  with  one  empty  bier 
for  those  of  the  slain  Avhose  bodies  could  not  be  found,  were  earned 
in  procession  to  the  Kerameikos,  the  most  beautiful  suburb  of  the 
city ;  and  there  in  sight  of  the  precipitous  rock  from  which  the 
Virgin  Goddess  in  her  gleaming  armor  seemed  to  extend  her  pro- 
tecting spear  over  the  land,  the   citizen   chosen  for  ilie  purpose 
addressed  to  tlie  assembled  throng  such  words  of  encouragement 
and  comfort  as  the  time  and  the  circumstances  of  the  mourners 
seemed  to  call  for.      The   citizen   chosen   on  this  occasion   was 
Perikles  :  and  Perikles  determined  to  speak  to  them  as  he  would 
have  spoken  if  they  had  been  fresh  from  battles  as  momentous  as 
those  of  Plataiai  and  Mykale.    If  ever  there  was  a  time  when  the 
Athenians  needed  to  be  reminded  of  the  efforts  of  their  forefathers 
in  order  that  they  might  be  spurred  on  to  fresh  efforts  for  them- 
selves, that  time  was  the  present :  and  accordingh^  Perikles  passed 
in  rapid  review  the  course  by  which  the  Athenians  had  created 
their  empire,  and  the  results  which  had  been  thus  far  achieved. 
In  all  likelihood,  as  with  an  eloquence  all  the  more  impressive 
from  its  lack  of  rhetorical  ornament  Perikles  drew  a  pictiire  which 
almost  astonishes  us  in  its  splendor,  he  thought  that  the  children's 
children  of  those  Avho  now  heard  him  would  be  able  to  look  back 
upon  a  history  still  more  magnificent.      But  Athens  had  reached 
her  highest  point ;  and  his  description,  as  it  would  not  have  been 
true  of  the  Athens  of  Themistokles,  can  be  applied  Avith  no  greater 
truth  to  the  Athens  of  Demosthenes.   Not  eighty  years  had  passed 
since  the  tyrant  Uippias  had   departed  with  his  followers  into 
exile  :  and  the  reforms  of  Kleisthenes,  although  they  insured  the 
growth  of  the  commonwealth,  did  little  at  first  towards  breaking 
the  apparent  ascendency  of  the  oligarchical  houses.     Within  the 
space  of  fifty  years  Athens  had  pushed   back  the  power  of  Persia 
beyond  the  limits  of  Asiatic  Hellas,  had   raised  up  against  the 
barbarian  the  permanent  barrier  of  her  maritime  empire,  and  had 
developed  at  home  a  genius  in  art,  in  science,  and  in  government 
such  as  the  world  had  never  seen.     Fifty  years  before,  this  de- 
velopement  was  a  thing  of  the  future  ;  but  the  Athenian  people 
were  animated  by  the  nerve  and  energy  which  rendered  it  possible. 
Fifty  years  later,  the  fruits  of  this  developementin  the  man}'  phases 
of  Athenian  civilisation  were  almost  as  splendid  as  ever  ;  but  the 
old  spirit  of  indomitable  perseverance  was  gone.      In  the  age  of 
Perikles  alone  could  the  union  of  the  two  be  found :  and  thus  his 
funeral  oration  becomes  an  invaluable  picture  of  a  state  of  things, 
reali.sed   for  a  fev^  years,  whicli   would  in  some  respects  at  least 
be  well  for  us  if  we   could  realise   now.    If  the  ideal  happiness  of 
man  is  to  be  found  in  a  polity  which  with  a  strict  inforcement  of 
the  laws  gives  the  fullest  scope  to  the  tastes,  fancies,  and  peculiarities 


CnAP.  II.]  LAST  YEARS  OF  PERIKLES.  281 

of  each  citizen,  then,  unless  the  historian  has  wholly  misrepresented 
the  orator,  Athens  in  tlic  days  of  Perikles  approached  nearer  to  this 
ideal  than  we  a{)pro.ich  it  now  ;  and  we  can  well  understand  the 
high-strung  entliiisiasni  which  the  speaker  unquestionably  felt,  and 
which  most  of  his  hearers  probably  shared  with  him,  as  he  dwelt 
on  the  real  freedom  and  splendid  privileges  of  Athenian  citizens. 
If  it  was  worth  while  to  die  for  such  a  state,  the  sacrifice  was  alto- 
gether more  costly  than  that  of  the  Spartan  who  gave  up  nothing 
more  than  the  dull  monotony  of  a  monastic  barrack,  and  who  knew 
nothing  of  the  larger  sympathies  and  wider  aims  developed  by  the 
extended  empire  and  trade  of  a  power  like  Athens.  Perikles 
therefore  might  well  rise  to  a  strain  of  enthusiasm  when,  after  his 
sketch  of  their  political  and  social  life,  he  addressed  himself  to  those 
who  were  mourning  for  brothers  and  kinsfolk  fallen  in  battle. 
These  had  shown  themselves  worthy  of  the  men  by  whose  efforts 
the  fabric  of  Athenian  empire  had  been  reared,  and  had  left  to  their 
survivors  the  task  of  following  their  example,  or,  if  age  had  ended 
their  active  life,  a  memory  full  of  quiet  and  lasting  consolation. 

With  this  picture  of  Athens  assailed  by  vehement  enemies,  and 
confronting  them  with  the  sober  resolution  arising  from  the  con- 
sciousness of  a  substantially  righteous  cause,  the  history  .  ^ 
of  the  first  year  in  this  momentous  struggle  comes  to  at  Athens. 
an  end.  The  narrative  of  the  second  year  opens  with  ^^'^ ^^^ 
the  story  of  disasters  utterly  unlooked  for,  and  of  miseries  after 
which  Athens  was  never  to  be  again  quite  what  she  had  been  before. 
Immediately  after  the  vernal  equinox  the  Spartan  army  again 
appeared  in  Attica,  and  after  ravaging  the  Eleusinian  plain  passed 
on  to  the  Paralian  or  southeastern  portion  of  the  land  as  far  as  the 
silver  mines  of  Laureion.  But  they  had  not  been  many  days  in  the 
land  when  they  learnt  that  their  enemies  ■\V3rc  being  smitten  by  a 
power  more  terrible  than  their  own.  For  some  time,  we  are  not 
told  how  long,  a  strange  disease  had  been  stalking  westwards  from 
its  starting-post  in  Nubia  or  Ethiopia.  It  had  worked  its  way 
through  Egypt  and  Libya  ;  it  had  ranged  over  a  great  part  of  the 
Persian  empire,  and  now  just  as  the  summer  heats  were  coming  on, 
it  broke  out  with  sudden  and  awful  fury  in  the  Peiraieus.  In  the 
general  state  of  the  city  there  was  little  to  check,  and  everything  to 
feed  it.  The  houses  in  Athens  itself  were  filled  with  country  folk 
to  whom  their  owners  had  given  hospitality  ;'  and  in  the  empty 
spaces  within  the  walls  a  vast  population  was  crowded  with  no 
shelter  beyond  tents  and  stifling  huts.  Happily  the  cattle  and 
horses  belonging  to  the  country  estates  liad  been  removed  not  to 
Athens  but  to  Euboia.     Had  they  been  brought  into  the  city,  the 

»  Thuc.  ii.  17.  1. 


282  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

triumph  of  the  Peloponnesians  might  have  been  assured  in  six 
months.  Thus  far  their  efforts  had  been  rewarded  by  no  substan- 
tial results  ;  but  the  Athenians  had  now  to  cope  with  a  foe  against 
which  skill  and  courage  furnished  no  protection.  The  physicians 
hastened  to  the  aid  of  the  suiferers  :  and  they  were  the  first  to  fall 
victims  to  the  plague.  Friends  and  kinsfolk  who  tended  the 
suffering  caught  and  carried  about  the  contagion,  until  all  learnt 
to  accept  as  their  death-warrant  the  first  sensations  of  sickness. 
Then  followed  scenes  such  as  no  Hellenic  city  had  ever  witnessed 
before.  In  the  crow'ded  space  between  tlie  walls  lay  men,  women, 
and  children,  some  in  a  state  of  passive  stupor,  others  racked  with 
the  fearful  pains  which  attended  the  early  stages  of  the  disease, 
others  Avhom  an  intolerable  thirst  had  fevered  into  madness.  En- 
tangled with  the  dying  and  the  dead,  these  wretched  sufferers 
fought  tlieir  way  with  frantic  veliemence  to  the  rain-water  tanks, 
into  which  they  flung  themselves.  The  dead  were  indeed  to  be 
envied  by  comparison  with  the  wretched  men  who  survived  with 
memory  so  effectually  destroyed  that  hencef ortli  they  retained  no 
longer  the  sense  of  personal  identity.  In  the  midst  of  all  this 
suffering  there  were  not  wanting,  as  there  never  are  wanting,  some 
who  carried  out  with  a  literal  zeal  the  precept  which  bade  them 
eat  and  drink,  because  on  the  morrow  they  should  die.  It  is 
right,  however,  to  remember  that  of  some  of  the  worst  horrors  wliicli 
have  attended  plagues  of  modern  times  we  hear  nothing  during 
this  terrible  summer  at  Athens.  At  Milan  or  in  London  human 
nature  was  disgraced  by  the  cruelty  which  hunted  men  to  death  on 
the  groundless  suspicion  that  they  had  anointed  doors  and  walls 
or  smeared  benches  in  order  to  spread  tlie  pestilence.  At  Tyre  or 
at  Carthage  human  victims  would  have  been  roasted  bj'  hundreds 
in  order  to  appease  the  angry  gods.  At  Athens  some,  it  is  said, 
thought,  when  the  sickness  began,  that  the  Spartans  had  poisoned 
the  tanks ;  but  it  is  not  added  that  the  charge  was  urged  against 
anyone  within  the  city  walls.  In  the  midst  of  all  these  horrors 
there  was  but  one  alleviation.  Those  who  had  recovered  from  the 
plague  were  safe  from  a  second  attack  ;  but  we  could  not  be  over- 
severe  in  our  condemnation,  if  after  thus  passing  through  fire  and 
water  they  had  abandoned  themselves  to  an  inert  selfishness.  Far 
from  doing  this,  they  exhibited  a  noble  rivalry  in  kindly  offices  ; 
and  unwearied  in  their  tender  care  for  those  who  were  less  liappy 
than  themselves,  they  showed  that  consciousness  of  good  already 
attained  may  be  a  more  powerful  stimulus  to  well-doing  than  the 
desire  f>f  conquering  a  crushing  evil. 

For  forty  days  Arcliidamos  with  liis  troops  ravaged  the  soil  of 
Attica;  and  although  some  would  have  it  that  he  hastened  home 
sooner  than   he   would  have   done  if  Athens  had  been  free  from 


Chap.  II. J  LAST  YEARS  OP   PERIKLES.  283 

plague,  still  during  the  remainder  of  the  war  no  Spartan  army  re- 
mained in  the  country  so  long.  But  even  before  he  could  reach 
the  Faralian  land,  Perikles  had  a  fleet  of  one  hundred   _ 

'  ,  ...  .  ,        Depression 

ships  made  ready  for  another  expedition  against  the  ofiheAthe- 
Peloponnesos.  Returning  to  Athens,  the  "men  who  J^'a"  people. 
had  thus  far  served  under  Perikles  and  who  during  their  voyage 
round  the  Peloponnesos  had  lost  many  of  their  number  from  the 
plague  were  dispatched  under  Hagnon  and  Kleopompos  to  aid  in 
the  reduction  of  Potidaia.  The  result  was  disastrous.  In  spite  of 
all  the  appliances  which  even  Athenian  skill  could  bring  against 
it,  the  city  still  held  out,  while  the  infection  brought  by  the  troops 
of  Hagnon  spread  with  territic  speed  amongst  the  Athenians  who 
had  preceded  them  in  besieging  the  place.  In  less  than  six  weeks 
1,500  died  out  of  4,000  hoplites,  and  Hagnon  returned  with  his 
crippled  force  to  Athens.  Here  the  old  energy  wliich  had  been 
ready  to  encounter  the  severest  hardships  and  to  make  the  most 
costly  sacrifices  seemed  to  be  gone  utterly.  While  envoys  were 
sent  to  Sparta  on  a  vain  errand  to  sue  for  peace,  the  people  with 
vehement  outcries  laid  all  their  sufferings  at  the  door  of  Perikles. 
Whether  the  disease  had  already  begun  to  desolate  his  own 
home,  we  cannot  say  ;  but  if  he  was  at  this  time  bearing  the 
burden  of  personal  grief,  his  firmness  under  this  outcry  becomes 
more  wonderful.  Summoning  the  assembly  by  the  authority 
which  he  possessed  as  general,  he  met  the  people  with  a  more 
direct  rebuke  of  their  faint  heartedness  and  a  more  distinct  asser- 
tion of  his  own  services  than  any  to  which  he  had  in  more  pros- 
perous times  resorted.  In  a  few  pointed  sentences  he  showed 
them  that  they  were  committing  themselves  to  a  false  issue.  It 
had  been  beyond  their  power  to  avert  the  war ;  and  as  soon  as 
the  struggle  became  inevitable,  the  safety  of  the  state  became  by 
the  conditions  of  ancient  warfare  the  one  object  to  be  aimed  at, 
whatever  suffering  the  task  might  involve  for  individual  citizens. 
For  these  defeat  or  submission  meant  the  loss  of  freedom,  of  pro- 
perty, or  of  life,  while  victory  would  give  them  the  means  of  more 
than  repairing  all  their  losses.'  To  a  certain  extent  he  had  fore- 
seen this  outburst  of  anger.  He  knew  that  the  dwellers  in  the 
country  would  be  sorely  chafed  by  being  compelled  to  exchange 
their  pleasant  homes  for  a  cramped  and  wretched  hut  within  the 
city  walls  :  but  he  had  not  foreseen  the  terrible  disease  whose  ra- 
vages were  worse  than  those  of  hostile  armies,  aud  he  could  take 
no  blame  for  this  disaster  unless  they  were  ready  to  give  him 
credit  for  every  piece  of  unexpected  good  luck  which  \iiight  befaU 
them  during  the  war. 

*  Tbuc.  ii.  60.     Macaulay,  Essays,  i.  47. 


284  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

The  Athenians  had  listened  probably  to  many  embittered 
harangues  against  Perikles  before  he  opened  his  mouth  ;  but 
neither  the  arguments  of  the  speakers  nor  their  own 
career  of  feelings  of  anger  could  withstand  the  reasoning  of  the 
Perikles.  great  statesman.  They  resolved  at  once  to  make  no 
more  proposals  to  the  Spartans,  and  to  carry  on  the  wrr  with 
vigor  ;  but  Thucydides  adds  that  his  enemies  were  still  powerful 
enough  to  induce  the  people  to  fine  him.  Their  irritation  against 
him  was  not  long  continued.  The  plague  had  now  laid  its  hand 
heavily  on  his  house.  His  sister  and  his  two  sons  Xanthippos  and 
Paralos  were  dead  ;  and  his  grief  when  he  had  to  place  the 
funeral  wreath  on  the  head  of  his  younger  son  showed  that  at 
length  the  iron  had  entered  into  his  soul.  There  remained  still 
the  son  of  Aspasia  Avho  bore  his  own  name  ;  and  the  people,  im- 
pressed more  than  ever  by  his  fiiTnness  and  his  wisdom,  not  only 
chose  him  again  as  one  of  their  Strategoi,  but  allowed  him,  in 
contravention,  it  is  said,  of  a  law  passed  by  himself,'  to  inroU  this 
surviving  child  amongst  the  number  of  Athenian  citizens.  Thu- 
cydides merely  mentions  his  re-election  as  Strategos,  and  adds  that 
he  lived  for  two  years  and  a  half  after  the  attack  of  the  Thebans 
on  I^lataiai.  But  his  work  was  now  done,  and  from  this  time  we 
hear  no  more  of  the  statesman  who  more  than  any  other  man  saw 
what  the  ca})a])ilities  of  his  countrvmcn  were,  and  seized  the  best 
means  for  bringing  out  their  best  qualities.  Thus  ended  amid 
dark  shadows  the  life  of  a  man,  the  key-note  of  whose  policy  Avas 
the  indispensable  need  of  sweeping  away  all  private  interests,  if 
these  should  clash  with  the  interests  of  Athens  in  this  great  strug- 
gle. The  resources  of  the  state  were  not  to  be  Avasted  or  risked 
in  enterprises  which  at  best  could  tend  only  to  the  benetit 
of  individuals,  and  enterprises  to  which  the  state  Avas  committed 
were  not  to  be  starved  or  mismanaged  in  order  to  further  the 
purposes  of  factious  politicians.  Nothing  can  be  more  severely 
simple  and  emphatic  than  the  few  sentences  in  AvhicliTlnicydides 
insists  that  on  these  two  rocks  the  Athenians  made  shipwreck. 
Perikles  had  Avorked  for  the  welfare  of  Athens  and  for  that  alone. 
Those  A\ho  came  after  him  Avcre  bent  on  securing  each  the  first 
place  for  himself  ;  and  the  inevitable  consequences  foUoAved.  Their 
powers  and  the  resources  of  the  city  Avere  not  concentrated  on 
great  tasks  Avhich  without  such   concentration  could  never  be 

'  Tliis   law  restricted   Athenian  Solon,  Kleisthenes,  Ephialtes,  and 

citizenship  to  the  children  born  of  Perikles  hiiiiself.      In  sliort,  there 

parents  who  both  were  Athenians,  could  be  no  remedy  for  tliis  deep- 

TJie  law  was  Imd  ;  but  it  shows  the  seated  and  deadly  dise:ise  until  the 

Btreiijith  of  that  ancient  exclusive-  not'on  of  Poleis  or  cities  with  their 

ness  which  thus  survived  the  blows  interpolitical  law,  see  p.  12,  should 

inflicted  on  it   by  the  reforms  of  be  displaced  for  our  idea  of  a  nation 


Chap.  II.]  LAST  YEARS  OF  PERIKLES.  285 

accomplished.  The  expedition  to  Sicily  ought,  according  to  the 
policy  of  Perikles,  never  to  have  been  undertaken.  When  once 
undertaken,  it  ought  to  have  been  carried  out  manfully.  Instead 
of  this  the  interests  of  the  fleet  and  army  were  put  out  of  sight  by 
factious  generals  at  home  ;  and  the  great  catastrophe  of  Nikias  and 
Demosthenes  availed  nothing  to  check  these  miserable  rivalries. 
But  in  spite  of  all  this  wretchedness  Athens  held  out  for  nine 
years  longer  against  the  whole  confederacy  of  Sparta,  against  the 
determined  rebellion  of  her  own  allies,  against  lavish  subsidies 
from  Persia  to  her  enemies  ;  and  even  in  these  dire  straits  it  is  the 
conviction  of  the  historian  that  Athens  would  not  have  fallen,  if 
her  very  heart  had  not  been  riven  by  the  desperate  feuds  of  her 
own  children.'  If  then  the  true  greatness  of  Athens  began  with 
Themistokles,  with  Perikles  it  closed.  Henceforth  her  course  was 
downward. 


CHAPTER  HI. 

THK    PELOPONNESIAN    WAR    FROM    THE    CLOSE    OF    THE    PUBLIC 
LIFE    OF    PERIKLES    TO     THE    DESTRUCTION    OF    PLATAIAI. 

The  usages  of  Greek  warfare  were  at  all  times  cruel.  In  this 
internecine  struggle  between  the  two  great  Ionian  and  Dorian 
states  of  Hellas  exasperation  of  feeling  on  both  sides  Execution  of 
liad  its  fruit  in  a  horrible  inhumanity.  That  priva-  ^^yf^"^  ^"' 
teers  issuing  from  Megara'^  and  from  the  Peloponne-  Athens, 
sian  ports  generally  should  strive  to  cripple  Athenian  commerce 
to  the  utmost,  is  no  more  than  we  should  look  for.  But  to  lawful 
captures  of  property  the  Megarians  and  Peloponnesians  added  the 
crime  of  Avholesale  murder.  Not  merely  were  all  merchants 
whetlier  belonging  to  Athens  or  to  her  allies,  who  might  be  seized 
in  ships  sailing  round  Peloponnesos,  slaughtered  without  distinc- 
tion ;  but  the  Spartans  acted  on  the  sweeping  rule  of  killing  all 
whom  they  might  seize,  even  if  these  were  citizens  of  states  tak- 
ing no  part  in  the  war,  and  hurling  their  bodies  into  clefts  or  gul- 
lies near  the  sliore.'  It  was  not  long  before  Spartan  short-sighted- 
ness furnished  Athens  with  the  means  of  making  terrible  reprisal. 
Dead  to  all  care  for  Hellenic  freedom,  the  Spartans  were  now  bent 
on  securing  the  aid  of  the  barbarian  who  fifty  years  ago  had  been 
beaten  back  chiefly  by  Athenian  energy.     On  this  disgraceful 

'  Thuc.  ii.  65,  13.  '  Tliuc.  iii.  51.  '  lb.  ii.  67. 


THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

mission  they  dispatched  Xikolaos  the  son  of  Boulis  and  Aneristos 
the  son  of  Sperthias.'  "With  them  was  joined  a  more  notorious 
and  probably  a  much  abler  man  :  but  even  the  foresiglit  of  the 
Corinthian  Aristeus  failed  to  calculate  fully  the  risks  which  they 
might  run  by  the  way.  Betaking  themselves  to  the  court  of 
Sitalkcs  they  placed  themselves  in  the  lion's  jaws.  They  were 
making  their  way  to  the  sliip  which  was  to  carry  them  over  to 
Asia,  when  at  Bisanthe  they  were  seized  and  handed  over  to  the 
Athenian  envoys  Learchos  and  Ameiniades  who  took  them  to 
Athens,  where,  without  listening  to  what  they  wished  to  say  in 
their  behalf,  the  Athenians  put  all  three  to  death. 

Bv  the  death  of  Aristeus  the  Potidaians  lost  a  man  whom  they 
knew  to  be  unwearied  in  his  efforts  to  relieve  them.     The  know- 
ledge  that  they  could  look  for  nothing  more  from  him 
derofPo-      weighed   heavily   on   men   who   had  been  reduced  by 
tidaia.  famine  to  straits  so   frightful  that  they  bad  even  eaten 

the  bodies  of  their  dead.  It  was  impossible  to  hold  out  longer ; 
and  a  little  more  fiminess  on  the  part  of  the  besiegers  would  have 
insured  an  unconditional  surrender.  Happily  for  the  Potidaians 
the  full  extent  of  their  sufferings  was  not  known  to  Xenophon  and 
his  colleagues,  and  they  were  allowed  to  leave  the  place  under  a 
convention  that  the  men  should  depart  with  one  garment  and  the 
women  with  two,  and  a  fixed  sum  of  money  to  enable  them  to 
reach  some  refuge.  Tlic  tidings  of  this  surrender  were  received 
at  Athens  with  very  mingled  feelings.  The  savage  instinct  latent 
in  the  Greek  mind  might  have  chafed  at  being  balked  of  an  op- 
portunity for  wholesale  slaughter ;  but  the  more  prudent  Athe- 
nians felt  specially  indignant  at  the  loss  of  so  many  men,  women, 
and  children  who  might  have  been  sold  to  defray  the  costs  of 
the  siege  on  which  2,000  talents  had  been  expended.  For  a  time 
Xenophon  was  in  disgrace  ;  but  the  property  seized  within  the 
place  made  up  in  some  measure  for  the  money  spent  on  the  block- 
ade, and  Potidaia  further  furnished  a  home  for  the  1,000  Athe- 
nian settlers  who  were  sent  to  oi-cupy  it. 

Two  invasions  of  Attica  had  failed  thus  far  to  bring  about  the 
end  aimed  at   by  .Sparta  and  Corinth.     At  the  begin- 
Plataiaiby     ning  of  the  third  year  of   the  war  the  invading  force 
muii^r'Archf-  ^^'^^   ^^"^  "'^'^  into"  Attica  but  into   the   little  strip  of 
(iiinio!*.  Plataian   territory  which   even   Spartan   sentiment  re- 

garded as  in  some  sense  sacred  ground.    The  Plataians 
were,   in  fact,   otiered   up    as    victims  on   the    altar   of   Theban 

'  Spcrt1)ia»  and  Boulis  were  the  ill-treatineut  of  the  Persian  heralds 
ambassadors  wlio,  as  it  is  said,  were  at  Atlu-ns  and  Sparta  (p.  147).  The 
si'iu  to  Xerxes  to  be  put  todeatli  by  oIBce  of  herald  was  hereditary  at 
him  by  way  of  compensation  for  the'  Sparta. 


Chap.  III.]      AFFAIRS  OP  LESBOS  AND  PLATAIAI.  2S7 

hatred  and  cruelty  ;  and  tlio  tragedy  began  when  Archidamos 
encamped  with  his  army  on  the  territory  which  the  Spartans  had 
sworn  to  protect  against  all  assailants.  In  a  few  words  the 
Plataian  heralds  who  were  at  once  sent  out  to  him  bade  him 
remember  the  oaths  solemnly  sworn  after  the  rout  of  the  Persians 
under  Mardonios.  In  reply  the  Spartan  king  told  them  that  he 
was  come  only  to  set  them  free.  Athens  had  built  up  a  tyranny 
in  IlcUas ;  and  her  subjects,  rescued  from  her  clutches,  nmst  be 
made  to  feel  the  blessings  of  oligarchic  liberty.  If  the  Plataians 
could  not  duly  appreciate  these  blessings  and  take  part  in  the  good 
work,  they  must  remain  neutral,  and  a  promise  of  neutrality 
would  be  followed  by  the  departure  of  the  invaders.  But 
neuti'ality  as  defined  by  Archidamos  meant  the  reception  of  both 
sides  as  friends,  and  the  Plataians  felt  that  the  gates  of  their  city 
were  thus  practically  thrown  open  to  their  worst  enemies.  To 
the  fears  thus  expressed  Archidamos  replied  by  pledging  himself 
and  the  Spartan  confederation  to  restore  to  the  Plataians  without 
loss  or  damage  at  the  end  of  the  Avar  their  houses,  their  lands, 
their  fruit  trees  and  all  other  property  which  might  be  numbered, 
if  in  the  meantime  the  Plataians  would  leave  them  in  trust  to  the 
Spartans,'  and  themselves  find  a  refuge  elsewhere.  The  proposal 
was  one  with  which  under  the  circumtances  it  would  be  wise  to 
close,  and  the  Plataians  were  inclined  to  accept  it.  But  since  the 
night  attack  on  the  city  their  wives  and  their  children  had  been 
transferred  to  Athens,  and  without  the  consent  of  the  Athenians 
they  could  do  nothing.  Plataian  envoys  were  accordingly  sent 
under  truce  to  Athens,  and  brought  back  the  simple  message  that 
the  Athenians  had  never  yet  betrayed  Plataiai  and  that  they 
would  never  abandon  her  to  her  enemies.  It  was  an  unfortunate 
answer.  The  doom  of  the  Plataians  was  sealed  when,  witli  a 
solemn  invocation  of  the  gods  and  heroes  of  the  land  and  a 
solemn  protest  that  he  was  acting  against  his  will,  Archida- 
mos on  learning  their  decision  gave  orders  for  surrounding  the 
town  with  a  stockade  made  from  the  fruit  trees  which  were  cut 
down.  Probably  he  would  never  have  undertaken  the  task,  had 
he  not  felt  assured  that  a  place  containing  less  than  600  in  all 
could  not  long  hold  out  against  a  force  overwhelming  in  numbers. 
But  the  attempts  made  to  breach  or  undermine  the  walls  were  use- 
less :  and  as  the  summer  wore  on,  orders  were  given,  it  is  said,  for 
the  complete  circumvallation  of  the  city,  a  sufficient  Spartan  force 
being  left  to  guard  half  the  circle,  while  the  Boiotians  undertook 

'  This  proposition  may  be  com-  should  be  given  up  to  tlie  British 

pared  with  the  proposal  made  by  g:overnment,  to  be  retained  in  trust, 

the  English  envoy  at  Copenhagen  and  restored,  as  soon  as  this  could 

in  1807  that  the  whole  Danish  fleet  be  done  with  prudence  and  safety, 


288  THE   EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  TIL 

to  giiurd  the  other  half.  This  blockading  wall  was  finished,  wo 
are  told,  shortly  before  the  autumnal  equinox,  and  the  main  body 
of  the  besiegers  returned  home. 

While  the  Spartans  were  thus  engaged  at  Plataiai,  the 
Athenian  general  Xenophon  who  had  been  pardoned  for  his 
Defeat  of  generosity  to  the  Potidaians  was  dispatched  wilh  two 
anshfchai-  Colleagues  at  the  head  of  a  force  intended  to  advance 
kidike.  the  interests  of  Athens  in   the   Chalkidic   peninsula. 

Their  first  step  was  to  ravage  the  lands  of  the  Bottiaian  Spartolos, 
within  which  an  Athenian  party  was  working  for  the  surrender  of 
the  city  to  the  invaders.  But  there  were  others  who  would  not 
hear  of  this  plan,  and  these  summoned  aid  from  Olynthos.  The 
battles  which  followed  showed  the  superiority  of  the  Atlienian 
lioplites  on  the  one  side  and  of  the  Chalkidian  light-armed  troops 
on  the  other.  In  the  end  the  Athenians  fled  to  Potidaia,  leaving 
430  men  with  all  their  generals  dead  upon  the  field.' 

Tliese  disasters  were  compensated  by  brilliant  successes  else- 
where. During  the  preceding  winter  Phormion  had  been  stationed 
Invasion  of  with  20  triremes  at  Naupaktos  to  block  the  entrance 
b>^thesp'ar-  oi  the  Corinthian  gulf.=  The  events  of  the  following 
tans,  aided  year  showed  that  in  him  the  Alhenians  had  found  the 
ans,  Molos-  ablest  of  all  their  naval  commanders.  Aided  by  the 
othcr'raoun-  ^'^^''^ones  and  other  wild  tribes  of  the  neighboring 
taiu  dans,  country,  the  Ambrakiots  undertook,  with  the  help  of 
an  adequate  Peloponnesian  force,  to  reduce  the  whole  of  Akar- 
nania  and  to  insure  the  conquest  of  Zakynthos  and  Kcphallenia. 
The  execution  of  this  plan  was  intrusted  to  the  Spartan  admiral 
Knemos,  who  managed  to  cross  the  gulf  with  his  thousand 
lioplites  without  the  knowledge  of  Phormion.  The  main  object 
of  the  expedition  was  the  town  of  Stratos  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Acheloos  and  about  twenty  miles  from  its  mouth.  The  reduction 
of  tliis  place,  it  was  thought,  would  be  followed  at  once  by  the 
submission  of  the  Akarnanians  generally.  AVith  the  forces  of 
Knemos  were  combined  the  troops  of  the  Chaonians  and  Thes- 
jirotians  and  tlie  clansmen  of  the  Orestai  and  Parauaioi.  The 
tvur-shifting  Perdikkas  sent  1,000  Makedonians  without  the 
knowledge  of  the  Athenians.  The  tidings  of  their  approach  at 
tirst  struck  terror  into  the  Stratians  who  sent  to  Phormion  an 
urgent  message  for  aid.  lint  that  general  answered  that  he  dared 
not  leave  Xaupaktos  unguarded,  and  the  Stratians  made  ready  to 
defend  themselves  as  best  they  might.  Their  enemies  were  moving 
in  three  parallel  columns,  so  far  separated  from  each  other  as  often 
to  be  out  of  sight,  the  Leukadians  and  Anaktorians  being  on  the 

'  Thuc.  ii.  79.  -  lb.  ii.  69. 


Chap.  III.]      AFFAIRS  OF  LESBOS  AND  PLATAIAI. 


289 


right,  the  Pcloponnesians  and  Ambrakiots  on  the  left.  Theso 
marched  warily  and  in  good  order,  taking  all  precautious  when 
they  iiicaniped  at  night.  The  Chaonians,  hurried  on  by  their 
habitual  impetuosity,  thought  of  nothing  but  a  headlong  onset 
which  should  carry  Stratos  by  storm.  To  the  Stratians  their 
disorderly  haste  suggested  the  idea  of  ambuscades  to  take  their 
assailants  in  tiank  Avhile  their  main  body  should  sally  forth  from 
the  city  gates.  The  plan  was  crowned  with  thorough  success,  and 
the  Greeks  saw  nothing  of  their  friends  until  they  beheld  them 
rushing  back  in  Avild  confusion.  Night  liad  no  sooner  closed  in 
than  Knemos  fell  back  on  the  Anapos,  a  stream  flowing  into  the" 
Acheloos  about  ten  miles  below  Stratos.  Thence,  retreating  first 
into  the  land  of  the  friendly  Oiniadai,  he  made  the  best  of  his 
way  home.' 

Meanwhile  a  far  heavier  disaster  had  befallen  the  reinforce- 
ment which  should  have   reached  him   from   Corinth  and  other 
cities  of    the    allies.     The   narrow    strait   barely   one    victory  of 
mile    in    width    which    forms   the     entrance   to    the    Phormion 

-i^  .        .  ^,      .      ,  .  ic     •       1      1      1      ■       -L  ov(3/t.ieCo- 

Krissaiau  or  Corinthian  gulf  is  locked  in  by  two  rimiiiau 
promontories,  the  southern  known  simply  as  Rhion  or  ^^^' 
the  Ness,  and  the  northern  as  the  Rhion  of  Molykreion,  a  town 
about  three  miles  to  the  west,  facing  Patrai  which  lies  about  five 
miles  to  the  southwest  of  the  Achaiaa  Rhion.  At  about  equal 
distances  from  the  northern  Naze  or  Ness  lay  Naupaktos  on  the 
east  and  the  little  territory  of  Chalkis  near  the  mouth  of  the  river 
Euenos  to  the  west.  Hence  it  is  obvious  that  a  leader  who 
wished  to  avoid  a  fleet  stationed  at  any  point  between  the  Moly- 
kreian  Rhion  and  Naupaktos  would  keep  his  ships  on  the  southern 
coast  of  the  gulf  and  having  doubled  the  cape  would  strike  from 
Patrai  for  Chalkis.  This  course,  accordingly,  the  Corinthians 
took  in  full  assurance  that  with  five-and-forty  ships  they  needed 
tv)  fear  no  attack  from  Phormion  who  had  only  twenty.  Hence, 
although  on  doubling  the  southern  cape  they  saw  that  Phormion 
also  had  passed  the  entrance  of  the  gulf  oa  the  northern  side,  the 
Corinthians  still  thought  that  their  way  would  be  undisputed. 
But  no  sooner  had  they  moved  from  Patrai  than  they  saw  the 
Athenian  triremes  bearing  directly  upon  them  from  Chalkis.  The 
day  was  drawing  to  an  enrl,  and  the  Corinthians,  to  put  their 
enemy  off  his  guard,  pretended  to  take  up  their  station  for  the 
night  off  the  Achaian  shore,  their  intention  being  to  steal  across 
the  passage  under  cover  of  darkness.  But  Phormion  was  not  to 
be  thus  cheated.  The  Corinthians  had  hoped  that  when  they  had 
come  to  anchor  he  also  would  fall   back  to  his  own  ground  ;  but 

'  Time.  ii.  81-82. 
13 


290  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  la 

Phonnion  kept  the  sea  all  nigbt,  and  at  break  of  day  his  triremes 
confronted  the  Corinthian  ships  which  were  then  creeping  across 
the  gulf.  The  conditions  of  the  conflict  were  precisely  those 
which  he  could  most  desire.  The  Corinthian  fleet  consisted  of 
vessels  awkwardly  built,  poorly  equipped,  and  manned  by  crews 
with  little  or  no  experience  in  rowing ;  and  when  these  ships 
formed  themselves  into  a  circle  with  their  prows  outward,  leaving 
just  space  enough  for  five  of  their  best  ships  reserved  within  the 
circle  to  dart  out  upon  the  enemy,  but  not  enough  to  give  room 
for  the  terrible  manoeuvre  known  as  the  Diekplous,"  Phormion 
saw  that  the  issue  of  the  day  was  in  his  own  hands.  Soon  after 
sunrise  the  breeze  blows  strongly  from  the  gulf,  and  he  knew  that 
this  alone  v.ould  render  impossible  the  task  of  keeping  a  steady 
position  Avhich  even  in  still  water  is  full  of  difficulty  for  unskilful 
seamen.  To  distress  the  enemy  yet  more,  he  sailed  round  their 
fleet  with  his  ships  in  single  line,  gradually  contracting  his  circle, 
and  threatening  attack  from  moment  to  moment.  The  Corin- 
thians, thus  confined  within  a  narrowing  space,  were  already  in 
great  confusion  when  the  wind  came  down  upon  them  and  dashed 
their  ships  against  each  other.  In  the  midst  of  this  dreadful 
disorder  I'hormion  gave  the  order  for  attack  to  his  crews  who 
knew  well  the  vast  advantage  of  keeping  strict  silence^  during 
naval  engagements.  AVhat  followed  was  not  battle  but  rout.  At 
every  onset  from  an  Athenian  trireme  a  Peloponnesian  ship  went 
down.  Twelve  were  taken  with  most  of  their  crews.  The  few 
Avhich  were  not  taken  or  sunk  fled  to  the  Eleian  docks  at  Kyllene. 
The  Athenians  sailed  with  their  prizes  to  Molykreion  and  there 
set  up  a  trophy  for  the  victory. 

The  tidings  of  this  exploit  were  received  at  Sparta  with  un- 
mingled  indignation.  I^eremptory  orders  to  bring  on  at  once  a 
fresh  engagement  were  sent  to  Knemos  by  three  corn- 
expedition  missioners,  Jirasidas,  Timokratcs,  and  Lykophron,  who 
toKrete.  Avere  to  form  his  standing  council.  Phormion  on  his 
side  added  to  the  dispatch  announcing  his  success  an  earnest 
request  for  immediate  reinforcements.  Perikles  was  now  dying, 
and  the  Atheniaiis   had  already  brought  themselves  to  think  that 

'  The  excellence  of  Athenian  na-  struck  liis  ship  in  the  stern  or  the 
vfil  tactics  lay  in  extreme  rapidity  side,  thus  instantly  disabling  or 
as  well  as  precision  of  movement  :  sinking  her.  For  this  operation 
and  the  special  work  of  the  trireme  free  space  was  indispensable  ;  and 
was  to  strike  the  enemy'.s  ship  in  thustlie  revolution  in  Athenian  na- 
Bome  weak  or  dangerous  part,  val  warfare  since  the  days  of  Sala- 
avoiding  all  contact  with  tlie  armed  mis  and  INIykale  is  fully  explained, 
prow   or   beak.     Hence    wherever  '^  This  fact  alone   exhibits  in  a 

tliere  was  room,  the  triremes  darted  striking  light  the  consummate  dis- 
tiirou^'li  gaps  in  the  enemy's  line,  ciplineof  the  Athenian  navy  at  this 
and  then  turning  suddenly  round      time. 


CiiAP.  Ill]      AFFAIRS  OF  LESBOS  AND  PLATAIAI.  291 

they  were  doing  rightly  by  sending  this  force  first  on  a  con- 
temptible errand  to  Krete.  In  Krete,  nothing,  it  seems,  was 
done,  beyond  the  ravaging  of  the  land  around  Kydonia  ;  and 
when  this  was  over,  the  winds  would  not  allow  them  to  pursue 
their  voyage. 

Phormion  was  thus  left  with  his  twenty  triremes  to  take  his 
chance  against  any  fleet  which  the  Spartans  might  send  against 
him.  In  hourly  expectation  of  being  reinforced  he  The  battle 
kept  his  ships  oS  the  Ness  of  Jlolykreion  while  seventy-  of  Naupak- 
nve  Peloponnesian  triremes  watched  him  from  the  ond  victory 
opposite  promontory  of  Achaia.  The  Spartans  knew  o^  Pi^oi-ni'on- 
now  the  dangers  against  which  they  had  to  guard  ;  and  for  six  or 
seven  days  not  a  movement  was  made  on  either  side.  On  the 
seventh  or  eighth  day  the  Peloponnesian  fleet  began  at  daybreak 
to  move  in  lines  four  deep  from  Panormos  to  the  northern  coast  of 
the  gulf,  the  right  wing  leading  the  way,  headed  by  twenty  of  the 
swiftest  and  stoutest  of  their  ships,  which  were  to  turn  sharply 
round  and  pin  the  fleet  of  Phormion  to  the  shore  if,  thinking  that 
the  movement  was  against  Naupaktos,  he  should  enter  the  gulf. 
Their  plan  was  successful.  Phormion  felt  that  he  dared  not  suffer 
so  large  a  force  to  attack  Naupaktos,  and  hastened  to  the  defence 
of  that  city.  But  he  had  advanced  only  a  little  way  to  the  east  of 
the  Molykreian  Rhion  when  the  whole  Peloponnesian  fleet  faced 
about,  their  vanguard  hurrying  to  cut  off  retreat  in  the  direction  of 
Naupaktos,  while  the  main  body  of  the  ships  suflSciently  blocked 
escape  to  the  west.  The  safety  or  destruction  of  the  Athenian 
triremes  depended  wholly  on  the  rapi<lity  of  their  movements  :  and 
such  was  the  promptitude  of  the  trierarchs  and  so  great  the  swift- 
ness of  their  vessels  that  eleven  ships  escaped  even  from  this  supreme 
peril,  and  outstripping  the  enemy  hiistened  towards  Naupaktos. 
The  remaining  nine  were  driven  ashore,  such  of  their  crews  as 
could  not  swim  being  all  slain.  The  battle  seemed  to  be  ended  by 
a  decisive  victory,  for  the  rescuing  of  some  of  the  ships  by  Mes- 
senian  hoplites  who  dashed  into  the  sea  and  leaped  upon  their 
decks  was  a  matter  of  not  much  moment.  But  another  turn  was 
to  be  given  to  the  day  by  the  Athenian  triremes  who  had  outsailed 
the  Spartan  vanguard.  Ten  of  them,  having  reached  the  Apol- 
lonion  or  temple  of  Phoibos  near  Naupaktos,  took  up  a  defensive 
position.  One  was  sailing  up  in  the  rear,  chased  by  a  single 
Leukadian  vessel  far  in  advance  of  the  rest  of  the  Peloponnesian 
fleet  which  came  onwards  to  the  chant  of  the  Paian  or  pa3an  liymn 
of  victory.  Some  way  in  front  of  this  Athenian  ship  a  merchant 
vessel  was  lying  at  its  moorings.  Sweeping  swiftly  round  it,  the 
Athenian  trireme  dashed  into  the  broadside  of  its  pursuer  and 
forthwith  disabled  it.      This  exploit   so  dismayed  the  Spartan 


THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  IIL 

admiral  Timokrates  wlio  was  on  board,  tliat  he  slew  himself,  and 
his  body  fell  into  the  sea.  It  also  damped  the  courage  of  the 
Peloponnesians  who  were  coming  up  behind.  The  victory  which 
they  had  just  won  seemed  to  render  strict  order  unnecessary  ;  and 
in  a  fatal  moment  the  crews  of  some  of  the  ships  ceased  from 
rowing,  to  enable  the  others  to  join  them,  while  some  from  igno- 
rance of  the  soundings  found  themselves  among  tlic  shoah.  Seiz- 
ing instantly  the  favorable  moment,  the  ten  Athenian  ships  flew  to 
the  attack.  The  conflict  was  soon  over.  Disorder  had  already 
half  done  their  work  ;  and  in  a  little  while  the  Peloponnesian  ships 
were  seen  in  flight  for  Panonnos  near  the  Achaian  Rhion  from 
which  they  had  advanced  in  the  morning.  Six  of  their  vessels  fell 
into  the  hands  of  the  Athenians  who  also  recovered  their  own 
trii  'mes  which  had  been  taken  by  the  Spartans  earlier  in  the  day.' 
The  great  plan  of  the  Spartans  which  was  to  drive  the  Athe- 
nians from  the  Coi-inthian  gulf  had  thus  failed  utterly  :  but  before 
ProDosed  ^^^"^y  dismissed  the  contingents  of  tlie  s^everal  cities, 
nigiit  attack  the  Pelopoiuiesian  leaders  thought  that  a  blow  might 
on  Peiraicus.  ^^  ^^^.^^j,   ,^^   Athens   herself  by   a  sudden   attack  on 

Peiraiens.  No  one  had  supposed  that  tliere  was  any  need  to  guard 
tlie  harbor  of  a  city  whose  fleets  had  no  rivals.  Hence  when  the 
Megarians  suggested  the  enterprise,  Brasidas  and  Knemos  at  once 
gave  orders  to  their  men  to  hasten  to  the  Megarian  port  of  Nisaia, 
and  there  to  man  the  forty  triremes  which  were  lying  in  dock. 
Thus  far  their  commands  were  obeyed  ;  but  when  they  were  fairly 
at  sea,  the  desperate  risk  involved  in  carrying  out  their  scheme  led 
them  or  their  men  to  substitute  the  easier  task  of  a  raid  on  Salamis. 
The  excuse  that  they  were  kept  by  an  unfavorable  wind  was  a 
mere  pretence.  It  was  in  fact  safer  to  attack  the  three  ships  which 
kept  guard  at  the  promontory  of  Boudoron  for  the  purpose  of 
barring  access  to  the  harbor  of  Megara.  The  capture  of  these 
vessels  and  the  landing  of  Peloponnesian  plundering  parties  were 
made  kiiown  at  Athens  by  means  of  fire  signals,  and  excited  ex- 
treme alarm.'  No  sooner  had  day  dawned  than  the  Athenians 
liurried  in  full  force  to  I'eiraieus,  and  launching  a  numl)er  of  tri- 
remes rowed  off  to  Salann's.  But  the  Spartans  were  already  gone, 
taking  with  them  a  lai'ge  amount  of  plunder  and  many  prisoners, 
together  with  the  three  guard-ships  from  Boudoron.     The  Athe- 

'  Tliuc.  ii.  93.  of  Demosthenes  in  Aitolia  was  as 

"  Tliucydidi-s,  ii.  94,  1,  says  that  notliing  to  the  catastrophe  at  Syra- 

no  other  iiiciilcnt  in  the  war  caused  cuse.     It  was  not  until  Thucydides 

grealcranxicty  at  Athens.   Heraugt  readied  a  later  stage  in  liis  liistory 

mean,  dearly,  the  war  down  to  the  that  lie  began  to  regard  tlie  Deke- 

peace  of  Nikias.  just  as  tlie  same  leian  war  as  a  partof  tlie  Pelopon- 

perif)d  must  he  meant  by  tliophrase  nesian  war.     v.  26. 
tv  Tif)  no?.t/i<f)  Ttj(5f,  ill.  98,  '•^.  Tlie h)8s 


Chap.  III.]      AFFAIRS  OF  LESBOS  AND  PLATAIAI.  293 

nians  had  been  taught  a  severe  lesson,  and  Peiraiens  was  never  left 
unguarded  again.' 

It  had  been  the  earnest  wish  of  the  Athenians  to  bring  down 
upon  Perdikkas  or  rather  upon  the  Chalkidian  towns  the  great  but 
unwieldy  power  of  Sitalkes,   who  had  made  himself  Expedition 

master  of  the  vast  regions  watered  by  the  Hebros  and  of  Sitaikes 
=>  ,    -^ .   .  ,1  agamst  Ma- 

lts tributary  streams,  and  whose  dominions  stretched  kedouia  and 
from  Abdera,  near  the  mouth  of  the  Nestos  (the  drain  cii'ii^idike. 
of  the  valleys  lying  between  the  chains'of  Rhodope  and  Pangaios), 
to  the  mouth  of  the  Istros  or  the  Danube.  Thus  in  extent  at  least 
his  dominions  were  second  to  none  in  Europe  after  those  of  the " 
Scythian  hordes,  whose  union  in  the  belief  of  Thucydidcs  would 
have  involved  an  omnipotence  which  Herodotus  thought  that  the 
Thrakian  tribes,  if  really  united,  could  not  fail  to  achieve.^  But 
this  great  empire  had  been  founded  with  no  definite  political  aim. 
Revenue  in  the  form  of  tribute,  and  gifts  answering  closely  to  the 
blackmail  of  the  Scottish  Highland  chiefs,  were  the  great  objects 
of  ambition  to  the  Odrysian  princes.  In  short,  the  administration 
of  the  Thrakian  chief  was  marked  by  all  the  venality  of  the  Roman 
empire  ;  and  without  gifts,  Thucydides  tersely  remarks,  nothing 
could  be  done.  A  power  thus  extended  over  a  vast  tract  of  coun- 
try could  not  soon  or  easily  be  brought  to  a  head.  Sitalkes  had 
indeed  a  double  motive  for  taking  the  field  early.  The  Athenians 
had  subsidised  him  well  for  his  Chalkidian  campaign,  and  he  had 
his  own  private  quarrel  to  settle  with  Perdikkas.  This  Avily  and 
treacherous  chief  had  by  a  definite  compact  induced  Sitalkes  to 
give  up  the  cause  of  his  brother  Philip,  and  he  had  refused  to  fulfil 
his  promise.  Philip  was  now  dead  ;  but  the  Odrysian  king  was 
resolved  that  his  son  Ainyntas  should  be  restored  to  his  inheritance.^ 
At  last  the  gathered  mass  was  set  in  motion,  to  swell  in  size  as  it 
went  onwards,  like  a  rolling  snowball.  The  approach  of  an  army 
of  150,000  men  might  well  strike  terror  among  the  peoples  which 
lay  in  its  path.  The  Makedonians  fled  to  their  fortresses ;  ;ind 
although  their  cavalry,  when  able  to  act,  beat  back  the  mountaineers 
opposed  to  them,  they  dared  not  to  run  the  risk  of  being  surrounded 
I'y  overwhelming  numbers.  The  tidings  of  this  expedition  spread 
dismay  not  only  among  all  Hellenic  tribes  to  the  north  of  Thermo- 
pylai,  but  among  the  states  now  in  league  against  Athens,  Their 
fears  were  groundless.  The  winter  was  now  come  ;  the  supply  of 
food,  in  spite  of  the  plunder  obtained  from  Bottiaia,  Makedonia, 
and  Chalkidike,  was  running  short ;  and  Perdikkas  found  tint 
l)ribes  and  promises  carried  more  weight  than  his  cavalry.     The 

'  Thuc.  ii.  94.  '  Thuc.  ii.  98,  7.     Herod,  v.  3. 

'  Thuc.  ii.  95. 


294  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  ill, 

offer  of  his  sister  Stratonike  in  marriage  with  a  large  dowry  secured 
the  friendship  of  Seuthes,  who  had  accompanied  his  uncle  Sitalkes ; 
and  Seuthes  found  a  strong  argument  for  retreat  in  the  absence  of 
the  Athenian  ships  which  were  to  have  co-operated  with  them. 
So  much  time  had  been  wasted  since  the  campaign  was  first 
planned,  that  the  Athenians  had  given  up  the  coming  of  Sitalkes 
as  hopeless.  They  had  sent  him  envoys  with  large  gifts  ;  but 
their  failure  to  fulfil  the  rest  of  the  compact  made  the  pleadings  of 
Seuthes  for  immediate  retreat  irresistible.  Thirty  days  had 
gone  by  since  Sitalkes  had  left  his  own  dominions,  when  the  order 
was  given  for  tlie  homeward  march.  Perdikkas  felt  that  in 
Seuthes  he  liad  found  an  ally  Avhom  it  was  not  safe  to  cheat,,  and 
he  kept  his  promise  in  the  matter  of  Stratonike. 

The  fourth  year  of  the  war  brought  with  it  for  the  Athenians 
not  only  another  Spartan  invasion,  but  a  crisis  so  sudden  and  so 
The  revolt  of  scrious  tliat  for  a  time  their  power  of  action  was  almost 
Lesbos.  paralysed.  All  Lesbos  revolted,  with  tlie  exception  of 
^■^"  the  one  town  of  Methymna  in  the  northeastern  corner 
of  the  island.  Together  with  Chios  Lesbos  alone  now  retained  the 
privileges  of  free  members  of  the  Delian  or  Athenian  confederacy  : 
but  light  as  were  the  burdens  and  constraints  laid  even  on  the 
subject  allies,  the  Lesbian  oligarclis  who  there  ruled  over  the  De- 
mos hated  utterly  any  state  of  things  wliicli  interfered  in  the  slight- 
est degree  with  their  dearly  loved  exclusiveness.  We  have  already 
liad  ample  evidence  that  while  Athenian  ascendency  Avas  resented 
as  an  intolerable  burden  wherever  the  old  Eupatrid  houses  remained 
supreme,  Athens  still  had  in  tlic  Demos  an  ally,  if  not  a  zealous 
friend.  Even  tliese  demoi  would,  if  left  to  themselves,  liave  pre- 
ferred to  keep  their  interpolitical  independence, — so  deep  had  the 
roots  pierced  of  that  centrifugal  feeling  wliich  in  tho  t)ligarchical 
states  had  long  since  become  a  deadly  and  incurable  vice.  Hence 
even  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war  the  nobles  of  Mytilene,  the 
great  city  of  the  eastern  coast  of  Lesbos,  liad,  like  the  men  of 
Tliasos,  Samos,  and  Potidaia,  besought  aid  from  Sparta  in  the 
revolt  wiiich  they  meditated.'  We  are  not  told  at  what  time  the 
application  was  made  :  and  it  is  possible  that  it  may  have  come  at 
a  time  when  the  attitude  taken  by  Corinth  compelled  the  Spartans 
to  refuse  the  re(|uest  of  the  Samian  envoys."  Still  the  Mytilenaian 
oligarchs  persevered  in  their  scheme  ;  and  Methymna  was  the  only 
town  which  resisted  a  change  not  unlike  that  wliieh  Theseus  is  said 
to  have  effected  for  Attica.  Antissa,  Eresos,  and  Pyriha,  the  two 
first  lying  on  the  north-western  shore  of  Lesbos,  the  third  sheltered 
within  a  bay  whicdi  ran  into  the  heart  of  the  island  a  few  miles 

'  Thuc.  iii.  2,  1.  «  See  p.  260. 


Chap.  HI.]   AFFAIRS  OP  LESBOS  AND  PLATAIAI.       295 

more  to  the  soutlieast,  were  induced  to  become  simply  Demoi  of 
Mytiiene,  and  to  hold  here  their  common  Prytaneion.  The  work 
of  blocking  up  harbors,  of  building  walls,  of  laying  in  stores  and 
hiring  mercenary  archers  from  tribes  lying  beyond  the  gates  of  the 
Euxine,  was  carried  on  with  zeal ;  and  the  men  of  Tenedos  as  well 
as  the  Methymnaians  warned  the  Athenians  that,  unless  they  acted 
promptly,  the  island  would  be  lost.  The  tidings  seemed  to  lay 
upon  them  a  burden  against  which  they  could  not  bear  up.  The 
plague  had  terribly  thinned  their  numbers  and  weakened  the  power 
and  the  will  for  action  ;  and  for  a  time  they  could  not  bring  them- 
selves to  look  upon  news  so  terrible  as  true.  But  when  the  envoys 
sent  to  dissuade  the  Mytilenaians  from  reducing  the  other  towns  to 
the  condition  of  demoi  had  returned  home  unsuccessful,  they  in- 
stantly dispatched  to  Lesbos  forty  ships  which  happened  to  be  ready 
for  an  expedition  to  the  Peloponnesian  coasts.  The  orders  given 
to  the  general  Kleippides  and  his  colleagues  were  to  surprise  and 
seize  Mytiiene,  if  possible  during  the  absence  of  the  citizens  while 
keeping  the  feast  of  Apollon  Maloeis,  or,  failing  in  this,  to  summon 
the  oligarchs  to  surrender  their  fleet  and  pull  down  their  walls. 
Happily  there  were  in  the  Peiraieus  ten  Lesbian  triremes  accord- 
ing to  the  terms  of  the  alliance.  These  ships  the  Athenians  seized, 
and  guarded  their  crews  as  hostages  ;  but  the  tidings  of  the  mission 
of  Kleippides  were  carried  to  Lesbos  in  three  days  by  a  Mytilenaian 
spy.  The  festival  of  Apollon  was  put  off  ;  and  when  the  Atlienians 
arrived,  they  were  met  by  open  opposition.  But  the  ships  which 
ventured  out  of  the  harbor  were  chased  back  again,  and  the  Myti- 
lenaian leaders  resolved  to  temporise.  Kleippides,  with  a  fleet 
which  he  deemed  too  scanty  to  cope  with  the  combined  forces  of 
the  Lesbian  towns,  was  easily  persuaded  to  give  time  for  the  send- 
ing of  a  Lesbian  embassy  to  Athens.  These  envoys  had  no  further 
errand  than  to  ask  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  Athenian  squadron, 
and  to  give  a  general  promise  that  the  Mytilenaian  government 
meant  no  harm.  Conscious  that  a  trick  so  transparent  must  fail, 
they  sent  ambassadors  at  the  same  time  to  Sparta  in  a  trireme 
which  escaped  by  the  southern  entrance  of  the  harbor,  while 
Kleippides  kept  guard  only  at  Malea  on  the  north  of  the  town. 
But  when  the  Lesbian  envoys  returned  from  Athens  with  no  good 
report  and  the  island  had  openly  revolted,  even  a  victory  gained 
over  the  Athenians  who  had  landed  to  blockade  the  city  was  fol- 
lowed by  a  retreat  within  the  walls,  and  by  the  sending  of  a  second 
embassy  to  Sparta.  Awaiting  the  return  of  this  second  batch  of 
envoys  the  Mytilenaian  oligarchs  remained  inactive  ;  and  the  Athe- 
nians, who  seldom  failed  to  seize  a  favorable  opportunity,  at  once 
sent  to  summon  aid  from  their  allies.  The  same  remissness  which 
had  cheered  the  Athenians  had  also  convinced  the  Chians  and  other 


296  THE   EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

inembevs  of  the  confederacy  that  not  mucli  was  to  be  expected 
from  tlie  Lesbian  rebellion,  and  with  their  help,  now  readily  af- 
forded, Mytilene  was  blockaded  from  the  south  as  well  us  the  nortli.' 

If  Thucydides  had  inserted  in  his  history  no  speeches  which 
could  not  have  been  uttered  by  the  persons  to  Avhom  they  are 
Audience  of  ascribed,  we  might  lay  greater  stress  on  the  language 
envo3^8'at'"^  *^^  the  Mytilcnaian  envoys  when  about  midsummer  of 
Olympia.  this  year  they  appeared  to  plead  their  cause  before  the 
[Hellenes  assembled  to  celebrate  the  great  Olympian  festival.  It  is 
enough  to  say  that  for  themselves  these  Lesbian  envoys  liave  no 
grievance  whatever  to  urge.  Far  from  having  been  either  op- 
pressed or  even  unfairly  used,  they  admit  that  they  liad  been 
treated  with  marked  distinction  f  and  ail  that  they  could  say  for 
themselves  was  first  that  the  idea  of  revolt  had  been  forced  on  them 
by  the  slavery  to  which  other  members  of  the  Delian  confederation 
had  been  reduced,  and  secondly  that  they  had  been  compelled  to 
carry  out  their  plan  prematurely.  Of  the  real  relations  of  Atliens 
with  her  free  and  her  subject  allies  they  said  not  a  word.  There 
was  no  intimation  that  the  Athenian  law-courts  were  open  to  re- 
ceive and  decide  all  complaints  brought  by  one  ally  against  another 
ally  or  by  the  citizens  of  any  confederated  city  against  Athenian 
officials  or  residents  or  settlers,  and  that  these  courts  certainly 
could  not  be  accused  of  perverting  justice  in  favor  of  Athenian 
criminals.  On  the  real  independence  of  the  allies  in  the  manage- 
ment of  their  internal  affairs  they  kept  careful  silence  :  but  tlie 
checks  which  were  put  on  quarrels  and  wars  between  two  or  more 
allied  cities  were  resented  as  involving  loss  of  feedom.^  In  short, 
if  the  picture  drawn  by  the  historian  be  in  any  degree  a  true 
one,  the  revolt  of  Lesbos  was  the  work  of  a  faction  with  which 
the  main  body  of  the  people  had  no  active  sympathy,  and  which 
they  seized  the  first  occasion  for  defeating. 

It  had  been  the  spc(;ial  prayer  of  the  Lesbian  envoys  that  the 

Spartans  should  invade  Attica  for  the  second  time  this  year,  the 

inducement  held  out  for  this  fresh  toil  being  the  like- 

iVI  C8  B 11  rcB  ^ 

taken  by  the  lihood  that  the  Athenians  would  thus  be  compelled  to 
f'o^theTup-  withdraw  their  fleets  both  from  Lesbos  and  from  the 
prcssion  of  sliorcs  of  I*cloponncsos.  The  Athenians,  they  urged, 
liad  not  only  been  jjrostrated  by  the  plague  but  had 
spent  all  their  reserve  funds.  This  last  statement  was  true.  Of 
the  six  thousand  talents  which  were  stored  in  the  treasury  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war,  one  thousand  only  remained, — that  sum, 
namely,  of  which  under  pain  of  death  no  citizen  was  to  propose  to 

'  Thuc.  iii.  6.  her  allies  have  been  examined  al- 

"  Time.   iii.  93.  ready.     See  p.  246. 

'  The  relations  of   Athens  with 


Chap.  III.]      AFFAIRS  OF  LESBOS  AND  PLATAIAI.  297 

make  use  except  for  the  defence  of  the  city  itself  or  its  harbors 
against  invading  armies  or  fleets.  The  former  assertion  was  re- 
futed in  a  way  which  the  Spartans  little  anticipated.  They  had 
accepted  the  Lesbians  as  their  allies,  and,  having  promised  a  second 
invasion  of  Attica,  they  made  preparations  for  dragging  their  ships 
across  the  Corinthian  isthmus  to  the  Saronic  gulf,  sending 
round  a  summons  at  tlie  same  time  for  tlie  immediate  presence  of 
their  allies.  These  were  in  no  hurry  to  obey  the  order.  They 
were  busy  carrying  their  harvest ;  and  the  Athenians  resolved  to 
show,  that  in  spite  of  all  depressing  causes  they  were  able  to  me^t 
their  enemies  on  equal  terms  without  taking  away  any  portion  of 
their  fleet  from  Lesbos.  Meanwhile  the  Mytilenaian  oligarchs 
had  been  able  to  do  but  little.  Their  attack  on  Methymna  had 
failed  ;  but  an  attempt  to  retaliate  was  followed  by  a  severe  de- 
feat of  the  Methymnaians.  The  jNIytilenaians  had  in  fact  full 
command  of  the  land,  although  the  harboi's  of  Mytilene  were 
under  strict  blockade.  On  learning  this  fact,  the  Athenians  sent 
out  a  force  of  a  thousand  hoplites  under  Paches,  and  the  revolted 
city  was  at  once  completely  invested. 

So  ended  the  fourth  year  of  the  war.  Soon  after  the  equinox 
of  the  following  spring  a  Peloponnesiau  array  again  invaded  Attica. 
Archidamos  was  perhaps  still  living,  but  his  long  Surrender  of 
reign  was  well-nigh  ended  ;  and  the  leader  of  this  ex-  paci'ios"*^ 
pedition  was  Kleomenes  who  acted  as  the  deputy  of  his  *2"  ^-c- 
nephew  the  young  king  Pausanias,  son  of  Pleistoanax.  Their 
ravages  were  even  more  merciless  than  those  of  the  earlier  inroads. 
They  were  expecting  daily  to  hear  news  from  Lesbos,  to  which 
Alkidas  had  been  dispatched  with  a  fleet  ordered  during  the  pre- 
ceding winter.  But  at  length  their  food  was  all  gone,  no  tidings 
had  come,  and  they  were  reluctantly  driven  to  retreat.  In  fact 
the  Lesbian  oligarchs  had  no  successes  to  report.  For  some  un- 
known reason  Alkidas  failed  to  make  his  appeai'ance  with  his  fleet ; 
and,  looking  on  his  ari'ival  as  hopeless,  the  party  in  power  armed 
the  Demos  as  hoplites  (they  had  thus  far  served  only  as  light-armed 
troops)  in  order  to  sally  out  from  the  city  against  the  besiegers. 
The  step  was  fatal.  The  commons,  instead  of  obeying  the  order? 
given  to  them,  insisted  on  an  immediate  distribution  of  corn  to 
alleviate  the  famine  which  already  pressed  hard  upon  thenv 
or  threatened  in  default  of  this  to  throw  open  the  gates  to  the  Athe- 
nians. Making  a  virtue  of  necessity,  the  oligarchs  at  once  made  a 
convention  with  Paches,  who  pledged  himself  neither  to  imprison, 
inslave,  nor  slay  any  Mytilenaian  until  the  Athenian  people  had 
given  their  judgment  in  the  matter.  Struck  with  terror,  the  prime 
movers  of  the  revolt  took  sanctuary  :  but  without  doing  them  any 
harm  Paches,  pending  the  decision  of  the  Athenians,  placed  them 
13* 


298  THE  EMPIRE   OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III 

for  safe  keepiiiij  in  the  island  of  Tenedos,  Seven  days  after  this 
gurrender  the  licet  of  Alkidas  entered  the  little  harbor  of  Embaton 
on  the  southern  shore  of  the  territory  of  Erythrai  beneath  the 
Ki)rvkian  mount,  not  twenty  miles  to  the  east  of  the  Phanaian  or 
southernmost  promontory  of  Chios.  Here  a  council  was  l)eld,  and 
Teutiaplos  of  Elis  strenuously  insisted  on  the  duty  of  making  an 
immediate  attempt  for  the  recovery  of  Mytilene.  But,  Alkidas  had 
liad  more  than  enough  of  the  business,  and  he  was  determined  to 
return  home.  For  fifty  miles,  sailing  to  the  south-east,  he  carried 
with  him  the  prisoners  whom  he  had  seized  in  the  merchant 
vessels  which  had  approached  his  fleet  without  suspicion.  No 
one  had  thought  that  a  Spartan  force  would  venture  int»  waters 
over  which  Athens  had  thus  far  been  supreme,  and  when  the 
ships  of  Alkidas  were  seen,  they  were  naturally  supposed  to  be 
Athenian.  So  large  a  body  of  men  had  fallen  into  the  trap  that 
Alkidas  now  felt  his  movement  of  retreat  seriously  hampered. 
Tliat  men  not  engaged  in  hostilities  on  either  side,  and  belonging 
possibly  to  cities  which  were  only  against  their  will  in  alliance  with 
Athens,  deserved  a  different  treatment,  never  entered  into  his 
mind  ;  and  on  the  promontory  of  Myonnesos  in  the  Teian  terri- 
tory he  landed  for  the  horrible  purpose  of  lightening  his  cargo 
by  a  wholesale  butchery.  The  greater  number  of  the  prisoners 
were  thus  slain  ;  but  this  ruthless  barbarity  roused  tlie  indigna- 
tion even  of  the  oligarchic  refugees  at  Anaia.  They  told  Alkidas 
in  few  words  that  the  repetition  of  acts  so  shameful  would  win  him 
few  friends  and  would  change  most  of  his  friends  into  enemies. 
Shamed  by  the  sarcasm  which  hailed  the  would-be  deliverer  of 
Hellas  with  the  title  of  butcher,  Alkidas  set  free  those  whom  he 
liad  not  slaughtered,  and  hastened  a  retreat  which  it  was  now 
needful  to  convert  into  flight.  In  fact,  nothing  but  extreuie 
liastc  saved  liini  from  I'aches  who  pursued  him  as  far  as  Patmos, 
and  then,  as  the  Spartan  fleet  was  not  in  sight,  turned  back,  con- 
gratulating himself  that  Alkidas  had  not  taken  refuge  in  some 
liarbor  where  it  would  have  been  necessary  to  blockade  liim. 

On  his  return  to  Lesbos  Paches  reduced  the  towns  of  Pyrrha 
and  Eresos.  The  Mytilenaians  (in  number  about  1,000)  who  had 
C(»ndcmna-  been  placed  for  safe  keeping  in  Tenedos  were  sent  to 
>i'jiii''-'iaian  Athens,  a  large  portion  of  the  force  under  Paches 
p.opit;  by  returning  home  at  the  same  time.  At  Athens  indig- 
iiiaii  usb'ein-  nation  at  the  revolt  ran  liigh.  By  their  own  showing 
'^'y-  the  Mytilenaians,  far  from  having  any  definite  cause  of 

complaint,  had  been  treated  with  special  indulgence  and  respect ; 
ami  they  had  rewarded  Athens  by  bringing  a  Peloponnesian  fleet 
witiiin  waters  which  should  have  been  closed  to  all  armed  vessels 
except  those  of  the  Athenian   confederacy.     No  event  had  yet 


Chap.  III.]     AFFAIRS  OF  LESBOS  AND  PLATAIAI.  299 

happened  so  seriously  afiecting  lier  dignity  and  so  greatly  en- 
dangering her  empire.  Moved  by  the  mastering  passion  of  re- 
sentment, the  Athenians  were  in  no  mood  for  drawing  distinctions 
between  the  guilty  and  the  innocent.  Their  one  longing  was  to 
intiict  a  punishment  which  should  be  a  warning  to  her  subjects 
for  all  time  to  come  ;  and  this  longing  found  utterance  in  the 
plan  of  murdering  the  whole  adult  male  population  of  Mytilene. 
Of  the  orators  who,  in  the  assembly  called  together  to  decide  on 
the  question,  spoke  most  vehemently  in  favor  of  this  proposition 
the  most  violent,  if  we  may  believe  Thucydides,  wasKleon.  The. 
severity  of  the  historian's  judgment  might  be  set  down  to  a  stern 
moral  indignation  at  the  inhumanity  of  Kleon's  counsel,  if  we 
could  forget  that  his  judgment  of  character  is  not  always  de- 
termined by  tlie  morality  or  immorality  of  tlie  me.i  of  whom  he 
speaks.  Not  only  does  he  relate  the  worst  iniquities  of  Athenians 
and  Spartans  without  saying  what  he  thinks  or  feels  about  them  ; 
but  he  can  hold  up  as  one  of  the  best  of  Athenian  citizens  a  man 
rendered  infamous  by  a  series  of  dastardly  assassinations.'  Hence 
when  we  find  that  the  unimpassioncd  impartiality  of  language 
which  marks  his  history  is  disturbed  only  when  he  speaks  in 
praise  of  a  man  like  Antiphon  or  in  blame  of  a  man  like  Kleon, 
we  cannot  but  ask  whether  there  may  not  be  a  cause  for  so  strange 
a  difference.  To  this  question  the  absolute  honesty  of  the  man 
happily  furnishes  the  answer.  He  lauds  the  virtues  of  Antiphon, 
but  he  takes  care  to  note  the  murders  in  which  he  has  a  share  ; 
he  never  mentions  Kleon  without  a  disparaging  epithet,  but  he 
makes  no  attempt  to  conceal  the  fact  that  for  Kleon  he  had  a 
strong  feeling  of  pergonal  enmity  and  tliat  his  own  character  was 
bound  up  with  that  of  the  noisy  and  audacious  leather-seller. 

Although  Kleon  is  here  first  mentioned  by  Thucydides,  he  had 
long  since  gained  some  notoriety,  if  not  fame,  by  liis  opposition 
to  Perikles.  Hi.s  career  calls  for  notice  chiefly  as  mark-  influence 
ing  a  new  phase  in  the  political  growth  of  Athens,  and  cimrac- 
Kleonis  popularly  known  as  the  Demagogue  ;  and  for  ^er  of  Kleon. 
those  who  will  not  take  the  trouble  to  ascertain  its  meaning,  the 
word  involves  some  strange  misconceptions.  In  the  broad  and 
coarse  pictures  of  Aristophanes  Kleon  is  the  unprincipled  schemer 
who  gains  influence  by  pandering  to  the  vices  of  the  people  and 
cajoling  them  with  the  meanest  and  most  fulsome  flattery.  No 
picture  could  be  more  untrue  ;  and  the  false  colors  with  which 
the  comic  poet  can  bedaub  the  low-born  leather-seller  may  warn 
us  how  to  take  the  slanders  which  he  retails  about  the  great 
Alkmaionid  statesman  whom  Kleon  made  it  his  business  to  oppose. 

'  Thuc.  viii.  68. 


300  THE  EMPIRE  OF   ATHENS.  [Book  HI. 

Kleon  was  a  demagogue,  not  as  leading  the  people  by  honeyed 
words,  but  as  belonging  to  a  class  of  statesmen  whose  activity 
was  confined  to  the  popular  assemblies,  and  who  were  more  likely 
to  fail  than  to  win  distinction  if  they  ventured  to  play  the  part 
of  military  leaders.  In  earlier  ages  this  class  had  been  unknown  ; 
it  was  only  now  becoming  strongly  marked.  If  a  man  so  placed, 
without  any  advantages  of  birth  or  fortune,  rose  to  such  power  as 
Kleon  at  length  attained,  by  availing  himself  of  the  popular  or 
dominant  feeling,  it  may  fairly  be  answered  that  he  could  scarcely 
rise  in  any  other  wav.  All  citizens  at  Athens  were  now  eligible  to 
all  offices  :  but  in  fact  the  meanly  born  and  the  poor  seldom  filled 
any  offices  except  those  for  which  election  went  by  the  lot.  If  a 
man  belonging  to  the  lowest  class  and  meaner  families  in  the 
state  wished  to  obtain  a  hearing,  he  could  do  so  only  by  enlisting 
popular  feeling  on  his  side  and  by  presenting  a  firm  front  to  the 
aristocratic  and  oligarchic  orators  who  would  seek  to  brow-beat 
and  to  silence  him. 

It  is  then  undoubtedly  true  that  the  rudeness  and  grossness  of 
the  leather-merchant  who  came  forward  to  resist  or  to  accuse 
Second  de-  l'<--rikles  were  forgiven  by  the  aristocratic  party  to 
bate,  and  whom  the  policy  of  Perikles  was  distasteful.  In  other 
of  the  sen-  words,  Kleon  had  in  his  favor  a  powerful  sentiment  in 
^^"9*^  their  dislike  of  the  great  Alkmaionid  statesman   who 

Mytiienaian  had  dealt  the  deathblow  to  their  ancient  privileges, 
people.  jjj  ^Y\c  case  of  the  Mytilenaians  he  had  on  his  side   a 

feeling  still  more  powerful.  The  maintenance  of  their  maritime 
supremacy  was  for  all  Athenians  a  matter  which  admitted  no 
questioning  :  and  the  very  foundations  of  this  supremacy  had  been 
assailed  by  men,  who,  revolting  without  cause,  had  dared  to  bring 
Spartan  war-ships  into  Athenian  waters.  According  to  Thucydi- 
des,  it  was  Kleon  who  determined  the  issue  of  the  debate  ;'  it  is 
far  more  likely  that  a  vast  majoiity  came  to  the  debate  vehemently 
eager  to  take  the  vengeance  ti>  which  Kleon  gave  the  name  of 
justice.  But  the  massacre  which  he  and  they  desired  was  on  so 
vast  a  scale  that  the  feeling  of  burning  anger  was  speedily  followed 
by  a  feeling  of  amazement  at  the  ocean  of  blood  which  was  to  be 
shed  in  order  to  appease  it.  Not  a  few  of  those  who  had  voted  for 
the  slaughter  felt,  as  they  went  home,  or  in  the  quiet  of  their 
houses,  that  they  were  making  themselves  responsilile  for  a  gigantic 
and  savage  iniquity.  The  manifest  symptoms  of  thi.s  change  of 
feeling  revived  the  courage  of  the  Mytiicnaian  envoys,  and  rendered 
it  poivsible  to  bring  about  a  reconsideration  of  the  question.    What- 

'  Tlie  plirase  evevtKijKEi  uare  u-6-  spj-nker  on  the  winninfi  side. 
KTeh'ui  could  hardly  bo  said  of  a  Tluic.  iii.  36,  o.  Kleon  i)robably 
uinn  niprrly  ln-c.TUSf  lio  liad  been  a      BUjrfiested  the  plan  of  massacre. 


Chap.  III.]     AFFAIRS  OF  LESBOS  AND  PLATAIAI.  301 

ever  risk  might  be  involved  in  summoning  the  assembly  for 
the  purpose  of  repealing  a  Psephisma  passed  only  a  few  hours  ago, 
the  Prvtaneis  felt  that  the  circumstances  of  the  case  justified  the 
irregularity,  and  they  took  the  step  without  hesitation,'  It  was 
early  morning  when  Kleon  found  himself  once  more  face  to  face 
with  the  men  who,  the  day  before,  had  tried  in  vain  to  resist  the 
influence  of  his  furious  oratory.  Without  pausing  to  reflect  on  the 
risk  which  he  might  himself  incur  as  tJie  author  of  a  measure  which 
must  rouse  the  indignation  of  the  whole  Hellenic  world,  he  stood 
up  again  to  administer  a  stern  rebuke  to  the  Demos  and  to  urge 
with  savage  persistency  the  paramount  duty  of  giving  full  play  to 
the  instinct  of  resentment.  This  course  he  held  to  be  that  of  strict 
justice,  and  as  he  demanded  no  more  than  justice,  so  neither  would 
he  take  less.  The  Lesbians  had  gained  no  experience  from  the 
punishment  of  Thasos  or  Samos  ;  they  had  not  been  deterred  by 
the  certainty  of  losing  special  privileges  and  sacrificing  the  wealth 
and  prosperity  of  the  island.  But  Kleon,  if  the  report  of  Thucy- 
dides  may  be  trusted,  uttered  a  direct  falsehood  when  he  asserted 
that  the  oligarchs  and  the  Demos  had  been  guilty  of  the  same 
crime  and  therefore  deserved  the  same  punishment.  The  plea 
was  palpably  untrue.  The  Demos  was  armed  only  when  the  oli- 
garchs felt  that  thus  only  could  they  escape  imminent  ruin  ;  and  no 
sooner  had  they  grasped  their  weapons,  than  they  used  the  power, 
thus  gained,  in  the  interests  of  Athens.  To  this  vehement  outburst 
Diodotos,  who  had  strenuously  resisted  the  proposal  carried  on  the 
preceding  day,  replied  in  a  speech  which,  if  we  may  accept  the 
report  of  Thucydides  as  substantially  correct,  is  amongst  the  most 
remarkable  ever  uttered  at  Athens.  It  is  the  speech  of  a  man 
comparatively  humane,  who  yet  feels  that  undue  stress  laid  on  the 
duty  of  mercy  might  defeat  his  purpose.  It  was  unnecessary  to 
enjoin  as  a  duty  that  which  was  demanded  imperatively  on  the 
score  of  mere  policy  and  expediency.  There  was  no  need  to  gloss 
over  the  iniquities  of  the  Lesbians,  far  less  to  attempt  any  formal 
apology  for  them,  when  the  question  turned  not  on  the  wickedness 
of  the  rebels  but  on  the  wisdom  of  slaughtering  them  in  a  mass. 
Nay,  he  would  take  Kleon  on  his  own  ground,  and  he  would  meet 
by  a  direct  contradiction  the  plea  that  Athenian  interests  would 
be  advanced  by  mthless  massacre.  It  was  absurd  to  found  expec- 
tations of  future  gain  on  the  mere  severity  of  punishment.  Human 
action  was  determined  not  by  pains  and  penalties  which  might 
possibly  never  be  inflicted,  but  by  desires  or  passions  which  bear 
down  all  constraints  of  prudence,  law,  or  fear.     The  black  codes 

'  A  case  somewhat  similar  oc-  scheme  of  the  Sicilian  expedition 
ciirred  when  Nikias  proposed  to  which  had  already  been  determined 
consider  as  an  open  question  the     on  by  the  people. 


30'^  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

Avliicli  punished  all  offences  with  death  had  not  been  specially  suc- 
cessful in  lessening  the  number  or  the  atrocity  of  offences.  But 
if  the  results  of  merciless  revenge  were  uncertain  in  one  direction, 
they  were  clear  enough  in  another.  Far  from  being  tempted,  as 
they  were  now,  to  surrender  betimes  in  the  hope  of  moderate 
treatment,  the  knowledge  that  no  heed  would  be  taken  of  shades 
of  guilt  would  goad  revolted  allies  to  desperate  resistance.  Nay, 
even  this  would  not  be  the  whole  misciiicf  wrouglit  by  this  ill- 
judged  vindictiveness.  In  all  the  states  of  her  alliance  Athens 
now  had  bevond  all  doubt  a  body  of  stanch  friends :  and  even  in 
Lesbos  these  friends  had  only  been  overborne  by  the  selfish  violence 
of  the  oligarchic  faction.  By  following  the  advice  of  Kleon  they 
would  deal  the  death-blow  to  this  friendship,  andv/ould  encounter 
evers'where  an  ominous  monotony  of  hatred  and  disgust. 

When  at  length  the  question  was  put  to  the  vote,  the  amend- 
ment of  Diodotos  that  the  prisoners  then  at  Athens  should  be  put 
Theeubu-  "P'^"  their  trial  and  that  the  lives  of  the  Mytilenaians 
gatioii  of  in  Lesbos  sliould  be  spared  was  carried  by  a  very  small 
Lesbos.  niajority.     But  although    the  decree  of  the    preceding 

day  was  thus  rescinded,  there  was  little  chance  that  the  more  mer- 
ciful decision  would  take  effect.  The  trireme  carrying  the  death- 
warrant  of  six  or  seven  thousand  men  had  had  the  start  of  nearly 
twenty -four  hours  :  but  the  errand  on  which  they  were  dispatched 
was  not  so  cheerful  as  to  call  for  any  special  tension  of  muscle, 
and  the  second  trireme  was  sent  forth  with  far  greater  induce- 
ments for  the  most  strenuous  exertion.  The  Lesbian  envoys 
stocked  the  ship  with  an  ample  supply  of  wine  and  barley  meal, 
and  they  promised  the  crew  rich  rewards  if  they  reached  the  island 
in  time.  Possibly  tlie  desire  of  saving  Athens  from  a  great  crime 
and  a  great  disgrace  may  have  influenced  them  even  more  ])0wer- 
fully,  and  the  men  pushed  onwards  with  a  zeal  which  happily  was 
not'damped  by  adverse  weather.  Taking  their  meals  as  they  sat 
on  their  benches,  and  working  in  relays  of  men  relieved  at  very 
short  intervals,  tlicy  reached  Lesbos,  not  indeed  before  the  first 
trireme,  but  before  Paches  had  begun  the  execution  of  the  decree 
which  he  had  already  published.  Here  ended  the  repentance  and 
the  mercy  of  the  Athenians.  The  thousand  Mytileiiaian  prisoners 
sent  by  Paclies  to  Athens  were  put  to  death.  The  walls  of  Mytilene 
were  ])ulled  down  and  its  fleet  forfeited  ;  and  a  definite  animal  tri- 
bute was  imposed  upon  the  city.  The  Mytilenaian  possessions  on 
the  mainland  were  seized  at  the  same  time,  and  henceforth  formed 
part  of  the  empire  of  Athens.  Throughout  all  these  operations 
Taclies  had  sliown  hinisolf  to  be  a  general  of  more  than  common 
po\v(T,  if  not  gifted  with  the  genius  of  Phorinion  :  but  either  he 
tlid  not  care  to  keep  his  passions  in  check  or  he  thought  that  his 


Chap.  III.]     AFFAIRS  OF  LESBOS  AND  PLATAIAI.  303 

official  position  would  insure  him  impunity  in  indulging  tliom. 
lie  was  altogetlier  mistaken.  The  courts  of  Athens  were  open, 
not  in  name  only  but  really,  to  the  citizens  of  allied  states  whether 
subject  or  free  :  and  Paches,  charged  before  an  Athenian  Dikastery 
with  a  monstrous  crime,  slew  himself  in  the  presence  of  his  judges. 
The  subjugation  of  Lesbos  preceded  only  by  a  few  days  or 
weeks  the  destruction  of  Platalal.  A  year  and  a  half  had  passed 
away  from  the  first  appearance  of  ArQhldamos  before  ^^^^  destruc- 
the  devoted  town,  when  the  Plataians  resolved  to  tionofpia- 
force  their  way  through  tlie  lines  of  the  besiegers.  ""'*'■ 
From  Athens  there  was  clearly  no  hope  of  help,  and  their  store  of 
food  was  rapidly  failing  them.  But  as  the  time  for  carrying  out 
the  plan  drew  nigh,  not  much  more  than  half  the  number  could 
muster  courage  to  go  on  with  the  scheme.  Two  hundred  and 
twenty  still  persevered,  and  the  event  showed  the  wisdom  of  their 
choice.  After  a  long  and  careful  preparation,  they  chose  a  night 
of  furious  storm  for  the  great  attempt.  They  had  mounted  and 
descended  the  wall,  when  seven  more  turned  back  and  spread  the 
tidings  that  all  the  rest  had  been  slain.  One  was  taken  prisoner 
at  the  outer  moat :  the  remainder  found  a  welcome  in  Athei: ; 
which  had  done  nothing  to  help  them  against  the  blockading  force. 
At  daybreak  the  Plataians  Avlthln  the  city  sent  a  herald  to  ask  for 
the  bodies  of  the  dead  and  then  learnt  that  the  boldness  of  their 
comrades  had  been  crowned  with  success.  For  some  months  longer 
they  held  out  against  an  enemy  more  terrible  than  man  ;  but  as 
the  summer  wore  on,  the  Spartan  leader  found  that  his  assaults 
were  met  wuth  steadily  diminishing  force.  Famine  was  fast  doing 
its  work  ;  but  there  was  a  special  reason  for  arresting  it  before  its 
close.  If  the  Plataians  could  be  Induced  to  make  a  voluntary 
surrender  of  their  city,  there  would  be  no  need,  in  the  event  of 
either  truce  or  peace,  to  give  up  the  place  along  with  others  which 
had  been  forcibly  occupied.  The  proposal  therefore  made  to  them 
was  that  they  should  submit  themselves  to  the  judgment  of  the 
Lakedalmonlans  who  would  give  them  a  pledge  that  the  guilty 
only  should  be  punished.  The  Plataians  were  in  no  condition  to 
refuse  these  terms  ;  but  they  could  at  once  foresee  the  Issue  when 
on  the  arrival  of  the  five  special  commissioners  dispatched  from 
Sparta  they  were  put  upon  their  trial,  or  rather  were  called  upon 
to  answer  the  single  question  whether  during  the  present  war  they 
had  done  any  good  to  the  Spartans  and  their  allies.  The  very 
form  of  the  question  showed  that  no  reference  would  be  suffered 
to  their  previous  history  ;  but  only  by  such  reference  was  it 
possible  to  exhibit  In  Its  true  light  the  injustice  of  their  present 
treatment.  In  fact,  unless  the  Spartans  were  prepared  to  throw 
over  their  alliance   with   Thebes,  the  case   of  the  Plataians  was 


3U4  THE   EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

hopeless.  The  Platalans  might  insist  that  their  alliance  with 
Athens  was  the  direct  result  of  Spartan  advice,  that  from  that 
time  down  to  the  treacherous  inroad  of  theThebans  into  their  city 
they  had  never  failed  to  do  Sparta  such  good  service  as  had  been 
in  their  power,  and  that  their  sacrifices  during  the  struggle  with 
Persia  had  been  followed  by  zealous  aid  given  to  the  Spartans 
during  the  long  llelot  war.  They  might  dwell  on  the  inicjuity  of 
the  Thebans  in  assailing  their  city  in  time  not  only  of  truce  but  of 
festival.  They  might  invoke  the  deep  religious  instinct  which  still 
regarded  the  unbroken  worship  of  ancestors  as  of  primary  im- 
portance ;  they  might  argue  that  the  maintenance  of  this  worship 
had  by  the  common  oath  of  all  the  non-Medizing  Hellenes  been 
committed  as  a  sacred  trust  to  the  Plataians,  and  that,  if  these 
were  destroyed,  the  Spaitans  would  be  depriving  their  own  fore- 
fathers of  the  careful  reverence  which  Thobans  as  the  vehement 
allies  of  the  I'ersian  king  could  not  even  dare  to  offer.  They  might 
remind  them,  further,  that  they  had  submitted  themselves  to  the 
Spartans  and  to  the  Spartans  alone,  and  that  if  they  had  suspected 
the  least  collusion  with  the  Thebans,  they  would  rather  have  all 
died  by  famine  than  open  the  gates  of  their  city.  Tliev  might  insist 
that  the  Spartans,  if  they  were  not  prepared  to  do  tlicm  justice  and 
to  set  them  fiee,  should  allow  them  to  go  back  within  the  wjillsof 
their  town,  and  there  take  their  chance  whether  of  death  by 
famine  or  of  succor  from  their  allies.  All  this  they  might  urge  ; 
but  to  each  and  all  of  these  pleas  the  Plataians  well  knew  that  the 
Thebans  liad  their  answer  ready.  The  very  question  to  which 
Kleomenes  replied  by  bidding  them  seek  the  alliance  of  Athens 
was  in  itself  a  crime.  It  was  their  duty  to  abide  in  the  confede- 
racy of  their  countrymen,  and  they  had  chosen  from  the  first  to 
assume  an  attitude  of  bitter  and  schismatical  opposition.  The  sur- 
prise of  a  city  with  which  the  Thebans  were  not  at  war  might  be 
wrong:  the  case  was  wholly  altered  when  they  came  at  the  wish  of 
the  first  men  in  the  town  who  desired  only  to  bring  back  their  fel- 
low-citizens to  their  ancient  allegiance.  The  Plataians  had  been 
invited  by  the  Thebans  to  join  the  Poiotian  confederacy  of  their 
own  free  will.  No  wrong  had  been  done  and  the  invitation  was 
accepted;  but  the  compact  was  no  sooner  made  than  it  was  broken, 
and  in  breach  of  a  solemn  promise  all  the  men  who  had  fallen  into 
tlieir  hands  were  slain.  The  retort  brings  us  back  to  the  monster 
evil  of  this  horrible  war, — the  cxasperat(!d  and  vindictive  spiiit 
which  forgot  prudence,  reason,  and  sound  policy  in  the  blind  long- 
ing for  revenge.  It  matters  not  whether  we  take  the  version  of 
theThebans  or  that  of  the  Plataians.  These  by  their  own  mouth 
stand  on  this  point  self-condemned.  By  their  own  adir/ission  they 
Jiad  j)romised  that  the  fate  of  their  prisoners  should  depend  on  the 


Chap.  III.]     AFFAIRS  OF  LESBOS  AND  PLATAIAI.  305 

result  of  future  negotiation,  and  the  men  were  killed  before  a  word 
more  could  be  said  ou  either  side.  If  one  crime  Avas  to  serve  as 
the  justification  of  another,  the  Thebans  had  full  warrant  for  de- 
manding the  death  of  the  Plataians.  But  there  was  no  need  to 
urge  a  reqnest  with  which  the  Spartans  had  already  made  up  their 
minds  to  comply.  The  prisoners  were  again  asked,  one  by  one, 
the  same  question  to  which  their  speech  had  evaded  a  direct 
answer  ;  and  as  each  man  replied  in  the  negative,  he  was  led  away 
and  killed.  So  were  slain  two  hundred  Plataians  and  twenty-five. 
Athenians  who  had  been  shut  up  in  the  town  ;  and  so  fell  the 
city  of  Plataiai  in  the  ninety -third  year  of  its  alliance  with  Athens, 
to  rise  again  once  more  and  to  be  once  more  destroyed.  For  a 
year  the  town  was  given  over  by  the  Thebans  to  some  Megarian 
exiles  and  to  such  Plataians  as  had  preferred  Boiotian  oligarchy  to 
alliance  with  the  Demos  of  Athens.  But  even  thus  the  Thebans 
could  not  rest  satisfied.  The  Plataian  territory  was  declared  to  be 
public  land,  and  was  let  out  for  ten  years  to  Boiotian  graziers. 
The  play  was  played  out,  as  the  Tliebans  would  have  it.  The 
phrase  is  strictly  justified,  for  the  existence  or  the  fall  of  Plataiai 
could  have  no  serious  issue  or  meaning  in  reference  to  the  war. 
Thebes  would  scarcely  be  a  gainer  by  recovering  the  little  town 
to  the  Boiotian  confederacy :  Athens  would  be  in  no  way  the 
weaker  for  losing  her  ancient  and  devoted  ally.  From  first  to  last 
the  Plataians  were  sacrificed  to  the  vindictive  meddlesomeness  of 
the  Thebans  ;  and  it  must  be  admitted  that  in  some  measure  they 
helped  to  sacrifice  themselves.  If  the  prisoners  taken  on  the  night 
of  the  surprise  had  been  sent,  as  Perikles  would  have  had  them 
sent,  to  Athens,  the  possession  of  these  hostages  would  have  had  a 
sobering  effect  upon  the  Thebans  and  would  have  extorted  a  very 
different  verdict  from  the  five  commissioners  of  Sparta. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


THE    PKLOPONNESIAlSr  WAR  FROM  THE   REVOLUTIOlSr  IN    KORKYRA  TO 
THE    CAPTURE    OF    SPHAKTERIA    BY  DEMOSTHENES  AND  KLEON. 

The  defensive  alliance  of  Korkyra  with  Athens  had  been  followed, 
It  would  seem,  by  something  like  peaceful  and  orderly  government 
in  that  unhappy  island;  and  things  remained  com-  state  of  par- 
paratively  quiet  until  the  Corinthians  sent  back  ^y*^'"  ^°^' 
the  prisoners  whom  they  had  taken  in  the  battles  off  427  b.c. 
the  island.'  Nominally  they  were  set  free  under  a  promise  to  pay 
'  See  p.  265. 


306  THE  EMPIRE   OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

800  talents  as  their  ransom.  Really  their  freedom  was  to  he 
earned  not  by  money  buthy  severing  the  island  from  all  connexion 
with  Athens,  in  other  words  by  transferring  power  from  the 
demos  to  an  oligarchy. 

These  men,  in  fulfilment  of  their  compact,  set  to  work  to 
kindle  a  flame  which  was  to  consume  not  their  enemies  only  but 
Intrigues  of  themselves.  The  time  which  followed  was  marked  by 
the  priso-  a  series  of  frightful  crimes,  by  pitiless  massacres,  and 
by  the  Co-  an  iron  inhumanity,  worthy  of  the  worst  days  of  the 
nuthiaiis.  flj.g^  French  revolution.  In  Korkyra,  as  in  France, 
the  end  was  a  thorough  confusion  of  all  political  and  social 
morality  and  the  substitution  of  a  new  standard  of  right  and 
wrong.'  The  animosity  of  the  contending  orders  was  embittered 
by  resentment  for  terrible  injuries,  and  all  generous  impulses  were 
repressed  by  a  blind  and  furious  desire  for  revenge.  The  secret 
destruction  of  enemies  became  the  great  end  to  be  aimed  at,  and 
they  who  were  foremost  in  the  race  of  iniquity  won  a  reputation 
for  pre-eminent  wisdom.  In  this  liorrible  rivalry  the  interests  of 
faction  supplied  the  one  motive  for  every  measure  ;  and  the  ties 
of  kindred  and  friendship  went  for  nothing.  In  short,  men  on 
all  sides  acted  solely  from  an  all-al)sorbing  selfishness,^  and  earth 
for  the  time  became  a  hell. 

The  first  step  of  the  Korkyraians  sent  back  from  Corinth  was  a 
personal  canvassing  of  the  citizens  generally  for  the  purpose  of 
Opp„p„^j,y  breaking  oif  the  alliance  Avith  Athens.  It  was  so  far 
of  the  p()j)u-   successful  that  on  the  arrival   of   envoys   from  Athens 

lace  and  tlie  i     /i      •    ^i  i  i    '        x:       •  ii 

aristocratic  and  Coriutli  a  decree  was  passed  connrming  the 
factious.  Athenian  alliance  but  re-establishing  the  ancient 
friendship  with  the  Peloponnesians, — an  arrangement  whicli  de- 
feated itself.  Their  next  act  was  the  accusation  of  I'eithias,  a 
prominent  member  of  the  demos,  on  the  general  charge  of  be- 
traying ]\orkyra  to  the  Athenians.  The  trial  (how  carried  on, 
we  know  not)  ended  in  liis  acquittal  :  and  Peithias  in  his  turn, 
picking  out  five  men  of  the  wealthiest  families,  charged  them 
with  cutting  stakes  for  vine  props  from  the  Temenos  of  Zeus  and 
Alkinoiis.  The  men  were  condemned  to  pay  the  fine  of  a  stater, 
or  four  drachmas,  for  each  stake  cut.  The  vastness  of  the  amount 
drove  them  to  take  sanctuary  and  to  pray  for  permission  to  pay 
by  instalments.  But  the  demon  of  vindictivencss  was  busy  at 
work  ;  and  Peithias  prevailed  on  the  people  to  let  the  law  take  its 
course.  He  was  about  to  propose  the  renewal  of  an  offensive 
alliance  with  Athens,  when  the  oligarchic  faction  resolved  to  take 

'  Tj/v  elufhlav  a^iurjiv  tC)v  ovn/iuTuv  *  nni/Tuv  (V  avTuiv  atTioi>  npxv  V  •^"^ 

i(:  rh  Ipya  iivTi'iV/.a^av  Ty  diKaiuaet.  TT7,eovE^iav  K(ii<^LXoTiftiav.  Thuc.  iii. 
Thuc.  iii.  82,  5.  82,  15. 


Chap.  IV.]         OPERATIONS  OF  DEMOSTHENES.  307 

the  matter  into  their  own  hands.  Breaking  suddenly  into  the 
council  chamber,  they  slew  with  their  daggers  Peithias  and  sixty 
of  his  fellow-senators,  and  then  carried  a  decree  that  neither 
Spartans  nor  Athenians  should  be  received  except  with  a  single 
ship.  Envoys  were  at  the  same  time  sent  to  Athens  to  announce 
this  resolution  and  to  warn  the  Korkyraians  who  had  sought  a 
refuge  there  against  making  any  attempts  to  disturb  the  order  of 
things  thus  established.  These  envoys  had  already  succeeded  in 
gaining  some  of  the  exiles  over  to  their  side,'  when  they  were 
seized  by  the  Athenians  and  placed  with  their  converts  on  the 
island  of  Aigina.'^  Meanwhile,  at  Korkyra  the  arrival  of  ambas- 
sadors from  Sparta  and  Corinth  encouraged  the  oligarchs  to  fresh 
acts  of  violence.  The  discomfited  demos  fled  to  the  Akropolis 
and  occupied  the  Hyllaic  or  southern  harbor,  while  their  enemies 
held  the  Agora  and  the  harbor  facing  the  coast  of  Epeiros.  Both 
alike  now  made  efforts  to  enlist  the  services  of  the  slaves  by  the 
promise  of  freedom.  The  slaves  for  the  most  part  joined  the 
people  :  the  oligarchs  were  strenglhened  by  800  mercenaries  from 
the  mainland.  A  battle  which  took  place  two  days  later  ended  in 
the  defeat  of  the  oligarchs,  who,  caring  not  at  all  whether  they 
destroyed  their  own  houses  in  that  quarter,  set  fire  to  the  Agora. 
Had  the  flames  been  carried  by  the  wind,  the  whole  town  nmst 
have  been  burnt.  At  this  moment,  when  the  demos  was  most 
fiercely  excited,  the  Athenian  fleet  of  twelve  triremes  under  Ni- 
kostratos  reached  Korkyra.  The  wish  of  the  Athenian  admiral 
was  to  effect  an  offensive  alliance  between  Athens  and  Korkyra, 
and,  having  done  this,  to  pour  oil  on  the  troubled  waters.  This 
task  he  thought  he  had  accomplished  Avhen  he  had  persuaded  the 
Korkyraians  to  content  themselves  with  bringing  to  trial  ten  of 
the  most  conspicuous  and  intemperate  of  the  oligarchic  party  ; 
and  he  was  about  to  return  to  Naupaktos  when  the  demos  begged 
him  to  leave  five  of  his  ships  and  to  take  in  their  stead  five  tri- 
remes which  they  would  themselves  man.  The  consent  of  Nikos- 
tratos  was  followed,  as  we  might  expect,  by  an  attemj)t  to  man 
tliese  ships  with  crews  taken  from  the  aristocratic  faction.  But 
the  going  into  vessels  under  tlie  command  of  an  Athenian  general 
was  much  like  going  to  Athens,  and  the  going  to  Athens  was  death. 
The  fear  of  being  thus  carried  away  drove  them  to  take  sanctuary 
in  the  temple  of  the  Dioskoroi.  Nikostratos  tried  in  vain  to  dis- 
abuse them  of  their  terrors  ;  but  the  people  were  now  in  a  state 
of  feverish  irritation,  and  construing  their  reluctance  to  serve  on 
shipboard  as  evidence  of  some  hidden  plot,  they  deprived  their 
enemies  of  their  arms,  and  made  fresh  attempts  to   destroy  them 

^  oaovi  tTVELaav.     Thuc.  iii.  72,  1.  -  See  p.  251. 


308  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  IH. 

which  were  again  bafRed  by  Nikostratos.  Four  liuudred  oligarchs 
took  refuge  at  the  Heraion ;  and  the  demos,  now  seriously 
alanned,  carried  them  over  to  the  opposite  islet,  and  sent  to  them 
thither  their  daily  supplies  of  food.  While  things  were  in  this 
state,  a  new  turn  was  given  to  affairs  by  the  arrival  of  the  Pelo- 
ponnesian  fleet  of  53  trii'emesoff  Sybota.  The  tumult  in  Korkyra 
was  terrible  when  in  the  early  morning  Alkidas,  with  whom 
Brasidas  was  joined  as  a  counsellor,  was  seen  beai-ing  down  upon 
the  island.  In  wild  confusion  the  Korkyraians  set  to  work  to  man 
60  triremes,  which  they  sent  out  one  by  one,  as  they  were  filled, 
instead  of  allowing  Nikostratos  to  follow  liis  plan  of  keeping 
Alkidas  in  check  until  the  Korkyraians  could  advance  in  a  com- 
pact body.  There  was,  in  short,  no  Jmthority  and  no  law.  Two 
Korkyraian  ships  at  once  deserted  to  the  enemy,  and  the  scattered 
groups  of  the  remainder  seemed  to  the  Spartans  so  contemptible 
that  twenty  ships  only  were  kept  back  to  oppose  them,  while  the 
remaiiuug  thirty -three  prepared  to  encounter  the  twelve  Athenian 
triremes.  But  Nikostratos  was  a  general  scarcely  less  formidable 
than  Phormion.  By  a  successful  charge  of  one  of  his  triremes  he 
sunk  one  of  the  Peloponncsian  ships,  and  then,  while  the  Korky- 
raians were  fighting  rather  among  themselves  than  with  tlieir  ene- 
mies, he  so  pressed  upon  the  S[)artans  by  sweeping  rapidly  round 
them,  that  the  twenty  sliips  reserved  to  deal  with  the  islanders 
were  drawn  off  to  the  aid  of  Alkidas.  In  face  of  this  overpow- 
ering force  Nikostratos  was  obliged  to  retreat;  but  he  did  so 
with  perfect  calmness  and  with  a  leisurely  movement  which 
might  give  tlie  Korkyraians  am})le  time  to  get  back  to  their  own 
harbor.  By  sailing  straight  to  Korkyra  Alkidas  might  now  have 
carried  everything  before  him  ;  but  to  the  disgust  of  Brasidas  he 
contented  himself  with  going  to  Sybota.  Still  fearing  another 
attack  the  Korkyraian  demos  made  overtures  to  the  four  hundred 
oligarchs  whom  they  liad  brought  back  to  Heraion,  as  well  as  to 
others,  and  prevailed  on  some  of  them  to  aid  in  manning  thirty 
triremes  Avhich  were  hastily  made  ready. 

The  Peli>ponnesian  fleet  departed  about  midday,  in  all  likeli- 
hood because  they  knew  that  large  reinforcements  might  soon  be 
Massacres  at  cxp^'ctcd  for  Nikostratos.  Night  was  closing  when 
Korkyra.  firc-signals  warned  Alkidas  that  Eurymedon  with  60 
Athenian  triremes  Avas  sailing  up  from  Leukas.  Escaping  under 
cover  of  darkness,  the  Peloponnesians  dragged  their  ships  across 
the  Lenkadian  istlunns,'  and  so  avoided  an  encounter.  At  Kor- 
kyra the  approach  of  Eurvmedon  gave  a  vent  to  the  pent-up  fury 
of  the  demos,  who  now  felt  that  they  migl.t  requite  their  assail- 

>  See  p.  61. 


Chap.  IV.]         OPERATIONS  OF  DEMOSTHENES.  309 

ants  tenfold.  They  sent  their  ships  round  to  the  HyUaic  harbor, 
as  being  the  quarter  where  the  demos  was  strongest ;  but  before 
the  vessels  could  reach  the  haven,  the  work  of  bloodshed  had  be- 
gun. Those  of  the  oligarchic  party  who  had  been  induced  to 
serve  on  shipboard  were  taken  out  and  slain.  The  suppHants  at 
the  Heraion  were  invited  to  come  forth  and  take  their  trial.  Fifty 
obeyed,  and  Avere  slaughtered  within  sight  of  their  comrades. 
These  chose  rather  to  kill  themselves  than  to  be  butchered  by 
others  :  and  the  silence  of  death  soon  reigned  in  the  Temenos  of 
Here.  For  seven  days  the  massacre  went  on,  and  Eurymedon 
lifted  not  a  finger  to  check  or  repress  it.  On  his  departure  five 
hundred  only  of  the  oligarchic  faction  remained  alive.  These 
seized  the  Korkyraian  forts  on  the  mainland,  and  by  frequent  raids 
from  these  strongholds  did  so  much  mischief  to  the  ishuid,  that 
the  demos  soon  found  itself  pinched  by  famine.  But  their  efforts 
to  obtain  aid  from  Sparta  and  Corinth  were  fruitless ;  and  with  a 
desperate  resolution  they  landed  on  the  island,  burnt  their  ships  to 
make  retreat  impossible,  fortified  themselves  on  the  heights  of 
Istone  to  the  north  of  the  city,  and  made  the  surrounding  country 
a  desert.'  They  had  maintained  this  post  for  nearly  two  years, 
when  an  Athenian  fleet  on  its  way  from  Pylos  to  Sicily  under 
Eurymedon  and  Sophokles,  son  of  Sostratides,"  came  to  the  aid  of 
the  demos,  who  were  thus  enabled  to  storm  the  fort  and  to  bring 
to  terms  the  garrison  which  had  fallen  back  on  a  lofty  and  pre- 
cipitous peak.^  By  the  covenant  then  made  the  oligarchic  Korky- 
raians  agreed  to  submit  themselves  to  the  judgment  of  the 
Athenians,  and  to  give  up  their  allies  to  the  will  and  pleasure  of 
the  conquerors.  Stripped  of  their  weapons,  they  were  taken  to  the 
islet  of  Ptychia,  to  be  thence  conveyed  to  Athens ;  but  it  was 
"pecially  agreed  that  the  attempt  of  any  one  man  to  escape  would 
nullify  the  whole  treaty  and  leave  them  at  the  mercy  of  their 
enemies.  The  demos  or  their  chiefs  were  resolved  that  the  treaty 
should  be  nullified.  Emissaries  were  accordingly  sent  by  these 
men  to  the  })risoners,  to  cheat  them  into  breaking  the  letter  of  the 
bond.  They  told  them  that  the  risk  involved  in  an  attempt  to 
escape  was  at  least  to  be  preferred  to  the  certainty  of  betrayal  by 
the  Athenians  into  the  hands  of  merciless  enemies,  and  they 
offered  to  provide  boats  to  carry  them  to  the  mainland.  The 
dismal  ceremony  went  on.  The  boat  was  sent ;  the  men  got  into 
it,  and  were  taken  ;  and  the  treaty  was  broken.  The  demos  had 
gained  their  point,  and  to  their  lasting  shame  the  Athenian 
generals  had  gained  theirs  also.  These  men  were  under  orders  to 
go   on  to   Sicily,  and  to  Eurymedon  at  least  massacre  was  as 

'  Thuc.  iii.  85.  "  lb.  iii.  115.  '  lb.  iv.  45. 


310  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  HI. 

notliing  in  comparison  with  the  annoyance  of  sending  home  a  body 
of  prisoners  in  the  charge  of  a  deputy  who  would  carry  off  all  the 
honors  of  the  victory.  The  lie  which  was  to  cheat  the  prisoners 
to  their  ruin  was  thus  deliberately  concocted  between  tbe  Athe- 
nian generals  and  the  chiefs  of  the  Korkyraian  demos,  who  now 
shut  up  their  victims  in  a  large  building,  from  which  they  were 
taken,  twenty  at  a  time,  and  made  to  run  tiie  gauntlet  between  the 
swords  and  spears  of  their  personal  enemies.  Sixty  had  thus  met 
their  doom,  when  they  who  remained  within  the  building  found 
out  what  was  going  on  and  refused  to  leave  it.  The  Korky- 
raians  took  off  the  roof  of  the  building  and  began  to  shoot  their 
prisoners  down  with  tiles  and  arrows.  The  horrors  which  had 
already  been  witnessed  at  the  lleraion  were  now  seen  here  on  a 
larger  scale.  All  night  long  the  work  of  murder  and  suicide  went 
on,  and  in  the  morning  the  dead  bodies  were  laid  mat-wise  on 
waggons  and  carted  away  from  the  city.  The  oligarchic  faction  was 
destroyed  ;  and,  like  fire  dying  out  for  lack  of  fuel,  the  awful  feuds 
which  had  drenched  Korkyra  in  bloo  i  ceased,  necessarily,  to  rend 
the  island  asunder.  Tbe  narrative  brings  before  us  the  picture  of 
an  unspeakably  vindictive  and  savage  people  ;  nor  is  there  any  use 
in  attempting  to  discriminate  shades  of  guilt  in  criminals  whose 
iniquities  arc  all  of  so  deep  a  dye.  But  one  fact  stands  out, 
nevertheless,  with  singular  clearness.  The  island  was  in  orderly 
condition,  when  the  oligarchic  prisoners  from  Corinth  came  back 
with  the  deliberate  purpose  of  stirring  up  trouble  within  it.  It  is 
enough  to  say  tliat  in  both  parties  the  sense  of  patriotic  union  was 
dead  ;  that  the  demos  was  at  the  least  an  apt  disciple  in  that 
school  of  iniquity  in  which  the  oligarchic  factions  in  Hellas  gene- 
rally had  distanced  all  competitors  ;  and  lastly  that  the  crimes 
of  these  oligarchic  factions  were  the  crimes  of  men  wlio  called 
themselves  pre-eminently  gentlemen,  nobly  born,  nobly  bred, 
generous  and  refined,  yet  not  less  superstitious  and  altogether  more 
hard-hearted,  selfish,  and  cruel  than  the  men  of  less  splendid 
ancestry  on  whom  they  looked  down  with  infinite  contempt. 

The  summer  of  the  fifth  year  of  the  war  brought  to  the  Athe- 
nians some  success  by  the  capture  of  Minoa,  an  islet  used  by  the 
Capture  of  ^legarians  as  a  post  to  defend  their  neighboring  har- 
xik'"!.''^  bor  of  Nisaia.  The  general  in  command  of  the  suc- 
suninierof  cessful  forcc  was  Nikias  the  son  of  Nikaratos,  a  man 
4vr7  B.C.  y^,]^^  jj,  j.jjj(j  ^jj  jjj^^.g  j\\\^,f[  ti,e  office  of  Stratcgos  even 

as  a  colleague  of  Perikles,  but  who  is  at  this  time  first  brought 
before  our  notice  by  Tluicydides.  From  this  moment  he  becomes 
one  of  the  most  prominent  actors  on  the  stage  of  Athenian  poli- 
tics, until  his  career  closed  under  conditions  thoroughly  abhor- 
rent  to   a   nature   singularly  unenterprising  and    cautious.      J)e- 


Chap.  IV.]         OPERATIONS  OF  DEMOSTHENES.  311 

ficient  in  military  genius,  possessed  of  not  niucli  power  as  an 
orator,  caring  more  for  the  policy  of  his  party  than  for  the  wider 
interests  of  his  country,  this  strictly  conservative  and  oligarchic 
statesman  gained  and  kept  an  ascendancy  at  Athens  which  might 
almost  be  put  into  comparison  with  that  of  Perikles.  With  both 
it  rested  in  some  part  on  the  same  foundation.  In  all  that  related 
to  money  Nikias,  like  Perikles,  was  incorruptible  ;  and  this  fact 
alone,  joined  with  careful  decency  of  Hfe,  secured  for  him  an 
influence  with  the  people  which  from  every  other  point  of  view 
was  utterly  undeserved.  Endowed  with  ample  wealth,  he  made 
use  of  his  riches  not  for  indulgence  in  luxury  and  pleasure  but 
chiefly  for  the  magnificent  discharge  of  the  Litui-gies  imposed  on 
the  wealthiest  citizens.  Generous  in  the  gifts  which  were  to  in- 
crease his  popularity,  he  was  careful  in  husbanding  and  extend- 
ing the  resources  which  enabled  him  to  make  them.  He  was  a 
speculator  in  the  silver  mines  of  Laureion,  and  he  gained  a  large 
revenue  by  letting  out. slaves  to  work  in  these  mines.  In  no  way 
tainted  with  the  philosophical  tastes  of  Perikles,  Nikias  spent  his 
leisure  time  in  listening  to  the  discourses  of  prophets  whom  he 
kept  in  his  pay,  while  both  his  temper  and  the  need  of  attending 
to  his  property  made  him  either  unambitious  of  public  offices  or 
even  averse  to  filling  them.  Here  again  a  carefulness  which  took 
tlie  form  of  modesty  increased  the  eagerness  of  the  people  to  place 
him  in  positions  which  he  wished  rather  to  avoid,  and  to  comply 
even  with  unreasonable  demands  which  he  made  in  the  hope  of 
avoiding  them. 

The  sunnncr  in  which  Nikias  captured  Minoa  was  marked  by 
the  first  interference  of  the  Athenians  in  the  affairs  of  Sicily.  The 
autumn   was    darkened    by  the   reappearance   of   the   second  out- 
plague  which  after  a  lull  of  some  time  bui-st   out  with   pw^e^^t*^*^*^ 
extreme  violence  for  a  twelvemonth.     But  the   earth-  Athens, 
quakes  which  took  place  in  rapid  succession  in  Attica  and  Euboia 
and  especially  in  the  Boiotian  Orchomenos  during  the  following 
winter  and  spring  were  so  far  a   benefit  to   the   Athe- 
nians  that  they  prevented  the   invading  army  of  the   sixth  year 
Peloponnesians  from   aflvancing  any  further  than  the   of  tii"  ^^'i'"- 
isthmus.     An  unsuccessful  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  Athenians 
to  bring  the  island  of  Melos  into  the  Athenian  confederacy  was 
followed  by  an  enterprise  not  much  more  successful,  at  first,  on  the 
side  of  the  Spartans. 

The   Trachinians  of  the    Malian  gulf,  annoyed  by  the  moun- 
taineers  of   Oita,  had   thought  at  first  of  asking  help   Foundation 

from  the   Athenians.     But  "the  fall  of  Plataiai  or  the  ofHcraUieia 
11      •        1        1  c    »  1  •     11      by  the  Spar- 

recollection  that  the  power  of  Athens  was  practically   tans. 

confined  to  the  sea  led  them  to  apply  to  Sparta  ;  and  the  Spartans 


312  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

saw  in  this  petition  an  opportunity  for  inflicting  permanent  and 
serious  mischief  on  Athens.  Thus  sprung  into  existence  the  town 
of  Heraklcia,  from  which  friends  and  foes  expected  great  things, 
and  wliich  hereafter  was  to  attain  some  importance.  But  for  tlie 
present  a  blight  fell  on  the  new  settlement ;  and  the  Athenians 
found  that  nothing  was  to  be  feared  from  a  colony  which  had 
started  with  high  hopes,  as  under  the  special  protection  of  Herakles. 
Tidings  of  a  more  alarming  kind  reached  them  from  a  quarter 
to  which  they  had  looked  without  forebodings  of  evil.  The  Mes 
Defeat  of  Rcuians  of  Xaupaktos  had  impressed  on  Demosthenes 
Demos-  |.]jg  necessity  of  assailino;  in  their  fastnesses  the  savaijc 

thencs  in  Ai-  n    i       >.  ■     t  i  i---  i 

tolia.  clans  of  the  Aitolian  caterans,  who,  as  living  in  scattered 

hamlets,  could  be  attacked  in  succession  and  subdued  long  before 
they  could  combine  their  forces.  So  little  did  Demosthenes 
dread  a  conflict  with  these  mountaineers,  that  he  looked  forward 
not  only  to  an  easy  conquest,  but  to  making  use  of  them  in  further 
conquests.  Second  in  ability  as  a  naval  commander  only  to 
Phormion,  Demosttenes  allowed  himself  to  be  carried  away  into 
schemes  which  Perikles  assuredly  would  never  have  sanctioned. 
The  caution  which  led  the  great  statesman  to  oppose  the  expedi- 
tion of  Tolmides  to  Tanagra'  would  have  resisted  still  more  stren- 
uously the  daring  but  impracticable  plan  of  restoring  the  supre- 
macy of  Athens  in  Boiotia  by  an  attempt  made  not  from  Attica 
but  from  the  passes  of  the  Aitolian  mountains.  Yet  sucli  was  the 
plan  of  Deijjosthenes.  But  his  eyes  must  in  some  measure  have 
been  opened  to  the  difficulties  of  his  task,  when  on  reaching  Sol- 
lion  the  Akarnanians  flatly  refused  his  request  for  their  help.  Still, 
undeterred  by  their  desertion,  he  began  his  march  towards  the 
rusT^jed  sides  of  Oita.  The  villages  of  Potidania,  Krokyleion,  and 
Teichion  were  easily  stormed;  but  the  mountain  tribes  were  now 
astir,  and  even  the  clans  inhabiting  the  valleys  watered  by  the 
tributary  streams  of  the  Spercheios  hurried  to  the  aid  of  their 
kinsfolk.  Still  the  Me-ssenians  insisted  that  the  enterprise  was  not 
merely  practicable  but  easy  :  and  without  waiting  for  the  Lokiian 
liiiht-arined  troops,  of  whick  he  had  the  greatest  need,  he  advanced 
to  Aigition,  a  town  not  more  than  ten  miles  from  the  sea,  and 
carried  it  by  storm.  But  leaping  down  from  the  surrounding 
crags  the  Aitolians  hurled  showers  of  darts  on  the  Athenians, 
falling  back  when  these  came  forward,  and  harassing  them  as  they 
again  retreated.  Everything  depended  now  on  the  bowmen  in 
the  army  of  Demosthenes  ;  but  their  captain  was  presently  killed, 
his  men  scattered,  and  the  retreat  became  a  rout.  Hurrying  away 
from  the  Aitolian  javelins,  the  Atlienians  fell  into  chasms  worn 

'  See  p.  2^}\. 


Chap.  IV.]         OPERATIONS   OF   DEMOSTHENES.  313 

down  by  the  winter  torrents,  or  were  entangled  in  difficult  ground 
from  which  only  an  experienced  guide  could  extricate  them.  Un- 
happily the  Messcnian  Chromon,  who  had  thus  far  served  them, 
was  among  the  slain  ;  and  the  mountaineers  hastened  to  fire  the 
woods  in  which  these  fugitives  were  caught.  A  few  only  found 
their  way  to  the  Lokrian  Oineon,  whence  they  had  set  out ;  and 
the  triremes  which  had  brouglit  them  from  Leukas  departed  on 
their  cheerless  voyage  to  Athens.  J)emosthencs,  not  daring  to 
face  the  people,  remainel  in  the  neighborhood  of  Xaupaktos. 

But  the  Aitolians  were  now  spurred  on  by  the  desire  of  further 
vengeance  against  the  authors  of  the  recent  mischief  ;  and  when 
their  envoys  appeared  at  Sparta,  they  spoke  to  no  un-  Aitemntof 
willing  hearers.  It  was  now  autumn  ;  but  a  force  was  tiieAitoUans 
at  once  sent  oS  for  Delphoi,  where  Eurylochos,  the  ulnsonNau- 
Peloponnesian  general,  succeeded  in  detaching  from  pantos, 
their  alliance  with  Athens  the  Lokrian  tribes  through  whose  lands 
he  must  pass  on  his  way  to  Naupaktos.  Keeping  on  in  a  westerly 
direction,  he  also  took  the  Corinthian  colony  of  Molykreion,  now 
subject  to  Athens,  and  then  turned  round  upon  Naupaktos.  But 
here  he  had  a  more  formidable  enemy  to  deal  with.  Undeterred 
by  his  last  rebuff,  Demosthenes  went  in  person  to  Akarnania,  and 
by  persistent  intreaty  prevailed  on  the  Akarnanians  to  come  to  the 
aid  of  the  Messenian  city.  A  thousand  hoplites  were  embarked 
on  board  the  fleet,  and  Naupaktos  was  saved.  Eurylochos  fell 
back  to  the  west  on  the  Aitolian  town  of  Kalydon,  the  scene  of 
the  mythical  boar  hunt  of  Meleagros,  and  thence  on  Pleuron  be- 
neath the  heights  of  Arakynthos.  The  winter  season  had  begun 
when  3,000  Ambrakian  hoplites  seized  Olpai,  a  fortress  about 
three  miles  to  the  north  of  Argos  ;  tbe  Akarnanians  sent  also 
urgent  messages  to  Demosthenes,  who  no  longer  seemed  to  them 
a  person  to  be  slighted,  and  to  the  leaders  of  the  Athenian  fleet 
of  twenty  ships  then  coasting  off  the  Peloponnesos.  Soon  after- 
wards the  Athenian  fleet  sailed  into  the  Ambrakian  gulf  and  took 
up  a  position  off  Olpai,  while  Demosthenes,  who  was  now  chosen 
general  of  the  Akarnanians,  incamped  on  ground  separated  from 
that  which  Eurylochos  occupied  by  the  bed  of  a  winter  torrent  of 
more  than  usual  width.  Five  days  passed  without  any  movement. 
On  the  sixth  day  both  sides  made  ready  for  battle.  From  the 
superiority  of  their  numbers  the  Spartans  were  able  so  to  extend 
their  line  as  well-nigh  to  surround  their  enemies  :  and  Demosthenes 
resolved  to  adopt  again  the  plan  which  had  brought  about  the 
discomfiture  of  the  Ambrakiots  with  Knemos  at  Stratos.'  In  the 
fight  which  followed,  the  Peloponnesians  under  Eurylochos  on  the 

'  See  p.  389. 
14  ^ 


314  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

left  wing  were  turning  the  flank  of  the  Messenians  under  Demos- 
thenes, when  the  Akarnanians  starting  from  their  liiding-placc 
attacked  them  in  the  rear.  Smitten  with  panic  terror  they  not 
only  fled  themselves  but  carried  most  of  their  allies  along  with 
them.  The  death  of  Eurylochos  and  of  the  best  amongst  his  men 
added  to  their  dismay.  In  the  meanwhile  the  Ambrakiots  and 
others  on  the  right  wing  had  chased  the  enemy  opposed  to  them . 
as  far  as  Argos.  Returning  to  the  battlc-lield,  they  found  the  day 
irretrievably  lost,  and  made  their  way  to  Olpai  in  u  disorderly 
retreat  which  added  to  the  number  of  the  slain. 

Darkness  was  closing  in  when  the  battle  ended.  During  the 
night  Menedaios,  who,  having  been  third  in  command,  had  now 
Retreat  of  taken  the  place  of  Eurylochos,  conviaced  himself  that 
thePeiopon-  his  first  duty  was  to  escape  from  a  difficult  if  not  a 

nesiai]8  after    i  a.  i         i  i.        tj.  i  •  •  i,       r 

the  defeat  at  desperate  entanglement.  It  was  his  wish,  or  course, 
Olpai.  iQ  extricate  all  who  had  fought  on  his  side.     When 

on  the  following  day  he  made  overtures  to  Demosthenes  for  a  truce 
which  should  give  them  time  for  retreat,  he  was  met  by  a  refusal 
to  all  appearance  peremptory  ;  but  he  was  privately  informed  that 
if  he  and  his  Peloponnesians  chose  to  withdraw  quietly  and  se- 
cretly, the  Akarnanian  generals  would  take  care  that  their  retreat 
should  be  mimolested.  These  ignominious  terms  were  not  re- 
fused ;  and  the  design  of  Demosthenes  for  discrediting  them 
among  the  allies  whom  they  abandoned  and  among  the  Greeks 
generally  was  thoroughly  successful. 

About  twelve  miles  to  the  north  of  Olpai  rose  two  precipitous 
hills,  known  as  Idomene.  The  higher  of  these  two  summits  was 
Deatruction  occupied  by  the  troops  sent  by  Demosthenes  to  iuter- 
brakfots"at  cept  the  Ambrakiots,  avIio,  having  already  posted  them- 
idomcne.  selves  on  the  lower  hill,  yet  knew  not  what  had  taken 
place.  Demosthenes  himself  marched  during  the  night  towards 
Idomene,  leaving  one-half  of  his  force  up  the  pass,  while  the  other 
half  worked  its  way  round  over  the  Amphilochian  hills.  At  dawn 
of  day  the  Ambrakiot  sentinels  heard  themselves  hailed  in  the 
familiar  Dorian  dialect  by  men  whom  they  naturally  took  to  be 
their  friends.  The  spokesmen  were  Messenians  whom  Demosthenes 
had  jiurposely  placed  in  the  van,  and  who  now  began  the  Avork  of 
slaughter  on  men  practically  unarmed  and  defenceless.  The  Am- 
hrakiots  were  iu  everyway  at  a  disadvantage.  They  were  roused 
suddenly  from  their  slumbers  by  enemies  who  had  taken  care  to 
cut  of?  .'ill  chances  of  escape.  The  necessary  result  followed. 
Matty  of  the  Atnbrakiots  rushed  into  the  gullies  and  watercourses 
and  thus  into  the  ambuscades  there  set  for  them.  A  few  stragglers 
only  rettimed  to  the  Atiihiakian  city,  while  the  Akarnanians,  hav- 
ing plundered   the  dead  and   set  up  their  trophies,  betook  them- 


Chap.  IV.]        OPERATIONS   OF  DEMOSTHENES.  315 

selves  to  Argos.  Thitlier  on  the  following  day  came  a  herald  from 
the  Ambrakiots  who  after  the  previous  eiigagenieiit  had  fled  into 
the  land  of  the  Agraians.  On  the  huge  pile  of  arms  taken  from 
the  men  slain  at  Idomcne  he  gazed  with  such  evident  astonishment 
that  a  bystander  asked  him  tlie  reason  of  his  wonder,  and  the 
number  of  the  bodies  which  he  demanded  for  burial.  To  his  re- 
ply that  they  were  at  the  most  two  hundred,  his  questioner  an- 
swered by  pointing  out  the  obvious,  fact  that  the  arms  before 
him  were  tliose  of  at  least  a  thousand  men.  '  Then,'  said  the 
herald,  '  these  are  not  tlie  arms  of  the  men  who  fought  with  us.'- 
'  But  they  must  be,'  retorted  the  Akarnanian,  '  if  you  fought  at 
Idomene  yesterday.'  '  We  fought  with  none  yesterday,'  was  the 
answer ;  '  the  battle  was  on  the  day  before  when  we  were  retreat- 
ing from  Olpai.'  '  It  may  be  so,'  said  the  other  ;  '  but  these  are 
the  arms  of  the  Ambrakiots  whom  we  defeated  yesterday  on  their 
way  from  the  city.'  The  herald  understood  at  once  that  the  whole 
force  of  Ambrakia  had  been  routed,  if  not  cut  to  pieces,  and  with 
a  loud  and  bitter  cry  of  agony  he  departed  without  giving  further 
heed  to  the  errand  on  which  he  had  come.  So  ended  the  most 
fearful  carnage  of  the  war  which  was  brought  to  a  close  with  the 
peace  of  Nikias.'  The  campaign  had  done  little  for  Athens,  but 
much  for  Demosthenes.  Witliout  calling  on  the  state  to  aid  him 
he  had  achieved  a  victory  which  insured  to  him  the  condonation 
of  his  previous  mistakes  ;  but  the  Athenians  had  gained  nothing 
beyond  a  pledge  on  the  part  of  the  Ambrakiots  that  they  would 
take  no  part  in  any  operations  directed  against  Athens. 

The  seventh  year  of  the  war  began  with  the  usual  invasion  of 
Attica  by  the  Peloponnesian  army  under  Agis,  the  son  of  Archi- 
damos  ;  but  the  time  of  the  inroad  was  earlier.  The  occupation 
corn  was  still  green,  and  a  singularly  cold  and  stormy  ^e^^og^^jg/ 
spring  added  to  the  discomfort  of  the  invaders  while  nesinthe 
it  increased  the  difficulty  of  getting  food.  But  scarcely  oTuie  wai!'^'" 
a  fortnight  had  passed  since  they  crossed  the  Attic  425  b.c. 
border,  when  Agis  received  tidings  which  caused  him  to  hurry 
homewards  with  all  speed.  The  ill-success  of  the  Aitolian  cam- 
paign had  not  damped  the  courage  of  Demosthenes,  or  deterred 
him  from  forming  elaborate  schemes  for  bringing  the  war  to  a  liap- 
py  issue.  His  plan  for  restoring  the  supremacy  of  Athens  over 
Boiotia  by  an  invasion  from  the  northwest  was  suggested  by  the 
Messenians  of  Naupaktos ;  in  his  present  design  he  followed  the 
advice  of  the  same  counsellors.  He  was  in  this  case  justified  in 
doing  s(f ;  and  the  high  reputation  which  he  had  won  through  his 
victories  at  Olpai  and  Idomene  insured  him  a  favorable  hearing 

'  Thuc.  iii.  113,  11. 


316  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

wlien  he  asked  the  sanction  of  the  people  for  employing  in  any 
operations  along  the  coasts  of  Feloponnesos  the  fleet  of  forty  ships 
which  they  were  sending  first  to  Korkyra'  and  then  to  Sicily.  His 
request  was  granted  ;  and  the  fact  that  he  was  not  one  of  the  Strate- 
goi  for  the  year^  attests  the  thorough  confidence  which  his  coun- 
trymen felt  in  his  genius.  But  the  generals  with  whom  he  sailed 
were  less  disposed  to  listen  when  on  doubling  the  promontory  of 
Methone  he  suggested  that  Pylos  might  sen^e  well  for  the  pur- 
poses of  his  scheme.  They  insisted  on  sailing  onwards,  but  a 
storm  brought  them  back  to  Pylos,  and  Demosthenes  again  urged 
the  advantages  of  occupying  a  spot  not  much  more  than  fifty  miles 
from  Sparta,  well  supplied  with  wood  and  stone  for  fortification, 
and  surrounded  by  a  practically  desert  countr3\  Their  reply  was 
that  many  such  spots,  might  be  found  on  the  Peloponnesian  coasts, 
if  ho  chose  to  waste  public  money  upon  them  ;  nor  had  lie  any 
better  success  either  with  the  subordinate  otticers  or  witlx  the  men. 
But  the  storm  lasted  on  for  days,  and  the  men,  wearied  with  idle- 
ness, began  of  their  own  accord  to  fortify  the  place  by  way  of 
passing  the  time.  They  soon  took  a  serious  interest  in  the  work 
which  they  had  begun  almost  in  sport,  and  toiled  hard  to 
strengthen  the  comparatively  small  extent  of  ground  which  was 
not  sufficiently  fortified  by  nature,  before  a  Peloponnesian  army 
could  be  marched  against  them.  Six  days  sufficed  to  complete 
the  wall  on  the  land  side,  and  Demosthenes  was  left  with  five 
ships  to  hold  the  place,  while  the  rest  went  on  to  Korkyra. 

The  spot  thus  chosen,  associated  with  the  traditional  glories  of 
Nestor,  is  described  by  Thucydides  as  a  rocky  promontory,  known 
The  bay  of  ^^^^  under  the  name  Koryphasion,  separated  from  the 
Sphakteria.  island  of  Sphakteria  by  a  passage  wide  enough  to  ad- 
mit two  triremes  abreast.  This  island,  fifteen  furlongs  in  length 
or  in  superficial  size  (for  his  expression  is  not  decisive  on  this 
point),  stretched  from  northwest  to  southeast,  a  passage  capable  of 
admitting  eight  or  nine  war-ships  abreast  dividing  it  from  the 
mainland.  Within  this  breakwater  lay  the  spacious  harbor  of 
Pylos,  in  which  J)emosthenes  hoped  to  raise  to  a  higher  point 
than  ever  the  reputation  of  the  Athenian  navy. 

The  tidings  that  the  Athenians  were  masters  of  Pylos  had 
brought  Agis  and  his  men  away  from  Attica  ;  and  a  large  force  of 
...    ,    ,       infantry  liad  assembled  to  attack  the   fortifications  on 

Attack  of  iii-iir 

Brnsidason    tlic   land   Side,   before  the   sixty   Peloponnesian  ships 

^  "*■  could  return  from  Korkyra.     Their  plan  was  simple, 

and  of  its  success  they  felt  no  doubt,  if  only  the  work  c#uld  be 

'  T]h'.  Ki)rk_vraiaii  denios  waa  at      Mount  Istone.     See  p.  309. 
this  time  still  annoyed  by  the  oli-  "  Thuc.  iv.  3,  3. 

garchical     exiloB     who    occupied 


Xe<i-  York:  Hai/.er  Jc  Biot/x-n. 


Chap.  IV.]        OPERATIONS  OF  DEMOSTHENES.  317 

done  before  Demosthenes  received  any  reinforcements.  The 
Athenian  ships  from  Zakynthos  might  arrive  at  any  moment ;  and 
in  the  interval  it  was  indispensably  necessary  that  the  occupants  of 
Pylos  should  be  crnshedbya  simultaneous  attack  by  land  and  sea. 
Triremes  lashed  together  with  their  heads  facing  seawards  were  to 
block  up,  it  is  said,  both  entrances  to  the  harbor,  while  a  body  of 
Spartan  hoplites,  landed  on  Sphakteria,  would  not  only  make  it 
impossible  for  the  Athenians  to  use  tliat  island  as  a  military  post, 
but  would  support  the  fleet  in  its  attack  on  the  fortification.  The 
former  part  of  this  plan  was  not  carried  out ;  but  the  hoplites, 
drafted  by  lot  from  all  the  Lochoi  or  centuries,  were  placed  on  the 
islet  under  the  command  of  Epitadas.  Demosthenes  on  his  side 
had  done  all  that  an  able  and  brave  leader  could  do.  Before  the 
Peloponnesian  fleet  entered  the  harbor,  he  had  sent  ofE  two  ships 
to  summon  with  all  speed  the  whole  squadron  froni  Zakynthos; 
and  drawing  up  his  own  five  triremes  on  the  shore  under  the  walls 
of  his  fort,  he  hedged  them  in  with  a  stout  stockade.  Their  crews 
he  armed  with  such  shields  (for  the  most  part  of  wicker  work)  as 
could  there  be  got  or  made  ;  and  the  few  weapons  which  he 
placed  in  their  hands  were  obtained  from  a  Messenian  privateer  of 
thirty  oars  and  a  pinnace,  from  which  he  received  also  the  not 
less  welcome  aid  of  forty  hoplites.  The  day  went  precisely  as  he 
had  anticipated.  On  the  land  side  Peloponnesian  besiegers  were 
not  much  to  be  feared  ;  and  we  are  only  told  that  they  achieved 
nothing.  Tlie  attack  made  by  the  fleet  of  43  ships  under  Thrasy- 
melidas  is  related  with  greater  detail.  In  detachments  of  four  or 
five  vessels  at  a  time  the  Spartans  strove  to  effect  a  landing  on 
some  of  the  narrow  openings  by  whicli  alone  they  could  approach 
the  fort.  The  Athenians  were  already  here  to  encounter  them  : 
but  they  had  a  powerful  ally  in  the  rocks  and  reefs  which  girt 
this  dangerous  promontory,  and  the  captains  of  the  ships  exhibit- 
ed a  natural  reluctance  to  risk  the  destruction  of  their  vessels. 
Furious  at  the  sight,  Brasidas  asked  them  whether  they  meant  for 
the  sake  of  saving  some  timber  to  allow  the  enemy  to  establish 
himself  in  their  country,  while  on  the  allies  he  urged  the  duty  of 
sacrificing,  if  need  be,  every  ship  belonging  to  them  as  a  small 
return  for  the  long. series  of  good  deeds  which  they  had  received 
from  Sparta.  Then,  insisting  that  his  own  ship  should  be  driven 
straight  upon  the  beach,  he  took  his  stand  on  the  gangway  ready 
to  spring  on  land.  In  this  position  he  was  exposed,  before  he 
could  strike  a  blow  or  even  attempt  to  leap  on  shore,  to  showers 
of  darts  and  arrows.  Struck  down  with  many  wounds,  he  fell 
back  fainting  into  the  forepart  of  the  vessel  with  his  left  arm  hang- 
ing over  the  side,  and  his  shield  slipped  off  into  the  water.  Dashed 
up  presently  by  the  waves  on  the  beach,  it  was  seized  by  the  Athe- 


318  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  HI. 

nians  who  witli  it  crowned  tlic  trophy  raised  after  the  battle.  The 
Spartans  were  completely  baffled ;  and  evening  closed  on  the 
strange  victor}'  of  Athenians  on  the  Peloponnesian  coast  over  Pelo- 
ponnesians  who  sought  in  vain  to  efiect  a  landing  from  their  own 
ships  on  their  own  shores.  Two  days  more  were  spent  in  futile 
efforts  on  the  part  of  the  Lakedaimonians  to  obtain  a  footing  on 
the  beach.  On  the  third  day  they  sent  for  wood  for  the  construc- 
tion of  battering  engines  ;  but  their  schemes  were  disconcerted  by 
the  arrival  of  the  Athenian  fleet  from  Zakynthos.  For  that  night 
the  Athenian  commanders  were  compelled  to  sail  back  to  the  islet 
of  Prote,  for  Sphakteria  was  full  of  hoplites,  and  the  Spartan 
army  held  the  ground  beyond  the  fortifications  of  Demosthenes, 
while  their  ships  lay  just  within  the  entrance  to  the  harbor.  On 
the  following  morning  the  Athenian  generals  advanced  in  order 
of  battle,  with  the  intention  of  forcing  their  way  within  the  pass- 
age, unless  the  enemy  should  come  out  to  meet  them  in  the  open 
sea.  With  a  strange  infatuation  the  Lakedaimonians  quietly 
awaited  their  attack  within  the  harbor  ;  and  the  Athenians  sweep- 
ing in  at  both  entrances  dashed  down  upon  their  ships,  disabling 
many  and  taking  five,  with  the  whole  crew  of  one,  and  running 
into  those  vessels  which  had  fled  to  the  shore.  Others  were  seri- 
ously injured  before  they  could  be  manned  and  put  to  sea ;  and 
others  again,  deserted  by  their  crews,  were  towed  away  empty. 

The  Athenians  had  won  another  and  a  decisive  victory  ;  and 
something  must  at  once  be  done,  if  the  hoplites  in  Sphakteria, 
Embass  of  ^^^^J  ^^  them  belonging  to  the  first  families  of  Sparta, 
the  Spartans  Were  to  be  saved  from  starvation  or  from  the  imminent 
for^tiie"'c-  '"'^^  °^  being  taken  prisoners  by  an  overwhelming  force, 
gotiation  of  The  ephors  themselves  at  once  hurried  from  Sparta  to 
Pylos  to  effect  a  truce  until  envoys  should  have  re- 
turned from  Athens  with  the  decision  of  the  people  whether  for 
peace  or  for  continued  war.  The  terms  on  which  this  truce  was  ar- 
ranged were  sufficiently  stringent.  Every  ship  of  the  Lakedaimo- 
nian  fleet,  wherever  it  might  be,  was  to  be  brought  to  Pylos  and 
surrendered  tu  the  Athenians,  who  were  to  yield  them  up  again 
at  the  end  of  the  truce  in  the  condition  in  which  they  had  received 
them  ;  and  no  attack  whether  by  land  or  sea  was  to  be  attempted 
against  the  Athenian  fortifications.  On  the  other  hand  the  Athe- 
nians, while  they  agreed  that  the  Spartans  should  under  strict  in- 
spection send  in  a  daily  allowance  of  food  and  wine  for  the  men 
imprisoned  in  Sphakteria,  reserved  to  themselves  the  right  of 
keeping  a  constant  guard  round  the  island,  under  the  one  condi- 
tion that  they  should  make  no  attempt  to  land  upon  it.  Not  very 
many  days  had  passed  since  the  Athenians  had  witnessed  the  pre- 
mature retreat  of  the   invading  army  ;  and  nothing  was  further 


Chap.  IV.J         OPERATIONS  OF  DEMOSTHENES.  319 

from  their  minds   than   the  thought   thrit   the   next  scene  in  the 

drama  woukl  be  the  sight  of  Spartan  ambassadors  suing  for  peace 

with  a  tone  of  moderation,  if  not  of  humility,  in  Uttle  harmony 

with  their  general  character.     The   blockade  of  the  hoplites  in 

Sphakteria  had  suddenly  opened  the  eyes  of  the  Spartans  to  the 

exceeding  value  of  forbearance  and  kindliness,  and  indeed  to  the 

general  duty  of  the  forgiveness  of  injuries.     The  Hellenic  world, 

they  urged,  was  sorely  in  need  of  rest,' and  the  boon  would  be  not 

the  less  welcome  because  they  knew  not  now  who  had  begun  the 

quarrel,  and  had  at  best  a  vague   notion  as  to  what  they  were 

fighting  for  ;  and  lastly  they  hinted  that  a  haughty  rejection  of 

their  proposal  would  carry  with  it  a  new  and  terrible  danger. 

Thus  far  Sparta  was  actuated  by  no  feelings  of  uncompromising 

enmity  towards  Athens  ;  but  the  loss  of  her  hoplites  in  Sphakteria 

and  still  more  their  massacre  if  taken  prisoners  by  the  Athenians 

would  make  the  Spartans  their  bitter  and  relentless  foes  in  a  war 

which  must  end  in  extermination  on  one  side  or  the  other. 

Adversity  often  teaches  some  very  wholesome  lessons,  and  the 

Spartans  never  spoke   more  to  the  purpose  than  when  they  said 

that  the  time  for  ending  the  war  had  come.     They   ^  ,  ^     ^ 
-  ^  T  ^  111  Debate  at 

had  indeed  forgotten,  or  tucy  did  not  care  to  dwell  on   Athens  on 

the  fact,  that  when  Athens  was  down  under  the  scourge  tkJiis*of  ufe 
of  the  great  pestilence,  they  had  dismissed  with  con-  Spartaa  en- 
tempt  the  Atlienian  envoys  who  had  come  to  sue  for  ^"^^' 
peace  ;  but  many  of  the  more  moderate  citizens  were  content  to 
overlook  this  inconsistency  in  their  wider  regard  for  the  permanent 
interests  not  of  Athens  only  but  of  Hellas.  Unfortunately  among 
these  moderate  citizens  not  one  was  to  be  found  who  could  venture 
to  force  these  interests  on  the  attention  of  the  people.  Had  Peri- 
klesbeen  alive  and  in  the  full  vigor  of  his  mental  powers,  he  would 
have  insisted  that  the  honor  of  Athens  must  be  amply  asserted ; 
but  he  would  have  insisted  not  less  earnestly  tliat  no  unnecessary 
hindrances  should  be  placed  in  the  way  of  a  settlement  which 
Athenians  might  make  not  only  with  satisfaction  but  with  self- 
respect.  But  Perikles  was  dead,  and  Kleon  was  living  with  a 
spirit  unchanged  from  the  day  when  he  hounded  on  his  country- 
men to  slaughter  the  friendly  Demos  as  well  as  the  rebellious  oli- 
garchy of  Mytilene.  The  account  which  Thucydides  gives  of  the 
interference  of  Kleon  in  the  debate  is  short  and  marked  by  his 
personal  animosity  to  the  man.  Introduced  with  all  the  particula- 
rity of  a  first  notice,' Kleon  is  represented  as  saying  that  the  Athe- 
nians could  not  honorably  demand  less  than  the  surrender  of  the 

'  The  introduction  in  Thucy-  which  he  is  introduced,  iii.  30,  5, 
dides,  iv.  21,  2,  is  clearly  superfiu-  before  the  second  debate  about  the 
OU8  after  the  very  similar  terms  in      Mytiienaians. 


320  THE   EMPIRE   OF   ATHENS.  [Book  IIL 

boplites  in  Sphaktcria  with  all  their  arms,  and  that  after  these  men 
should  ha\-e  been  brouglit  as  prisoners  to  Athens,  the  Spartans 
might  make  a  further  truce  pending  negotiations  for  a  permanent 
peace,  on  the  one  condition  of  giving  back  to  the  Athenians  Ni- 
saia,  Pegai,  Troizen,  and  Achaia  which  had  been  extorted  from 
them  under  constraint  long  before  the  beginning  of  the  war.' 

To  these  demands  the  Spartan  envoys  made  no  direct  reply  ; 
but  no  rejection  of  the  proposal  was  implied  in  their  request  for 
Kuptnre  of  the  appointment  of  commissioners  to  -discuss  the  terms 
the  truce.  ■with  them  and  submit  the  result,  as  it  must  necessarily 
be  submitted,  to  the  people.  In  the  case  of  the  My  tilenaians  Kleon 
had  availed  himself  of  the  popular  feeling  which  was  smarting 
under  the  sense  of  a  causeless  revolt  on  the  part  of  a  state  which 
had  been  treated  with  exceptional  kindness  ;  and  he  now  availed 
himself  of  the  popular  sentiment  which  sprang  from  a  natural 
elation  on  success  as  sudden  as  it  was  unlooked-for  and  decisive. 
On  hearing  the  I'equest  of  the  Spartan  amba.ssadors,  he  burst  out 
into  loud  and  indignant  denunciations  of  their  double-dealing.  He 
had  suspected  from  the  tirst  that  they  had  come  with  no  good 
intent :  he  was  now  sure  that  they  wished  only  to  cheat  and  mis- 
lead the  people,  before  Avhoni  he  bade  them  speak  out  anything 
which  they  had  to  say.  The  envoys  were  taken  by  surprise. 
Popular  debates  were  things  unknown  at  Sparta  ;  and  the  uncul- 
tured discipline  under  which  their  lives  had  been  passed  left  them 
little  fit  to  cope  with  the  bluster  of  loud-tongued  speakers  or  to 
plead  their  cause  before  a  vjist  assembly.  Nor  had  any  citizen  of 
the  moderate  party,  from  Nikias  downwards,  the  courage  to  de- 
mand that  the  request  of  the  envoys  should  be  submitted  to  the 
decision  of  the  people.  It  was  the  duty  of  such  citizens  to  deny 
the  right  of  Kleon  to  impute  evil  motives  to  the  ambassadors. 
They  might  have  insi.'^ted  that  although  the  peo})le  nuist  in  tlie  last 
resort  sanction  or  condemn  the  conclusions  reached  by  the  men 
whom  thcv  might  appoint  as  commissioners,  the  preliminary  stages 
would  be  far  better  left  to  the  coun.sels  of  a  few  citizens  selected 
especially  for  the  tjusk.  Nikias,  or  those  who  agreed  with  him, 
might  have  urged  further  that  of  these  citizens  Kleon  himself 
should  be  one  ;  nor  in  such  case  could  Kleon  have  repeated  his 
impudent  a.ssumption,  when  it  must  have  called  forth  the  obvious 
retort  that  liis  words  must  be  made  good  by  some  show  of  proof. 

"With  the  return  of  the  envoys  to  Pylos  the  truce  ended,  and 
RcBuniption  the  Spartans  demanded  the  restoration  of  their  fleet, 
blocknrte  of  ■^^"*'  ^'^^  Athenians  alleged  against  them  some  attack 
SphaktiTia.  on  their  fortification  ;  and  as  the  slightest  infniction 
of  any  one  part  of  the  agreement  was  to  vitiate  the  whole,  they 
'  See  p.  254. 


Cmu".  IV.]         OPERATIONS  OP  DEMOSTHENES,  321 

refused,  on  this  excuse  which  the  historian  admits  to  be  paltry, 
to  surrender  tlie  Lakedaimonian  ships.  Protesting  against  the 
iniquity,  the  Spartans  made  ready  to  carry  on  the  war.  They  did 
so  at  a  great  disadvantage  :  and  the  cii'cumstances  of  the  case 
generally  make  it  more  than  possible  that  the  double-dealing  which 
Kleon  imputed  to  the  Spartan  envoys  was  distinctly  contemplated 
by  Demosthenes  and  the  Strategoi  when  the  Lakedaimonian  fleet 
was  committed  to  their  charge.  Their  one  great  object  now  was 
to  cut  off  all  possibility  of  escape  from  the  hoplites  in  Sphakteri^a  ; 
and  the  most  effectual  way  of  preventing  the  Spartans  from  getting 
at  them  would  be  to  deprive  them  of  their  ships. 

But  at  first  it  seemed  as  though,  in  spite  of  these  vast  advan- 
tages, the  Athenians  would  find  that  they  had  undertaken  a  task 
beyond  their  powers.  Their  slender  garrison  was  itself  causes  tend- 
besieged  by  an  army  which  occupied  the  land  on  all  {"f  J'JiJ^'^"' 
sides  :  and.  one  solitary  spring  on  the  summit  of  the  siege. 
little  peninsula  furnished  a  scanty  supply  of  water  for  them  and  for 
the  crews  of  the  triremes.  Compelled  to  land  whether  for  sleeping 
or  eating  from  ships  which  had  no  accommodation  for  either  pur- 
pose, they  scraped  aside  the  pebbles  on  the  beach  to  get  such  water 
as  they  might  find  underneath,  and  after  a  short  time  for  rest  re- 
turned on  board  to  make  room  for  others  to  land.  On  the  other 
hand  the  hoplites  in  Sphakteria  were  well  supplied  from  a  spring  in 
the  centre  of  the  island  ;  and  the  Spartans  on  shore  pi'omised  free- 
dom to  Helots  and  large  rewards  to  freemen  who  might  succeed  in 
bringing  ground  corn,  cheese,  wine,  or  other  provisions  into  the 
island. 

In  short,  the  prospects  of  Demosthenes  and  Eurymedon  were 

singularly  dark  and  gloomy  ;  and  they  were  at  once  felt  to  be  so 

at  Athens  when  the  tidings  came   not  that  Sphakteria   Mis!<ion  of 

veas  taken  but  that  the  hoplites  within   it  were   in  no    Kkon  with 

lack  of  food  while  their  own  men  were  beginning  to  be   ments'for 

in  want.     The  feeling  of  elation  caused  by  the  coming   I'y'os. 

of  the   Spartan   envoys  as  humble  suitors  was  followed  b}'  dark 

forebodings,  and  the  popular  feeling  ran  strongly  not,  as  it  should 

have  done,  in  the  channel  of  self -accusation,  but,  according  to  the 

Athenian   fashion   of   shifting  all   responsibility   upon    advisers, 

against  Kleon.     The  leather-seller  was   indeed   sorely  perplexed, 

and  in  the  spirit  of  selfishness  which  characterises  all  sides  in  this 

fearful  war'  his  opponents  were  in  the  same  measure   deliglited. 

At  the  spur  of  the  moment  he  charged  the  messengers  from  Pylos 

with  falsehood  :  but  he  felt  that  he  had  made  a  false  move  when 

they  asked  that  commissioners  should  be  sent  to  test  the  truth  of 

their  report,  and  when  he  himself  was  chosen  along  with  Theogenes 

'  See  pp.  304,  310. 
14* 


322  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

to  discharge  this  duty.  If  he  went,  he  must  either  cat  his  own 
words,  if  their  account  should  be  correct,  or  be  soon  convicted  of  a 
lie,  if  he  ventured  to  put  a  better  face  upon  the  matter.  Then 
followed  a  scene  which  singularly  illustrates  that  state  of  political 
feeling  in  the  oligarchic  party  at  Athens  which  was  afterwards  to 
lead  to  signal  disaster.  In  bringing  about  the  dismissal  of  the 
Spartan  envoys  Kleon  was  distinctly  both  foolish  and  Vvi'ong.  But 
the  question  now  was  how  to  insure  the  safety  of  thegairison  and 
fleet  at  Pylos ;  and  the  question  was  one  which  concerned  all 
Athenians  alike,  and  in  which  banter  and  levity  must  be  dangerous- 
ly near  the  borders  of  treachery.  With  all  his  faults  and  with  all 
his  recklessness  in  imputing  falsehood  to  others,  Kleon  Avas  none 
the  less  right  in  telling  the  Athenians,  that  if  they  believed  the 
news  just  brought  to  them,  their  business  was  to  sail  without  a  mo- 
ment's delay  to  help  their  countrymen  and  seize  the  hoplites  in 
Sphakteria ;  that  if  the  Strategoi  then  present  were  men  they 
would  at  once  do  so  ;  and  that  if  he  were  in  their  place  not  an 
hour  should  be  wasted  before  setting  off.  Nikias,  instead  of  feel- 
ing that  Kleon  was  doing  no  more  than  pointing  out  his  clear  duty 
as  Strategos,  answered  at  once  that,  if  the  task  seemed  to  him  so 
easy,  he  would  do  well  to  undertake  it  himself.  Kleon  was  guilty 
of  indiscretion,  perhaps,  in  answering  that  he  was  ready  to  go  ; 
but  he  can  be  charged  with  nothing  more,  and  his  fault  was  more 
than  atoned  when  on  seeing  that  Nikias  really  meant  to  yield  up 
liis  authority  to  him  he  candidly  confessed  his  incompetence  for 
military  command.  With  incredible  meanness,  if  not  with  deli- 
berate treachery,  Nikias  called  the  Athenians  to  witness  that  he 
solemnly  gave  up  his  place  to  Kleon  ;  and  the  eagerness  of  the 
demos  to  ratify  the  compact  was  naturally  increased  by  the  wish 
of  Kleon  to  evade  it.  Noisy  and  arrogant  a.;  he  may  have  been, 
Kleon  yet  was  a  man  who,  like  Varro,  r(;fused  to  despair  of  the 
commonwealth  ;'  and  he  at  once  said  that,  if  he  must  go,  he 
should  set  out  on  his  errand  without  any  fear  of  the  Lakcdaimo- 
nians,  mider  the  full  assurance  that  within  twenty  days  he  would 
return  home  either  having  slain,  or  bringing  with  him  as  j)risoners, 
the  hoplites  now  shut  up  in  Sphakteria. 

The  bitter  animosity  of  Thucydides  to  the  man  w'ho  was  mainly 
instmmcntal  in  bringing  about  his  own  banishment  could  not 
Attituficof  tempt  him  to  suppress  facts;  but  it  led  him  to  indulge 
ifiiMJiignr^  in  feelings  which  apart  from  this  ground  of  irritation 
chic  puriy.  he  Would  have  scouted  as  unworthy  of  an  Athenian. 
Klei>n  had  done  no  more  than  assert  that  Athens  was  well  able  to 
do  what  Nikias  held  to  be  impossible  ;  and  Thucydides  stigmatises 
this  assertion  and  his  confident  anticipation  of  success  as  tokens  of 
'  I-iivy,  xxii.  Gl. 


Chap.  IV.]         OPERATIONS  OF  DEMOSTHENES.  323 

madness.*  Kleon  had  further  taken  care  that  his  colleague  should 
be  the  man  whose  genius  had  not  merely  planned  the  enterprise  at 
Pylos  but  had  successfully  achieved  a  far  more  difficult  task  among 
the  Akarnanianand  Amphilochian  mountains.  He  could  scarcely 
have  shown  sounder  sense  or  greater  modesty  in  his  arrangements  : 
and  yet  Thucydides  can  tell  us  without  a  feeling  of  self-condemna- 
tion that  Kleon's  speech  was  received  by  the  Athenians  with 
laughter  and  that  sober-minded  men  were  well  pleased  with  an 
arrangement  which  could  not  fail  to  insure  one  of  two  good 
things,  either  the  defeat  and  ruin  of  Kleon  or  a  victor}'-  over  the 
Lakedaimonians  which  might  open  the  way  for  peace.  Still  more 
astounding  is  his  statement  that  the  ruin  of  Kleon  was  what  these 
sober-minded  men  especially  desired.^  In  the  judgment  of  Eng- 
lishmen these  sober-minded  men  would  be  mere  traitors  :  but  it 
is  hard,  if  not  impossible  to  believe,  that  the  words  of  Kleon  were 
received  with  laughter  by  the  whole  body  of  the  Athenians,^  and 
we  are  driven  to  the  conclusion  that  in  this  instance  personal 
jealousy  has  betrayed  Thucydides  into  a  distortion  or  at  least  into 
the  exaggeration  of  fact.  The  laughter  came  probably  only  from 
the  members  of  the  oligarchic  clubs  and  from  those  who  were 
afraid  of  offending  them. 

Thus  ended  a  scene  infinitely  disgraceful  to  Nikias  and  his 
partisans.  But  Kleon  found  himself  at  Pylos  among  men  who 
were  not  less  ready  than  the  Athenians  at  home  to  Attack  of 
fall  in  wdth  his  plan  of  immediate  and  decisive  opera-  ^^"Jfie  ^the- 
tions.  They  were  thoroughly  tired  of  being  besieged  uiaus. 
themselves  while  they  Avere  professedly  blockading  others  :  and  a 
fire,  accidentallykindledby  Athenians  who  were  compelled  to  land 
in  parties  on  the  island  and  dine  under  a  guard,  had  burnt  down 
most  of  the  wood  in  Sphakteria  and  greatly  lessened  the  risks  and 
the  difficulty  of  landing.  The  Spartan  hoplites  could  no  longer 
shoot  them  down  from  behind  impenetrable  coverts,  while  they 
also  lay  exposed  to  the  arrows  of  the  Athenian  bowmen,  and  the 
island  could  with  comparative  ease  be  traversed  by  a  hostile  force. 
Hence  on  the  arrival  of  Kleon  there  seemed  to  be  the  more  likeli- 
hood that  the  Spartans  on  the  mainland  would  listen  to  the  pro- 
I)osal  which  was  at  once  made  to  them  for  the  surrender  of  the 
hoplites.  But  the  Spartans  would  not  hear  of  it ;  and  with  the 
full  consent  of  Kleon  Demosthenes  arranged  the  plan  of  attack. 
His  great  aim  was  to  do  his  work  by  means  of  the  light-armed 
troops.  An  encounter  of  Athenian  with  Spartan  hoplites  could 
lead  only  to  terrible  slaughter  in  which  not  only  would  the  Athe- 
nians probably  be  the  greater  sufferers  but  a  large  nuinber  of  the 
enemy  would  be   slain  whom  he  especially  wished  to  take  alive. 

'  iv.  39.  3.  "  iv.  28,  5. 

^  T  oic  ^i  'Adr/vaioic  iveneae  k.  t.  X.  iv.  28,  5. 


324  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  IIL 

This  end  he  hoped  to  achieve  by  surrounding  tlieni  with  numbers 
so  manifestly  overwhelming  as  to  convince  them  that  tiieir  only 
course  was  to  surrender ;  nor  could  it  be  said  that  a  slur  was  cast 
even  on  Spartan  bravery  if  390  men  with  their  attendants  yielded 
up  their  weapons  to  an  army  falling  not  much,  if  at  all,  short  of 
10,000.  From  the  first  the  Spartans  had  no  chance.  The  stones 
and  arrows  shot  from  the  slings  and  bows  of  their  enemies  told  on 
them  from  a  distance  at  which  their  own  heavy  spears  were  use- 
less ;  and  if  they  made  a  charge,  the  force  in  front  fell  back  while 
others  advanced  to  annoy  them  in  the  rear.  Before  them  stood 
motionless  the  compact  mass  of  Athenian  hoplites  ;  but  all  at^ 
tempts  to  reach  them  were  baffled  by  showers  of  weapons  from  the 
light-armed  troops  on  either  side.  All,  it  is  true,  who  came  within 
their  reach  were  borne  down  by  the  strokes  of  the  most  redoubt- 
able warriors  in  the  world  ;  and  at  the  outset  the  light-armed 
troops  of  Demosthenes,  even  at  a  safe  distance,  gazed  with  feel- 
ings of  wonder  bordering  almost  on  dismay  upon  men  whose 
bravery,  strength,  and  discipline  had  won  for  them  a  terrible  re- 
putation. But  the  discovery  that  at  a  little  distance  tliey  were 
comparatively  powerless  so  far  restored  their  self-possession,  that 
rushing  simultaneously  from  every  side  they  ran  with  loud  cries 
and  shoutings  on  the  devoted  band.  Unable  in  the  fearful  din 
purposely  raised  by  their  assailants  to  hear  the  orders  given,  they 
at  length  began  to  fall  back  slowly  to  the  giiard-j)()st  at  the  north- 
western end  of  the  island  where  the  ground  is  highest ;  but  the 
very  fact  of  their  retreat  insured  their  doom.  They  had  abandoned 
the  only  spring  of  water  on  the  islet,  and  in  a  few  hours  more  or 
less  thirst  alone  would  do  all  that  Demosthenes  could  desire.  But 
in  the  meanwhile  th(;y  were  comparatively  safe.  Their  rear  was 
covered  by  the  sea,  and  the  Athenians  now  as  vainly  strove  to 
dislodge  them  from  their  position  as  the  Spartans  had  thus  far 
sought  in  vain  to  come  to  close  quarters  with  the  Athenian  hoplites. 
Demosthenes  and  Kleon  were,  however,  soon  relieved  of  their  per- 
plexity. The  leader  of  the  Messenian  allies,  pledging  himself  to 
find  a  track  which  should  bring  them  to  the  rear  of  the  enemy, 
led  his  men  round  from  a  spot  not  within  sight  of  the  Spartans, 
and  creeping  along  wherever  the  precipitous  ground  gave  a  footing, 
suddenly  showed  himself  above  them.  Summarily  checking  all 
further  attack,  he  sent  a  herald  to  demand  unconditional  surrender  ; 
.ind  the  dropping  of  their  shields  as  their  hands  were  raised  aloft 
allowed  that  the  inevitable  terms  were  accepted.  Four  hundred 
and  twenty  ho])Htes  had  been  cooped  up  in  Sphakteria  when  Kleon 
arrived  with  his  reinforcements.  Of  these  202  lived  to  be  taken 
prisoners,  and  of  these  again  not  less  than  120  were  genuine  Spar- 
tiatai  of  tiie  noblest  lineage.  The  loss  of  the  Athenians  was  triHing. 


Chap.  IV.]        OPERATIONS  OF  DEMOSTHENES.  3:25 

Seventy  clays  had  passed  away  siiice  the  victory  of  tlie  Athenian 
sliips  in  tlie  harbor  of  I'ylos  had  cut  olf  thchophtesin  Sphakteria 
from  ail  conmuinication  with  the  army  on  land:  but  Return  of 
so  carefully  had  Epitadas  husbanded  the  provisions  Kieon  with 
brought  in  during  the  three  weeks  of  truce,  or  so  sue-  pi-rsoners  to 
cessf  ully  had  the  Peloponnesian  boatmen  and  swimmers  •'^'■'^ens. 
evaded  the  Athenian  guard-ships,  that  the  besieged  were  in  no 
danger  of  famine  when  Demosthenes  and  Kleon  determined  to 
cut  short  the  contest.  The  work  was  now  done.  Within  twenty 
days  i.'om  the  time  of  his  departure  Kleon  re-entered  the  harbor 
of  Pciraieus,  bringing  with  h'un  the  costliest  freight  which  had 
ever  been  landed  on  its  shores.  Thucydides.  dismisses  the  fact 
with  the  curt  comment  that  the  mad  pledge  of  Kleon  had  thus 
been  literally  redeemed.  On  this  verdict  little  needs  to  be  said. 
Disgraceful  though  it  may  be,  it  is  not  nearly  so  disgraceful  as  the 
conduct  of  Nikias  and  his  partisans  in  not  merely  suffering  but 
compelling  Kleon  to  undertake  a  work  which  they  regarded  as  tit 
only  for  a  madman.  The  judgment  of  the  historian  is,  in  short, 
the  judgment  of  his  party  ;  and  it  proves  not  the  insanity  of 
Kleon  but  the  political  immorality  of  those  who  would  have  it 
that  10,000  Athenians,  under  a  general  singularly  fertile  in  expe- 
dients, popular  with  his  men,  and  supported  by  precisely  the  kind 
of  force  which  he  most  needed,  could  not  hope  to  capture  400 
Spartans  who  were  cut  off  from  all  possibility  of  escape  by  a  hedge 
cf  the  enemy's  ships  and  the  forfeiture  of  their  own  navy. 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE    PELOPONNESIAN'    WAR    FROM    THE    CAPTURE    OF    SPHAKTERIA 
TO    THE    PEACE    OE    NIKIAS. 

The  success  of  Demosthenes  and  Kleon  had  a  inarked  effect  on 
public  feeling  at  Athens.  The  occupation  of  Pylos,  bringing  with 
it  the  hope  of  capturing  the  hoplites  shut  up  in  chanKe  in 
Sphakteria,  had  not  only  removed  the  depression  f'!''iJJ"f,"i^'^ 
which  till  then  had  been  very  generally  felt,  but  had  Athens.' 
awakened  in  the  party  of  which  Kleon  was  the  most  prominent 
t-.peaker  a  desire  of  recovering  for  Athens  the  supremacy  which 
she  had  won  and  lost  before  the  thirty  years'  truce.  But  there 
were  nevertheless  many  to  whom  such  schemes  appeared  iui- 
practicable  ;  and  it  was  only  the  personal  influence  of  Kleon  which 
turned  the  scale  in  favor  of  carrying  on  the  war.     Now,  it  would 


32G  •    THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

seem,  no  voice  was  raised  on  behalf  of  peace  ;  and  Nikias  liad 
brouo-lit  on  himself  so  much  disgrace  by  his  behavior  in  the 
matter  of  Sphakteria  that  he  could  not  venture  on  warnings  which 
■^ould  now  have  been  both  seasonable  and  wholesome.  The 
Athenians  could  make  peace  whenever  they  might  choose  to  do 
so  ;  but  without  offering  for  the  present  any  terms  to  the  Spartans 
they  placed  a  permanent  garrison  at  Pylos,  and  tlie  exiled  Messe- 
nians  returning  eagerly  from  Naupaktos  began  to  lay  waste  the 
Lakonian  temtories.  i 

The  northern  portion  of  the  Peloponnesos  was  now  to  suffer 
from  the  aclivitv  of  the  Athenians.  A  fleet  of  eighty  ships  issued 
Camnaien  fi"om  Peiraicus  under  cover  of  night,  and  before  dawn 
of  Nikias  on  the  army  had  disembarked  on  the  beach  beneath  the 
theSarouic^  hill  on  which  stood  the  unfortified  village  of  Solygeia 
s^^^-  distant  about  six   miles   from   Corinth   and  two  from 

the  isthmus.  Fire-signals  announcing  the  event  called  forth  the 
whole  available  Corinthian  force.  The  fight  which  followed  was 
one  at  close  quarters  throughout ;  but  the  issue  of  the  obstinate 
contest,  after  a  temporary  repulse  of  the  Athenians,  was  deter- 
mined by  the  Athenian  cavalry.  The  Corinthians,  destitute  of 
horsemen,  Avere  at  length  made  to  give  way  ;  the  Athenians 
sailed  on  the  same  day  to  Kronunyon,  and  ravaged  its  lands.  On 
the  next  day  they  occupied  the  peninsula  between  Epidauros  and 
Troizen,  and  building  a  wall  across  the  isthmus,  made  it  a  perma- 
nent post  from  which  raids  might  be  made  on  the  coast  lands  of 
the  neighborhood.' 

The  history  of  this  momentous  year  was  not  yet  closed.  An 
Atlienian  fleet  had  yet  to  make  its  way  to  Sicily,  and  on  its  voyage 
Eurymedon  was  to  bring  about  by  his  detestable 
the  Per!<ian  treachery  the  slaughter  which  marked  the  end  of  the 
phernef  on  bloody  Struggles  at  Korkyra.^  An  incident  on  the 
his  way  to  shores  of  the  Egean  brought  the  Athenians  into 
Sparta.  momentary   contest    with   the    Persian    power.     Arta- 

pherncs,  an  envoy  from  Aitaxerxes  to  the  Spartans,  was  seized  at 
Eion  on  the  mouth  of  the  Strymon  by  the  commander  of  one  o*f 
the  tribute-gathering  Athenian  ships,  and  was  brought  to  Athens 
with  his  dispatches.  The  gist  of  these  lay  in  the  complaint  that 
with  all  his  efforts  the  king  could  not  make  out  what  the  Spartans 
wanted.  Their  ambassadors  had  come  each  with  a  different  story, 
and  if  they  wished  to  make  their  meaning  clear,  they  nnist  send 
with  Artaphernes  men  who  could  speak  intelligibly.  The  dispatch 
of  Artaxcrxes  never  readied  Sparta.  Artaphernes  was  sent  back 
to  Ephesos  with  some  Athenian  envoys  to  the  great  king.    About 

'  Thuc.  iv.  45.  "  See  p.  309. 


Chap.  V.]  BRASIDAS  IN  THRACE.  327 

the  objects  of  their  mission  nothing  is  said  ;  but  if  we  may  fairly 
infer  that  they  aimed  at  detacliing  Persia  from  all  alliance  with 
Sparta,  we  may  be  quite  sure  that  they  were  guiltless  of  the 
treachery  which  led  the  Spartans  to  call  down  the  force  of  an 
Asiatic  despot  to  aid  them  in  crushing  an  Hellenic  city.  To  them 
the  absurdity  of  bringing  a  Persian  fleet  or  army  to  the  Pelopon-- 
nesos  was  manifest :  and  in  the  East  tJieir  only  interest  was  to 
keep  the  Persian  king  within  the  bounds  which  for  nearly  half  a 
century  he  had  been  compelled  to  respect.  But  the  object  of  the 
Athenians,  wliatever  it  may  have  been,  was  frustrated  by  the 
death  of  the  king.  The  envoys  heard  the  tidings  at  Ephesos,  and 
returned  straight  to  Athens. 

The  building  of  a  new  wall  to  their  city  by  the  Chians  seemed 
to  the  Athenians  to  forebode  a  rebellion  such  as  tli.it  orck-rtotUe 
which  they  had  already  had  to  crush  in  Samos  and  ciuans  to 
Lesbos,  and  a  peremptory  order  was  at  once  sent  to  tl"e  ncwlvall 
them  to  pull  it  down.  The  decision  of  the  Athenians  "f  theircity. 
was  soon  justified  by  the  hostile  movements  of  Lesbian  exiles  on 
the  opposite  mainland. 

The  Spartans  had  been  already  more  than  vexed  by  the  settle- 
ment of  a  hostile  force  on  the  little  peninsula  of  Pylos  ;  but  within 
sight  of  the  southwestern  promontory  of  Lakonia  lay  Athenian 
an  island,  of  which  according  to  an  old  story  the  sage  ^f  ^'I'ther"^ 
Chilon  had  said  that  it  would  be  well  for  the  Spartans  424  b.c. 
if  they  could  sink  it  to  the  bottom  of  the  sea.*  Whatever  pre- 
cautions the  Spartans  may  have  taken  (and  Thucydides  tells  us 
that  they  guarded  Kythera  with  more  than  usual  care),  they  were 
ineffectual  against  the  energetic  attacks  wliich  Nikias  and  his 
colleagues,  with  a  fleet  of  sixty  ships  carrying  2,000  hoplites  and 
some  horsemen,  made  simultaneously  upon  the  two  towns  in  the 
island.  Li  fact,  tlie  resistance  was  more  nominal  than  real ;  and 
the  enterprise  had  been  in  part  concerted  with  a  friendly  body 
among  the  people  who  wished  to  be  rid  of  the  oligarchic  rule  of 
Sparta.  But  for  these  allies  the  Athenians  would  without  hesi- 
tation have  dealt  with  Kythei-a  as  they  had  dealt  with  Aigitia.'^ 
As  it  was,  some  few  were  sent  to  take  their  trial  at  Athens,  under 
promise,  however,  that  they  should  not  be  put  to  death  ;  and  the 
Athenians  set  to  work  to  show  the  Spartans  how  they  meant  to 
use  their  new  conquest.  Athenian  ships  made  descents  on  Asine, 
Helos,  and  otlier  places  on  the  Lakonian  gulf.  The  lands  of 
Epidauros  Limera  on  the  eastern  coast  were  then  ravaged,  and 
lastly  the  Athenian  fleet  appeared   before  Thyrea  where  the  ex- 

'  Herod,    vii.   235.     See   p.  188.     liave  been  written   before  the   de- 
This   portion    of    the    history  of    scent  of  Nikias  on  the  island. 
Herodotos   must,  it   would   seeni,         ''  See  p.  351. 


328  THE   EMPIRE   OF  ATHENS.  [BooK  IIL 

pelled  Aiginetans  had  found  a  home.  The  iViginetans  captured 
within  it  were  all  taken  to  Athens  and  were  all  there  put  to  death. 
Thus  was  swept  away  the  remnant  of  that  people  who  had  shaved 
with  the  Athenians  the  glory  of  Salamis,  and  a  second  catastro- 
phe as  horrible  as  that  of  Plataiai  attested  the  strength  of  the 
fatal  disease  which  rendered  impossible  the  growth  of  an  Hellenic 
nation. 

It  was  at  this  time,  it  would  seem,  that  the  Spartans  committed 
a  ci-ime,  the  reality  of  which  we  can  accept  only  on  the  assertion 
Massacre  of  of  an  historian  with  whose  veracity  even  personal 
thc^Spar^  hatred  was  not  allowed  to  interfere.  Among  those 
tans.  who  risked  life  and  limb  to   convey  food  to  the  men 

shut  up  in  Sphakteria  the  most  prominent  were  the  Helots  to 
whom  the  Spartans  had  promised  freedom  as  the  reward  of  their 
good  service.  But,  if  Thucydides  may  be  believed,  the  eyes  of 
the  Spartans  were  blinded  to  everything  except  the  fact  that  He- 
lots (probably  those  who  had  not  been  manumitted)  were  deserting 
to  the  Messenians  at  Pylos,  and  that  the  success  of  Nikias  had 
opened  for  them  another  refuge  at  Kythera.  Happily  for  the 
lasting  interests  of  mankind  the  most  strenuous  preachers  of  the 
gospel  of  slavery  have  never  hesitated  to  act  towards  the  slaves  of 
other  men  on  the  hypothesis  that  of  all  evils  slavery  is  the  worst ; 
and  even  Aristotle  himself,  who  would  no  more  concede  the  right 
of  rebellion  to  his  own  'animated  machines"  than  he  would 
concede  it  to  his  horses  or  his  asses,  would  without  scruple,  if 
he  wished  to  ruin  the  citizen  of  another  state,  teach  that  man's 
'  breathing  instruments  '  that  they  had  fully  as  much  right  to  be 
free  as  their  master.  The  panic  fear  caused  by  the  dread  of  such 
teaching  has  led  to  some  crimes  the  enormity  of  which  staggers 
our  powers  of  belief ;  but  these  crimes  have  in  their  turn  sealed 
the  doom  of  that  accursed  system  which  received  an  execrable 
sanction  from  philosophers  like  Aristotle  and  Plato.  Goaded  on 
by  such  unreasoning  terrors,  the  Spartans,  it  is  said,  issued  a  pro- 
clamation that  all  who  felt  that  their  exploits  on  behalf  of  Sparta 
gave  them  a  title  to  freedom  might  at  once  come  forward  and 
claim  it,  under  the  assurance  that  if  their  claim  should  be  found 
to  rest  on  good  evidence  the  boon  should  be  conferred  upon  them. 
How  many  came  forward  we  are  not  told  :  two  thousand,  it  is  said, 
were  selected  as  worthy  of  liberty,  and  with  garlands  on  their 
heads  went  the  round  of  the  temples  in  which  they  now  stood  on 
a  level  with  the  highest  born  Dorian.  But  the  Spartans  never 
meant  that  the  gift  should  be  really  enjoyed.  A  few  days  later,  <J 
these  2,000  men  not  one  remained  to  be  seen.     How  they  had  di.s 

'  t:(ii('vxov  (ipyavov.     Polit.  i.  4,  2. 


Chap,  v.]  BRASIDAS  IN  THRACE.  329 

appeared,  no  one  ever  could  say  :  but  if  tliey  lived  at  all,  their 
place  literally  know  them  henceforth  no  more.  If  we  hold  that, 
the  crime  was  committed,  there  seems  to  be  no  other  time  to 
which  we  can  possibly  assign  it :  but  there  is  a  strange  inconsis- 
tency in  the  readiness  of  the  Spartans  to  employ  the  surviving 
Helots  on  foreign  service  after  wreaking  on  them  cruelties  which 
might  waken  a  desperate  resistance  in  the  meanest-minded  of 
mankind.  If  there  was  danger  in  setting  Helots  free,  there  was 
greater  danger  in  placing  arms  in  the  hands  of  their  kinsfolk  after 
a  massacre  more  ruthless  than  any  other  of  which  we  hear  even 
in  Greek  history.  Yet  Helot  hoplites  not  many  months  later  are 
dispatched  with  Brasidas  to  Thrace :  and  no  catastrophe  follows. 

The  Spartans,  in  the  judgment  of  Thucydides,  were  suffering 
under  a  paroxysm  of  selfish  fear  which  had  its  natural  fruit  in 
cowardly  and  atrocious  cruelty.  AVhether  such  a  Proposed  ex- 
state  as  Sparta  was  worth  the  saving,  is  a  question  Brasidas  to 
with  which  we  need  not  concern  ourselves ;  but  we  Thrace, 
can  scarcely  doubt  that  it  must  have  fallen  but  for  the  singularly 
un-Spartan  genius  and  energy  of  Bi'asidas.  The  larger  mind  of 
this  eminent  man  saw  that  only  a  diversion  of  the  Athenian  forces 
to  a  distant  scene  would  loosen  the  iron  grasp  in  which  they  now 
held,  the  Peloponnesos.  Such  a  diversion  was  reudered  practicable 
by  invitations  which  came  from  the  towns  of  the  Chalkidic 
peninsula  and  from  the  habitually  faithless  Perdikkas  who  now 
Avished  to  be  aided  in  settling  a  quarrel  with  the  Lynkestian  chief 
Arrhibaios.'  The  Spartans  were  well  pleased  to  intrust  the  task 
to  Brasidas,  whose  coming  the  Chalkidians  made  a  special  con- 
dition in  the  compact :  and  they  were  still  more  pleased  at  the 
opportunity  of  getting  rid  of  another  large  body  of  Helots  by 
sending  them  on  foreign  service.  Seven  hundred  of  these  bond- 
men were  armed  as  hoplites  ;^  and  the  fact  that  after  the  slaughter 
of  the  2,000  they  could  fail  to  take  dire  vengeance  as  soon  as  they 
liad  crossed  the  Lakonian  border  and  before  Brasidas  had  levied 
the  1,000  Peloponnesiau  hoplites^  which  accompanied  him  on  bis 
march  through  Thessaly  into  Thrace,  is  one  which  might  tempt 
us  to  think  that  the  story  of  that  fiendish  massacre  was  a  wild 
distempered  dream. 

But  before  he  could  complete  his  levies,  his  interference  was 
needed  nearer  home.  Probably  even  when  Megara  revolted  from 
the  great  city  with  which  she  had  chosen  to  ally  her-  Attempt*  of 
self,  there  was  a  minority  which  felt  that  union  with  theAtheni- 
Athens  was  better  than  independence  under  an  oliwar-  ""iaancf^ 
chy.  This  minority  had  gained  strength  both  from  Megara. 
the  bitter  lessons  of  a  protracted  war  and  from  the  raids  of  oligar- 
'  Time.  iv.  79.  "  lb.  iv.  80,  4.  '  lb.  iv.  78,  1. 


360  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  IIL 

chical  exiles ;  and  a  plan  for  the  surrender  of  the  city  "was  con- 
certed with  the  Athenian  generals  Hippokrates  and  Demosthenes. 
The  scheme  was  all  but  successful  ;  but  the  appearance  of  Brasi- 
das  gave  fresh  confidence  to  the  oligarchic  faction,  and  suggested 
to  the  Athenian  commanders  the  folly  of  risking  a  defeat  which 
would  be  most  severely  felt,  in  order  to  encounter  a  force  com- 
posed simply  of  detachments  levied  from  many  Peloponnesian 
cities  "which  would  lose  at  the  worst  only  a  small  fraction  of  their 
troops.  Their  retreat  was  followed  by  the  entrance  of  Brasidas 
into  Megara ;  but  this  fiery  Spartan  had  mc)re  important  work  to 
do  elsewhere.  On  his  departure  a  strict  oligarchy  Avas  set  up, 
"which  lasted,  the  historian  remarks,  far  longer  than  most  govern- 
ments set  up  by  a  minority  both  numerically  and  personally  in- 
significant.' Before  the  close  of  the  year  the  Megarians  gained 
possession  of  their  long  walls,  and  levelled  them  with  the  ground  f 
and  thus  was  demolished  a  work  by  which  the  Athenians  had 
hoped  to  maintain  on  the  isthmus  a  hold  as  firm  as  that  which 
they  kept  on  their  own  harbor  of  Peiraieus.^ 

Unconscious  of  the  dangers  which  were  threatening  them  from 
the  north,  the  Athenians  not  only  did  nothing  to  prevent  Brasidas 
Schemes  of    from  passing  onwards  to  kindle  the  flame  of  revolt  in 

the  Athem-  Cbalkidikc,  but  were  bent  on  makino;  another  attempt 
aiis  for  the  '  i  •  i    n      i  i  i  i         i 

recovery  of    to  rccovcr  the  Supremacy  which  had  been  lost  by  the 

macy  hr*"'    defeat   at   Koroneia.     With   the   help  of   the  Theban 

Boioiia.         Ptoiodoros,  it  was  arranged  that  Demosthenes  should 

sail  from  Naupaktos  to   Siphai,   a  town  about   25   miles  to  the 

south-west    of   Thespiai.     By   the    betrayal    of   this    place    the 

Athenians  would  obtain  a  footing  in  the  south.     In  the   north 

they  would  have  the   like   advantage  by  their   admission  within 

the   walls  of  Chaironcia,   while   in  the  east  they  would  gain  a 

still  stronger  base  of  operations  by  fortifying  the   gi'ound  round 

the  Delion,  a  temple   of   Phoibos  Apollon.^     The  success  of  this 

plan   depended  obviously  on  the  simultaneous  execution  of  these 

several    schemes.     Unluckily   the    Athenian    commanders    were 

not   punctual.     In    the   Corinthian   gulf   Demosthenes   sailed    to 

Siphai,  only  to  find  that  the  plot  had  been  betrayed  and  that  both 

Siphai  and  Chaironeia  were  held  by  the  Boiotians  in  full  force.* 

We  might  have  supposed   that  the   failure   of  Demosthenes  and 

the  consequent  inaction  of  the  Athenian  partisans  in  the  Boiotian 

towns  would   have  led  the   Athenians  to  question  the  prudence 

of   risking   thuir   chief  military  force  in  operations  which  would 

certainly  bo  resisted  with  the  undivided  strength  of  the  Boiotian 

'  Thuc.  iv.  74.  •■  Herod,  vi.  118. 

''  lb.  iv.  109.  ^  Thuc.  iv.  89. 

"  See  p.  349. 


Chap,  v.]  BRASIDAS  IN   THRACE.  331 

confederacy.  Not  less,  it  seems,  than  25,000  men  set  out  from 
Athens  to  fortify  tlie  Tenienos  of  Deiion.  In  five  days  their 
work  was  practically  done,  and  the  lij2;ht-arraed  force  marched 
about  a  mile  on  the  road  to  Athens,  while  Hippocrates  remained 
at  Deiion  with  the  Iioplites.  But  these  five  days  were  fatal  to  his 
enterprise. 

Gathering  from  all  the  cities,  the  troops  of  the  Boiotian  con-" 
federacy  huriied  towards  Deiion,  to  find  that  the  main  body  of 
the  enemy  had  passed  across  the  Athenian  border.  At  Battle  of 
fiist,  their  resolution  was  to  risk  no  engagement  on  Deiion. 
Attic  soil ;  but  this  decision  was  stoutly  opposed  by  the  Theban 
Boiotarch  Pagondas.  He  professed  that  he  could  not  understand 
the  subtle  distinction  which  forbade  encounter  with  an  enemy  on 
his  own  ground.  The  Athenians  were  their  enemies,  wherever 
they  might  be.  Their  main  army  had  but  an  instant  ago  profaned 
the  Boiotian  soil  :  their  hoplitcs  under  Ilippokrates  were  not 
merely  profaning  it  still,  but  were  defiling  the  temple  of  the  lord 
of  Delos.  Far  therefore  from  hesitating  to  attack  them,  they 
should  remember  the  achievements  of  their  fathers  at  Koroneia, 
and  teach  the  Athenians  that  men  who  love  freedom  will  not  part 
from  their  inheritance  without  at  the  least  striking  a  blow  to 
retain  it.  The  words  of  Pagondas  removed  all  scruples ;  and 
although  it  was  now  late  in  the  day,  they  resolved  to  fight  at 
once.  Between  the  two  armies  rose  a  small  hill,  which  deter- 
mined the  issue  of  the  struggle.  Ou  either  side  were  drawn  up 
the  two  opposing  masses,  the  Boiotians  being  arranged  after  a  sort 
which  marked  a  change  in  military  tactic  not  less  important  than 
that  which  had  raised  the  Athenian  navy  to  its  undisputed  pre- 
eminence. The  Theban  hoplites  were  drawn  up  25  men  deep  :'  the 
Athenian  front  had  a  depth  of  only  8  men.  The  arrangement 
points  to  a  growing  consciousness  that  with  opposing  forces  con- 
sisting of  men  equal  in  discipline,  bravery,  and  personal  streno-th, 
weight  must  decide  the  contest.  There  is  no  evidence  that  the 
Athenians  foreboded  any  disaster  from  this  difference  of  tactic, 
and  Ilippokrates  in  the  few  words  which  he  addressed  to  his  men 
as  he  rode  along  the  lines  reminded  them  chiefly  of  the  power 
which  they  had  won  by  their  victory  at  Oinophyta,  and  of  the 
glory  which  would  be  theirs,  if  by  another  victory  they  could  re- 
store the  supremacy  of  the  imperial  city.  The  battle  which  fol- 
lowed was  fiercely  contested.     The  Athenian  left  wing  in  spite  of 

'  Thucydides,  iv.   93,  adds  that  the  want  of  cohesion  wbicli  is  tho 

the  hophtes  of  tlie  other  cities  were  most  marked  characteristic  of  all 

drawn  up  after  the  fancy   of  the  the  Hellenic  states,  and  more  es- 

Boiotarchs      belonging    to     those  peciallyof  those  whose  coustitutioa 

cities.     The   statement   illustrates  was  olit>-archic. 


332  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  in. 

tlie  bravest  resistance  was  borne  down  by  the  tremendous  wall  of 
Theban  hoplites  ;  and  even  the  defeated  Thespians,  Tanagraians, 
and  Orchomenians  were  relieved  by  the  appearance  of  a  body  of 
men  whom  l*agondas  had  sent  secretly  round  the  little  hill,  and 
who,  suddenly  showing  themselves  to  the  Athenians,  threw  them 
into  a  confusion  which  soon  became  irretrievable.  So  fierce  was 
the  pursuit  that  probably  nothing  but  the  approach  of  darkness 
prevented  the  complete  destruction  of  the  Athenian  army.  Nearly 
a  thousand  Athenian  hoplites  with  their  general  Hippokrates  lay 
dead  upon  the  field.^  On  the  next  day  only  an  Athenian  garrison 
remained  to  defend  the  intrenchments  round  the  temple.  The 
rest  of  the  survivors  were  sent  home  by  sea. 

The  occupation  of  the  sacred  Temenos  had  awakened  a  singu- 
larly bitter  feeling  in  the  minds  of  the  Thebans.  Their  victory 
Refusal  of  gave  them  an  opportunity  for  indulging  it.  The  laws 
theBoiotians  of  War  among  all  tlie  Hellenic  tribes  required  from  the 
the  Ath"^  victor  the  surrender  of  the  dead  without  any  conditions 
nian  dead,  ^q  ^\^q  kinsmen  who  might  claim  them  ;  but  as  the 
Athenian  herald  was  on  his  way  to  the  enemy's  camp,  he  was  met 
by  a  Boiotian  herald,  who,  hurrying  back  with  him  to  Delion, 
charged  the  Athenian  garriso!i  with  wanton  profanation  of  a 
sacred  site,  and  added  that  the  bodies  of  the  dead  should  not  be 
restored  to  them  so  long  as  the  temple  or  its  close  should  be  occu- 
pied by  an  invading  force.  Unfortunately  the  Athenians  failed 
to  urge  the  obvious  answer,  that,  whatever  their  own  guilt  might 
be,  the  Boiotians  were  disingenuously  shirking  a  duty  for  which 
Hellenic  morality  recognised  no  evasion  and  admitted  no  excep- 
tions. Although  such  a  rejoinder  must  have  driven  them  to 
comply  with  the  Athenian  demand,  the  invaders  took  the  short- 
sighted course  of  denying  that  they  were  invaders.  The  Boiotians, 
they  argued,  had  gained  their  present  territories  by  the  conquest 
of  the  tribes  more  anciently  in  possession  of  them,  and  the  posses- 
sion of  the  temples  was  involved  in  the  possession  of  the  ground 
on  v.'hich  they  were  built,  the  extent  of  this  ground  being  a  mat- 
ter of  no  consideration.  The  Boiotians  retorted  that,  if  they  spoke 
the  truth,  tiiere  was  an  end  of  all  debate.  Athenians  in  xVttica 
might  do  what  they  willed  with  their  own,  and  being  within  their 
own  borders  they  might  bury  tlieir  dead  without  asking  permis- 
sion of  anyone.  Even  here,  the  Athenians  might  have  answered 
that  according  to  their  own  theory  the  limits  of  Attica  extended 
no  further  than  their  own  intrenchments,  and  thus  the  Boiotians 
were  l)ound  to  give  up  the  dead  without  further  speaking  ;  but  the 
reply  did  not  suggest  itself  to  their  herald,  whose  departure  was 
followed  by  an  immediate  attack  on  the  intrenchments, 
'  Thuc.  iv.  101. 


Chap.  V.]  BRASIDAS   IN   THRACE.  333 

Two  tliousand  Corinthian  hoplites,  together  witli  the  Pclopon- 
nesians  and  Mcgarians  set  free  from  Nisaia,  took  part  in  the  assault 
which  on  the  seventeenth  day  after  the  battle  was  sue  •    .  ^^    u  a  d 
cessful.     So  ended  a  scheme  which,  so  long  as   Brasi-   capture  of 
das  was  at  large,  ought  never  to  have  been  undertaken.      '^ '°"" 
But  the  fall  of  Delion  was  only  the  beginning  of  a  series  of  trou- 
bles which  were  to  lower  the  Athenians  in  the  eyes   of  Hellenes 
generally   as   much  as  the   events    of  Sphakteria   had  damaged- 
the  reputation  of  the  Spartans. 

While  the  Athenians  were  thus  wasting  their  energies  on  plans 
from  which  at  best  no  great  good  could  be  gained,  they  left  a 
pathway  open  to  the  most  al)le  and  the  most  vigilant  of  March  of 
their  enemies  to  strike  a  blow  at  the  very  heart  of  their  ^j^il'lf,® 
maritime  empire.  Demosthenes  was  perhaps  still  sail-  Thessaly. 
ing  from  Naupaktos  to  Siphai,  Avhen  from  the  Spartan  colony 
of  Herakleia  in  Trachis  Brasidas  sent  to  his  partisans  at  Pharsalos 
a  message  bidding  them  to  furnish  liim  at  once  with  guides  for  his 
march  through  Thessaly.  At  no  time  was  it  easy  for  a  foreign 
force  to  make  its  way  through  that  country  without  a  guide  ;  in 
the  present  temper  of  the  people  it  would  be  doubly  dangerous. 
As  it  so  turned  out,  the  whole  power  of  the  oligarchic  governments 
barely  sufficed  to  carry  him  through.  Setting  out  from  the 
Phthiotic  town  of  Melitia  on  the  banks  of  the  Enipeus  a  few  miles 
below  its  source  and  under  the  shadow  of  the  mighty  range  of 
Othrys,  he  had  not  reached  Pharsalos  (a  town  near  the  point  where 
the  Apidanos  joins  the  Enipeus  in  the  centre  of  the  great  Thessalian 
plain)  when  he  was  met  by  a  large  body  of  the  people,  who  seemed 
resolved  to  bar  his  further  progress.  To  their  plea  that  no  stranger 
could  pass  without  the  consent  of  the  commonwealth  the  guides  of 
Brasidas  at  once  answered  that  they  would  not  think  of  loading 
him  any  further  against  their  will ;  and  Brasidas  himself  with  that 
singular  power  of  adapting  himself  to  the  temper  of  his  hearers 
which  no  Spartan  had  ever  yet  displayed,  assured  them  that^  if 
they  wished  it,  he  would  at  once  turn  back,  but  added  that  he 
should  regard  it  as  churlish  treatment  if  he  were  sent  back,  since 
he  had  come  not  to  hurt  the  Thessalians  with  whom  the  relations 
of  Sparta  were  both  peaceful  and  friendly,  but  merely  to  carry  out 
plans  which  he  had  devised  for  the  humiliation  of  the  Athenians 
with  whom  they  were  at  open  war.  These  words,  it  is  said,  dis- 
armed the  opposition  of  the  Thessalians  ;  but  the  readiness  witli 
which  they  allowed  him  to  pass  onwards  showed  that  their  friendly 
feeling  for  Athens  was  a  sentiment  rather  than  a  principle.  Freed 
thus  from  a  serious  danger,  Brasidas  lost  not  a  moment  in  hurry  incr 
forwards  ;  but  the  wily  Makedonian  who  had  lured  him  by  tlie 
promise  of  maintaining  half  his  army  looked  upon  him  as  a  hired 


334  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

instrument  for  doing  any  work  which  he  might  have  in  hand. 
Sorely  against  his  will  Brasidas  was  dragged  off  to  the  mountain- 
pass  which  shut  in  the  territory  of  Arrhibaios  the  chief  of  th(i 
Makedonian  clan  of  the  Lynkestai.  With  a  mission  so  sharply  de- 
fined he  Avas  more  likely  to  convert  the  Lynkestian  prince  than  to  be 
himself  converted  to  the  theories  of  Perdikkas  ;  and  when  Arrhi- 
baios expressed  a  wish  to  submit  himself  to  arbitration  and  to  be- 
come the  ally  of  Sparta,  Brasidas  obstinately  refused  to  carry  the 
quarrel  further,  and  in  spite  of  prayers  and  protests  Avitlidrew  his 
forces. 

Not  until  he  had  passed  the  Thessalian  border  were  the  Athe- 
nians awakened  to  a  sense  of  their  danger  ;  and  even  when  they 
_     .^^  learnt  that  something  must  be  done,  they  acted  with  a 

of  the  Athe-  tardiness  and  hesitation  in  singular  contrast  with  the 
mans.  vehemence  and  promptitude  of  the  Spartan  champion. 

Nothing  can  sliow  more  clearly  the  fatal  loss  sustained  by  Athens  in 
the  death  of  Perikles  than  the  Aveakness  now  displayed  in  maintain- 
ing that  which  they  knew  to  be  the  very  foundation  of  their  em- 
pire. That  Perikles  would  have  countenanced  either  of  the  recent 
attempts  to  re-establish  the  supremacy  of  Athens  in  Boiotia,  we 
may  very  confidently  question  ;  that  he  would  have  staked  the 
whole  power  of  the  state  in  encountering  and  crushing  Brasidas, 
we  cannot  doubt  at  all.  The  preservation  of  the  subject  allies  on 
the  coasts  of  Thrace  was  a  matter  to  be  carried  through  at  all 
costs ;  but  instead  of  striving  with  the  energy  of  men  struggling 
for  their  lives  they  contented  themselves  with  simply  increasing 
their  garrisons'  in  the  cities  threatened  by  Brasidas. 

The  grapes  were  all  but  ready  for  the  gathering,  and  the  whole 
produce  of  the  year  was  therefore  at  his  mere}',  when  Brasidas 
Revolt  of  appeared  before  the  gates  of  the  Andrian  colony  of 
Akanthos.  Akanthos.  The  oligarchic  Chalkidians  at  whose  in- 
vitation he  liad  come  had  led  him  to  look  for  an  eager  and  even  an 
enthusiastic  welcome.  He  was  unpleasantly  surprised  to  find  that 
the  gates  were  guarded  and  that  lie  could  do  no  more  than  pray 
for  permission  to  plead  his  cause  before  them  in  person.  Once  ad- 
mitted, Brasidas  was  to  employ  again  those  arts  of  persuasion 
which  might  tempt  the  ignorant  into  thinking  that  Sparta  was 
training  up  a  body  of  citizens  like  the  adroit  orator  who  now  ex- 
hibited himself  as  the  apostle  of  absolute  freedom  and  of  perfect 
happiness  for  everybody.  His  business  now  Avas  to  convince  the 
Akanthians  that  they  could  secure  their  OAvn  Avelfare  only  by  re- 
volting from  Athens.  Reminding  them  of  the  AvhoUy  disinterested 
motives  which  had  led  Sparta  into  the  Avar,  he  assured  them  that  the 
state  Avhich  had  sent  him  was  honestly  anxious  to  confine  itself  to 
the  one  definite  task  of  putting  down  an  iniquitous  tyranny,  lie 
'  Thuc.  iv.  82. 


Chap.  V.]  BRASIDAS  IN  THRACE.  335 

had  come  to  set  them  free  :  he  was  amazed  at  not  finding  hhiiself 
welcomed  with  open  arms.  Their  coohiess  caused  him  oven  greater 
grief  and  alarm.  Tlieir  refusal  would  tempt  ihe  other  allies  of 
Alhens  in  these  Thrace-ward  regions  t-<>  think  that  the  freedom 
which  Brasidas  promised  was  Utopian,  or  that  his  power  to  insure 
it  to  tliem  was  not  equal  to  his  Will ;  and  he  could  not  allow  such 
thouglits  to  be  awakened  in  them.  Their  confidence  he  sought  to 
gain  for  Sparta  by  assuring  them  that  he  had  bound  theephorsby 
the  most  solemn  oaths  that  the  cities  which  might  join  him  should 
remain  absohitely  autonomous.'  Two  further  arguments  he  had 
yet  in  store.  The  one  was  addressed  to  that  centrifugal  instinct 
which  pre-eminently  marked  the  Hellenic  race  in  general :  the  other 
to  their  purses  or  their  stomachs.  He  assured  them  that  when  he 
spoke  of  freedom  and  independence,  his  words  were  to  be  taken 
in  their  literal  meaning,  and  not  as  denoting  merely  liberation  from 
the  yoke  of  Athens.  They  were  to  be  left  absolutely  to  themselves, 
as  unconstrained  as  the  oxen  which  parted  company  by  the  advice 
of  the  lion  who  hungered  after  their  flesh.  They  would  be  free, 
after  joining  Sparta,  to  manage  their  own  matters  to  their  own 
liking  ;  they  were  perfectly  free  to  decide  now  whether  they  would 
or  would  not  join  Sparta.  Only  they  must  remember  that,  as  things 
then  were,  a  large  amount  of  money  went  yearly  from  Akanthos 
in  the  form  of  tribute  for  the  support  of  a  tyranny  which  his  con- 
science would  not  allow  him  to  tolerate  ;  and,  further,  they  saw  his 
army  outside  their  walls.  He  would  leave  them  to  their  delibe- 
rations :  but  if  they  should  say  him  nay,  their  ripe  grapes  would 
be  trampled  under  foot,  their  vineyards  ravaged,  and  they  must 
make  up  their  minds  to  face  poverty,  perhaps  famine,  perhaps  also  a 
blockade.  This  forcible  special  pleading  carried  so  much  weight, 
that  a  majority  of  the  citizens  voting  secretly  decided  on  revolt. 
The  wretched  farce  of  free  debate  and  free  voting  was  ended,  and 
Akanthos  renounced  the  alliance  of  Athens.  Brasidas  had  begun 
his  work  well,  and  Stageiros,  another  Andrian  colony  a  few  miles 
more  to  the  north,  soon  followed  the  example  of  Akanthos.'^ 

Not  many  weeks  after  achieving  this  success  Brasidas  appeared 
before  the  walls  of  Amphipolis.^  The  post  was  as  strong  and  as 
easily  defensible  as  it  was  important.  By  a  mournful  surrenderor 
infatuation  it  was  allowed  without  a  sti-uo-gle  to  fall  into  Amphipoiis. 
the  hands  of  Brasidas.  On  a  stormy  and  snowy  night  the  citi- 
zens learnt  that  the  army  of  Bi'asidas  was  without  their  walls,  and 
that  their  lands  and  all  who  happened  to  be  without  the  city  were 
wholly  at  his  mercy.  So  great  was  the  confusion  that  in  the 
judgment  of  the  historian  Brasidas  might  with  ease  have  carried 

^  Thuc.  iv.  85,  6.  "  Thuc.  iv.  88. 

'  For  the  founding  of  this  colony  see  p.  259. 


336  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

the  place  by  assault :  but  he  allowed  his  men  to  pkinder  the  land 
instead,' and  so  gave  time  to  the  citizens  who  were  not  on  his  side 
to  recover  their  self-possession.  These  now  found  that  they  Avere 
still  in  a  numerical  majoritA'-  and  they  not  only  insisted  that  the 
gates  should  be  kept  shut,  but  tliat  the  Athenian  general  Eukles 
should  send  a  request  for  immediate  aid  to  his  colleague  Thucydides, 
the  historian,  who  was  then  with  his  fleet  off  the  island  of  Thasos 
about  half  a  day's  sail  from  Amphipolis.  With  a  feeling,  probably, 
of  deep  misgiving  and  self-accusation  Thucydides  hastened  to  the 
post  which  he  ought  never  to  have  quitted  after  the  arrival  of 
Brasidas  in  Makedonia.  Trusting  that  he  might  reach  Amphipolis 
in  time  to  save  it  from  falling  into  his  hands,  he  liopedthat  at  tlie 
worst  lie  should  be  able  to  rescue  Eion.  But  Brasidas  was  before- 
liand  with  him.  He  knew  that  for  a  large  proportion  of  the  cit- 
izens alliance  with  Sparta  had  no  attractions.  He  therefore  offered 
terms  by  which  he  hoped  to  determine  their  action  in  his  favor. 
All  who  chose  to  remain  should  have  the  full  rights  of  citizenship. 
To  those  who  preferred  to  depart  he  gave  five  days  for  conveying 
away  their  pruperty.  The  proposals  of  Brasidas  were  accepted, 
Amphipolis  was  gone,  and  within  twenty-four  hours  the  Spartans 
would  have  been  masters  of  Eion  :  but  on  the  evening  of  the 
same  day  the  seven  ships  of  Thucydides  entered  the  mouth  of 
the  Strymon,  and  this  fresh  humiliation  was  avoided. 

Thus  in  these  two  cities  of  Akanthos  and  Amphipolis  Ave  have 
a  greater  and  a  less  degree  of  opposition  to  the  wishes  of  Brasidas : 
Lightness  of  but  in  botli  cases  the  majority  of  the  people  is  disin- 
an'^imperh'l  cliucd  to  ally  itself  with  him,  and  in  neither  case  is 
yoke.  really  free  debate  or  free  voting  allowed.     The  con- 

clusion follows  irresistibly  that  apart  from  the  passion  for  inter- 
political  independence  the  subject  allies  of  Athens  had  no  sub- 
stantial grievance  calling  for  redress.  Men  whose  feelings  liave 
been  offended  are  not  likely  to  regard  the  offender  with  any  warm 
or  eager  affection  ;  but  so  long  as  they  feel  that  their  connexion 
with  him  is  on  the  whole  to  their  own  benefit,  they  arc  not  likely 
to  be  carried  away  by  enthusiastic  adn.iration  of  a  stranger  who 
simply  wishes  to  leave  them  in  a  state  of  complete  isolation.  It 
was  j)rccisely  thus  at  Akanthos  and  Amphipolis.  There  was  no 
positive  love  for  Athens :  but  indifference  towards  the  imperial 
city  implied  no  longing  to  be  severed  from  her  confederacy,  and 
the  introduction  of  l^rasidas  was  due  not  to  the  action  of  the  main 
body  of  the  citizens  who  in  both  these  towns  were  well  disposed 
to  Athens,  but  to  the  intrigues  of  a  small  but  overbearing  faction, 
which,  because  it  could  not  hope  for  the  voluntary  adoption  of 
their  ]»lans,  resolved  to  take  the  people  l)y  surprise  and  hurry 
tliein  into  revolt  under  pain  of  absolute  ruin  in  case  of  refusal. 


Ohap.  v.]  BliASIDAS  IN  THRACE.  337 

The  tidings  of  the  fall  of  Amphipolis  came  upon  the  Athenians 
almost  as  an  omen  of  doom.     But  nothing  was  done  beyond  dis- 
patching a  few  troops  to  reinforce  the  garrisons  in  the   Effects  of 
Thrace-ward   cities  ;  and   disasters  still  more  terrible   ^'"^  [=}"  of 
were  averted  only  by  the  jealousy  felt  at  Sparta  for  a   lis  on  the 
man  whose  achievements  might  bring  with  them  quite   aud*^the^^ 
as  much  of  annoyance  as  of  glory.     Their  chief  wish   Spartans.  . 
now  was  to  recover  the  prisoners  taken  in   Sphakteria  and  so  to 
bring  the  war  to  an  end.     For  Brasidas  the  continuance  of  the 
war  was  the  continuance  of  life  itself ;  and  while  he  set  to  work 
to  build  triremes  on  the  banks  of  the  Strymon,  he  asked  them  for 
more  troops  to  aid  him  in  carrying  out  his  schemes.     The  Spartans 
cared  little  for  liis  plans,  and  his  request  was  refused.' 

For  twenty  years  after  the  loss  of  Amphipolis  Thucydides 
lived  in  exile.  The  story  went^  that  Kleon  brought  against  him 
a  charge  of  incapacity  or  wilful  mismanagement,  and  Tiie  exile  of 
that  the  historian,  failing  to  defend  himself,  was  form-  Timcydides. 
ally  sentenced  to  banishment.  From  his  own  words^  we  do  not 
learn  that  he  was  sentenced  at  all ;  still  less  do  we  learn  the  na- 
ture or  amount  of  the  punishment  or  the  name  of  his  accuser.* 
It  is  more  than  possible  that  the  sense  of  personal  injury  may  have 
intensified  his  feelings  of  dislike  or  disgust  for  the  noisy  leather- 
seller  :  but  his  silence  on  the  share  of  Kleon  in  this  matter  seems 
to  attest  the  self-condemnation  of  the  general.  In  this  instance 
Kleon,  if  he  had  anything  to  do  with  the  matter,  was  perfectly 
right.  Amphipolis  and  Akanthos  were  lost  only  through  the  care- 
lessness of  Thucydides  and  his  colleague  ;  and  the  absence  of 
Thucydides  from  his  post  must,  it  is  to  be  feared,  be  set  down  to 
a  preference  of  his  own  interests  over  those  of  his  country. 

The  year  was  closing  with  a  series  of  misfortunes  and  discou- 
mgements  for  the  Athenians.  Their  garrisons  still  held  the  island 
of  Kythera ;  their  troops  aided  by  the  Messenians  still  harassed 
the  Spartans  frum  the  side  of  P\  los ;  the  Mcgarian  islet  of  Minoa 

■  Thuc.  iv.  108.  have  no  mcansofascLrtaining.   But 

'^  See  the  life  of  Thucydides  by  in  this  case  Oiuobios,  before  he  pro- 

Marcellinus,  p.  xix.  in  the  edition  posed  the  vote  for  the  recall  of  Thu- 

of  Arnold.  cydides,  would  have  had  to  propose 

^  Thuc.  v.  26.  the  repeal  of  the  Psephisma  order- 

^  Certainly  his  language  cannot  ing  the  capital  Ptntecce ;  and  we 

he  taken  to  mean  that  a  sentence  of  can  scarcely  suppose  thatPausanias 

banishment  for  the  precise  period  of  would  have  failed  to  state  this  fact. 

20  years  was  passed  upon  him  :  but  If  the  same  sentence  was  passed 

the  expressions  of  Pausanias,  i.  23,  upon  Eukles,  we  must  suppose  that 

11,  do  not  prove  conclusively  that  it  both  he  and  Thucydides  allowed 

was  not  passed.     Whether,  as  Dr.  judgment  togo  by  default,  and  that 

Thirlwall,  i?t«^.  G^r.  iii.  288,  thinks  consciousness   of    ill    desert   kept 

likely,  Thucydides  was  sentenced  both  of  them  away  from  Athens. 

not  to  banishment  hut  to  death,  we  Eukles  is  not  heard  of  ao^ain 

15 


338  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

was  still  an  Athenian  outpost ;  and,  above  all,  the  boplites  from 
Spliakteria  were  still  ■within  the  walls  of  Athens.  But  they  were 
now  daily  feeling  more  and  more  that  wars  are  wont 
Toronlby  to  take  tums  not  wished  for  Ly  those  wlio  make  them. 
Brasidas.  Their  attempt  on  Megara  had  been  followed  by  very 
partial  success  :  their  campaign  in  Boiotia  had  ended  in  utter  dis- 
comfiture ;  and  their  whole  empire  Avas  threatened  by  the  ope- 
rations of  Brasidas  in  Chalkidike.  Nor  had  they  yet  seen  the 
end  of  Spartan  successes  and  Atlienian  failures.  The  Athenian  gar-, 
rison  was  expelled  from  Torone,  a  city  lying  on  the  extreme  point 
of  the  Sithonian  peninsula,  and  the  Toronaians  followed  the  ex- 
ample of  the  men  of  Akanthos  by  joining  the  Spartan  confederacy. 

Amid  these  and  other  operations  in  Chalkidii.e  the  eighth  year 
of  the  war  came  to  an  end.  The  ninth  found  both  the  Spartans 
Trace  for  a  ^^^^  ^^^^  Athenians  more  than  ever  disposed  to  rid 
year  be-  themselves  of  the  growing  burdens  of  the  strife.  Little 
ens  ancf^'^  difficulty  tlierefore  was  found  in  aiTanging  the  terms  of 
Sparta-  a  truce  as  a  preliminary  measure  for  a  permanent  set- 

tlement. Eager  to  conclude  the  matter  at  once,  the 
Spartans  drew  up  and  signed  a  document  wliich  they  forwarded 
for  the  approval  of  the  Athenians  with  the  assurance  that  they 
would  readily  make  any  equitable  changes  which  the  Athenians 
might  consider  necessary.  This  document,  having  secured  to 
both  sides  equal  access  to  the  Delphian  temple  from  which  the 
Athenians  had  been  excluded  during  the  war,'  laid  down  practi- 
cally the  rule  that  during  the  year  of  truce  each  side  should  re- 
tain its  present  possessions.  The  covenant  was  acknowledged  to 
be  a  mere  temporary  measure,  leaving  room  for  more  deliberate 
discussions  for  the  permanent  ending  of  the  strife;  and  ample 
arrangements  were  made  for  the  safe  conduct  of  envoys  to  and 
fro  between  Athens  and  Sparta. 

The  liopes  which  the  Athenians  had  formed  of  a  time  of  re- 
pose among  their  subject  allies  on  the  coasts  of  Makedonia  and 
■Revolt  of  Tb race  were  soon  rudely  disturbed.  Two  days  after 
Mend'efrom  tbe  ratification  of  the  truce  Brasidas  received  the  ad- 
Athens,  hesion  of  Skione,  a  city  near  the  extremity  of  the 
Pallenian  peninsula.  It  is  not  pretended  that  the  subject  allies  of 
Athens  were  drawn  to  the  impeiial  city  b}'  any  other  considera- 
tions than  those  of  sound  reason  and  sober  judgment ;  and  reason 
and  judgment  are  the  first  to  lo.se  their  power  over  a  people  dazzled 
by  schemes  which  appeal  to  sentiments  thus  far  kept  under  control, 

'The  Boiotians   and    Pliokians  Ampliiktyoniccouncilhasseeming- 

were  no  parties  to  this  truce.     The  ly  no  voice  in  the  matter.  For  their 

Spartans   therefore   plndrre   them-  inaction  in  this  case  as  in  others, 

Belves  only  to  employ  persuasion  to  see  p.  23. 
get  this  concession  carried  out.  The 


Chap.  V.]  BRASIDAS  IN   THRACE.  339 

and  that  not  without  difficult}'^  and  irksome  self-restraint.  The 
campaign  of  Brasidas  had  now  acquired  a  romantic  cliaraeter,  and 
the  politic  harangue  in  which  he  lauded  the  boldness  of  the  Skio- 
naians  in  defying  the  efforts  of  Athens  made  them  look  on  them- 
selves as  fellow-crusaders  with  him  in  the  sacred  cause  of  liberty. 
Ill  the  place  of  public  assembly  a  golden  diadem  was  placed  on  the 
lujad  of  the  Deliverer  of  Hellas  ;  in  private  houses  he  was  crowned 
with  fillets  and  honored  as  an  athlete  who  had  reached  the  highest 
standard  of  Hellenic  humanity.  In  the  midst  of  these  rejoicings 
the  commissioners  from  Sparta  and  Athens  arrived  to  announce 
the  truce.  A  reckoning  of  the  time  showed  that  the  revolt  of 
Skione  had  taken  place  since  the  ratification  of  the  covenant,  and 
the  Athenian  Aristonymos  refused  to  recognise  this  acquisition  of 
Brasidas  as  coming  within  the  terms  of  the  treaty.  Time  pressed, 
and  Brasidas  boldly  lied.  His  false  message  went  to  Sparta  and 
there  received  credit.  The  true  account  stirred  up  at  Athens  a 
vehement  wrath  which  refused  to  listen  to  the  Spartan  proposal 
to  submit  the  matter  to  adjudication.  The  revolt  of  people  in 
the  position  of  the  Skionaians  was  a  deliberate  defiance  of  Athens  : 
and  Kleon,  encountering,  it  would  seem,  little  opposition  or  none, 
carried  a  decree  dooming  the  Skionaians  to  the  sentence  which 
had  been  all  but  carried  out  after  the  revolt  of  Mytilene.'  It 
was  not  long  before  the  town  of  Meudc  followed  the  example  of 
Skione,'^  and  Brasidas,  who  had  been  naturally  disgusted  with  a 
truce  which  cut  short  his  career  of  conquest,  received  the  city 
without  hesitation  into  the  Spartan  confederacy. 

Brasidas  was  now  to  pay  the  penalty  of  dallying  with  habitual 
traitors.  He  received  from  Perdikkas  a  summons  (which  we  must 
suppose  that  he  could  not  afford  to  disobey)  to  march  Difflcuitios 
once  more  against  the  Lynkestian  chief,  with  whom  on  "„  Ma^ke-^^ 
the  previous  expedition  he  had  patched  up  a  hasty  donia. 
peace.  Arrhil)aios  was  defeated ;  but  Perdikkas,  amazed  at 
hearing  that  a  body  of  Illyrian  mercenaries  by  whom  he  was  ex- 
pecting to  be  joined  liad  transferred  their  services  to  his 
enemies,  hastily  fled  and  left  Brasidas  to  face  the  onslaught  of  the 
savages.  With  singular  I'eadiness  the  Spartan  leader  prepared  his 
men  for  the  conflict,  and  by  a  vigorous  effort  threw  the  lUyrians 
into  confusion.      The   Brasideians  now   wreaked  their  wrath  on 

'  Tbuc.  iv.  122.  because  the  conspirators,  when 
^  Too  much  stress  can  scarcely  be  they  had  once  proposed  the  scheme, 
laid  on  the  fact  that  here  also,  in  did  not  like  to  aljandon  it  and  to 
spite  of  the  enthusiasm  wliich  had  own  themselves  beaten  ;  and  when 
greeted  Brasidas  in  Skione,  the  an  opportanity  offered  for  abandon- 
main  body  of  the  people  Avas  alto-  ing  the  l^elopnnnesians,  thedenms 
gether  averse  to  the  revolt.  Thu-  availed  themselves  of  it  without 
cydides,  iv.  123,  says  plainly  that  hesitation.  Thuc.  iv.  130,  4. 
the  rebellion  was  carried  out  only 


340  THE  EMPIRE  OF   ATHENS.  [Book  IIL 

Perdikkas  by  appropriating  the  baggage  waggons  which  his  fol- 
lowers in  their  haste  had  left  behind  them,  and  by  the  useless 
slaughter  of  the  beasts  of  burden  which  with  greater  profit  they 
might  have  appropriated  also.  This  absurd  revenge  thoroughly 
alienated  Perdikkas,  who  resolved  to  seek  once  more  the  alliance 
of  the  Athenians  whom  he  had  more  than  once  betrayed. 

The  events  which  followed  the  departure  of  Brasidas  on  the 
errand  of  the  Makedonian  chief  fully  justified  the  reluctance  with 
Recovery  wliicli  he  marched  against  Arrhibaios.  While  he  was 
b'^tlf"''^"  still  entangled  in  the  passes  of  Lynkos,  an  Athenian 
Athenians,  fiect  sailed  from  Potidaia  against  the  Mendaians,  who 
with  a  Skionaian  force  had  taken  up  their  position  under  the 
Spartan  Polydamidas  on  a  strong  hill  without  the  city.  At  first 
the  Athenians  seemed  to  be  baffled  ;  but  the  weak  side  in  the 
system  of  Brasidas  was  now  to  be  brought  into  clear  light.  He 
had  come  as  the  apostle  of  freedom  ;  it  was  now  to  be  seen  that 
the  natural  consequence  of  his  preaching  was  dissension  and 
sedition.  The  arrival  of  Nikias  and  his  colleague  had  thrown  the 
Mendaians  into  such  a  state  of  agitation  that  the  300  Skionaians 
who  had  come  to  help  them  hastened  hurriedly  homeward.  On 
the  uext  day  Nikias  ravaged  the  lands  to  the  borders  of  Ski- 
one,  while  Nikostratos  kept  watch  without  the  gates  of  the  cily. 
Impatient  to  put  an  end  to  these  movements,  Polydamidas  drew 
out  his  own  troops  in  order  of  battle  and  summoned  the  Mendai- 
ans to  sally  out  against  the  enemy.  But  the  spell  of  Spartan 
authority  was  broken  ;  and  in  an  evil  hour  Polydamidas  ordered 
the  arrest  of  a  citizen  who  cried  out  that  he  had  no  intention  of  serv- 
ing against  the  Athenians,  and  that  the  war  was  merely  a  luxury 
for  the  rich.  This  insult  drove  the  demos  to  seize  their  arms, 
and  to  surprise  their  antagonists  who  had  conspired  to  bring  the 
Pelopomiesians  upon  them.  The  Spartan  garrison  thus  attacked 
fled  to  their  former  post  in  the  Akropolis,  while  the  Athenians 
burst  into  Mende  with  an  eager  thirst  for  revenge  which  could  be 
satisfied  with  little  less  than  the  blood  of  all  the  townsmen.  Bid- 
ding the  Mendaians  to  retain  their  old  constitution,  the  Atheni- 
ans left  to  their  judgment  those  citizens  whom  they  suspected  to 
be  the  authors  of  the  revolt. 

The  incessant  shiftings  of  Perdikkas  had  in  some  degree  taught 
his  enemies  and  his  friends  how  he  might  best  be  dealt  with  ;  and 
.    .    ,    ,      when  during  the  blockade  of  Skione  he  proposed  to 

Arrival  of       -._..  .  i         i  i     n-  i  i 

Ischagoras  JNikias  to  renew  the  old  alliance,  the  answer  was  that 
Spar^an^'^  he  must  give  some  substantial  evidence  that  he  really 
cominis-  meant  what  he  said.  Happily  for  the  Athenians  he 
was  able  to  do  this,  and  to  gratify  his  resentment 
against  Brasidas  at  the  saine  time.     Ischagoras  was  known  to  be 


Chap.  V.]  BRASIDAS  IN  THRACE.  341 

on  his  mavcli  from  Sparta  ■with  the  reinforcements  for  which 
Brasidas  had  so  eagerly  and  thus  far  vainly  intreated  :  and  a 
message  from  Perdikkas  to  the  Thessalian  chiefs  in  his  alliance 
rendered  this  scheme  abortive.  The  army  was  compelled  to  return 
home  :  but  Ischagoras  Avent  on  with  Ameinias  and  Aristeus  as  com- 
missioners appointed  to  act  in  conjunction  with  Brasidas.  An 
ineffectual  attempt  of  Brasidas  on  Potidaia'  closed  the  opera- 
tions of  this  unwearied  leader  for  the  winter. 

With  the  beginning  of  the  tenth  year  from  the  surprise  of 
Plataiai  the  twelve  months'  truce  drew  towards  its  close.  But 
while  in  the  continuance  of  the  war  by  Brasidas  in  Expedition 
Thrace  both  the  Spartans  and  tlie  Athenians  had  a  valid  Makedonia 
reason  for  resuming  the  old  strife  if  they  had  wished  423  b.c. 
to  do  so,  the  mere  fact  that  no  positive  step  was  taken  on  either 
side  before  the  close  of  the  Pythian  games — in  other  words,  for 
more  than  four  months  beyond  the  time  agreed  on  for  the  truce — 
shows  not  merely  the  anxious  desire  for  peace  on  both  sides  but 
the  indifference  of  the  Spartans  for  the  theories  and  schemes  of 
Brasidas.  But  the  feast  had  no  sooner  come  to  an  end  than  we 
find  Kleon  in  command  of  an  army  and  fleet  which  Perikles  would 
have  dispatched  or  led  thither  before  Bi'asidas  had  crossed  the 
Thessalian  border.  That  this  appointment  was  not  made  without 
strong  opposition,  there  can  be  not  the  least  doubt.  The  facts 
which  we  have  specially  to  note  are  these,  that  after  an  interval  of 
nearly  three  years  a  man,  who  had  never  put  himself  forward  as 
fitted  for  military  command,  and  Avho  had  been  successful  in  a  task 
of  no  special  difficulty  because  he  had  the  good  sense  to  subordinate 
himself  to  a  leader  of  real  genius,  is  now  sent  on  a  far  more  dan- 
gerous service  without  the  aid  of  such  a  colleague  as  Demos- 
thenes. Why  this  distinguished  general  was  not  sent  with  him, 
we  are  not  told.  It  is  possible  that  he  may  now  have  been  em- 
ployed on  bis  old  station  at  Naupaktos.  In  such  a  matter 
guesses  are  worth  but  little  ;  but  if  Demosthenes  was  thus  absent, 
the  state  of  things  at  Athens  becomes  clear  enough.  If  Perikles 
had  been  living,  he  would  have  insisted  that  the  recovery  of  Am- 
phipolis  and  the  neighboring  towns  was  just  one  of  those  objects 
for  the  attainment  of  which  the  full  strength  of  Athens  should  be 
put  forth  without  a  moment's  hesitation  or  delay.  But  during 
the  whole  sojourn  of  Brasidas  in  Thrace  Nikias  and  his  adhe- 
rents had  been  throwing  cold  water  on  a  policy  which  would  have 
been  prudent  as  well  as  vigorous,  and  urging  that  the  career  of 
the  Spartan  champion  would  be  best  cut  short  not  by  sending 
out  armies  to  fight  him  but  by  making  peace  with  Sparta.     In  all 

'  Tbuc.  iv.  135. 


342  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  HI. 

likelihood  Kleon  insisted  that  the  futility  of  such  a  course  had 
already  been  made  plain  ;  nor  are  we  doing  injustice  to  Nikias 
and  his  partisans,  if  we  say  that  the  old  trick  was  employed 
again,  and  that  they  deliberately  thrust  Kleon  into  an  office-  in 
which  they  hoped  and  thought  that  he  would  not  fail  to  ruin 
himself.  This  shameful  and  treacherous  policy,  we  are  told,  had 
been  openly  avowed  before  Kleon's  departure  for  Pylos  ;  we  have 
no  ground  whatever  for  questioning  that  they  were  prompted  by 
the  same  disgraceful  motives  now.  The  fact  that  Kleon  had  not 
been  employed  in  the  interval  is  conclusive  evidence  that  he  had 
not  sought  employment,  and  it  is  to  the  last  degree  unlikely  that 
he  would  now  thrust  himself  into  an  office  to  which  he  had  no 
other  title  than  a  sincere  and  hearty  desire  to  maintain  the  hon- 
or and  the  true  interests  of  his  country. 

The  summer  solstice  had  long  passed  when  Kleon  sailed  from 
Peiraieus.  Touching  first  at  Ski  one,  he  took  away  some  of  the 
Capture  of  heavy-amied  men  belonging  to  the  blockading  force, 
Toioneby  and  sailinor  on  to  Torone  learnt  the  welcome  news 
that  Brasidas  was  not  within  the  city  and  that  the 
garrison  was  scarcely  adequate  to  the  maintenance  of  the  place. 
The  place  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  xVthenians  ;  the  tiger-like  rules 
of  ancient  warfare  made  every  home  in  Torone  desolate  ;  and 
while  fathers,  husbands,  and  brothers  went  into  captivity,  mothers 
and  wives  with  all  the  children  were  sold  as  slaves.  These  hence- 
forth disappear  wholly  ;  so  little  is  the  history  even  of  a  city  the 
history  of  its  inhabitants.  The  Pcloponnesian  prisoners  were 
exchanged  on  the  ratification  of  tlic  subsequent  peace.  The  Toro- 
naians  were  ransomed  by  the  Olynthians,  to  return  to  homes 
where  the  voices  of  those  whom  they  had  loved,  if  Hellenes  are  to 
be  supposed  capable  of  loving,  were  to  be  heard  no  more. 

The  next  attempt  of  Kleon,  on  Stageiros,  failed :  but  the 
Thasian  colony  of  Galepsos  was  taken  by  storm.  Kleon,  however, 
Thebattloof  fc't  t,hat  he  could  not  venture  to  advance  upon  Amphi- 
Ainpiiipoiis.  polls  with  his  present  forces,  and  he  sent  to  the 
Brasidas  and  Makcdonian  Perdikkas  for  aid  according  to  the  terms 
Kleon.  yf  ]^j^  alliance,  while   he    requested    the    Odomantian 

cliief  Polles  to  bring  him  a  body  of  Thrakian  mercenaries.  While 
Kleon  to  the  disgust  of  liis  men  waited  at  Eion,  Brasidas  for  the 
purpose  of  guarding  Amphipolis  took  up  his  post  on  the  hill  of 
Kerdylion  on  the  western  bank  of  the  river  facing  the  city,  and 
connnanding  a  view  of  all  the  land  around  it.  He  had  heard, 
probably,  that  the  Athenians  had  little  confidence  in  their  general, 
that  they  despised  his  timidity,  and  resented  his  inaction  :  and  his 
task  clearly  was  to  watch  for  an  opportunity  of  surprising  him 
when  discontent  and  want  of  discipline  had  thrown  his  army  into 


Chap.  V.]  BRASIDAS   IN  THRACE.  343 

sufficient  disorder.  Blunder  after  blunder  followed.  Whatever 
they  were,  we  see  them  at  their  worst,  for  he  had  a  merciless  critic 
in  the  historian  whom  he  helped  to  banish  from  liis  country. 
Kleon,  it  is  manifest,  was  wholly  at  a  loss  how  to  act.  His  men 
were  becoming  impatient,  and  he  was  driven  at  last  to  the  course 
which  had  led  him  to  success  at  Pylos.  This  course  was  seemingly 
nothing  more  than  marching  up  a  hill  for  the  purpose  of  marching 
down  again  ;  and  even  this  manoeuvre,  the  historian  adds  with 
supreme  contempt,  Kleon  regarded  as  a  trick  worth  knowing.'  The 
wall  of  Amphipolis,  forming  the  chord  of  the  arc  within  which  the 
city  la}',  ran  across  the  ridge  which  rises  to  the  eastward  until  it 
joins  the  Pangaian  range.  This  ridge  Kleon,  foP  the  sake  of  doing 
something,  felt  himself  compelled  to  ascend.  No  sooner  was  the 
Athenian  army  in  movement  than  Brasidas,  seeing  from  the 
heights  of  Kerdylion  how  things  were  going,  hastened  down  the 
hill  and  entered  the  city  across  the  bridge  over  the  Strymon,  wdiich 
by  carrying  a  rampart  and  stockade  from  the  main  wall  to  a  point 
on  the  river  some  one  or  two  hundred  yards  further  eastward  he 
had  included  within  the  fortifications  of  the  city.  Of  this  change 
of  position  Kleon  can  scarcely  have  been  unaware  :  it  is  more 
likely  that  from  the  scanty  numbers  of  the  men  who  entered  with 
Brasidas  he  did  not  attach  much  weight  to  it.  On  reaching  the 
top  of  the  ridge  from  which  he  had  an  unbroken  view  of  the  city 
at  his  feet  and  of  the  river  as  it  flowed  out  of  the  LakeKerkinitis 
and  sweeping  round  the  city  ran  into  the  sea  at  Eion,  he  was  im- 
pressed by  the  silence  and  quiet  of  the  scene.  Through  the  v^ast 
extent  of  country  over  which  his  eye  ranged  no  bodies  of  men  were 
to  be  seen  in  motion  ;  not  a  man  was  visible  on  the  walls  ;  not  a 
sign  betokened  preparation  for  battle.  Even  the  entrance  of 
Brasidas  seemed  to  make  no  change  in  the  aspect  of  things,  for  that 
leader  had  seen  enough  to  convince  himself  that  he  could  hope  for 
victory  only  if  he  could  dupe  Kleon  by  a  simulation  of  extreme 
weakness.  Still,  if  a  blow  was  to  be  struck  at  all,  it  must  be 
struck  at  once,  for  the  reinforcement  of  Kleon's  army  would  se- 
riously add  to  his  difficulties.  Summoning,  therefore,  all  his  men 
together,  Brasidas,  having  explained  to  them  the  simple  order  of 
the  coming  engagement,  offered  sacrifice  before  sallying  forth 
against  the  enemy.  This  ceremony  was  seen  by  the  scouts  of 
Kleon  who  also  told  him  that  under  the  city  gates  they  could  see 
the  feet  of  horses  and  men  ready  to  issue  out  for  battle.  Having 
satisfied  himself,  by  personal  inspection,  that  their  report  was  true, 
Kleon  resolved  not  on  maintaining  his  ground,  which  he  might 
have  done  with  little  less  than  the  certainty  of  success,  but  on  a 

Thuc.  V,  7,  3. 


344  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  IH. 

retreat  to  Eion.  He  must  await,  lie  said,  the  reinforcements  wliicli 
he  expected  from  Thrace,  and  thus  his  army,  wheeling  to  the  left, 
began  their  southward  march  with  their  right  or  unshielded  side 
exposed  to  the  enemy.  *  These  men  will  never  withstand  'our 
onset,'  said  Brasidas.  '  Look  at  their  quivering  spears  and  nod- 
ding heads.  Men  who  are  going  to  fight  never  march  in  such 
a  fashion  as  this.  Open  the  gates  at  once  that  I  may  rush  out  on 
them  forthwith.'  The  sudden  onslaught  at  once  broke  the  Athe- 
nian ranks,  and  Klearidas  issuing  from  the  Thrakian  gates  further 
to  the  north  completed  the  disorder.  In  the  pursuit  of  the  Athe- 
nian left  wing  Brasidas  fell,  mortally  wounded  ;  but  his  people 
bore  him  away  without  sufEering  the  Athenians  to  know  what  had 
happened.  On  the  right  wing  the  resistance  of  the  Athenians  was 
more  firm  ;  but  Kleon,  we  are  told,  had  come  without  any  inten- 
tion of  fighting,  and  he  made  up  his  mind  at  once  to  run  away. 
Flight,  however,  is  more  easily  thought  of  than  executed,  and  Kleon 
hurrying  away  from  the  men  whom  he  had  luidertaken  to  lead 
was  intercepted  and  slain  by  a  Myrkinian  peltast.  Their  leader 
was  dead  :  but  the  Spartans  under  Klearidas  were  none  the  more 
able  to  crush  the  Athenian  right  wing,  which  gave  way  only  un- 
der the  show-ers  of  arrows  poured  in  upon  them  by  the  Myrkinian 
peltastai  and  the  assaults  of  the  Chalkidian  horsemen.  Brasidas 
lived  just  long  enough  to  knoAvthat  the  Athenians  were  defeated; 
and  the  romantic  career  of  this  thoroughly  un-Spartan  champion 
of  Sparta  was  closed  with  a  public  funeral  in  the  Agora  of  Am- 
phipolis,  where  he  received  yearly  henceforth  the  honors  of  a  de- 
ified hero.  The  buildings  raised  by  Hagnon  were  thrown  down, 
and  Brasidas  was  venerated  as  the  founder,  or  Oikistes,  of  the  city. 
The  historian  remarks  that  the  battle  of  Amphipolis  removed 
the  two  great  hindrances  to  a  pacific  settlement  between  Athens 
Comparative  and  Sparta ;  but  he  makes  no  effort  to  show  that 
BraMdasand  peace  at  the  cost  of  sacrifices  which  Kleon  was  not 
Kleon.  willing   to    offer   was    at  this   time  to  be  desired  for 

Athens.  Of  Brasidas  his  judgment  is  more  indulgent :  it  is  even 
enthusiastic.  His  moderation,  his  affability  to  the  citizens  of 
revolted  towns,  his  reputation  for  universal  excellence,'  his  saga- 
city and  decisive  promptitude,  are  all  carefully  noted.  The  blun- 
ders and  shortcomings  of  Kleon,  his  bluster,  his  arrogance,  his 
incompetence  as  a  military  leader, are  not  less  exactly  registered; 
but  whether  the  energetic  prosecution  of  the  war  in  Thrace  was  or 
was  not  necessary,  he  takes  care  never  to  ask.  From  first  to  last, 
in  fact,  in  his  account  of  the  career  of  Kleon,  we  have  not  a  trace 
of  that  judiciously  balanced  criticism  which  marks  his  sketch  of 

'  Time.  iv.  81,  3. 


Chap.  V.]  BRASIDAS  IN  THRACE.  345 

Themistoklcs  ;  and  we  are  left  to  discover  for  ourselves  whether 
and  how  far  in  the  several  stages  of  his  course  Kleon  was  right  or 
wrong.  Happily  the  unswerving  honesty  which  never  allows  him 
to  suppress  facts  has  shown  us  that  he  was  throughout  more 
than  justified  in  the  policy  by.  which  he  held  that  Brasidas  must 
be  encountered  and  put  down  in  Thrace.  That  he  was  left  to 
carry  out  this  policy  himself,  was  his  misfortune,  not  his  fault ; 
that  he  was  feebly  supported  at  Athens  and  sent  without  compe- 
tent colleagues  to  Thrace,  redounds  not  to  his  own  shame  but  to 
that  of  his  adversaries. 

The  death  of  Brasidas  and  Kleon  left  the  way  clear  for  those 
statesmen  at  Athens  and  Sparta  Avho  had  regarded  the  policy 
of  both  with  suspicion  and  dislike.  Nikias  and  his  Negotiations 
followers  were  now  free  to  urge  that  Sparta  might  ^"'' P'^'^*^''* 
fairly  be  trusted  to  fulfil  her  engagements  :  and  at  Sparta  the 
peace  party  had  a  strongly  interested  advocate  in  the  king  Pleis- 
toanax,  whose  retreat  from  Attica  shortly  before  the  ratification 
of  the  Thirty  Years'  Truce  had  been  ascribed  to  personal  corrup- 
tion,* and  had  been  punished  by  a  sentence  of  exile. 

There  was  nothing  therefore  to  stand  in  the  way  of  immediate 
negotiations.  Both  sides  were  depressed,  and  each  side  had  its 
own  special  causes  of  anxiety.  Still  it  was  only  after 
some  little  difficulty  that  the  contending  parties  agreed  the  treaty, 
each  to  give  up  what  they  had  acquired  during  the  423  b.c. 
war.  This  arrangement  may  have  been  proposed  by  Nikias,  by 
whose  name  this  peace  is  generally  known  ;  it  is,  at  the  least, 
thoroughly  in  accordance  with  the  policy  which  had  prompted  his 
opposition  to  Kleon.  By  this  stipulation  tlie  Athenians  supposed 
that  they  would  regain  Plataiai ;  but  they  found  themselves  mis- 
taken. The  Thebans  availed  themselves  of  the  shuffle  that  the 
Plataians  had  voluntarily  yielded  themselves.  But  the  Athenians 
remembered  that  if  this  plea  gave  the  Boiotians  the  right  to  hold 
Plataiai,  they  had  precisely  the  same  title  to  retain  the  Megarian 
port  of  Nisaia,  and  they  insisted  on  keeping  it  accordingly.  The 
treaty  for  fifty  years  between  Athens  and  Sparta  Avith  her  allies 
thus  pledged  the  latter  to  restore  Amphipolis,  while  Athens  was 
bound  to  leave  autonomous  all  towns  in  Chalkidike  which  had  put 
themselves  under  the  protection  of  Brasidas,  the  obligation  of  pay- 
ing to  Athens  the  tribute  enjoined  on  them  by  the  assessment  of 
Aristeides  still  continuing  in  force.  The  last  concession  to  the 
Athenians  was  Panakton,  a  fort  at  the  foot  of  Kithairon,  which 
the  Boiotians  had  seized  in  the  preceding  year."  On  their  part  the 
Athenians,  who  were  to  receive  back  all  prisoners  in  the  hands 

•  See  p.  253.  ^  Thuc.  v.  3,  5. 

15* 


346  THE   EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

whether  of  the  Spartans  or  their  allies,  were  bound  to  restore  all 
captives  belonging  to  Sparta  or  anj^  city  in  her  confederacy,  as 
well  as  to  surrender  Koryphasiou  (Pylos),  Kythera,  Methone,  and 
Atalante. 


CHAPTER    VI. 

THE    PELOPONNESIAN    WAR    FROM    THE    PEACE    OF    NIKIAS    TO     THE 

MASSACRE    AT    MELOS. 

Ever  since  the  victory  of  Demosthenes  and  Kleon  the  great  desire 
of  the  Spartans  had  been  to  recover  the  hoplites  taken  prisoners  in 
Separate  Sphakteria.  "Whether  these  prisoners  should  be  sur- 
treaty  of  rendered  at  once  or  not,  would  depend  on  the  order  in 
tweeiiAtii  which  the  stipulations  of  the  treaty  might  be  carried 
Sparta!^  out.  The  lot  which  was  to  decide  this  question  was 
421  B.C.  drawn  by  the  Spartans,  who  had  now  to  fulfil  their 
part  of  the  compact  in  order  to  bind  the  Athenians  to  the  perform- 
ance of  their  engagements.  Their  love  for  Athens  was  not  great ; 
but  to  their  wish  for  the  recovery  of  the  hoplites  was  added 
another  anxiety  nearer  home.  The  thirty  years'  truce  which  the 
Argives  had  refused  to  renew  except  on  the  cession  of  Kynouria 
was  drawing  to  its  close  ;  and  an  alliance  of  Argos  with  Athens 
might  restore  her  to  her  ancient  supremacy  in  the  Peloponnesos. 
The  friendship  of  Athens  had  therefore  become  a  matter  of  im- 
portance for  the  Spartans  who  at  once  set  free  all  Athenian  prisoners 
in  their  possession,  and  sent  orders  to  Klearidas  to  surrender  Am- 
phipolis  forthwith.  In  the  hope  that  it  might  still  be  possible  to 
obtain  some  lighter  terms,  that  officer  returned  with  the  envoys 
to  Sparta  and  reported  the  determination  of  the  Chalkidians  not 
to  give  np  the  city.  He  Avas  sent  back  with  the  peremptory  man- 
date to  carry  out  his  orders  or  to  withdraw  the  Avhoie  Peloponnesian 
garrison.  The  troops  were  accordingly  withdrawn,  for  Klearidas 
still  insisted  that  the  Chalkidians  were  steadily  set  against  sub- 
mission. Nay  more,  the  envoys  of  the  confederate  cities  renewed 
their  protest  against  the  injustice  of  the  peace,  and  this  protest  left 
slender  hope  that  the  other  stipulations  of  the  treaty  would  be 
fulfilled.  It  was  clearly,  therefore,  the  policy  of  Sparta  to  separate 
Athens  from  Argos ;  and  as  this  could  only  be  done  by  binding 
lier  to  a  private  alliance  with  herself,  a  covenant  was  proposed 
and  forthwith  signed,  pledging  Athens  and  Sparta  to  defend  each 
the  otlier's  territories  against  all  invaders.     So  great  was  the  Avorth 


Chap,  VI.]  THE  PEACE  OF  NIKIAS.  347 

of  this  alliance  in  the  eyes  of  Nikias  and  his  followers  that  by  a 
tacit  agreement  Sparta  received  as  hev  reward  the  prize  which  she 
most  eagerly  coveted.  The  Sphakterian  hoplites  were  all  given 
np  ;  and  in  this  barren  exchange  Athens  received  the  first-fruits  of 
the  philo-Lakonian  policy  of  her  oligarchic  citizens.  Kieon  was 
no  longer  living  to  maintain  a  policy  not  lacking  the  spirit  and 
foresight  of  Perikles  ;  and  the  lamp-maker  Hyperbolos  can  scared}' 
be  said  to  have  taken  his  place.  Athens  was  now  practically  ruled 
by  those  Avho  prided  themselves  on  being  nobly  born  and  nobly 
bred ;  and  these  statesmen  who,  like  Hekataios,  could  trace  their 
generations  back  to  the  ancestral  god  set  to  work  to  strip  her  of 
one  advantage  after  another,  offering  her  in  their  stead  apples  of 
the  Dead  Sea.  The  continued  detention  of  the  Pylian  prisoners 
and  a  demand  that  a  combined  Athenian  and  Spartan  force  should 
undertake  the  reduction  of  Amphipolis  would  at  once  have  com- 
pelled the  Spartans  to  display  themselves  in  their  true  colors,  or, 
as  is  far  more  likely,  have  secured  to  Athens  all  that  she  wanted. 
As  it  was,  the  terms  of  the  peace  were  not  kept  on  either  side,  and 
the  period  which  followed  until  the  open  resumption  of  the  war 
was  at  best  no  more  that  a  time  of  truce.* 

The  clause  in  the  treaty  of  peace  which  gave  the  Spartans  and 
Athenians  power  to  modify  any  of  its  terms  at  will  had  grievously 
offended  the  Peloponnesian  allies   of    Sparta.^       The   „  ,        , 

/-I     ■      I  •  iTi  Mil  (■!•••       •  Scheme  for 

Corinthians  gladly  availed  themselves  or  this  irritation   getting  up 
to    carry    out  their   own   plans.     Instead  of  returning   ponnesi^n*'' 
straight  home,  their  envovs  went  to  Aro;os,  and  there    confederacy 

*'  .  imder  the 

said  that  on  the  Aigives  lay  the  duty  of  saving  Pelo-  presidency 
ponnescs  from  a  combination  Avhich  might  inslave  ofArgos. 
them  as  effectually  as  the  Athenians  had  inslaved  the  islanders  of 
the  Egean.  The  Argives  agreed  readily  to  issue  a  proclamation 
inviting  the  alliance  of  any  autonomous  Peloponnesian  cities,  and 
appointed  commissioners  with  full  powers  to  treat  with  the  chief 
men  of  each  city  in  private.  The  Peloponnesian  cities  generally 
were  deeply  stirred.  The  democratic  Mantineia,  Avhich  in  the 
course  of  the  war  had  subdued  some  of  the  neighboring  Arkadian 
towns,  was  the  first  to  throw  itself  into  the  new  alliance.  The 
accession  of  Corinth  and  Elis  was  followed  by  that  of  the  Chal- 

'  This  fact  impelled  Thucydides  vogue  among  the  people  happened 
toregard  the  whole  period  from  the  to  hit  the  fact.  He  states  his  own 
surprise  of  Plataiai  by  the  Thebans  acquaintance  with  these  predictions 
to  the  surrender  of  Athens  and  the  from  the  befjinning  of  the  war,  and 
destruction  of  the  Long  Walls  as  adds  that  the  reckoning  was  ex- 
taken  up  with  one  persistent  strug-  ceeded  only  by  a  few  days.  v.  2G. 
gle,  lasting  for  27  years, — the  only  ^  Thuc.  v.  29.  2. 
matter  in  which  the  prophecies  in 


348  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  HL 

kidian..  anioiifr  -wliom  Brasidas  had  toiled  and  died.  The  Boio 
tians  and  Megarians  held  aloof. 

Meanwhile  the  feelings  of  the  Athenians  towards  the  Spartans 
were  undergoing  a  change.  The  latter  had  signally  failed  to  fulfil 
Intrigues  for  their  promises  ;  but  they  had  learnt  that  words  went 
abmuanal-  ^  lo^g  way  with  the  philo-Lakonian  party  at  Athens, 
liance  be-  and  SO,  putting  them  off  with  undefined  promises  of 
taaud  Ar^"^'  undertaking  with  them  a  joint  expedition  to  coerce  the 
g°^-  Corinthians   and    Boiotians,  they   had   the    assurance 

to  demand  either  that  the  Athenians  should  give  up  P3dos  or  that 
they  should  withdraw  all  the  Messenians  and  Helots  who  might  be 
in  the  place,  leaving  only  Athenians  as  the  garrison.  They  were 
well  aware  that  they  bad  strenuous  allies  in  Athens  ;  and  these 
allies  worked  so  well  on  their  behalf  that  the  Helots  and  other 
deserters  in  Pylos  were  taken  from  Peloponnesos  and  lodged  in 
Kephallenia.  The  patience  of  the  Athenians  w-as  to  be  still  more 
severely  tried.  In  the  following  winter  deputies  from  Athens, 
Boiotia,  and  Corinth  met  in  vain  debate  at  Sparta.  With  a  fickle- 
ness equal  to  that  of  any  democratical  commonwealth  the  policy  of 
Sparta  was  changed.  Of  the  new  ephors  two,  Kleoboulos  and 
Xenares,  Avcre  vehemently  opposed  to  Athens,  and  with  the  Co- 
rinthian and  Boiotian  envoys  they  concocted  the  scheme  that  the 
latter  should  first  make  an  alliance  with  Argos  and  then  should 
bring  Argos  into  alliance  with  Sparta.  One  condition  only  they 
attached  to  the  working  of  this  roundabout  plan.  The  Boiotians 
must  surrender  Panakton,  that  by  giving  it  up  to  the  Athenians 
the  Spartans  might  bring  about  the  evacuation  of  Pylos.  Even 
this  the  ]>oiotians  Avere  ready  to  agree  to  :  and  their  willingness 
was  .still  further  increased  when  on  their  homeward  journey  they 
were  accosted  by  two  of  the  most  distinguished  of  the  citizens  of  Ar- 
gos, Avho  expressed  an  extreme  anxiety  that  Boiotia  and  Argos  might 
be  united  in  the  same  confederacy.  AVith  the  report  thus  brought 
from  Sparta  the  ]>oiotarchs  were  highly  gratified,  and  they  never 
for  a  moment  supposed  that  the  Four  Boiotian  Senates'  Avould 
refuse  to  ratify  a  decree  sanctioning  an  alliance  with  the  Corin- 
thians, Megarians,  and  the  Chalkidians  of  Thrace,  and  thus  open- 
ing the  way  for  an  alliance  of  all  these  states  with  Argos.  But 
the  idea  of  alliance  with  Argos  was  so  new  to  the  people  that  the 
Boiotarchs  never  ventured  to  reveal  the  plot,  and  to  tell  them 
that  tlie  .step  which  they  proposed  was  eagerly  desired  at  Sparta. 
The  Boiotians  kncv\'  only  that  Corinth  had  abandoned  her  old 
alliance,  and  they  at  once  declared  that  they  durst  not  offend 
Sparta  by  entering  into  covenant  with  her  enemies.     Thus  foiled 

'  Nothing  is  known  of  the  constitution  of  these  bodies. 


Chap.  VI.]  THE   PEACE  OF  NIKIAS.  349 

at  the  thresliold  of  their  task,  the  Boiotarchs  could  go  no  further  ; 
and  for  a  time  the  spinning  of  these  complicated  webs  seemed 
altogether  at  an  end.' 

But  the  Spartans  could  not  rest  without  regaining  Pylos  ;  and 
as  the  Boiotians  refused  to  yit'ld  up  I'aiiakton  with  which  the  ex- 
change  was  to  be   made,  unless  the    Spartans   would    _         ^     , 
make  with  them  a  separate  alliance  like  that  into  which   Hance  be-, 
they  had  entered  with  the  Athenians,  the  latter  ended   taanduiT" 
the  eleventh  year  of  the  great  struggle  with  a  piece  of   Boiotians. 
deliberate  treachery  to  the  Athenians,  to  whom  they 
were  pledged  to  make  no  engagements  without  their  knowledge 
and  consent.      The  Boiotians,    however,    Avere  resolved  that  no 
Athenian  force  should  occupy  the  border  fortress,  and  they  spent 
the  winter  in  levelling  its  walls  with  the  ground. 

The  demolition  of  Panakton  naturally  annoyed  the  Spartans, 
Avho  feared  the  difficulty  of  getting  a  living  lion  in  exchange  for  a 
dead  dog  ;  but  in  the  hope  that  the  excuse  which  had  Dismissal  of 
served  them  in  the  matter  of  Amphipolis  might  stand  ambas^aciors 
them  in  good  stead  here,  Andromedes  was  sent  with  from  Alliens, 
two  colleagues  to  Athens  to  demand  the  surrender  of  Pylos  on  the 
ground  that  the  surrender  of  the  site  of  Panakton  fulfilled  the 
stipulation.  But  the  Athenians  were  not  in  the  mood  for  further 
fooling.  They  were  wearied  out  with  talking  which  had  now 
gone  on  for  twelve  months  to  little  purpose  or  to  none,  and  the 
Spartan  envoys  were  dismissed  after  a  reception  which  showed 
the  depth  of  their  indignation. 

This  feeling  was  sedulously  fostered  by  Alkibiades,  the  grand- 
son of  that  Alkibiades  who  had  been  one  of  the  most  strenuous  op- 
ponents of  the  Peisistratidai,  and  who  had  thrown  up  intrjo-ues  of 
a  standing  friendship  with  Sparta  on  purely  political  Alicibiades. 
grounds.  This  friendship  Alkibiades  had  sought  to  renew.  Special 
attention  paid  to  the  comfort  of  the  hoplites  taken  at  Sphakteria 
would  win  for  him,  he  hoped,  the  oflice  of  proxenos  for  Sparta  ; 
and  he  was  honestly  convinced,  if  honest  conviction  can  be  asso- 
ciated at  all  with  his  name,  that  for  such  an  office  no  man  had  a 
better  title.  The  blood  of  Zeus  and  Aiakos  was  flowing  in  his 
veins  ;  and  the  gods  had  endowed  him  with  marvellous  bodily 
beauty.  To  the  possession  of  vast  wealth  he  added  a  readiness  of 
wit,  a  fertility  of  invention,  a  power  of  complaisance,  which  in- 
vested his  manner,  when  he  wished  to  please,  with  an  almost  irre- 
sistible charm.  Magnificent  in  his  tastes,  splendid  in  the  lavish- 
ness  of  his  Liturgies,^  revelling  in  the  elegance  of  the  most  refined 
Athenian  luxury,  Alkibiades  shrunk  from  no  hardship  in  war,  and 

'  Thuc.  V.  38.  «  See  p.  80. 


350  THE  EMPIRE   OF  ATHENS.  [Book  HI. 

faced  danger  with  a  bravery  never  railed  into  question.  At  the 
siege  of  Potidaia  under  Phorinion  lie  had  been  severely  wounded  ; 
but  his  life  was  unfortunately  saved  by  the  philosopher  Sokrates 
then  serving  among  the  Athenian  hoplites.  In  the  battle  of  Delion 
he  had  repaid  the  obligation  by  saving  the  life  of  Sokrates.  With 
the  qualiHcations  which,  as  he  hoped,  might  commend  him  to 
Spartan  favor,  he  combined  a  spirit  of  oligarchical  exclusiveiiess 
which  miglit  ha^'e  satisfied  the  most  rigid  disciples  of  the  school  of 
Lykourgos.  But  in  their  eyes  his  youth  was  an  offence  (he  was 
now  a  little  over  thirty  years  of  age,  the  age  at  which  an  Athenian 
became  eligible  for  the  Boule  or  Senate)  ;  and  Spartans,  although 
they  were  oligarchs,  had  respect  for  oligarchical  law.  Alkibiades 
had  respect  for  none.  Without  a  conscience,  without  a  heart, 
caring  for  nothing  but  his  own  grandeur,  as  ready  to  make  oli- 
garchs his  tools  as  to  cheat  and  dupe  a  demos,  defying  the  magis- 
trates, insulting  the  law,  Alkibiades  presents  an  image  of  violent 
selfishness  and  ingrained  treachery  standing  very  near  the  pinnacle 
of  human  wickedness.  Hating  a  demos  in  his  heart  with  the 
supercilious  arrogance  which  looks  on  human  blood  as  a  vile  fluid 
when  it  runs  in  the  veins  of  men  who  boast  no  pedigree,  he  was 
still  as  ready  to  destroy  an  oligarchy  as  he  was  to  uproot  a  free 
constitution,  and  he  was  therefore  justly  dreaded  by  men  of  all 
political  parties  as  a  man  treading  in  the  paths  of  the  old  Hellenic 
despots.  The  welfare  of  Athens  was  the  one  end  and  object  of 
Themistokles  with  whom  he  has  been  compared  :  Alkibiades  cared 
no  more  for  Athens  than  he  cared  for  Argos  or  for  Sparta.  He 
could  pretend  to  love  each  or  all,  so  long  as  it  suited  his  pui'pose 
to  do  so.  To  commit  the  people  to  his  plans,  he  could  act  or  utter 
a  lie  with  only  a  feeling  of  self-complacence  at  his  own  cleverness. 
His  life  had  been  saved  by  the  man  whose  life  and  teaching  have 
remained  from  that  time  to  the  present  a  subject  of  absorbing  in- 
terest:  but  he  sought  the  company  of  Sokrates  for  no  higher  pur- 
j)ose  than  to  learn  the  trick  of  leading  his  opponents  by  Jlironeia 
(Irony)  or  pretended  ignorance  to  contradict  themselves,  as  well  as 
to  acquire  with  a  certain  adroitness  of  language  and  readiness  of 
illustration  an  insight  into  the  characters  and  motives  of  men,  the 
better  to  make  use  of  them  as  tools  in  the  execution  of  his  own 
plans.'  The  society  of  this  wonderful  man  tended  therefore  only 
to  make  him  more  dangerous  ;  and  if  we  arc  to  believe  the  stories 
told  of  him,  his  career  from  first  to  last  was  one  unbroken  course  of 
gilded  sensuality  and  of  barbarous  ruffianism  scantily  hid  by  a  veil 
of  superficial  refinement.  Under  any  circumstances  such  a  man 
must  be  infamous  :  but  Alkibiades  had  opportunities  of  committing 

'  Xen.  Mem.  i.  3- 


Chap.  VI.]  THE   PEACE  OF  NIKIAS.  351 

crime  on  a  vast  scale,  and  he  availed  himself  of  them  to  the  utter- 
most. 

To  such  a  man  a  slight  was  a  deadly  offence  ;  and  Alkibiades 
had  received  a  marked  slight  from  the  Spartans.  xVlkibiades 
therefore  ceased  to  be  a  philo-Eakonian  ;  and  he  now  Treachery  of 
discovered  that  an  alliance  with  Argos  would  secure  to  ^'^'spar^n" 
Athens  her  old  preponderance.  There  is  much  to  be  envoys, 
said  in  favor  of  a  vast  number  of  alternative  political  schemes; 
and  it  may  fairly  be  urged  that  in  deserting  the  party  of  Nikias  he 
was  consulting  the  ti'ue  interests  of  Athens.  The  arrival  of  the 
ambassadors  to  surrender  to  the  Athenians  not  the  fortress  of 
Panakton  but  its  site  enabled  him  to  make  with  decency  the 
change  which  had  become  necessary.  While  he  inveighed  in  the 
assembly  against  Spartan  duplicity,  shuffling,  and  dilatoriness,  he 
sent  a  message  to  Argos  urging  the  need  of  sending  envoys  at  once 
to  propose  an  alliance  with  Athens.  The  embassy  was  accordingly 
sent.  But  the  tidings  of  this  movement  liad  reached  Sparta,  and 
no  time  was  lost  in  sending  a  counter  embassy  consisting  of  men 
personally  popular  at  Athens.  Even  in  this  desperate  strait  they 
charged  their  envoys,  with  an  obstinacy  almost  praiseworthy,  1  > 
insist  that  the  ground  on  which  Panakton  had  stood  was  a  fittino' 
equivalent  for  Pylos,  and  that  no  harm  whatever  was  meant  by  the 
private  agreement  of  Sparta  with  the  Boiotians.  To  all  this  the 
Athenians  might  have  turned  deaf  ears  :  the  case  was  altered  when 
the  envoys  said  in  the  Senate  that  they  had  come  with  full  powers 
for  the  immediate  settlement  of  all  differences.  Alkibiades  at 
once  saw  that  such  a  statement,  made  before  the  assembly,  might 
jeopardise  his  proposed  alliance  with  Argos.  It  must  not,  there- 
fore, be  made  :  and  he  found  the  means  of  prevention  in  one  of 
the  envoys  named  Endios.  Through  Endios  he  gained  access  to  his 
colleagues  and  persuaded  them  that  their  profession  of  full  powers 
before  the  assembly  might  expose  them  to  demands  and  impor- 
tunities which  they  might  find  it  difficult  to  resist,  adding  that  if 
they  would  claim  no  further  mission  than  that  of  envoys  charged 
only  to  report  the  wishes  of  the  Athenians  he  would  pledge  him- 
self to  secure  for  them  the  surrender  of  Pylos  and  to  plead  their 
cause  in  person  before  the  people.  The  Spartans  fell  into  the 
snare.  On  their  introduction  to  the  assembly  on  the  following 
day  Alkibiades,  we  are  told  by  Plutarch,'  rose  and  asked  them 
with  his  nK)st  courtly  manner  with  what  powers  they  came.     The 

'  Aikib.  14.     Thucydides,  v.  45,  speak  ;     otherwise    tlie     speakers 

4,  does  not  mention  this  fact  ;  but  would  probably  liave  informed  the 

it  is  obvious  that  no  one  else  would  people  that  tliey  saw  before  then: 

ask  the  question.    In  all  likelihood  the  plenipotentiaries  of  Sparta. 
Alkibiades  gave  no  one   time   to 


352  THE   EMPIRE   OF  ATHENS.  [Book  IIL 

answer  was  given  according  to  his  prompting,  and  roused  the 
instant  and  deep  indignation  of  hearers  who  could  hardly  believe 
their  senses.  Far  from  saying  a  word  in  their  favor,  Alkibiades 
joined  vehemently  in  the  outcry  against  Spartan  shuffling  and 
lying  and  was  proposing  that  the  Argive  envoys  should  at  once  be 
admitted  to  an  audience  when  a  shock  of  earthquake  caused  the 
adjournment  of  the  assembly  to  the  following  day.  So  ended  a 
scene  in  which  the  descendant  of  Zeus  and  Aiakos,  the  refined  and 
cultured  gentleman,  played  a  part  infinitely  more  disgraceful  for 
its  unblushing  impudence  and  unscrupulous  lying  than  any  in 
which  the  coarsest  leather-seller  or  lamp-maker  among  the  demos 
•had  ever  been  an  actor.  The  comic  poets  had  jested  about  the 
shiploads  of  lies  brought  from  Perdikkas  to  Athens  ;  the  false- 
hoods of  Alkibiades  would  have  formed  the  cargo  of  a  fleet. 

When  the  assembly  met  again,  Nikias  insisted  with  greater 
success  that  if  alliance  with  Sparta  was  to  the  interest  of  Athens, 

.,,.  ,  it  was  their  business,  whatever  they  mio-ht  think  of 
Alliance  be-      ,  .  en  i  •     • 

tween  Argos  the  conduct  01  the   envoys,  to   send  commissioners  to 

and  Athens,   gp^^j-ta  to  ascertain  their  real  intentions.     The  answer 

of  the    Spartans  Avas  that  although  they  could   not  give  up  their 

compact  with  the  Boiotians,  they  were   ready  to  renew  the  oaths 

of  their  covenant  with  the  Athenians.     This,  Nikias  knew,  was  a 

superfluous  and  useless  ceremony,  and  so  great  was  the  irritation 

against  him  tliat  Alkibiades  found  no   difficulty  in  effecting  with 

Argos,  Mantineia,  and  Elis,  a  defensive   alliance  which  distinctly 

recognised  the  imperial  character  of  each  of  those  states. 

The  Olympian  festival  of  this  vear  was  marked  by  the  presence 
of  the  Athenians  and  their  allies  who  had  been  shut  out  for  eleven 
Exclusion  of  years.  The  exhaustion  of  Athens,  it  had  been  sup- 
the  Spaitaus  posed,  was  so  great  that  not  much  competi tion  might 
oi>"npian  be  looked  for  from  her  citizens.  Alkibiades  Avas 
games.  resolved  that  this  notion   sliould   be   signally    falsified. 

He  had  little  liesitation  in  straining  his  own  resources  for  this 
purpose  to  the  utmost,  for  lie  knew  that  his  money  would  be  well 
laid  out  ])olitically  :  he  had  none  in  availing  himself  of  the  aid  of 
tlic  Cliians,  Lesbians,  and  Eftliesians.  The  result  was  a  splendor 
of  display  on  the  part  of  the  Athenians  whicli  dazzled  even  eyes 
long  accustomed  to  the  magnificence  of  Panhcllenic  feasts ;  and  the 
enterprise  of  Alkibiades  in  sending  seven  four-horsed  chariots  to 
the  lists,  Avhen  few  had  ever  sent  more  than  one,  was  rewarded  by 
a  first  and  a  second  prize,  Avhilc  another  chaiiot  was  placed  in  the 
fourth  rank.' 

L'nder  the  guidance  of  Alkibiades  Athens  was  now  rapidly 
committing  herself  to  .schemes  whicli  completely  reversed  the 
'  Time.  vi.  10. 


Chap.  VI.]  THE  PEACE  OF  NIKIAS.  353 

policy  of  Perikles.  The  ill-fated  expedition  wliicli  ended  in  the 
catastrophe  at  Delion  aimed  only  at  the  recovery  of  a  power  which 
had  for  a  time  belonged  to  her ;  but  new  conquests  operations 
alone  could  satisfy  Alkibiades,  and  the  paramount  "n^.^.os'amf 
duty  of  the  Athenians  to  re-e.^tablish  their  empire  in  Epidauros. 
Chalkidike  was  put  aside  for  the  establishment  of  a  new  supremacy 
in  the  Pelopoimesos.  The  Argives  had  at  this  time  some  relioioU"s 
quarrel  with  the  Epidaurians  connected  with  the  service  of  the 
Pythian  Apollon  ;  and  the  occupation  of  Epidauros  would,  he 
believed,  be  greatly  to  tlie  advantage  of  Athens.  The  Argives, 
however,  although  urged  on  by  Alkibiades,  hesitated  to  strike  a 
blow  while  the  Spartans  were  in  the  tield.  They  had  heard  that 
Agis  was  advancing  towards  the  border  town  of  Leuktra  ;  they 
Avere  soon  reassured  by  the  tidings  that  unfavorable  sacrifices  had 
Compelled  him  to  return  home,  and  that  no  further  movement 
would  be  made  before  the  end  of  the  holy  Karneian  month.  Four 
days  were  still  to  run  before  this  time  of  truce  binding  on  all 
members  of  the  Dorian  race  would  begin,  and  the  Argives 
determined  not  only  to  invade  Epidauros  at  once  but  to  secure 
themselves  ample  time  by  the  readjustment  of  their  calendar.  It 
was  the  twenty-sixth  day  of  the  month  when  the  Argives  set  off, 
and  it  remained  the  twenty-sixth  day  of  the  month  so  long  as  their 
work  of  invasion  went  on.  The  Spartans  after  the.  feast  advanced 
as  far  as  Karyai,  and  were  again  turned  back  by  unfavorable 
sacrifices  at  the  border.  The  summer  ended  with  a  second 
invasion  of  the  Epidaurian  territory  by  the  Argives,  aided  by 
Alkibiades  and  1,000  Athenian  hoplites.  Irritated  Avitli  this 
warfare  which  really  broke,  while  it  nominally  respected,  the 
peace,  the  Spartans  during  the  winter  contrived  to  smuggle  300 
men  into  Epidauros ;  and  the  Argives  urged  the  grievance  at 
Athens  in  terms  which  could  not  fail  to  gratify  the  pride  of  the 
imperial  city.  It  had  been  agreed  between  them  that  neither  side 
should  allow  hostile  forces  to  pass  through  their  territory  :  but  the 
Spartans  had  conveyed  these  men  by  sea,  and  the  sea  was  specially 
the  dominion  of  Athens.  They  demanded  therefore  that  by  way 
of  atoning  for  their  remissness  the  Athenians  should  bring  back 
to  Pylos  the  Messenians  and  the  Helots  whom  they  had  placed  in 
the  Kephallenian  Kranioi.  The  request  was  complied  with,  a 
note  being  added  to  the  inscription  on  the  pillar  of  peace  at 
Athens  ascribing  ihis  step  to  the  violation  of  the  covenant  by  the 
Spartans. 

But  the  Spartans  were  now  fully  awake  to  the  dangers  of  their 
position.  In  the  following  summer  the  full  force  of  the  Lake- 
daimonians  with  their  Helots  set  out  for  the  invasion  of  Argos. 
The  Argives  took  up  tlieir  position  on  a  hill  near  the  Arkadian 


354  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

Methydrion  about  15  miles  to  the  west  of  Mantineia.  Here  they 
were  dh'ectly  in  the  path  of  Agis  on  his  march  to  join  the  alUes 
lnva«on  of  ^^  Phlious.  Tlie  Spartans  were  posted  on  an  opposite 
Argos  by  tiie  hill  ;  and  the  Argives  made  ready  for  battle  on  the 
under  Agis.  morrow.  But  Agis  had  no  intention  of  fighting  here, 
418  B.C.  j^j^(j  j^^  ji^g  night  the  Spartans  left  their  ground  and 
hastened  on  to  Phlious.  The  Argives,  finding  the  enemy  gone, 
hurried  back  to  Argos,  a  distance  of  about  40  miles,  and  thence  on 
the  road  to  Nemea.  No  long  time  had  passed  before  they  saw 
behind  them  on  the  plain  of  Argos  the  Spartan  force,  which  had 
worked  its  way  over  the  mountain  tracks  to  the  west.  By  another 
road  not  less  rugged  the  Corinthians,  Pallenians,  and  I'hliasians 
were  pom-ing  down  into  the  low  ground,  while  along  the  pass  of 
Tretos  in  their  front  were  advancing  the  Boiotians,  Megavians,  and 
Sikyonians.  Hastening  back  towards  Argos,  the  Argives  found 
themselves  hemmed  in  by  the  Spartans  in  their  rear,  and  two  other 
armies  in  front  and  flank.  Under  such  circumstances  their  destruc- 
tion was  certain  :  but  with  an  astonishing  blindness  the  Arrives  saw 
m  their  position  only  an  oppoi'tunity  for  taking  ample  revenge  upon 
the  Spartans.  Two  men  alone,  Alkiphron  and  Thrasyllos,  seemed 
not  to  share  their  madness ;  and  almost  at  the  moment  of  onset  these 
two  sought  an  interview  with  Agis,  and  on  their  own  responsibility 
asserted  that,  i/  he  would  withdraw  his  army,  the  Argives  would 
submit  all  matters  in  dispute  to  arbitration.  Taking  counsel  for  a 
moment  with  one  of  his  otficers  only,  Agis  granted  them  a  truce  of 
four  months,  and  gave  the  order  for  retreat.  In  utter  amazement 
the  Spartans  witnessed  the  breaking  up  of  the  finest  llellenic  army 
which  had  ever  been  gathered  together,'  and  set  out  on  their 
homeward  journey  in  deep  indignation  against  the  leader  who  had 
snatched  the  prey  from  the  very  claws  of  the  lion.  To  crown  the 
series  of  wonders,  the  Argives,  far  from  feeling  gratitude  to  the 
men  who  had  saved  the  city  from  ruin,  burst  out  in  frantic  wrath 
against  them  for  suffering  their  enemies  to  escape. 

The  Spartans  on  their  .side  were  with  difiiculty  witliheld  from 
razing  the  liouse  of  Agis  to  its  foundations  and  from  sentencing 
The  buttle  of  him  to  a  fine  of  1 00,000  drachmas.  Agis  simply  asked 
Mantineia.  tl^.^^  jj^  might  bc  allowed  an  opportunity  of  redeeming 
liis  past  error  before  tlie  infiiction  of  the  punishment ;  and  the  mes- 
sage which  now  came  from  the  i)e()ple  of  Tegea  to  say  that  only  in- 
stant help  could  prevent  the  loss  of  the  city  to  the  S[)artan  confede- 
racy l)rought  the  occasion  whicli  he  desired.  With  a  rapidity  never, 
in  the  judgment  of  Thucydides,  yet  matched,  Agis  set  out  at  the 
head  of  the  whole  Spartan  force.  From  Ore.stlieion  he  sent  back 
for  the  defence  of  Sparta  itself  a  sixth  i)artof  his  forces,  consisting 
'  Thiic.  v.  GO,  3. 


Chap.  VI  ]  THE   PEACE   OF   NIKIAS.  355 

of  the  oldest  and  the  youngest  men.      With  the  rest  he  reached 
Tegea  wliere  ho  was  joined  by  the  Arkadian  allies  ;  and  adv^ancing 
into  the  Mantineian  territory,  he  began  to  ravage  it.     Posted  on 
a  precipitous  eminence  the  Argives  waited  his  attack  in  order  of 
battle,   and  the  Spartan  leader,  eager  to  wipe  out  his  disgrace, 
was    anxious    only    to    order   the    onset.     So    manifest  was  his 
rashness   that  a  Spartan  veteran  could  not  help  citing  the  old 
proverb  on  the  healing  of  evil  by  evil.'     Struck  by  the  truth  of  the 
man's  words,  or  possibly  making  the  discovery  for  himself  at  the 
same    moment,  Agis    drew   off  his  men  when  they  w^ere  almost 
within  javelin's  cast  of  the  enemy.     Puzzled  by  the  sudden  dis- 
ap}~earance  of  the  Spartans,  the  Argives  soon  began  to  grow  weary 
of  inaction  in  their  strong  andalmost  impregnable  position,  and  to 
accuse  their  generals  of  a  trick  like  that  which  they  had  resented 
at  the  hands  of  Alkiphron  andTlirasyllos.     To  the  Argivc  leaders 
these  threats  came  with  a  force  not  to  bo  resisted,  and  they  at 
once  brought  their  men  down  from  the  hill  and  drew  them  out  in 
order  of  battle  on  the  open  plain.     On  the  following  day  the 
Spartans  returning  northwards  from  Tegea  suddenly  came  in  sight 
of  the  whole  Argive  army  in  full  lighting  array  and  almost  within 
the  range  of  archers.     Spartan   discipline  alone  preserved  them 
from  the  panic  which  under  such  circumstances  would  have  seized 
Hellenic  troops  generally  ;    but  while  the  leaders  of  the  Man- 
tineians  and  their  allies  were  going  through  the  speeches  by  which 
the    courage    of   the  men  was  wound  up  to  battle    pitch,    the 
Spartans  also  had  formed  in  fighting  order  and  were  ready  for  the 
attack.    Their  right  wing  was  decisively  and  almost  instantaneously 
victorious.     The  steady  march   of  the  iron  wall  seems  to  havo 
resumed  its  old  terrors,  for  the  Spartans  conquered  almost  without 
a  conflict,   and  vast  crowds  of  fugitives  were  trampled  down  iu 
the  vain  effort  to  escape  from  the  pursuers  who  were  on  them. 
For  the  Athenians  the  worst  danger  was  averted  partly  by  the 
efforts  of  their  cavalry,  but  still  more  by  the  order  which  Agis  was 
obliged  to  issue  that  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy  must  be  abandoned 
for  the  defence  of  his  left  wing  from  the  onslaught  of  the  Man- 
tineians.     The  mere  approach  of  Agis  chilled  the  courage  of  the 
enemy  ;    and    in    their  hurried  fliglit  the  Mantineians  were  far 
greater  sufferers  than  the  Argive  regiment  of  One  Thousand.     But 
on    the  whole   the    slaughter  was  not  great,   for  it  was  not  tlie 
Spartan  custom  to  spend  much  time  on  the  chase  of  a  flying  foe. 
So  ended  the  great  battle  in  which  little  was  done  by  the  skill  of 
the  general,  but  everything  by  the  bravery  and  discipline  of  liis 
men.^     It  did  away  with  the  impression  which  the  surrender  of 

'  Tliis  proverb  is  found  in  Soplio-     363. 
kles,  KaKov  KOKij)  61601%  aaui;.     Aias,        '■''J'buc.  v.  73,  2. 


356  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

the  hoplites  at  Spliakteria  and  the  subsecj^uent  skiggishness  of  the 
Spartans  had  almost  everywhere  ci'eated ;  and  it  was  at  once 
acknowledged  that  although  they  may  have  been  unfortunate, 
Spartan  courage  was  as  great  and  Spartan  discipline  as  effective 
as  ever. 

We  have  seen  that  in  the  cities  whicli  Brasidas  detached  from 
the  Athenian  empire,  and  in  those  which  the  Athenians  recon- 
Treaties  querecl  after  revolt,  the  demos  generally  was  averse  to 
Sparta  and  ^^^  revolution,  and  in  many  instances  counteracted  it 
Argos.  as  soon  as  it  was  possible  to  do  so.     But  the  course 

now  taken  by  the  Spartans  speaks  volumes  on  the  utter  futility  of 
the  promises  made  by  Brasidas  to  the  subject  allies  of  Athens. 
Far  from  encouraging  the  theory  of  absolute  independence  which 
according  to  that  tiery  leader  lay  at  the  root  of  her  foreign  policy, 
Sparta  made  it  clear  that  freedom,  as  interpreted  by  her,  meant 
only  the  liberty  of  modifying  constitutions  so  as  to  suit  her  fancy, 
or  of  adopting  the  form  of  government  which  she  might  dictate. 
The  Argive  conspirators  were  a  formidable  body  ;  and  the 
Thousand  Regiment  were  ready  to  throw  oS  all  disguise.  In  the 
fight  at  Mantineia  the  demos  had  been  shamefully  beaten,  while 
they  had  been  really  victorious.  In  casting  their  lot  in  with  the 
Spartans,  they  were  thus  consulting  at  once  their  interests  and 
their  dignity  :  and  with  their  sanction  Liclias  arrived  from  Sparta 
with  an  ultimatum,  offering  the  Argives  either  war  or  the  treaty 
which  he  brought  with  him  ready  written.  The  acceptance  of  this 
covenant  wasfollowedby  the  withdrawal  of  the  Spartan  force,  and 
probably  by  the  departure  of  Alkibiades.  The  tide  had  now 
turned  against  the  influence  of  Athens  ;  and  the  Argive  oligarchs 
soon  brought  about  the  ratification  of  a  treaty  of  alliance  which 
declared  the  autonomy  of  all  allies  whether  of  the  Argives  or  of 
the  Spartans.  Mantineia  could  now  no  longer  hope  to  inforce  her 
claim  to  supremacy  over  her  allies  ;  and  accepting  her  position,  she 
acknowledged  herself  once  more  a  member  of  the  confederacy  of 
Sparta." 

The  fabric  of  oligarchy  thus  raised  at  Argos  stood  on  an  uncer- 
tain fouiuiation.  The  Argive  demos  waited  until  the  time  came 
Restoration  when  the  people  at  Sparta  busied  themselves  in  watch- 
^[^^"Jj^'^^^y  ing  the  Gynmopaidiai,  or  dances  of  naked  men  and 
417'b.c.  boys,  and  then  rising  up  against  the  oligarchs  slew 
some  and  drove  others  out  of  the  city.  The  wanton  insolence  of 
the  Thousand  Regiment  liad  become  insufferable,  and  after  such 
provocation  tlie  bearing  of  the  demos  seems  to  have  been  singularly 
moderate.  They  were  fortunate  in  the  time  chosen  for  their  rising. 
The  Spartans  had  refused  to  stir  on  the  first  invitation  of  the  oli- 
•Thuc.  V.  81. 


Chap.  VI. ]  THE  PEACE  OF  NIKIAS.  357 

garcbs  ;  and  when  at  length  they  were  persuaded  to  pnt  off  the 
games,  it  was  too  late.  The  Argives  again  became  allies  of  Athens, 
and  gave  themselves  to  the  task  of  connecting  their  city  by  long 
walls  with  the  sea  not  less  earnestly  than  the  Athenians  had  under- 
taken like  tasks  in  the  days  of  Themistokles  and  Perikles.  If  this 
design  could  have  been  completed,  Argos  might  have  defied  the 
attacks  of  any  land  force,  as  the  Athenians  could  pour  in  from  the 
sea  any  supplies  needed  for  the  people  ;  but  the  oligarchical  party, 
was  not  wholly  rooted  out,  and  the  Spartans  received  promises  of 
aid  from  the  faction  within  the  city  if  they  would  once  more  put 
down  the  demos  and  destroy  the  unfinished  long  walls.  These 
promises  they  were  unable  to  fulfil  :  but  when  in  the  following 
winter  Agis  with  his  army  departed  baffleil  from  Argos  itself,  he 
levelled  the  long  walls  to  the  ground. 

The  feebleness  of  Athenian  policy  is  shown  by  the  course  which 
in  the  winter  of  this  year  the  Athenians  found  themselves  con- 
strained to  adopt  towards  the  Makedonian  Perdikkas.   _  ., 

xT-i  •  1    1  •  11  1  1  *         1  •      Failure  of  an 

JNikias  and  his  adherents,  who  now  saw  that  Amphi-  Atiieuiau 
polls,  if  it  was  ever  to  be  recovered  at  all,  must  be  re-  for'the're" 
covered  by  force,  urged  an  expedition  for  this  purpose  covery  of 
which  was  nevertheless  to  be  made  dependent  on  the     '^^  "^°  '*' 
co-operation  of  a  chief  whose  only  gifts  to  Athens  had  been  confined 
to   shiploads  of  lies.     Perdikkas,  of  course,  failed  to  keep  his  en- 
gagements, and  the  enterprise  was  abandoned. 

But  the  policy  of  Athens  was  as  misdirected  as  it  was  feeble. 
In  a  strufjo-le  such  as  that  in  which  she  was  now  enojag^ed  it  was  of 
the  utmost  importance  that  no  enterprise  should  be  Themassa- 
undertaken  in  which  success  would  not  be  fully  worth  ere  of  Meloa. 
the  time,  labor,  and  cost  bestowed  upon  it ;  nor  could 
"uy  condemnation  be  too  strong  for  the  policy  which  would  waste 
xhe  strength  of  the  city  in  schemes  in  which  success  could  bring  no 
profit,  and  would  involve  a  lasting  shame.  Such  a  scheme  was  the 
expedition  undertaken  in  the  sixth  year  after  the  so-called  peace  of 
Nikias  against  the  island  of  Melos,  which,  like  the  neighboring- 
island  of  Thera,  had  been  colonised  from  Sparta.  Thirty  Athenian 
triremes  with  six  from  Chios  and  two  from  Lesbos,  carrying  about 
2,700  hoplites,  besides  light-artned  troops,  sailed  to  the  attack  of  a 
city,  which,  as  a  source  of  wealth  or  power  to  Athens,  was  utterly 
insignificant.  The  story  of  the  expedition  is  soon  told.  The  re- 
quest of  the  islanders  to  be  allowed  to  remain,  as  they  had  been, 
neutral  in  the  contest  was  peremptorily  refused  :  and  the  demand 
of  the  Athenians  that  they  should  become  allies  of  Athens  was 
refused  also.  On  receiving  this  decision  the  invaders  applied  them- 
selves diligently  to  the  task  of  the  siege.  The  city  of  Melos  was 
completely  walled  in,  while  the  fleet  blockaded  it  by  sea.     Plots 


358  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  HI. 

for  betraying  the  place  to  the  Athenians  were  soon  discovered  ; 
and  the  Melians  deterniined  to  anticipate  them  by  unconditional 
surrender.  The  islanders  underwent  the  fate  which  the  Mytile- 
naians  had  all  but  suffered  and  which  the  Skionaians  had  actually 
undergone.  The  grown  men,  including  even  those  who  had  be- 
trayed or  wished  to  betray  the  place  to  the  Athenians,  were  all 
slain,  the  women  and  children  sold  as  slaves  ;  and  five  hundred 
Athenians  were  brought  into  the  island,  not  as  Klerouchoi  retain- 
ing their  political  rights  at  home  but  as  colonists.  On  the  brutal 
savagery  of  the  ancient  laws  of  war  it  is  useless  to  say  a  word  ;  but 
it  must  be  noted  that  the  case  of  Melos  was  utterly  unlike  that  of 
either  Mytilene  or  Skione.  The  Melians  had  done  to  the  Athenians 
no  specific  wrong ;  nor  have  we,  it  would  seem,  any  valid  reason 
for  supposing  that  they  would  have  refused  to  contribute  an  equit- 
able portion  of  their  revenue  to  meet  the  expenditure  of  an  empire 
from  which  tbey  themselves  derived  now  or  had  derived  direct  and 
important  benefits.  But  this  would  not  satisfy  the  Athenians. 
Tlie  Melians  must  become  their  subJ3ct  allies,  and,  as  such,  mast 
take  part  in  the  struggle  against  their  mother  city.  This  they 
naturally  refused  :  and  the  strength  which  might  have  recovered 
Amphipolis  was  put  forth  to  convince  them  of  their  folly.  Nor 
can  we  doubt  that  an  attempt  to  awaken  them  to  this  conviction 
had  been  made  in  words  before  the  final  appeal  was  made  to  force  ; 
and  this  attempt  assumes  in  the  narrative  of  Thucydides  the  f orra 
of  a  conference  which  forms  one  of  the  most  singular,  if  not  per- 
plexing, portions  of  his  history.  It  is  true  that  both  by  Perikles 
and  by  Kleon  the  supremacy  of  Athens  over  her  allies  is  repre- 
sented as  in  some  respects  resembling  a  tyranny  ;  but  we  have  seen 
that  this  phrase  denotes  nothing  more  than  that  amount  of  centrali- 
sation which  was  indispensably  necessary  if  the  confederacy  was 
to  be  maintained  at  all.  It  was  perfectly  competent  to  the  Athe- 
nians to  plead  that  the  Melians  had  no  right  to  enjoy  the  tranquil 
waters  of  a  sea  cleared  of  Persian  cruisers  and  tribute-gatherers  at 
a  cost  in  which  they  took  no  share  ;  but  this  would  have  been  a 
reason  for  compelling  them  to  join  the  confederacy  in  the  days  of 
Aristeides,  not  for  straining  the  strength  of  Athens  in  reducing 
them  now  when  a  long  war  with  Sf)arta  had,  at  least  for  Spartan 
colonists,  given  a  very  different  complexion  to  the  case.  Still  it  is 
to  such  arguments  as  these  that  Athenians  would  be  tempted  to 
resort  for  the  materials  of  their  indictment  against  the  Melians. 
The  open  avowal  that  might  makes  right  was  one  which  Avould  not 
be  made  by  Greeks  generally.  Least  of  all  would  it  be  made  by 
Athenians,  whose  sopliists  were,  whether  justly  or  unjustly,  credited 
with  a  singular  skill  in  making  the  worst  appear  the  better  reason. 
The  temper  which  glories  in  the  exertion  of  naked  brute  force  and 


Chap.  VI.]  THE  PEACE  OF  NIKIAS.  359 

delights  to  insult  and  defy  the  moral  instincts  of  mankind  is  the 
growth  of  not  every  condition  of  society  ;  and  we  should  least  of 
ail  look  for  it  amongst  a  people  who  were  always  disposed  to  call 
ugly  things  by  pretty  names/  But  in  the  conference  which  pre- 
cedes the  Meliari  massaci'e  we  have  a  rude  and  wanton  trampling 
on  all  seemliness  of  word  or  action,  a  haughty  assertion  of  an  in- 
dependence which  raises  them  above  all  law,  an  impudent  boasting 
that  iniquity  to  the  weak  can  do  the  strong  no  harm,  of  which-wc 
liave  had  as  yet  no  example  and  no  sign  in  Athenian  history." 

In  its  whole  spirit  and  form  this  conference  stands  out  in  glaring 
inconsistency  not  only  with  the  previous  history  of  Athens  but  with 
the  language  whether  of  her  own  statesmen,  of  her  Historical 
subject  allies,  or  of  her  open  adversaries.  It  is  still  theMeHan^ 
more  completely  at  variance  with  the  principles  and  conference. 
methods  ascribed  with  justice  perhaps  to  some  sophists,  most  un- 
justly to  the  sophists  as  a  class.  It  gives  the  impression  that  the 
Athenians  wished  to  be  regarded  as  bidding  a  studied  farewell  to 
all  honorable  or  even  liuman  motives  and  instincts,  and  as  pledging 
themselves  henceforth  to  a  new  mode  of  dealing  with  those  who 
might  be  weaker  than  themselves.  But  if  their  earlier  history  does 
not  prepare  us  for  such  an  outburst,  so  neither  is  their  philosophy 
here  borne  out  by  the  history  which  follows  it ;  and  we  are  thus 
driven  to  ask  whether  any  explanation  of  so  perplexing  a  pheno- 
menon be  forthcoming.  When  we  remember  that  the  massacre  at 
Melos  was  a  political  crime  greater  certainly  and  more  atrocious 
than  any  of  which  the  Athenians  had  yet  been  guilty,  that  it 
brought  them  no  gain  while  it  insured  to  Athens  a  bitter  harvest 
of  hatred  and  brought  down  upon  her  a  terrible  revenge,  and  that 
this  wanton,  inexcusable,  and  infatuated  crime  preceded  only  by  a 
few  months  that  ill-fated  Sicilian  expedition  which  was  to  seal  her 
doom,  we  can  have  little  doubt  that  the  historian  has  for  once 
dropped  his  function  of  recording  facts  rigidly  as  they  occurred, 
and  that  he  has  left  us  in  this  so-called  Melian  conference  an  ethical 
picture  like  that  which  Herodotos  has  drawn  of  the  Persian  despot 
in  his  overweening  arrogance  and  pride. ^  From  this  time  forwards 
the  strength  of  Athens  was  to  be  turned  aside  to  impracticable 
tasks  in  which  even  unqualified  success  could  scarcely  bi'ing  a  gain 
pi'oportionate  to  the  outlay,  and  the  affairs  of  the  city  were  to  be 
conducted  in  the  gambling  spirit  which  stakes  a  continually  increas' 
ing  sum  in  the  hope  of  recovering  past  losses.    The  expedition  to 

"  Tovc  'KOjjvaiovg  ael  ra  TrpaoTara  sation  as  fabricated  by  Thucydidea 

Tuv  bvoficiTuv  TolQ  uiiapTi] fiaa I.     Tide-  in  order  to  bring  discredit  upouliia 

uevovc.     Plut.  Alk.  16.  countrymen. 

^  On  this  ground  Dionysios,   dc  ^  See  p.  195. 
Tkuc.  Jud.  39,  regards  this  conver- 


360  THE   EMPIRE   OF   ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

Melos  marks  the  turning-point  beyond  wliicli  the  policy  of  Periklos 
is  lost  to  sight,  and  full  play  is  given  to  the  policy  of  Alkibiades. 

If  in  the  massacre  and  inslavement  of  a  people  we  see  the  Athe- 
nians in  their  most  repulsive  and  loathsome  aspect,  the  ostracism  of 
^,  _     the   lamp-maker  Hyperbolos  exhibits  the  ignoble  use 

cismofHy-  to  Avhicli  an  instrument,  fashioned  for  better  purposes, 
perbo  OS.  ^^^^^  Y)q  at  length  applied.  From  Thucydides'  we  learn 
only  the  fact  that  Hyperbolos  was  ostracised.  By  Plutarch^  wc 
are  told  that  the  challenge  came  from  Nikias  and  his  adherents  to 
Alkibiades  and  liis  followers,  but  that  before  the  time  for  voting 
came  these  two  parties  had  changed  their  plans  and  formed  a  com- 
bination to  bring  about  the  banishment  of  the  lamp-maker  who  is 
.said  to  have  taken  the  place  of  Kleon.  The  combination  was,  of 
course,  successful ;  and  Hyperbolos  lived  as  an  exile  at  >Samos 
where  some  years  later  he  fell  a  victim  to  the  daggers  of  oligarchic 
conspirators.  The  historian  adds  that  he  was  a  pestilent  man,  ex- 
iled not  on  account  of  any  fears  of  his  political  genius  or  influence 
but  simply  because  his  madness  and  violence  reflected  disgrace 
upon  the  city.  Thucydides  was  well  aware  that  ostracism  was  never 
devised  to  be  a  punishment  for  such  men,  and  in  all  likelihood  he 
me?nt  liis  statement  to  be  taken  as  an  expression  of  this  conviction. 
The  matter  was  regarded  in  the  same  light  by  the  people,  and 
ostracism  was  never  again  resorted  to  against  an  Athenian  citizen. 

The  general  condition  of  Hellas  at  the  time  of  the  Melian  expe- 
dition presents  an  astonishing  picture  of  the  complications  which 
Position  of  may  arise  from  the  conflicting  interests  of  independent 
Heilenfc  ^'^J  Communities.  Formally  the  treaty  of  peace  be- 
states.  tween  Athens  and  Sparta  was  still  in  force  :  nor  had 

these  two  cities  renounced  their  private  treaty  of  alliance  made 
after  the  peace.  The  Spartans  still  had  their  own  private  agree- 
ment with  the  Boiotians,  and  the  Boiotians  their  ten  days'  truce 
with  the  Athenians.  At  the  request  of  the  Argives  tlie  Messenians 
and  Helots  liad  been  brought  back  from  Kephallenia  to  I'ylos  ;^ 
and  while  tlie  vVthenians  were  blockading  Melos,  the  Pylian  garri- 
son made  destructive  inroads  into  the  Lakonian  territory.  The 
Corinthians  also  had  their  own  grounds  of  quarrel  witli  the  Athe- 
nians :  but  they  had  no  formal  covenants  to  restrain  them  from 
open  strife.  They  had  refused  to  accept  the  peace  of  Nikias,  and 
they  were  free  to  act.  opeidy.  The  Spartans  were  not  yet  prepared 
to  destroy  the  pillar  which  bore  witness  to  tlieir  compact  with 
Athens  ;  but  they  determined  to  requite  the  ravages  of  the  Messe- 
nians from  Pylos  by  issuing  licenses,  or  in  modern  phrase  letters 
of  marqne,  to  those  who  might  be  willing  to  retaliate  as  privateers 
on  the  coa.sts  of  Attica  or  on  the  mercantile  fleets  of  Athens, 
'  viii.  73.  ""  Alk.  13.     Nik.  11.  '  See  p.  348. 


CHAPTER   VII. 

THE    PELOPONNESIAN    WAR. — THE    SICILIAN    EXPEDITION. 

In  the  year  which  witnessed  the  disgraceful  revolution  at  Kor- 
kyra,  the  rhetor  Gorgias  headed  an  embassy  from  the  Sicilian 
Leontinoi  to  ask  the  aid  of  Athens  against  the  Syra-  First  imei-- 
cusans,  who  were  at  open  war  not  only  with  them  but  [he*'^''the^-^  ' 
with  Naxos  and  Katana.  In  this  strife  Syracuse  had  niaus  in  the 
the  aid  of  all  her  Dorian  neighbors  except  the  men  of  sicii'y!" 
Kamarina  who  threw  their  force  into  the  opposite  scale.  427  b.c. 
On  her  side  also  appeared  the  troops  of  the  Epizephyrian  Lokrians, 
while  the  men  of  Rhegion  took  the  side  of  Leontinoi.'  Whatever 
power  the  eloquence  of  Gorgias  may  have  exercised  over  the 
Athenian  assembly,  no  more  constraining  argument  probably  was 
adduced  than  the  warning  that  if  the  Sicilian  Dorians  should  be 
suffered  to  subdue  their  Ionian  kinsfolk,  the  Spartans  would  as- 
suredly receive  from  Sicily  the  succors  on  which  the  Corinthians 
especially  had  eagerly  counted.  The  fact  may  be  doubted  ;  and 
had  Perikles  still  been  in  his  place  in  the  assembly,  he  would  in  all 
likelihood  have  told  his  countrymen  that  they  could  find  more 
effectual  means  of  aiding  the  lonians  of  Sicily  than  by  diverting 
the  strength  of  Athens  to  operations  in  that  distant  island.  But 
neither  was  Perikles  living,  nor  was  his  policy  in  reference  to  for- 
eign conquests  taken  up  by  Kleon,  although  when  vigorous  efforts 
were  needed  for  the  recovery  of  revolted  cities  the  line  taken  by  the 
leather-seller  was  more  spirited  and  creditable  than  that  of  the 
high-born  Nikias  and  his  followers.  The  Leontine  envoys  had 
thus  little  difficulty  in  obtaining  the  promise  of  help  ;  but  althouo;h 
three  Athenian  fleets  appeared  successively  during  the  next  two 
years  in  Sicilian  waters,  no  decisive  results  were  obtained  on  either 
side. 

The  great  success  of  Demosthenes  at  Sphakteria  produced  in  the 
public  opinion  of  Sicily  a  change  not  less  marked  than  that  which 
it  brought  about  at   Athens.     If  the  Athenians  were   consress  of 
led  by  it  not  only  to  insist  on  harder  terms  from  the   SiciiTan 
Spartans  but  even  to  engage  in  schemes  for  regaining   Geia.  ^^ 
their   short-lived   supremacy   in   Boiotia,    the   Sicilian      424  b.c. 
Greeks  began  to  feel  that  their  incessant  quarrels  and  wars  might  • 
leave  the  whole  island  at  the  mercy  of  a  people  who  had  shown  a 
power  of  resistance  and  a  fertility  of  resource  far  beyond  any  with 
which   at   the  beginning  of  the  war  their  enemies  would   have 

'Thuc.  iii.  86. 
lo 


362  THE  EMPIRE   OF  ATHENS.  [Book  HI. 

credited  them.  The  necessity  of  making  common  cause  against 
Athens  was  felt  first  by  the  citizens  of  Kamarina  and  Gela,  and 
was  first  expressed  probably  by  the  men  of  the  weaker  city.  The 
truce  between  these  two  cities  was  followed  by  a  congress  at  Gela 
in  which  before  the  general  body  of  Sikeliot  envoys'  the  Syracusan 
Hei'mokrates  stood  forwai'd  for  the  first  time  as  the  uncompromis- 
ing antagonist  of  Athens, 

The  decision  sought  for  by  Ilern'okrates  was  attained  ;  and  it 
was  agreed  that  a  general  peace  should  be  made  between  the 
Punishment  several  cities  Avhich  should  retain  each  its  present  pos- 
nl-m  com-^  sessions,  Morgantine  only  being  given  to  Kamarina  on 
manders.  the  payment  of  a  fixed  sum  of  money.  The  Athenian 
commanders  were  at  once  informed  of  the  treaty  to  which,  it  was 
added,  they  might,  if  they  pleased,  become  a  party. ^  For  the  time 
being  they  had  scarcely  an  option  ;  and  the  Athenian  fleet  was 
accordingly  withdrawn.  But  sinca  the  departure  of  Eurymedon 
from  Pylos  and  Korkyra  the  mad  promise  of  Kleon,  as  some  chose 
to  call  it,  had  been  fulfilled  ;  and  the  admirals  on  reaching  Athens 
found  themselves  to  their  amazement  objects  of  general  and  vehe- 
ment indignation.  The  people  would  have  it  that  bribery  only 
could  explain  the  facts  :  and  on  this  theory  Pythodoros  and  So- 
phokles  were  banished,  while  Enrymedon,  the  infamous  hero  of  the 
Korkyraian  massacre,  was  fined. 

The  pacification  brought  about  by  the  efforts  of  Hermokrates 
was  short-lived.  It  was  not,  indeed,  likely  to  last  longer  than  the 
Renewed  general  fear  of  Athenian  ambition  ;  and  the  disasters 
iirLc'mit'inoi  ^^  ^'^^  Boiotian  campaign,  crowned  by  the  catastrophe 
42y  B.C.  of  Delion,  speedily  dispelled  this  fear.  But  in  spite  of 
all  the  fair  words  of  the  Syracusan  envoy  some  at  least  of  the 
weaker  towns  could  not  rid  themselves  of  the  suspicion  that  in  the 
city  whicli  Hermokrates  represented  Ihey  had  a  neighbor  more 
dangerous  than  Athens.  Tlie  men  of  Leontinoi  resolved  accordingly 
to  increase  the  nund)er  of  their  citizens,  a  measure  wdiicli  would  be 
necessarily  followed  by  a  re-arrangement  of  the  land.  To  this  the 
oligarchical  party  could  not  bring  themselves  to  submit ;  and  they 
liad  power  enougli  to  expel  the  demos,  and  to  dismantle  the  city. 
They  now  became  possessed  of  all  the  lands,  which  they  continued 
to  occupy  although  they  had  taken  up  their  abode  at  Syracuse. 
The  new  strife  thus  brought  about  furnished  a  fresh  excuse  for 
Athenian  inten-ention,  but  the  mission  of  Phaiax  ended  only  in 
promises  of  further  and  more  effectual  aid  to  the  Leontines. 

'  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  say  selves  and  the  native  Sikeloi. 

that  the  Sicilian  Hellenes  spoke  of  -  The     Epizepliyrian     Lokrians 

themselves  as  Sikeliotai, thus  mark-  alone  refused  to  agree  to  this  cove- 

ing  the  distinction  between  them-  nant.     Thuc.  v.  5,  3. 


Chaf.  VII.]  THE   SICILIAN  EXPEDITION.  363 

The  complication  of  affairs  in  Peloponnesos  after  the  peace  of 
Nikias  left  to  the  Athenians  no  time  for  any  thoughts  of  inter- 
ference in  Sicily.  But  when  in  the  beginning  of  the  Quairui  j^q. 
year  in  which  the  Melians  were  massacred  an  embassy  tween  Seii- 
reached  Athens  from  Egesta,  one  of  the  two  cities  of  Egesta" 
the  Elymoi,  in  Sicily,  the  envoys  were  far  more  gra-  '^^^  b.c. 
ciously  received  than  the  poor  exiles  of  Leontiuoi.  These  had  ap- 
pealed simply  to  their  feelings  of  compassion  :  the  Egestaians 
inforced  their  claim  on  the  )nore  constraining  grounds  of  expe- 
diency and  good  policy.  They  asked  for  help  against  the  men  of 
Selinous  in  a  quarrel  which  had  arisen  from  some  merely  local 
dispute ;  and  probably  they  would  not  have  cared  to  deny  the  in- 
significance of  its  cause.  But  they  pointed  simply  to  the  policy  of 
Syracuse,  and  to  the  likelihood  that,  when  she  had  made  herself 
the  imperial  city  of  Sicily,  she  would  come  forward  openly  to  the 
help  of  the  great  Dorian  state  of  Continental  Hellas.  She  had 
already  wiped  Leontinoi  out  of  the  luimber  of  Sicilian  towns ;  and 
unless  her  course  was  cut  short,  Egesta  would  suffer  the  same  fate. 
But  although  the  envoys  were  quite  willing  to  admit  that  they 
could  not  stand  by  themselves,  they  were  not  less  strenuous  in 
asserting  that  their  power,  if  combined  with  that  of  Athens,  was  not 
to  be  despised.  Reminding  the  Athenians  that  they  were  already 
their  allies  by  virtue  of  a  treaty  made  ten  years  ago  with  Laches, 
they  pledged  themselves  not  merely  to  bring  their  own  men  into 
the  field,  but  to  take  on  themselves  the  whole  costs  of  the  war. 

The   picture,   as  it  was  drawn  and  colored  by  the  envoys   in 
repeated   audiences  before  the  public   assembly,  was  sufficiently 
seductive  ;  nor  can  we  doubt  that  among  the  citizens   Resolution 
there  were  many  who  were   ready  to  dress  it  out  in   of  the  Athe- 
still   more  enticing  colors.      So  far  were   the  people   maiirtain 
charmed  bv  the  new  influence  that,  instead  of  pausino-   t^"  cause  of 

,.,',,  .  »     ^ ,         .  '^    the  Eges- 

to  thmk  whether  under  any  circumstances  further  m-  taians. 
terference  in  Sicily  would  be  either  wise  or  profitable,  ^^°  ^-^' 
they  resolved  to  send  ambassadors  to  test  the  resources  of  the 
Egestaians  and  their  prospects  of  success  in  their  war  with  Seli- 
nous.' The  Egestaians  turned  out  to  be  mere  impostors  :  but  un- 
happily the  cheat  was  not  discovered  until  the  Athenian  fleet  had 
reached  Rhegion.^  The  envoys  returned  from  Sicily  in  the  spring 
of  the  following  year  with  glowing  accounts  of  the  wealth  which 
they  had  seen  there,  not  only  in  the  temples  and  public  buildings, 
but  in  the  houses  of  the  citizens  ;  the  crews  of  the  triremes  which 
conveyed  the  ambassadors  were  loud  in  expressions  of  wonder  and 
admiration   at  the   magnificent  hospitality   with  which  they  had 

'  Time.  vi.  6.  '  lb.  vi.  46. 


364  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  IH. 

been  entertained  during  their  whole  stay  at  Egesta.  But  the 
treasures  of  the  temples  were  of  silver,  not  gold  ;  and  the  orna- 
ments which  made  their  feasts  so  splendid  represented  the  collective 
wealth  not  only  of  Egesta  but  of  other  cities  from  which  they  were 
borrowed,  the  whole  being  transferred  secretly  from  house  to  house 
for  each  successive  entertainment.  The  Athenian  people,  however, 
felt  assured  that  the  Egestaians  had  told  the  simple  truth,  when 
the  envoys  laid  before  them  sixty  talents  of  uncoined  silver  as  a 
month's  pay  in  advance  for  a  fleet  of  sixty  vessels.  The  popular 
enthusiasm  had  been  wrought  up  to  the  requisite  pitch,  and  a 
decree  was  passed  appointing  Alkibiades,  Nikias,  and  Lamachos 
commanders  of  an  expedition  charged  with  maintaining  the  cause 
of  Egesta  against  the  men  of  Sclinous,  Avith  the  restoration  of 
Leontinoi,  and  with  the  general  furtherance  of  Athenian  interests 
in  Sicily.  Five  days  later  the  assembly  was  to  meet  again  to  dis- 
cuss more  fully  the  details  of  the  expedition. 

Nikias,  we  cannot  doubt,  had  done  what  he  could,  or  felt  that 
he  could  do,  to  knock  the  whole  scheme  on  the  head.  We  are 
Opposition  expressly  told  that  his  appointment  to  the  command 
of  Nikias.  ^r^^  made  against  liis  will  ;  and  the  statement  implies 
that  he  had  made  no  secret  of  his  opinion.  The  life  of  Nikias,  born 
though  he  was  to  high  station  and  abundant  wealth,  was  not  par- 
ticularly foi'tunate  :  but  of  all  his  misfortunes  none  was  greater 
than  his  strange  inability  to  discern  the  road  whicli  almost  at  any 
given  time  would  have  led  him  out  of  his  difficulties.  The  expe- 
dition to  Sicily  was  not  much  more  to  his  mind  than  the  enterprise 
of  Demosthenes  at  Pylos.  In  the  former  case  he  pronounced 
success  to  be  difficult :  in  the  latter  he  asserted  it  to  be  impossible. 
Had  he  chosen,  when  replying  to  the  sarcasms  of  Kleon,  to  adopt 
the  line  which  he  took  in  opposition  to  Alkibiades  in  reference  to 
the  Sicilian  invasion,  he  might  with  the  aid  of  Demosthenes  have 
secured  a  victory  far  more  brilliant  than  that  which  Demosthenes 
and  Kleon  achieved  on  the  island  of  Sphakteria,  But  Nikias  op- 
posed himself  to  resolute  action  under  all  circumstances  :  and  his 
words  failed  to  carry  due  weight  when,  as  in  the  present  instance, 
they  were  fully  borne  out  by  facts.  He  was  indeed  fully  justified 
in  asserting  on  the  day  of  the  second  assembly  that  Athens  owed 
no  duties  to  barbarian  inhabitants  of  a  distant  island,'  while  she 
owed  the  strongest  duties  to  her  own  citizens  and  to  the  members 
of  her  great  confederacy  ;  that  the  Spartans  Avere  only  nominally 
at  peace  with  her,  and  that  her  first  disaster  would  be  to  them  a 
welcome  opportunity  for  giving  vent  to  a  wrath  long  pent  up  -^ 
that  their  example  would  be  followed  by  other  states  which  had 

'  Thuc.  vi.  9,  1.  *  lb.  vi.  9,  2. 


Chap.  VII.]  THE   SICILIAN  EXPEDITION.  365 

either  openly  repudiated  the  peace  or  had  contented  themselves 
with  a  ten  days'  truce  periodically  renewed  ;  and  that  if  Athens 
was  bent  on  righting  wrongs,  her  business  was  to  redress  her  own. 
The  Thrace-ward  Chalkidians  were  still  in  revolt ;  and  until  these 
were  again  brought  under  obedience,  it  was  madness  to  dispatch 
fleets  and  armies  to  aid  the  Egestaians.'  In  short,  there  was  abso- 
lutely no  reason  for  going,  and  every  reason  for  refusing  to  go. 
The  plea  of  the  Egestaians  that  Syracuse  was  seeking  to  make 
herself  mistress  of  all  Sicily  was  one  to  which  it  was  absurd  to 
listen.  The  success  of  Syracuse  in  any  such  scheme  would  be  to 
the  intej'est  of  Athens,  not  to  her  injury.  In  their  present  state  of 
isolation,  the  several  Dorian  cities  of  that  island  might  be  tempted 
to  take  part  with  the  Dorian  states  to  which  they  traced  their 
origin  :  but  if  Syracuse  became  an  imperial  power,  she  would  be 
less  likely  to  risk  her  empire  in  a  contest  with  a  city  whose  strength 
was  equal  to  her  own.''  A  far  more  serious  danger  threatened 
Athens  from  the  Spartan  itch  for  subverting  democratical  consti- 
tutions and  setting  up  oligarchies  in  their  place,'  and  from  the 
selfish  ambition  of  men  who  far  outran  their  fortunes  in  the  extra- 
vagant luxury  of  their  private  lives,  in  the  ostentatious  magnifi- 
cence of  their  liturgies,  and  in  the  splendor  of  the  chariots  and 
horses  with  which  they  competed  for  the  prizes  in  the  great  Hel- 
lenic festivals.  If  such  men  urged  on  the  expedition,  they  had  the  • 
twofold  motive  of  wishing  to  increase  their  own  importance  and 
making  good  the  ruinous  costs  of  their  lavish  and  iniquitous  dis- 
play ;  and  on  this  account  they  were  utterly  unfitted  to  be  inl  rusted 
with  any  command  in  such  an  enterprise.  Lastly  he  intreaU-J  the 
Prytanis,  or  President,  to  put  the  whole  question  once  more  to  the 
vote  under  the  full  assurance  that  the  irregularity  of  the  step  would 
at  the  least  be  condoned. 

The  speech  of  Nikias  roused  the  vehement  indignation  of  Alki- 
biades.  Making  a  virtue  of  necessity,  he  gloried  in  the  acts  which 
had  called  forth  the  strongest  censures  of  Nikias.  It  counter- 
was  true  that  he  had  competed  for  the  Olympian  prize  of^^i™fi5i^^ 
with  seven  chariots  of  four  horses  each,  and  that  he  ades. 
had  sought  to  make  his  liturgies  as  splendid  as  he  could.  Bat  his 
victories  at  Olympia  had  impressed  the  whole  Hellenic  world  with 
a  sense  of  the  power  and  wealth  of  Athens,  in  which  they  had 
well-nigh  ceased  to  believe,  while  the  richness  of  his  public  services 
had  tended  greatly  to  attract  and  reassure  her  subjects  and  her 
allies.     He  had  even  the  efirontery  to  boast  of  his  Peloponnesian 

*  Thuc.  vi.  10.  at  Athens  ;  but  no  one  will  cbartje 

"  lb.  vi.  11,  3.  him  witli  any  complicity  in  the  vio- 

^  lb.  vi.  11,  5.     Nikias  belonged,  lent  counsels  which  disgraced  tbia 

it  is  true,  to  the  oligarchical  party  party  a  few  years  later. 


360  THE  EMPIRE  OF  AITJENS.  [Book  III. 

intrigues  and  of  the  strait  to  which  he  had  reduced  Sparl  a  when  she 
was  obliged  to  stake  everything  on  a  single  throw  at  Mantineia  ; 
and  he  crowned  his  avowal  with  the  impudent  falsehood  that,  al- 
though Sparta  won  the  stake,  she  had  not  yet  recovered  the  haughty 
contidence  of  the  times  preceding  the  disasters  of  Sphakteria.  It 
was  true  also,  he  added,  that  he  was  young,  and  that  Nikias  had 
the  experience  of  maturer  years  :  but  this  was  oidy  a  reason  for 
turning  to  the  good  of  the  state  the  youth  of  the  one  and  the  wis- 
dom of  the  other.  As  to  the  strength  of  the  Sicilian  cities,  Nikias 
was  scaring  them  with  imaginary  terrors.  They  were  but  solitary 
units  without  power  of  cohesion,  on  whom  the  barbarous  tribes  of 
the  Sikels  would  be  glad  to  wreak  the  enmity  of  ages.  But,  as 
Athenians,  they  were  bound  to  remember  their  own  wants  and 
their  own  honor.  The  very  life  of  Athens  depended  on  energetic 
action.  Sicily  would  supply  a  field  for  such  action.  The  refusal 
to  occupy  this  field  would  be  followed  by  stagnation,  <and  st^agna- 
lion  would  end  in  death.'  It  was  the  old  argument  of  Asiatic 
conquerors  which  Ilcrodotos  puts  into  the  mouth  of  Xerxes  ;^  and 
it  was  worthy  alike  of  the  Persian  despot  and  the  selfish  Athenian 
oligarch. 

The  speech  of  Alkibiades  was  followed  by  addresses  from  other 
orators  and  by  renewed  intreaties  from  the  Egestaian  envoys;  and 
'Attempt  of  the  effect  of  all  was  so  powerful  that  Nikias,  feeling* 
Nikias  to  himself  already  practically  defeated,  resorted  to  a  de- 
peopicby  vice  by  which  he  hoped  to  disgust  ihem  with  the 
thc'vasTef"  dterprise.  Assuming  that  the  expedition  would  be 
fort  needed  voted,  he  insisted  that  it  must  be  made  on  a  scale 
ihe'^eSer'-"  whicli  might  fairly  justify  confidence  in  its  success, 
prise.  They  must   carry    with  them  hopiites,   bowmen,  and 

slingers,  and  must  go  amply  provided  with  a  convoy  of  grain-bear- 
ing vessels,  and  with  everything  that  could  insure  the  well-being 
of  the  army  under  all  possible  accidents  of  war.  These  were  for 
him  no  matters  for  doubt  or  controversy  ;  and  if  any  viewed  them 
as  ;uich,  he  would  resign  to  them  a  command  which  had  been  thrust 
upon  him  against  his  will. 

This  manoeuvre  on  the  part  of  Nikias  was  followed  by  a  result 
precisely  opposite  to  that  which  lie  had  hoped  for.  Far  from  in- 
ducing the  people  to  give  up  the  enterprise  as  one 
ofthcAthe-  wholly  bcyoud  their  strength,  he  united  all  parties  by 
wUh  uii 't'lle  l>i'oposing  a  course  which  seemed  to  make  failure  im- 
deniaiidBof  possible.  The  enthusiasm  of  those  who  were  most 
eag(}r  for  the  expedition  was  increased  tenfold,  while 
the  more  sober-minded  were  led  to  think  that  what  Athens  under- 

'  Time.  vi.  la  *  See  ]>.  161. 


Chap.  VII.]  THE   SICILIAN   EXPEDITION.  3(5 f 

took  with  a  superfluity  of  resources,  she  would  assuredly  be  able 
to  accomplish.  When  then  one  of  the  citizens  started  up  and 
insisted  that  instead  of  further  preface  Nikias  should  say  precisely 
what  he  wanted,  the  unfortunate  general  was  caught  in  his  own 
trap.  Like  one  passing  sentence  of  death  on  the  high-spirited,  al- 
though mistaken,  men  whom  he  feared  that  he  should  be  leading 
to  ruin,  Nikias  said  that  he  mnst  have  at  least  a  hundred  triremes, 
and,  if  })Ossible,  more  than  live  thousand  hoylites,  with  light  troops 
in  proportion.  Not  only  wiis  his  request  instantly  complied  with, 
but  with  his  colleagues  he  received  full  powers  over  all  arrange- 
ments for  the  expedition.  The  die  was  cast.  The  efforts  of  Nikias 
to  chill  the  ardor  of  the  people  had  secured  to  Aikibiades  a  victory 
far  greater  than  any  which  he  had  hoped  for,  and  staked  almost 
the  existence  of  the  state  on  the  issue  of  the  enterprise.  But  in 
justice  to  Nikias  it  must  be  remembered  that  his  dissuasions  were 
not  founded  on  the  mere  anticipation  of  disaster.  Ue  went  with 
no  high  hopes ;  he  was  weighed  down  perhaps  with  some  heavy 
misgivings  :  but  unquestionably  he  had  not  made  up  his  mind  tliat 
the  scheme  would  inevitably  end  in  failure.  Nikias  went  to  Sicily, 
because  on  a  general  view  of  the  case  he  felt  that  he  might  hope  to 
return  home  in  triumph  ;  but  he  condemjied  the  whole  scheme  em- 
phatically on  the  ground  that  in  such  an  enterprise  victory  would 
be  not  much  less  a  calamity  than  defeat.  The  latter  might  cripple 
Athens  for  years  ;  but  success  would  extend  her  empire  to  an  un- 
manageable size,  would  involve  her  in  an  inextricable  network  of 
difficulties,  and  would  lead  to  further  schemes  of  aggression  which 
would  be  avenged  in  her  speedy  downfall.' 

The  prospect  for  the  present  was  singularly  bright  and  alluring. 
The  regard  paid  to  the  personal  integrity  of  Nikias  roused  the  ve- 
hement enthusiasm  of  the  Athenians,  and  brought  for-  ^j^^  mutiia- 
ward  an  eager  crowd  of  volunteers  where  the  generals  tion  of  the 
had  feared  that  they  might  have  to  constrain  men  to  '^'^'^^'• 
an  irksome  service.  With  the  same  ardor  the  trierarchs  vied  with 
each  other  in  the  lavishness  with  which  they  provided  everything 
necessary  for  the  comfort  of  their  crews  and  of  the  troops  whom 
they  were  to  convey  to  the  scene  of  action.  The  vehement  impulse 
thus  imparted  was  at  its  height,  when  the  citizens  awoke  one 
morning  to  find  that  the  figures  of  Hermes,  busts  standing  on 
quadrangular  pedestals,  had  with  scarcely  an  exception  been  mu- 
tilated and  defaced.  These  Ilerraai,  or  statues  of  the  Master 
Thief,^  stood  in  the  Agora,  before  the  temples,  the  public  build- 
ings, and  private  houses  ;  and  the  people  comforted  themselves  with 
the  thought  that  the  reverence  which  they  paid  to  him  enlisted 

*  Thuc.  vi.  11  et  seq.  '  Myth.  Ar.  Nat.  i.  119  ;  ii.  326. 


368  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  IH. 

the  god  on  their  side,  and  pledged  bim  to  protect  them  against  the 
robbers  of  whom  be  was  the  most  adroit  and  subtle.  Tbe  event 
produced  a  profound  sensation.  The  religious  fears  of  tbe  Athe- 
nians had  been  roused  ;  and  no  people  perhaps  were  ever  on  this 
point  more  sensitive.'  It  was  clear  that  there  lurked  in  the  city  a 
body  of  men  for  whom  religion,  law,  and  duty  had  no  constraint, 
men  who  did  not  scruple  to  wage  war  against  the  gods  and  to  ini- 
volve  the  guiltless  in  the  punishment  due  for  their  own  iniquities. 
But  the  presence  of  such  men  in  the  city  involved  a  political  not 
less  than  a  religious  danger.  The  one  in  fact  could  not  be  separated 
from  the  other.  The  sacrilege  committed  on  the  Herraai  was  the 
act  of  men  belonging  to  an  organised  body  ;  and  hence  the  Athe- 
nians had  in  their  midst  a  secret  society  who  hated  the  existing 
constitution  of  their  country.  Men  who  had  any  respect  for  law 
and  decency  could  never  have  become  partakers  in  such  evil  deeds, 
and  thus  the  suspicion  of  political  conspiracy  was  necessarily 
roused  by  the  discovery  that  a  gross  insult  had  been  offered  to  one 
of  the  divine  protectors  of  the  city. 

Resjjecting  the  mutilation  of  the  Hermai  at  Athens  two  things 
only  are  certain.     There  is  not  the  least  doubt  that  a  conspiracy 
Accusation     existed,  whatever  may  have  been  its  objects,  and  that 
of  Alki-         with  this  conspiracy   Alkibiades  had  nothing  to  do. 
la  eo.  -^Yg  ^^^^^^  advance  one  step  further,  and  maintain  con- 

fidently that  the  end  at  which  most  of  the  conspirators  aimed  was 
the  ruin  of  Alkibiades.  It  is  also  possible  that  with  this  motive 
was  combined  a  desire  to  bring  about  the  abandonment  of  the 
Sicilian  expedition  altogether.  It  is  perhaps  even  not  unlikely  that 
among  the  conspirators  may  have  been  some  who  were  actuated  by 
the  latter  motive  alone  ;  and  these,  knowing  how  earnestly  Nikias 
had  spoken  against  the  scheme,  may  have  felt  that  an  appeal  to  liis 
religious  fears  would  be  the  means  of  re-opening  the  question  and 
rousing  a  more  determined  opposition  on  the  part  of  men  who  were 
thus  far  afraid  to  break  silence.  But  that  the  Avhole  career  of 
Alkibiades  whether  as  a  statesman  or  a  private  citizen  had  raised 
up  against  him  a  band  of  bitter  enemies,  there  is  no  doubt  at  all. 
lie  was  hated  more  especially  by  wealthy  men  of  the  oligarchical 
party,  whom  he  insulted  by  his  arrogance  and  eclipsed  by  the 
ostentation  and  extravagant  costliness  of  his  liturgies.  An  oli- 
garchical society  may  display  towards  the  inferior  classes  a  super- 
cilious haughtiness  scarcely  surpassed  even  by  that  of  Alkibiades, 
but  oligarchs  generally  have  no  mind  that  this  haughtiness  should 
be  exhibited  towards  themselves  by  one  who  is  only  their  peer. 
As  soon  as  tbe  sacrilege  was  discovered,  rewards  were  offered  for 

'This  cl.aracteristic,  known   as     in  the  speech  of  St.  Paul  on  the  bill 
tbeir  deiaidaifiovia,  is  specially  noted    of  Ai  eiopagos. 


Chap.  VII.]  THE   SICILIAN  EXPEDITION.  360 

the  apprehension  of  the  conspirators  ;  but  the  slaves,  who  came 
forward  as  informants,  appeared  not  to  give  an  account  of  the  mu- 
tilation of  the  Ilermai,  but  to  say  that  they  had  seen  Alkibiades 
with  other  young  and  rich  men  mimicking  in  private  houses  the 
ceremonies  of  the  Eleusinian  mysteries.  The  preparations  for  the 
departure  of  the  fleet  were  all  but  finished,  and,  if  we  may  believe 
Andokides,  the  trireme  of  Lantachos  was  already  moored  in  the 
outer  harbor,  when  in  the  public  assembly  Alkibiades  was  charged 
with  this  intolerable  profanation.  His  demeanor  in  this  crisis 
was  straiglitforward  and  commendable.  He  insisted  on  being 
brought  to  trial  before  he  sailed,  and  protested  against  the  injustice 
of  allowing  him  to  depart  in  charge  of  an  army,  while  at  home  an 
accusation  impended  over  him  which  his  enemies  by  slanders 
spread  about  during  his  absence  might  indefinitely  aggravate.  In 
demanding  an  immediate  trial  he  was  acting  wisely.  His  oppo- 
nents saw  that  a  large  proportion  of  the  troops  were  on  his  side, 
and  they  feared  that  his  condemnation  might  send  home  in  wrath 
or  disgust  the  Argive  and  Mantineian  allies  who  by  his  influence 
had  been  induced  to  take  part  in  the  expedition.  It  was  indispen- 
sable that  the  fleet  should  not  be  detained  ;  and  the  speakers  who 
now  followed  the  instructions  of  his  personal  enemies  urged  that 
the  trial  should  be  postponed  until  a  deflnite  time  should  have 
passed  after  his  recall,  whenever  the  latter  step  should  be  re- 
solved on. 

It  was  now  midsummer,  and  the  fleet  was  ready  for  sea ;  and 
never  did  a  more  magnificent  force  issue  from  Athens  than  when 
the  hoplites  left  the  city  to  embark  on  board  the  ships  The  depar- 
which    were  to  bear  them   away   to    Sicily.     On   the     tureofthe 

Ai'ii  11  ^'^^^  from 

sliore.5  or  tne  great  Athenian  harbor  the  day  was  Peiraieus. 
made  memorable  not  so  much  by  the  brilliancy  of  military  array 
as  by  the  high  hopes,  troubled  by  some  transient  misgivings,  which 
filled  the  hearts  of  all  who  had  accompanied  their  friends  from  the 
city  and  were  now  to  bid  them  farewell.  Almost  the  whole  popu- 
lation of  Athens  had  come  down  to  Peiraieus.  Foreigners  were 
there,  gazing  in  wonder  at  the  sumptuousness  of  the  armament, 
while  fathers,  brothers,  wives,  and  children  felt  their  bright  hopes 
fading  away  as  they  were  brought  face  to  face  with  the  stern 
realities  of  parting.  Thus  far  they  had  buoyed  themselves  up  with 
the  thought  that  the  power  of  Athens  was  fully  equal  to  the 
achievement  of  any  scheme  on  which  she  had  set  her  mind ;  but 
now  the  length  of  the  voyage,  their  scanty  knowledge  of  the  great 
island  which  they  were  going  to  conquer,  and  the  certainty  that  in 
any  case  many  were  departing  who  would  never  see  their  homes 
again,  threw  a  dark  veil  over  the  future,  and  many  burst  into  bit- 
ter weeping.  The  trumpets  gave  the  signal  for  silence,  and  while 
some  prayed  to  a  God  and  Father  neither  local  nor  changeful,  the 
16* 


370  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  IIL 

voices  of  the  heralds  rose  in  invocation  of  the  gods  oi  the  city. 
From  golden  and  silver  g-oblets  the  libations  were  poured  to  appease 
the  deities  of  the  heavens  and  the  earth,  of  the  land  and  the  sea. 
The  Pfean  shout  echoed  over  the  waters,  and  the  long  line  of  tri- 
remes swept  in  file  from  the  harbor. 

Durino"  the  many  wrecks  ?})ent  by  the  Athenians  in  getting  their 
armament  together,  tidings  of. the  coming  invasion  were  from  time 
„  ^,.  ^         to  time  brouo'lit  to  Syracuse  :  but  thev  were  received 

PuOllC  QG-  ^  ,  *  .       *  . 

bateatSyra-  for  the  most  part  with  a  stubborn  incredulity  against 
cuse.  which   Hermokrates  in  vain    raised    his   voice.      Ten 

years  before  at  the  synod  of  Gela  he  liad  striven  earnestly  to  form 
a  confederacy  of  all  the  Sicilian  Greeks,  whether  Dorians  or  lo- 
nians,  avowedly  as  a  check  on  the  boundless  aggressiveness  of 
Athens.  Now  he  came  forward  in  tlie  public  assembly  at 
Syracuse  to  tell  his  countrymen  that  the  danger  which  he  had 
feared  was  no  longer  distant.  The  Athenians,  having  taken  up 
the  absurd  quarrel  of  the  Egestaians  and  the  ruined  Leontinoi, 
were  already  on  the  way  upon  their  errand  of  conquest.  But  all 
history  taught  the  same  lesson.  Schemes  for  distant  conquest 
were  rarely  successful,  and  the  brightest  page  in  Athenian  annals 
was  the  humiliation  of  Xerxes  and  the  destruction  of  Mardonios 
with  forces  vastly  larger  than  any  which  Athens  could  bring 
against  Sicily.  Nothing  more,  then,  was  needed  than  timely  cau- 
tion. The  Syracusans  must  be  ready  for  the  straggle  themselves. 
Nay,  were  it  not  for  their  habitual  inactivity  or  sluggishness, 
he  would  urge  upon  them  the  adoption  of  more  vigorous  and 
decisive  measures.  If  they  were  of  his  mind,  provisions  for  two 
months  would  be  placed  on  every  Syracusan  trireme,  and  the 
Athenians  should  learn  that  they  must  fight  on  the  shores  of  Italy, 
before  they  could  make  their  way  to  those  of  Sicily. 

The  position  of  Ilerniokrates  as  an  oligarchical  leader  could 
scarcely  fail  to  impart  a  political  complexion  to  his  censures  on  the 
Kepiy  of  character  of  the  Syracusan  people.  At  least  it  might 
to''licnno-"'*  ^^  turned  to  a  political  account  by  speakers  belonging 
krates.  to  a  different  school.     The  aiguments  urged  by  Nikias 

against  the  whole  scheme  from  first  to  last  and  under  any  conditions 
were  so  strong  and  at  the  same  time  so  obvious  that  we  need  feel 
no  surprise  if  they  suggested  themselves  to  the  Syracusan  Athena- 
goras.  This  speaker  treated  the  coming  of  the  Athenians  as  a  bare 
possibility,  very  much  to  be  desired,  indeed,  because  their  coming 
could  only  lead  to  their  cotnplcte  destruction  ;  but  until  he  had  for 
the  fact  of  their  approach  evidence  which  he  believed  not  to  be 
forthcoming,  he  must  reijard  these  reports  as  the  malicious  fabrica- 
tions of  men  who  for  their  own  oliEfarchical  purposes  were  bent  on 
keeping  the  city  in  a  state  of  coTitinual    fernu'ut.      The   persons, 


Chap.  VII.]  THE  SICILIAN  EXPEDITION.  371 

therefore,  to  be  punislied  werenotthe  Athenians  whom  they  would 
never  see,  but  the  orators  who  for  their  own  selfish  ends  sought  to 
scare  them  with  imaginary  terrors,  and  to  shut  their  eyes  to  more 
real  perils  at  liomc.  The  harangue  of  Athenagoras  would  have 
been  followed,  we  cannot  doubt,  by  an  angry  controversy,  had  not 
the  Strategoi  or  generals  interposed  their  authority.  Rising  up 
at  once,  one  of  them  insisted  that  these  personal  arguments  and 
retorts  must  come  to  an  end,  and  that  astlioy  were  responsible  for 
the  safety  of  the  city,  so  they  would  take  the  measures  most 
likely  to  insure  it.' 

While  with  the  Syracusans  the  coming  of  the  enemy  was  a 
matter  of  doubt  and  controversy,  the  tidings,  no  longer  question- 
able, were  received  that  th?  Athenian  armament  had  prooresisof 
already  reached  Rherrion.     At  Korkyra,  in    order  to  the  Athenian 

.  tirnmniBnt  to 

avoid  difficulties  in  procuring  supplies  of  food  and  the  straits 
water,  the  fleet  had  been  divided  into  three  portions,  ofMesaene. 
one  being  intrusted  to  each  of  the  three  commanders.  These  divi- 
sions followed  at  fixed  intervals  the  three  ships  which  had  been 
sent  to  ascertain  the  intentions  of  the  Italian  and  Sicilian  cities." 
The  bright  hopes  with  which  they  started  were  damped  almost  at 
tlie  outset.  Nowhere  would  the  people  of  the  towns  which  they 
passed  allow  them  more  than  mooring  ground  and  liberty  of  water- 
ing ;  and  even  this  boon  was  refused  to  them  by  the  Tarantines  and 
the  Lokrians.  The  Syracusans  had  now  been  awakened  to  a  full 
sense  of  their  danger,  and  were  strengthening  their  outposts  with 
strong  garrisons,  wlien  the  ships,  sent  forward  by  the  Athenian 
commanders  before  the  fleet,  returned  with  the  news  that  the  pre- 
tended wealth  of  Egesta  was  a  mere  cheat,  and  that  the  whole 
contents  of  its  treasury  amounted  to  no  more  than  the  modest  sum 
of  thirty  talents.^  To  Nikias  this  was  no  disappointment ;  but  the 
rude  shock  to  his  bright  dreams  greatly  depressed  and  disconcerted 
Alkibiades.  The  commissioners  who,  whether  bribed  or  not,  had 
by  their  first  report  excited  and  fed  these  brilliant  hopes  had  now 
to  undergo  no  gentle  censure ;  but  the  generals  had  to  face  the 
graver  duty  of  determining  tlie  course  to  be  taken  under  the  cir- 
cumstances. The  mind  of  Nikias  was  soon  made  up.  He  had 
been  sent  to  bring  to  an  end  the  quarrel  between  Egesta  and  Seli- 
nous,  and  further  to  see  whether  the  restoration  of  Leontinoi  were 
possible,  and  whether  anything  more  might  be  done  to  promote  the 
interests  of  Athens  generally.  He  proposed  to  act  according  to 
the  letter  of  these  instructions,  and  having  displayed  the  power  of 
Athens  before  the  cities  on  the  coasts  of  Sicily,  to  return  home 
unless  any  fresh  events  should  open  the  way  for  further  operations. 

'  Thuc.  vi.  35-41.  '  lb.  vi.  43.  '  lb.  vi.  46, 


372  THE   EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

Counsel  so  tame  and  prudent  as  this  could  have  no  attractions  for 
Alkibiades,  who  contended  that  envoys  should  at  once  be  sent  to 
all  the  Sikeliot  cities  in  the  hope  of  detachino-  them  from  Syra- 
cuse, and  to  the  Sikel  tribes  in  the  hope  of  securing  their  alliance  for 
Athens,  and  that  if  these  things  could  be  done  they  should  then 
besieo-e  Selinous  and  Syracuse,  uidess  tlie  former  would  agree  to  a 
reconciliation  with  Egesta  and  the  latter  to  the  restoration  of 
Leontinoi.  With  a  sharpness  and  precision  equal  to  that  of  Xikias 
Lamachos  urged  the  view  of  the  mere  general  as  distinguished  from 
the  statesman.  Not  a  moment  in  hii  opinion  was  to  be  lost,  while 
the  impression  made  on  the  mind  of  the  Sicilians  by  the  sudden 
arrival  of  the  Athenian  fleet  was  still  fresh.  Either  complete 
victory  or  an  important  success  w^ould  follow  an  immediate  attack 
on  Syracuse. 

Of  these  three  plans  that  of  Nikias  was  the  oest  from  the 
statesman's  point  of  view.  From  that  of  the  general  the  counsel 
Plans  of  the  of  Lamachos  was  both  bold  and  able  :  that  of  Alkibiades 
aramand-  '^^"^^  Utterly  unwortliy  whether  of  the  soldier  or  the 
ers.  statesman.    Looking  to  the  political  interests  of  Athens, 

we  can  scarcely  imagine  a  more  prudent  and  business-like  course 
than  that  of  Nikias  ;  and  the  result  would  have  been  a  return 
home,  if  not  after  brilliant  success,  yet  without  disgrace,  and  with- 
out that  exasperation  of  feeling  both  in  central  and  Sporadic  Hellas 
which  Avould  have  followed  the  triumphant  execution  of  the  plan 
of  Lamachos.  But  that  of  Alkibiades  Avas  a  trimming  and  vacil- 
lating compromise  which  boded  no  good  issue  to  the  campaign, 
and  showed  him  to  be  as  deficient  in  military  genius  as  he  was 
])rominent  for  the  audacity  and  arrogance  of  his  demeanor.  Un- 
happily it  was  the  plan  which  the  adhesion  of  Lamachos  inade  it 
necessary  to  adopt.  This  brave  and  gifted  military  leader  was  a 
poor  man  to  whom  neither  birth  nor  culture  gave  an  adventitious 
importance  ;  and  when  he  found  himself  in  a  minority,  he  natu- 
rally felt,  as  a  soldier,  that  it  was  better  to  run  the  chance  of  vic- 
tory with  Alkibiades  than  at  once  to  abandon  it  with  Nikias. 

The  first  step  of  Alkibiades  after  carrying  his  point  against 
Nikias  was  to  cross  over  in  his  trireme  to  Messene  in  the  hope  of 
Occupation  securing  its  alliance  :  but  here  too  he  was  foiled.  The 
of  Katane,  Mcssenians  would  allow  hhn  nothing  more  than  a 
withth'e'Ka-  market  beyond  the  Avails  of  their  city.  Taking  with 
tauaians.  them  only  sixty  ships,  the  Athenian  generals  then 
sailed  to  Naxos,  where  they  found  the  people  well  disposed  :  but 
the  hospitality  of  the  Naxians  Avas  followed  by  a  rough  reception 
at  KataiR!  where  the  Syracusan  party  was  uppermost,  and  the 
Athenians  were  compelled  to  take  up  their  night  station  on  the 
banks  of  the  Terias.     On   the   next   day    the  whole  fleet,  the  re- 


Chap.  VII.]  THE   SICILIAN   EXPEDITION.  373 

maining  triremes  having  joined  tlieni  from  Rhegion,  advanced  in 
file  to  Syracuse.  Ten  ships  sailed  into  the  great  harbor,  and  a 
proclamation  was  made  inviting  the  Leontines  within  the  city  to 
join  their  friends  the  Athenians  who  were  come  to  restore  them  to 
their  homes.  Nothing  further  was  accomplished,  however,  beyond 
a  survey  of  the  fortifications ;  but  on  their  return  to  Kalane, 
although  the  army  was  still  kept  shut  out  of  the  city,  the  generals 
were  allowed  an  audience  before  the  public  assembly.  Alkibiades 
was  still  speaking,  when  some  Atlienians,  having  succeeded  in 
effecting  an  entrance  into  the  town  through  agate  which  had  been 
imperfectly  walled  up,  made  their  way  to  the  Agora.  The  sight 
of  the  enemy  thus  seemingly  in  possession  of  the  place  frightened 
the  small  minor  ty  wliich  constituted  the  Syracusan  party  ;  and  on 
their' flight  the  men  of  Kataiie,  having  passed  a  decree  of  alliance 
vvitli  the  Athenians,  invited  the  generals  to  bring  thither  the  por- 
tion of  the  forces  which  had  been  left  at  lihegion.  The  new? 
that  Kamarina  also  miglit  be  expected  to  join  them  seemed  to 
disclose  for  the  moment  a  brighter  prospect  ;  but  the  whole  Atlie- 
nian  fleet,  passing  by  Syracuse,  doubled  the  Pachynian  promon- 
tory, only  to  find  that  the  Kamarinaians  were  resolved  to  abide 
by  the  treaty  which  bound  them  to  admit  no  more  than  a  single 
war-ship  at  a  time  into  their  harbor.  On  their  return  voyage  to 
Katane,  they  committed  some  ravages  on  Sj'racusan  territorv,  and 
routed  a  small  body  of  Syracusan  horse. 

At  Katane  they  found  the  Salaminian  trireme.  This  ship  had 
brought  a  summons  to  Alkibiades  and  some  others  who  were  named 
with  him,  to  return  at  once  to  Athens  and  take  their  Recall  of 
trial  on  the  charge  of  profaning  the  Eleusinian  mysteries.  -'Alkibiades. 
The  excitement  attending  the  departure  of  the  fleet  had  quieted 
only  for  a  moment  the  popular  feeling  which  had  been  sorely 
wounded  by  the  mutilation  of  the  Hermai  and  the  disclosures, 
whether  true  or  false,  which  followed  it.  Promises  of  immunity 
and  of  rewards  in  money  produced  the  usual  crop  of  informers,  and 
the  circumstantial  stories  of  these  worthless  men  fed  the  credulity 
and  the  terror  of  the  multitude.'  But  while  their  alarm  grew 
daily  more  intense,  evidence  of  the  quality  Avhich  they  ^elt  to  be 
indispensable  was  for  some  time  not  forthcoming.  The  circum- 
stantial story  of  Diokleides  was  rewarded  with  a  wreath  of  honor 
and  a  public  entertaimnent  in  the  Prytaneion  ;  the  circumstantial 
story  of  Andokides  whom  along  with  more  than  forty  others  he 
had  denounced  contradicted  his  graphic  tale,  and  Diokleides  was 
put  to  death.  At  last  theAthenians  breathed  freely.  An  Athenian 
citizen  had  come  forward  to  accuse  himself  while  he  laid  bare  the 
iniquities  of  the  Hermokopidai.  Of  the  men  thrown  into  prison 
'  Time.  vi.  53,  3. 


S74:  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

on  the  information  of  Diokleides  those  Avho  were  not  accused  by 
Andokides  were  discharged  with  the  informer  :  the  rest  were  put 
upon  their  trial,  and  the  tanguage  of  Thucydides  impUes  that  they 
were  convicted  on  evidence  as  slender  or  absurd  as  that  which  sent 
Lord  Strafford  and  his  fellow-sufferers  to  the  scaffold.  But  al- 
though the  punishment  of  these  victims  had,  as  it  was  supposed, 
appeased  the  wrath  of  Hermes,  nothing  had  been  brought  out  to 
connect  Alkibiades  with  the  plot.  Stilf  his  enemies  were  resolved 
that  if  he  could  not  be  convicted  of  mutilating  statues  he  should  be 
found  guilty  of  profaning  the  mysteries.  In  the  accusation  laid 
against  him  by  Thessalos,  the  son  of  Kimon,  he  was  charged  not 
with  any  share  in  the  matter  of  the  Hermai  or  even  in  political 
plots  of  any  kind,  but  simply  with  iriimicking  the  Eleusinian  cere- 
monies in  his  own  house.  Unfortunately  tlie  march  of  a  small 
Spartan  force  to  the  isthmus  for  the  purpose  of  concerting  some 
measures  with  the  Boiotians  caused  in  the  public  mind  a  fresh 
paroxysm  of  suspicion  and  terror.  In  this  movement  they  saw 
plain  evidence  of  a  deep-laid  plot  on  the  part  of  Alkibiades  for  the 
subversion  of  the  democracy  ;  and  in  their  agony  the  whole  force 
of  the  city  'ilept  with  their  arms  in  the  Temenos  of  Theseus  near 
the  gates  which  opened  on  the  roads  to  Eleusis  and  Corinth.  The 
feeling  against  Alkibiades  had  now  been  raised  to  a  height  which 
satisfied  his  enemies  that  they  might  safely  insist  on  his  recall  ;  but 
although  the  commander  of  the  Salarainian  trireme  received  for 
Alkibiades  only  an  order  that  he  should  return  home  in  his  own 
ship,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  trireme  which  carried  this 
summons  brought  him  also  information  of  the  efforts  which  his 
enemies  had  made  to  poison  the  mind  of  the  people  against  him. 
His  resolution  was  at  once  taken,  and  with  it  the  doom  of  the 
Athenian  demos  was  sealed.  He  accompanied  the  Salaminian 
trireme  as  far  as  Thourioi ;  but  when  the  ships  were  to  sail  on- 
wards from  that  place,  he  was  nowhere  to  be  seen.  All  attempts 
to  search  for  him  were  fruitless.  The  ships  returned  to  Atliens 
without  him  ;  and  with  the  I'cst  who  had  shared  his  tiiglit  he  w;is 
sentenced  to  death. 

The  departure  of  Alkibiades  left  to  Nikias  and  Lamachos  the 
joint  command  of  the  whole  expedition.  Instead  of  sailing  south- 
Victory  of  wards,  the  whole  fleet  steered  through  the  Messenian 
nians  on  thu  strait,  and  then  along  the  northern  shores  of  the  island. 
t^horcs  of  The  generals  wished  to  visit  both  Egesta  and  Selinous,' 
iiari)orat  ^'T  the  purpose  of  obtaining  money  from  the  former, 
t^yrncuse.  and  bringing  about  a  peace  between  the  two  cities. 
They  had  hoped  to  be  received  at  Ilimera,  the  only  Hellenic  town 

'  We  have  no  reason  for  supposing  that  they  went  on  to  this  latter  city. 


Chap.  VII.]  THE  SICILIAN  EXPEDITION.  375 

on  tliis  coast ;  but  their  exclusion  liere  was  in  some  degree  com- 
pensated by  the  capture  of  the  Sikanian  fortress  of  Hykkura,  which 
they  gave  over  to  the  Egestaians,  while  the  captives  taken  in  the 
place  brought  to  them  tlie  sum  of  120  talents,  in  addition  to  the 
tliirty  obtained  from  p]gesta.  So  ended  the  summer,  the  bright 
hopes  with  which  they  left  Peiraieus  still  remaining  dreams  for  the 
future  which  were  rapidly  vanishing  away.  To  the  Syracusanson 
the  other  hand  the  indecision  of  the  Athenians  and  their  ill-success 
in  gaining  allies  in  Sicily  changed  the  lirstfeelingof  awe  into  one 
of  positive  contempt,  and  Syracusan  horsemen  riding  up  to  the 
Athenian  lines  asked  them  if  they  were  come  as  colonists  to 
Sicily  or  for  the  purpose  of  restoring  the  city  of  Leontinoi.  This 
insult  suggested  to  Nikias  a  plan  for  effecting  a  landing  near 
Syracuse  without  the  danger  of  a  battle.  The  Athenians  had  no 
cavalry,  and  an  attempt  to  force  their  way  on  to  the  shore  in  the 
face  of  the  horsemen  of  Syracuse  might  end  in  a  failure  as  signal 
as  that  of  Brasidas  atPylos.  AKatanaian  on  whom  Nikias  could 
thoroughly  depend  was  therefore  sent  to  Syracuse.  Availing  him- 
self of  his  own  previous  reputation  and  that  of  the  Syracusan 
partisans  in  Katane  whose  names  he  mentioned,  this  man  told  them 
how  easily  the  Athenian  army  might  be  destroyed.  Ifa  day  were 
definitely  fixed  for  the  attempt,  the  Katanaians  would  shut  up  in 
their  town  those  Athenians  who  were  in  the  habit  of  sleeping 
within  the  walls,  and  would  also  set  fire  to  the  Athenian  fleet, 
while  the  Syracusans,  attacking  the  Athenian  lines,  would  carry 
everything  before  them.  Tlie  Syracusans  caught  eagerly  at  the 
bait,  and  their  whole  force  of  cavalry  and  infantry  was  dispatched 
at  the  time  agreed  upon  to  Katane,  only  to  find  a  deserted  camp 
and  to  suspect  that  their  presence  was  needed  most  of  all  at  home. 
Meanwhile  the  Athenian  fleet  had  sailed  round  the  island  of 
Ortygia  into  the  great  harbor,  and  had  landed  the  troops  at 
leisure  on  its  western  sliore  near  the  inlet  known  as  the  bay  of 
Daskon.  The  bridge  across  the  Anapos  near  the  temple  of  the 
<Jlvin[)ian  Zeus  was  immediately  broken  ;  the  trees  felled  in  the 
neighbf>rhood  supplied  a  strong  palisade  for  the  ships,  while  a 
fort  of  wood  and  stone  was  hastily  run  up  on  the  shore  of  Daskon. 
To  all  these  operations  no  opposition  was  offered  by  tlie  Syracusans 
within  the  city  :  but  the  army  on  its  return  from  Katane  siiowed 
its  unabated  confidence  by  at  once  offering  the  Athenians  battle. 
For  that  day  it  was  declined  ;  but  on  the  following  morning  Nikias 
placed  the  Argives  and  Mantineians  on  the  right  wing,  and  the 
other  allies  on  the  left,  while  the  Athenians  occupied  the  ground 
in  the  midst.  The  short  address  which  Nikias  made  to  his  men 
before  the  engagement  contains,  if  it  be  accepted  as  historical,  a 
humiliating  confession  of  the  evil  effects   produced   by   his   own 


376  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Bo.)i^  III. 

hesitating  strategy  ;  and  tlie  Syracnsans  are  now  represented  as 
men  needing  a  severe  lesson  from  enemies  whom  they  despise, 
while  the  Athenians  are  spurred  on  by  the  sense  not  of  their  own 
intrinsic  superiority  but  of  the  difficulties  of  their  position  which 
courage  alone  would  enable  them  to  surmount.^  The  previous 
indecision  of  Nikias  had  led  the  Syracusaus  to  think  that  they 
might  choose  their  own  time  for  the  attack.  In  this  they  were 
mistaken.  Nikias  had  no  sooner  ended  his  speech  than  he  ordered 
a  sudden  and  rapid  charge,  and  the  Athenian  hoplites  were  on  the 
enemy  almost  before  the  latter  could  seize  their  arms.  But  in 
spite  of  this  surprise  the  struggle  was  obstinate,  and  the  result 
might  have  been  indecisive  but  for  a  heavy  storm  of  rain  and 
thunder  which  discouraged  the  Syracusans,  while  the  Atlienians, 
not  having  as  yet  anything  to  dismay  them,  ascribed  the  incident 
to  the  season  of  the  year.  Thus  dismayed,  their  infantry  fled  ;  but 
the  Syracusan  horse  so  effectually  protected  their  retreat  that  the 
Athenians  were  soon  compelled  to  give  up  the  task  of  pursuing  them. 
Two  hundred  and  fifty  had  been  slain  on  the  side  of  the  Syracu- 
sans :  the  xVthenians  and  their  allies  had  lost  fifty.  The  results 
of  the  battle  were  confined,  it  would  seem,  to  the  erection  of  a 
trophy.  A  large  treasure  lay  in  the  Olympieion  ;  but  the  Athe- 
nians made  no  attempt  to  take  it,  and  the  Syracusans  tlirew  a 
strong  garrison  into  the  Temenos.  A  decisive  defeat  might  have 
led  Nikias  at  once  to  give  up  the  enterprise,  to  the  unspeakable 
benefit  of  Athens  ;  his  insignificant  success  furnished  him  with  an 
excuse  for  spending  the  winter  in  comparative  idleness  and  for 
sending  to  Athens  for  troops  and  munitions  of  war.  Even  now, 
although  some  three  months  had  passed  since  their  arrival  in 
Sicily,  the  general  prospect  was  almost  as  favorable  as  it  had  been 
at  the  first.  Between  the  great  harbor  and  the  bay  of  Thapsos 
lay  the  inner  city  on  Ortygia  joined  by  a  bridge  to  the  mainland, 
and  the  outer  city  on  Achradina  to  the  north,  each  with  its  own 
encircling  walls.  Between  the  two  the  little  harbor  aiforded 
an  unwalled  landing-place  :  and  there  was  no  reason  why  the 
Athenians  should  not  at  once  have  drawn  their  besieging  lines  far 
within  the  circuit  of  the  wall  which,  during  the  winter  now  be- 
giiming,  the  Syracusans  threw  up  from  the  shore  of  the  Great 
port,  taking  in  the  precincts  of  ApoUon  Temenites,  to  the  eastern 
extremity  of  the  ground  afterwards  occupied  by  the  suburb  of 
Tyche."     But  now,  as  before,  the  golden  hours  were  wasted.    The 

'  Tliuc.  vi.  68.  98,  as  that  of  a  position  seized  by 

"  Tliis  suburb  was  so  known  from  the  Atlienians  after  occupyinjjLab- 

the  temple  of  Tyche,  or  Fortune,  dalon,  is  not  another  form  of  Tyche. 

which  it  contained  ;  but  there  is  'J'here  is  no  reason  for  supposing 

little  doubt  or  none  that  the  name  that  the  Syracusans  said  Syclia  for 

Syke,  mentioned  by  Tliucydides,  vi.  Tycha  ;  and,  had  they  done  so,  the 


Chap.  VII.]  THE   SICILIAN  EXPEDITION.  377 

fleet  sailed  away  to  Katane,  and  thence  to  Messene  in  tlie  hope 
that  that  town  would  be  betrayed  to  them.  Here  they  liad  the  first 
practical  experience  of  the  hatred  of  Alkibiades.  His  countrymen 
had  sentenced  hin;  to  death  :  he  had  sworn  that  they  should 
feel  that  he  was  alive.  His  first  act  was  to  warn  the  Syracusan 
party  in  Messenu  of  the  intended  betrayal  of  the  town  ;  and  the 
partisans  of  the  Athenians  weVe  put  to  death.  For  thirteen  days 
the  fleet  lingered  in  vain  hope  before  the  place,  and  then  with- 
drew to  winter  quarters  at  Naxos.' 

The  conduct  of  Hermokrates  in  Syracuse  was  as  prompt  and 
statesmanlike  as  that  of  Nikias  was  feeble  and  silly.  Taking  the 
true  measure  of  the  situation,  that  sagacious  leader  Activity  of 
told  liis  countrymen  that  the  result  was  fully  as  en-  gans^u'urino- 
couraging  as  lie  had  dared  to  hope  that  it  might  be.  the  winter. 
Even  in  battle  they  had  undergone  nothing  more  than  an  insig- 
nificant reverse  at  the  hands  of  the  most  experienced  troops  in 
Hellas  ;  and  better  discipline  for  the  future  would  soon  make  up 
for  past  want  of  skill.  But  he  told  them  candidly  that  they  were 
sufl'ering  from  the  evil  of  having  too  many  masters.  The  large 
number  of  fifteen  Strategoi  would  do  more  harm  than  good  :  three 
would  amply  suflice,  if  they  were  invested  with  adequate  powers. 
His  advice  was  taken,  and  he  himself  was  appointed  to  be  one  of 
the  three  with  Herakleides  and  Sikanos  as  his  colleagues.  Envoys 
were  sent  to  Corinth  and  Sparta  to  urge  the  adoption  of  vigorous 
measures  against  Athens.  The  wall  which  might  have  formed  the 
line  of  Athenian  circumvallation  was  advanced  rapidly  to  the  need- 
ful height,  and  if  the  slopes  of  Epipolai  to  the  northwest  had 
been  garrisoned  as  well  as  the  deserted  town  of  Megara  and  the 
Olyrapieion,  the  great  catastrophe  of  the  Athenian  army  might 
have  been  prevented  by  the  impossibility  of  attempting  the  siege. 
Further,  all  places  on  which  a  hostile  force  might  find  it  easy  to 
land  were  strongly  palisaded  by  stakes  thrust  into  the  sea  bottom  ; 
and  lastly  the  empty  camp  of  the  Athenians  at  Katane  was  burnt 
and  the  neighboring  country  ravaged. 

Still  more  to  counteract  the  feeble  efforts  of  Nikias,  the  Syra- 
cusans  sent  envoys  to  Kamarina  the  alliance  of  whicli  Debate  at 
place  with  Laches,^  ten  years  before,  had  induced  the  Kamarina. 
Athenians  to  make  fresh  overtures.     The  envoys  of  both  parties 

fact  must  have  been  noticed  by  liis-  of  the  southern  slope  of  Epipolai, 
torians.  Syche  is  said  by  Stephanos  exactly  to  the  southward  of  Tar- 
Byzantiuos.  to  have  been  a  place  getta,  a  name  which  along  with  the 
near  Syracuse,  so  called  from  the  neisrhboring  Tari^ia  seems  to  ex- 
fig-trees  which  grew  ihere.  Mr.  hibit  traces  of  the  ancient  name 
Grote,  Hist.  Or.  vii.  559,  agrees  Trogilos. 
with  Dr.  Arnold,  Tliuc.ydides,  vi.  '  Thuc.  vi.  74. 
98,  in  placing  Syke  on  the  middle  ^  Time.  vi.  75. 


378  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  HI. 

were  introduced  together  before  tlie  assembled  citizens.  On  the 
part  of  the  Syracusans  Hermokrates  sought  to  draw  them  into  a 
ch)ser  friendship  or  a  more  hearty  co-operation  by  dwelling  on 
the  restless  and  aggressive  temper  and  habits  of  the  Athenian:-, 
and  warned  them  that,  if  the  Syracusans  should  gain  the  day,  they 
wonld  know  how  to  recompense  the  inaction  of  those  who  left 
them  to  their  own  resources  in  the  hour  of  supreme  danger.  The 
reply  of  the  Athenian  ambassador  Enphemos  is  noteworthy  chiefly 
as  inviting  the  alliance  of  the  Kamarinaians  on  the  very  grounds 
which  Nikias  in  the  first  debates  at  Athens  had  urged  as  reasons 
for  abandoning  the  enterprise  altogether,  and  as  ascribing  the 
expedition  to  motives  which  luast  have  wholly  failed  to  awaken 
the  enthusiasm  of  the  Athenian  people.  They  were  not  come  to 
effect  any  permanent  settlement  in  Sicily,  or  to  make  the  island  a 
part  of  their  empire.  Tliey  indulged  in  no  such  wild  dreams.  The 
distance  was  far  too  great,  the  impossibility  of  maintaining  such 
distant  conquests  far  too  obvions,'  to  justify  any  fears  on  this 
score,  on  the  part  whether  of  the  Syracusans  or  of  their  allies. 
Tlieir  objects  were  twofold.  The  one  they  Avould  be  glad  to 
attain  ;  tlie  other  must  at  all  liazards  be  achieved.  They  ear- 
nestly hoped  to  win  the  friendship  of  Kamarina  and  other  Sicilian 
cities ;  but  tliey  could  not  afford  to  leave  the  Dorians  of  Sicily  in 
a  position  which  v.ould  enable  them  to  interfere  actively  on  behalf 
of  the  Dorians  of  Peloponuesos. 

As  w'e  read  the  speech  of  Euphemos,  we  can  scarcely  help 
feeling  how  easily  tliat  portion  of  it  which  relates  to  the  growth 
„    ^    ,.         of   the    Athenian    empire    iniiiht    be    translated    into 

Neiitralily        ,  ,  i  i     i  •   •  •  i 

of  tlie  Ka-  language  tliorouglily  fiarmonismg  witli  our  own  notions 
mannaums.  ^£  national  unity  and  freedom.  The  Athenian  empire 
was  a  standing  protest  against  the  suicidal  jiolicy  of  isolation  on 
which  Sparta  for  lier  own  selfish  purposes  found  it  convenient  to 
act ;  and  the  Athenians,  whether  consciously  or  unconsciously, 
felt  that  the  Hellenic  tlieory  of  autonomy  tended  first  to  keep  up  a 
dead  level  of  insignificance  and  then  to  leave  the  feeble  units  thus 
produced  at  the  mercy  of  one  great  military  state.  Euphemos 
would  liavc  been  speaking  tlic  truth,  had  lie  said  that  Athens  had 
been  striving  to  weld  the  Ionic  tribes  into  a  nation  :  but  the  Greek 
langnao;e  had  no  Avord  to  ex])ress  the  idea,  nor  could  he  have  dared 
so  far  to  wound  the  strongest  instincts  of  the  Hellenic,  and  more 
especially  of  the  Dorian,  mind.  But  the  very  truthfulness  of  this 
assertion  would  have  laid  liim  o])en  to  the  retort  that  on  liis  own 
showiiiix  lie  was  advocating  a  policy  of  isolation  for  the  Sicilian 
cities  whicli  lie  deprecated  as  mischievous  or  fatal  nearer  liomc. 
Euphemos  could  not  confess  that  the  expedition  Avas  from  first  to 
'  Time.  vi.  86,  3. 


Chap.  VII.]  THE  SICILIAN  EXPEDITION.  379 

last  opposed  to  tlie  principles  wliicli  bad  guided  tlic  most  illustrious 
Atbeniau  statesmen,  and  he  could  not  therefore  remove  the  sus- 
picions with  which  the  Kamarinaians,  in  spite  of  their  friendly 
leanings  and  their  habitual  distrust  of  the  Syracusans,  still  reg;ird- 
ed  the  undertaking.  Both  the  envoys  were  therefore  dismissed  with 
courtesy,  and  Kamarina  remained  professedly  neutral,'  wbcii  the 
prompt  action  recommended  by  Lamachos  might  long  ago  liave 
secured  her  hearty  alliance  for  Athens.  In  fact,  during  this  win- 
ter, the  plan  of  action,  so  far  as  it  deserves  the  name,  was  that  of 
Nikias  ;  and  throughout  it  showed  bis  incompetence  as  a  general 
not  less  than  bis  previous  career  had  shown  his  incompetence  as  a 
statesinan.  Whether  success  in  this  expedition  would  have  been 
better  for  Athens  and  better  for  the  world  in  general,  is  a  question 
into  which  we  need  not  here  enter;  but  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  had  Demosthenes  and  Lamachos  been  sent  out  at  the  first, 
Syracuse  would  liave  fallen  in  the  first  summer.  Nay  the  con- 
quest of  all  Sicily  would  in  all  likelihood  have  been  achieved,  while 
Xikias  was  frittering  away  time  in  seeking  to  patch  up  alliances 
with  Sikel  tribes  who  fell  away  as  soon  as  their  chief  Archonides 
was  dead,^  and  in  humiliating  petitions  for  aid  addressed  to  the 
Phenicians  of  Carthage,  from  whom  he  received  only  a  rebuff,  or 
to  Tyrrhenian  cities,  which  professed  a  willingness  to  help  him, 
perhaps  because  they  saw  in  descents  on  the  Sicilian  coasts  a  means 
for  enriching  themselves.  He  was  also,  it  is  true,  collecting  horses, 
together  with  bricks,  iron,  and  other  siege  instruments  ;  but  it 
is  quite  possible  that  these  might  not  have  been  needed  by  a  more 
energetic  general,  and  we  almost  blush  for  the  determined  slug- 
gishness which  insists  on  remaining  idle  in  the  luxurious  tempe- 
rature of  a  Sicilian  winter  Avhen  Brasidas  could  work  hard  through 
the  frosts  and  icy  winds  of  the  Thrace-ward  Cbal'iidike. 

Meanwhile  the  evil  genius  of  Athens  was  busily  at  work  else- 
where. From  the  Thourian  territory  Alkibiades  found  his  way  in 
a  trading  vessel  to  the  Eleian  port  of  Kyllene ;  but  Traitorous 
probably  before  he  left  Italy  he  had  made  overtures  to  schemes  of 
the  Spartans  in  whicli  he  claimed  for  himself  the 
power  as  well  as  the  will  of  destroying  the  Athenian  empire.  He 
knew,  however,  that  the  remembrance  of  Mantineia  would  not  tell 
much  in  his  favor  at  Sparta,  and  not  until  he  had  received  a 
solemn  pledge  for  his  safety  did  he  dare  to  venture  thither.  But 
it  would  seem  that  he  was  already  there  when  the  Corinthians 
came  Avith  the  Syracusan  envoys  to  plead  the  cause  of  the  Sicilian 
Dorians  and  to  urge  them  to  an  open  resumption  of  the  war  with 
Athens.  The  ephors  were  contenting  themselves  with  the  placid 
expression  of  a  hope  that  the  Syracusans  ^vould  not  submit  to 
'  Thuc.  vi.  88.  '  Thuc.  vi.  88,  4  ;  vii.  1,  4. 


380;  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  HI. 

Nikias,  Avhen  Alkibiades  broke  in  upon  the  debate  with  a  veliement 
eagerness  for  which  he  felt  that  some  apology  was  needed.  The 
apology  which  he  otiered  brands  him  with  an  infamy  even  blacker 
than  that  which  the  deep  malignity  of  his  suggestions  would  de- 
serve. It  was  made  np  of  a  string  of  lies.  No  Athenian  citizen 
had  ever  so  systematically  defied  the  law  and  insulted  its  officers 
as  himself  ;  and  he  had  now  the  effrontery  to  take  credit  to  himself 
for  an  exceptional  moderation  and  sobriety,'  for  the  prudence  of 
his  public  counsels,  and  for  his  real  love  of  oligarchy  in  which  he 
asserted  that  all  well-educated  Athenians  sympathised,  his  inten- 
tion being  to  set  it  up  in  the  place  of  democracy  on  the  first  con- 
venient opportunity.  Having  thus  lied  about  liim self,  he  went  on 
to  spin  a  web  of  falsehoods  about  his  countrymen.  The  fatal  en- 
terprise in  which  they  were  now  engaged  had  been  his  own  spe- 
cial creation  ;  and  even  in  the  speech  by  which  he  had  striven  to 
rouse  their  lust  of  conquest  and  had  most  succeeded  in  exciting  it 
he  held  out  to  them  no  higher  hope  than  that  victory  in  Sicily 
might  lead  in  the  end  to  a  supremacy  over  all  Hellas.^  But  now 
speaking  at  Sparta,  he  said  not  a  word  about  his  own  share  in  the 
business,  while  he  ascribed  to  the  Athenians  a  boundless  scheme 
of  aggression  and  conquest  which  had  probably  taken  shape  in  his 
own  brain  since  he  made  his  escape  from  the  Salaminian  trireme  at 
Thourioi.  These  schemes  would  almost  certainly  be  carried  out, 
if  the  Syracusans  should  be  conquered.  A  Spartan  force  should  be 
sent  out  at  once  to  aid  them  ;  the  presence  of  a  Spartan  general  to 
organise  their  resistance  was  even  more  needful  ;  but  it  was  most 
of  all  necessary  that  the  Athenians  sliould  be  crippled  at  home. 
The  one  measure  which  the  Athenians  regarded  with  uimiingled 
dread  their  enemies,  happily  for  them,  had  not  yet  tried.  The 
maintenance  of  a  permanent  garrison^  within  the  borders  of  Attica 
would  weight  them  with  a  burden  which  they  would  be  hardly 
able  to  bear  ;  and  the  Spartans  would  find  in  the  lower  ground 
between  Parnes  and  Pentelikos  a  post  than  which  none  could  be 
more  convenient.  The  occupation  of  Dekeleia  would  give  them 
the  command  of  the  silver  mines  of  Laureion,  while  it  would  do  to 
the  Athenians  mischief  more  serious  than  the  loss  of  a  few  cart- 
loads of  precious  metal.  The  calls  of  incessant  military  service 
would  not  only  paralyse  the  administration  of  the  Athenian  law- 
courts  but  would  deprive  the  poorer  citizens  of  a  revenue  which 
had  become  to  them  almost  a  necessity  of  life.  Still  more,  it 
would  l)reak  the  spell  of  Athenian  authority  over  their  allies  who 
would  see  that  their  masters  were  at  length  unable  to  hold  their 

'  Tliuc.  vi.  89,  5.  into  the  mouth  of  the  Corinthians, 

»  Tliuc.  vi.  18,  4.  Time.  i.  122,  1. 

*  Compare  the  suggestion    put 


Chap.  VII.]  THE  SICILIAN  EXPEDITION.  381 

own  at  home,  and  would  seize  the  opportunity  for  sending  their 
tribute-ships  away  empty. 

"When  we  remember  that  Athens  lay  exposed  to  this  deadly 
wound  only  because  the  flower  and  strength  of  the  people  had 
been  drafted  away  on  a  distant  expedition  which  Mission  of 
Alkibiades  himself  had  planned  and  urged  on  with  |^.|'J^°' ^"^ 
frantic  passion,  we  shall  feel  that,  whatever  may  have  4U  b.c. 
been  his  wrongs,  treachery  more  dastardly  and  inhuman  can 
scarcely  be  found  in  the  annals  of  mankind.  But  what  were  his 
wrongs  ?  His  life  at  Athens  had  been  one  of  unparalleled  license  ; 
yet  even  thus  he  had  been  able  to  repel  an  accusation  for  which 
the  evidence  of  facts  was  not  forthcoming.  His  recall  had  nothing 
to  do  with  the  mutilation  of  the  Hcrmai  ;  he  had  not  even  to  an- 
swer any  charge  of  political  conspiracy.  But  of  profaning  the  re- 
ligious mysteries  he  knew  himself  to  be  guilty,  and,  fearing  that 
the  personal  enmity  which  his  insolence  had  roused  might  make 
the  matter  go  hard  with  him,  he  resolved  to  defy  his  countrymen 
by  flight.  So  great,  however,  was  the  charm  of  his  manner  and 
such  his  powers  of  persuasion  that  had  he  chosen,  when  first 
charged  with  complicity  in  the  plot  of  the  Hermokopidai,  to  make 
a  clean  breast  of  it,  and,  while  he  asserted  his  absolute  ignorance  of 
that  plot,  to  express  his  regret  for  acts  of  profanity  and  irreverence 
which  were  never  designed  to  be  more  than  a  private  jest  and 
which  ought  not  therefore  to  be  regarded  as  an  offence  against  the 
Athenian  people  or  the  public  gods,  the  minor  transgression  would 
in  all  likelihood  have  been  condoned,  and,  promising  greater  care 
for  the  time  to  come,  Alkibiades  would  have  departed  for  Sicily 
free  from  all  accusations  and  from  all  suspicion.  For  the  present 
his  work  tvas  done.  The  slow  current  of  Spartan  blood  was 
'\uickened  by  the  stimulus  of  his  fiery  rhetoric.  It  was  decreed 
that  a  Spartan  army  should  seize  on  Dekeleia,  and  that  Gylippos 
should  be  sent  to  take  the  command  at  Syracuse.  This  general  at 
once  requested  the  Corinthians  to  send  two  ships  to  convey  him 
from  the  Messenian  port  of  Asine,  and  to  make  ready  the  rest  of 
their  fleet  with  the  utmost  speed.  While  the  enemies  of  Athens 
were  thus  stirred  to  more  vigorous  action  in  the  Peloponnesos, 
the  trireme  dispatched  by  Nikias  for  more  troops  and  more 
money  reached  Athens.  Both  were  granted  without  a  word  to  ex- 
press the  disappointment  which  they  must  have  felt,  and  the 
strength  of  the  state  was  more  dangerously  committed  to  an  expe- 
dition which  it  would  have  been  infinitely  better  if  they  had  from 
the  outset  starved. 

From  the  level  land  adjoining  Achradina  the  ground  to  the 
west  of  Syracuse  rises  by  an  ascent  almost  imperceptible  except 
where  it  is  broken  by  four  slopes  or  ledges  of  rock,  narrowing 


382  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

jTradually  to  the  northwest  until  it  reaches  an  apex  at  the  point 
now  known  as  the  Belvedere,  which  marks  the  site  of  the  Euryelos 
Surprise  of  of  Thucydides.  The  northern  and  southern  sides  of 
Epipoiai  by  ^j^jg  triano'le  break  off  into  precipitous  cHffs  seldom 
ans.  exceeding  twenty  or  twenty-five  teet  m  height,  leaving 

access  only  through  the  gaps  which  occur  in  tliem  to  the  table- 
land of  Epipoiai.  To  this  rising  ground  with  the  liigher  table- 
land behind  it  the  new  wall  built  by  the  Syracusans,  inclosing  the 
ground  to  the  cast  of  the  statue  of  Apollon  Tcmenites,  had  given  a 
sudden  and  great  importance.  From  the  table-land  of  Epipoiai 
the  inner  and  the  outer  city  was  seen  stretched  out  ou  the  level 
ground  at  the  foot  of  the  long  and  gentle  slope  which  began  from 
Euryelos.  The  possession  of  this  slope  by  the  Syracusans  must  in 
all  likelihood  have  led  the  Athenians  to  abandon  a  task  which 
would  thus  have  become  impracticable  ;  its  occupation  by  the 
Athenians  would  give  them  the  command  of  all  the  ground  as  far 
as  the  Syracusan  wall,  the  capture  of  which  would  at  once  enable 
them  to  cut  off  Achradina  f  roin  Ortygiaand  to  blockade  the  outer 
and  the  inner  city  separately  both  by  land  and  sea.  This  discovery 
may  have  been  made  simultaneously  by  the  Syracusans  and  the 
Athenians,  but  to  their  ultimate  ruin  the  latter  were  the  first  to 
take  advantage  of  it.  In  a  review  of  their  whole  force  on  the  low 
ground  bordered  by  the  river  Anapos  the  Syracusans  had  told  off 
600  picked  hoplites  under  an  Andrian  exile  named  Diomilos  for 
the  special  purpose  of  occupying  and  holding  the  range  of  Epipoiai ; 
but  for  whatever  reason  the  order  was  not  at  once  carried  out.  In 
the  meanwhile  the  whole  Athenian  army  had  landed  unnoticed  at 
a  spot  facing  the  hill  or  rock  known  as  the  Lion,'  while  the  fleet  was 
drawn  up  on  the  peninsula  of  Thapsos  Avhich  was  strongly  palisaded 
on  the  land  side.  No  sooner  had  the  troops  disembarked  than 
they  advanced  at  a  run  on  the  road  leading  to  Euryelos,  and  they 
were  already  in  possession  of  the  summit  before  Uiomilos  and  his 
hoplites  caught  sight  of  them  and  began  to  move  from  the  plain 
of  the  Anapos.-"  These  had  nearly  three  miles  of  uphill  ground  to 
get  over  before  they  could  even  reach  the  enemy,  and  they  arrived 
out  of  breath  and  in  a  disorder  which  left  them  no  chance  of  suc- 
cess. Diomilos  was  killed  with  one-half  of  his  band  :  the  rest  re- 
treated to  the  city.  The  Athenians  on  the  next  day  advanced  to 
the  Syracusan  wall,  and  offered  battle  which  the  Syracusans  de- 
clined. Their  next  step  was  to  build  a  fort  on  Labdalon.  This 
'Thucydides  merely  says  that  where  to  the  north  ot  the  peninsula 
Leon     was    distant    about    three-     of  Thapsos. 

fourths  ot  a  mile  from  Ei)i|)ol:u  ;  -  From  the  words  of  Thucydides, 
but  he  does  not.  say  that  it  was  on  vi.  98,  3,  it  seems  that  theiSyracu- 
tbe  sea-sliore  or  how  far  it  was  from  sans  had  a  review  of  their  forces  on 
the  sea.     It   was   i)r<)babiy   some-     two  successive  days. 


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Chap.  VII.]  THE   SICILIAN   EXPEDITION.  3S3 

was  followed  by  the  erection  of  another  work  with  a  rapidity  which 
astonished  and  alarmed  their  enemies.  Hard  by  the  spot  known 
as  the  Syche  the  Athenian  generals  ordered  the  construction  of  a 
strongly  fortified  inclosure,  either  circular*  or  quadrangular,  which 
might  serve  as  a  stronghold  for  the  army  and  as  a  centre  and 
starting-point  for  the  blockading  walls  which  were  to  run  thence 
eastward  to  Trogilos  and  westward  to  the  Great  Harbor.  So  mar- 
vellous was  the  speed  with  which  this  fortification  was  raised  that 
the  Syracusans  advanced  for  the  purpose  of  summarily  arresting 
the  work.  But  the  horsemen  sent  from  Athens  had  now  been 
provided  with  Sicilian  horses,  and  about  four  hundred  more  had 
been  got  together  from  Egesta,  Naxos,  and  the  friendly  Sikel 
tribes.  As  the  Syracusans  drew  near  to  the  enemy,  the  generals, 
contrasting  their  lack  of  discipline  and  the  inferiority  of  their  wea- 
pons and  armor  with  those  of  the  Athenians,  determined  on  re- 
treat. Their  cavalry  for  some  time  hindered  the  Athenians  in  their 
work,  but  were  presently  attacked  and  beaten.  Nikias  might 
profess  to  see  in  this  victory  the  earnest  of  still  greater  results  to 
be  achieved  by  a  force  the  lack  of  which  he  had  pleaded  as  his 
excuse  for  his  long  inaction  :  but  we  do  not  hear  of  the  Athenian 
cavalry  again,  until  they  arc  mentioned  as  undergoing  a  defeat  in 
the  engagement  which  preceded  the  final  conflict  in  the  Great 
Harbor.'^ 

This  reverse  convinced  Hermokrates  that  the  strength  of  the 
city  must  not  be  hazarded  in  open  fight  with  the  enemy.  Starting 
from  a  point  in  their  new  wall  probably  not  far  ppj-tmction 
from  Temenites,  the  Syracusans  carried,  as  rapidly  as  of  thu  first 
they  could,  a  strong  palisading,  behind  which  they  conmer-"* 
erected  a  wall  reaching  to  the  cliffs  of  Epipolai,  tlius  work, 
cutting  the  extended  line  of  the  Athenian  wall  and  also  depriving 
the  enemy  of  the  power  of  turning  these  defences  and  attacking 
them  ill  flank.  To  this  work  Nikias  offered  no  interruption. 
The  Athenians  had  enough  to  do  in  building  their  blockading  wall 
on  both  sides  from  the  circle,  so  far  as  their  course  was  clear,  and 
in  destroying  tlie  aqueduct  which  supplied  the  city  Avitii  water 
from  the  springs  of  Epipolai.  The  generals  probably  preferred  to 
take  the  chance  of  surprising  the  defenders  of  the  intersecting  wall 
to  wasting  time  and  force  in  desultory  efforts  to  hinder  its  pro- 
gress ;  nor  had  they  long  to  wait  for  an  opportunity.  The  stockade 
with  its  wooden  towers  and  the  wall  behind  it  were  no  sooner 
finished  than  the  Syracusans  retreated  within   their  new   line  of 

'  Thucydides,  vi.98,  calls  it  shn-  mean  ilio  wliolo  circuit  of  the  in- 

ply  the  Circle  KVKAor ;  and  as  lie  tended  Athenian  circnmvallation, 

speaks  of  it  as  finished,  there  can  be  which  was  never  finished, 

no  doubt  that  the  word  does  not  ^  Thuc.  vii.  51,  3. 


384  THE  EMPIRE  OP  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

defence,  leaving  the  troops  of  one  tribe  to  guard  tliem  :  and  of  these 
some  even  during  the  heat  of  the  day  took  refuge  in  the  city,  while 
others  went  to  sleep  in  their  tents  and  none  kept  a  careful  watch. 
Of  such  improvidence  the  Athenian  generals  quickly  took  advan- 
tage. By  their  orders  300  picked  hoplites  with  a  certain  propor- 
tion of  light-armed  troops  assailed  the  intersecting  wall,  while  one- 
half  of  the  Athenian  army  advanced  to  the  wall  of  the  city,  the 
other  half  to  the  stockaded  gate  which  probably  opened  from  the 
Temenos  of  Phoibos.  The  palisade  of  the  intersecting  wall  was 
soon  taken  by  the  300  hoplites,  and  the  defenders,  abandon- 
ing their  post,  sought  refuge  within  the  new  city  wall.  So  quick- 
ly were  they  followed  by  the  enemy  that  many  of  these  forced 
their  way  in  along  with  the  fugitives  but  were  beaten  back  with 
some  loss  by  the  Syracusans  within.  Still  the  enterprise  was 
thoroughly  successful.  The  intersecting  wall  was  destroyed,  and 
the  materials  of  the  palisade  were  used  by  the  Athenians  in  their 
work  of  circumvallation. 

The  Athenian  generals  were  now  resolved  that  the  Syracusans 
should  not  have  the  opportunity  of  throwing  out  fresh  counter- 
Destruction  '^^'C'f^s  running  like  the  last  to  the  cliffs  of  Epipolai 
of  the  sec-  and  thus  defying  the  enemy  to  turn  them.  The  clifis 
cusan^"^*  were  themselves  fortitied,  and  the  Athenians  thus 
counter-  started  with  an  immense  advantage  in  their  further 
Death  of  task  of  carrvingtheir  southward  wall  to  the  great  harbor. 
Lamachos.  j^^^^  Avhile  this  work  was  going  on,  the  Syracusans  were 
busy  in  preparing  a  fresh  stockade,  defended  by  a  deep  trench, 
from  the  new  wall  of  the  city  across  the  low  and  i7iarsliy  ground 
which  stretched  to  the  banks  of  the  Anapos  ;  and  by  the  time  that 
the  walls  on  the  clifEs  were  finished,  the  Athenians  found  them- 
selves opposed  by  a  fresh  obstacle  in  their  progress  to  the  sea. 
Lamachos  determined  to  make  himself  master  of  this  counterwork 
at  once.  Tlie  fleet  was  ordered  to  sail  round  from  Thapsos  into 
the  great  harbor  ;  and  an  attack  on  the  trench  and  stockade  at  day- 
break was  rewarded  by  the  capture  of  almost  the  whole  of  it. 
The  Athenians  had  to  make  their  way  across  the  marshy  ground  by 
making  a  sort  of  causeway  with  planks  and  boards :  and  thus  the 
rest  of  the  counterwork  was  not  taken  until  later  on  in  the  day.  The 
real  purpose  of  Lamachos  was  now  accomplished.  The  Syracu- 
sans had  not  only  been  driven  from  their  counterwork,  but  had 
been  defeated  in  open  battle.  Their  right  wing  had  fled  to  the 
city  ;  the  left  wing  was  in  retreat  for  the  river  ;  and  it  would  liave 
been  to  the  advantage  of  the  Athenians  if  these  liad  been  al- 
lowed to  cross  and  so  been  cut  otf  from  re-entering  Syracuse.  But 
at  this  point  the  three  hundred  j)icked  hoplites  who  had  done  their 
task  so  well  at  the   first   counterwork   brought   about  a    disaster 


Chap.  VII.]  THE  SICILIAX   EXPEDITION.  385 

wliicli  carried  the  whole  Athenian  army  many  steps  nearer  to  its 
ruin.  Hurrying  towards  the  bridge  in  order  to  cut  oS  tiie  fugi- 
tives, they  Avere  attacked  by  a  body  of  Syracusan  horse  and 
thrown  back  on  the  Athenian  right  wing  in  such  disorder  as  to  dis- 
turb the  ranks  of  the  tribe  witli  which  they  came  into  contact. 
Lamachos  saw  tiie  daugup,  and  hurried  to  their  aid  from  the  left 
wing  with  the  Argive  allies  and  a  .small  force  of  archers.  In  his 
Jiaste  he  advanced  with  a  few  companions  and  crossing  a  trench 
was  for  a  moment  separated  from  his  followers.  In  an  instant  he 
was  struck  down  and  killed.  Five  or  six  died  with  him,  and 
their  bodies  were  carried  off  by  the  enemy.  But  the  main  body 
of  the  Athenian  army  had  now  come  up,  and  the  Syracusans  were 
again  compelled  to  retreat.  Meanwhile  those  of  them  who  had 
lied  from  the  stockade  to  the  city,  encouraged  by  the  repulse  of 
the  three  hundred  and  the  disorder  of  the  Athenian  right  wing, 
issued  again  from  the  walls  ;  and  while  they  remained  in  suffi- 
cient numbers  to  retain  the  enemy  on  the  former  battle-ground,  a 
detachment  was  sent  to  take  the  great  central  fortitication  from 
which  the  Athenian  siege  walls  had  started.  They  had  hoped  to 
find  it  empty,  and  they  succeeded  in  taking  and  destroying  the 
redoubt  of  one  thousand  feet  in  length  raised  for  the  protection 
of  the  builders ;  but  when  they  advanced  beyond  it,  they  found 
themselves  suddenly  facing  a  wall  of  flame.  Nikias  was  lying  sick 
within  the  fort,  and  as  soon  as  he  knew  that  the  enemy  was  approach- 
ing, ho  ordered  his  attendants  to  set  on  fire  all  the  woodwork 
within  their  reach.  The  assailants  at  once  retreated  ;  the  day 
had,  indeed,  again  turned  against  them.  The  Athenian  army, 
startled  by  the  sudden  outburst  of  flame  round  the  fortress,  was 
hurrying  up  from  the  lower  ground  ;  and  at  the  same  moment  the 
Miagnificent  Athenian  fleet  was  seen  sweeping  round  into  the  great 
harbor  which  it  was  destined  never  to  leave. 

Once  more  Nikias  had  everything  in  his  favor,  and  prompt 
action  would  have  been  as  certainly  followed  by  success  now  as 
when  his  army  first  landed  near  the  Olympieion.  Prospects 
Some  weeks  were  yet  to  pass  before  Gylippos  could  nLrlrand'^''' 
attempt  to  enter  Syracuse  ;  and  the  one  thing  of  vital  Syracusans. 
moment  was  that  the  city  should  be  completely  invested  before 
that  attempt  should  be  made.  A  single  wall  carried  from  the 
great  harbor  to  the  central  fort  and  thence  to  the  sea  at  the  north- 
ern extremity  of  Achradina  would  have  amply  sufficed  for  this  pur- 
pose. But  instead  of  urging  on  this  work  with  the  utmost  speed, 
Nikias  wasted  time  in  building  the  southward  wall  double  from 
the  first,  while  much  of  the  ground  which  should  have  been 
guarded  by  the  eastward  wall  was  left  open.  The  Syracusans  were 
therefore  able  still  to  bring  in  supplies  by  the  road  which  passed 
17 


386  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  HI. 

under  the  rock  of  Euryelos  ;  but  even  thus  tlieir  prospects  were 
suflBcieutly  gloomy.  They  were,  in  fact,  beginning  to  feel  the 
miseries  of  a  state  of  siege,  and  their  irritation  was  vented  first 
upon  their  generals  whom  they  suspected  either  of  gross  neglect 
of  duty  or  of  wilful  treachery.  Hermokrates  and  his  colleagues 
were  deprived  of  their  conunand,  and  Herakleides,  Eukles,  and 
Tellias  put  in  their  place.  Even  this  measure  of  success  was  fully 
enough  to  lull  Nikias  into  a  feeling  of  fatal  security  :  and  the 
temptation  to  abandon  himself  to  an  inactivity  which  a  painful 
internal  disease  made  doubly  agreeable  was  at  this  time  for  other 
reasons  yet  stronger.  From  the  first  a  party  in  Syracuse  had  been 
at  work  to  make  liim  master  of  the  city  ;  and  later  in  the  siege, 
when  the  Athenians  had  begun  to  feel  that  their  chances  of  success 
were  becoming  very  small,  these  partisans  induced  him  to  linger 
on  when  retreat  had  become  a  matter  of  urgent  need.'  ]?v  these 
men  lie  was  now  told  that  the  utter  dejection  of  the  Syraeusans 
foreboded  their  alnuist  immediate  surrender  ;  and  the  near  pros- 
pect of  this  unconditional  submission  probably  made  him  turn  a 
deaf  ear  to  the  proposals  which  were  actually  made  to  him  for  a 
settlement  of  the  quarrel.' 

Three  or  four  months  at  least  had  passed  away  since  the  synod 
at  Sparta  in  which  Alkibiades  propounded  his  infamous  treachery, 
Vo  <Te  f  l)6fore  Gylippos  found  himself  able  to  advance  beyond 
Gyiipposto    Leukas.       At  length    with    two    Lakonian    and    two 

^"  Corinthian  vessels  he  crossed  over  to  Taras,  and  thence 

went  on  to  Thourioi  in  the  vain  hope  that  the  Thourians  would  be 
glad  to  aid  him  for  the  sake  of  his  father  Klcaudridas,  who  had 
long  sojourned  among  them.  Far  from  giving  him  any  help,  ihey 
sent  to  Nikias  a  message  telling  him  that  a  Spartan  general  was 
making  his  way  to  Sicily  more  in  the  guise  of  a  pirate  or  a  priva- 
teer than  as  the  leader  of  a  force  which  should  conunand  respect. 
The  contempt  implied  in  the  phrase  soothed  the  vanity  of  Nikias, 
who  showed  his  sense  of  his  own  superiority  by  failing  to  send, 
until  it  was  too  late,  so  much  as  a  single  ship  to  watch  the  move- 
ments of  his  enemy  and  to  prevent  his  landing  in  Sicily .°  Gylip- 
pos had  already  passed  through  the  straits  of  Messene  on  his  way 
to  Himera,  before  the  four  triremes  dispatched  by  Nikias  on 
learning  that  Gylippos  was  already  in  Lokroi  reached  Khegion. 
But  even  Avhen  Gylippos  had  set  out  on  his  march  from  Himera 
with  a  force  of  nearly  13,000  men,  Nikias  still  remained  as  uncon- 
cerned within  his  lines  as  though  the  approach  of  agenerHl  bringing 
with  him  the  influence  of  the  Spartan  name  were  a  thing  wholly 
beneath  his  notice.      He  had  now  onlv  to  block  the  mads  by  which 

•  Thuc  vii.  49  and  86.  "  \\>.  vi.  10;5.  '  lb.  vi.  104. 


Chap.  VII.]  THE  SICILIAN   EXPEDITION.  387 

he  had  himself  seized  Epipolai,  and  Gj'lippos  must  liavo  fallen  back 
to  devise  some  other  means  for  succorinii;  Syracuse. 

The  time  demanded  indeed  all  the  energy  and  the  caution  of 
which  an  Athenian  army  was  capable.  An  assembly  had  already 
been  summc^ncd  in  Syracuse  to  discuss  definitely  the  Entry  of 
terms  for  capitulation,  when  the  Corinthian  Gongylos  iJito'syra- 
in  a  single  ship  made  liis  way  into  the  city  and  told  cuse. 
them  that  tlie  aid  of  which  they  had  despaired  was  almost  at  their 
doors.  All  thoughts  of  submission  were  at  once  cast  to  the  winds, 
and  they  made  ready  forthwith  to  march  out  with  all  their  forces 
to  bring  Gylippos  into  the  town.  Nikias  was  doing  all  that  he 
could  to  make  his  way  smooth  before  liim.  The  materials  for  the 
new  wall  to  the  east  of  the  central  fort  were  lying  for  the  most 
part  ready  for  the  builders  :  but  the  workmen  were  busy  on  the 
few  fnrlongs  wluch  still  remained  unfinished  at  the  end  of  the 
southern  wall  where  for  the  present  there  was  no  danger  whatever, 
and  Gylippos  entered  Syracuse  almost  as  a  conqueror.  The  Atlie- 
nians  were  at  once  made  to  feel  that  the  parts  of  the  actors  had 
been  changed.  The  Spartan  general  offered  them  a  truce  for  five 
days,  if  tliey  would  spend  this  time  in  leaving  not  merely  Syracuse 
but  Sicily.  The  terms  were  treated  with  contemptuous  silence  ; 
but  the  very  fact  of  their  being  offered  was  not  less  significant  than 
the  refusal  of  Nikias  to  accept  battle  when  Gylippos  led  the  Syra- 
cusans  into  the  open  space  before  his  lines.  The  next  day  was 
marked  by  the  loss  of  the  fortress  of  Labdalon,  which  seemed  to 
have  gone  from  the  mind  of  Nikias  because  it  was  out  of  his  sight, 
and  by  the  seizure  of  an  Athenian  trireme  in  the  liarbor.'  Event 
followed  event  with  astonishing  speed.  A  night  attack  made  by 
Gylippos  on  a  weak  part  of  the  southern  blockading  wall  was 
frustrated  by  the  vigilance  of  the  besiegers,  wlio  were  now  fast 
taking  the  place  of  the  besieged  ;  and  the  Atlienian  watches  were 
in  this  portion  of  their  work  hencefortli  disposed  with  something 
like  effectual  care.  But  these  precautions  were  of  little  avail  or 
none  ;  and  Nikias  resolved,  while  there  was  yet  time,  to  fortify  the 
promontory  of  Plemmyrion  which  with  Ortygia,  from  Avhich  it  is 
one  mile  distant,  formed  the  entrance  to  the  port.  Here  lie  stationed 
his  large  transport  and  merchant  vessels  with  the  swiftest  of  his 
triremes,  while  the  stores  for  the  army  generally  were  deposited  in 
three  forts  erected  on  the  cape  ;  and  undoubtedly,  as  commanding 
the  entrtlncc  to  the  bay,  the  post  had  great  advantages.  Convoys 
could  enter  the  harbor  without  risk,  and  the  Athenian  fleet  could 
intercept  any  vessels  seeking  entrance  on  the  enemy's  side  :  but 
as  a  set-off  to  these  benefits,  Plemmyrion  had  no  water,  and  the 

•Time.  vii.  3. 


388  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

Syracusan  horsemen,  having  full  command  of  the  country,  harassed 
or  destroyed  the  foraging  parties  which  were  compelled  to  seek 
supplies  from  long  distances.  More  fatal  than  all  was  the  admission, 
implied  by  this  change  of  position,  that  the  Athenians  were  rather 
def eliding  therasejves  than  attacking.  Hencefoith  their  seeming 
victories  were  to  do  them  no  good  :  their  slightest  failures  or 
blunders  were  to  do  them  infinite  harm,  and  the  former  were  indeed 
few  and  far  between.  No  attempt  had  been  made  to  stop  Gylippos 
before  he  reached  the  Epizephyrian  Lokroi ;  but  twenty  triremes 
were  now  sent  to  intercept  the  approaching  Corinthian  Heet  under 
Erasinides.  In  a  few  days  the  enemy's  ships  reached  Syracuse 
without  having  even  come  into  contact  with  the  Athenian  squadron. 
A  faint  gleam  of  hope  seemed  to  light  up  the  prospect  for  the 
besiegers,  when  Gylippos,  having  led  out  liis  army  to  battle  many 
Third  coun-  times  without  being  attacked,  determined  himself  to 
th"s°v'acif-  l^GComc  the  assailant.  The  ground  which  he  had 
sans.  chosen   for  the  action  near  the  new  counterwork  was 

too  much  cramped  and  broken  up  with  walls  to  allow  free  action 
to  his  horsemen  and  archers  ;  and  he  was  punished  by  a  defeat  in 
which  the  Corinthian  Gongylos  was  slain.  Of  this  def  cat  he  took 
the  whole  blame  on  himself.  He  would  take  care  on  the  next  day 
that  they  should  light  under  no  such  physical  disadvantages,  and  the 
thought  was  not  to  be  borne  that  Dorians  from  Peloponnesos  should 
be  unable  to  drive  out  the  jumbled  crowd  of  an  Ionian  army.  In 
this  second  battle,  the  Syracusan  horsemen  did  their  work  with 
fatal  success.  The  Athenian  left  wing  was  immediately  broken, 
and  the  whole  array  driven  back  to  their  lines, — not  an  attempt 
being  made  by  their  cavalry  to  aveii.  or  to  lessen  the  disaster. 
Nikias  had  fought  only  to  binder  the  progress  of  the  counterwork 
Avhich  liad  all  but  reached  his  wall.  In  the  night  wliicli  followed 
the  fight,  the  point  of  intersection  was  passed,  and  all  hope  of 
blockading  Syracuse  except  by  storming  the  counter-wall  faded 
iBnally  away.  But  Nikias  still  had  it  in  his  power  to  gnard  the 
entrances  to  tlie  slopes  of  Epipolai,  and  thus  to  keep  tlie  ground 
open  for  the  work  which  the  new  force  to  be  presently  summoned 
from  Athens  mnst  inevital>Iy  have  to  do.  It  would  have  been  bet- 
ter even  to  abandon  the  wliole  line  of  siege  works  and  concentrate 
the  army  on  the  high  ground  which  overlooked  the  city,  thus 
maintaining  full  comnmnication  with  the  interior  of  the  island, 
and  tnisting  to  the  effect  of  main  force  for  dislodging  th»  enemy, 
so  soon  as  the  new  army  from  Athens  should  arrive.  But  there 
was  no  need  to  do  even  thus  much.  If  an  adequate  detachment 
had  occupied  this  ground  now,  Demosthenes  would  liave  en- 
countered no  opposition  until  he  readied  the  third  Syracusan 
countorwork.      But  Nikias  again  let  the  opportunity  slip  :  and  the 


z 
O 

Ui 

Q.    f^  rj  " 


4)   H^ 


O 


r4 

H 


^1k^ 


CO 


fc 


_..^ 


%IL 


Chap.  VII.]  THE   SICILIAN  EXPEDITION.  389 

crews  of  tlie  Corinthian  fleet  which  had  just  reached  Syracuse 
took  part  in  the  construction  of  the  farther  works  without  which 
Gylippos  saw  that  the  cit}'  could  not  be  safe,  if  an  array  of  suffi- 
cient strength  should  occupy  the  heights  under  J]uryelos.  So 
passed  away  the  precious  days,  while  the  idleness  of  Nikias  add- 
ed to  the  colossal  burden  under  which  even  the  genius  of  Denaos- 
theiies  broke  down. 

Meanwhile,  Gylippos  had  left  Syracuse  for  the  purpose  of  stir- 
ring her  allies  to  greater  efforts  in  her  behalf,  and  of  inducing 
other  cities  to  abandon  their  neutrality  and  to  join  in  Letter  of 
crushing  the  invaders,  while  a  messenger  was  bearing  ^I'^l^^^^jji^ 
to  Athens  a  letter  in  which  Nikias  professed  to  give  niaus. 
a  plain  unvarnished  report  of  all  that  had  thus  far  befallen  the  fleet 
and  army.  It  is,  to  say  the  least,  a  marvellous  specimen  of  the 
ingenuity  with  which  a  religious  man  may  deceive  himself  about 
the  motives  and  consequences  of  his  own  actions.  To  their  mis- 
fortune the  Athenians  believed  hini  when  he  extended  the  scale  of 
the  armament  intended  for  the  expedition  to  Sicily  :  to  their  utter 
ruin  they  believed  him  now,  and  took  liis  letter  as  a  picture  not  of 
things  as  Xikias  saw  them  but  of  things  as  they  were  in  themselves. 
Nikias  told  them  in  substance  that  at  flrst  they  had  been  uniformly 
victorious  and  that  they  had  finished  their  besieging  walls,'  when 
Gylippos  came  with  an  army  from  Peloponnesos  and  from  some 
towns  in  Sicily  ;  but  he  never  told  tliem  that  common  care  would 
liave  made  his  entrance  impossible.  lie  told  them  that  his  first 
victory  over  Gylippos  had  been  followed  by  a  defeat  caused  by  the 
Syracusan  horsemen  and  archers  ;  but  he  added  not  a  word  to  ex- 
plain the  lack  or  absence  of  cavalry  and  bowmen  on  his  own  side. 
lie  told  them  of  the  Syracusan  counter-walls  which  had  crossed 
his  own,  forgetting  that  he  was  thus  contradicting  his  previous 
assertion  that  his  own  wall  had  been  finished,  and  that  the  success 
of  the  Syracusans  with  this  counterwork  was  liis  own  fault.  He 
told  them  that  not  merely  the  splendid  appearance  but  the  useful- 
ness of  their  ships  was  wretchedly  impaired,  forgetting  that  only 
through  his  own  resistance  to  the  counsels  of  Lamachos  they  liad 
failed  to  do  and  to  finish  their  work  long  ago.  He  told  them  that 
the  change  in  their  fortunes  had  been  followed  by  discontent 
and  some  insubordination  among  the  troops  and  by  desertion? 
both  among  their  allies  and  among  their  slaves  ;  but  he  did  not 
tell  them  whether  to  this  or  to  wb.at  cause  they  were  to  ascribe 
the  disappearance  or  inaction  or  carelessness  of  his  cavalry.  He 
told  them  that  either  the  present  army  must  be  withdrawn,  or 
another   army   of  equal  strength  sent  to  reinforce  it,  adding  the 

^  ra  reixn  o'tKoSofiTjaafihuv.     Thuc.  vii.  11,  1.  Taken  strictly,  this  asser- 
tion was  not  true. 


890  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

expression  of  his  own  Avisli  to  be  relieved  from  his  command,  for 
which  he  was  now  incapacitated  by  disease  of  the  kidneys.  He 
had  always  been  incapacitated  for  it ;  but  although  fur  his  uncon- 
sciousness of  this  fact  he  must  not  perhaps  be  too  severely  judged, 
yet  it  would  be  bard  to  count  up  the  many  benefits  which,  as  he 
said,  the  Athenians  had  derived  from  his  generalship.  In  their 
infatuation  they  thought  that  they  would  derive  more  still.  The 
resignation  of  Nikias  was  not  received  ;  but  two  of  his  officers 
Menandros  and  Euthydemos  were  appointed  his  colleagues,  mitil 
the  new  generals  Demosthenes,  Alkisthenes,  and  Eurymedon  should 
reach  the  scene  of  action.  About  the  time  of  the  winter  solstice 
Eurymedon  was  dispatched  with  ten  ships  and  120  talents  of  sil- 
ver, to  tell  them  that  the  other  generals  would  come  with  the 
spring  bringing  more  efiectual  succor.'  Twenty  ships  w-ere  at  the 
same  time  dispatched  to  the  Peloponnesian  coasts  to  see  that  no 
Spartan  or  Corinthian  fleets  should  depart  thence  for  Sicily. 

But  troubles  greater  than  any  which  they  had  experienced  in 
the  earlier  years  of  the  war  were  impending  over  the  Athenians 
Outbreak  of  nearer  home.  The  disaster  of  Sphakteria  liad  con- 
the  so-called  x'inccd  the  Spartans  that  they  and  their  allies  were 
war.  under  divine  displeasure   for  the   way  in  Avhich  they 

liad  brought  about  the  war,  and  they  acknowledged  that  in  the 
crisis  which  preceded  the  outbreak  of  the  struggle  the  Athenians 
were  in  the  right  and  themselves  wholly  in  the  wrong.^  Hence 
they  were  especially  anxious  that  the  blame  of  renewing  the  strife 
should  attach  distinctly  to  the  Athenians ;  and  such  a  manifest 
breach  of  the  peace  seemed  to  be  furnished  by  the  mission  of  an 
Athenian  fleet  which  about  the  time  when  Gylippos  departed  for 
Sicily  was  sent  to  aid  the  Argives.  The  desultory  warfare  carried 
on  by  the  Helots  and  Messenians  from  Pylos  did  not  in  terms  break 
the  compact  inscribed  on  the  brazen  pillars  which  still  stood  in 
Athens  and  in  Sparta ;  but  when  Athenian  ships  landed  their 
crews  to  ravage  the  territories  of  the  Limerian  Epidauros,  Prasiai, 
and  other  cities,'  they  held  that  no  room  was  left  for  further  hesi- 
tation,^ and  they  set  diligently  to  work  to  get  together  materials 
for  the  permanent  ffarrisoning  of  Dekeleia.  In  the 
■  ■  early  spring  a  Spartan  army  not  only  renewed  openly 
a  war  only  nominally  interrupted,  but  without  any  opposition  on  the 
part  of  the  Athenians^  built  the  fortress  which  gave  its  name  to 
the  ten  years'  straggle  which  followed  its  erection.  Once  more 
after  an  interval  of  twelve  3'ears  the  fertile  farms  of  Attica  were 

'  Tliuc.  vii.  16.  own  part  of  the  compact  relating  to 

"  lb.  vii.  18,  2.     See  also  p.  267.  Amphipolis  and  some  other  points 

*  Thuc.  vi.  105.  bad  never  been  fulfilled. 

*  They  chose  to  forget  that  tlieir  '  Thuc.  vii.  19,  1. 


Chap.  Vll.]  THE  SICILIAN  EXPEDITION.  391 

ravaged  and  dismantled,  while  from  the  very  walls  of  their  city  or 
from  the  Eleusinian  plain  the  Athenians  could  now  see  in  the  dis- 
tance the  hostile  camp  which  was  to  be  a  thorn  in  their  side  until 
the  gates  of  Athens  itself  should  be  thrown  open  to  admit  a  Spartan 
conqueror. 

Twenty -five  Corinthian  shipskept  watch  over  the  fleet  of  twenty 
Athenian  triremes  stationed  at  Naupaktos,  while  a  convoy  of  mer- 
chant vessels  set  off  for  Sicily  with  the  Peloponneslan     „  , 

J  L  "cIoponnG- 

reinforcements  for  the' Syracusans.     More  than  2,000     sianand 
heavy-armed  soldiers  thus  left  tlie  Peloponneslan  shores,     ^inforce'- 
The  armament  taken  by  Demosthenes  w;ft  far  more     mentsfor 
imposing,  and  if  it  could  have  been  used  for  any  other       '^'  ^' 
purpose   than   that  of  re[)airing  a  series  of  fatal  blunders  would 
doubtless  have  been  far  more  efficacious. 

While  Athens  was  thus  making  ready  more  victims  for  the 
slaughter,  Gylippos  was  urging  the  Syracusans  boldly  to  attack  the 
Athenians  on  the  element  which  they  regarded  as  their  Naval  vic- 
own.  With  his  usual  promptness  he  arranged  that  *^thenLn9° 
five-and-thirty  ships  should  issue  from  the  great  har-  andcaptme 
bor  at  the  moment  wlien  five  and-forty  from  the  dock  rjon  by  Gy- 
iu  the  lesser  liarbor  should  double  the  islet  of  Ortygia,  I'ppos. 
the  one  to  attack  the  Athenian  fleet  in  the  harbor,  the  other  to 
assail  the  naval  station  at  Plemmyrion,  and  thus  to  cover  the  attack 
on  the  forts  which  was  to  be  made  sinuiltaneously  by  the  land- 
/orces.  It  was  a  fight  to  determine  which  side  should  command 
the  entrance  to  the  harbor;  and  with  common  care  the  Athe- 
nians might  have  retained  it  to  the  great  discomfiture  of  their 
enemies.  Five-and-twenty  Athenian  triremes  advanced  hastily 
from  their  station  at  the  extremity  of  the  blockading  wall  to  meet 
the  five-and-thirty  ships  of  the  enemy  ;  but  at  first  the  day  went 
against  them,  not  only  here,  but  also  in  the  battle  off  Plemmyrion, 
until  the  Syracusan  fleet  becoming  disordered  from  their  own  suc- 
cess furnished  the  Atlienians  with  an  opportunity  for  the  employ- 
ment of  a  tactic  in  which  they  were  unrivalled.  With  a  loss  of 
three  triremes  they  sunk  eleven  ships  of  the  enemy,  the  crews  of 
three  being  made  prisoners,  the  rest  slain.  But  a  victory  which 
might  otherwise  have  at  least  insured  the  ultimate  safety  of  the 
besiegers  was  rendered  worthless  by  the  loss  of  Plemmyrion.  With 
an  imprudence  against  which  it  was  the  business  of  Xikiasto  guard, 
the  garrison  of  the  three  forts  on  the  cape  went  down  to  witness 
the  sea-fight  from  the  shore  where  they  could  do  no  good,  leaving 
a  few  only  of  their  number  to  keep  watch  at  their  post.  On  these 
Gylippos  Tell  with  overpowering  force.  After  a  short  and  sharp 
conflict  the  first  fort  was  in  his  hands,  and  the  fugitives  found 
some  difficulty  in  escaping  to  the  merchant  and  transport  vessels, 


392  THE   EMPIRE  OP  ATHENS.  [Book  IH. 

for  the  Syracusan  fleet  Avas  tlins  far  victorious.  AVilh  tlic  other 
two  forts  he  liad  even  less  difficulty  :  but  when  these  had  been 
takeu,  the  fortune  of  the  day  had  changed  on  the  sea.  It 
mattered  little.  The  Athenian  garrison  escaped ;  but  Gylippos 
was  master  not  only  of  the  entrance  to  the  harboi-,  but  of  the 
Athenian  forts  and  of  the  vast  quantities  of  corn  and  money,  som(i 
belonging  to  the  military  chest,  some  to  private  merchants,  which 
had  been  placed  there  for  safety.  With  these  the  Athenians  lost 
three  triremes  Avhich  had  been  drawn  up  for  repairs,  a.  the  sails 
and  tackle  of  not  less  than  forty  ships.  But  worse  than  this,  they 
saw  two  of  their  fortS  permanently  occupied  by  their  enemies, 
while  the  Syracusan  fleet  kept  guard  off  Plemmyrion.  Henceforth 
convoys  could  be  introduced  into  the  harbor  only  after  a  fight, 
and  they  were  made  to  feel  on  how  slender  a  thread  the  very  exist- 
ence of  the  whole  armament  was  hanging. 

Blow  after  blow  now  fell  upon  the  besieging  force.  The  idea 
of  their  maritime  supremacy  had  led  the  Athenians  to  think  that 
Indecisive  supplies  of  money  for  the  army  might  be  safely  in- 
Athenian  trusted  to  merchant  vessels  even  without  a  convoy. 
mThe Great  Eleven  ships  were  thus  sent  with  a  vast  amount  of 
Harbor.  treasure  :  almost  all  of  them  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
Syracusan  cruisers  off  the  coast  of  Italy.  A  large  quantity  of 
timber  for  ship-building  lay  ready  for  the  Athenians  in  the  territory 
of  Kaulon  :  it  was  all  set  on  fire  by  the  Syracusans.  An  Athenian 
squadron  of  twenty  triremes  watched  off  Megara  for  the  return  of 
the  ships  which  had  done  them  so  much  harm  ;  it  succeeded  in 
intercepting  only  one  of  them.  ]Sor  were  they  more  fortunate 
within  the  great  harbor.  Much  time,  money,  and  toil  was  spent 
in  the  useless  effort  to  pull  up  or  to  saw  off"  the  stakes  which  the 
Syracusans  had  planted  in  the  water  in  front  of  their  old  docks ; 
but  while  they  were  thus  working  to  no  purpose,  the  Syracusans 
were  maturing  their  larger  scheme  for  the  destruction  of  the  Athe- 
nian fleet  before  any  reinforcements  should  reach  them.  It  was  to 
the  misfortune  of  Athens  that  this  scheme  was  not  wholl}^  suc- 
cessful, for  the  ruin  of  the  navy  of  Nikias  would  have  furnished  to 
Demosthenes  a  sufficient  justification  for  taking  off  the  army  and 
forthwith  returning  home. 

Meanwhile  Demosthenes  was  approaching  with  his  new  force 
from  Athens.  At  Kephallenia  and  Zakynthos  he  took  in  the  hop- 
Vovaseof  '"'^^^  furnished  by  those  islands,  and  thence  went  to 
Uemosthe-  the  Akarnatuan  towns  of  Alvzia  and  Anaktorion,  there 
kyra^and'^"  f*^*'"  the  last  time  to  gather  slingers  and  javelin  men 
Italy.  near  tliL  scone  of  the  brilliant  campaigns  wliich   had 

marked  his  earlier  career.  It  was  here,  where  every  spot  reminded 
hira  of  happier  times,  that  Eurymcdon  met  him,  bringing  not 


Chap.  VII.]  THE   SICILIAN  EXPEDITION.  393 

merely  the  disheartcnino-  report  of  what  he  had  himself  seen  hut 
the  tidings  which  he  had  received  on  his  voyage  of  the  disastrous 
loss  of  Plemmyrion.  Hither  also  came  Konon,  the  commander  at 
Naupaktos,  to  make  a  confession  which  to  Phormion  would  have 
seemed  intolerably  humiliating  but  which  was  extorted  by  a  stern 
necessity.  The  eighteen  ships  which  formed  his  squadron  were 
unable  to  cope  with  the  Corinthian  fleet  of  twenty-five  ships  which 
were  manifestly  making  ready  to  attack  him.  Ten  ships  were  de- 
tached to  reinforce  him  :  and  Eurymedon  went  on  to  Korkyra, 
where  for  the  last  time  he  appeared  as  an  Athenian  general  on  "the 
island  where  he  had  won  a  fame  less  enviable  than  that  of  his 
colleague.^  The  Korkyraians  furnished  fifteen  triremes  and  some 
hoplites  for  the  fleet  which  now  crossed  the  Ionian  gulf  to  the 
lapygian  promontory.  At  Thourioi  they  found  the  philo- Athenian 
party  dominant,  and  a  resolution  was  taken  to  aid  the  Athenians 
with  VOO  hoplites  and  300  light-armed  troops.'^ 

At  Syracuse  the  attack  on  the  Athenian  fleet  had  been  delayed 
by  a  disaster  which  befell  some  reinforcements  of  Syracusan  allies. 
These  were  marching  across  the  territory  of  Sikel  Arrival  of 
tribes,  whose  chiefs  had  been  warned  by  Nikias  to  do  ne"aT  ^' 
what  they  could  to  cut  short  their  journey.  Had  he  Syracuse, 
taken  this  step,  when  he  heard  that  Gylippos  was  marching  from 
IJimera,  the  issue  of  the  siege  might  have  been  different.  As  it 
was,  eight  hundred  of  these  Syracusan  allies  w"ere  slain  by  Sikels 
who  lay  in  ambush  for  them,  together  with  all  the  envoys  but  one  : 
but  this  one,  the  representative  of  Corinth,  led  the  remaining  1,500 
to  Syracuse,  and  the  delay  thus  caused  served  only  to  involve  the 
second  Athenian  army  in  the  ruin  which  might  otherwise  have 
been  confined  to  the  first.  Of  the  Sikeliot  cities  Akragas  alone 
insisted  on  remaining  neutral :  the  rest  felt  the  need  of  abandoning 
the  sinking  ship,  and  came  forward  to  take  active  part  with  the 
Syracusans.  In  short,  the  Syracusans  were  not  merely  gaining 
strength  by  additions  to  their  numbers :  they  were  fast  acquiring 
that  power  of  making  the  best  of  circumstances  which  had  marked 
the  Athenians  in  their  most  vigorous  days.  The  bulk  and  awk- 
wardness of  the  vSyracusaii  ships  would  tell  only  in  their  favor,  so 
long  as  the  Athenians  were  debarred  from  using  their  peculiar 
tactics  ;  and  they  had  no  hesitation  in  so  arming  the  prows  of  their 
triremes  and  reducing  their  projection  as  to  render  them  fatal  to 
the  lighter  ships  which  under  other  conditions  had  won  for  Athens 
her  command  of  the  sea.  The  entrance  to  the  great  harbor  was 
only  one  mile  in  width,  and  after  the  loss  of  Plemmyrion  the 
Athenian  fleet  had  been  cooped  up  in  that  part  of  the  harbor 
whence  their  blockading  wall  ran  northward  to  Epipolai.  The 
*  See  pp.  308-310.  '  Tliuc.  vii.  33  and  35. 

17* 


394  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  IE. 

Syracusans  counted  therefore  on  a  certain  victory,  if  an  attack  were 
made  simultaneously  both  by  sea  and  by  land.  Unhappily  for  the 
Athenians,  their  hopes  were  disappointed.  The  advance  of  the 
Syracusan  array  against  the  blockading  wail  led  the  Athenians  to 
think  that  their  work  for  the  day  would  be  confined  to  the  land  ; 
and  the  sudden  appearance  of  80  Syracusan  ships  advancing  up  the 
harbor  at  first  amazed  them.  Hastily  manning  Vo  triremes,  the 
Athenians  hurried  to  meet  thera  ;  but  the  day  was  spent  in  desul- 
tory and  indecisive  movements.  On  the  following  day  the  Syra- 
cusans did  nothing,  and  Nikias  spent  the  time  in  placing  his  trans- 
ports before  the  stockade  of  his  naval  station  in  such  wise  that 
any  trireme  hard  pressed  by  the  enemy  might  retreat  through  the 
openings  left  between  thera  and  return  to  the  battle  in  good  order. 
The  conflict  which  began  early  on  the  next  day  was  following 
much  the  same  course  with  the  last  engagement,  when  the  Corin- 
thian Ariston  suggested  that  the  Syracusan  crews  should  take  their 
mid-day  meal  on  the  shore,  and  then  immediately  renew  the 
struggle.  An-angements  were  accordingly  made  for  this  purpose  ; 
and  the  Athenians,  seeing  their  enemies  retreat  about  noon,  thought 
that  their  work  for  the  day  was  done.  They  were  soon  undeceived. 
Most  of  them  were  still  fasting,  when  the  Syracusan  fleet  was  seen 
again  advancing  in  order  of  battle.  Even  thus,  in  spite  of  the  dis- 
order in  which  the  Athenian  ships  were  manned,  neither  side  had  any 
decisive  advantage  until  the  Athenians,  wearied  out  with  hunger, 
determined  to  bring  the  matter  to  an  issue,  and  advanced  rapidly 
against  the  enemy.  The  result  instantly  verified  the  calculations 
of  the  Syracusans.  The  loss  of  three  S}Tacusan  ships  was  more 
than  compensated  by  the  sinking  of  seven  Athenian  triremes  and 
tlie  disabling  of  many  more  ;  and  the  Syracusans  were  counting  on 
the  complete  destruction  of  the  fleet  and  army  of  Nikias,  when 
seventy-three  x\thenian  triremes  swept  into  the  great  harbor. 
The  feeling  first  excited  in  the  minds  of  the  Syracusans  was  one 
of  consternation.  For  a  moment  the  relative  position  of  the  an- 
tagonists was  reversed.  The  Athenians  at  once  issued  from  their 
lines  and  ravaged  the  lowlands  of  the  Anapos  without  any  resist- 
ance except  from  the  garrison  in  the  Olympieion ;  but  Demos- 
thenes saw  at  a  glance  that  this  must  go  for  nothing,  unless  some 
decisive  advantage  could  be  gained  which  would  fairly  justify  a 
continuance  of  the  siege.  At  present  the  very  name  of  blockade 
■was  an  absurd  misnomer,  unless  the  Athenians  were  to  be  regarded 
as  the  blockaded  party.  The  forces  of  Nikias  were  in  part  de- 
moralised, in  part  worn  out  by  marsh  fever  caught  in  the  lowlands 
of  the  Anapos  ;  nor  was  it  of  the  least  use  to  prolong  operations 
near  the  sea  imless  the  position  of  the  Syracusans  could  be  turned 
o  1  th'j  northern  side  of  J^pipolai.     But  it  was  soon  evident  that 


Chap.  VII.]  THE   SICILIAN   EXPEDITION.  395 

attacks  by  day  had  little  chance  of  success  ;  and  with  the  consent 
of  his  colleagues  Demosthenes  resolved  on  a  night  assault. 

AVitli  the  whole  disposable  force  of  the  camp  Demosthenes  with 
Menandros  and  Euthydemos  set  out  on  a  moonlit  night  for  their 
march  to  Euryelos.  He  felt  that  everything  depended  Njcrht attack 
on  the  work  of  that  night,  and  his  men,  in  spite  of  all  bytheAtiic- 
the  sufferings  and  disasters  which  had  thus  far  attended  syracusan 
the  expedition,  were  full  of  hope  and  even  of  con-  tross  Avall.^ 
fidence.  They  were  now  acting  under  a  general  whose  sagacity  in 
council  and  energy  in  the  field  had  won  him  the  highest  reputation. 
They  were  carrying  with  them  everything  which  might  be  reason- 
ably expected  to  insure  a  successful  surprise.  It  wanted  about 
two  hours  of  midnight  when  Demosthenes,  leaving  Nikias  to  com- 
mand in  the  camp,  marched  along  that  portion  of  the  slope  of 
Epipolai  which  still  remained  in  the  possession  .of  the  Athenians: 
and  not  only  did  he  succeed  in  making  his  way  under  Euryelos, 
but  the  cross  wall  itself  was  taken  before  any  alarm  was  given. 
Some  of  the  garrison  were  slain  ;  but  the  greater  number,  feeling 
that  the  post  was  no  longer  tenable  since  the  enemy  was  on  the 
northern  side,  fled  in  haste  and  roused  the  picked  body  of  Six 
Hundred  who  had  suffered  so  severely  under  Diomilos  when  the 
Athenians  first  surprised  Epipolai.  They  were  now  not  less 
bardly  handled  by  Demosthenes,  when  they  hurried  from  the  forts 
in  front  of  the  cross  wall  to  the  recovery  of  the  wall  itself  ;  and 
the  Athenian  generals,  thus  far  victorious,  led  on  a  large  proportion 
of  their  forces  towai'ds  the  Syracusan  counter  wall,  while  others 
began  the  task  of  demolishing  the  cross  wall.  The  Syracusans 
were  now  fully  alarmed  ;  but  even  Gylippos  with  all  the  forces  at 
liis  command  was  at  first  driven  back  by  the  determined  energy  of 
the  Athenian  assault.  In  fact  the  work  of  Demosthenes  was  already 
done,  if  he  could  only  maintain  his  present  position.  But  he  was 
anxious  to  push  the  Syracusans  at  once  as  far  back  as  possible  ; 
and  success  had  excited  in  his  army  a  confidence  which  with  Greek 
troops  generally  led  to  a  dangerous  neglect  of  discipline.  The 
Athenians  in  front  were  already  in  some  disorder  when  they  were 
thrown  into  confusion  by  the  sudden  charge  of  a  body  of  heavy 
Boiotian  hoplites,  who  had  been  recently  brought  to  Sicily.  From 
this  moment  the  battle  became  a  wild  jumble,  in  which  all  authority 
was  lost.  The  light  of  the  moon,  which  was  shining  brightly, 
revealed  the  general  features  of  the  scene,  but  left  it  diflScult  or 
impossible  to  distinguish  at  a  distance  one  body  of  men  from 
another ;  and  the  Athenians,  as  they  were  driven  back,  became 
separated  from  the  columns  which  were  pressing  forward  in  full 
confidence  that  they  were  still  victorious.  As  the  disorder  in- 
creased, they   were  no  longer  able  to  see  in  what  direction  their 


396  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  IIL 

movements  should  be  made,  and  in  the  iiproar  the  words  of  com- 
mand could  not  be  distinguished.  In  this  fearful  din  they  began 
to  regard  as  enemies  every  body  of  men  which  was  seen  advancing 
towards  them  ;  and  as  these  bodies  were  now  frequently  their  own 
fugitives,  the  horrors  of  conflict  with  their  own  people  were  added 
to  the  fierce  onsets  of  the  Syracusans,  while  the  watchword  re- 
peatedly asked  for  and  given  became  known  to  the  enemy.  The 
discovery  was  fatal.  Small  parties  of  Syracusans,  if  brought  into 
collision  with  a  larger  Athenian  force,  could  now  escape  as  being- 
able  to  give  the  password,  while  Athenians  in  the  like  case  were 
at  once  slaughtered.  The  presence  of  Dorians  in  the  Athenian 
army  completed  the  catastrophe.  The  war-cry  of  the  Argives, 
Ivorkyraians,  and  other  Dorian  allies  could  not  be  distinguished 
from  the  Syracusan  pa^an  ;  and  tlie  Athenians,  dismayed  already, 
were  hopelessly  bewildered  by  the  liorrible  suspicion  that  the 
enemy  was  in  their  rear,  was  among  them,  was  everywdiere.' 
Attacking  all  who  raised  the  Dorian  war-shout,  they  not  unfrc- 
quently  fell  on  their  friends,  nor  were  they  easily  convinced  of  their 
mistake.  The  defeat  had  in  fact  become  rout.  The  one  thing 
for  wliicli  the  Athenians  now  strove  was  to  reach  their  lines  on 
the  plain  of  the  Anapos;  but  the  slopes  which  led  to  them  were 
bounded  by  precipices  over  which  vast  numbers  were  pushed  by 
their  pursuers,  and  either  grievously  n^aimed  or  killed.  Even  when 
they  had  reached  the  lower  level,  all  danger  was  not  yet  sur- 
mounted. The  new  comers  belonging  to  the  reinforcements  of 
Demosthenes  knew  nothing  of  the  ground,  and  many  of  them 
strayed  away  into  the  country  where  they  were  found  on  the 
coming  day  by  the  Syracusan  horsemen  and  cut  to  pieces.  The 
loss  to  the  Athenians  was  fearful  ;  but  the  number  of  the  shields 
which  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy  Avasgreater  even  than  that 
of  the  slain.  Many  wlio  had  safely  reached  the  camp  had  been 
compelled  to  throw  down  their  arms  before  venturing  on  the 
terrible  leap  over  the  crags  of  p]pipolai. 

The  folly  or  the  iniquity  of  Nikiaswas  now  to  inflict  on  Athens 
a  deadlier  mischief  than  any  which  Alkil)iadcs  liad  striven  to  do 
Refusal  of  to  her.  Syracuse  was  wild  with  excitement;  Gy- 
Kikiasto       jippos    was   ff'^ne   to    o'ather    fresh    recruits   in   otlier 

retroat  or  a  i  »    r^l•    -i  i        t  -i         i  •  -ri    •       i    • 

toaiiowthe  parts  of  Sicily ;  and  while  tJie  victory  on  Epipolai 
thcGroat'^*'  was  stirring  the  Syracusans  to  a  mighty  attaclv  on 
Harbor.  the  Atlicuian  camp  near  the  harbor,  their  enemies, 
overwhelmed  by  the  long  series  of  their  calamities,  were  being 
wasted  by  the  marsh  fever  which  becomes  most  malignant  in 
the  autumn,  and  were  possessed  by  the  one  absorbing  desire  to 
be  quit  of  a  task  wliich  brought  them  notliing  but  deadly  and 
Thuc.  vii.  45,  7. 


Chap.  VII.]  THE   SICILIAN  EXPEDITION.  397 

ignominious  defeat.  In  circinnstanccs  such  as  tliese  Demosthenes 
was  a  man  not  likely  to  hesitate.  All  that  he  could  do  as  an  as- 
sailant had  been  done  :  and  he  was  bound  to  preserve  lives  on 
which  the  very  salvation  of  their  country  depended.  For  the  pre- 
sent the  new  fleet  which  he  had  brought  with  them  made  them 
once  more  masters  of  the  sea ;  and  it  was  his  business  to  remove 
the  army  while  the  path  was  open.  The  reply  of  Nikias  betrays 
an  imbecilityi  an  infatuation,  or  a  depravity  which  has  seldom 
been  equalled,  perhaps  never  surpassed  ;  and  we  have  to  remeniber 
that  it  is  given  to  us  by  an  historian  who  reviews  his  career  with 
singular  indulgence  and  Avho  cherished  his  memory  with  affection- 
ate but  melancholy  veneration.  The  party  in  Syracuse  which  had 
been  all  along  in  communication  with  him  may  still  have  urged 
him  not  to  abandon  the  siege.  By  these  men  be  may  have  been 
informed  that  the  Syracusans  had  already  spent  2,000  talents  on 
the  war,  that  they  owed  a  heavy  debt  besides,  and  that  it  would 
be  beyond  their  power  to  maintain  the  contest  much  longer  ;'  but 
it  was  impossible  for  him  not  ta  sec  that  while  the  strength  of  the 
Athenians  was  daily  becoming  less,  that  of  his  enemies  was  enor- 
mously increasing.  The  truth  is  that,  if  the  repoil  of  his  speech 
may  be  trusted,  his  resolution  was  taken  on  other  considerations. 
The  Athenians,  he  asserted,  were  a  people  under  the  dominion  of 
loud-voiced  and  bullying  demagogues,  and  of  the  men  who  were 
now  crying  out  under  the  hardships  of  the  siege  the  greater  number 
would  join  eagerly  in  charging  their  generals  with  treachery  or 
corruption,  if  ever  they  shijuld  again  take  their  seats  in  the  Athe- 
nian assembly.  Nothing  therefore  should  induce  him  to  consent 
to  a  retreat  until  lie  received  positive  orders  from  Athens  com- 
manding his  return.  In  plain  English,  Nikias  was  afraid  to  go 
home,  and  he  was  a  coward  where  Demosthenes,  in  spite  of  his 
failure,  was  honest,  straightforward,  and  brave.  His  absurd  delu- 
sion found  no  favor  with  Demosthenes,  who  insisted  again  that 
the  siege  ought  at  once  to  be  given  up,  but  that,  if  on  this  point 
they  nnist  wait  for  a  dispatch  from  Athens,  they  would  be  grossly 
disregarding  their  duty  to  their  country  if  they  failed  to  remove 
their  fleet  at  once  either  to  Katane  or  to  Naxos.  To  linger  in  the 
great  harbor  was  to  court  ruin.  Above  all,  there  was  time  now 
to  carry  out  this  change.  Soon  it  might  be  too  late.  Even  to  this 
wise  and  generous  counsel  Nikias  opposed  a  front  so  linn  that  his 
colleague  began  to  think  that  he  liad  some  private  grounds  for  his 

'  Tlnicydides,  vii.  49,  1,  speaks  of  Nikias  knew  well  and  ought  toliave 

the  knowledge  which  Nikias  had  of  remembered  that  men  are  not  likely 

Syracusan  aifairsas  beinp:  exact  and  to  slacken  in  their  efforts  when  they 

accurate.     It  may  have  been  so,  so  have   reason   to    think    that    tlie 

far  as  the  mere  financial  factson  the  enemy's  ship  is  sinking. 
Syracusan  side  a"e  concerned  ;  but 


308  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

resolution  wliieli  time  in  the  end  would  justify.  He  had  none  ; 
and  when  Gylippos  returned  to  Syracuse  with  reinforcements  Ni- 
kias  at  once  saw  that  any  attemi;)t  to  speak  of  the  resources  of 
Syracuse  as  failing  would  be  utterly  vain,  and  only  requested  that 
the  order  for  retreat  should  be  privately  circulated  through  the 
army,  not  formally  decreed  in  a  council  of  war. 

Days  and  weeks  of  most  precious  time  had  Xikias  thus  wasted, 
while  Gylippos  was  gathering  his  reinforcements  in  other  parts  of 
The  eclipse  "Sicily.  But  although  all  hope  of  taking  Syracuse  was 
of  the  moon,  gone,  the  mischief  done  to  Athens  was  not  yet  irre- 
parable. The  consent  of  Nikias,  even  now  reluctantly  extorted, 
had  come  to  Demosthenes  as  a  reprieve  for  which  he  had  almost 
ceased  to  hope  ;  and  the  preparations  for  departure  were  far  ad- 
vanced when  an  eclij^se  of  the  moon  filled  Nikias  with  an  agony 
of  religious  terror.  To  the  grovelling  devotee  one  course  only 
was  open.  The  prophets  must  be  consulted,  and  their  decision 
scrupulously  obeyed.  Unhappily  his  own  prophet  Stilbides  had 
recently  died,  and  the  soothsayers  whose  opinion  was  taken  de- 
clared that  the  Athenians  must  remain  where  they  were  until 
thrice  nine  days  should  have  passed  away.'  Nikias  accordingly 
insisted  that  during  this  period  the  question  of  retreat  should  not 
even  be  mooted  ;  but  he  had  sealed  the  doom  of  the  army  and  the 
doom  of  his  country,  and  long  bef  ote  the  seven-and-twenty  days  were 
ended  this  once  magnificent  armament  had  been  utterly  destroyed. 

Through  Syracuse  the  tidings  flew  like  fire  that  the  Athenians 
had  resolved  to  sail  away,  and  that  their  resolution  had  been 
Defeat  of  changed  by  the  eclipse.  The  former  decision  was  a 
the  Athe-       virtual  confession  both  of  defeat  and  hopelessness  ;  the 

man  fleet,  ,  .i       o  i     *•         x  V.i 

and  death  of  second  gave  tlie  Syracusans  ample  time  to  prepare  tlie 
Eiirymedon.  ^j,^  j-^^p  seizing  the  prey.  They  knew  the  character  of 
Nikias  too  well  to  fear  that  he  would  move  of  his  own  accord 
before  the  allotted  time  had  run  out.  When  at  length  they  were 
ready,  the  first  attack  was  made  by  land  upon  the  enemy's  lines. 
A  force  of  Athenian  hoplites  and  horsemen  advanced  to  meet 
them,  but  was  soon  driven  back  with  the  loss  of  seventy  horses 
and  some  hoplites.  On  the  following  day  the  attack  on  the  lines 
was  renewed,  while  76  trireii»es  issued  from  the  city  and  sailed 
straight  to  the  Athenian  naval  station.  The  Athenians  liastened 
to  meet  them  with  80  ships,  and  learnt  that  even  with  superior 
numbers  Athenian  science  and  skill  were  of  no  avail  under  the 
'  Diodorog  pays  that  the  prophets  story  be  true,  tln'  infiiMiation  of 
required  no  more  than  the  usual  de-  Nikias  assumes  a  lilackercliaracter; 
lay  of  threedays.  Plutarch  atiirms  but  we  mav,  perhaps,  accept  the 
that  in  insisting  on  a  delay  of  27  stalementnf  Thucydides.amiacquit 
days  Nikias  went  beyond  tlie  de-  him  of  tliis  monstrous  and  criminal 
mands  of  the  soothsayers.     If  this      extravagance. 


Chap.  VII.]  THE   SICILIAN  EXPEDITION.  399 

circuiTistaiice.^  in  which  Nikia.s  had  phiced  them.  Forgetting  for 
a  while  that  he  was  not  in  tlie  open  sea,  Eurymedon  with  a  divi- 
sion of  eighteen  ships  made  an  effort  to  outtiank  the  enemy.  The 
movement  i.sohited  him  from  tiie  rest  of  the  fleet  and  brought  him 
dangerously  near  to  the  shore.  The  Athenian  centre  was  already 
broken,  and  the  Syracusans  at  once  bore  down  upon  Eurymedon. 
His  eighteen  ships,  dri,ven  back  upon  the  land,  were  taken  and  all 
their  crews  slain  ;  and  the  life  of  Eurymedon  closed  in  a  massacre 
more  dreadful  ihan  that  to  which  he  had  condemned  the  oligarchs 
of  Korkyra.  The  rest  of  the  Athenian  fleet  narrowly  escaped  the 
same  fate  ;  but  Gylippos,  seeing  the  ships  nearing  the  shore  be- 
yond the  protection  of  the  naval  station,  hurried  down  to  the 
causeway  which,  running  out  from  the  city  wall,  shut  off  the  sea 
from  the  low  ground  known  as  the  Lysimeleian  marsh.  Ills  force 
advau'ied  in  some  disorder,  and  the  Tyrrhenian  allies  who  kept 
guard  in  this  quarter  of  the  Athenian  lines  hastened  to  engage 
them.  The  Syracusans,  soon  thrown  into  confusion,  were  pushed 
back  into  the  mar.shy  ground  behind  the  causeway,  and  the  arri- 
v;il  of  a  large  Athenian  force  compelled  them  to  retreat  with  some 
little  loss.  The  rules  of  Greek  warfare  constrained  the  Athenians 
to  treat  this  check  as  a  victory  :  but  they  probably  felt  that  the 
setting  up  of  their  trophy  was  but  as  the  last  flash  of  the  sinking 
sun  which  gives  a  more  dismal  and  ghastly  hue  to  the  pitch-black 
storm-clouds  around  him.  It  was  true  that  the  massive  prows  of 
the  Syracusans  had  done  them  enormous  mischief  in  the  battle 
which  was  brought  to  an  end  by  the  entrance  of  Demosthenes 
into  the  great  harbor  ;  but  they  had  hoped  that  the  arrival  of  his 
seaworthy  triremes  with  their  healthy  crews  would  do  more  than 
restore  the  balance,  and  this  hope  too  had  failed  them.  They 
were  utterly  cast  down.  Superiority  of  force  had  done  nothing 
for  them,  and  the  generals  could  hold  out  no  bait  which  might 
excite  a  political  reaction  in  their  favor. 

For  the  Syracusans  their  great  naval  victory  had   changed  the 
whole  character  of  the  struggle.     A  little  while  ago  they  had  been 
fighting  in  the  mere  hope  of  compelling  the  enemy  to   Effects  of 
abandon  the  siege.     From  this  hope  they  had   passed   ti'ie'g'Z°J^ 
to  a  desire  of  so  crippling  the  Athenians  as  to  remove   cusans. 
all  cause  for  fearing  a  renewal  of  the  war  in   any   other   part   of 
Sicily.     But  now  their  thoughts  turned  with  a  feeling  of  bewildered 
exultation  to  the  contrast  between  their  present  position  and  the 
splendor  of  the  Athenian  armament  when  it  first  approached  their 
shores.     In  their  view  the  Athenians  had  come  to  inslave  Sicilv ; 
and  the  issue  of  the  contest  had   opened  to  the   Syracusans   the 
prospect  of  sweeping  away  her  empire.     With  the  intoxication  of 
men  who  from  mountain  summits  seem  to  look  down  on  a  world 


400  THE   EMPIRE   OF   ATHENS.  FBoOK  III. 

beneath  them,  they  abandoned  themselves  to  the  convictioa  that 
henceforth  they  must  fill  a  foremost  place  in  the  history  of  Hellas. 
But  as  yesterday  they  were  about  to  discuss  in  tlieir  public  as- 
sembly the  terms  of  capitulation  to  Nikias.  Now  they  held  a  po- 
sition even  prouder  than  that  which  either  Sparta  or  Athens  ha<:l 
ever  attained  ;  and  few  things  in  history  are  more  impressive 
than  the  change  which  passes  over  the  language  of  Thucydides, 
as  he  describes  this  mighty  revolution  in  the  thoughts  and  aims  of 
the  Syracusans.  These  were  now  leaders,  along  with  Spartans, 
Corinthians,  Arkadians,  and  Boiotians,  against  the  relics  of  the  most 
splendid  and  efficient  armament  which  had  ever  left  the  liarbors 
of  Athens  or  had  ever  been  brought  together  throughout  her 
wide-spread  einpire.  The  epical  conception  which  had  led  the 
historian  to  ascribe  to  the  Athenians  before  the  massacre  at  Melos 
language  which  belies  their  general  reputation  now  leads  him  to 
enumerate  with  a  solemnity  full  of  pathos  the  tribes  which  were 
to  face  each  other  in  the  last  awful  struggle.  Here,  as  at  Mara- 
thon, the  Plataians  were  present  in  the  hope  perhaps  of  avenging 
themselves  on  the  Boiotian  allies  of  Syracuse,  but  prompted  still 
more  by  a  devotion  to  Athens  which  had  never  for  an  instant 
wavered.  Here  were  the  ships  of  her  free  allies  from  Chios  and 
Methymna.  Here  were  Khodians  who,  perhaps  against  their  will, 
were  to  fight  against  their  colonists  of  Gela,  and  Korkyralans  who 
were  anxious  to  settle  scores  with  the  men  of  their  mother  city. 
Here  with  the  Dorian  allies  of  Athens  were  Messenians  from  Pylos 
and  Xaupaktos,  and  .Vkarnanians  who  were  now  to  follow  to  their 
death  the  standard  of  their  favorite  general.  On  the  Syracusan 
side  were  enrolled  the  Kamarinaians  for  wliose  friendship  Euphe- 
mos  and  Hcrmokrates  had  bi  Iden  largely,  and  the  men  of  Selinous 
who  were  to  play  th^ir  j)art  in  tlic  closing  scenes  of  the  stupen- 
dous drama  which  had  grown  out  of  their  petty  quarrel  with  the 
barbarians  of  Kijesta. 

Ii\  the  eatlmsiasm  created  by  their  vict<uy  the  Syracusans 
resolved  that  the  whole  Athenian  armament  should  be  destroyed 
,^  ,      like  vermin  in  a  snare  :  and  thev  proceeded  with  calm 

thcmoutii  deliberation  to  set  the  trap,  iriremes,  trading  slups, 
Great' Har-  '"'"^  vessels  of  all  kinds  were  anchored  lengthwise! 
bor  by  the  across  thc  wholc  mouth  of  the  harbor  from  riemmyrion 
.yracusans.  ^^  Qi'tygia,  and  strongly  hislied  together  with  ropes  ami 
chains.  This  was  "all  that  Xikias  had  gained  by  fostering  silly 
scruples  for  which  the  men  to  whom  Athens  owed  her  greatness 
would  have  folt  an  iiitinite  contempt.  The  indignation  with  which 
Demosthenes  had  pmtested  against  any  di'lay  after  the  failure  of 
his  great  night  attack  must  have  burned  still  more  fiercely  when 
he  saw  tlie  supreme  result  of  the  besotted  folly  of  his  colleague. 


Chap.  VII.]  THE   SICILIAN   EXPEDITION.  401 

Their  very  food  wus  rminin<r  short,  for  before  the  eclipse  a  mes- 
sage li;ul  been  sent  to  Katane  to  announce  the  immediate  return 
of  the  licet  and  to  countermand  all  fresh  supplies.  But  regret 
and  censure  were  now  alike  vain.  No  longer  insisting  on  the  su- 
preme authority  with  which  the  Athenians  had  invested  their 
generals,  Nikias  summoned  a  council  of  war,  in  which  all  present 
admitted  the  stern  neeessity  of  abandoning  the  whole  length  of 
their  lines  on  Epipolai,  and  finally  of  staking  everything  on  a  gi- 
gantic eifort  to  break  the  barrier  which  now  lay  between  them 
and  safety.  If  this  effort  should  fail,  the  ships  wei*e  to  be  burnt 
and  the  army  was  to  retreat  by  land. 

A  hundred  and  ten  triremes  still  remained,  some  scarcely  sea- 
worthy, others  still  strong  and  in  good  trim  ;  and  we  must  not 
press  hardly  on  Athenian  generals  who  shrunk  at  the  p,.epa,..aion 
first  from  a  sacrifice  so  costly.  A  few  only  of  the  fortiie  final 
seven-and-twenty  days  had  passed  when  Nikias  told  th" Grea" 
them  that  alt  had  been  done  which  could  be  done  to  Hm-bor. 
insure  success  in  the  struggle  which  must  bring  them  to  their 
doom,  if  it  failed  to  furnish  some  hope  of  escape,  lie  reminded 
the  countrymen  of  Phormion,  who  had  shattered  fleets  as  large 
again  as  his  own,  that  they  still  had  many  more  ships  than  the 
Syracusans  ;  and  he  besought  them  to  show  that,  in  spite  of  bodily 
weakness  and  un])aralleled  misfortunes,  Athenian  skill  could  get  the 
better  of  brute  force  rendered  still  more  brutal  by  success.  He 
sought  to  stir  the  enthusiasm  of  the  allies  by  reminding  them  of 
the  benefits  which  they  had  reaped  from  association  with  the  im- 
perial city  ;  to  the  Athenians  he  said  plainly  that  they  saw  before 
them  all  the  fleet  and  all  the  army  of  Athens.  Her  docks  were 
empty,  her  treasury  was  exhausted,  and,  if  they  should  now  fail, 
her  powers  of  resistance  were  gone.  A  speech  more  disgraceful 
to  himself  and  less  likely  to  encourage  his  men  has  seldom  been 
uttered  by  any  leader  ;  for  Nikias  himself  wm  the  whole  and  sole 
cause  of  all  the  shameful  facts  which  he  was  now  compelled  to  urge 
as  reasons  for  a  last  and  desperate  effort.  It  was  his  fault  that  Syra- 
cuse had  not  been  taken  a  year  ago  ;  it  was  his  fault  that  everything 
went  wrong  after  the  death  of  Lamachos  ;  it  was  his  fault  that 
Gylippos  had  entered  the  beleaguered  city  ;  it  was  his  fault  that 
they  had  not  retreated  when  retreat  was  first  urged  by  Demos- 
thenes ;  and  it  was  his  fault,  lastly,  that  they  had  not  left  the 
harbor  before  the  barrier  of  ships  had  made  departure  almost  im- 
possible. Yet  this  was  the  man  who  could  beseech  his  soldiers  to 
remember  that  on  the  issue  of  this  fight  depended  the  great  name 
of  Athens  and  the  freedom  which  had  made  her  illustrious.*  How 
far  the  speech  of  Gylippos  or  even  that  of  Nikias  answered  to 
'  Tliuc.  vii.  64. 


402  THE  EMPIRE   OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

the  Avovds  actually  spoken,  "\ve  cannot  say.  It  is  natural  that  the 
Spartan  leader  should  dwell  on  the  utter  despondency  of  the  ene- 
my, and  on  the  duty  of  taking  a  revenge  which  should  make  the 
ears  of  all  who  heard  it  tingle.  But  Gylippos  is  further  repre- 
sented as  insisting  on  the  more  dreadful  fate  which  the  Athenians 
had  designed  for  them,  a  fate  involving  death  or  slave»"v  for  the 
men,  and  the  most  shameful  treatment  i"()r  their  wives  and  chil- 
dren.' If  he  so  spoke,  he  knew  that  he  was  uttering  lies.  The 
conditions  of  ancient  warfare  were  horrible  indeed,  and  the  Athe- 
nians Avere  not  especially  tender  in  their  treatment  of  the  con- 
quered ;  but  the  history  of  their  dealings  with  their  own  revolted 
allies  Avould  show  that  the  fears  of  Gylippos  were  groundless.  To 
adopt  the  language  put  into  the  mouth  of  the  Athenians  at  Melos, 
such  cruelties  would  have  been  highly  inexpedient. 

The  time  for  the  last  great  experiment  had  come,  and  the  men 
were  all  on  board,  wlien  Xikias  in  his  agony  determined  to  make 
_,  ,  ..  one  more  effort  to  rouse  his  men  not  to  greater  courage, 
ofthcAthe-  for  this  had  never  failed,  but  to  greater  confidence, 
manfluet.  jj^  cared  nothing  whether  he  repeated  himself  or 
dwelt  on  topics  which  might  be  thought  weak  or  stale.^  They 
were  in  fact  neither  the  one  nor  the  other,  and  they  had  furnished 
the  substance  of  the  great  funeral  oration  of  Perikles  ;  but  it  may 
1)0  doubted  whether  he  was  acting  judiciously  in  drawing  to  this 
extreme  tension,  at  a  time  when  steadiness  of  eye  and  hand  was 
most  of  all  needed,  the  nerves  of  a  people  so  higiily  sensitive  as 
the  Athenians.  At  length  the  signal  was  given,  and  the  fleet  made 
straight  for  the  narrow  passage  which  the  Syracusans  had  left  for 
ingress  and  egress  in  the  bariicr  of  ships  across  the  harbor.  In 
the  desperate  force  of  their  onset  the  Atlienians  mastered  the  vessels 
wliich  were  here  keeping  guard  ;  but  they  had  not  succeeded  in 
breaking  the  chains  when  the  Syracusan  fleet  .starting  from  all 
points  of  the  harljor  attacked  them  in  tlie  rear;  and  the  harbor 
soon  pn-scnted  the  sight  of  gi'onj)s  of  shij)S  locked  in  a  deadly 
struggle,  three  or  fonr  sometimes  being  fastened  upon  one.  To 
Athenians  trained  in  the  school  of  I'honnion  and  Demosthenes  the 
conflict  was  utterly  bewildering.  Their  decks  were  crowded  with 
ardicrs  and  javiilin  men  who  had  no  room  for  the  free  use  of  their 
weapons,  and  who  frequently  did  more  harm  than  good.  The 
terrible  din  rendered  all  orders  unintelligible,  and  the  sounds  which 
presently  reached  them  from  the  .shore  had  the  effect  rather  of 
paralysing  than  of  encouraging  them.  AVithin  their  lines  the 
Athenian  armv,  advancing  to  the  water's  edge,  surveyed  with  al- 
ternations of  passionate  liope  and  fear  the  fortunes  of  a  fight  on 

Thuc.  vii.  G8,  2.  "^  apxnioloydv.     Thuc.  vii.  60,  2. 


Chap.  VII.]  THE   SICILIAN  EXPEDITION.  403 

which  the  lives  of  all  depended.  So  long  as  the  two  sides  seemed 
nearly  equal,  the  suspense  of  the  spectators  kept  them  silent ;  but 
the  defeat  or  destruction  of  a  ship  called  forth  the  loud  and  bitter 
wail  which  expresses  the  grief  of  southern  peoples.  At  last  brute 
force  prevailed,  and  the  weight  of  the  Syracusan  charge  became  in 
tlie  excitement  of  the  moment  irresistible.  Borne  on  with  a  fury 
of  rage  and  revenge,  they  pushed  the  Athenians  further  and  further 
back  until  their  whole  fleet  was  driven  ashore.  Amidst  the  piercing 
shrieks  and  bitter  weeping  of  the  troops  who  hurried  down  to  give 
such  lielp  as  they  could,  the  crews  of  the  shattered  ships  were 
landed,  while  some  hastened  to  the  defence  of  their  walls  and 
others  bethought  themselves  only  of  providing  for  their  own  safety. 
The  sun  sank  down  on  a  scene  of  absolute  despair  in  the 
Athenian  incampment,  and  of  fierce  and  boundless  exultation 
within  the  Syracusan   walls.     The  first   care    of   the   „,    .  , 

/-,,,.  r.     1  -CI  111  StiatllSl'Ill  of 

(jrreek  after  a  sea-nght  was  to  recover,  ir  he  could,  the   iicnuDkni- 
wrecks  of  his  ships,  and  in  any  case  t(3  demand  pe      tiie  retreat^ 
mission  under  truce  for  the  burial  of  the  dead.     The   oftheAtiiu- 
supreme  misery  of  the  lioar  left  them  no  heart  for  any  '     ^' 

task  except  that  of  preparing  for  instant  flight.  Demosthenes  was 
anxious  that  one  more  effort  should  be  made  to  break  the  barrier 
at  the  mouth  of  the  harbor.  The  advantage  of  numbers  still  lay 
with  the  Athenians  :  but,  although  Nikias  assented  to  the  plan  of 
Demosthenes,  the  men  would  not  stir,  and  they  were  right.  Every 
hour  left  them  more  powerless  for  lack  of  food  ;  every  hour  added 
to  the  strength  and  the  spirit  of  the  enemy,  while  the  conditions  of 
the  struggle  would  remain  unchanged  except  for  the  worse.  They 
therefore  determined  to  retreat  by  land  at  once  ;  and  had  they 
acted  on  this  resolution,  the  whole  of  this  still  mighty  armament 
would  have  been  saved.  But  Nikias  svas  to  be  their  evil  genius 
to  the  end.  The  false  report  of  some  Syracusan  horsemen  who 
professed  to  be  sent  by  the  Athenian  party  within  the  city  now  led 
to  a  resolution  which  sealed  the  doom  of  the  army  as  that  of  the 
fleet  had  been  sealed  by  the  occurrence  of  the  eelipse.  Feeling 
sure  that  the  Athenians  would  attempt  immediate  fliglit,  Ilermo- 
krates  spent  the  afternoon  in  trying  to  persuade  the  generals  to 
send  out  at  once  a  force  which  might  break  up  and  guard  the 
roads  on  the  probable  lines  of  march.  Their  answer  was  that  for 
the  present  their  power  was  not  equal  to  their  will.  A  great  sacri- 
fice was  on  that  day  to  be  offered  to  Ilerakles,  and  the  whole  city 
was  so  given  up  to  a  frenzy  of  wild  delight  that  the  carrying  out 
of  the  scheme  proposed  by  Hermokrates  was  simply  impossible. 
Foiled  here,  Hermokrates  dispatched  the  horsemen  to  the  Athenian 
lines  with  the  tidings  that  the  roads  were  already  blocked  and 
guarded,  and  that  a  careful  and  deliberate  retreat  on  the  following 


40i  THE   EMPIRE   OF   ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

day  would  be  better  than  a  hasty  departure  during  tlie  niglit.  The 
tidings,  we  are  told,  were  implicitly  believed,  and  we  are  left  to 
infer  that  Demosthenes  was  as  thoroughly  tricked  as  Nikias. 
Either  the  inference  is  untrue,  or  the  judgn:ent  of  that  excellent 
officer  was  at  last  over-clouded  and  weakened  l)y  the  long  series  of 
his  misfortunes.  The  message  wasdmost  transparently  false,  and 
under  a  less  grievous  weight  of  misery  he  must  have  seen  that, 
even  if  its  truth  were  granted,  every  hour's  delay  would  only  make 
matters  worse  instead  of  better.  Having  remained  over  the  first 
night,  they  now  thought  it  best  to  tarry  yet  another  day  and  make 
preparations  for  a  more  orderly  retreat.  But  early  in  the  morning 
the  Syracusan  troops  had  set  out  into  the  country,  and  long  before 
the  day  was  done  the  roads,  the  fords,  and  the  hill  passes  weic 
broken  up,  or  carefully  occupied  and  guarded. 

With  the  morning  of  the  second  day  after  the  battle  tlie  retreat 
which  was  to  end  in  ruin  began  with  unspeakable  agony.  Forty 
„,     ,  tliousand  men  were  to  make  their  wearv  and  desolate 

ture  of  the  journey,  tliey  scarcely  knew  wlnther,  with  a  vague 
froni'iheir  notioii  of  reaching  the  country  of  some  friendly  Sikel 
fortiticd  tribes.  The  cup  of  bitterness  was  in  truth  filled  to  the 
briin  and  running  over.  Not  until  now  had  the  history 
of  Hellenic  states  exhibited  such  an  appalling  contrast  of  over- 
whelming misery  v>'ith  the  lavish  splendor  and  high-wrought 
hope  which  liad  marked  their  de2)arture  from  Peiraieus.  They 
had  looked  their  last  on  the  rock  and  shrine  of  the  virgin  goddess 
with  the  expectation  that  they  were  going  to  make  Athens  the 
centre  and  head  of  a  I'anhellenic  empire  ;  they  were  now  marching 
ignominiouslv  after  irretrievable  defeat,  perhaps  to  slavery  or  to 
deatli.  IJut  although  they  could  take  their  food  (its  weight  now 
would  be  no  oppressive  burden),  they  could  not  take  their  sick. 
Hundreds  were  pining  away  with  the  wasting  marsh  fever ; 
liundreds  were  smitten  down  with  wounds  received  in  the  recent 
battles.  All  these  luust  now  bu  left,  and  left,  not,  as  in  the  less 
savage  warfare  of  our  own  times,  with  the  confidence  that  they 
would  be  treated  with  .something  like  mercy  and  liumanity,  but  to 
the  certainty  of  slavery,  torturcis,  or  death.  As  the  terrible  realities 
of  departure  broke  upon  them,  the  wliole  camp  became  a  scene  of 
unutterable  woe.  In  the  agony  of  the  moment  the  fever-stricken 
sufferers  clung  to  their  companions  as  tliese  set  out  on  their  misera- 
ble march,  and  mangled  wretches  crawled  feebly  on,  intreatingto  ho 
taken  with  them,  until  strength  failed  and  they  sank  down  hy  the 
way.  The  sight  of  tiie  still  unburied  <k'ad  might  well  in  a  super- 
.stitious  age  rouse  dark  forebodings  in  minds  more  superstitious,  if 
such  there  could  be,  than  even  that  of  Nikias.  To  these  vague 
terrors  and  to  the  awful  wreiu  h   'jf  parting  was  added  the  diro 


Chap.  VII.]  THE   SICILIAN  EXPEDITION.  405 

huniiliation  of  the  catastroplie  ;  and  tho  men  lost  all  heart  as  they 
contrasted  the  splendor  of  the  morning  with  the  utter  darkness  of 
the  night  which  was  coming  on. 

In  this  desperate  crisis  Nikias  did  his  best  to  cheer  and  en- 
conrago  the  men  wlioin  his  own  egregious  and  obstinate  carelessness 
had  brought  into  thei'r  present  unparalleled  dithculties.  Eshorta- 
If  the  substance  of  his  exhoilations  be  rightly  given  ^'("("^^.^f  ^'J 
(and  in  this  instance  we  can  have  little  doubt  that  it  march.  . 
is),  his  words  were  singularly  characteristic  of  the  man.  They 
were  chiefly  a  comment  on  the  homely  saying  that  the  lane  must 
be  long  which  has  no  turning.  If  when  the}'  set  out  on  this  ill- 
starred  enterprise  they  had  incurred  the  wrath  of  any  of  the  gods, 
they  had  surely  been  amply  punished,  and  they  might  therefore 
now  reasonably  hope  for  gentler  treatment  at  the  hands  of  the 
offended  deity.  In  any  case  the  evils  which  they  might  still  have 
to  suffer  luust  in  some  degree  be  lightened  by  the  consciousness 
that  they  were  shared  alike  by  all.  Suffering  now  from  a  painful 
malady,  accustomed  during  his  life  to  the  graceful  ease  and  luxu- 
ry of  a  high-born  and  wealthy  Athenian,  and,  more  than  this, 
scrupulously  exact  in  his  religious  worship  and  blameless  in  his 
private  conduct,  he  had  uosv  to  bear  up  under  the  same  toils  and 
privations  with  themselves.  This  is  not  the  language  of  a  man 
who  dreads  the  physical  dangers  of  war  :  but  it  is  the  language  of 
one  who  even  in  the  direst  extremity  cannot  be  brought  to  see 
that  the  misery  which  he  is  striving  to  alleviate  is  the  result  of 
his  own  folly  in  wasting  a  series  of  golden  opportunities. 

In  the  order  of  march  the  division  of  Nikias  led  the  way, 
followed  by  that  of  Demosthenes.  At  the  bridge  of  the  Anapos 
they  found  the  way  blocked  by  a  Syracusan  force  ;  but  „. 
tliis  was  defeated,  and  the  army  passed  on,  harasseel  the  retreat 
throughout  the  day  by  the  cavalry  and  light  troops  of  render  oT 
the  enemy,  until  they  incamped  in  the  evening  on  a  Demosthc- 
rising  ground  about  four  miles  from  their  fortified  post 
on  the  shores  of  the  great  harbor.  Early  on  the  following  day 
the  march  was  resumed  ;  but  after  advancing  about  two  miles,  they 
incamped  on  a  plain  in  the  liope  of  obtaining  some  supply  of  food 
from  the  neighboring  houses  or  villages,  and  of  laying  in  a  store 
of  water  to  carrv  them  through  the  drier  region  which  lay  before 
them.  During  tlieir  ill-timed  sojourn  here  the  Syracusans  built  a 
wall  across  the  road  which  passed  under  the  Akraian  cliff  with  a 
torrent-bed  on  either  side.  This  barrier  on  the  next  day  the  Athe- 
nians found  themselves  unable  even  to  reach,  and  they  returned 
sadly  to  their  incampment  of  the  night  before.  On  the  fourth  day 
they  made  a  desperate  but  vain  attempt  to  force  the  pass.  Not 
only  was  the  enemy  too   strongly   posted,  but  a  violent   storm  of 


406  THE   EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III, 

thunder  and  rain  convinced  the  Athenians  that  they  were  still  the 
special  objects  of  divine  displeasure.'  So  s)Teatly  had  their  spirit 
arid  temper  been  changed  since  the  time  when  precisely  the  .sune 
incident  had  dismayed  their  enemies  while  it  failed  to  terrify 
themselves.^  At  the  end  of  the  fifth  day  the  Athenians,  having 
had  to  gain  every  inch  of  the  way  by  sheer  h:ird  lighting,  found 
themselves  only  half  a  mile  further  from  Svracuse  ;  and  this  fact 
that  in  five  days  they  had  accomplished  a  distance  which  with- 
out hindrance  they  could  have  traversed  easily  in  two  hours, 
convinced  the  generals  that  the  line  of  march  must  be  clianged. 
They  resolved  to  make  for  the  Ilelorine  road  leading  to  the 
southern  coast  of  Sicily.  In  the  dead  of  night,  under  cover  of 
many  fires  which  they  kindled  to  put  the  enemy  off  liis  guard,  they 
set  forth  on  their  southward  march.  It  was  safely  acconi])lished, 
in  spite  of  a  panic  which  separated  the  division  of  Nikias  from  that 
of  Demosthenes.  The  two  leaders  had  taken  counsel  together 
f  )r  the  last  time  :  but  having  reached  the  road  to  Ileloros  early 
i'l  the  morning,  they  pressed  on  to  the  fords  of  Kakyparis.  A 
Syracusan  force  which  was  already  raising  a  wall  and  stockade 
across  the  channel  was  beaten  off,  and  the  Athenians  having  cross- 
ed the  stream  pursued  their  march  to  the  Erineos.^  Demosthenes 
was  never  to  reach  it.  Marching  in  the  rear,  he  had  to  think 
more  of  keeping  his  men  in  order  of  battle  than  of  getting  over 
ground.*  Thus  constrained  to  mass  his  troops,  he  was  exposed  to 
the  danger  of  being  surrounded.  Hemmed  in  between  walls  in 
an  olive  garden  intersected  by  a  single  road,  his  men  could  liere 
be  shot  down  by  an  eneniy  who  needed  not  to  expose  liiinself  to 
any  (hmger.  As  the  day  drew  towards  its  close,  (jryli[)pos  made 
proclamation  that  the  inhabitants  of  Sicilian  cities  who  chose  to 
desert  the  Athenians  might  do  so  without  prejudice  to  their  free- 
(b)ni.  Not  many  wt-re  found  to  accept  the  invitation  ;  but  later  on 
in  tli(!  cvciiiiig  the  Syracusans  invited  the  surrender  of  Demos- 
thenes and  his  troops  under  the  covenant  that  none  should  be  [)Ut 
to  death  either  by  open  violence  or  by  intolorabtc  bonds  or  by 
starvation.''  The  summons  was  obeyed,  and  four  shields  held 
upwards  were  filled  with  the  money  still  possessed  by  the  troops 
of  Demosthenes,  who  were  now  led  away  to  Syracuse. 

Nikias,  five  miles  further  to  the  south,  knowing  nothing  of  the 
icatastroplie  wliich  had  befallen  Ids  colleague,  had  crossed  the 
Erincosand  incampcd  his  men  on  some  sharply  rising  ground.  He 
had  well-nigli  reached  the  end  of  Ids  march,  and  the  incessant 

'  Thuc.  vii.  79,  3.  '  Thuc.  vii.  82,  2.     The  compact 

"  See  ]).  37G.  distinctly    includes    Demosthenes 

^  'I'liuc.  vii.  80,  5.  not  less  tlian  his  men. 
'  \b.  vii.  81,  3. 


Chap.  VII.]  THE   SICILIAN  EXPEDITION.  407 

toil  of  a  whole  week  liad  left  this  great  army  within  two  or  three 
hours'  distance  of  Syracuse.  P]arly  on  the  following  day  Syracusan 
messennxTs  informed  him  of  the  surrender  of  Demos-     t,  t    »     j 

,  ^.,,.         ,,,...  T  ,,.  Defeat  and 

theiies  with  his  whole  division,  and  summoned  him  to  surrender 
follow  the  example  of  his  colleague.  Incredulous  at  «' ^''^a*- 
first,  Nikias  was  convinced,  when  the  horsemen  whom  he  received 
permission  to  send  under  truce  returned  to  confirm  the  wretclied 
lidings.  lie  lost  no  time  in  proposing  to  Gylippos  tiiat  in, ex- 
change for  the  men  under  his  command  Athens  should  pay  to  the 
Syracusans  the  wdiole  cost  of  the  war,  hostages  being  given  at  the 
rate  of  one  man  for  each  talent  until  tlie  whole  sum  should  be 
paid  off.  Terms  more  advantagi'ous  to  Synicuse  could  not  well 
have  boon  obtained,  and,  as  things  turned  out,  the  public  treasury 
would  have  been  much  richer,  had  they  been  received.  But  tlie 
Syracusans  were  now  filled  with  the  absorbing  delight  of  the 
savage  in  trampling  a  fallen  enemy  under  foot.  The  proposals  of 
Nikias  Avere  rejected,  and  all  day  long  the  Athenians  were  worn 
down  with  the  incessant  attacks  of  their  pursuers.  In  the  dead  of 
night  they  took  up  their  arms,  hoping  that  they  might  be  able  to 
cross  the  next  stream  before  their  flight  was  discovered  ;  but  the 
war-shout  which  instantly  rose  from  the  Syracusan  camp  showed 
the  vanity  of  this  hope,  and  with  a  feeling  of  blank  dismay  they 
remained  where  they  were.  On  the  following  morning  the  mise- 
rable scenes  of  the  preceding  days  were  renewed  for  the  last  time. 
Not  far  in  front  ran  the  stream  of  tlie  Assinaros ;  and  fainting  with 
exhaustion  the  Athenians  dragged  themselves  on  in  the  hope  partly 
of  quenching  a  thirst  which  from  lack  of  water  had  now  become 
unbearable,  and  partly  of  obtaining  on  the  other  side  of  the  river 
some  respite  from  tortures  fast  exceeding  the  powers  of  human 
endurance.  But  the  end  was  come.  The  sight  of  the  sparkling 
and  transparent  stream  banished  all  thoughts  of  order  and  disci- 
pline, all  prudence  and  caution.  In  an  instant  all  was  hopeless 
confusion  and  tumult ;  and  the  stream,  fouled  first  by  the  trampling 
of  thousands,  was  soon  after  reddened  with  their  blood.  To  put 
an  end  to  slaughter  which  had  now  become  mere  butchery,  Nikias 
surrendered  himself  to  Gylippos  personally,  in  the  hope  that  the 
Spartan  might  remember  the  enormous  benefits  which  in  times  past 
Sparta  had  received  from  him.  He  submitted  liimself,  he  said,  to 
the  pleasure  not  of  the  Syracusans  but  of  the  Spartans,  and  re- 
quested only  that  the  massacre  of  his  men  should  cease.  The  order 
was  accordingly  issued  to  take  the  rest  alive  ;  but  the  number  of 
prisoners  finally  got  together  was  not  large.  By  far  the  larger 
number  were  stolen  and  hidden  away  by  private  men,  and  the  state 
was  at  once  defrauded  of  wealth  which  an  acceptance  of  the  offers 


408  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

of  Nikias  would  have  insured  to  it.'  Of  the  prisoners  thus  sur- 
reptitiously conveyed  away  not  a  few  made  their  escape,  some  al- 
most immediately,  others  after  liaving  spent  sometime  in  slavery. 
But  this  slight  alleviation  fails  to  affect  the  completeness  of  tlie 
catastrophe.  Forty  thousand  men  had  left  the  Athenian  lines  on 
Sufferings  the  great  harbor  :  a  week  later  seven  thousand  marched 
meiit'ofthe  ^*  prisoners  into  Syracuse.^  If  we  assume  that  twice 
prisoners.  this  number  were  stolen  away  into  private  slavery, 
nearly  half  of  this  great  multitude  had  in  seven  days  perished  after 
the  most  intense  and  exquisite  suffering  alike  of  body  and  mind. 
What  became  of  the  sick  and  wounded  who  were  left  in  the  camp, 
Ave  are  not  told  :  but  we  can  scarcely  doubt  that  all  were  murdered, 
and  murder  was  mercy  in  comparison  with  the  treatment  of  tlie 
7,000  prisoners  who  were  penned  like  cattle  in  the  stone  quarries 
of  Epij)olai.  Without  shelter  from  the  sun  l)y  day  and  from  the 
increasing  cliills  of  the  autumn  nights,  never  suffered  to  quit  for  a 
moment  the  dungeon  into  which  they  were  thrust,  these  miserable 
captives  had  to  live  as  best  they  might  amidst  noisome  stenches 
which  by  breathing  deadly  fevers  relieved  many  from  their  miseries, 
witli  no  liquid  whatever  beyond  the  daily  allowance  of  lialf  a  pint 
of  water  and  with  half  the  portion  of  flour  usually  given  to  skwes. 
Thus  passed  away  seventy  days  of  unspeakable  wretchedness  to  the 
living  and  of  shameful  indignities  to  the  dead  which  were  literally 
piled  in  heaps  to  rot  away.'  At  the  end  of  that  time  their  suffer- 
ings were  somewhat  lessened.  All  who  were  not  Athenians  or 
citizens  of  Sikellot  or  Italiot  cities  were  taken  out  and  sold.  Their 
own  lot  could  not  ha  made  Avorse,  while  that  of  the  men  Avho  still 
remained  shut  up  in  the  quarries  became  less  intolerable.  For 
nearly  six  months  longer  Avere  these  men  kept  within  their  loath- 
some prison,  Avith  deliberate  and  most  unseltisli  wickedness.'  The 
sale  of  these  men  brought  to  the  state  probably  not  a  tithe  of  the 
sum  for  Avliich  Nikias  offered  to  pledge  the  credit  of  Athens,  while 
the  Avay  in  Avhich  tliey  Avere  treated  exhibits  the  Syracusans  as  a 
race  of  savage  and  bloodthirsty  liars.  They  liad  promised  to 
Demosthenes  that  no  man  belonging  to  liis  division  should  suffer  a 
violent  death  or  die  from  bonds  or  for  lack  of  necessary  food  ;  and 
tlicy  insured  the  death  of  liundreds  or  of  thousands  as  certainly 

"  Thuc.  vii.  85,  3.  iu  order  to  gratify  a  doniiniint  ])as- 

"^  II).  vii.  87,  3.  eion.     Self-loA'e,  accordinjr  toBisli 

^  II).  vii.  87,  1.  op  Butler,  Scruious,  xi.  xii.,  would 

''  If  any  iniquitica  may  be  cited  in  not  only  have  led  the  Syracusans  to 

proof  of  Bishop  Butler's  assertion  J2fet  hard  money  in  jjlacd  of  ]>rison- 

that  iiK'ii  are  too  little  instead  of  too  ers  whose  inainiiMiiincc  must  cost 

much  guided  by  self-love,  it  must  something,  but  would  liave  taught 

surely  be  the  cruelties  of  men  Avho  them  that  men  are  not  happier  for 

more  or  less  im[x)verish  themselves  being  inhuman. 


Chap.  VII.]  THE  SICILIAN   EXPEDITION.  409 

as  Suraj-ud-Doulah  murdered  the  victims  of  the  Black  Hole  of 
Calcutta. 

The  Athenian  generals  were  happily  spared  the  sight  of  these 
prolonged  and  excruciating  tortures.     Unless  tlie  terms  of  tlie  con 
ventioii  were  to  be, kept,  Demosthenes  could,  of  course.    Death  of 
expect  no  mercy.     In   flagrant   violation   of   a  distinct   Demosthe- 
coinpact   the    doom    of   the  victor  at  Sphakteria  was   »es. 
sealed,  and   lie    died,  as    he   had   lived,  without   a  stain   oh   his 
military  reputation,  the  victim  of  the  superstition  and  the  respect- 
ability of  his  colleixguc.     But  the  Syracusans  were  determined  on 
the  instant  death  not  of  Demosthenes  only,  whose  life  tliey  were 
pledged  to  spare,  but  of  Nikias.     The  Corinthians  too,  it  is  said, 
were  sorely  troubled  by  the  fear  that  his  great  wealth  might  re- 
gain him  his  freedom  and  that  liis  freedom  would  be  used  to  in- 
volve them  again  in  a  struggle  like  that  which  had  now  reached 
its  close.     Their  fear  was  absurdly  thrown  away.      Had  they  voted 
to  him  a  golden  crown  with  a  public  maintenance  for  life  in  their 
I'rytaneion  as  tlie  destroyer  of  Athens  and  the  benefactor  and 
saviour  of  Syracuse  and  Sicily,  their  decree  would  have  been  not 
too  severe  a  satire  on  his  political  and  military  career. 

So  ended  an  expedition  whicli  changed  the  current  of  Athenian 
history  and  tlierefore,  in  more  or  less  degree,  of  the  history  of  the 
world.     In  the  Athenian  people   the   mere   entertain-   „„   ^  ,^, 

i       i  <•  o-    M  Effectof  the 

ment  or  such  a  project  as  the  conquest  or  Sicily  was  a  expedition 
grave  political  error.  They  had  hazarded  on  this  dis-  sequent  his- 
tant  venture  an  amount  of  strength  which  was  ini-  tory  of 
periously  needed  for  the  protection  of  x\ttica  and  the 
recovery  of  Amphipolis ;  and  instead  of  a  starvation  whicli,  as 
things  turned  out,  would  have  been  wise,  they  fed  the  expedition 
with  a  bounty  so  lavish  that  failure  became  utter  ruin.  In  short, 
Troui  first  to  last,  everything  was  done  to  court  disaster  and  to  play 
into  the  hands  of  their  enemies  ;  but  unless  we  are  to  maintain  the 
doctrine  that  things  have  always  happened  as  it  is  best  that  they 
should  happen,  it  would  have  been  distinctly  better  for  Syracuse 
and  better  for  the  world,  if  the  success  of  Athens  had  been  only 
somewhat  less  complete  than  her  catastrophe.  The  power  of 
trampling  on  Sicily  as  Gylippos  and  his  allies  trampled  on  the  de- 
feated armament  would  have  done  no  good  either  to  Athens  or  to 
the  world  ;  but  if  the  isolating  policy  which  seeks  to  maintain  an 
infinite  number  of  autonomous  units  be  in  itself  an  evil,  then  it  is 
unfortunate  that  the  victory  of  Gylippos  insured  the  predominance 
of  this  policy.  Athens  had  done  what  she  could  to  weld  into  a 
coherent  body  a  number  of  such  centrifugfvl  units.  Her  work  may 
have  been  imperfect,  but  so  far  as  it  went,  it  was  real,  and,  as  we 
18 


410  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  HI. 

have  seen,  it  involved  no  substantial  injustice.'  To  a  vast  extent 
she  could  offer  to  her  allies  or  her  subjects  common  interests  and 
common  ends.  Sparta  could  offer  none  ;  but  the  system  of  Spar- 
ta fell  in  -with  instincts  in  the  Hellenic  mind  which  may  have  been 
weakened  but  were  never  eradicated,  and  against  this^  instinct  the 
wisdom  and  prudence  of  Athenian  statesmen  strove  in  vain.  The 
military  history  of  the  expedition  has  a  painful  and  terrible  in- 
terest of  its  own  :  but  the  Athenians  who  were  led  to  death  or 
slavery  in  Sicily  Avere  not  mere  professional  soldiers,  and  the  hor- 
rors of  the  catastrophe  are  heightened  by  the  intense  political 
emotions  with  which  they  undertook  to  fight  the  battles  of  their 
country.  Never  had  they  behaved  more  gallantly,  never  had  they 
undergone  privations  so  cheerfully,  never  had  they  nerved  them- 
selves so  zealously  to  renewed  efforts  imder  frightful  disasters  as 
in  this  fatal  expedition.  Had  they  left  Peiraieus  under  the  com- 
mand of  Lamachos  and  Demosthenes,  they  would  have  returned 
home  in  triumph  a  year  before  the  time  when  they  were  brought 
to  utter  ruin  by  the  folly  and  obstinacy  of  one  man. 


CHAPTER  VHI. 


THE    PELOPONNESIAN    (dEKELEIAn)  WAR    FROM    THE    CATASTROPHE 

AT    SYRACUSE    TO    THE    SUPPRESSION    OF    THE    OLIGARCHY    OF 

THE    FOUR    HUNDRED    AT    ATHENS. 

AVhile  the  walls  of  Dekeleia,  daily  gaining  height  and  strength, 
showed  that  the  enemy  was  permanently  established  on  Attic  soil. 
Effect? of  the  Athenians  still  fed  themselves  on  bright  hopes  of 
the  Spartan    Sicilian    conquest.     There   was,  in   tnith,  need  of  en- 

occupation  i  .  .  .  '        i      i  i  >      i       i       i 

of  Dekeleia.    couragemeut.      Previous  invasions  had  left  the  land  at 

rest  after  a  raid  of  five  or  six  weeks  at  the  utmost  ;  now  the  whole 
country  lay  at  the  mercy  of  the  enemy.  Each  day  they  felt  the 
sting  of  the  monster  evil  of  slavery.  Twenty  thousand  men,  whom 
Greek  philosophy  delighted  to  regard  as  animated  machines,  de- 
serted to  the  enemy  and  left  Athens  almost  destitute  of  skilled 
workmen.  Each  day  the  Athenian  cavalry  was  employed  in  re- 
pelling the  assaults  or  keeping  hack  the  forces  of  the  enemy  :  and 
each  day  its  strength  and  usefulness  were  impaired  by  the  laming  or 
the  wounding  of  horses  on  ground  utterly  unfitted  for  their  opera- 
tions. Thus  far,  even  during  the  yearly  invasions  of  the  enemy, 
the  pressure  had  been  comparatively  slight.  If  the  Eleusinian 
plain  was  wasted,  still  abundant  su[)plies  could  be  brought 
■  See  p.  247. 


Chap.  VIII.]     THE  OLIGARCHICAL  REVOLUTION.  411 

into  the  city  by  way  of  Oropos.  But  this  way  was  now  blocked 
by  the  Spartan  garrison  :  and  the  fiery  energy  of  Agis,  in  marked 
contrast  with  the  slower  movements  of  Archidanios,  made  the  idea 
of  forcing  it  hopeless.  Everything  nuist  now  be  conveyed  round 
Sounion  in  merchant  ships  which  lay  exposed  to  the  attacks  of 
Peloponnesian  privateers.  Athens  had,  indeed,  ceased  to  be  a  city. 
It  was  now  nothing  more  than  a  garrison  in  which  the  defenders 
were  worn  out  with  harassing  and  incessant  duty.  The  very  mag- 
nitude of  their  tasks  involved  a  charge  of  something  like  madness 
or  infatuation.  Athens  was  herself  practically  in  a  state  of  siege  : 
and  all  her  fleet  with  the  flower  of  her  forces  was  besieging  a  dis- 
tant city  of  equal  size  and  power.  Their  expenses  were  daily  rising 
at  a  ruinous  rate,  while  their  revenues  were  melting  away,  or  proved 
themselves  wholly  inadequate  to  bear  the  strain  put  upon  them. 

Nor  was  this  the  end  of  the  evils  involved  in  the  lack  of  means 
brought  about  by  this  deadly  war.  A  body  of  1,300  Thrakian 
mercenaries  reached  Athens   after   Demosthenes  had   „, 

.,    1    ^       ^,.    .,  ,        .  .  .,  ,  ,    ,  The  massa- 

sailed  tor  .Mciiy  ;  and  as  it  was  impossiole  to  send  them  ere  of  My- 
after  him,  so  sheer  poverty  prevented  the  Athenians  ^'^i'*'****^- 
from  keeping  them  in  Attica  for  a  service  in  which  they  would 
probably  have  been  especially  usefnl.  They  were  accordingly  dis- 
missed under  the  command  of  Diitrephes,  who  was  charged  to  do 
the  enemy  a  mischief,  if  he  could,  as  he  went  along.  Witli  these 
men  he  made  liis  way  to  Mykalessos,  distant  about  two  miles  from 
their  night  post  at  the  Hermaion.  The  town  was  small ;  the  walls 
were  weak  and  for  the  most  part  in  ruins  ;  and  the  gates  were  wide 
open.  An  attack  from  enemies  was  the  last  thing  which'the  in- 
habitants looked  for,  when  the  troop  dW^loodthirsty  savages  burst 
in  upon  them  and  a  massacre  began  to  which  even  the  frightful 
annals  of  Hellenic  warfai'e  could  furnish  no  parallel.  Not  less  than 
eight  or  nine  hours  could  pass  before  tidings  of  the  catastrophe 
could  bring  help  from  Thebes  :  and  when  the  Thebans  reached 
Mykalessos,  the  Thrakians  had  departed  with  their  booty.  But 
success  had  made  them  incautious;  and  their  enemies  were  upon 
them  before  they  had  traversed  the  short  distance  which  separates 
the  town  from  the  sea.  Two  hundred  and  fifty  were  killed  :  the 
rest  got  on  board  and  sailed  homewards.  The  Boiotians  lost  about 
twenty  horsemen  and  hoplites  with  the  Boiotarch  Skirphondas ; 
but  the  Athenians  sustained  a  greater  injury  in  the  deep  and  uni- 
versal indignation  excited  against  them  by  this  frightful  massacre.' 
Scarcely  more  than  three  weeks  later  the  Athenians  must  have 
received  the  dispatch  which  informed  them  of  the  failure  of  the 
night  attack  on  Epipolai  and  taught  them  that  success  was  no  longer 
to  be  hoped  for.  The  Athenians  would  have  done  no  more  than 
their  duty,  if  as  soon  as  these  tidings  came  they  had  sent  to  the 
'  Thuc.  vii.  30. 


412  THE   EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

generals  an  order  for  the  inunediate  return  of  the  army  aiid  fleet. 
For  a  full  month  longer  such  an  order  \Yould  have  averted  the  last 
terrible  catastrophe  ;  nor  can  they  be  acquitted  of  a 
Athens  when  most  culpable  remissness  except  on  the  ground  that, 
phe^^hi^'^llcTiy  although  their  confidence  in  Nikias  was  egregiously 
became  misplaced,  they  had  ample  reason  for  trusting  the  judg- 

ment as  well  as  the  bravery  of  Demosthenes.  During 
the  month  which  followed  the  night  attack  no  dispatch  probably 
was  sent  after  the  one  which  announced  its  failure  ;  and  if  any  was 
sent  along  with  the  order  countermanding  further  supplies  from 
Katane,  it  preceded  only  by  a  few  days  the  events  which  sealed 
their  doom.  Of  those  last  awful  hours  no  official  record  ever 
reached  Athens  ;  and  it  needed  probably  the  exultation  which  was 
soon  manifested  by  their  enemies  to  convince  the  Athenians  of  the 
infinitude  of  the  ruin.  In  the  first  burst  of  despairing  grief  they 
turned  angrily  on  the  speakers  who  had  urged  on  the  expedition, 
and  on  the  soothsayers  and  diviners  who  had  augured  success  for 
the  enterprise  :  but  such  revenge  was  a  poor  consolation  for  the 
litter  failure  of  a  scheme  which  they  had  themselves  decreed. 
Their  thoughts  were  soon  drawn  away  to  more  practical  matters. 
The  strength  and  flower  of  their  army  had  been  cut  off  ;  their  fleet 
was  either  burnt  or  in  the  enemy's  haiids  ;  their  docks  Avere  almost 
empty  of  ships,  and  their  calamity  had  rendered  their  adversaries 
irresistible.  But  although  the  heavens  seemed  laden  with  their 
doom,  one  feeling  only  pervaded  the  people.  The  idea  of  submission 
crossed  no  man's  mind.  The  struggle  must  be  carried  on  vigorously 
and  economically  :  and  the  second  consideration  was  as  important 
as  the  first.  They  resolved  at  once  to  provide  wood  for  ship-build- 
ing, and  to  watch  closely  all  movements  among  their  subject  allies, 
and  especially  in  Euboia.  The  dockyards  were  again  l)usy  with 
workmen,  and  with  the  rapidity  which  had  astonished  the  Syra- 
cusans'  the  promontory  of  Sounion  was  strongly  fortified  to  pro- 
tect the  passage  of  merchant  vessels,  while  a  further  force  was 
rendered  available  by  abandoning  the  fort  on  the  Peloponncsian 
coast  facing  the  island  of  Kythora. 

Tlie  ("ilamities  which  had  thus  strung  the  nerves  of  the  Athe- 
stiitcof  nians  to  a  pitcli  of  desperate  resolution  roused  in  their 
fi'riitmin  enemies  a  vehement  enthusiasm  which  regarded  the 
iitui  anion-,'  struggle  as  all  but  ended.  One  more  l»low  only  was 
ohiV'ii'fac-  iic-ede'd  ;  and  if  this  blow  should  be  struck  quickly  and 
tioi.s  ii,  the  finnly,  Atliens  would  experience  the  fate  which  she  had 
jlcttV"  '  designed  for  all  the  Hellenic  tribes.  Such  at  least 
Athens.  .seemed  the  prospect  to  the  oligarclii(5al  factions  which 
were  more  or  less  powerful  in  the  cities  belonging  to  the  Athenian 

'  See  p.  383. 


Chap.  VIII.]    THE  OLIGARCHICAL  REVOLUTION.  413 

confederation.'  Orders  were  issued  for  the  building  of  a  hundred 
ships,  of  which  the  Spartans  and  Boiotiaus  should  each  furnish 
twenty- five,  fifteen  being  furnished  by  the  Corinthians  and  the 
same  number  by  the  Phokians  and  Lokrians  together.  But  the 
winter  had  not  passed  away  before  some  of  the  alhes  of  Athens 
made  efforts  to  transfer  their  allegiance  to  Sparta.  The  first  depu- 
tation came  from  Euboia  :  and  Agis  at  once  summoned  Alkameues 
and  Melanthos  from  Sparta  to  undertake  the  government  of  the 
island.  Before  they  could  accomplish  their  journey  a  second  depu- 
tation came  from  Lesbos  ;  and  the  intiucnce  of  the  Boiotians,  who 
insisted  on  the  paramount  need  of  securing  that  island,  induced 
Agis  to  leave  Euboia  for  the  present  to  itself,  while  Alkamenes  was 
sent  as  Harmostes  or  governor  to  Lesbos. 

At  Sparta  the   drama  soon  became  more  complicated.     The 
oligarchic  factions  in  Chios  and  Erythrai'^  were  anxious  to  avail 
themselves  of  the  prostration  of  Athens  in   order  to    „     , 
realise  their  dreams  of  autonomy.     With  their  envoys,    ofTissa- 
whom  they  sent  not  to  Agis  but  straight  to  Sparta,    ["^haniaba"'^ 
appeared  ambassadors  from  Tissaphernes.     The  Persian   zos  to  tiie 
satrap  of  the  province  which  lay  to  the  south  of  the     ^^^  ^^^' 
gulf  of  Adramyttiou  had  received  notice  from  the  great  king  that 
the  tributes  due  from  the  Hellenic  cities  withiu  his  jurisdiction 
must  be  paid  into  the  treasury.     The  mere  fact  that  the  weakness 
of  Athens  should  at  once  call  forth  such  a  claim  might  have  taught 
them  that  in  seeking  to  be  free  of  the  Athenian  yoke  they  were  but 
wishing,  like  the  froo-s,  to  chano-e  king  Loo:  for  kino- Stork.     Both 
sides  were  indeed  ranch  like  thieves  who  needed  each  the  aid  of 
the  other.     The  oligarchic  conspirators,  for  such  they  literally  and 
strictly  were,  felt  that  they  dared  not  run  the  risk  of  revolt  unless 
they  could  have  the  support  of  an  adequate  force  of  allies,  and  they 
knew  that  Sparta  would  not  stir  unless  it  could  be  made  clear  that 
it  was  to  her  interest  to  do  so.     Tissaphernes,  again,  on  his  side 
knew  that  witliout  Spartan  aid  he  could  not  break  up  the  Athenian  i 
empire,  and  that  until  this  result  could  be  achieved,  he  must  remain 

'  Thucydides,    viii.     2,    3,    says  Chians  knew  nothing  of  the    in- 

sweepinirly  that  tliesul)ji'cts  of  the  trigues   wliich    had    revolt    from 

Athenians  were  most  of  all  ea<j:er  to  Athens  for  their  object:  and  it  was 

revolt,  tlms  iiuplyinjr  unanimity  of  thisiornorance  which  compelledtlie 

thought  and  action.     We  shall  see  conspirators,  for  such  they  were,  to 

that  thisstutemiMit  is  as  untrue  now  proceed  wuh  the  utmost  caution. 

as  it  was  when  Brasidas  went  on  his  viii.  9,  3.     They  knew  that  if  the 

errand  to  Chalkidiive.     See  p.  335  people  should  become  acquainted 

et  scq.  with    what  was   going    on,  their 

"  Thucydides,  viij.  5,  4,  says  bold-  schemes  would  be  hopelessly  frus- 

ly  that  the  application  came  from  trated.     It  is  of  the  utmost  impor- 

'  the  Chians  and  Erythraians.'    By  tance  to  keep  this  fact  steadily  in 

his  own  showing  the  statement  is  view, 
false.     The  large  majority  of  the 


414  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  IH. 

a  debtor  to  the  king  for  a  sum  the  magnitude  of  which  was  every 
day  increasing.  But  Tissaphernes  did  not  stand  alone  in  his  wish 
to  make  alliance  with  Sparta.  The  same  demand  which  pressed  so 
heavily  upon  him  had  been  forwarded  from  Sousa  to  the  satrap  of 
the  Hellespont  whose  representatives  intreated  that  the  Hellespont 
might  be  made  the  scene  of  the  first  operations.  That  the  satraps 
should  each  be  anxious  to  win  the  royal  favor  by  being  foremost 
in  pulling  down  the  Athenian  empire  was  perfectly  natural ;  that 
the  Spartans  who  in  the  day  of  need  had  abjured  the  Athenians 
j  not  to  betray  their  kinsfolk  to  the  barbarian  should  now  deliberately 
reopen  the  way  for  Persian  aggression  was  an  unnatural  and 
dastardly  treason  against  the  liberties  not  only  of  Hellas  but  of 
Europe.  But  looking  merely  to  the  mode  in  which  treachery 
might  be  made  to  yield  its  fruits  most  readily,  we  cannot  doubt 
that  the  Spartans  were  right  in  inclining  rather  to  the  side  of  Tis- 
saphernes than  to  that  of  Pharnabuzos.  The  contest  was  decided 
by  Alkibiades,  who  with  all  his  strength  urged  the  claims  of  the 
Chians'  as  being  the  highest  bidders.  For  the  moment  he  had 
everything  in  his  favor.  The  mission  of  Gylippos  had  saved 
Sicily,  and  this  mission  had  been  suggested  and  passionately  urged 
by  himself.  He  was  in  a  special  sense  the  hero  of  Dekeleia  and 
Syracuse  :  and  his  verdict  turned  the  scale  in  the  councils  of 
Sparta.^ 

So  passed  away  the  winter  which  ended  the  nineteenth  year  of 
the  war.  The  spring  had  come  ;  and  the  Chian  conspirators^  still 
Synod  of       waited  impatiently  for  the  promised  succor.     At  last 

the  Spartan    three    Spartan    envoys  were    sent  to  Corinth    with  a 
allies  at  i  .  •'  t    ,  .  i  .  T  ... 

Corinth.         request  that  the   nme-and-thirty  ships   tlieii    lying  m 

the  port  of  Lechaion  should  be  hauled  over  the  isthmus  and  all  be 

dispatched  to  Chios  together  with  the  twenty  shijjs  which  Agis  had 

•promised  to  send  to  Lesbos.''     The  prospect  was  not  altogether 

encouraging.     The  Chian  oligarchs  were  in  a  fever  of  anxiety  lest 

their  secret  devices  should  become  known  to  the  Athenians,  while 

the  envoys  of  Pharnabazos  went  (jff  in  disgust,  vowing  that  they 

would  liave  nothing  to  do  with  Chios,  and  carrying  back  with 

tliem  the  money  whicli  they  had  brought.     Agi.s,  however,  threw 

liimself  lieartily  into  the  .scheme  of  Alkibiades.     To  distract  the 

attention  of  the  Athenians  and  to  divide  the  scanty  fleet  which 

still  remained  to  them,  they  determined  that  only  one-and-twenty 

ships  should  be  brought  across  the  isthmus.     These  were  launched 

'  Tliur.  viii.  6.  7,  1,  says  simply  '  tlie  Chians  ;'  but 

"11).  viii.  8,3.  Lis  own  subsequent  statements  con- 

'  I  urn  comi)'elled  to  use  this  tenn,  vict  this  expression  of  falsehood. 

because  no  other  will  express  the        *  Thuc.  viii.  5,  2,  and  7. 

facts  of  the  case.    Thucydides,  viii. 


Chap.  VIII.]     THE  OLIGARCHICAL  REVOLUTION.  415 

witliout  an  attempt  at  concealment,  as  in  tlie  utter  prostration  of 
Athens  secrecy  seemed  both  superfluous  and  absurd.  This  con- 
fidence was  not  wliolly  justified.  The  refusal  of  the  Corinthians 
to  sail  before  the  celebration  of  the  Isthmian  games  gave  the 
Athenians  time  to  verify  in  some  measure  the  suspicions  which 
they  had  already  formed,  and  which  during  the  celebration  of  the 
festival  were  converted  almost  into  certainty.'  Aristokrates  was 
accordingly  sent  to  Chios,  and  on  being  assured  by  the  government 
that  they  had  no  intention  of  revolting,  he  demanded  a  contingent 
of  .ships  by  the  terms  of  the  alliance,  and  as  a  pledge  of  their 
fidelity.  The  demand  was  complied  with,  wc  are  told,  only  because 
the  conspirators  dared  not  to  call  the  people  into  their  council. 
Seven  Chian  triremes  sailed  for  Athens  ;  and  curses  not  loud  but 
deep  were  probably  imprecated  on  the  Spartans  whose  remissness 
had  brought  this  ignominy  upon  them.^ 

When  therefore  the  Peloponnesian  fleet  under  Alkamenes  set 
ont  from  Kenchreai,  an  Athenian  squadron  of  equal  strength 
advanced  to  meet  them  in  the  hope  of  provoking  a  Defeat  and 
conflict  in  the  open  sea.  The  Peloponnesians  declined  ^^lamcnes 
the  risk ;  and  the  Athenians  also  retreated,  feeling  at  Peiraion. 
that  they  could  place  no  confidence  in  ihe  Chian  ships  which 
accompanied  them.^  On  the  following  day  the  Athenians  again 
came  on  in  order  of  battle  as  soon  as  the  enemy  began  their 
voyage,  and  drove  them  back  on  the  desolate  harbor  of  Peiraion 
near  the  Epidaurian  border.  One  Peloponnesian  ship  was  sunk  at 
sea ;  the  rest  were  moored  on  the  beach.  But  the  Athenians 
attacked  them  both  by  sea  and  land,  and  with  some  loss  to  them- 
selves disabled  most  of  the  enemy's  ships  and  killed  the  admiral 
Alkamenes.  It  had  been  agreed  that  as  soon  as  the  fleet  began  its 
voyage  from  Kenchreai,  Chalkideus  should  be  dispatched  with  his 
squadron  of  five,  taking  Alkibiades  with  him.  This  squadron  had 
actually  set  sail,  when  a  second  messenger  brought  the  tidings  of 
the  defeat  and  death  of  Alkamenes  ;  and  the  Spartans  saw  in  this 
disaster  an  evil  omen  for  their  fortunes  in  a  struggle  which  was 
now  rather  an  Ionian  than  a  Peloponnesian  war.  They  at  once 
recalled  Chalkideus  and  resolved  on  issuing  orders  for  the  return 
of  some  ships  which  had  set  out  before  him.  In  this  resolution 
Alkibiades  saw  the  deathblow  to  the  wholescheme.  Chios  could 
be  added  to  the  Spartan  confederacy  only  by  the  success  of  the 
oligarchic  plot :  and  Akibiades  witli  his  partisans  had  to  contend 
not  only  with  the  certain  opposition  of  the  demos  but  with  the 
wariness  of  the  conspirators  who  were  ready  to  revolt  from  Athens 

4Thuc.  viii.  10,  1.  niajs  did  not  at  once  take  the  pre- 

^  lb.  viii.  9,  3.  cautions  which  they  adopted  a  lit- 

^  It  seems  strange  tliat  the  Athe-      tie  later.     Thuc.  viii.  15. 


416  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

but  not  at  all  ready  to  run  the  risk  of  ruining  themselves.  He 
insisted  that  the  original  plan  should  still  he  carried  out,  and  he 
pledged  himself  that,  if  once  .he  reached  the  Ionian  coast,  he  would 
bring  about  the  revolt  not  only  of  Chios  but  of  the  other  cities  in 
alliance  with  Athens.  The  influence  of  his  friend  Endios,  united 
with  liis  own,  gained  the  day  :  but  the  hasty  departure  (■)f  Alkibiades 
and  of  Chalkideus  with  his  five  triremes  left  the  Spartans  not  less 
rich  in  the  number  of  ships  at  their  command.  The  twenty-seven 
Athenian  triremes  Avhich  kept  guard  off  Loukas  liad  succeeded  in 
destroying  only  one  of  the  fleet  of  sixteen  ships  which  Gylippos 
was  bringing  back  from  Syracuse.  The  rest  made  their  way  safely 
to  Corinth. 

It  was  necessary  now  to  lioodwink  the  conspirators  at  Chios 
not  less  than  the  Chian  demos  :  and  Alkibiades  accordingly  coin- 
_  ,  ,  pelled  every  vessel  which  he  met  or  overtook  tu  ac- 
chios,  Ery-  company  his  triremes,  until  they  reached  the  penin- 
1?,™' ''°I^„:  sula  of  Korvkos  or  Ervthrai.  Thus  no  tidings  of  the 
from  Ath-  defeat  of  Alkamenes  reached  the  oligarchs,  who  advised 
the  Spartans  to  enter  the  Chian  harbor  without  giving 
any  notice  of  their  approach.  The  plan  of  proceeding  had  been 
carefully  arranged.  The  council  was  assembling  when  to  the 
dismay  and  bewildennent  of  the  Chian  people  the  Spartan  triremes 
approached  the  landing-place  ;  and  Alkibiades,  appearing  at  once 
before  the  senate,  assured  them  that  the  little  squadron  which  had 
brought  himself  and  Chalkideus  to  their  harbor  was  but  the  van 
of  a  larger  fleet  already  on  its  way,  while  of  the  incidents  at 
Peiraion  he  said  nothing.  The  decisive  step  was  taken.  Chios 
revolted  from  Athens,  and  her  example  was  followed  first  by 
Erythrai  and  then  by  Klazomenai.  Thus  had  Alkibiades  once 
again  changed  the  history  of  his  country  ;  and  the  voyage  of 
Clialkideus  with  liis  Ave  ships  bore  its  fruit  in  the  flnal  catastrophe 
of  Aigospotanioi. 

Having  once  committed  themselves  to  the  venture,  the  Chian 
oligarchs  espoused  the  cause  of  their  new  friends  with  impetuous 
ardor ;  but  tliere  is  no  reason  for  thinking  that  the 
Employniciit  demos  shared  their  zeal.  The  oligarchic  faction  at 
nian reserve  Chios  was  not  blind  to  the  beneflts  which  they  had 
fiindtomcet  reaped  from  their  connexion  with  Athens;  and  while 

tins  crisis.         ,     *        .   ,      1  ,  I       ■  •    1      •  1  11 

they  wislied  to  weaken  tlie  nnpenal  city,  tiiey  iiad  no 
desire  to  impoverish  themselves.  ]>ut  for  the  present  their  act  had 
produced  all  the  results  which  could  have  been  looked  for.  It  had 
given  a  new  and  startling  impulse  to  the  ccnlrifugal  instincts  of 
the  Athenian  allies ;  and  it  had  fllled  Athens  with  a  dismay 
bordering  on  .sheer  despair.  With  her  present  resources  she  was 
'  Time.  viii.  10-13. 


Chap.  VIII.]    THE  OLIGARCHICAL  REVOLUTION.  417 

wholly  unable  to  make  way  against  the  difficulties  wliicli  were 
overwhelniiiig  her  :  but  there  remained  still  the  reserved  fund  of 
one  thousand  talents  which  under  solemn  sanctions  Perikles  had 
stored  up  in  the  Akropolis.'  These  sanctions  were  now  removed, 
and  a  decree  wa^  passed  that  the  sum  should  be  used  for  the  needs 
of  the  state.  A  new  Heet,  probably  of  inferior  ships,  was  at  once 
manned  and  sent  to  take  the  place  of  the  blockading  squadron  off 
Peiraion.  Of  this  squadron  eight  ships  commanded  by  Strombichi- 
des  were  dispatched  to  Chios,  while  the  seven  Chian  ships  were 
taken  to  Athena  where  the  free  men  among  the  crews  were  impri- 
soned and  the  slaves  belonging  to  them  set  free.  In  addition  to 
these,  tliirty  more  triremes  Avere  to  be  equipped  and  n:ianned.^ 

Meanwhile  Strombichides  had  reached  Samos.  Sailing  thence 
to  Teos,  he  insisted  on  the  neutrality  of  the  Teians  if  he  could  not 
have  their  active  help.  But  the  approach  of  a  land- 
force  from  Erythrai  and  Klazomenai  warned  him  to  Miietos. 
stand  out  to  sea,  where  presently  the  three-and-twenty  beuve™'''^ 
triremes  of  Chalkideus  hove  in  sight  from  Chios.  Spaitaand 
Against  such  a  mimber  his  own  small  fleet  was  use-  ^^^^'^' 
less,  and  retreat  now  became  flight.  While  Chalkideus  was 
chasing  him  to  Samos,  the  Teians  were  induced  to  admit  the 
Erythraian  and  Klazomenian  forces  whom  they  had  refused  to  re- 
ceive so  long  as  the  Athenians  maintained  their  ground.  The 
strangers,  having  vainly  waited  a  while  for  the  return  of  Chalkideus, 
set  to  work  to  demolish  the  wall  which  the  Athenians  had  built 
on  the  landward  side  of  the  city,  and  Stages  the  deputy  of  Tissa- 
pherne>-  hurried  up  with  a  body  of  troops  to  take  part  in  the  pleasant 
task.  But  Alkibiades  was  impatient  to  strike  a  harder  blow  on 
the  falling  power  of  Athens.  His  arrival  at  Miietos  was  followed 
by  the  inmiediate  revolt  of  the  city  and  the  ratification  of  a  treaty 
between  the  Persian  king  and  the  Lakedaunonians.  This  compact 
not  only  bound  either  party  to  carry  on  the  war  so  long  as  the 
other  should  desire  its  continuance,  but  declared  the  great  king  to 
be  the  righlfnl  owner  of  all  lands  which  he  or  his  predecessors  had 
at  any  time  possessed.^  The  promises  which  Brasidas  had  made 
to  the  revolted  towns  of  Chalkidike  had  been  kept  with  no  great 
strictness  :  but  now  the  Spartans,  who  had  sworn  to  maintain  the 
autonomy  of  every  Hellenic  city,  had  declared  a  barbarian  despot 
the  master  not  only  of  the  lands  Ij^ing  to  the  east  of  the  Egean, 
but  of  Boiotia,  Thessaly,  Attica,  and  Megara.* 

*  See  p.  279.  days  by  Mardonios,  after  the  second 

*  Thuc.  viii.  15.  occup;ition  of  Athens:  andanysuch 
lb.  viii.  18.  occupation  served  in  the  eyes  of  the 

*  The  territory  of  Mcgara   or  a     great  king  as  a  title  to  possession, 
part  of  it  had  been  held  for  a  few 

IS" 


418  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  IH. 

But,  wliile  the  prospect  seemed  daily  to  grow  darker  and  more 
hopeless,  an  event  occiirrod  which  for  a  time  averted  the  final 
Eisins  of  catastrophe  and  seemed  even  to  make  it  likely  that 
theSamian  Athens  might  yet  be  victorious  over  her  enemies.  A 
against  the  revolution  took  place  in  Samos  not  against  her  but  in 
Geomoroi.  \^qj.  f.,vor.  So  httle  liad  Athens  interfered  with  the 
domestic  affairs  of  tlie  island  since  the  suppression  of  the  first 
revolt,'  that  the  Geomoroi,  or  oligarchical  landowners,  had  con- 
trived to  regain  their  preponderance  and  to  deprive  the  demos  of 
all  right  of  intermarriage  with  the  dominant  class.  Of  the  time 
when  or  the  mode  in  whicli  this  change  occurred  we  know  nothing ; 
but  it  is  certain  that  when  the  rising  of  the  demos  took  place, 
Samos  was  strictly  under  local  government.  The  demos  had  pro- 
bably been  for  some  time  watching  an  opportunity  for  deposing 
their  rulers,  and  the  presence  of  the  Athenian  ships  determined 
them  to  act  at  once.  The  oligarchy  was  in  all  likelihood  taken 
completely  by  surprise  ;  but  they  made  an  obstinate  resistance.  Two 
hundred  were  slain  in  the  struggle  ;  four  hundred  were  driven 
into  exile ;  and  their  property,  both  real  and  personal,  was  divided 
amongst  the  demos,  who  with  a  studied  irony  treated  the  Geomoroi 
as  an  inferior  class  by  forbidding  the  people,  on  whom  they  had 
thus  far  looked  down  with  infinite  contempt,  from  contracting  any 
marriages  with  them.  These  were  sweeping  if  not  hard  measures; 
and  the  Samians  must  be  severely  condemned,  if  the  acts  cannot 
be  justified.  But  there  cannot  be  a  doubt, — indeed  it  is  admitted 
even  by  historians  who  are  least  disposed  to  favor  Athens, — that 
these  oligarchs  intended  to  follow  the  example  of  their  brethren  at 
Chios  :  and  unless  it  can  be  maintained  that  the  people  were  bound 
to  be  passive  while  a  foreign  enemy  was  being  brought  in,  and  a 
yoke  put  upon  them  far  harder  than  the  mere  sentimental  grievance 
which  formed  their  one  ground  of  complaint  against  the  Athenians, 
then  it  nmst  be  granted  that  they  took  the  only  course  open  to 
them.  That  the  Athenians  should  feel  both  pleasuic  and  gratitude 
towards  the  Samian  people,  is  only  what  we  should  look  for.  The 
Samians  had  given  signal  proof  of  their  fidelity,  and  Athens 
rewarded  them  by  raising  them  at  once  to  the  rank  of  autonomous 
allies. 

The  effect  of  this  revolution  soon  became  felt.  If  the  Athenians 
were  to  continue  the  struggle  at  all,  their  base  of  o]>erations  must 
Revolt  and  ^?  securc  :  and  such  a  post  they  now  had  in  Samos. 
recovery  of  Nor  was  it  long  before  they  were  able  to  check  the 
Lesbos.  eager  zeal  of  the  Chian  oligarchs  who  dreaded  most  of 

all  to  stiuiil  alone  in  revolt,  and  who  now  made  a  strong  effort  to 
detach  Losbos  from  Athens.  Thirteen  Chian  ships  sailed  to  Lesbos, 
'  See  J).  260. 


Chap.  VIII.]    THE  OLIGARCHICAL  REVOLUTION.  419 

while  a  land-force  of  Peloponnesians  and  their  allies  marched 
towards  Klazoinenai  and  Kyine,  on  their  road  to  the  Hellespont, 
if  the  revolt  of  Lesbos  should  lea\e  the  way  open.  Methymna 
and  Mytileuc  at  once  threw  off  their  allegiance  to  Athens  ;  but 
three  days  after  the  arrival  of  the  Spartan  high-admiral  Astyochos 
at  Chios,  live-and-twenty  Athenian  triremes  under  Leon  and 
Diomedon  sailed  to  the  island.  Seeing  them  pass,  Astyochos  with 
his  four  Peloponnesian  ships  and  one  Chian  vessel  folio  wed- them 
late  in  the  day,  and  sailed  to  Pyrrha  and  thence  to  Eresos,  where 
he  learnt  that  the  Athenians  had  taken  the  Mytilenaians  completely 
by  surprise  and  carried  their  city  by  storm.  The  men  of  Eresos 
showed  their  courage,  if  not  their  wisdom,  by  revolting  after 
they  heard  this  news  ;  and  Astyochos  sailed  on  to  Antissa  and 
Methymna  in  the  hope  of  retrieving  losses  and  gaining  fresh 
ground.  But  his  efforts  were  vain.  The  Athenians  were  soon 
masters  of  the  whole  island.  The  Peloponnesian  land-force  was 
broken  up,  and  the  idea  of  immediate  operations  at  the  Hellespont 
in  conjunction  with  Pharnabazos  was  abandoned. 

On  the  suppression  of  the  Mytiienaian  revolt  in  the  days  of 
Kleon  the  whole  male  population  of  the  city  was  condemned  to 
death.     If  the    Lesbians   now    escaped,    as   it   would   j.  ~   ^ 
seem,    without  any  pains  and    penalties  except  those   death  of 
which    are    involved   in   actual    warfare,    their    good   A?henian°^' 
fortune  may  be  ascribed  rather  to  the  weakness  of  the   ravages  in 

...  .  Chios 

conquerors  than  to  their  magnanimity.  The  Athenians 
could  not  afford  to  do  now  as  they  had  done  at  Skione  or  at 
Melos:  but  there  was  nothing  to  prevent  them  from  retaliating  on 
their  enemies  at  least  those  evils  which  the  fortification  of  Dekeleia 
had  so  bitterly  aggravated  for  themselves ;  and  their  vengeance 
was  directed  first  against  the  conspirators  of  Chios.  In  an  attack 
which  they  now  made  on  the  Milesian  Panormos  the  Spartan 
commander  Chalkideus  was  slain  :  and  then  the  storm  burst  upon 
the  Chians  simultaneously  from  Lesbos,  from  the  Oinoussian  islets 
off  the  northern  promontory  of  their  own  island,  and  from  Sidoussa 
and  Pteleon  on  the  opposite  territoi'y  of  Erythrai.  A  series  of 
defeats  at  Kardamyle  and  Bolissos,  at  Phanai  and  Leukonion  re- 
duced the  Chians  to  a  state  of  siege  within  their  walls,  and  com- 
pelled them  to  look  passively  upon  the  ravaging  of  those  fruitful 
and  happy  lands  on  which  no  invader  had  trod  since  the  days  of 
Xerxes.  This  was  all  that  the  plotters  had  gained  by  intrigues 
warily  carried  on  and  by  schemes  carefully  matured.  The  singular 
and  unbroken  prosperity  of  the  island  from  the  time  when  Athens 
became  the  head  of  the  Delian  confederacy  furnished  indisputable 
proof  that  the  islanders  not  only  had  no  real  grounds  of  complaint 
against  the  administration  of  the  imperial  city,  but  were  indebted 


420  THE   EMPIRE   OF   ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

to  it  for  liappinoss  ;ind  wealth  which  in  like  measure  they  would 
never  know  again.  It  is  unnecessary  to  palliate  those  enormous 
crimes  of  the  Athenian  people  which  stand  out  in  their  naked 
hideousness  from  the  more  decent  tenor  of  their  general  history  : 
nor  need  Ave  even  ask  for  any  arrest  of  judgment  ou  the  ground 
that  the  crimes  of  Spartans,  Boiotians,  Korkyraians,  and  Syracusans 
were  immeasurably  more  loathsome  and  disgusting.  There  was 
enough  in  the  conduct  of  the  Chian  government  to  excite  the 
deepest  indignation  of  Englishmen  at  the  present  dav.  Had  it 
not  been  for  Athens  they  must  have  remained  subject  to  the  de- 
grading yoke  and  the  arbitrary  exactions  of  the  I*ersian  king. 
Under  lier  protecting  arm  tliev  had  passed  more  than  half  a  cen- 
tury in  perfect  safety,  and,  as  her  free  allies,  they  had  been  called 
upon  only  to  furnish  their  yearly  quota  of  ships  for  the  inain- 
tenance  of  an  order  from  which  they  derived  beneiits  fully  equal 
to  any  which  Athens  herself  received.  It  is  not,  indeed,  too  much 
to  say  that  this  order  was  the  greatest  political  blessing  which  the 
■world  had  yet  seen  ;  and  to  this  order  in  spite  of  the  sentimental 
grievances  shaped  by  diseased  dreams  of  autonomy  the  people  in 
most  of  the  allied  or  subject  cities  were  honestly  attached.  In 
Chios  their  attachment  was  so  strong  that  tiie  oligarchs  liad  to 
ivork  in  fear  and  trembling  lest  their  plots  should  conie  pre- 
maturely to  the  knowledge  of  the  demos. 

AVhile  Astyochos  was  seeking,  by  taking  hostages  or  in  other 
modes,  to  keep  down  the  pliilo-Athenian  party  in  Chios/  a  fleet 
Victory  of  ^^  '^^  sliips  under  the  command  of  I'hrynichos, 
theAthe-  Onomakles,  and  Skironides  was  conveying  from  x\thens 
Argiv(fs°ovcr  to  Miletos  a  forcc  of  1,000  Athenian  and  1,500  Argeian 
■'^^'yociips  hoplites  (500  of  these  having  received  their  panoplies 
phonies  at  at  Athens),  together  with  l,00t)  furnished  by  the 
Milctos.  allies.  This  force  had  incampt-d  on  Milesian  ground, 
before  the  Milesians,  aided  by  the  Pelopoimesians  under  Chalkideus 
and  by  Tissapliernes  himself  with  a  body  of  Persian  cavalry,  came 
out  to  meet  them.  Tiie  Dorian  Argives  atlvancod  with  the  care- 
lessness of  contempt  against  the  lonians  of  Milelos  who  were 
opposed  to  them  ;  but  their  disorder  was  T)unished  by  a  defeat 
which  cost  them  '.WO  men,  while  the  lonians  of  Athens  Avere  not 
less  decisivelv  victorious  over  the  Dorians  of  Sparta.  The  a.ston- 
ishment  caused  by  this  strange  r(4sult  might  liave  been  especially 
useful  to  the  Athenians  in  their  intended  investment  of  Miletos, 
had  not  tidings  come  that  a  fleet  of  'tT)  ships  from  Peloponncsos 
and  Sicily  under  the  ct)minan(l  of  Ilermokrates  might  at  any 
moment  be  looked  for.  The  whole  armament  reached  the  islet  of 
Lcros,  about  HO  miles  to  the  southwest  of  Miletos,  under  the 
'Thuc.  viii.  24,  fi. 


Chap.  VIII.]     THE  OLIGARCHICAL  REVOLUTION.  421 

command  of  Tlieramenes,  who  was  charged  to  hand  it  over  to 
Astyochos.  Thence,  hearing  that  the  Athenians  were  at  Miletos, 
he  sailed  eastwards  to  the  gulf  of  lasos ;  and  here  at  Teichioussa 
Alkibiadcs  who  had  fought  in  the  last  battle  told  him  in  a  few 
words  that  unless.Miletos  could  be  relieved  their  whole  work  in 
sapping  the  empire  of  Athens  must  be  frustrated.  A  resolution 
was  taken  to  go  at  once  to  its  aid ;  but  their  mere  approach  had 
attained  the  object  in  view.  The  Athenian  commanders  were  at 
first  anxious  to  meet  the  Peloponnesians  in  open  fight :  but  they 
were  opposed  by  Phrynichos  with  a  determined  energy  which,  if 
displayed  by  Demosthenes,  might  have  conquered  even  the  obsti- 
nacy of  Nikias  and  made  the  revolt  of  Chios  and  Miletos  impossible. 
Defeat,  he  insisted,  was  the  one  thing  which  Athens  in  her  present 
need  could  not  afford  to  incur.  This  need  Avas  so  great  that  even 
with  full  preparation  they  were  not  justified  in  risking  a  battle, 
unless  tlicv  were  absolutely  compelled  to  fight;  but  here  there  was 
no  such  necessity,  and  he  assuredly  would  not  allow  the  safety  of 
Athens  to  be  imperilled  from  any  fancied  notions  of  honor  or  self- 
respect.  This  advice  of  Phrynichos  calls  forth  the  warm  praise 
of  Thucydides.'  But  neither  here  nor  in  the  later  scenes  of  his 
career  is  it  easy  to  determine  the  character  of  his  motives.  AVe 
are  now  approaching  the  time  in  which  the  constitutional  life 
developed  in  Athens  from  the  days  of  Solon,  or  rather  perhaps 
those  of  Kleisthenes,  was  to  be  disastrously  interrupted  ;  and  the 
acts  of  Phrynichos  were  not  such  as  to  vindicate  for  him  the 
trust  reposed  whether  in  Perikles  or  in  Aristeides. 

The  summer  passed  away  without  the  excitement  of  angry 
feeling  between  the  Peloponnesians  and  their  allies.  In  the  autunui 
the  paynicnt  of  the  fleet  at  the  rate  of  a  drachma  Dispute  bc- 
dailv  for  each  man,  together  with  a  notice  that  for  the  tweenTis- 
future  Tissaphernes  could  not,  except  on  direct  orders  and  Hermo- 
from  the  king,  pay  more  than  the  half  drachma,  showed  ^'■^*'^*- 
the  working  of  a  secret  influence  which  afterwards  led  to  more 
important  results.  By  Theramenes,  who  was  only  in  temporary 
command,  the  notice  was  received  with  indifference  ;  but  the  loudly 
expressed  indignation  of  Hermokrates  convinced  Tissaphernes  of 
the  wisdom  of  compromising  the  matter,  and  he  agreed  to  furnish 
a  rate  of  pay  which  should  enable  all  to  receive  the  half  drachma, 
wliile  the  crew  of  one  ship  in  rotation  would  be  paid  at  the  old 
rate.  The  events  of  the  winter,  on  tlie  whole,  told  more  for  the 
Athenians  than  for  their  enemies.  A  fresh  force  of  flv^e-and-thirty 
ships  under  Cliarminos,  Strombichides,  and  Euktemon,  joined  tlie 
fleet  already  at  Samos,  thus  raising  the  wliole  number  of  efiicicnt 
ships  on  that  station  to  104,  in  scarcely  more  than  a  year  from  the 
'Thiic  viii.  37,5. 


422  THE    EMPIRE   OF   ATHENS.  [BOOK  III. 

time  wlien  the  catastrophe  of  Syracuse  left  thcin  practically  with- 
out a  uavy.  Ou  the  Spartan  side  Astyochos  was  mortified,  by  a 
failure  first  at  Pteleon  and  then  at  Klazomenai  where  the  citizens 
refused  to  banisli  to  Daphnous  the  philo-Athenian  party.  From 
Klazomenai  he  went  to  I'hokaia  andKyme,  where  a  deputation  of 
Lesbian  oligarchs  besought  his  help  for  a  second  revolt.  Astyochos, 
eager  to  comply  with  their  request,  went  liimself  to  Chios,  and 
strove  to  prevail  on  the  Spartan  commander  Pedaritos  by  the 
argument  that  even  their  failure  would  do  far  more  mischief  to 
the  Athenians  than  to  themselves.  Pedaritos  answered  briefly 
that  lie  would,  neither  go  himself  nor  allow  the  Chian  ships  to 
be  taken  on  this  errand  ;  and  Astyochos,  vowing  that  he  would 
uot  return  to  aid  the  Chians  if  they  should  need  liis  help  ever  so 
mucli,  departed  for  Miletos. 

In  the  powerful  Spartan  fleet  licre  assembled  Astyochos,  it 
would  seem,  read  the  condemnation  of  the  disgraceful  treaty 
Second  treaty  made  by  Chalkideus  with  Tissaphernes;  and  accord- 
Spartaaiid  iugly  he  insisted  on  a  revision  of  the  terms.  The 
Persia.  result  was  a  compact  which  formally  bound  the  Spar- 

tans not  to  injure  whether  by  invasions  or  in  any  other  way  any 
country  or  city  which  might  at  any  time  have  belonged  to  the 
reigning  Persian  monarch  or  to  any  of  his  predecessors.  From 
such  territories  or  towns  they  were  forbidden  to  exact  any  tax  or 
tribute  whatsoever.  In  return  for  these  concessions  the  barbarian 
despot  graciously  condescended  to  give  the  Spartans  such  help 
as  lie  might  be  persuaded  to  aflford,  and  to  guarantee  them  to  the 
best  of  his  power  from  invasion  on  the  part  of  any  of  Ids  subjects.' 

Meanwhile  the  Chians  had  be(!n  feeling  in   its  full   effects  the 

angry  declaration  of  Astyochos  that  in   their  liour  of  need  tlicy 

_  ,.^  ,.  should  seek  liis  aid  in  vain.  Having  finished  their 
Fortiflcatioc  .  ...  ,        .    ,       •  i    i    ^     /m- 

of  Delphi-      preparations   m   Samos,   tlie  Atlienians  sailed  to  CJuos 

rava^ns'of  '"^"'^  established  themselves  in  a  fortified  camp  at  Del- 
Chios  by  the  phinion  somewhat  to  the  north  of  the  city.  From  this 
sheltered  harbor  they  could  liarass  the  island  by  sea, 
and  ravage  tlie  country  at  their  will.  Nor  is  it  surprising  that 
the  losses  thus  occasioned  roused  again  the  indignation  of  the 
demos  against  a  struggle  to  which  they  liad  never  given  a  voluntary 
sanction,  or  that  the  Chian  oligarchs  should  begin  to  feel  the  sting 
of  slavery  even  more  poignantly  than  the  Athenians  had  been 
made  to  feel  it  after  the  Spartan  occupation  of  Dekeleia.  So  large 
was  the  number  of  slaves  in  the  island  that  great  severity  became 
needful  to  keep  them  down  ;  and  this  liarshness  led  many  to  escape 
to  the  mountains  ami  there  maintain  themselves  by  systematic 
plundering.  To  these  men  the  Athenian  occupation  of  Delphinion 
'  Thuc.  viii.  '37. 


Ch.\p.  VIII.]     THE  OLIGARCHICAL  REVOLUTION.  "^23 

furnislied  a  temptation  for  desertion  not  to  be  resisted  ;  and  their 
desertion  was  followed  by  calamities  wliicli  almost  reduced  the 
Chian  oligarchy  to  despair.  Once  more  they  applied  to  Astyoohos ; 
and  tlie  manifest  feeling  of  the  allies  convinced  him  that  the  re- 
fusal of  their  requ^'st  would  be  impolitic  as  well  as  wrong.  He  had 
made  u[)  his  mind  to  go  at  once  to  that  island,  when  he  received 
the  news  that  a  fleet  of  seven-and-twenty  Spartan  ships,  having  on 
board  eleven  men  who  after  Spartan  fashion  were  to  give,  him 
advice  or  keep  him  in  check,  had  reached  Kaunos,  on  the  southern 
coast  of  Asia  Minor.' 

The  admiral  in  command  of  this  fleet  was  Anlisthenes  ;  at  the 
head  of  the  commissioners  was  Lichas  ;  and  tliey  were  charged  to 
do  all  that  miglit  be  in  tlieir  power  to  further  the  Defeat  of 
wislies  not  of  Tissaphernes  but  of  Pharnabazos.  The  charminos 
arrival  of  these  ships  at  Kaunos  was  a  circumstance  tan  admiral 
which  in  the  judgment  of  Astyochos  fully  justified  ABtyoclios. 
him  in  abandoning  for  the  present  the  thought  of  helping  the 
Chians.''  Sailing  to  Kos,  he  found  the  city  of  that  island  helpless, 
the  v/alls  having  been  thrown  down  by  an  earthquake  ;  but  this 
was  a  sufficient  reason  for  ravaging  the  city  and  for  the  selling  of 
those  among  the  prisoners  who  had  been  slaves.  On  reaching 
Knidos  they  would  have  preferred  to  land  and  rest ;  but  the  Kni- 
dians  insisted  that  he  should  sail  at  once  against  the  twenty  tri- 
remes with  which  Charminos  was  looking  out  for  the  I'eloponnesian 
reinforcement.  On  his  way  to  the  islet  of  Syme  a  storm  with 
heavy  rain  and  fog  dispersed  his  fleet ;  and  at  daybreak  his  left 
wing  was  siglited  by  Charminos,  who,  supposing  that  this  was  the 
squadron  under  the  command  of  Antisthenes,  attacked  it  at  once. 
He  was  fast  gaining  the  day,  three  of  the  enemy's  ships  being  simk 
and  others  being  disabled,  when  he  found  himself  thoroughly 
hemmed  in  by  the  rest  of  the  ships  belonging  to  the  force  of  As- 
tyochos. In  their  flight  the  Athenians  lost  six  vessels  :  the  rest 
made  their  way  first  to  the  island  of  Teutloussa,  and  thence  to 
Ilalikarnassos,  while  the  two  divisions  of  the  Peloponnesian  fleet 
effected  a  junction  and  sailed  together  to  Knidos. 

The  possession  of  so  mighty  an  armament  justified  the  assump- 
tion of  a  little  more  dignity  in  their  dealings  with  the  Persian* 
satrap,  who  was  now  invited  to  a  conference  with  the   Rupture  be- 
Spartan  commissioners.     Speaking  for  his  colleagues,    and*^Tissa- '^^ 
Lichas  passed  in  review  the  provisions  of  the  former   pbcmes. 
covenants,  and  told  Tissaphernes  flatly  that  he  had  not  the  least 
intention  of  abiding  by  pactions  so  shameful  and  humiliating  not 
merely  to  Sparta  but  to  the  Hellenic  states  generally.     Tal\eii 

'Thuc.  viii.  41,  1.  Mb.  viii.41,  1. 


424  THE   EMPIRE   OF   ATHENS.  [Book  HI. 

aback  by  language  utterly  iinlooked  for  from  men  who,  so  long  as 

they  crushed  Athens,  seemed  to  care  for  nothing,  Tissaphernes 

turned  away  and  went  off  in  a  rage.^ 

The  retreat  of  the  Athenians  to  Samos  left  Rhodes  exposed  to 

the  full  force  of  Spartan  influence.     The  three  cities  of  this  island, 

„  ,^  ,  Lindos,  lalvsos,  and  Kamiros,  (the  fourth  citv,  Rhodes, 
Revolt  of  ,    '.      -        ',  -  ^  ,  ^  II    •   1     ,*•      1   1 

Khodesfrom  not  having  yet  been  formed,)  were  all  luiiabited   by  a 

Athuns.  Dorian  population  ;  and  it  might  be  supposed  that  they 
would  thus  bitterly  resent  their  subordination  to  an  Ionian  power 
and  be  eager  to  shake  off  the  yoke.  But  it  was  not  so  ;  and  the 
fact  speaks  volumes  for  the  general  spirit  of  the  imperial  adminis- 
tration of  Athens.  Here,  as  elsewhere,  revolt  was  the  work  not  of 
the  people  but  of  the  oligarchs.  AVhen  the  Peloponnesian  fleet  of 
ninety-four  ships  entered  the  harbor  of  Kamiros,  the  demos,  dis- 
mayed as  well  as  astonished,  fled  hurriedly  to  the  mountains  ;  and 
the  conspirators,  now  able  to  manage  things  in  their  own  way, 
summoned  the  representatives  of  the  other  cities,  unfortified  like 
Kamiros,  to  a  conference,  in  which  Rhodes  was  declared  to  be  a 
member  of  the  Spartan  confederacy.  On  receiving  these  tidings, 
the  Athenian  fleet  sot  sail  from  Samos;  butthemischief  could  not 
be  undone,  and  they  were  compelled  to  content  themselves  with 
making  occasional  descents  on  Rhodian  territory,  while  the  Pelo- 
ponnesian fleet  remained  for  nearly  three  months  drawn  up  on 
shore  in  the  harbors  of  the  island. 

Tliis  strange  and  injudicious  inactivity  was  in  some  measure  the 

result  of  the  irritation  which  had  prompted  the  remarks  of  Lichas 

to  Tissaphernes.     The  Spartans  had  chosen  Rhodes  as 

Intended  ^,.         A  ^         ^^.        ^     ,    '■  ^     e  i  •  i- 

miiiderof  their  Winter  station  to  l>e  more  out  or  his  way  ;  and  in 
Aikibiades  by  ^1,^  ]|,,p,  ^],j^^  ^]^Qy  mio-ht  be  able  to  carrv   on  the  war 

the  bpartaus.  i  J         =•  ,      ■     ^  -i  e    i  ■ 

Without  I'ersian  money  they  levied  a  tribute  or  tlurty- 
two  talents  on  the  Rhodians,  who  thus  found  that  autonomy  was  a 
blessing  which  must  at  least  be  paid  for.  But  it  was  owing  far 
more  to  the  intrigues  of  Alkibiades.  For  him  there  was  emphati- 
callv  no  choice  between  pre-eminence  and  ruin  :  and  pre-eminence 
could  be  secured  and  retained  only  by  brilliant,  if  not  unbroken, 
success.  His  suggestions  had  manifestly  brought  about  the  forti- 
fication of  J)ekeleia  and  the  destruction  of  their  armaments  in 
Sicily.  But  in  the  waters  of  the  Egoan  things  began  to  assume 
a  different  aspect.  Either  he  had  already  done  the  Spartans  all 
the  good  which  he  was  capable  of  doing;  and  this  of  itsrlf  woulil 
be  a  sufficient  reason  for  discarding  him  :  or  he  was  trading  on  liis 
genius  elsewhere,  and  this  would  be  a  reason  for  putting  him  out 
of  the  way  altogether.  They  forgot  that  the  conditions  of  the  con- 
flict were  not  now  what  they  had  been  in  Syracuse  :  and  perhaps 
'Thuc.  viii.  43. 


Chap.  VIII.]     THE  OLIGARCHICAL  REVOLUTION.  42.") 

llerniokrates  alone  saw  that  in  spite  of  all  their  troubles  both  finan- 
cial and  military  the  Athenians  had  the  advantage  of  standing  on 
the  defensive  with  the  popular  feeling  of  the  allied  cities  strongly 
on  their  side,  while  the  Peloponnesians  had  committed  themselves 
to  aggressions  as  vast  as  thuse  uf  which  the  Athenians  were  guilty  in 
Sicily.  But  they  were  irritated  by  such  unlooked-for  events  as  the 
rising  of  the  people  in  Samos  and  the  disagreeable  air  of  superiority 
assumed  towards  them  by  the  Persian  satrap  ;  and  at  the  instance 
of  his  personal  enemy  Agis  an  order  was  sent  out  to  Astyochos  to 
kill  the  Athenian  exile  ;  but  that  keen-sighted  schemer  was  still 
more  than  a  match  for  the  stupid  cunning  and  treachery  of  Spartans. 
Contrasting  possibly  tlie  secret  assassination  of  a  refined  oligarchic 
community  with  the  open  courts  and  the  straightforward  decrees  of 
the  vulgar  Athenian  demos,  Alkibiades,  warned  of  liis  intended  mur- 
der, shook  the  dust  off  his  feet  and  made  bis  way  to  Tissaphernes. 
But  like  other  able  and  unscrupulous  men,  Alkibiades  seldom 
failed  to  overreach  himself.  He  had  been  a  most  convenient  in- 
strument in  the  eyes  of  the  Spartans  ;  and  Tissaphernes  orowino-ia- 
now  stood  in  need  of  iust  such  an  agent  in  his  dealings   *J'^f,<''?/=?  "•" 

.  ■  A.llvlDlllClGS 

with  the  Greeks.  So  far  as  his  advice  tended  to  in-  withTissa- 
crease  their  ditficulties,  he  was  ready  to  avail  himself  P'»e™<^*- 
of  it  and  to  act  upon  it  promptly  :  so  far  as  it  concerned  himself, 
he  would  heheve  and  adopt  as  much  as  he  pleased.  It  was  from 
this  new  counsellor  that  the  suggestion  came  for  reducing*  the  pay 
of  the  Peloponnesians  from  a  drachma  to  half  a  drachma  daily  ; 
but  the  satrap  felt  greater  confidence  in  the  result  of  another  sucr- 
gestion  made  by  Alkibiades  for  bribing  the  generals  and  trierarchs 
belonging  to  tlie  Peloponnesian  force.  Too  much  stress  can 
scarcely  be  laid  upon  the  fact  that  the  plan  succeeded  with  all  ex- 
cept the  Syracusan  Hermokrates.  Personal  corruption  has  often 
been  alleged  as  the  special  vice  of  democracies  ;  and  in  Athens  it 
is  supposed  to  liave  found  a  singularly  congenial  soil.  But  in 
Athens  its  growth  is  but  dwarfish  in  comparison  with  the  gigantic 
proportions  which  it  readied  in  the  pure  Doric  oligarchy  of  Sparta 
and  the  haughty  and  refined  nobility  of  her  allies. 

The  acceptance  of  these  bribes  by  the  Peloponnesian  officers  at 
once  enabled  Alkibiades  to  come  forth  as  the  accredited  agent  of 
Tissaphernes,  and  to  adopt  towards  them  and  others  a  sngo-pstions 
tone  which  he  knew  that  they  dared  not  openly  resent,  of  Aikibia- 
Greek  cities  came  to  ask  for  aid  in  money  :  they  were  longing  the 
dismissed  with  the  answer  that  tliey  had  paid  tribute  '^^'"'■• 
to  Athens  while  they  were  her  subjects,  and  that  they  must  ex|)ect 
to  find  freedom  a  luxury  even  more  costly.  For  Tissaphernes 
Alkibiades,  it  is  said,  had  further  advice.  It  was  to  his  interest, 
he  urged,  and  to  that  of  his  master  that  the  movement  of  the  waj 


426  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  IH. 

should  be  slow.  The  cause  of  Persia  could  not  be  furthered  by 
the  victory  either  of  Sparta  or  of  Athens  ;  nay  the  victory  of  the 
latter  would  be  by  far  the  lesser  evil.  Her  object  was  to  bring  the 
islanders  of  the  Egean  into  absolute  subjection  to  herself,  and  to 
secure  to  the  great  king  the  same  absolute  power  over  the  conti- 
nental Hellenic  cities.  To  these  cities  the  Spartans  promised  free- 
dom ;  and  although  for  the  present  they  signed  treaties  which 
seemed  to  attest  their  indiiference  to  the  matter,  yet  success  would 
compel  them  to  throw  off  the  mask,  or  would  make  the  Hellenic 
cities  strontr  enough  to  compel  the  Spartans  to  go  on  with  the 
work  which  they  had  begun.  To  this  string  of  glibly-uttered  lies 
Tissaphernes  listened  probably  with  a  calm  incredulity  to  which  he 
took  care  that  his  countenance  should  give  no  expression.  He  was 
perfectly  aware  that  lie  was  himself  in  debt  to  the  king  because  for 
more  than  half  a  century  I'ersian  tribute-gatherers  had  been  shut 
out  from  the  continental  not  less  than  the  insular  cities  by  this  state 
which  was  now  represented  as  bent  on  multiplying  Persian  slaves. 
But  while  he  saw  through  these  flimsy  falsehoods,  he  was  none 
the  less  ready  to  follow  the  advice  which  protected  his  purse  or 
increased  his  power.  Acting  on  his  counsel,  the  satrap  allowed 
his  payments  to  become  irregular,  while  he  insisted  on  the  near 
approach  of  the  Phenician  fleet  as  a  reason  for  not  venturing  a 
battle  with  the  Athenians  in  the  present  efficiency  of  a  navy  which 
but  twelve  months  before  had  no  existence.  It  was  thus  that 
weeks  and  even  months  passed  away  while  the  Peloponnesian 
ships  lay  hauled  ashore  in  the  Rhodian  harbors  ;  and  the  Spartans 
began  to  suspect  that  Tissaphernes  had  made  up  his  mind  to  look 
on  while  the  two  contending  parties  Avore  each  other  out.' 

P>iit  Alkibiades  had  no  intention  of  remaining  long  the  mere 
agent  or  instrument  of  a  Persian  satrap.  Scarcely  a  year  ago  it 
Overtures  of  ^^'^'-^  seemed  that  Athens  must  soon  lie  at  the  mercy  of 
Alkibiades  to  lier  encmics  :  now  by  an  unnaralieled   effort  she  was 

the  Athenian     i  i      ^      i  i  i  ^i  •  r    i>   i  i 

officers  at  able  to  keep  at  bay  tlie  navies  ot  i  eloponnesos  and 
Samos.  Sicily  aided  by  the  gold  of  I'ersia.      Xor  can  there  be 

a  reasonable  doubt  that  she  would  have  outridden  the  storm  had 
it  not  been  for  the  vile  machinations  of  one  of  tlie  worst  of  traitors 
acting  on  a  knot  of  Athenian  citizens  almost  as  treacherous  and  as 
unprincipled  as  himself.  But  not  one  of  these  men  had  thought 
seriously  of  making  a  systematic  effort  to  overthrow  the  existing 
political  constitution  of  Athens,  until  Alkibiades  stiiTcd  the  smoul- 
dering embers  into  flame.  This  miserable  victim  of  his  own 
cleverness  .spent  his  life  in  spinning  webs  of  intrigues  which  seem 
to  have  brought  liiin  no  rest  and  little  satisfaction.  The  result 
of  the  Sicilian  expedition  liad  made  his  influence  for  the  moment 
'Tbuc.  viii.  4G. 


Chap.  YIII.]     THE  OLIGARCHICAL  REVOLUTION.  427 

paramouut  at  Sparta  ;  but  as  soon  as  things  went  wrong  in  the 
Egean,  he  was  made  to  feel  that  traitors  can  he  tolerated  only  so 
long  as  they  are  successful.  He  had  been  driven  to  take  refuge 
with  Tissaphernes  ;  and  he  saw  clearly  that  he  must  soon  get 
ready  a  place  of  retreat  elsewhere.  If  anything  in  the  life  of 
Alkibiades  could  be  amazing,  we  might  be  astonished  at  the  impu- 
dence of  the  message  which  he  now  sent  to  those  of  the  oligarchic 
party  who  were  serving  in  the  armament  at  Samos.  Calling 
himself  to  the  remembi-ance  of  the  best  men  of  Athens  (to  oligarchs 
in  all  ages  their  fellows  are  always  the  cream  of  the  cream), 
he  could  dare  to  say  that  he  owed  his  banishment  to  the  demos, 
and  that  so  long  as  this  vagabond  society  continued  to  exist  at 
Athens,  he  would  never  set  foot  in  the  streets  of  his  native  city. 
Xor  did  he  shrink  from  adding  that,  if  he  could  return  to  an  oli- 
garchical Athens,  he  would  secure  for  her  the  active  friendship  of 
Tissaphernes.'  Xothing  more  was  needed  to  rouse  the  enthusiasm 
of  the  oligarchic  party  in  the  Atlienian  army  at  Samos.  Some 
envoys  went  from  the  camp  of  Samos  to  Alkibiades,  who  now  had 
even  better  things  to  tell  them.  He  had  promised  them,  before, 
the  friendship  of  Tissaphernes  :  he  now  assured  them  that  he  wt)uld 
bring  them  into  alliance  with  the  great  king  himself,  if  they  would 
put  down  the  democratical  constitution  which  made  it  impossible 
for  the  king  to  put  any  trust  in  Athenian  citizens.  The  envoys 
were  completely  duped.  Instead  of  asking  for  some  solid  warrant 
for  all  these  tine  assertions,  and  especially  for  evidence  that  the 
Persian  despot  felt  this  deep  interest  in  the  domestic  concerns  of 
Athens,  they  hastened  back  to  Samos,  eager  to  deliver  themselves 
of  the  tidings  that  the  friendship  and  treasures  of  the  Persian  king 
were  within  their  grasp,  on  the  small  conditions  that  the  banishment 
of  Alkibiades  should  be  annulled,  and  that  the  democracy  of  Athens 
should  be  put  down.  To  the  great  mass  of  the  army  and  fleet  the 
conditions  were  intolerable.  But  there  were  both  at  Athens  and  in 
the  camp  at  Samos  many  who  in  strictness  of  speech  were  thorough 
traitors,  and  who  in  order  to  gain  their  object  would  without  re- 
morse or  scruple  upset  evervthing.  For  such  men  it  mattered  com- 
paratively little  whether  Alkil)iades  could  or  could  not  fulfil  his 
promises.  Even  if  he  should  fail  to  do  so,  the  assumption  of  his 
ability  would  in  the  meantime  vastly  strengthen  their  hands  and 
enable  them  to  intimidate  the  people. 

One  man  only,  it  would  seem,  saw  through  the  transparent  lies 
of  Alkibiades  ;  and  this  was  the  general  Phrynichos.^  With  the 
vast  majority  of  the  Athenians  at  Samos  the  subsidies  opposition  of 
of  the  great  king  were  the  one  object  to  be  aimed  at ;  PiiO"";iio3. 
and  they  never  cared  to  inquire  whether  they  might  not  be  led 
'  Thuc.  viii.  47.  ^  lb.  viii.  48,  2. 


428  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

blindfold  to  their  ruin.  But  Phrynicbos  detected  the  fallacies  un- 
derlying the  statements  of  Alkibiades,  and  dwell  on  the  absurdity 
of  siipjiosiiig  that  Dareios  would  at  all  care  whether  Athens  was  or 
was  not  governed  by  a  democracy.  With  an  earnestness  which 
seemed  to  indicate  a  hearty  attachment  to  the  existing  constitution 
of  Athens  Phrynicbos  sought  further  to  dispel  the  miserable  delu- 
sion that  the  establishment  of  oligarchy  would  tend  to  maintain  and 
strengthen  her  maritime  empire.  The  idea  that  the  imperial  city 
would  retain  its  revenues  under  an  oligarchical  government  Phry- 
nichos  treated  as  an  absurd  and  fatal  mistake.  The  revolution 
would  bring  back  not  one  single  revolted  city  to  its  allegiance,  or 
render  any  one  of  the  allies  more  trustworthy.  Speaking  from  his 
own  personal  experience,  he  assured  them  that  under  the  regimen 
of  gentlemen'  the  allied  cities  would  be  only  more  troublesome 
and  unruly,  for  these  rciined  and  highborn  rulers  were  just  the  men 
who  were  most  of  all  bent  on  securing  what  they  were  pleased  to 
call  their  freedom,  while  they  also  hounded  on  the  people  to  acts 
of  violence  and  bloodshed  which  they  hoped  to  turn  to  their  own 
profit.  Nay  more,  he  knew  that,  whatever  might  be  the  desire  of 
the  allies  for  autonomy,  it  was  the  Athenian  demos  alone  which 
had  lield  or  would  hold  them  together  at  all.  Nomore  triumphant 
or  emphatic  eulogy  of  the  imperial  government  and  the  political 
constitution  of  Athens  could  have  been  pronounced  than  the  simple 
statement  of  facts  by  which  Phrynicbos  sought  to  warn  the  assem- 
bled oligarchs  against  a  step  likely  to  involve  them  and  the  whole 
state  in  ruin.  The  very  object  of  government  is  the  maintenance 
of  order  and  of  the  absolute  sovereignty  of  Law  ;  and  according  to 
Phrynicbos  it  was  the  demos  and  the  demos  alone  which  main- 
tained both  order  and  law  not  onh'^at  Athens  but  throughout  her 
whole  confederation.  It  might  be  supposed  that  Phrynicbos  be- 
longed to  the  school  of  Perikles  or  Epliialtes.  The  fact  that  he 
did  not  adds  only  to  the  strength  of  his  Avordsand  makes  his  warn- 
ing more  memorable.  His  warning  was  thrown  away.  The  con- 
spirators were  resolved  to  make  the  venture,  and  it  was  determined 
that  I'cisandros  should  be  sent  with  other  envoys  to  Athens  to 
brine:  about  the  ruin  of  the  demos  and  the  restoration  of  Alkibiades. 
Having  reached  Athens  Pcisandros  disburdened  himself  of  his 
message  in  the  assembly  of  the  citizens,  telling  them  in  few  words 

that  without  foreign  help  ruin  was  inevitable,  and 
Peis:iiidios  that  they  might  have  this  help  from  Persia,  if  they 
vovs'f'rom^  would  consent  to  receive  zVlkibiades  and  to  cliange 
Saiiiosat       their  Constitution.     The  proposal  was  met  by  vehement 

opposition.  •  Disregarding  the  clamor,  Peisandros  went 
up  to  each  speaker  and  quietly  asked  him  how  he  proposed  to 
'  Time.  viii.  48,  5. 


Chap.  VIII.]     THE  OLIGARCHICAL  REVOLUTION.  429 

carry  on  the  war  with  an  enemy  whose  fleet  now  far  outnumbered 
that  of  Athens,  if  the  whole  weight  of  Persia  should  further  be 
placed  in  the  scale  against  them.  The  speakers  were  silenced,  and 
Peisaiidros  added  that  the  establishment  of  oligarchy  would  win 
for  them  the  contidencc  of  the  Persian  king  ;  that  Alkibiades  was 
the  only  man  who  could  do  the  work  for  them  ;  that  constitutional 
forms  were  a  matter  of  small  uioment  compared  with  the  safety  of 
the  state  ;  and  that  if  they  did  not  like  oligarchy  when  tliey  had 
fairly  tried  it,  why, — then  it  would  be  very  easy  to  restore  the 
democracy.' 

Impudence  of  assertion  will  go  a  long  way  with  men  who  are 
worn  down  by  a  seemingly  endless  series  of  crushing  disasters 
coming    upon  a  struggle  which    had  now  lasted   for     Appoint- 
nearly  a  generation.     No    one    asked    what   grounds     a\7\'"^ 
there  were  for  believing  that  the  influence  of  Alkibiades     commis- 
with  Tissaphernes  was  what  he  represented  it  to  be,  or     fittHi'a-af- 
whether  the   Persian  king  Avonld  hold   himself  bound     Mrevyith 
by  the  bargain   of  this  satrap,   even    if  that   bargain     andTissa- 
should  be  made.     In   this    unreflecting   temper   they     piiernes. 
resolved  to  send  Peisandros  with  ten  conunissioners  authorised  to 
settle  matters  as  they  might  think  fit  with  Alkibiades  and  Tissa- 
phernes, and  to  put  Leon  and  Diomedon  in  place  of  Skironides  and 
Phrynichos." 

But  before  he  could  return  to  Samos  Peisandros  knew  that  he 
had  still  much  to  do  at  Athens.     The  Demos  was  not  yet  put 
down  ;  the  army  at  Samos  was   strongly  opposed   to     oro-anisa- 
any  constitutional  chaufje  ;  and  there  was  no  o-uarantee     tionof  the 

oli*^fircnic 

that  the  old  energy  of  the  Athenian  people  might  not  conspimcy 
at  any  moment  be  roused  against  the  oligarchic  con-  atAtimus. 
pirators.  It  was  necessary  therefore  to  set  in  order  the  oligarchic 
machinery  without  which  the  foundations  of  the  democracy  could 
not  possibly  be  thrown  down.  The  polity  of  Athens  rested  on 
freedom  of  speech  ;  and  if  this  could  be  summarily  repressed,  the 
constitutional  forms  and  the  modes  of  legal  procedure  to  which 
they  were  so  much  attached  would  be  found  most  useful  in  riveting 
their  chains.  Well  knowing  how  the  months  of  the  citizens  must 
be  gagged,  Peisandros  went  round  to  all  the  political  Clubs,  and 
concerted  with  them  a  plan  of  action  to  be  carried  out  by  the 
leaders  who  should  remain  behind  him.  At  the  head  of  these  was 
the  Rhetor  Antiphon.  Gifted  with  great  natural  powers  sharpened 
by  a  singular  acuteness,  he  had  taken  to  a  calling  which  made  it 
hard,  if  not  impossible,  for  him  to  attain  to  a  position  like  that  of 
Perikles  in  the  public  assembly.  The  professed  rhetorician  was 
one  who,  it  was  supposed,  had  given  his  whole  mind  to  devising 
'  Thuc.  viii.  53.  ^  lb.  viii.  54. 


430  THE   EMPIRE  OF   ATHENS.  [Book  HL 

tricks  of  debate  and  advocacy  and  with  whom  ordinary  citizens 
stood  at  an  unfair  disadvantage.  But  if  the  occupation  of  Antiphon 
interfered  with  his  popularity,  it  added  hirgely  to  his  gains.  Dislik- 
ing the  demos  partly  perhaps  because  popular  feeling  had  debarred 
him  a  public  career,  but  more  probably  from  a  general  leaning  to 
oligarchy,  he  threw  liimself  into  tlie  conspiracy  for  upsetting  the 
Athenian  constitution  with  an  energy  equal  to  his  ability,  and  for 
this  end  worked  with  consuimnate  skill  the  machinery  of  assas- 
sination. But  in  private  life,  we  arc  told,  he  was  a  man  of 
genial  character,  sober,  kindly  in  liis  relations  with  his  family, 
and  affectionate  in  his  intercourse  with  his  friends.  He  had,  in 
short,  the  estimable  qualities  of  Nikias ;  and  for  the  oligarchic 
Thucydides  this  was  enough.  Antiphon  becomes  in  liis  eyes  a 
man  '  second  to  none  of  his  age  in  virtue.'  This  employer  of 
murdering  bravoes  was  ably  seconded  not  only  by  Theramenes,  the 
son  of  Hagnou  foimder  of  Amphipolis,  but  by  Plirynichos,  who  in 
his  hatred  and  fear  of  Alkibiades  hesitated  not  to  inilict  upon 
Athens  a  system  which  according  to  his  own  previous  warning 
must  be  fatal  to  her  empire  and  could  not  be  beneficial  to  himself.' 

A  (rleam  of  briufhtness  seemed  to  fall  on  the  arms  of  Athens 
after  the  departure  of  Leon  and  Diomedon  for  the  Egean.  Their 
Victories  of  ^^^^  descent  was  on  Rhodes,  where  tliey  found  the 
theAthe-  Poloponnesian  fleet  still  drawn  up  on  shore.  After  a 
Rhodcsand  victory  Over  the  Ilhodians  who  came  out  to  encounter 
Death  of  them,  they  made  Chalke  their  naval  station  in  pre- 
Vedaritos.  fcreucc  to  Kos,  as  furnishing  a  better  look-out  for  the 
enemy's  fleet  in  case  it  should  put  to  sea.  Meanwhile  the 
Athenian  fortress  of  Delphinion  was  fast  approaching  its  com- 
pletion, niid  urgent  messages  were  sent  to  Rhodes  for  immediate 
help.  But  before  it  could  arrive,  I'edaritos  with  the  whole  force 
of  the  Chians,  aided  by  some  allies,  fell  upon  the  stockade  around 
the  Athenian  ships  and  succeeded  in  taking  part  of  it,  together 
with  some  vessels  which  were  drawn  upon  shore.  The  arrival  of 
the  Athenians  changed  the  fortunes  of  the  day.  I'edaritos  was 
slain  :  and  the  loss  to  the  Chians  was  heavy  both  in  men  and  arms. 

It  was  at  this  moment  when  the  Chians  Avere  still  more  strictly 
blockaded  than  they  hatl  been,  and  wlien  they  already  felt  keenly 
the  pressure  of  famine,  that  Pcisandros  and  the  com- 
potiutioii  of  missioners  from  Athens  reached  Magnesia  with  their 
commib^illn-  proposjils  for  the  alliance  of  J'ersia  with  the  now 
erswithTis-  oligarchical  city.  Alkibiades  saw  at  once  that  he  was 
eap  cnu8.  (..mrflit  in  a  trap,  the  plain  fact  being  that  Tissaphernes 
had  no  intention  of  making  any  definite  covenant  with  the  Athe- 
nians. One  course  only  remained  open  to  him.  By  some  means 
'  Thuc.  viii.  68,  3. 


Chap.  VIII.J    THE  OLIGARCHICAL  REVOLUTION.  431 

he  must  make  it  appear  that  the  failure  of  the  negotiation  was  the 
work  not  of  the  satrap  but  of  the  Athenians  themselves ;  and  he 
sought  to  effect  this  by  raising  the  terms  for  Tissaphernes  at  each 
conference.  The  first  demand  was  for  the  surrender  of  all  Ionia 
to  the  king :  the  second  involved  the  cession  of  all  the  islands 
lying  off  the  eastern  shores  of  the  Egean,  and  was  carried  even 
further.  With  both  these  demands  the  commissioners  expressed 
their  willingness  to  comply;  and  Alki  blades  was  almost  at  his 
wits'  end  to  devise  conditions  more  humiliating,  when  it  struck 
liim  that  they  might  be  less  complaisant  if  in  a  third  conference 
the  king  should  insist  on  maintaining  in  the  Egean  as  large  a  fleet 
as  might  suit  his  purposes.  The  point  beyond  which  Athenian 
oligarchs  would  refuse  further  to  abase  tliemselves  and  to  dis- 
honor their  country  was  not  easily  reached  ;  but  Alkibiades  had 
reached  it  at  last  by  proposing  terms  which  contemptuously  swept 
away  the  real  or  so-called  convention  of  Kallias.  The  commis- 
sioners, now  thoroughly  angry,  departed  with  the  feeling  that  they 
had  been  both  insulted  and  cheated  by  Alkibiades.  Unfortu- 
nately, the  Athenian  army  at  Samos  drew  their  own  inference 
from  this  rebuff  of  the  oligarchic  envoys  :  and  this  inference  was 
that  in  his  heart  Alkibiades  leant  to  the  democracy,  and  that  he 
might  be  induced  to  bring  Tissaphernes  into  active  alliance  with 
it.     His  ability  to  do  this  was  questioned  by  neither  side. 

The  spring  of  the  next  year,  the  twenty -first  of  this  weary  war, 
was  ushered  in  by  no  good  omens  for  the  endurance  of  Athenian 
empire.    While  Astyochos  remained  inactive  at  Rhodes,    „ 

•  9  j^rO'-TGSS  of 

the  Chians  after  the  death  of  Pedaritos  had  chosen  as   theoiigar- 
their  commander  a  Spartan  named  Leon  who  had  come    f!';!:.,';"":" 

1  ypir<icj  111 

out  as  a  hoplite  serving  on  board  the  fleet  of  which  samos. 
Antisthenes  was  the  admiral.'  With  him  they  re- 
ceived a  reinforcement  of  twelve  ships  which  were  keeping  guard 
off  Miletos.  They  were  thus  enabled  to  oppose  six-and-thirty 
ships  to  the  two-and-thirty  triremes  of  the  Athenians ;  and  in  the 
fight  which  followed  they  were  now  for  the  first  time  not  defeated. 
In  short,  the  tide  had  begun  to  turn  in  their  favor,  while  their 
enemies  were  almost  daily  harassed  by  fresh  distractions.  The 
return  of  Peisandros  and  his  fellow  envoys  after  their  ignominious 
dismissal  by  Alkil)iadcs  had  convinced  the  traitors  in  the  Athenian 
camp  that  no  aid  was  to  be  looked  for  from  Tissaphernes,  and  that 
the  relation  of  Alkibiadeshimself  with  the  Athenian  oligarchs  was 
one  of  open  war.  They  affected  to  feel  special  satisfaction  in  being 
rid  of  a  man  so  little  likely  to  work  in  harmony  with  them  ;  and 
they  resolved  only  the  more  determinately  to  do  by  themselvus 
what  they  had  hoped  to  achieve  by  his  aid.     Their  first  step  was 

'  Time.  viii.  Gl,  63. 


432  THE  EMPIRE  OF   ATHENS.  [Book  HI. 

to  make  overtures  to  such  of  the  present  Samian  government  as 
mii>;ht  seem  favorably  inclined  to  oligarcliy/  Shortsighted  as 
well  as  treaclierous,  they  still  fancied  tliat  oligarchy  would  ad- 
vance the  interests  of  Athens ;  and  as  by  this  they  meant  enrich- 
ment and  license,  for  themselves,"  they  were  ready  to  carry  on  the 
war  from  their  own  private  resources.  Their  activity,  in  short, 
was  the  result  of  an  absorbing  and  pitiless  scltishuess,  in  strange 
contrast  with  that  nobler  energy  which  in  the  stirring  words  of 
Herodotos^  the  Athenians  had  displayed  when,  just  a  hundred 
years  before,  they  had  risen  up  against  the  I'eisistratidai. 

There  was,  in  truth,  no  end  to  their  folly  and  luadness. 
They  would  liave  it  tliat  oligarchy  must  strengthen  an  empire 
Revolt  of  which  Phrynichos  had  solemnly  warned  them  it  would 
Thasos.  most  assuredly  dissolve  ;  and  in  this  frenzy  they  dis- 
patched Peisandros  with  five  of  the  commissioners  to  Athens  to 
complete  the  work  of  revolution  there,  and  to  establish  oligarchies 
in  anv  towns  which  they  might  visit  on  their  way.  With  the 
remaining  five  Diotrcphes  was  sent  as  general  to  operate  in  the 
Thrace-ward  regions.  His  first  exploit  was  to  suppress  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  people  in  Thasos  and  to  place  the  oligarchs  in 
power.  Two  months  later  the  oligarchs  sliowed  their  gratitude  for 
the  boon  by  fortifying  the  town  and  openly  joining  the  enemies 
of  Athens. 

With  the  aid  of  some  hoplites  which  he  gathered  as  he  went 
along  Peisandros  did  his  errand  well.  In  the  several  cities  which 
he  passed  the  few  were  enabled  to  thrust  aside  the 
sassinatioiis  many  ;  and  when  he  reached  Athens,  he  found  that 
by'^hJfoli-  there  was  little  more  for  him  to  do.  He  had  probably 
gardiiccon-  sent  to  his  partisans  full  tidings  of  the  breach  with 
Alkibiades,  and  the  conspirators  were  perhaps  not 
sorry  to  be  (piit  of  his  interference  and  to  carry  on  their  work 
purely  as  a  political  revolution  without  reference  to  any  foreign 
aid.  They  boldly  attacked  the  citadel,  and  for  the  time  freedom 
of  speech  was  at  an  cud.  Tiic  first  blow  iiail  fallen  upon  Androkles, 
a  man  who  lia<l  been  prominent  among  the  accusers  of  .Vlkibiudes 
before  his  dej)artnrc  to  Sicily;  and  by  a  strange  irony,  while  that 
restless  schemer  was  throwing  his  infiuencc  into  the  opposite  scale, 
this  uidiappy  victim  was  offered  up  for  the  special  purpose  of 
winning  his  favor  and  with  it  the  money  of  Tissaphernes.'     The 

'  Time.  viii.  63,  3.   Wehaveseen  nian  plotters lind  broujjlitabnuttbo 

that  Tliiicyditles  takes  little  care  to  risini;  ajjainst  tlie  faction  in  power. 

distin<.rnisli    tin'    olijrarcliical    lac-  It  is  inori^lilii-lyihai  tiievjoinedtlio 

tions  from  the  peupic.     Tliu  Cliian  moveiiieiu  wlieu  its  success  seemed 

conspiratorsarejri'iicraliy  spoken  of  more  j)robable  tlian  its  failure, 

as  'the  ('l)ians  ; '  luMict-  wi^  have  no  "  Time.  viii.  G3,  4. 

Bufficientwarrantforsayin^Tlliatthe  '•'v.  78. 

Samians  who  now  joined  the  Athe-  *  Thuc.  viii.  65,  2. 


CilAP.  VIII.J     THE  OLIGARCHICAL  REVOLUTION.  433 

work  of  assassination  once  begun  was  not  allowed  to  flag  until  it 
had  acliieved  its  purpose.  Not  many  murders,  however,  were 
needed  to  silence  the  people.  In  the  assembly  the  conspirators 
asserted  loudly  that  no  pay  ought  under  any  circumstances  to  be 
issued  to  any  citizens  except  while  they  were  actually  serving  in 
war,  and  that  not  more  than  five  thousand  must  be  allowed  to  re- 
tain the  franchise,  the  principle  being  that  they  only  should  have 
a  vote  who  could  contribute  substantially  to  the  needs  of  the 
state.  Even  this  was  a  cheat.  The  conspirators  had  no  intention 
of  sharing  power,  if  they  should  secure  it,  with  others  ;  and  they 
took  their  measures  accordingly.  Not  a  subject  was  proposed  for 
discussion  except  after  their  dictation  ;  the  men  who  rose  to  speak 
on  these  subjects  belonged  to  their  faction,  and  the  very  words  of 
their  speeches  were  pre-arranged.  At  the  same  time  beyond  the 
walls  of  the  assembly  young  men,  hired  as  bravoes  and  murderers, 
struck  down  citizens  whose  presence  might  be  inconvenient,  and 
picked  off  especially  all  the  popular  speakers.  The  man  who 
ventured  to  oppose  a  measure  or  utter  a  protest  against  revolution 
disappeared  soon  and  for  ever  ;  and  with  the  silencing  of  all  op- 
position followed  perfect  impunity  for  the  assassins.  The  order 
of  society  was  for  the  time  broken  up.  No  man  could  put  trust 
even  in  those  whom  he  had  looked  upon  as  his  friends.  AVhilc  Anti- 
phon  with  his  partisans  took  advantage  of  these  vague  and  indefi- 
nite terrors,  he  availed  himself,  with  even  greater  ingenuity,  of 
the  existing  constitutional  forms  for  the  more  etfectual  subjuga- 
tion of  the  people.  The  Council  of  the  Five  Hundred  still  held 
their  meetings  ;  and  if  there  were  some  who  had  spirit  enough  to 
absent  themselves  from  the  Senate-house,  there  were  others  who 
would  feel  that  even  their  absence  might  tell  as  much  against  them 
3.S  a  speech  in  opposition  to  oligarchic  innovations.  Their  presence 
was  indeed  all  that  Antiphon  wanted,  for  if  they  were  present, 
they  must  vote  ;  and  by  their  vote  they  must  be  bound.  The 
revolution,  in  short,  was  practically  accomplished  ;  and  the  highest 
and  best  characteristic  of  the  Athenian  people — their  respect  for 
law  and  order — was  thus  ingeniously  used  as  an  instrument  for 
establishing  and  keeping  up  a  reign  of  terror.'  While  this  terror 
was  at  its  height,  Peisandros  with  his  colleagues  arrived.  They 
Ket  themselves  at  once  to  complete  the  work  which  a  series  of 
dastardly  murders  had  brought  so  nearly  to  a  successful  issue. 
Their  first  proposal  was  to  appoint  ten  commissioners,  Peisandros 
seemingly  being  one  of  them,  with  absolute  powers,  charged  to  be 
ready  by  a  given  day  with  a  plan  for  the  better  government  of  the 
city.  On  the  day  named,  the  assembly  was  summoned,  not,  as 
usual,  to  the  Pnyx  within  the  walls,  where  the  interference  of  the 

*  Thuc.  viii.  m. 


434  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III, 

Metoikoi  or  alien  residents  and  even  of  the  slaves  might  be  in- 
convenient or  dangeroiis,but  to  the  Temenos  of  Poseidon  at  Kolonos 
about  a  mile  beyond  the  city  gates.  AVithout  preface  or  comment 
the  commissioners  at  the  suggestion  of  Peisandros  proposed  that 
every  citizen  should  be  left  perfectly  free  to  bring  forward  any 
measures  whatsoever,  and  that  any  attempt  to  punish  liim  by  means 
of  the  Graphe  Paronomon  or  Avrit  for  illegal  procedure  should  be 
visited  by  heavy  pains  and  penalties.  One  great,  bulwark  of 
Athenian  polity  was  thus  thrown  down  without  a  protest,  for  the 
citizens  now  knew  well  that  the  assassins  were  ready  with  their 
daggers  ;  and  the  next  proposition  swept  away  all  existing  offices 
and  all  pay  except  for  militaiy  service,  Avhile  it  gave  the  com- 
missioners power  to  choose  five  men  who  should  in  their  turn 
choose  one  hundred,  these  hundred  again  nominating  each  three. 
It  was  further  agreed  that  these  Four  Hundred,  invested  with  ab- 
solute powers,  should  take  their  place  in  the  council  chamber  and 
carry  on  the  government  after  their  will  and  pleasure,  taking 
counsel,  whenever  they  might  wish  to  do  so,  with  the  Five  Thou- 
sand citizens  not  of  Athens  but  of  Nephelokokkygia.  Such  were 
the  blessings  which  Athens  received  from  conspirators  who  prided 
themselves  on  being  gentlemen,  brave,  refined,  and  honorable,  and 
who  regarded  plain-spoken  demagogues  (if  the  word  must  be  used) 
as  the  very  scum  and  otfscouring  of  the  earth.  For  the  noisy  argu- 
ments of  these  vulgar  debaters  they  had  substituted  the  point  of 
the  dao-erer  ;  and  a  large  measure  of  success  had  rewarded  a  grace- 
ful change  singularly  befitting  men  of  careful  culture  and  ancient 
lineage. 

All  that  remained  now  to  be  done  Avas  the  installation  of  the 
tyrants  into  the  chamber  of  the  senate  which  represented  the 
Expulsion  of  Kleisthencau  tribes.  The  work  was  soon  done.  All 
t^*-' ^""."cii  Athens  was  now  one  vast  garrison.  It  was  easy  for 
liundrocl.  the  conspirators  to  instruct  their  bravocs  to  remain 
near  at  hand  after  the  dispersal  of  the  citizens  (few  probably  in 
number  and  utterly  cowed  in  spirit)  from  the  place  of  meeting  at 
Rolonos.  Attended  by  a  gcodly  band  of  four  hundred  and  twenty 
assassins'  carrying  each  his  hidden  dagger,  the  Four  Hundred 
marched  from  Kolonos  to  the  senate  liouse,  and  commanded  the 
senators  to  depart,  tendering  them  at  the  same  time  their  pay  for 
the  fraction  of  their  official  year  which  was  still  to  run  out.  The 
money  w:vs  taken  ;  the  democracy  of  Kleisthenes  died  with  self- 
inflicted  ignominy  ;  and  in  its  place  was  set  up  the  religious  asso- 
ciation of  the  old  Eupatrid  polity." 

'  The  new  association  consisted  from  various  Greek  cities,  for  car- 

of  .300:    but  tlio  conspirators  had  rvin<r   out   the   sentences  of  their 

already  orf^anised   a  band  of  121)  Vehniic  tribunal.    Tliuc.  viii.  G'J,  4. 

young    men   gathered   seemingly  ''  See  p.  9  et  seq. 


Chap.  VIII.]     THE  OLIGARCHICAL  REVOLUTION  435 

The  seltlsh  and  heartless  traitors,  wlio  had  thus  undone  the 
work  of  a  century,  were  to  receive  some  hard  and  wholesome 
lessons.  The  trusty  oligarchs,  who  found  assassination  Overtures 
a  vastly  more  convenient  instrument  than  long  and  Hunlredto 
troublesome  trials  in  courts  of  law,  were  now  supreme.  Agis. 
There  could  therefore  be  no  difficulty  in  adjusting  the  quarrel  with. 
Sparta,  and  no  hindrance  to  the  enjoyment  of  a  peace  sadly  needed 
to  recruit  the  exliausted  powers  of  Athens.  The  message  was 
accordingly  sent  in  full  confidence  to  Agis  at  Dekeleia,  and  by  him 
treated  with  contempt.'  Sending  for  a  large  reinforcement  to 
Sparta,  the  Spartan  king  allowed  sufficient  time  for  their  march  to 
the  Athenian  border  and  then  advanced  from  Dekeleia  in  the  hope 
tliat  the  present  confusion  within  the  city  might  even  enable  him 
to  carry  the  walls  by  storm.  He  found  himself  completely  mis- 
taken. There  was  no  slackening  in  the  watch,  and  some  of  the 
enemy  who  approached  too  close  paid  a  heavy  penalty  for  their 
rashness,  while  a  body  of  Athenian  hoplites,  bowmen,  and  light- 
armed  troops,  sallying  out,  caused  great  loss.  Agis  therefore  after 
a  wliile  sent  liis  Peloponnesian  reinforcement  home,  and  returned 
to  his  border  fortress,  whither  a  fresh  embassy  from  the  Four 
Hundred  soon  followed  him.  These  were  more  graciously  treated, 
and  received  permission  to  .send  envoys  to  make  their  wishes  known 
at  Sparta. 

But  the  tyrants  felt  that  their  work  was  but  half  done,  ratlier 
was  not  done  at  all,  so  long  as  they  failed  to  secure  the  co-operation 
of  the  army  of  Samos.  Envoys  were  accordingly  sent  Attempted 
to  assure  them  that  the  oligarchical  conspirators  had  "efJXu" 
acted  from  a  disinterested  generosity  which  looked  at  Samos. 
only  to  the  interests  of  the  city  and  the  empire  ;  that  they  liad 
done  away  with  a  cumbrous  and  impracticable  franchise,  securing 
at  the  same  time  a  great  saving  in  the  public  expenditure  ;  but 
that  the  governing  body,  being  still  five  thousand,  fully  represented 
the  whole  mass  of  the  people.  Before  they  could  reach  Samos, 
the  traitors  in  that  island  had  set  in  motion  the  machinery  which 
Antiphon  had  worked  so  successfully  at  home.  Some  few  of  the 
Samians,  who  scarcely  a  year  ago  had  taken  part  in  the  democratic 
revolution,  were  induced  to  join  the  plot."  The  brave  work  was 
begun  by  the  murder  of  Hyperbolos,  who  had  been  ostracised  by 
the  combined  partisans  of  Alkibiades  and  Nikias  certainly  six,  and 
perhaps  even  ten,  years  earlier.  Sundry  other  like  things  they 
did,  the  historian  tells  us  ;  and  they  were  fast  maturing  their 
scheme  for  putting  down  the  opposition  of  the  adverse  majority. 
In  all  likelihood,  their  plans  might  have  been  carried  out,  liad  it 

'  Tbuc.  viii.  71.  ""  Thuc.  viii.  73,  2. 


436  THE  EMPIRE  OP  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

not  been  for  the  precautions  taken  by  Leon  and  Diomedon,  the 
commanders  sent  out  on  the  suggestion  of  Peisandros  to  supersede 
the  oligarchic  Phrynichos.'  Honestly  attached  to  the  law  and 
constitution  of  Athens,  these  men  never  quitted  Samos  without 
leaving  behind  them  some  ships  to  keep  guard  against  oligarchical 
inti-iguers ;  and  they  were  ably  and  zealously  seconded  by  the 
trierarch  Thrasylos  and  by  Thrasyboulos  then  serving  as  a  hoplite 
in  the  army.  Roused  by  the  earnest  requests  made  to  them,  these 
men  canvassed  the  army  presonally,  praying  them  not  only  to  guard 
the  laws  of  Athens,  but  not  to  let  go  their  hold  on  Sainos  which 
had  now  become  the  mainstay  of  her  empire.  The  sincerity  of  the 
men  whom  they  addressed  was  attested  by  the  heartiness  of  their 
answers ;  and  tlms  when  the  oligarchs  ventured  to  trust  the 
issue  to  the  dagger  or  the  sword,  they  were  met  by  a  resistance 
which  cost  them  the  lives  of  thirty  of  their  number.  Tlie  victors 
were  more  generous  than  the  vanquished  deserved,  more  generous 
than  sound  policy  required  that  they  should  be.  Three  only  of 
those  who  were  most  guilty  were  banished  ;  the  rest  were  allowed 
to  remain  unmolested  under  tlie  rule  of  the  demos  which  they  had 
souglit  to  subvert.  In  the  entliusiasm  of  the  moment  tliey  dis- 
patched tlie  Paralian  trireme  with  Chaireas,  the  son  of  Archestratos, 
to  Athens  with  a  report  of  what  had  taken  place.  They  sailed 
ignorantly  into  the  lion's  den.  As  soon  as  they  landed,  some  few 
of  the  men  were  imprisoned  by  the  Four  Hundred  ;  the  rest  were 
placed  in  another  ship  and  ordered  to  cruise  about  Euboia. 
Chaireas  contrived  to  make  his  escape,  and  hastening  to  Samos, 
informed  the  army  that  Athens  was  in  the  hands  of  tyrants  who 
were  scourging  the  citizens  and  insulting  their  wives  and  children, 
and  whose  intention  was  to  imprison  and  to  put  to  death  those  of 
the  army  who  were  not  prepared  to  submit  to  tlieir  dictation.'^ 

The  escape  of  Chaireas  was  followed  by  results  which  showed 
that  the  tyrants  had  committed  a  blunder  in  not  putting  him  to 
Detcrmina-  dcatli.  An  oatl)  inforced  l>y  the  most  solenni  sanctions 
tionoftiie      was  taken  bv  everv  soldier  in  the  army  that  he  would 

Athonians  .^.,-  "         ,         ,,  ..•^  i-ii.-  r 

in  Samos  maintain  harmony  under  the  ancient  constitution  or 
to  inaintniii  Athens,  that  he  would  vigorously  carry  on  the  war, 
tntion.  and  that  he  would  have  no  dealings   with  the  Four 

Hundred,  who  w'cre  denounced  as  public  enen::es. 

Put  the  citizens  assembled  at  Samos  did  even  more.  In  a  formal 
assembly  it  was  ruled  that  as  the  demos  at  Athens  had  been 
forcibly  put  down,  the  lawful  administration  of  government  de- 
volved upon  themselves,  and  that  they  in  fact  constituted  the  true 
Athens.     Exercising  thus  their  undoubted  rights  of  citizenship, 

^  Thuc.  viii.  54.  '  lb.  viii.  74,  3. 


Chap.  VIII.]    THE  OLIGARCHICAL  REVOLUTION.  437 

they  deposed  such  of  their  generals  and  trierarchs  as  wei-e  suspected 
of  being  concerned  witli  the  oUgarchical  conspiracy,  Tbrasyboulos 
and  Thrasylos  being  among  the  officers  chosen  in  their  Resoiutiou 
place.  Tlie  assembly  vvus  one  worthy  of  tbat  great  name  ^eusat^Sa- 
of  Athens  which  Nikias  knew  better  how  to  invoke  mos  to  treat 
than  to  defend.'  Unlike  the  contemptible  or  starving  revolted''*** 
senators  who  Qonsented  to  abandon  their  trust  for  a  *^^^y- 
pittance  held  out  to  them  by  traitors,  the  speakers  in  the  Samian 
council  declared  with  memorable  terseness  that  Athens  had  re- 
volted from  them,  and  that  this  fact  could  not  humiliatp  and 
should  not  discourage  those  who  had  had  nothing  to  do  with  her 
apostasy.  There  was  no  need  to  change  their  position  in  order  to 
carry  on  the  war.  Nay  because  her  army  and  fleet  had  found  a 
sure  refuge  in  Samos  and  friends  to  be  trusted  to  the  uttermost  in 
the  Samians,  therefore  and  oidy  therefore  was  the  mouth  of  the 
Peiraieus  kept  open  for  the  conveyance  of  supplies  to  a  town  which 
nmst  otherwise  soon  be  starved  out.  The  traitors  of  Athens  were 
thus  really  in  their  power,  for  they  might  at  anv  moment  sail  from 
Samos  and  block  up  the  harbor  themselves.  If  again  their  thought 
was  for  money,  the  city  since  the  Sicilian  disasters  had  been  able  to 
do  but  little  for  them.  In  few  words,  the  conspirators  at 
Athens  had  sinned  by  setting  at  naught  the  laws  of  their  fathers  ; 
it  was  the  business  of  the  citizens  at  Samos  to  keep  those  laws  and 
to  compel  these  traitors  to  keep  them. 

Such  was  the  attitude  of  the  Athenians  in  Samos  when  the  ten 
envoys  of  the  Four  Hundred  reached  Delos  and  heard  the  report 

that  the  citizens  serving  in  Samos  would   have  nothina;   ^,    ^. 

1         -ii     xi  I-  1  •  mi  1,       Election  of 

to  do  with  the    ougarchic    usurpers,      ihey  naturally   Aikibiades 

hesitated  to  go  further,  fearing  probably  most  of  all   w^'f^'^cfti- 
that  the   influence  of  Aikibiades  might  be  set  in  the   zens  at 
scale  against  them.     At  flrst  it  seemed  unlikely  that   ^^^°^- 
their  fears  would  be   realised.     The  main   body  of  the  citizens 
at  Samos  was   greatly  opposed  to  his  restoration  ;  and  it  needed 
all  the  eloquence  and    energy  of  Tbrasyboulos  to  induce  them 
to  consent  to  his  recall.^     But  Tbrasyboulos  was  as  firmly  con- 
vinced, as  the  oligarchic  envoys  had  been,  that  Aikibiades  could 
do  what  he   pleased  with  Tissaphernes,  and  that  the  salvation   of 
Athens  depended  on  her  obtaining  foreign  aid,  or  at  the  least  in 
detaching  Persia    from  the    alliance  with    Sparta.     Under   this 
conviction  he  went  to  Magnesia  and  brought  back  Aikibiades  to 
Samos.    The  narrative  of  his  introduction  to  the  assembly  is  painful 
not  so  much  for  the  glibness  of  the  lies  strung  together  by  this 
consummate  traitor  as  for  the  pitiable  credulity  of  his  hearers.    To 

'  Thiic.  vii.  G4,  3.     See  p.  40L  '  Time.  viii.  81. 


438  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  HL 

the  oligarclis  he  liad  said  that  on  no  consideration  would  he  again 
set  foot  on  Attic  soil  until  the  demos  which  had  driven  him  into 
exile  should  be  put  down  :'  speaking  to  the  people,  he  laid  the 
blame  of  his  calamities  not  upon  them  but  upon  his  own  unhappy 
destiny.  He  had  told  the  oligarchs  that  the  suppression  of  the 
democratic  constitution  was  the  one  indispensable  condition  for 
Avinning  the  thorough  conlidence  of  the  Persian  king  :  to  the  people 
he  not  only  uttered  no  hint  that  any  such  condition  Avas  required, 
but  he  described  in  moving  terms  the  absorbing  anxiety  of  Tissa- 
phernes  to  secure  the  close  friendship  of  democratic  Athens.  All 
Avho  lieard  him  were  too  much  carried  away  by  the  heated  fancies 
of  the  moment  to  question  his  facts  or  to  see  that  he  had  a  triple 
motive  in  thus  parading  his  supposed  influence  with  the  Persian 
satrap.  If  his  statements  could  only  be  credited,  they  would  strike 
terror  into  the  oligarchs  at  xVthens  and  paralyse  the  action  of  the 
Clubs  in  the  city  ;  they  Avould  encourage  the  array  in  Samos  and 
impress  them  with  a  due  sense  of  his  importance  ;  lastly  they  Avould 
have  the  effect  of  sowing  mistrust  between  Tissaphernes  and  his 
Peloponnesian  allies,  and  of  disappointing  the  bright  hopes  of  the 
Spartans.  So  greedily  Avcre  his  words  received  by  his  hearers  that 
before  the  assembly  dispersed  he  Avas  appointed  general,  and  a 
strong  wish  was  expressed  to  sail  at  once  to  the  Peiraieus  and 
punish  the  men  avIio  had  subverted  the  constitution.  From  this 
course  Alkibiades  strongly  dissuaded  them,  lie  had  a  part  to  play 
Avith  Tissaphernes,  and  in  order  to  get  aAvay  he  promised  to  return 
so  soon  as  he  should  have  concerted  Avith  him  the  necessary 
measures  for  carrying  on  the  Avar.^ 

But  before  the  return  of  Alkibiades  to  Magnesia,  the  oligarchic 
euA'oys,  who  had  felt  their  bravery  oozing  away  at  Dclos,  ventured 
Reception  of  Oil  presenting  themselves  to  the  assembly  of  the  citizens 
chk'envovs  '^^  Saiiios.  They  were  received  Avith  a  storm  of  iiidig- 
at Samos."  nation  which  threatened  their  lives;  but  Avhen  at 
length  they  Averc  allowed  to  speak,  they  delivered  themselves  of  the 
comforting  message  with  Avhich  they  liad  been  charged,^  adding 
some  comments  Avhich  recent  incidents  seemed  to  call  for.  The 
manifest  liatred  of  the  army  for  government  by  a  club  of  tyrants 
drew  forth  the  assurance  that  all  the  Five  Thousand  Avould  take 
tlieir  place  in  turn  in  the  Council  of  the  Four  Hundred  :  but  Avitli 
special  earnestness  they  inveighed  against  the  monstrous  liesAvith 
whicl),  as  they  insisted,  Chaireas  had  rheated  the  citizens  in  Samos. 
There  was  no  intention  whatever  of  doing  the  least  harm  to  their 
wives,  their  children,  or  their  kinsfolk  ;  nor  could  the  charges  of 
past  ill-treatment  be  sustained.     The  assassination  of   men  Avho 

'  rice  p.  427.  '  Time.  viii.  81,  83.  '  See  p.  435. 


Chap.  VIII.]    THE  OLIGARCHICAL  REVOLUTION.  439 

were  honestly  attached  to  the  constitution  of  Athens  was  a  subject 
on  which  it  was  best  to  be  silent ;  and  about  this  therefore  they 
said  nothing.  Their  lame  and  stumbling  apology  rather  inflamed 
than  soothed  the  angry  feelings  of  their  hearers,  of  whom  a  large 
majority  insisted  on  immediate  return  to  Peiraieus  to  punish  the 
traitors  and  to  nndo  their  work.  Against  this  plan  Alkibiades 
threw  the  whole  weight  of  his  influence  ;  and  the  people  accord- 
ingly gave  it  up.  Pacifying  the  assembly  as  well  as  he  could, 
Alkibiades  bade  the  envoys  of  the  Four  Hundred  go  back  and  tell 
their  masters  that  they  must  yield  up  their  power  to  the  Five 
Hundred  whom  they  had  thrust  out  of  the  Senate-house  ;  that  to 
the  rule  of  the  Five  Thousand,  if  these  were  a  reality  and  not  a 
sham,  no  objection  would  be  made  ;  and  that  for  any  retrenchments 
which  should  leave  more  means  for  carrying  on  the  war  vigorously 
the  Athenians  at  Samos  could  feel  only  gratitude  to  their  kinsmen 
at  home. 

The  tidings  brought  from  Samos  by  the  envoys  soon  brought  to 
the  surface  those  elements  of  disunion  which  Timcydides  admits 
to  be  the  bane  of  oligarchical  governments  based  on  the    _ 
ruins  of  a  democracy.     It  was  clear  tluit  the  people  at   of  Thera- 
home  were  oidy  waiting  for  an  opportunity  to  shalce    ^le'^cmmdl 
off  the  yoke  of  their  tyrants:  it  was  still  more  clear   of  the  Four 
that  in  the  people  at  Samos  the  Four  Hundred  had  to 
deal  with  a  force  of  resolute  and  uncompromising  enemies.    Among 
the  most  prominent  in  the  active  work  of  the  conspiracy  had  been 
Theramenes  and  Aristokrates  ;  but  their  share  of  power  and  of  the 
fruits  of  power  was  by  no  means  on  the  same  scale,  and  they  could 
not  but  remember  that  they  belonged  to  a  society  in  which  each 
man  avowedly  was  strictly  for  himself.     It  was  only  natural  there- 
fore that  the  eyes  of  these  men  and  of  others  like  them   should 
now  be  opened  to  the  vast  importance  of  making  the  Five  Thousand 
a  reality, — in  other  words,  of  restoring  practically  the  old  demo- 
cracy, for  as  these  Five  Thousand  had  been  thus  far  an  indefinite 
quantity,  so  an  indefinite  quantity  they  would  remain. 

The  tactics  of  Theramenes  warned  those  of  their  colleagues  who 
were  hopelessly  committed  to  tlic  usurpation  of  the  Four  Hundred, 
that  the  resistance  with  whicli  they  were  threatened 
must  be  put  down  at  once,  and,  if  need  be,  put  down  of^Eetionia" 
by  force.  One  attempt  to  send  ambassadors  to  Sparta  jiv  ^Y  ^"""^ 
had  miscarried  through  their  own  folly  in  committing 
them  to  men  who  had  delivered  them  as  prisoners  to  the  Argives. 
It  was  therefore  only  the  more  necessary  to  send  off  others  charged 
peremptorily  to  conclude  a  peace  on  whatever  terms  and  at  what- 
ever cost.'  On  this  errand,  loathsome  to  the  ruder  feelings  of  the 
'Thuc.  viii.  90,  3. 


440  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  HI. 

dt'inos,  vet  orateful,  it  would  seoin,  to  tlie  refined  and  cnltured 
tastes  of  p]npatvids,  I'liryniclios  and  Antiphon  departed  with  ten 
others,  while  their  accomplices  at  home  set  to  work  to  prepare  a 
place  for  the  enemy,  by  raising  a  fortress  on  the  mole  Eetionia, 
which  ran  out  on  the  nortli  side  of  the  artificially  narrowed  mouth 
of  tlie  I'eiraieus. 

There  remained,  in  truth,  for  the  Spartans  nothing  more  to  do 
hut  to  take  possession  on  their  own  terras.  It  is  more  tlian  possible 
^  ,.  that  the  very  ahiectness  of  the  envoys  may  have  made 
of  tlie  fort  the  ephors  feaiful  of  being  caught  in  some  trap  ;  but 
uiththe'"*  ^vhatever  may  have  been  the  cause,  the  traitt)rs  were 
ennctionof  dismissed  with  nothing  more  than  a  promise  that  a 
^''^^  fleet  should  pass  the  Athenian  harbor  on  its  way  to 
Euboia.  The  Four  Hundred  were  naturally  anxious  that  their 
fortress  should  be  finished  before  this  fleet  should  appear  ;  but  the 
secret  of  its  coming  could  not  be  kept  from  Theramcncs,  who  dis- 
tinctly protested  against  the  erection  of  the  fort  as  part  of  a  scheme 
arranged  in  concert  with  the  Spartans.  The  return  of  the  ambas- 
sadors stirred  the  people  still  more  deeply  ;  and  the  oligarchs  were 
now  to  learn  that  others  besides  themselves  could  use  their  favorite 
weapons.  In  the  open  market-place  and  in  the  middle  of  the  day 
Phrynichos  was  struck  down  by  a  man  belonging  to  the  force  of 
hoplites  employed  in  the  garrison  duty  of  Attica.  Reiulered 
bolder  by  the  impunity  Avhich  attended  this  crime,  Theramenes 
insisted  that  the  Spartan  fleet  which  had  now  come  to  Aigina  and 
thence  fallen  back  on  Epidauros  could  not  possibly  be  going 
straight  to  Euboia.  His  language  roused  an  ungovernable  excite- 
ment The  hoplites  employed  in  building  the  fort  of  Eetionia 
had  all  along  hated  their  work  and  had  toiled  under  the  conviction 
that  they  were  by  it  inslaving  themselves.  But  they  were  work- 
ing under  the  orders  of  the  general  Alexikles  :  and  furious  oligarch 
though  lie  was,  Alexikles  had  for  them  the  authority  of  a  law 
which  they  were  bound  to  obey.  Their  patience,  however,  liad 
now  reached  its  limits :  and  possibly  they  were  told  by  Aristo- 
krates'  that  they  had  obeyed  him  far  too  long.  Alexikles  was 
seized  and  shut  up  in  a  house  by  the  hoi>litcs,  who  were  aided  by 
the  ])olice  at  Monnychia  under  their  captain  Ilermun.  Receiving 
tlie  tidings  of  this  outrage  as  they  sat  in  their  council-chamber,  the 
Four  IIundre<l  roundly  charged  Tlieramenes  with  having  brought 
it  about.  Theraiiicnes  re[)lied  that,  if  they  wished,  he  would  go 
at  once  and  rescue  the  ])risoncr.  To  the  Peiraieus  accordingly  he 
went  with  one  of  the  strategoi  whom  he  could  trust.  Thither  also 
went  Aristarclios,  a  furious  partisan  of  the  oligarchy,  with  a  body 
of  young  horsemen.  Athens  and  Peiraieus  were  I'ow  both  in 
'  Thuc.  viii.  91,  4. 


Chap.  VIII.]     THE  OLIGARCHICAL  REVOLUTION.  441 

tumult.  A  battle  was  prevented  only  by  the  interference  of  some 
of  the  more  aged  citizens,  wiio  warned  the  people  against  the 
desperate  madness  of  civil  strife,  wliile  the  enemy  was  almost  at 
their  gates.  Meanwhile  Tlieramenes,  having  reached  Eetionia, 
addressed  the  people  in  pretended  anger.  Aristarchos  reviled  thetn 
in  more  real  rage.  But  the  fear  of  attack  grew  less  with  every 
moment's  delay  ;  and  the  hoplites  boldly  asked  Theramenes  to  tell 
them  plainly  whether  it  would  not  be  well  to  demolish  the  fortress. 
There  was  no  need  to  affect  scruples  here  which  he  had  cast  away 
even  in  the  Senate-house  ;  and  the  general  by  his  side  was  ready 
to  sanction  the  demolition  to  which  Theramenes  would  interpose 
no  hindrance.  With  impetuous  eagerness  the  hoplites  set  to  work 
to  throw  down  the  walls  which  they  had  been  compelled  to  raise, 
and  all  were  invited  to  join  in  the  task  who  wished  that  the  Five 
Thousand  should  be  put  in  place  of  the  Four  Hundred. 

In  fear  and  trembling  the  Four  Hundred  assembled  on  the  follow- 
ing day  in  their  council-chamber,  while  the  hoplites  from  Feiraieus, 
dismissing  Alexikles  unhurt  after  the  destruction  of  the  Defeat  of 
fort,  took  their  station  in  the  Anakeion  at  the  base  of  the  Tiiymocha- 
Akropolis  on  its  northern  side.  Here  they  were  joined  voit  of 
by  some  emissaries  of  the  Four  Hundred,  who  mingling  Euboia. 
freely  with  the  hoplites  besought  them  to  keep  order  and  promised 
that  the  list  of  the  Five  Thousand  should  be  published,  still  falsely 
implying  that  this  list  had  really  been  drawn  up.  They  renewed, 
further,  the  pledge  that  the  appointment  of  the  Four  Hundred 
should  be  in  the  hands  of  the  larger  body.  AVith  singular  modera- 
tion the  people  accepted  the  compromise.  A  day  was  fixed  for 
an  assembly  of  the  people  in  the  theatre  of  Dlonysos  at  the  southern 
end  of  the  wall  of  the  Akropolis  ;  and  on  that  day  the  citizens 
were  gathered  and  the  debate  had  all  but  begun  Avhen  it  was 
announced  that  the  Spartan  fleet  was  off  the  coast  of  Salamis.  At 
once  and  by  all  present  the  fact  was  coupled  with  the  warnings 
of  Theramenes,  and  rushing  down  to  Peiraieus,  some  hurried  into 
the  triremes  already  launched,  while  other  ships  were  hauled  down 
to  the  water.  But  it  was  no  part  of  the  plan  of  the  Spartan  com- 
mander Agesandridas  to  risk  a  battle  off  Peiraieus  ;  and  seeing 
that  a  surprise  was  not  to  be  thought  of  he  went  on  his  way,  and  on 
the  next  day  reached  Oropos.  At  once  the  Athenians  saw  that 
this  squadron  was  intended  to  cover  the  revolt  of  Euboia  ;  and  now 
that  Attica  itself  was  beleaguered,  Euboia  was  to  them  everything. 
At  all  risks  then  they  must  hasten  to  its  defence  :  and  with  heavy 
hearts  they  must  have  felt  that  the  risk  was  indeed  appalling. 
Reaching  Eretria  a  few  hours  after  Agesandridas  had  disembarked 
at  Oropos,  Thymochares  hoped  that  he  might  have  time  to  refresh 
his  wearied  and  hungry  crews.  But  the  Agora  of  the  Eretrians 
19* 


44<4  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  IIL 

was  purposely  empty  :  and  Avhile  the  men  in  tlieir  search  for  food 
straggled  even  to  the  ends  of  the  town,  a  signal  raised  at  Eretria 
warned  Agesandridas  that  the  time  for  attack  was  come.  His  own 
men  were  fresh  and  well-fed,  and  his  ships  had  crossed  the  narrow 
strait  while  the  Athenians  were  still  scattered  through  the  city. 
Six-and-thirty  ships  hastened  as  best  they  could  to  encounter  the 
Spartan  fleet ;  two-and-twenty  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy, 
their  crews  being  all  slain  or  taken  prisoners.  The  Athenian  fleet 
was,  in  fact,  destroyed  :  and  the  revolt  of  all  Euboia  except  Oreos, 
which  was  still  held  by  Athenian  Klerouchoi,'  crowned  the  schemes 
of  the  murderers  who  looked  down  calmly  from  their  council- 
chamber  on  their  awful  handiwork. 

According  to  their  own  philosophy  oligarchs  might  aSord  to  do 
so.  But  for  the  people,  wliose  life-blood  they  had  poured  out  like 
water,  the  revolt  of  Euboia  seemed  to  bring  with  it  the 
tion  at  '  day  of  doom.  Even  liad  there  been  a  plethora  of  ships, 
Uie^defeat  "^*^"  wcrc. lacking  to  man  them  ;  and  xVthens  herself 
ofThymo-  was  tom  by  factions  wliicli  at  any  moment  might  be 
locked  in  bloody  conflict.  The  town  was  indeed  de- 
fenceless ;  and  for  a  second  time  in  the  space  of  a  few  weeks  a 
Spartan  fleet  and  army  might  have  crushed  the  once  imperial  city 
almost  without  a  struggle.  But  the  great  catastrophe  was  to  be 
delayed  yet  a  little  longer,  and  the  respite  came  through  that 
singular  slowness  and  dulness  which,  in  the  emphatic  words  of 
the  historian,  made  the  Spartans  the  most  convenient  of  all 
enemies  for  the  quick-witted  and  prompt  Athenians,  who  found  in 
the  Syracusans  foes  not  much  less  energetic  than  themselves  and 
suffered  at  their  hands  accordingly.'^ 

Twenty  ships  only  were  the  Athenians  able  to  bring  together,' 
but  happily  they  were  not  culled  upon  to  encounter  any  enemy. 
The  gup-  Agesandridas  allowed  the  opportunity  to  slip;  and  the 
pret^sionof  Athenians  were  enabled  to  flx  their  minds  on  the 
of  the  Four  restoration  of  order  and  law.  In  an  assembly  held  in 
Hundred.  ^[^q  l*nyx,  the  Four  Hundred  were  solemnly  deposed 
and  the  elastic  company  of  Five  Thousand  su])stituted  in  their  place. 
No  attempt  was  made  to  publish  any  list  of  the  men  included  in 
this  number.  All  who  supplied  their  own  arms  or  who  furnished 
arms  for  others  could  claim  to  be  reckoned  among  them.  The 
miserable  conspiracy  was  at  last  put  down  ;  and  Athens  once 
more  lived  under  the  polity  of  Kleisthenes  and  Perikles. 

Thus  was  accomplished,  seemingly  amidst  the  death-throes  of 
the  state,  a  change  which  re-a.sserted  the  sui)remacy  of  law  :  and 

'  These     Klerouclioi     had    held     Time.  i.  114. 
Histiaiotis  from  th«!tinie  of  the  re-        ^  Thuc.  viii.  96,  5. 
ci'iiquest  of  tlie  island  by  Perikles.         ^  lb.  viii.  97,  1. 


Chap.  VIII.]     THE  OLIGARCHICAL  REVOLUTION.  443 

it  was  accomplished  witli  a  sobriety  and  calmness  which  calls 
forth  the  enthusiastic  eulogy  of  Thucydides.'  Nor,  if  we  survey 
the  whole  circumstances  of  the  time,  can  we  say  that  Restoration 
his  praise  was  undeserved.  If  the  citizens  at  Samos  ^henian'de-'* 
deserve  any  censure,  they  are  to  blame  for  taking  no  mocracy. 
further  guarantees  from  the  oligarchs  whom  they  had  mastered 
than  the  mere 'banishment  of  two  or  three  of  their  number.  Ir 
again  the  hoplites  of  the  Peiraieus  are  to  be  blamed,  it  would  be 
for  letting  Alexildes  go  instead  of  putting  Aristarchos  along  with 
him  into  safe  durance  and  taking  good  care  that  their  fellow-con- 
spiratoi's  should  not  escape  to  renew  their  mischief  at  Athens  or  to 
carry  on  their  intrigues  and  treachery  elsewhere.  It  was  only 
through  the  most  incredible  sluggishness  of  the  Spartans  that 
Athens  was  not  now  held  by  a  Peloponnesian  garrison ;  and  if, 
after  treachery  which,  if  committed  by  the  peers  and  gentlemen 
of  England,  v^ould  rouse  in  the  whole  mass  of  the  people  an  im- 
placable wrath,  the  Athenians  showed  themselves  ready  to  live 
peaceably  with  their  tormentors,  this  is  assuredly  one  of  the  most 
a.stonishing  facts  recorded  in  any  history. 

For  the  Four  Hundred,  indeed,  it  was  a  fortunate  thing  that 
their  usurpation  was  repressed  in  some  part  by  the  co-operation  of 
men  belonging  to  their  own  side.  If  Theramcnes  and  ,j,j.jjj,  .^^^^ 
his  helpers  had  not  been  concerned  in  restoring  the  execution  of 
democracy,  the  people  would  have  been  free  to  search  "  '^ 
out  and  punish  the  murderers  of  Androklesandof  all  later  victims 
of  the  oligarchic  bravoes.  As  it  was,  the  one  act  laid  to  their 
chai'ge  was  the  sending  of  the  last  embassy  to  Sparta  to  offer  a 
peace  clogged  by  no  conditions ;  and  for  this  charge  Theramenes 
to  his  own  future  cost  came  forward  as  the  accuser.  But  of  the 
men  thus  accused,  one  had  passed  beyond  the  reach  of  earthly  law. 
Phrynichos,  the  man  who  with  the  clearness  of  Balaam  saw  his 
duty  and  deliberately  defied  it,  had  paid  the  penalty  of  his  crimes 
with  his  life.  Three  only,  Antiphon,  Onomakles,  and  Archep- 
tolemos,  remained  at  Athens.  The  two  last  may  have  thought  that 
their  sins  might  be  condoned  :  the  hardihood  of  Antiphon  who 
must  have  known  that  he  at  least  had  sinned  unpardonably  is 
scarcely  consistent  with  his  sagacity  and  practical  wisdom.  The 
decree  was  passed  for  their  apprehension  and  for  their  trial,  which 
was  to  be  conducted  according  to  all  the  forms  of  the  polity  of 
Perikles ;  but  before  the  writ  could  be  executed  Onomakles,  who 
had  been  a  colleague  of  Phrynichos  at  Samos,"  seems  to  have  made 
his  escape.  The  other  two  were  brought  before  the  tribunal  of  the 
people,  were  condemned  and  executed.     Their  houses  were  I'azed, 

^  Thuc.  viii.  97,  3.  » lb.  viii.  25. 


444  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III, 

tlieir  property  confiscated,  their  cliildren  deprived  of  citizenship ; 
and  any  citizen  who  might  adopt  any  of  their  descendants  was  to 
lose  at  once  liis  own  franchise.  The  injustice  done  to  the  guiltless 
may  rouse  a  righteous  indignation  ;  hut  the  harshness  of  Athenian 
law  was  not  worse  than  the  tender  mercies  of  an  English  attainder. 
At  the  least  the  criminals  themselves  wei'e  fairly  tried  :  nor  can 
the  Dikasteries  which  condemned  them  on  overwhelming  evidence 
be  compared  with  tlic  slavisli  juries  which  sanctioned  a  series  of 
judicial  murders  at  the  bidding  of  Jeffreys  or  Scroggs. 

While  Athens  was  thus  convulsed  by  the  usurpations  and 
violence  of  a  knot  of  traitors,  the  history  of  Tissaphernes  and  his 
-  ,  .  .  Spartan  allies  exhibited  the  workino-  of  suspicion  on 
movements  the  onc  side  and  of  discontent  fast  passing  into  indig- 
nl-iii aiidPe-  "^tion  on  the  other.  For  eighty  days  the  Peloponnc- 
loponuegian  siau  fleet  had  been  in  absolute  inaction  in  Rhodes; 
and  the  men  became  daily  more  and  more  convinced 
that  the  promise  of  a  Phenician  fleet  to  reinforce  them  was  a  mere 
lie  and  cheat.  So  formidable  indeed  seemed  the  attitude  of  the 
Peloponnesians  and  their  allies,  and  so  loud  the  complaints  of  the 
Syracusans  especially  against  the  slender  and  infrequent  pay  doled 
out  to  them,  that  Astyochos  was  compelled  to  move  his  fleet  from 
Miletos  and  again  challenge  the  enemy  to  battle.  But  as  they  ap- 
proached the  promontory  of  Mykale  with  112  ships,  the  Athenians 
with  their  82  triremes  stationed  off  Glauke  thought  themselves  not 
justified  in  risking  a  general  engagement.  On  the  next  day  the 
return  of  Slronibichides  raised  the  Athenian  fleet  to  110  ships;  and 
thus,  nearly  matched  in  numbers,  they  advanced  in  order  of  battle 
against  the  Spartans,  who  now  in  their  turn  declined  the  contest.' 

If  even  this  poor  and  negative  check  brought  some  comfort  and 
encouragement  to  the  Athenians,  it  caused  in  the  Peloponnosian 
Revolt  of  camp  still  greater  indignation  against  the  neglect  or 
Byzaiition      treachery  of    Tissaphernes,   and    led  the  Spartans  to 

from  Athens.  ,■,  ■    ■>       / .i  ^  ■  i     i.     iV,  i 

think  of  the  more  generous  promises  made  to  them  by 
the  Ilellespontine  satrap  Pharnabazos.  To  him  accordingly  a 
squadron  of  40  ships  Avas  sent  under  Klearchos  who  had  received 
his  commission  at  Sparta  for  this  very  service.^  lie  set  out  with 
the  hope  not  only  of  abundant  j)ay  for  liis  men,  but  of  detaching 
Byzantion  from  its  connexion  with  Athens.  At  first  this  result 
seemed  little  likely.  The  necessity  of  avoiding  the  Athenian  fleet 
compelled  him  to  keep  out  at  sea,  and  a  severe  .storm  drove  most 
of  the  shi[)S  to  Dclos  whence  they  made  their  way  back  to  Mihitos. 
Klearchos,  not  to  ])e  thus  battled,  went  to  the  Hellespont  by  land, 
and  the  Megariaii  general  Ilelixos,  sailing  with  ten  ships  to 
Byzantion,  brought  about  the  revolt  of  that  city. 

"  Thuc.  viii.  79.  '  lb.  viii.  39. 


Chap.  VIII.]     THE  OLIGARCHICAL  REVOLUTION.  445 

The  departure  of  KIcarclio.s  and  Helixos  for  the  Hellespont  in 
no  way  improved  the  state  of  things  in  the  Peloponnesian  camp  at 
Miletos.  Not  only  had  Tissaphernes  become  still  more  Tumults  in 
slack  in  his  payments  since  they  had  refused  the  campa'r'"" 
challenge  of  the  Athenian  fleet;  but  the  Athenians  Miletos. 
themselves  had  become  far  more  formidable  from  the  patriotic 
enthusiasm  av^akened  by  the  suppression  of  the  oligarchic  con- 
spiracy. Tlie  discontent  of  the  army  was  no  longer  expressed  by 
mere  murmurs.  The  Spartans  at  home  were  also  wearied  out  with 
the  lethargy  wliich  seemed  to  have  come  over  their  armyin  the 
East;  and  Mindaros  Avas  sent  to  take  the  place  of  Astyochos.  In 
Astyochos  Tissaphernes  felt  that  he  was  losing  a  friend  whose 
departure  might  be  most  inconvenient  to  him,  and  whose  recall 
sliov/ed  that  not  much  I'eliance  could  be  placed  on  his  influence  at 
Sparta.  The  satrap,  therefore,  sent  with  him  a  special  envoy  both 
to  lay  a  complaint  against  tlie  Milesians  for  destroying  Ins  fort  in 
their  city,  and  more  particularly  to  counteract  the  indignant  re- 
monstrances of  the  Milesians  and  the  Syracusan  Hermokrates  by 
explaining  his  position  and  his  motives. 

But  Tissaphernes  felt  that  something  more  was  needed  than  the 
dispatch  of  an  envoy  to  Sparta.  He  knew  that  the  Phenician  fleet 
either  had  reached  or  would  soon  reach  Aspendos,  and  Djgniissalof 
he  therefore  invited  Lichas  to  accompany  him  thither  thePiieni- 
and  come  back  with  the  force  which  Avas  to  turn  the  fiom  Aspen- 
scale  decisively  against  Athens.  Mindaros,  not  yet  '^°^- 
versed  in  the  artifices  of  the  game  in  which  the  satrap  thought 
liimself  an  adept,  saw  with  satisfaction  the  departure  of  Liclias, 
while  Tamos  remained  as  the  deputy  of  Tissaphernes  to  furnish 
regular  payments  to  the  Peloponnesians  and  their  allies.  The 
voyage  to  Aspendos,  it  needs  scarcely  to  be  said,  was  only  a  fresli 
trick  to  gain  time  and  to  exhaust  both  the  Athenians  and  their 
enemies.  Mindaros  and  Lichas  were  thoroughly  fooled.  As  a 
paymaster,  Tamos  was  even  worse  than  Tissaphernes,  while  Tissa- 
I)hernes  himself,  having  brouglit  the  Phenician  fleet  to  the  Pam- 
phylian  coast,  kept  it  there  for  a  while  and  then  sent  it  home  again. 
But  if  Tissaphernes  cheated  Mindaros  still  furtlier  by  receiving 
Pliilippos  wlio  had  been  sent  by  Mindaros  with  two  triremes  to  join 
Lichas,  he  was  in  turn  overreached  himself.  It  was  no  part  of  his 
plan  to  exasperate  the  resentment  already  felt  against  him  in  the 
Spartan  camp,  if  such  a  result  could  bo  avoided;  but  Alkibiades 
was  resolved  that  it  should  not  be  avoided.  This  unwearied 
schemer  was  Avell  aware  that  Tissaphernes  had  no  intention  of 
bringing  the  Phenician  fleet  into  action  ;  and  therefore  he  eagerly 
availed  himself  of  the  opportunity  by  promising  the  Athenians  at 
Samos  that  he  would  either  bring  up  the  Phenician  fleet  to  their 


446  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

help  or  prevent  it  from  coming  to  the  help  of  their  enemies. 
Sailing  to  Aspcndos  with  thirteen  triremes,  he  took  care  to  parade 
ostentatiously  his  close  intimacy  with  the  satrap  ;  and  as  the 
Phenician  fleet  was  not  alluwed  to  take  part  in  the  war,  the 
Athenians  believed  that  this  supposed  change  of  plan  was  due  to 
the  influence  of  Alkibiades. 

The  patience  of  Mindaros  reached  its  limit,  when  a  message 
trwm  Philippos  told  liim  that  the  Phenicians  were  actually  on  their 
Eevolt  of  '^^''^y  home.  Not  tied  by  tiie  bribes  which  had  corrupted 
the  Lesbian  Astyoclios,  he  resolved  at  once  to  close  with  the  more 
eoB  from  '^^'  tempting  offers  of  Pharnabazos,  Avho  promised  to  detach 
Athens.  from  Athens  all  the  Hellenic  cities  in  his  satrapy. 
Sixteen  Peloponnesian  ships  from  the  fleet  of  Mindaros  had  already 
reached  the  Hellespont  and  overrun  a  great  part  of  the  Chersonesos, 
and  thither  Mindaros  himself  now  prepared  to  make  his  way  with 
13  triremes.  He  succeeded  in  escaping  the  notice  of  the  Athenian 
guard-ships  off  Samos  :  but  a  severe  storm  carried  him  to  Ikaros 
and  kept  him  there  for  nearly  a  week  before  he  could  sail  to  Chios. 
Meanwhile  a  body  of  oligarchic  exiles  from  Methynma  had 
succeeded  in  making  Eresos  revolt  again  from  Athens.  Hastening 
thither,  the  Athenian  commander  Thrasylos  found  Thrasyboulos 
already  there  with  five  ships  from  Samos,  which  together  with 
two  triremes  returning  from  the  Hellespont  and  five  belonging  to 
Methymna  raised  his  fleet  to  67  vessels. 

In  full  confidence  that  the  movements  of  Mindaros  would  be 
carefully  and  speedily  reported  to  him,  Thrasylos  made  his  ])re- 
Voyagcof  parations  for  carrying  out  the  siege  of  Eresos  with  the 
th'e^Hdtes-*'  "tmost  vigor.  But  ins  calculations  were  disappointed, 
pont.  Aware  tluit  the  Athenians  were  on  the  look-out  in  the 

channel  between  Lesbos  and  the  mainland,  Mindaros  resolved  to 
keep  out  of  their  sight ;  and  having  reached  the  islets  of  Argen- 
noussai  unnoticed,  he  was  at  lihoiteion  at  the  entrance  of  the 
Hellespont  before  midnight  of  the  next  day.  Beacon  fires  kindled 
by  friends  and  foes  warned  the  Athenian  squadron  of  eighteen 
ships  at  Sestos  that  the  enemy's  fleet  had  passed  the  mouth  of 
the  strait  off  Sigcion.  To  be  thus  caught  in  a  trap  by  a  force 
perhaps  three  or  four  times  as  large  as  their  own  would  be 
ceitain  ruin  ;  but  this  ruin  they  could  not  by  whatever  speed  or 
skill  have  escaped  liad  it  not  been  that  the  orders  of  Mindaros 
kept  at  their  j>ost  the  sixteen  ships  which  were  on  guard  at 
Abydos.  The  Athenian  triremes  were  thus  enabled  to  make  their 
way  unmolested  to  Eiaious.  Here  they  still  were  when  morning 
made  them  visible  to  the  ships  of  Mindaros. 

By  the  cond)ined  I'elopoimesian  fleet  of  eighty-one  ships  the 
day  w£is  spent  m  an  iucfTectual  attempt  to  reduce  Eiaious,  from 


Chap.  VIIL]    THE  OLIGARCHICAL  REVOLUTION.  447 

which  place  they  sailed  to  Abydos.  Soon  afterwards  the  Athenian 
fleet  of  Thrasylos,  strengthened  by  the  ships  which  had  suc- 
ceeded in  escaping  from  Sestos,  took  up  its  station  at  The  battle 
Elaious,  numbering  now  7G  triremes.  Five  days  were  of  Kynos- 
spent  in  preparations  for  the  battle,  the  story  of  which 
may  be  dismissed  in  a  few  words.  The  decay  of  Athenian  power 
an  I  science  is  strikingly  proved  by  the  mere  choice  of  the  scene  of 
conflict.  In  single  line  the  Athenian  fleet  advanced  from  Elaious 
along  the  coast  of  Chersonesos,  and  drew  up  between  Idakos  and 
Arrhianoi,  unknown  places  lying  between  Elaious  and  Sestos,  when 
the  Sjjartan  fleet  advanced  to  meet  them  along  the  coastline  lying 
between  Abydos  and  Dardanos.  The  Peloponnesians  drove  back 
the  centre  of  the  Athenian  fleet  upon  the  shore  ;  but  here,  as  with 
the  troops  of  Demosthenes  in  the  night  attack  on  Epipolai,  success 
produced  disorder,  of  which  the  Athenian  general  Thrasyboulos 
speedily  took  advantage.  His  colleague,  Thrasylos,  who  had 
doubled  the  promontory  of  Kynossema,  or  the  Hound's  Grave,  and 
for  the  time  had  passed  out  of  sight,  returned  after  defeating  the 
Syracusan  squadron  under  Hermokrates,  and  gav^c  the  finishing 
stroke  to  the  victory.  The  whole  Peloponnesian  fleet  was  thus 
driven  back,  leaving  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy  eight  Chian  ships, 
five  from  Corinth,  two  belonging  to  the  Ambrakiots  and  Boiotians, 
and  one  to  each  of  the  several  states  of  Leukas,  Sparta,  Syracuse, 
and  Pellene, — twenty-one  in  all.  But  the  Athenians  had  lost 
fifteen  vessels,  and  thus  were  gainers  only  by  six. 

Compared  with  the  great  exploits  of  Phormion  and  Demosthenes, 
the  victory  was  poor  indeed  ;  but  to  the  Athenians  it  came  at  a 
time  when  their  spirit  was  almost  crushed  by  a  seem-  Moral  effects 
jngly  infinite  series  of  disasters,  and  it  exercised  on  "y  on^^tl/g '^*'' 
them  a  moral  influence  scarcely  less  than  that  which  Athenians, 
the  victory  of  Mantineia  had  exercised  over  the  Spartans.  The 
trireme  sent  home  with  the  tidings  was  received  with  unbounded 
delight.  The  depression  which  had  so  long  hung  about  them  as 
with  the  darkness  of  death  was  suddenly  dispelled  ;  and  they  felt 
that  the  hope  of  a  successful  issue  to  the  war  was  no  longer  a 
presumptuous  and  unreasonable  delusion. 


448  THE  EMPIEE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 


CB AFTER  IX. 

THE    PELOPONNESIAN  (dEKELEIAX    OR    IONIAN)  AVAR,    FROM    THE 

BATTLE    OF    KYNOSSEMA    TO    THE    BATTLE   OFF  THE  ISLANDS  OF 

ARGENNOUSSAI. 

The  battle  of  Kynossema  was  not  the  last  victory  won  by  Athenian 
fleets  in  the  war  -which  was  now  gradually  drawing  to  its  close. 
Change  in  ■'^"^  ^^^  whole  history  of  the  stiiiggle  after  the  Sicilian 
the  Athenian  expedition  sliows  that  Athens  had  reached  a  point 
c  arac  er.  ^f^gj.  -which  the  most  brilliant  successes  cease  to  pro- 
duce any  pernianent  results.  She  was,  in  fact,  involved  now  in  a 
contest  in  which  victory  was  impossible.  It  Avas  not  merely  that 
her  fleets  and  armies  had  been  destroyed,  and  her  revenues  l)ccome 
precarious.  Against  such  difhcultics  as  these  she  might  have 
struggled  successfully.  But  she  could  not  do  this  unless  she  was 
seconded  by  the  hearty  goodwill  of  the  gTeat  body  of  her  allies ; 
and  if  these  were  not  honestly  convinced  that  alliance  with  Athens 
was  to  their  own  interest,  there  could  clearly  be,  sooner  or  later, 
but  one  issue  to  the  struggle.  In  all  the  allied  states  there  was  a 
party  which  hated  as  well  as  feared  her,  a  party  which,  knowing 
that  Iter  courts  would  give  redress  for  the  crimes  which  they 
dearly  loved  to  commit,  was  ready  to  cast  off  her  yoke  at  any 
cost.  This  alone  would  have  sufficed  to  shake  her  empire  to  its 
very  foundations ;  but  all  hope  of  preserving  it  was  gone  when 
Athenians  themselves  became  traitors  to  their  own  constitution, 
and  employed  the  dagger  to  put  down  opposition  in  a  city  for 
which  freedom  of  speech  was  the  very  breath  of  life.  Tlirough 
the  resolute  resistance  of  the  Athenians  at  Samos,  aided  by  the 
determined  friendship  of  the  Samian  people,  this  infamous  c<m- 
spiracy  had  been  pul  down  ;  but  the  wounds  left  behind  it  were 
never  healed,  and  among  the  most  fatal  of  these  was  the  lessening 
of  that  respect  for  forms  and  processes  of  law  whidi  in  earlier 
days  had  most  notably  distinguished  Athens  from  every  other 
Hellenic  city, — in  other  words,  from  every  other  city  in  the  world. 
Athens,  therefore,  fell ;  but  she  had  exhibited  to  the  world  a 
polity  which  might  be  the  means  of  overcoming  the  miserable 
feuds  of  scattered  clans,  and  of  cementing  into  a  single  nation  the 
inhabitants  of  cities  .spread  over  many  lands.  She  had  sown  seed 
which  was  to  bear  fruit  in  commonwealths  yet  unborn  ;  and  the 
work  of  the  great  founders  of  her  empire  was  therefore  not 
wronght  in  vain. 

The    departure    of    Mindaros   for   the    Hellespont    convinced 
Tissaplierncs  at  last  that  he  had  overdone  his  part.     His  province 


Chap.   IX.]  THE  IONIAN  WAR,  449 

w;is  exposed  to  dangers  wliicli  might  threaten  serious  consequences. 
His  garrisons  in  Antandros,  Miletos,  and  Knidos  had  been  ex- 
pelleei  ;'  and  he  resolved  to  go  in  person  to  the  Helles-  Departure  of 
pout,  both  to  complain  of  these  wrongs  and  to  make  f or*the  Hd-*^" 
an  effort  for  recovering  the  influence  which  was  fast  lespout. 
slipping  away  from  him. 

For  the  present  the  crafty  schemes  of  Tissaphernes  told  in 
favor  of  Alkibiades.  The  homeward  return  of  the  Phenician 
fleet  enabled  him  to  go  back  to  Samos  and  say  not  pefg^t  ^f 
only  that  this  part  of  his  promise  was  fulfilled  but  that  Dorieusand 
the  satrap  was  better  inclined  to  the  Athenian  causa  the  bay°o/" 
than  he  had  ever  been.  Sailing  from  Kos  he  reached  Dardanos. 
the  Hellespont  just  in  time  to  decide  a  battle  which  had  begun  in 
the  early  morning  by  the  defeat  of  Dorieus  in  the  bay  of  Dardanos, 
and  which  had  been  continued  during  the  day  by  the  fleet  of 
Mindaros.  Thirty  ships  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Athenians  who, 
having  recovered  their  own  captured  triremes,  sailed  away  to  their 
station  at  Sestos.^  Here  however  they  kept  only  40  ships  :  the 
rest  were  sent  to  gather  money,  where  they  might  and  as  they 
could.  Tlie  necessities  of  war  had  displaced  the  orderly  collection 
of  a  fixed  tribute  for  a  system  of  arbitrary  and  indefinite  exactions  ; 
and  the  indifference  and  ev^en  the  friendly  feeling  of  the  allies  gave 
way  to  active  dislike  or  a  fiercer  indignation. 

Twenty  years  earlier  a  victory  even   such   as  this  might  have 
changed  the  face  of  the  war.     All  that  Thrasylos  could  now  do 
was  to  go  to   Athens  to  ask  for  more   help  both    in 
ships  and  men.^     A  force  of  thirty  triremes  was  im-  Aikibiiuies 
mediately  sent  out  under  Theramencs  who  sailed  to   pi."so","eiit 
help  the  Makcdonian  chief  Archelaos  in  his  siege  of  at  Surdeis. 
Pydna  and  probably  to  live  upon  his  pay.     The  city 
was  reduced  at  last  :  but  before  its  fall  Theramenes  had  been  com- 
pelled to  sail  away  to  the  Athenian  naval  station  which,  in  fear  of 
the  large  fleet  now  being  collected  by  Mindaros,  had  been  transferred 
from  Sestos  to  Kardia  on  the  northern  side  of  the  Chersonesos. 
To  this  place  Alkibiades  had  found  his  way,  no  longer  as  a  friend 
of  Tissaphernes  or  of  his  master,  but  as  a  fugitive  from  the  power 
of  the  satrap  who,  professing  now  to  have  received  orders  from  the 
king  to  carry  on  war  vigorously  against  the  Athenians,  had  thrown 
him  into  prison. 

The  tidings  that  Mindaros  was  engaged  in  the  siege  of  Kyzikos 
made  the  Athenian  generals  resolve    upon    attacking      Battle  of 
him    at  once  Avith  their  whole  fleet   of  83   triremes.      Kyzikos. 
Having  contrived  by  sailing  past  Abydos  at  night  to  evade  the 

1  Time.  viii.  109.     -  Xen.  H.i.l,  7.     Diod.  xiii.  46.     "  Xen.  H.  i.  1,  8. 


450  THE   EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

notice  of  the  Peloponnesian  guard-ships,  they  rested  at  the  isUind 
of  Prokonnesos,  a  few  miles  to  the  northwest  of  the  peninsula  of 
Kyzikos.  On  the  next  day  Alkibiades  told  the  men  that  they 
must  undertake  simultaneously  the  tasks  of  a  sea-tight,  a  land- 
battle,  and  a  siege.  The  first  measure  was  to  disembark  the 
hoplites  on  the  mainland  with  orders  to  advance  upon  the  town. 
According  to  Diodoros'  the  issue  of  the  day  was  decided  by  a 
trick  of  Alkibiades,  who  by  a  pretended  flight  concerted  with  his 
colleagues  lured  the  squadron  of  Mindaros  to  some  distance  from 
the  rest  of  the  fleet  and  then  turned  fiercely  round  on  the  hoisting 
of  a  signal.  Finding  themselves  between  two  forces,  the  seamen 
of  Mindaros  liad  no  option  but  to  fly  to  a  place  called  Kleroi 
where  the  army  of  Pharnabazos  was  placed  for  co-operation  by 
land.  Mindaros  was  slain,  bravely  fighting  on  shore.  All  the 
Peloponnesian  ships  fell  into  the  hands  of  tlie  Athenians  with  the 
exception  of  the  Syracusan  triremes  which  the  crews  themselves 
set  on  fire  ;  and  still  more  important  in  the  exliaustion  of  all 
resources  was  the  enormous  plunder  in  slaves  and  other  booty 
taken  in  the  camps  of  the  Spartans  and  the  Persians.  On  the  day 
after  the  fight  tlie  victors  found  Kyzikos  evacuated  by  the  enemy. 
But  no  real  benefit  could  accrue  from  the  victory  unless  the  Athe- 
nians could  command  the  gates  of  the  Black  Sea  as  well  as  those 
of  the  Egean.  Byzantion  and  Chalkcdon  on  the  opposite  side  of 
the  strait  were  both  in  revolt,  and  the  latter  city  was  so  effectually 
protected  by  the  troops  of  Pharnabazos  that  an  attack  upon  it  at 
once  failed.  But  its  unfortified  port  of  Chrysopolis  was  seized  and 
converted  into  a  fortified  post  from  which  the  Athenians  levied 
tolls  on  all  ships  entering  the  Propontis.'  They  were  thus  again 
masters  of  the  most  important  road  for  the  introduction  of  supplies 
to  Athens. 

A  few  hours  after  the  battle  of  Kyzikos,  ni[)pokratcs,  the 
admiral's  seciretary,  addressed  to  the  epliors  the  following  letter  : 
Alleged  cm-  '  Our  glory  is  gone  :  Mindaros  is  dead  :  the  men  are 
E"fdHw  to  hungry  :  we  know  not  Avhat  to  do.'^  The  dispatch 
Ailuiis.  was  intercepted  and  carried  to  Athens,  where  the 
})eople  received  the  tidings  with  a  tunnilt  of  joy  which  found 
expression  in  maijnificent  religious  processions  and  displays.  "What 
may  have  been  the  precise  ell'eet  produced  u{)on  the  Spartans,  we 
cannot  say  with  certainty.  The  history  of  Tliucydides  here  fails 
us,  and  we  are  made  at  once  to  feel  the  irreparable  want  of  a  guide 
60  incorruptibly  truthful,  so  unwearied«in  his  search  for  evidence, 
and  so  exact  in  his  discrimination  of  it.  The  propositions  of  the 
envoy  whom  they  now  sent  to  Athens  were  confined,  we  arc  told, 

•  xiii.  50.  "  Xen.  //.  i.  1,  22.  '  lb.  i.  1,  23. 


Chap.  IX.]  THE   IONIAN  WAR.  451 

to  a  mere  exchange  of  prisoners  and  the  withdrawal  of  hostile 
garrisons  on  either  side, — in  other  words,  to  the  plan  that  the  Athe- 
nians should  abandon  Pylos  and  the  Spartans  quit  Dekeleia.  But 
even  if  the  Athenians  had  been  willing  to  listen  to  these  terras  and, 
by  the  condition  that  each  side  was  to  keep  its  present  possessions,  to 
yield  up  her  claim  to  the  allegiance  of  the  most  valuable  members 
of  her  maritime  confederacy,  they  knew  by  bitter  experience  that 
Spavta,  even  if  willing,  was  unable  to  coerce  her  allies.  They 
knew  further  that  at  the  present  time  the  Spartans  were  under 
covenant  with  the  Persian  king  not  to  make  peace  witho'ut  his 
consent ;  and  they  had  no  reason  for  thinking  that  the  necessities 
of  Sparta  would  be  to  him  a  constraining  motive  for  coming  to 
terms  with  her  enemy  and  his  own.  Athens  was  no  longer  re- 
ceiving the  riches  of  other  lands:  her  reserved  fund  was  long  since 
exhausted  :  and  her  fleets  were  able  to  carry  on  the  war  only  by  a 
system  which  had  become  little  better  than  organised  plundering. 
She  was  manifestly  approaching  the  end  of  a  struggle  which  must 
end  in  the  ruin  of  one  side  or  the  other,  and  every  sign  seemed  to 
tell  that  that  ruin  would  be  her  own. 

Whatever  may  have  been  the   discouragement  of  the  Spartans, 
Pharnabazos  felt  none.     Comforting  the  troops  of  Mindaros  with 
the    promise    of   unbounded   supplies    of    ship-timber    Ener<n'of 
from  the  forests  of  Ida,  he  gave  them  each  a  garment   Phama- 
together  with    provisions    for  two    mouths,    and    dis- 
tributed the  seamen  as  guards  throughout  the   coast  cities  of  his 
province,  while  orders  were  given  for  building  at  Antandros  a 
number  of  ships  equal  to  that  of  the  triremes  lost  at  Kyzikos. 

At  Dekeleia  the  effects  of  the  victory  of  Kyzikos  were  more 
visible  than  at  Sparta.  From  his  lofty  stronghold  Agis  could  sec 
the  corn-ships  from  the  Euxine  sailing  into  the  Repulse  of 
Peiraieus  and  felt  that,  until  this  stream  could  be  cut  ^,|'w'aiis'of 
off,  his  occupation  of  Athenian  soil  was  to  little  purpose.  Athens. 
An  inroad  to  the  very  walls  of  Athens  had  been  tried  and  had 
failed  ;'  and  Agis  thought  it  best  to  dispatch  Klearchos  with 
fifteen  ships  from  Megara  and  other  allied  cities  to  the  Hellespont. 
Of  these  vessels  three  were  taken  and  destroyed  by  the  Athenian 
guard-ships  :  the  rest  made  their  way  first  to  Abydos,^  then  to 
Byzantion. 

The  events  of  the  following  year  made  no  essential  change  in 
the  position  of  the  combatants  in  this  weary  war.  On  the  coast 
of  Attica  Thoi'ikos  was  fortified  for  the  protection  of  the  corn- 
ships  sailing  to  Peiraieus  from  the  Hellespont  f  and  Thrasylos 

'  Xen.  H.  i.  1,  33.  the   Athenian    naval    station,  this 

^  Xen.  H.  i.  1,  36,  says  that  they  would  be  jyoinor  into  the  lion's  den. 
went  to  Sestos:  but  as  Sestos  was        ^  Xen.  11.  i.  2,  1. 


452  THE   EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

at  the  beginning  of  summer  set  out  with  his  fleet  of  fifty  triremes 

for  Samos.     At  Ephesos  the  xVthenians  sustained  a  serious  reverse, 

Operations  of  in    which    tive-and-twenty    Syracusan    ships    took  the 

the  ]E>'C'ifi '"  "^ost  prominent  part.     But  this  defeat,  again,  was  com- 

409B.C.        pensated,  when    not  lung    afterwards  Tlirasylos,  from 

his  station  at  Methymna,  espied  this  Syracusan  squadron  sailing 

out  from  Ephesos,  to  wliich  lie  drove  back  all  the  triremes   with 

the  excej>tion  of  four  which  were  taken  witli  their  crews.     These 

were   dispatclied  as  prisonei's  to  Athens  where,  in  remembrance 

probably  of  the  treatment  which  Athenians  had  undergone  in  the 

Latomiai  of  Syracuse,  they  were  slmt  up  in  the  stone  quarries  of 

Peiraieus.     The  sufferings  of  these  captives  may  not  have  been  so 

severe  :  they  were  certainly  not  so  protracted.     Defore  the  autumn 

was  well  ended,  they  had  succeeded  in  excavating  a  way  out  of 

their  prison-house,  and  in  making  their  escape,  some  to  Dekeleia, 

some  to  Megara.' 

But  in  spite  of  all  fluctuations  the  tide  was  running  strongly 

against  Athens.    Fifteen  years  ago  S})arta  had  been  utterly  luunbled 

^  ,    by  the  shuttinc:  in  of  a  number  of  honliteson  the  island 

xtccovcrv  of       *  '  -  * 

Pylosbythe  of  Sphakteria.  During  those  years  the  Messenian 
Spartans.  garrison  at  Pylos  had  been  to  the  Spartans  an  annoy- 
ance only  less  serions  than  that  which  Dekeleia  was  causing  to 
Athens.  But  the  strong  efforts  which  the  Athenians  were  making 
to  restore  their  shattered  empire  in  the  East  led  the  S[)artans  to  think 
that  a  determined  attack  on  this  post  might  be  successful  ;  and  the 
tidings  soon  reached  Athens  that  their  Messenian  allies  were  being 
blockaded  by  a  fleet  of  fifteen  ships  and  besieged  by  a  large  land 
force  the  divisions  of  which  kept  up  a  series  of  assaults  upon  the 
fortress.  In  spite  of  the  drain  both  of  men,  ships,  and  money  in 
the  direction  of  the  Hellespont,  the  Athenians  managed  to  send 
out  thirty  ships  under  Anytos,  the  future  accuser  of  Sokratcs.  lie 
was  sent  to  no  purpose.  Stormy  weather,  he  said,  had  prevented 
him  from  doubling  cape  Maleai,  and  the  ships  came  back  to  Athens. 
Indignant  at  his  failure,  the  people  brought  him  to  trial ;  but 
Anytos  was  acquitted.  Thus  deserted  by  their  ancient  friends,  the 
Messenians  at  I'ylos  held  out  stoutly  for  a  time  :  but  their  numbers 
were  sorely  tliiiUK-d  in  conflicts  with  the  enemy  and  so  wasted  by 
actual  famine  that  they  were  at  last  compelled  to  make  terms  for 
the  surrender  of  the  place.  It  is  a  satisfaction  to  learn  that  these 
stout-hearted  Helots  could  so  maintain  their  ground  as  to  secure 
their  safe  departure  from  a  land  which,  if  the  Spartans  could  have 
had  their  will,  tliey  would  never  have  left  alive.  The  loss  of  this 
outpost  was  followed  or  accompanied  by  that  of  Nisaia."     These 

'  Xen.  U.  i.  2,  14.  «  See  p.  345. 


Chap.  IX.]  THE   IONIAN  WAR.  453 

losse.s  told  on  Athens  witli  far  heavier  effect  than  the  betrayal  of 
the  colonists  in  the  Tracliiniau  Herakleia  at  this  time  told  upon 
the  Spartans.' 

The  events  of  the  following  year  seemed  to  point  more  clearly 
to  a  good  issue  for  Athens  from  the  troubles  which  had  well-nigh 
crushed  her.  The  whole  Athenian  fleet  took  up  its  Keduction 
position  off  Btzantion  and  Chalkedon,  while  the  land  "^  chaike- 
force  besieged  the  latter  city,  shutting  it  in  all  round  Atiienians. 
with  a  wooden  wall  which,  so  far  as  it  was  practicable,  408 b.c. 
blocked  the  river  also.  The  satrap  was  anxions  to  break  the  Athe- 
nian lines,  while  llippokrates,  who  was  then  liarmost  within  the  city, 
made  a  vehement  .sally  from  the  gates.  The  attempt  wholly  failed. 
The  troops  of  Pharnabazos  were  beaten  off,  llippoki'ates  himself 
was  slain,  and  his  men  pushed  back  within  the  walls.  The  re- 
duction of  the  place  now  became  a  mere  question  of  time  ;  and  on 
the  advice  of  Pharnabazos  the  Chalkedonians  agreed  to  surrender 
under  covenant  that  they  should  become,  as  they  had  been,  tribute- 
paying  allies  of  Athens,  making  up  all  arrears  for  the  time  during 
which  they  had  been  in  revolt  against  her.^  But  the  satrap  seemed 
now  to  be  convinced  that  Athens  was  not  so  easily  to  be  put  down 
as  he  had  hoped  that  she  v/ould  be,  and  that  he  had  made  a  mistake 
in  assuming  tovvards  her  so  determinately  hostile  an  attitude.  He 
therefore  made  with  the  Athenians  a  convention  on  his  own  behalf 
by  which  he  agreed  to  send  up  their  envoys  to  Sousa  to  arrange  a 
treaty  with  the  king,  while  the  Athenians  pledged  themselves  to 
do  no  mischief  during  their  absence  in  the  territories  of  the  satrap. 
The  Athenian  envoys  met  the  satrap  at  Kyzikos,  where  they  were 
joined  by  an  embassy  from  Sparta  under  I'asippidas  and  by^  the 
Syracusan  Hermokrates  whom  a  grateful  city  had   rewarded  with 

lie  boon  of  exile. 

At  Byzantion  the  Athenians  might  very  possibly  have  been 
defeated,  had  it  not  been  that  popular  feeling  still  ran  in  their 
favor ;  but  in  the  town  were  many  who  were  exas-  surrender  of 
perated  by  the  severities  of  Pharnabazos  and  by  the  Byzantion. 
calmness  with  which  he  sacriticed  the  interests  of  the  citizens  to 
those  of  his  troops.  These  men  opened  the  gates  and  admitted 
Alkibiades  and  his  "men  to  the  quarter  called  the  Thrakion,  and  the 
garrison  was  compelled  to  surrender.^  Athens  was  thus  once  more 
mi.stress  of  the  great  high  road  which  brought  to  her  harbors 
the  wealth  of  the  corn-growing  districts  bordering  on  the  Black 
Sea. 

Had  the  Athenian  envoys  been  allowed  to  make  their  journey 
to  Sousa,  the  issue  of  the  w'ar  would,  it  is  more  than  likely,  have 

'  Xen.  H.  i.  3,  18.  "  Xen.  H.  i.  3,  9.  ="  Xeu.  H.  i.  3,  32. 


454  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  HI. 

been  in  favor  of  Athens.  Unhappily  the  ambassadors  after  spend- 
ing the  winter  in  the  Phrygian  Gordion  were  met  on  their  way  to 
Arrival  of  Sousa  by  Spartan  envoys  who  boasted  of  liaving  ob- 
Cyrusthe      tained   from  the    king* all  that  they   wanted.     Their 

younger  in  ^  i  ,  i         •  i  i 

Ionia.  words  Avere  borne  out   by  a  letter,  bearing  the  royal 

seal,  which  declared  that  Cyrus,  the  younger  son  of  Dareios  and 

his  cruel  wife  Parysatis,  Avas  sent  down  as  lord  of  all  the  armies 

gathered  ut  Kastolos. 

Before  Cyrus  reached  the  coast,  the  Spartan  admiral  Krate- 

sippidas  had  been  succeeded  by  Lysandros,  a  man  to  whom  the 

shaping  of  governments  in  the  interests  of  oligarchy  was 
Intris'nes  and      j      i    Ti  i  i  •    i       *  v  *■  i 

operations  of  ^  task  thoroughly  congenial.  A  liar  more  unscrupulous, 
I-.^anaros.  jf  5^.]^  ^  thing  miglit  be  possible,  than  Alkibiades 
himself,  he  was  determined  that  the  services  which  he 
pei-formed  for  his  country  should  make  his  own  continuance  in 
power  indispensable.  In  the  Persian  prince  now  sent  down  to 
the  coast  he  found  not  merely  an  ally  but  a  friend.  On  their 
meeting  at  Sardeis  the  hope  expressed  by  Lysandros  that  the  Avar 
might  now  be  carried  on  Avith  real  vigor  Avas  sustained  by  the 
assurance  that  if  the  500  talents  Avhich  Cyrus  had  brought  Avith 
him  should  not  suffice,  he  Avould  drain  his  own  private  resources, 
and  in  the  last  resort  he  Avould  according  to  the  Persian  metaphor 
turn  his  silver-gilt  throne  into  coin.  I'romises  thus  large  em- 
boldened the  Spartan  to  urge  that  the  pay  of  the  men  might  be 
raised  to  a  drachma  daily.  A  bait  like  this,  he  said,  avouKI  soon 
emj)ty  the  Athenian  triremes  :  but  on  this  point  the  young  ]>rince 
Avas  tirm.  Lysandros  Avas  silenced  ;  but  Avhen  toAvards  the  end  of 
the  banquet  at  Avhich  he  Avas  entertained  by  the  prince,  (.'yrus 
asked  Avhat  he  might  do  to  gratify  him,  he  answered  promptly  that 
the  best  favor  to  himself  Avould  be  the  addition  of  an  obolos  daily 
to  the  pay  of  the  men.  (Jyrus  granted  the  request,  and  the  troops 
receivedamonth'sj  ay  in  r»dvance  together  with  all  unpaid  arrears. 
Thisgenerositv  excited  in  the  army  an  enthusiasm  which  Lysandros 
directed  to  the  retitting  and  strengthening  of  a  tioet  now  seriously 
out  of  condition,  Avhilc  f(n'  himself  the  friendship  of  the  Persian 
prince  Avas  secured  by  coiKbict  which  showetl  that  in  the  matter  of 
money  the  Spartan  admiial  walked  in  the  Avays  of  Perikles  and 
Nikias.  ]>ut  while  he  was  thus  repairing  his  ninety  ships  at  Ephesos, 
-lie  took  care  to  send  for  the  chiefs  of  the  oligarchical  factions  in 
tlic  several  cities  allied  Avith  Athens  and  form  them  into  clubs 
pledged  to  act  by  his  orders,  under  the  assurance  that  so  soon  as 
Athens  should  be  ])ut  down  they  should  be  placed  in  poAver.'  He 
thus  became  the  centre  of  a  Aviciely  ramified  conspiracy,  Avhich  he 
alone  Avas  capable  of  directing. 

>  Diod.  xiii.  70. 


Chap.  IX.]  THE  IONIAN  WAR.  455 

Meanwhile  Alkibiaues  had  been  working  for  his  return  to 
Athens.  He  was  still  hesitating  as  to  his  future  course,  when  he 
received  the  tidings  that  the  Athenians  had  elected   „  ,        „ 

,  .         ,,  •  P    mi  11  IT'  Return  of 

liiiii  btrategos  with    llirasyboulos  and  Konon  among   Alkibiades 

his  colleagues.     With   twenty  triremes,  not  with  the   *" -Athens. 

fleet  which    convoyed   to  Athens  the  vast  multitude  of  vessels 

captured  at  Kyzikos,  he  arrived  at  Peiraieus,  still  doubting  whether 

he   might  trust  himself  among  his  countrymen.     Instead  of  the 

triumphant  landing  which  later  writers  invested  wdth  imaginary 

colors,  the  exile  Avhose  memory  must  have  recalled  the  long  series 

of  liis  treasons  stood  for  a  time  on  the  deck  of  his  trireme,  not 

venturing  to  land  until  he  saw  that  his  cousin  Euryptolemos  with 

other  friends  was  waiting  to  greet  him  and  to  guard  him  on  his 

way  to  the  city.    He  had  chosen,  some  said,' an  ill-omened  day  for 

his  return.     It  was  the  festival  of  Plynteria,  when  the  statue  of 

Athene  was  veiled  from  sight  and  reverently  washed  by  the  Praxier- 

gadai.     His  mind  was  perhaps  too  much  occupied  with  weightier 

things  to  think  of  this  coincidence.     His  friends  could  scarcely 

conceal  from  him  the  fact  that  some  with  candid  courage  denounced 

him  as  the  cause  of  all  the  disasters  which  Athens  had  undergone 

since  his  departure  and  of  all  the  dangers  which  still  threatened  lier 

safety.'*     But  they   would    dwell  with  more  satisfaction  on  the 

sophistry  and  falsehood  which  had  half-convinced  the  majority  of 

his  innocence.     Some  of  these  arguments  might  in  truth  call  up  a 

blush  on  the  cheek  even  of  Alkibiades.     The  self-possession  of  the 

hardiest  traitor  could  scarcely  put  forth  for  him  the  excuse  that 

during  his  years  of  exile  he  had  been  the  unwilling  slave  of  men 

at  whose  hands  his  life  was  daily  in  danger,  and  that  through  the 

whole  of  his  weary  time  his  one  grief  arose  from  his  inability  to 

do  for  Athens  the  good  which  he  would  gladly  have  achieved  for 

her.  That  this  language  did  not  represent  the  spirit  of  the  Athenian 

people  generally,  we  may  be  <[uite  sure.     But  however  black  the 

crimes  of  Alkibiades  may  have  been,  the  fact  could  not  be  denied 

that,  whether  rightly  or  v>rongly,  he  had  been  suffered  by  the 

Athenian  army,  or  rather  by  the  Athenian   people,  at  Samos,  to 

take  part  not  only  in  the  war  as  one  of  their  generals  but  in  the 

suppression  of  the  Four  Hundred,  and  that  for  a  year  or  two  his 

efforts  had  been  for  the  welfare  and  not  for  the  mischief  of  Athens. 

It  was  true  that  his  past  career  afforded  no  guarantee  for  his  future 

conduct ;  but  unless  he  was  still  to  be  treated  as  an  enemy,  that 

career  must  not  be  thrown  in  his  teeth.     Such,  we  cannot  doubt, 

was  the  temper  of  a  large  body  of  moderate  and  sober-minded  men  ; 

but  for  the  present  the  majority  was  carried  away  by  a  weak 

1  Xen.  H.  i.  4,  12.  =■  Xen.  H.  i.  4,  17. 


456  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III, 

sympathy  with  the  sufferings  which  he  took  care  to  parade  in  his 
speeches  before  the  senate  and  the  assembly.  In  moving  words  he 
j)rotested  his  innocence  of  all  impiety,  and  with  brazen  impudence 
declared  himself  an  injured  man.  So  well  did  he  play  his  part  and 
so  well  was  he  supported  by  his  friends  that  before  the  assembly 
dispersed  he  found  himself  once  more  general  with  full  powers. 
But  if  he  had  landed,  as  some  would  have  it,  on  an  unlucky  day, 
the  recurrence  of  the  mysteries  of  the  (rreat  Mother  furnished  an 
opportunity  of  wliich  a  man  like  Alkibiades  would  avail  himself 
with  eager  delight.  For  seven  years,  that  is  to  say,  since  the  time 
when  on  his  own  vehement  advice  Agis  had  been  sent  to  fortify 
and  hold  Dekeleia,  the  procession  along  the  sacred  road  to  Eleusis 
had  been  necessarily  given  up,  and  the  communicants  with  their 
sacred  vessels  had  been  conveyed  thither,  as  best  they  might,  by 
sea.  It  should  now  be  said  that  under  the  man  who  had  been 
charged  with  violating  these  mysteries  this  procession  should  follow 
its  ancient  path  as  quietly  and  safely  as  in  a  time  of  profound  peace. 
The  pomp  issued  from  the  gates  of  Athens,  guarded  by  all  the 
citizens  of  military  age  ;  but  no  attack  was  even  threatened  by  the 
garrison  of  Dekeleia,  Alkibiades  had  made  his  peace  with  the 
mighty  goddesses,  and  he  could  now  depart  with  cheerfulness  to 
meet  the  enemies  of  Athens  elsewhere.  AVith  a  tleet  of  100 
triremes,  carrying  1,500  hoplites  and  150  horse,  over  whom  Aris- 
tokrates  and  Adeimantos  were  appointed  generals,  he  sailed  to 
Andros.  Having  defeated  the  Andrians  and  their  Spartan  allies 
in  the  field,  he  shut  them  up  in  the  city,  and  departed  leaving 
Konon  with  twenty  ships  to  blockade  it.' 

He  reached  Samos,  to  experience  a  series  of  disappointments 
brought  about  partly  by  his  tortuous  policy  in  the  past  and  in  part 
Defeat  and  ^J  ^''^  almost  incredible  folly  which  led  him  to  intrust 
death  of  a  whole  tleetto  a])iIot  who  may  have  been  an  excellent 
Aniiociios  boon  companion  but  who  utterly  lacked  all  the  (pialities 
at  Notion.  of  a  connuander.  Sailing  from  this  island,  he  joined 
Thrasyboulos  who  was  fortifying  I'liokaia,  having  left  the  j)ilot 
Antiochos  in  command  of  the  fleet  with  a  strict  charge  to  avoid 
all  engagements  with  the  enemy  until  he  should  return.  The 
notions  of  Antiochos  on  the  subject  of  duty  were  on  a  par  with 
those  of  his  master;  and  Alkibiades  had  not  long  been  out  of 
sight  before  his  deputy  sailed  out  with  only  two  triremes  and  passed 
insultingly  before  the  prows  of  the  Spartan  fleet  at  Ephcsos, 
Lysandros  came  out  and  chased  him  with  a  few  ships,  and  tlie 
conflict  began  which  Antiochos  so  eageily  desired.  The  result  was 
the  loss  of  fifteen  Athenian  triremes''  and  the  death  of  Antiochos 

'  Xen.  II.  i.  5,  18.  -  Xeu.  II  i.  5,  14. 


Chap.  IX.]  THE  IONIAN  WAE.  457 

himself.  The  news  of  tliis  disaster  brought  Alkibiades  at  once 
back  to  Samos,  whence  with  the  whole  Athenian  fleet  he  sailed  to 
challenge  Lysandros  to  battle  off  Ephesos;  but  it  no  longer  suited 
the  Spartan  to  fight,  and  Alkibiades  returned  baffled  to  Samos. 

Thus  had  a  serious  reverse  been  sustained  through  his  own  fault. 
Nor  was  this  the  only  count  in  the  new  indictment  for  which  he 
was  now  furnishing  the  materials.  By  comparison  .  , 
with  her  wealth  in  the  days  of  Perikles  Athens  was  now  Kym6  by 
poor  indeed  ;  and  the  crews  of  her  fleets  had  long  been  Aikibuides. 
compelled  to  maintain  themselves  in  great  part  by  plunder  seized 
on  the  lands  of  the  enemy,  or  by  exactions  from  hostile  or  revolted 
cities.  But  it  was  reserved  for  Alkibiades  to  make  a  foray  on  the 
friendly  town  of  Kyme,  and,  so  far  as  his  power  extended,  to  make 
the  name  of  Athens  odious  to  all  the  members  of  her  confederacy. 
Alkibiades  and  his  people  were  driving  to  the  shore  a  large  body 
of  slaves  when  the  Kymaians  fell  upon  him  suddenly  with  all  their 
forces  and  compelled  them  to  yield  up  their  prisoners  and  fly  to  their 
ships.  Enraged  at  this  defeat,  Alkibiades  sent  to  Mytilene  for 
h'oplites,  and  supported  by  these  gave  the  Kymaians  a  challenge  to 
figlit  which  they  wisely  refused  to  accept.  Instead  of  fighting  the 
Athenian  general,  they  preferred  to  carry  their  complaints  io  the 
Athenian  assembly.  The  story  of  his  misdeeds  at  Kyme  came  upon 
the  tidings  of  the  disaster  of  Notion  ;  and  the  significance  of  these 
incidents  was  indefinitely  enhanced  by  the  accusation  of  Athenian 
citizens  at  Samos  who  charged  him  with  a  deliberate  scheme  for 
betraying  the  fleets  and  armies  of  Athens  to  Pharnabazos  or  the 
Spartans,  and  for  sheltering  himself  in  his  forts  on  the  Chersonesos 
until  by  the  help  of  his  allies  he  could  realise  the  true  object  of  his 
life  by  making  himself  despot  of  Athens. 

The  biter  is  not  unfrequently  bit :  and  against  such  a  charge  as 

this  Alkibiades  with  all  the  keenness  of  his  wit  and  all  his  readiness 

of  resource  was  absolutely  powerless.     In  one  sense  he   Removal  of 

was  less  happy  than  Nikias  :  in  another,  it  would  have   ^•l^'I'hY!^'® 

been  happier  for  Athens,   if  the  moral    character  of   commaud. 

Nikias  had  been  as  bad  as  that  of  Alkibiades.     That  unfortunate 

general  retained  the  misplaced  confidence  of  his  countrymen  to  the 

day  of  his  death,  because  he  was  supposed  to  be  a  good  man.    The 

revived  ascendancy  of  Alkibiades  came  suddenly  to  an  end,  because 

his  character  was   infamous.     The  disaster  at  Notion  had  been 

caused  by  his  neglect ;  the  suflferings  of  the  Kymaians  were  the 

result  of  his  own  crimes.     There  was  nothing  to  do  but  to  send 

others  to  take  his  place  ;  and  a  melancholy  interest  attaches  to  the 

names  of  most  of  the  commanders  thus  appointed.    In  the  pagcjs  of 

Xenophon'  Konon  heads  the  list  with  Diomedon,  Leon,  Perikles 

'  Xeu.  If.i.5,  16. 
20 


458  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  IH. 

(the  son  of  tlie  great  Perikles  and  Aspai-.ia)/  Erasinides,  Aris- 
tokrates,  Archestratos,  Protomaclios,  Thrasylo?,  and  Aristogenes. 
The  tidings  of  his  deposition  convinced  Alkibiadcs  that  he  had 
quitted  Athens  for  the  last  time.  AVitli  a  single  trireme  he  left 
Samos,  and  made  his  way  to  his  fortified  posts  vn  the  Chersonesos. 
On  reaching  Samos  Konon  was  struck  by  the  great  depression 
of  the  men  whom  he  was  sent  to  command.  Their  ships  were 
Arrival  of  becoming  daily  less  and  less  efficient,  and  for  pay  they 
Kaiiikrati-  had  little  to  depend  on  except  plunder.  He  therefore 
^cde^Lysan-'^  *^"t  down  the  number  of  his  triremes  from  one  hundred 
dros.  to  seventy,  and  dismissinoc  the  rest  of  the  crews  picked 

40d  s  c 

out  for  these  ships  the  strongest  and  most  skilful  oars- 
men,' who  found  ample  exercise  in  roving  expeditions  for  the 
purpose  of  raising  money  or  extorting  supplies.  The  naval  com- 
mand of  Lysandros  expired  about  this  time.  It  was  not  the 
Spartan  custom  to  retain  their  generals  in  office  for  more  than  a 
year,  or  to  send  the  same  man  out  twice  in  the  same  capacity.  But 
Lysandros  was  resolved  that  his  successor  should  repose  on  no  bed 
of  roses.  By  organising  his  clubs  in  the  various  cities  he  had 
attached  the  oligarchic  factions  to  himself  personally,  and  he  had 
further  succeeded  in  exciting  among  his  troops  a  strong  dislike  for 
service  under  any  other  commander.  He  took  care  that  this 
dislike  should  be  heiglitened  by  the  pressure  of  want.  He  placed 
in  the  hands  of  the  Persian  prince  every  drachma  not  yet  paid  out 
to  the  troops  ;'  and  when  that  successor  arrived,  lie  told  him  with 
studied  insolence  that  lie  vielded  up  his  place  while  lord  of  tlie  sea. 
When  Kallikratidas  assured  him  that  he  would  give  full  credit  to 
his  words  if,  setting  out  from  Ephesos  and  having  passed  the 
Athenian  station  at  Samos,  lie  would  hand  the  ships  over  to  liim 
at  Miletos,  Lysandros  replied  that  he  saw  no  need  of  taking  further 
trouble  Avhen  he  was  no  longer  in  command.  For  such  petty 
annoyances  Kallikratidas  may  have  cared  little.  The  case  was 
altered,  when  he  found  throughout  the  fleet  a  general  spirit  of 
contemptuous  resistance  to  his  authority  with  openly  expressed 
complaints  against  the  Spartan  rule  of  yearly  change. 

In  this  labyrinth  of  difficulties  Lysandros  left  a  young  man  in 
comparison  with  whom  he  was  as  Mammon  in  the  presence  of  the 
™  .  ,  Archano-el  Michael.  Untrained  in  the  school  of  lies 
Kaiiikrati-  in  wliicl)  his  predecessor  wjus  so  renowned  a  pro- 
''"''•  ficient,  Kallikratidas  had  not  even   learnt  the  sophistry 

with  which  Brasidas  cheated  the  Thrace-ward  allies  of  Athens : 
nor  had  he  convinced  himself  that  the  ruin  of  Athens  would  be 
cheaply  purchased  at  the  cost  of  prostration  before  llie  throne  of 

'  See  p.  284.  ^  Xen.  IF.  i.  5,  20,  and  C,  16.    Diod.  xiii.  77. 

=  Xeu.  IJ.  i.  G.  10. 


Chap.  IX.]  THE  IONIAN  WAR.  459 

the  Persian  despot.  More  than  this,  he  had  actually  learnt  that 
the  Hellenic  states  had  something  better  to  do  than  to  tear  each 
other  in  pieces  for  the  benefit  of  barbarians  against  whom  scarcely 
eighty  years  ago  they  had  pledged  themsehes  to  maintain  a  per- 
petual warfare.  A  singular  interest  attaches  to  the  brief  career  of  a 
man  who  with,  more  than  the  bravery  of  Lysandros  and  immeasur- 
ably more  than  the  honesty  of  Brasidas  was  determined  that,  so 
far  as  his  power  might  carry  him,  the  deadly  quarrel  between 
Sparta  and  Athens  should  be  ended  by  a  permanent  friendship, 
and  wlio  with  even  greater  nobleness  of  soul  resolved  that  his 
example  at  least  should  remain  as  a  perpetual  protest  against  the 
ferocious  and  inhuman  usages  of  Hellenic  warfare. 

Thus  deploring  the  miserable  strife  which  had  now  dragged 
itself  on  through  four-and  twenty  years,  Kallikratidas  found  himself 
face  to  face  with  men  who   practically  refused  to  obey   in8„bordi- 
him.     He    met  the   difficulty  with  the  courage   of  a   nation  in 
righteous  man.     Summoning  the  officers  together,  he   tieet<-uid 
told  them  that  he  was  there  by  no  will   of  his  own  ;   '"■'"^y- 
that,  havi'ag  come,  he  must  do  the  bidding  of  the  state  which  had 
sent  him  ;  but  that,  if  they  thought  otherwise,  they  had  only  to  tell 
him  so,  and  he  would  at  once  go  back  to   Sparta  and  report  the 
state  of  matters  at  Ephesos.     An  appeal   so  manly  and  straight- 
forward could  be  met  only  by  the  answer  that  his  work  must  be 
done  and  his  authority  must  be  obeyed.     Thus  freed  from  one 
trouble,  Kallikratidas  betook  himself  to  the  Persian  prince  and 
demanded  the  pay  needed  for  the  seamen.     Cyrus  kept  him  two 
days  waiting ;  and   Kallikratidas    in    the    agony  of   humiliation 
deplored  the  wretched  fate  of  the  Hellenes  who  for  the  sake  of 
silver  and  gold  were  compelled  to  crouch  before  Persian  tyrants, 
and  declared  that  if  he  should  be  spared  to  return  home  he  would 
do  all  that  he  could  to  bring  to  an  end  the  quarrel  between  his  own 
city  and  Athens.' 

Sending  some  triremes  to  Sparta  to  bring  the  money  which  he 
had  failed  to  get  from  Cyrus,  he  sailed  to  Miletos,  and  there,  having 
summoned  an   assembly  of  the   ruling   oligarchy,   he   Speech  of 
addressed  them  in  a  speech  which  was  a  melancholy   fa's'to'the 
commentary  on   their  abandonment   of  the  Athenian   Milesians, 
alliance.      Living  in  the  midst  of  barbarians,  they  ought,  he  told 
them,  to  be   animated  by  a  double  zeal  against  enemies  who  had 
already  done  them  vast  mischief,  and  who,  by  a  necessary  inference, 
might  do  them   much  more.     Nothing  less  than  this  he  expected 
from   them  ;  and  this  zeal  would  lead  them  to  contribute  sums 
equal  to  that  which  he  had  already  requested  the  ephors  to  send 
him.     They  should  be  repaid  as  soon  as  this  money  reached  him  ; 
'  Xen.  H.  i.  6,  7.     Diod.  xiii.  76. 


460  THE   EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  HI. 

but  he  could  not  bring  himself  to  haunt  the  doors  ot  a  Persian 
prince,  to  obtain  funds  which  the  Greeks  ought  to  be  able  to 
provide  for  themselves,  unless,  failing  this,  they  were  ready  to 
admit  that  the  whole  w'ar  was  a  mistake  and  therefore  to  end  it  by 
any  reasonable  compromise. 

The  manliness  of  Kallikratidas  put  his  hearers  to  shame  ;  and 
at  once  they  produced  from  their  private  purses  a  supply  of  money 
Capture  of  whicli  enabled  liim,  with  further  help  obtained  at 
MethiTOiia     Chios,  to  win  over  or  reduce  Phokaia  and  Kvme  and 

by  KalliKiati-  '  .  i       t      i  •  »r     i  "it         i  • 

das.  to  advance  against  the  Lesbian   JMethymna.     Here  his 

overtures  for  alliance  were  bluntly  rejected.  The  demos  was  firm 
in  its  attachment  to  Athens ;  and  Kallikratidas,  ordering  an 
assault,  carried  the  place  by  storm.  The  captives  were  all  brought 
into  the  market-place,  and  the  allies  insisted  that  every  one  should 
be  sold,  the  Methymnaians  themselves  not  less  than  the  Athenian 
garrison  whom  they  had  so  firmly  supported.  The  demand  was 
met  by  a  noble  protest  against  the  frightful  code  by  which  all 
warfare  was  conducted  then  and  byAvhicli  it  continued  to  be  con- 
ducted for  a  long  series  of  centuries  afterwards.  The  infamous 
practice  which  justified  the  slaying  or  inslaving  of  prisoners  at  the 
will  of  the  conqueror  was  really  war  not  against  states  but  against 
private  homes,  against  women  and  children  ;  and  although  Kalli- 
kratidas may  not  fully  have  seen  this,  his  soul  revolted  against  the 
murderous  policy  which  must  in  the  end  leave  Hellas  at  the  mercy 
of  any  powerful  invader.  With  solemn  earnestness  he  declared  that 
so  long  as  he  held  command  and  so  far  as  his  power  might  carry 
him  no  Hellen  should  ever  be  reduced  to  slavery.  The  citizens  of 
Methymna  and  Athens  were  all  set  free :'  and  by  this  act  Kalli- 
kratidas won  a  place  in  that  company  of  merciful  men  whose 
righteousness  shall  not  be  forgotten. 

Thus  generous  in  his  warfare,  Kallikratiaas  was  not  less 
vigorous  as  a  general.  His  first  act  was  to  chase  to  Mytilcne  the 
fleet  of  Konon  whom  he  had  warned  that  the  sea  was  now  the  bride 
not  of  Athens  but  of  Sparta.      With   all  his  speed   Konon  was 

'  Xenophon,  H.  i.  6,  15,  docs  not  cedinfj  sentence  of  Xenophon,  //.  i. 

mention  that  any  conditions  were  6,  14,  lays  a  stress  on  the  demand 

attached   to    their    freedom.     Dr.  that  the  Methymnaians  should  be 

Tiiirlwali,  Iliat.   Or.  iv.  117,  says  sold  along  with  the  rest.     About 

thatthe  Athenian  garrison  was  sold  these  tliereiiiight  bosome  doubt,  as 

alonjr  with  the  slaves  found  in  the  it  might  be  held  that  they  had  been 

place.     Mr.  (jf  rote  denies  this.    The  led  astray  liy  the  Athenians:  and  it 

soundness  of  the  text  is  doubtful  ;  is  more  likely   that   Kallikratidas 

butiflvallikratidnshadsaidalready  settled  the  difficulty  by  saying  that 

that  lie  would  do  his  best,  as  soon  as  neither  should  be  sold,  than  that  he 

lie  was  free,  to  reconcile  Athensand  should  half  stultify  his  previous 

S|iarla,  it  is  unlikely  that  he  would  words  by  yielding  the  point  in  the 

forego  this  o])j)ortunity  of  showing  case  of  the  Athenians, 
that  he  was  in  earnest.     The  pre- 


Chap.  IX.J  THE  IONIAN  WAR.  461 

unable  to  enter  the  harbor  before  the  enemy  was  upon  him,  and  a 
conflict  at  the  entrance  cost  him  not  less  than  thirty  out  of  his 
seventy^  triremes.  Happily  their  crews  escaped  ashore,  Blockade  of 
and  the  remaining  ships  were  drawn  up  and  guarded  by  the  flcft  of 
a  stockade.  But  Kallikratidas  renuiiued  master  both  Mytilene. 
of  the  northern  and  southern  gates  of  the  liarbor  be-  "^^  ^■^• 
tweeu  the  islet  on  which  Mytilene  had  been  orginally  built  and  the 
coast  of  Lesbos  itself.  Konon  had  not  been  prepared  to  stand  a 
siege  ;  without  relief  he  must  soon  surrender ;  and  relief  could  not 
be  looked  for,  while  his  situation  remained  unknown  at  Athens. 
Picking  out  the  best  rowers  from  all  his  triremes,  he  placed  them 
on  board  tuo  of  his  quickest  vessels,  and  for  four  days  waited  vainly 
for  an  opportunity  which  might  justify  him  in  giving  orders  for 
attempting  the  forlorn  enterprise.  On  the  flfth  day  at  the  time  of 
the  noontide  meal  the  dispersion  of  the  Spartan  crews  and  the 
slackness  of  the  guard  seemed  to  promise  success  ;  and  the  two 
triremes  started,  making  with  the  utmost  haste  the  one  for  the 
southern  and  the  other  for  the  northern  entrance  of  the  harbor. 
"With  all  their  efforts  one  only  escaped.  Hurrying  to  their  ships 
the  Spartans  cut  their  anchor-ropes,  if  they  could  not  at  once  haul 
them  up,  and  gave  chase  to  the  fugitives.  Before  the  day  was 
done,  one  trireme  with  its  crew  had  been  brought  back  to  Mytilene  ; 
the  other  first  announced  the  strait  of  Konon  to  Diomedon  at 
Sanios  and  then  hastened  on  to  Athens,  where  the  tidings  roused 
only  a  more  vehement  spirit  of  resistance.  By  a  vote  _.  ,  . 
to  which  no  opposition,  it  would  seem,  was  made,  the  of  Arpjeu- 
assembly  decreed  that  all  persons  within  the  military  noussai. 
age,  whether  free  or  slaves,  should  be  drafted  into  one  hundred  and 
ten  triremes  :  and  in  thirty  days  this  prodigious  force  was  on  its 
way.  Strengthened  at  Samos  by  ten  ships,  and  in  their  onward 
voyage  by  thirty  more  contributed  by  allied  cities,  the  Athenian 
generals  took  up  their  station  off  the  islets  of  Argennoussai  with  a 
fleet  of  not  less  than  150  triremes.  Hearing  of  their  approach, 
Kallikratidas  had  posted  himself  with  120  vessels  off  the  Malean 
cape,  distant  ten  miles  to  the  west  of  Argennoussai,  leaving 
Eteonikos  with  fifty  triremes  to  maintain  the  blockade  at  My- 
tilene. He  had  not  been  there  long  before  the  camp-fires  on 
the  opposite  coast  announced  the  presence  of  the  enemy.  His 
plan  was  to  attack  at  once,  and  so  to  take  them  by  surprise  ;  but  the 
attempt  which  he  made  to  set  out  at  midnight  from  Malea  was 
frustrated  by  a  severe  storm  with  thunder  and  heavy  rain.  Early 
in  the  morning  the  Spartan  fleet  advanced  to  the  encounter.  Of 
the  battle  itself  not  much  is  to  be  said.  If  Xenophon  be  right, 
there  were  some  in  the  Spartan  force  who  did  not  like  the  thought 
of  encountering  150  triremes  with  120  ;  and  Hermon,  the  Megarian 


462  THE   EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III 

sailing-master  in  the  ship  of  Kallikvatidas,  openly  suggested  the 
prudence  of  retreat.  Kallikratidas  replied  briefly  that  flight  would 
be  shameful,  and  that  Sparta  would  be  none  the  worse  inhabited 
if  he  were  himself  slain.'  For  a  time  the  battle  Avas  carried  on 
by  the  two  fleets,  each  with  its  whole  force  massed.  Afterwards, 
as  in  the  last  terrible  conflict  in  the  harbor  of  Syracuse,  the 
combatants  were  broken  up  into  detached  groups.  In  one  of  these 
groups  the  ship  of  Kallikratidas  came  into  contact  witli  tlie  enemy 
wdtli  such  force  that  the  Spartan  admiral  Avas  hurled  into  the  water 
and  never  seen  again.  At  length  the  left  wing  of  the  Spartan  fleet 
gave  way,  and  the  fliglit  soon  became  general.  The  Peloponnesiau 
fleet  was  practically  destroyed.  Of  the  ten  ships  furnished  by 
Sparta  herself  one  only  escaped  ;  of  the  vessels  contributed  by  her 
allies  more  than  sixty  were  lost.  On  their  side  the  Athenians  lost 
flve-and-twenty  ships  with  their  crews,^  a  few  more  being  driven 
on  the  land  without  further  injury  to  their  men.  So  died  in  the 
first  bloom  of  youthful  manhood^  the  only  Ilellen  who  had  yet 
learnt  practically  that  the  duty  of  men,  sprung  from  the  same  stock, 
speaking  the  same  language,  and  loving  the  same  equality  of  law 
and  freedom  of  speech,  was  to  make  as  little  as  possible  of  points  of 
diflFerence,  and  as  much  as  possible  of  all  that  they  had  in  common. 
AVhether  the  Athenians  spent  any  time  in  chase  of  the  flying 
enemy,  we  know  not."*  According  to  Xenophon  the  generals 
Departure  of  intrusted  the  trierarchs  Theramenes  and  Thrasyboulos 
^om^Mvti-  ^^^^^^  ^^'^  charge  of  recovering  from  the  wrecked  and 
lene.  disabled  ships  such  of  the  crew  as  might  still  be  living, 

while  they  themselves  were  anxious  to  sail  at  once  and  destroy  the 
blockading  squadron  of  Eteonikos  at  Mytilene.  A  heavy  tempest 
of  wind  and  rain,  it  is  said,  compelled  them  to  give  up  this  enter- 
prise ;  but  if  they  had  wasted  many  hours  in  pursuing  the  flying 
ships  of  the  enemy,  they  would  have  found  him  already  gone.  As 
soon  as  the  fate  of  the  battle  was  decided,  the  admiral's  pinnace 
conveyed  the  tidings  to  Eteonikos,  who  bade  the  crew  hold  their 
peace,  go  back  again  to  sea,  and  then  return  singing  the  pa>an  of 
victory  for  the  coni{)lete  destruction  of  the  Athenian  fleet.  His 
command  was  obeyed  ;  and  Eteonikos,  having  gravely  offered  the 
sacrifice  of  thanksiiiving  for  a  triumph  which  he  knew  to  be  achieved 
by  the  enemy,  ordered  his  crew  to  take  their  meal  at  once,  and 
then  sail  to  Chios  convoying  thither  the  merchants  with  their 

'  Xen.  IT.  i.  6.  .']2.  cessible  distance, niijjlit  save  thcm- 

'  It  must  be  inferred  that,  if  8ome  selves,  as  they  frequently  did,  by 

mifjht  be  sunk  alloirether  others  swimmin*?  ashore. 

would  be  waterloiTfjed  and  lunnan-  '  vf'of  TravTeXui;.     Diod.  xiii.  76. 

a^reable ;    and    tliat    of  these   the  *  Diod.  xiii.  100,  asserts  the  fact 

crews  mifxht  be  recovered  by  friend-  of  the  pursuit.  Xenophou  does  not, 

ly  sliips,  or,  if  they  were  within  ac- 


Chap.  IX.J  THE   IONIAN  WAR.  463 

trading-sliips.  He  then  set  his  camp  on  fire,  and  withdrew  with  his 
land  force  to  Methymna.'  The  wind  was  blowing  fair,  that  is, 
from  nearly  due  north,  when  they  set  out  for  Chios,  but  with 
what  strength  we  are  not  told.  That  the  breeze  must  have  been 
violent  may  be  inferred  from  the  statement  that,  although  Konon 
found  the  blockading  fleet  and  the  besieging  army  thus  suddenly 
withdrawn,  he  could  not  venture  to  join  the  Athenians,  on  their 
return  from  Argennoussai,  until  the  force  of  the  storm  had  some- 
what subsided. 


CHAPTER    X. 


THE     PELOPONNESIAN"    (dEKELEIAN     OR     IONIAn)    WAR,    FROM     THE 
BATTLE     OF    ARGENNOUSSAI    TO    THE    SURRENDER    OF     ATHENS. 

In  the  terrible  scenes  which  followed  the  victory  of  the  Athenians 
at  Argennoussai  we  cannot  but  feel  the  greatness  of  the  loss  which 
has  deprived  us  of  the  guidance  of  Tliucydides.  Of  Thetem- 
thesc  events  in  their  broad  outlines  we  know  little  pest  after 
beyond  the  fact  that  the  eight  generals  who  won  the  Argennous- 
battle  were  condemned  to  death,  that  six  of  them  were  ^^'■■ 
executed  for  failing  to  save  the  crews  of  the  disabled  ships,  and 
that  the  plea  of  severe  weather  as  preventing  the  discharge  of  this 
duty  was  emphatically  rejected  by  the  demos.  On  this  cardinal 
point  our  informants  furnish  us  with  no  adequate  testimony.  The 
strength  of  the  wind,  we  are  told,  had  made  it  impossible  for 
Kallikraiidas  to  surprise  the  enemy  in  the  morning ;  and  although 
after  the  battle  the  fleet  of  Eteonikos  was  able  to  make  its  way 
due  south  to  Chios  with  a  fair  breeze,  it  is  at  least  possible  that 
triremes  might  sail  with  a  wind  astern  which  it  might  be  danger- 
ous to  encounter  directly.  Nor  did  Konon  venture,  even  when 
the  course  was  clear  before  him,  to  leave  the  harbor  of  Mytilene 
until  the  strength  of  the  breeze  was  somewhat  lulled.  It  is  also 
possible,  and  even  likely,  that  the  pinnace  of  Kallikratidas  may 
have  set  off  on  its  way  to  Mytilene  as  soon  as  the  issue  of  the  day 
was  decided,  but  while  the  Athenians  were  still  compelled  to  do  what 
might  be  needed  to  make  the  victory  complete.  We  cannot  there- 
fore from  this  narrative  determine  whether  before  the  Athenians 
could  reach  Argennoussai  after  the  fight  (if  they  returned  to  it  at 
all  before  the  orders  were  given  for  attempting  the  rescue  of  the 
distressed  seamen)  the  wind  may  not  have  risen  to  such  a  height 
as  to  make  a  return  to  the  scene  of  action  impracticable, 

'  Diod.  xiii.  100,  makes  him  go  to  Pyrrha. 


464  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

Beyond  this  a  greater  or  less  degree  of  uncertainty  hangs  over 
all  the  facts.  If  we  follow  the  narrative  of  Xenophon,  we  shall 
Measures  pt'rhaps  infer  that  the  generals  returned  to  Argen- 
takcn  by  the  noussai  as  soon  as  the  battle  was  over  ;'  that  they  there 
generais'Vor  ^isld  a  Council  to  determine  their  course  of  action  ;  that 
'•^^ciunK  tbe  Dioniedon  urged  the  immediate  return  of  the  whole 
disabled  fleet  for  the  purpose  of  rescuing  the  crews  of  the  dis- 
ships.  abled  ships,  while  Erasinides  insisted  that  all  should 

sail  at  once  to  the  relief  of  Konon  ;^  that  Thrasylos  proposed  a 
division  of  the  fleet  for  the  accomplishment  of  both  objects  at 
once  ;  that  accordingly  it  Avas  agreed  that,  while  the  rest  should 
sail  forthwith  to  Mytilene,  thirty-seven  triremes,  including  three 
ships  from  each  of  the  divisions  commanded  by  the  eight  generals, 
should  go  to  the  help  of  the  disabled  vessels  ;  that  among  the 
oflBcers  told  off  for  the  latter  duty  were  the  trierarchs  Thrasyboulos 
and  Theramenes  ;  that  while  these  arrangements  were  being  made 
and  the  ships  from  the  several  squadrons  collected,  the  wind  was 
rapidly  rising,  and  that  when  at  last  they  were  ready  to  set  off 
the  storm  was  so  violent  that  they  could  do  nothing.  The  remiss- 
ness and  inhumanity  implied  in  this  narrative  in  great  part  dis- 
appear, if  we  can  give  credit  to  the  story  of  Diodoros.  If,  as  he 
seems  to  state,  the  council  of  commanders  took  place  on  the  scene 
of  action,  and  if  before  there  was  anv  time  for  carrying  out  their 
decision  the  force  of  the  rising  Avind  compelled  them  all  to  return 
hurriedly  to  Argennoussai,^  they  are  chargeable  with  no  other 
fault  thaii  that  of  debating  at  all  where  a  generous  and  kindly 
feeling  should  have  rendered  all  debate  superfluous.  But  the 
Hellenes  generally  Avere,  if  not  a  cruel,  yet  a  grossly  selfish  people. 
It  is  useless,  therefore,  to  repeat  the  emphatic  condemnation  which 
applies  to  the  commanders  at  Argennoussai  no  more  perhaps  than 
to  Athenian  or  Spartan  leaders  generally  ;  and  that  they  Avere 
bound  in  the  first  place  to  make  their  victory  decisive,  Avill  j^ro- 
bably  be  disputed  by  none. 

But  the  fact  remains  that  twenty-five  vessels  belonging  to  the 
Athenian  fleet  Averc  more  or  less  disabled  in  tlie  course  of  the 
Numbers  of  'iction  ;  and  by  the  admission  of  Euryptolemos  twelve 
the  men  lost  of  these  ships  Averc  still  above  Avater  Avhen  the  order 
abled^trl-  was  issued  for  sending  the  seven-and-f orty  triremes  to 
remes.  their  rescue."      It  would   follow  that  in  the  hiterval 

between  the  beginning  of  the  battle  and  the  issuing  of  this  order 
thirteen  ships  had  disappeared  altogether ;  but  we  cannot  infer 
either  that  it  had  been  possible  to  aid  the  crews  of  these  vessels 
or  that  none  of  them  escaped.     A  large  proportion  of  these  ships 

'  Xen.  n.  i.  6,  33.  '  Diod.  xiii.  100. 

'  lb.  //.  i.  7,  29.  *  Xen.  U.  i.  7,  30. 


Chap.  X.]  THE  IONIAN  WAR.  465 

might  go  down  bodily  in  the  battle  :  from  others  tlie  crew  might 
escape  by  swimming.  But  we  cannot  sliut  our  eyes  to  the  fact 
that  at  the  lowest  possible  reckoning  1,500  men  were  allowed  to 
die  who  might  without  much  difficulty  have  been  saved,  if  the 
generals  after  the  final  dispersion  of  the  enemy  had  instead  of 
debating  set  to  work  to  rescue  them.  Comparisons  of  Greek  war- 
fare with  that  of  our  own  day  are  uidiappily  useless,  and  most 
useless  of  all  are  comparisons  of  Athenian  with  British  sailors. 
English  fleets  are  provided  with  the  means  of  rescue  and  iielp  in 
some  fair  proportion  to  their  awful  powers  for  destruction  ;  the 
ancient  triremes  had  no  such  provision.  The  English  seamen  in 
the  hour  of  victory  would  despise  himself  if  he  could  bestow  a 
thought  on  his  own*  success  while  it  was  possible  to  save  a  drown- 
ing comrade  :  for  Athenians  or  for  their  enemies  self-congramla- 
tion  could  lead  them  without  an  effort  to  the  revelry  of  conquer- 
ors, whatever  might  be  the  condition  of  some  who  had  helped  them 
to  gain  the  victory. 

A  few  more  points  relating  to  this  disastrous  inquiry  seem  to 
be  brought  out  Avith  sufficient  clearness..  The  first  dispatch  oi  the 
generals  gave  the  tidings  of  the  victory  and  stated  the    charges 

amount  of  loss  on  the  Athenian  side,  addiii2;  that  the    i>ro\i='it 

11        ?    T      T  against  the 

severe  storm  immediately  tollowmg  tlie  battle  had  put  generals. 
it  out  of  their  power  to  rescue  the  crews  of  the  disabled  triremes.' 
The  report  caused  at  Athens  both  joy  and  grief.  For  the  victory 
tliey  received  the  thanks  of  the  people,  who  at  the  same  time  de- 
plored the  disaster  caused  by  the  storm.  But  there  were  many 
who  were  not  disposed  to  let  the  matter  drop  with  mere  censure ; 
and  the  indignation  thus  fanned  into  flame  led  the  generals,  it  is 
said,  to  send  a  second  dispatch  in  which  they  stated  that  the  task 
of  visiting  the  wrecks  had  been  deputed  among  others  to  Thera- 
menes  and  Thrasyboulos,"  who  had  already  come  to  Athens  while 
the  generals,  having  left  Mytilene,  had  established  themselves  in 
Samos  and  were  making  plundering  excursions  in  the  neighbor- 
hood.^ By  Theramenes  and  perhaps  also  by  Thrasyboulos  the  se- 
cond dispatch  was  treated,  it  is  said,  asamei'e  trick  on  the  part  of 
the  generals  to  transfer  to  others  the  blame  of  inaction  for  which 
they  themselves  were  wholly  responsible.  They  boldly  denied  the 
fact  of  the  storm,  and  denied  at  the  same  time  the  fact  tliat  they 
with  others  had  been  commissioned  to  rescue  the  drowning  men.* 
The  inquiry  therefore  resolves  itself  into  the  one  question  whether 
certain  men,  Theramenes  and  Thrasyboulos  among  them,  were 
ordered  to  visit  the  wrecks  or  whether  they  were  not ;  in  other 

1  Xen.  n.  i.  7,  4.  *  Both  these  denials  are  distiuct- 

'  Diod.  xiii.  101.  l.y   implied   in   the    statement   of 

'  Diod.  xiii.  100.  Xenovilion,  H.  i.  7,  4. 

20* 


466  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  HL 

words,  it  becomes  a  question  of  the  trustworthiness  of  these  men 
and  their  partisans  against  the  credibiUty  of  the  generals.  But  the 
issuing  of  this  order  was  not  mentioned  in  the  first  dispatch  of  the 
generals ;  and  we  cannot  be  sure  that  the  alleged  second  dispatch 
was  ever  sent.  The  generals  probably  knew  nothing  of  the  storm 
which  was  brewing  at  Athens,  until  at  Sanios  they  received  a 
peremptory  order  to  return  home  after  handing  over  their  com- 
mand to  Konon,  to  wliom  Adeimantos  and  Philoklcs  were  sent 
as  colleagues.'  Suspecting  mischief,  Protomachos  and  Aristogenes 
followed  the  example  of  Alkibiades  when  recalled  from  Sicily. 
The  other  six  went  back  with  the  confidence  of  men  who  had  done 
nothing  to  deserve  ill-treatment  at  the  hands  of  their  countrymen. 
According  to  Xenophon  the  first  step  in  the  mutter  was  taken  by 
Archedemos,  a  popular  orator,  who,  as  demarch,  it  would  seem, 
of  Dekeleia,  charged  Erasinides  with  neglecting  to  bury  the  dead 
belonging  to  his  own  demos.  This  charge,  coupled  with  an  accu- 
sation of  embezzlement,  was  brouglit  in  regular  form  before  the 
dikastery,  which  ordered  the  imprisonment  of  Erasinides.  His 
colleagues  were  now  introduced  to  the  Senate  of  Five  Hundred ; 
but  their  answers,  we  must  infer,  were  regarded  as  unsatisfactory, 
for  on  the  motion  of  Timokrates  they  were  all  imprisoned  to  await 
their  trial  before  the  people.  Thus  far,  it  would  seem  according  to 
Xenophon,  no  mention  had  been  made  of  Theramencs  and  Thrasy- 
boulos  as  having  had  anything  to  do  in  the  business  ;  but  in  the 
assembly  Avhich  followed  their  api)earance  before  the  Senate  tiic 
generals  were  allowed  to  speak  each  in  his  own  defence,  and  all,  it 
seems,  agreed  in  asserting  that  these  men  had  Avith  the  other 
trierarchs  been  charged  to  rescue  the  distressed  crews,  adding  also 
that  they  would  not  suffer  the  accusation  brought  by  Thcramenes 
to  tempt  them  into  a  lie.  They  had  no  intention  of  retorting  on 
him  the  imputation  of  guilt  which  lie  so  loudly  urged  against 
them.  The  storm  liad  rendered  all  action  impossible,  and  neither 
the  generals  nor  the  trierarclis  who  were  their  deputies  were  to 
be  blamed  for  results  wliolly  beyond  their  power.^  This  simple 
and  straightforward  answer,  backed  by  the  testimony  of  wit- 
nesses whose  trustworthiness  there  were  no  grounds  for  calling  in 
question,  produced  its  natural  effect.  The  people  were  fast  be- 
coming convinced  of  their  innocence  ;  many  were  eager  to  offer 
bail  on  their  behalf  ;  and  Tlieramenes,  as  having  denied  the  fact  of 
his  commission,  stood  convicted  of  a  lie.  But  it  was  now  late  in 
the  dav,  and  it  was  resolved  to  j)ostp()ne  the  discussion  to  the  next 
assejnblv,  the  Senate  in  the  meatiwliile  being  ordered  to  consider 
bow  the  trial  of  the  accused  should  best  be  conducted.  Thcramenes, 

'  lYiod.  xiii.  101.     Xen.  //.  i.  7,  38. 
"  Xen.  //.  i.  7,  6. 


Chap.  X.]  THE  IONIAN  WAR.  4G7 

however,  was  resolved  that  they  should  not  escape,  and  he  era- 
ployed  the  interval  in  maturing  his  conspiracy. 

We  need  surely  go  no  farther  before  attempting  to  determine 
the  measure  of  belief  to  be  accorded  to  the  generals  and  to  their 
accusers.  It  is  not  a  question  of  their  magnanimity  ,  ...^ 
,  or  their  self-llevotion.  They  may  have  possessed  and  ami  conspi- 
exhibited  neither  the  one  nor  the  other.  But  in  their  ramcnes^'^'* 
dispatches  and  their  answers  we  can  trace  no  contra- 
dictions, not  even  any  equivocation.  They  stated  in  their  first  let- 
ter that  the  storm  had  prevented  the  rescue  of  the  wrecked  seamen. 
In  their  second  letter  (which,  if  sent  at  all,  was  written,  according 
to  Diodoros,  to  counteract  the  eflEorts  of  enemies  of  whose  activity 
they  had  been  informed)  they  named  two  of  the  men  to  whom 
among  others  the  charge  of  visiting  the  ships  had  been  by  them  in- 
trusted, la  their  answer  before  the  assembly  they  repeated  the 
statement  and  only  added  that  neither  before  nor  then  were  they 
accusing  anyone  of  neglecting  duty  which  it  was  not  in  human 
power  to  fulfil.  But  how  stands  the  matter  with  Theramenes  ? 
It  would  need  a  reputation  for  truthfulness  such  as  few  men  have 
ever  attained  to  warrant  a  belief  that  a  body  of  generals,  not  all 
agreed  as  to  the  course  which  they  ought  to  take,  would  combine 
to  invent  and  maintaiu  a  lie  which  could  be  brought  home  to 
them  by  hundreds  and  by  thousands.  In  truth  the  fact  of  the 
commission  having  been  given  was  not  doubted ;  nor  can  we  find 
in  all  history  many  things  more  astonishing  than  the  change  which 
came  over  the  Athenian  people  after  the  first  assembly  and  which 
led  them  not  merely  to  punish  the  guiltless  but  to  acquit  or  rather 
deliberately  to  screen  the  guilty.  If  Theramenes  denied,  as  he 
undoubtedly  denied,  the  alleged  difficulty  of  the  storm,  still,  having 
received  the  commission,  he  and  his  colleagues  were  alone  to  blame 
if  they  failed  to  do  their  duty  ;  and  on  his  own  statement  that 
there  was  no  storm  to  hinder  them  he  and  they  were  doubly  and 
trebly  guilty.  But  for  the  new  direction  into  which  the  popular 
feeling  was  driven  in  the  second  assembly,  the  one  questioa  would 
have  been  to  determine  whether  the  commission  was  given  or  not ; 
and  with  the  answer  to  this  question  the  trial,  so  far  as  it  con- 
cerned the  generals,  would  have  come  to  an  end.  As  it  was,  tire 
trial  turned  on  this  amazing  issue,  that  there  was  a  delay  ingoing 
to  the  rescue  of  the  wrecked  seamen,  that  this  delay  was  not  due 
to  any  danger  arising  from  stormy  weather,  that  a  number  of  ships 
with  their  officers  and  men  were  told  off  for  this  duty,  and  be- 
cause these  failed  to  do  their  duty,  therefore  the  generals  were  to 
be  put  to  death,  while  their  accusers,  the  very  men  who  had  thus 
failed  to  obey  orders,  were  to  be  regarded  as  benefactors  to  the 
state.    Nor  is  this  all.     The  whole  career  of  Theramenes  absolutely 


468  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  IIL 

reeked  of  villainy.  He  had  been  a  traitor  to  the  constitution 
and  laws  of  bis  country.  He  bad  been  tbe  -willino;  and  tbe  able 
instrument  of  Antipbon  and  bis  fellow-conspirators  in  their  plans 
of  organised  assassination  ;'  and  because  he  had  failed  to  reap 
from  their  crimes  and  his  own  the  fruits  which  he  had  desired,  be 
had  betrayed  his  confederates  and  for  the  sake  only  ofliis  personal 
interests  bad  thrown  in  bis  lot  with  men  whom  he  despised  or 
bated.  He  was  now  bent  on  murdering  men  whom  lie  had  accused 
at  first  only  perhaps  in  order  to  enhance  his  own  importance  :  but 
the  story  which  be  told  now  was  not  the  last  version  for  which 
we  are  indebted  to  bis  fertile  fancy.  When,  in  the  last  struggle 
which  closed  tbe  tragedy  of  his  life,  Kritias  reviled  him  as  tbe 
murderer  of  the  six  generals,  Tlieramenes  replied  vehemently  that 
he  had  never  come  forward  as  their  accuser,  but  that,  having  laid 
on  himself  and  others  tbe  duty  of  rescuing  tbe  drowning  men,  they 
bad  charged  him  with  disobedience  to  orders  for  their  failure. 
They  had  failed,  he  pleaded,  but  only  because  the  storm  bad  made 
it  impossible  not  juereiy  to  visit  the  wrecks  but  even  to  leave  their 
moorings  ;  and  be  charged  the  generals  with  deliberately  laying  a 
plot  for  their  destruction  by  insisting  on  tbe  practicability  of  the 
task  and  then  taking  their  departure.  Putting  aside,  therefore,  his 
evidence  as  absolutely  worthless,  we  are  brought  at  once  to  the 
definite  conclusion  that  tbe  statements  of  the  generals  are  con- 
sistent and  substantially  true  ;  that  they  were  to  blame  for  holding 
council  on  a  matter  in  which  action  should  have  been  spontaneous 
and  immediate  ;  that  their  debate  ended  in  telling  off  a  large 
nmnber  of  men  and  ships  for  the  rescue  of  the  distressed  crews; 
and  that  before  they  could  set  off  on  their  t;isk,  the  wind  which 
had  been  gaining  strength  from  a  time  probably  preceding  the  end 
of  tbe  battle  bad  become  a  tempest  which  the  triremes  could  not 
face.  If  these  facts  may  be  regarded  as  practically  certain,  it  is 
further  likely  that  tbe  council  of  tbe  generals  was  held  in  tbe 
immediate  neighborhood  of  the  field  of  battle,  and  not,  as 
Xenopbon  seemingly  implies,  after  their  return  to  Argennoussai. 
If,  again,  tliis  be  so,  the  time  of  inaction  is  greatly  circumscribed, 
and  it  becomes  likely  that  the  wind  increased  to  a  storm  almost 
immediately  after  tbe  battle.  If,  lastly,  the  statement  of  Diodoros 
be  true  that  Tbei-amenes  with  his  party  was  busy  at  Athens  in- 
flaming the  public  feeling  against  tbe  generals  before  their  arrival 
from  Samos,  we  can  scarcely  avoid  tbe  conclusion  that  be  had 
returned  home  deliberately  bent  on  bringing  about  their  disgrace 
and  death.  On  Theramenes  the  liar  not  the  slightest  dependence 
can  be  placed  :  and  we  cannot  therefore  tell  bow  far  he  may  have 
looked  upon  these  generals  or  uj)on  some  of  them  as  hindrances  to 
'  See  ]).  430. 


Chap.  X.]  THE  IONIAN  WAR.  469 

his  own  future  career.  In  any  case,  liis  own  position  would  be 
indefinitely  raised,  and  his  influence  vastly  increased,  if  the  people 
could  be  made  to  believe  that  to  him  they  were  indebted  for  the 
vindication  of  their  deepest  affections  at  a  time  when  their  gene- 
rals had  openl}'  and  studiedly  insulted  them.  Such  an  object  was 
enough  for  Iheramenes;  and  his  plan  was  wonderfully  lielped  on 
by  an  accident  which  perhaps  he  may  have  foreseen  but  of  which 
assuredly  he  eagerly  availed  himself. 

The  postponement  of  the  discussion  from  the  first  assembly  had 
this  result, — that  the  matter  could  not  be  opened  again  until  after 
the  festival  of  Apatouria.     When   we   say  that   this   ,^.  ,  ,. 

P  II-  -I'll  ^•  r    Violations 

least  was  most  closely  intertwined  witli  the  polity  or  of  Athuniau 
Solonian  and  pre-Solonian  Athens,  we  assert  in  eifect  proceedings 
that  the  sentiments  which  it  was  likely  to  awaken  ran  against  the 
in  a  groove  altogether  different  from  that  of  the  '^«'^"^"^''- 
Kleisthenean  and  Periklean  constitution.  Popular  tradition,  which 
never  failed  to  invent  false  etymologies,  ascribed  its  foundation  to 
the  treacherous  murder  of  the  Boiotian  Xanthias  by  the  Athenian 
Melanthos ;  but  the  name  points  with  sufficient  clearness  to  the 
unions  of  the  ancient  Eupatrid  phratriai.'  In  this  festival,  then, 
there  was  all  that  could  bind  the  citizen  to  the  old  order  of  things, 
nothing  to  attach  him  to  the  new.  In  it  he  was  carried  back  into 
a  region  of  sentiment  in  which  the  family  was  everything,  the 
state  nothing.'''  Here  as  they  met  in  the  phratrion  or  common 
chamber  of  the  clan,  or  gathered  round  the  banquet  spread  out  in 
the  house  of  the  wealthiest  clansman,  the  talk  of  the  guests  turned 
necessarily  on  their  own  interests  and  on  the  fortunes  of  their 
kinsfulk.  Here  then  was  the  liearth  on  which  Therainenes  might 
kindle  the  flames  which  should  devour  his  victims  ;  and  his  emis- 
saries were  everywhere  busied  in  the  unhallowed  task.  Athe- 
nians were  not  to  be  done  to  death  with  impunity ;  and  their 
clansmen  would  be  bringing  shame  on  their  ancient  homes  if  they 
failed  to  stand  forth  as  avengers  of  murder.  The  generals  must 
die  ;  and  the  kinsfolk  of  the  men  whom  they  had  slain  must  be- 
siege the  assembly  clad  in  the  garb  of  mourning  and  with  their 
heads  shorn,  until  the  great  sacrifice  should  be  decreed  to  appease 
the  dead.  The  drama  was  well  got  up.  Kallixenos,  one  of  the 
Five  Hundred,  was  to  play  his  part  in  the  council  chamber,  while 
others  would  work  on  the  religious  instincts  of  the  assembly.  In 
the  senate  all  went  smoothly  ;  and  seemingly  without  opposition 
Kallixenos  carried  his  monstrous  proposal  that  without  further 

^  The  name  dnarovpia,  thus  mis-  compared    with  the  nouns  aih'>(pbc 

takenly  connected  with  aKarav,  to  and  J/zaC'^J',  as  applied  to  children  of 

cheat,  but  denoting  the  children  the  same  mother, 

sprung  from  a  common  sire,  may  be  "  See  p.  5  et  seq. 


470  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  HI, 

discussion  tte  demos  should  at  once  proceed  to  judgment,  on  the 
ground  that  the  accusers  and  the  accused  had  been  heard  when 
last  they  met  together.  Two  vessels  placed  for  each  tribe  should 
receive  the  secret  votes  of  unsworn  citizens  deciding  the  question 
of  life  and  death  for  six  generals  of  the  commonwealth.  When 
the  hour  for  the  assembly  came,  the  dark-robed  mourners  were 
there,  like  beasts  of  prey  thirsting  for  the  blood  of  their  victims  ; 
and  the  excitement  created  by  their  cries  and  tears  was  aggravated 
to  fury  when  a  man  came  forward  to  say  that  he  too  had  been 
among  the  drowning  seamen,  till  he  had  contrived  to  escape  upon 
a  corn-barrel,  and  that  as  he  floated  away,  the  last  sounds  which 
he  could  hear  were  intreaties  that  he  would,  if  saved,  tell  the  Athe- 
nians how  their  commanders  had  treated  the  bravest  and  best  of 
their  countrymen.  In  the  false  issue  thus  given  to  the  inquiry, 
if  such  it  can  any  longer  be  termed,  there  is  something  which 
would  have  been  scarcely  less  loathsome  to  Athenians  of  the  days 
of  Perikles  than  it  is  to  us.  In  this  horrible  outcry  not  a  voice 
is  raised  on  behalf  of  justice  and  truth.  Not  an  attempt  is  made 
to  determine^he  only  two  points  which  called  for  a  judicial 
decision, — these  points  being  the  reality  of  the  connnission  given 
to  the  trierarchs,  and  the  severity  of  the  storm  which  made  it  im- 
possible for  them  to  obey  orders.  The  first  being  proved,  the 
generals  stood  blameless  :  if  the  second  were  disproved,  the  per- 
sons to  be  punished  would  be  not  the  generals  but  Theramenes 
and  his  colleagues.  We  cannot  doubt  that  this  unscrupulous  liar 
saw  before  him  the  rock  on  which  he  might  yet  go  down,  and 
that  his  fear  suggested  a  treason  to  the  law  of  Athens  as  flagrant 
as  any  in  wliich  he  had  been  partaker  in  the  days  of  the  Four 
Hundred.  Athenian  law  demanded  that  no  citizen  should  be 
tried  except  before  a  court  of  sworn  jurymen  ;  that  ho  should 
receive  due  notice  of  trial  ;  and  that,  having  had  sulHcient  time 
for  the  preparation  of  his  «lefence,  he  should  be  brought  face  to 
face  with  his  accusers.  All  these  forms,  of  vital  moment  for  the 
due  administration  of  justice,  were  summarily  set  aside  by  the 
propositions  of  Kallixenos.  Bnt  there  were  yet  some,  although 
every  moment  left  them  in  a  more  fearful  minority,  who  were  de- 
termined that  if  tlie  law  was  to  be  defied  it  should  be  defied  un- 
der protest  from  them  and  that  they  would  not  be  sharers  in  the 
guilt.  The  proposer  of  unconstitutional  measures  was  liable  to 
indictment  under  the  writ  Graphe  I'aranomon  ;  and  Euryj)tole- 
mos  with  some  otliers  interposeil  this  check  to  the  madness  which 
was  coming  over  the  people.  Unless  this  difficulty  could  be  over- 
ruled, the  trial  of  the  generals  must  be  conducted  according  to  the 
constitutional  forms  ;  in  other  words,  the  acquittal  of  all  must  be 
insured.     But  it  was  too  late.     The  shaven  mourners  in  their 


Chap.  X.]  THE  IONIAN  WAR.  471 

black  raiment  raised  the  cry,  taken  up  by  the  majority  of  the 
citizens  present,  that  the  demos  must  be  allowed  to  do  what  they 
liked  and  that  any  attempt  to  defraud  them  of  this  undoubted  right 
was  monstrous.'  Theramcnes  had,  indeed,  triumphed.  A  spirit 
was  abroad  in  the  assembly  which  was  determined  that,  all  laws 
and  usages  to-  the  contrary  notwitiistanding,  the  six  generals  should 
drink  the  hemlock  juice  that  day  after  the  going  down  of  the  sun. 
They  were  not  to  be  deterred  by  threats  of  prosecution  on  the 
score  of  unconstitutional  proposals :  and  Lykiskos  bluntly  and 
tersely  informed  Euryptolemos  that  unless  he  withdrew  his  menace, 
he  with  his  aiders  and  abettors  should  share  the  deadly  draught 
with  the  generals.  It  was  decided  that  the  proposition  of 
Kallixenos  was  one  which  might  be  submitted  to  the  people  ;  but 
the  question  could  not  be  put  without  the  consent  of  tbePrytaneis 
or  fifty  presiding  senators,  and  of  these  some  (we  are  not  told  how 
many)  protested  against  its  shameful  illegality.  The  partisans  of 
Theramenes  were  not  to  be  thus  baulked.  Kallixenos  assured  the 
protestors  that  opposition  would  end  only  in  their  own  inclusion 
in  the  number  of  the  proscribed  (no  other  term  can  with  strict 
truth  be  used),  while  others  with  loud  shouts  insisted  on  the 
names  of  these  senators  being  made  known.  Of  these  senators  one 
only  was  prepared,  if  need  were,  to  sacrifice  his  life  for  the  vindi- 
cation of  law,  and  that  one  was  Sokrates.  For  him  the  clamor 
of  the  multitude  had  no  terrors,  and  he  returned  to  his  home  un- 
hurt. It  was  decided  that  the  question  should  be  put ;  and  when 
it  had  been  formally  submitted  to  the  demos,  Euryptolemos  rose 
to  avail  himself  of  the  last  resource  left  to  him  by  the  laws  which 
had  been  thus  grossly  outraged,  and  to  urge  its  rejection.  Of  the 
accused  generals  Perikles  was  liis  kinsman,  and  Diomedon  his 
intimate  friend  ;  and  on  their  behalf  as  well  as  on  that  of  the 
state  he  felt  bound  to  lay  before  them  his  honest  convictions. 
These  two,  so  he  asserted,  had  dissuaded  their  colleagues  from  in- 
forming the  people  about  the  commission  given  to  Theramenes 
and  his  fellow-trierarchs,^  and  for  this  he  held  them  to  be  deserv- 
ing of  cenSure  ;  but  this  censure  must  be  directed  not  against  their 
neglect  of  duty,  for,  having  delegated  it  to  competent  hands,  they 
were  on  this  score  guiltless,  but  against  their  good-natured  desire 
to  screen  the  officers  charged  with  the  execution  of  their  order.^ 

'  Xen.  n.  i.  7,  12.  of  the  drowning  crews. 

^  Xen.   //.   i.  7,   17.      It  is   pos-         ^  Euryptolemos  was  speakhijj  as 

sible  that  Erasinides  raitrht  Lave  an  advocate  ;  and  this  sentence,  if 

been  specially  anxious  that  this  cir-  he  uttered  it,  was  not  a  happy  one. 

cumstance   should    he   introduced  The  generals  had  saidallalongthat 

into  the  dispatch,  if  only  to  cover  no  one  was  to  blame,  as  the  decision 

his  own  previous  opposition  to  the  had  been  no  sooner  arrived  at  than 

making  of  any  effort  for  the  rescue  the  storm  rendered  all  action  im  pos- 


•^72  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

For  the  rest,  he  intreated  them  to  take  no  step  for  which  tliey 
could  not  adduce  the  distinct  sanction  of  law,  far  less  to  take  one 
which,  being  irrevocable,  could  be  followed  only  by  a  repentance 
as  unavailing  as  it  would  be  bitter,  lie  had  no  wish  to  save  even 
his  dearest  friends  if  these  should  be  found  guilty  of  a  well- 
defined  crime  against  the  state.  He  was  even  willing  and  anxious 
that  his  kinsman  Perikles  should  be  tried  first,  and,  if  convicted, 
punished  ;  but  in  the  name  of  law  and  constitutional  usage  he 
demanded  that  a  day  should  be  given  to  the  consideration  of  eacli 
case  separately.  To  his  warnings  lie  added  a  short  account  of 
the  facts  as  in  his  belief  they  had  really  taken  place,  and  his  con- 
viction that  the  violence  of  the  storm  had  not  been  exaggerated. 
This  could  be  proved  not  only  by  those  who  were  in  the  ships  of 
the  victorious  tieet,  but  by  many  who  had  managed  to  escape 
from  the  wrecks.  Among  those  who  were  tluis  saved  was  one  of 
the  generals  themselves  who  now  stood  before  them  charged  with 
the  crime  of  abandoning  others  to  the  death  wliich  he  had  well- 
nigh  shared  with  them.  Lastly,  lie  reminded  thom  that  they 
were  about  to  pronounce  judgment  on  men  who  had  won  for 
them  a  victory  which  had  all  but  settled  the  war  at  a  stroke  and 
which  might  easily  be  made  to  read  to  the  re-establishment  of  tlie 
Athenian  empire  ;  and  these  men,  he  emphatically  asserted,  de- 
served rot  to  be  put  to  death  but  to  be  crowned  as  conquerors 
and  honored  as  benefactors  of  the  city. 

To  this  speech  the  multitude  (the  name  of  Demos  they  no  longer 
deserve)  were  willing  to  listen  with  ])ati('nce,  if  not  with  attention. 
„     ,  It  needed  no  special  sagacity  to  see  which  side  had  the 

tionof  the  majority  in  the  assembly  ;  and  the  partisans  of  Ihera- 
gcnt-rals.  lucnes  knew  that,  if  only  the  proposition  of  Kallixcnos 
were  put  to  the  vote,  it  must  b(;  carried.  This  end  was  insured  so 
soon  as  Euryptolemos  was  compelled  to  withdraw  his  threat  of 
indicting  the  proposer  under  the  (Tiaphe  raranoiiion.  "When,  then, 
the  amendment  of  Euryptolemos  was  put  to  the  vote,  and  the  .show 
of  liands  declared  by  the  I'rytaneis  to  be  in  its  favor,  they  could 
even  yet  wait  patiently.  It  was  not  likely  that  the  presiding 
senators,  some  or  many  of  wliom  had  j)rotested  against  the  measure 
of  Kallixenos  as  illegal,  would  not  avail  tliemselves  of  every  means 
for  preventing  its  adoption  ;  and  so  conscious  were  they  of  the 
trick  i)y  which  they  had  lioped  to  save  the  people  from  the  com- 
mi.ssion'  of  a  freat  crime  that  when  Menekles  rose  to  insist  that  the 
amencbnent  should  be  put  to  the  vote  again,  they  made  no  oppixsi- 
tion  to  the  demand.'     The  proposal  put  forth  by  the  senate  was 

Bible;    and    Euryptolemos    would  '  Dr.  Tliirlwall, ///.s/.  6^/-.  iv.  132, 

have  done  more  "wiselvliadliecon-  believes  that  tliemotion  of  Eurypto- 
fined  himself  to  their  "statements.        lemos  '  was  carried  probably  by  a 


Chap.  X.]  THE  IONIAN  WAR.  473 

adopted,  and  there  remained  only  the  task  of  judging  all  the 
generals  by  one  vote.  But  in  a  case  like  this  judgment  must 
be  carefully  distinguished  from  trial  ;  and  without  hearing  any 
further  witnesses  or  any  defence  from  the  prisoners  the  Athe- 
nians proceeded  to  give  their  decision  by  placing  their  votes 
whether  for  acquittal  or  condemnation  in  the  two  urns  belonging 
to  each  of  the  ten  tribes.  The  result  Avas,  of  course,  that  for 
which  Theramenes  and  his  fellow-conspirators  had  so  earnestly 
striven.  All  the  eight  generals  were  condemned  and  on- that 
night  the  six  wlio  were  present  were  murdered  ;  and  thus  Athens 
requited  the  lifelong  labors  of  Perikles  by  slaying  his  son. 

A  feeling  of  disgust,  if  Tiot  of  loathing,  may  fairly  be  forgiven, 
when  we  read  that  no  long  time  passed  before  the  Athenians  re- 
pented of  their  madness  and  of  their  crimes,  but  that,  infamous 
yielding  still  to  their  old  besetting  sin,  they  insisted  f^i"" aum-^ 
on  throwing  the  blame  not  on  themselves  but  on  their  >"»"  demos, 
advisers.  As  they  had  done  in  the  days  of  Miltiades,  and  asthey 
had  done  after  the  catastrophe  at  Syracuse,  so  did  they  now.  It 
was  easy  to  decree  that  these  evil  counsellors  should  be  brought  to 
trial  ;  but  the  Athenians  were  falling  on  days  in  which  they  were 
no  longer  to  do  as  they  liked.  Kallixenos  and  some  of  his  partisans 
were  bailed  by  friends  who  did  what  they  could  to  secure  their 
presence  at  the  time  appointed  for  the  trial  ;  but  they  contrived 
to  make  their  escape  during  the  tumults  which  attended  the  illegal 
prosecution  of  Kleophon.  Kallixenos  returned  to  Athens  after  the 
end  of  the  war,  and,  hated  of  all  men,  died  of  hunger.    "Very  wicked 

very  small  majority.'  Surely,  if  it  propositions  were  put  to  the  vote, 
liad  been  really  carried,  the  Pryta-  one  after  the  other  ;  and  that  the 
neis  would  have  been  encouraged  to  Prytaneia  decided,  after  witnessinjr 
resistthedemandof  Menekles;  and  two  shows  of  hands,  that  there  was 
a  bold  front,  justified  by  a  real  a  majority  lor  that  of  Euryptole- 
thougli  small  majority,  mijiht  and  mos,  and  a  minority  lor  that  of  Kal- 
not  improbably  would  have  stayed  lixenos.  But  althoutjh  it  is  just 
thecurrentof thepopularmadness.  possible  that  a  large  minority 
Besides.thisstatementimpliesthat,  miorht  in  the  one  case  be  repre- 
when  the  amendment  was  put  a  sented  as  a  majority,  it  i3ialpossi- 
8econdtime,somewhohadvotedfor  ble  to  believe  that  on  the  first  vot- 
it  before  now  voted  a^^ainst  it,  and  inj;  more  hands  were  held  up 
insufficientnumbersat  leasttocon-  auainst  tlie  proposal  of  Kallixenos 
vert  a  small  majority  into  a  decided  than  for  it,  or  that  the  Prytaneis 
minority.  Now  tliese  citizens,  who  would  have  dared  to  represent  as  a 
weresimply  holding  up  their  hands  minority  that  which  was  a  real 
amongst  a  multitude,  were  person-  majority  in  favor  of  the  scheme  of 
ally  safe,  and  had  no  motive  for  Kallixenos.  The  whole  history  of 
changinor  their  minds  and  their  tliis  fatal  day  shows  that  from  the 
votes.  The  Prytaneis  had  a  very  first  a  considerable  majority  of  the 
strong  motive  for  wishing  that  people  had  abandoned  themselves 
the  amendment  of  Euryptolemos  to  the  clan  feeling  which  set  all 
should  be  carried.  Mr.  Grote,  Hist,  law  and  order  at  defiance. 
Gr.  viii.  275,  thinks  that  the  two 


474  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  HI. 

he  may  have  oecn  ;  but  all  who  had  voted  for  the  murder  of  the 
six  jTcnerals  were  not  less  guilty  than  he  and  should  be  not  less 
deeply  disgraced. 

The  Athenians  had  repented;  but  all  their  sorrow  could  not  do 
away  with  the  fact  that  the  growing  habit  of  tampering  with  law 
Moral  effect  and  Constitutional  forms  had  lowered  their  character 
oftheexecii-  ^^j  ^jjg  character  of  their  servants.     The  people  Avere 

tion  of  the  .  .  ^       t 

generals.  losmg  conhdcncc  in  those  whom  they  employed,  and 
their  officers  were  compelled  to  feel  more  and  more  that  no  benefits 
which  their  services  might  secure  to  the  state  would  insure  them 
against  illegal  prosecutions  and  arbitrary  penalties.  Corruption 
was  eating  its  way  into  the  heart  of  the  state,  and  treason  was  fast 
losing  its  loathsomeness  in  the  eyes  of  many  who  thought  them- 
selves none  the  worse  for  dallying  with  it.  For  the  moment 
Athens  was  again  mistress  of  the  sea  ;  but  the  crime  committed 
against  the  generals  who  conquered  at  Argennoussai  was  speedily 
avenged  at  Aigospotamoi.  One  thing  only  we  have  to  remember 
throughout  this  terrible  history.  The  execution  of  these  ill-used  men 
was  not,  primarily,  the  work  of  demagogues.  The  excitement  was 
stirred  up  and  the  flames  were  fanned  by  men  who  were  oligarchs 
at  heart,  who  had  subverted  the  constitution  once,  who  were  going 
to  subvert  it  again,  and  who  in  the  mean  season  found  it  convenient 
to  use  the  demos  as  an  instrument  for  attaining  their  own  ends. 

Such  was  the  sequel  of  the  last  battle  in  the  Peloponnesian  war. 
Of  the  victorious  generals  two  were  in  banishment,  six  were  dead  ; 

T)  ffl  ■  If  ^"^  ^^^'^  ^^^^  ^"  ^'''^*'  -^^^^'^"^  ''2<^  gained  from  a  victory 
ofEteoni-  more  decisive  than  that  of  Kyzikos.  AVhatever  the 
kos  111  Chios,  gpartans  may  have  done  after  their  disaster  at  Kyzikos, 
we  have  no  grounds  for  supposing  that  they  now  repeated  the 
proposals  which  Endios  is  said  to  have  made  to  the  Athenians  for 
the  ending  of  the  strife.  The  Athenian  fleet  had  fallen  back  iipon 
Samos  ;  and  with  this  island  as  its  basis  the  generals  occupied 
themselves  with  movements  not  for  crushing  their  enemies  but  for 
obtaining  money.  These  leaders  were  now  six  in  number  :  for  to 
Philoklcs  and  Adeimantos  who  had  been  sent  out  as  colleagues  of 
Konon  there  liad  been  added  Kephisodotos,  Tydeus,  and  lastly 
Menandros,  who  with  Euthydemos  had  helped  by  clogging  the 
liands  of  Demosthenes  to  bring  about  the  catastrophe  at  Syracuse. 
The  shooting  of  one  admiral  may  perhaps  be  a  convenient  mode  of 
encouraging  the  rest :  but  if  the  judicial  murder  of  Byng  had  been 
accompanied  by  the  execution  of  a  batch  of  his  colleagues,  the  ex- 
periment would  probably  have  been  followed  by  a  dangerous  de- 
cline in  the  zeal  both  of  officers  and  seamen.  It  was  not  in  human, 
far  less  in  Athenian,  nature,  that  the  six  generals  now  serving  in  the 
Eastern  waters  of  the  Egean  should  not  feel  their  ardor  damped 
by  a  consciousness  of  the  gross  injustice  with  which  their  country- 


Chap.  X.]  THE  IONIAN  WAR.  475 

men  were  ready  to  treat  them,  even  if  nothing  be  said  of  the  de- 
liberate treachery  with  whicli  some  of  them  wore  afterwards 
charfred.  But  if  the  Athenians  were  thus  miserably  employed,  not 
much  at  first  was  done  on  the  other  side.  Having  with  singular 
presence  of  miud  made  his  escape  from  Mytilene  where  he  was 
besieging  Konon,  Eteonikos  established  himself  at  Chios,  where  the 
oligarchs  felt  that  at  whatever  cost  their  revolt  against  Athens  must 
be  maintained.  But  his  resources  were  miserably  deficient.  He 
could  neither  pay  nor  clothe  his  men,  and  during  the  summer  these 
were  content  to  support  themselves  with  field  labor :  but  when 
the  crops  were  all  gathered  and  thev  again  felt  the  pressure  of 
v.'ant,  they  resolved  to  turn  their  arms  not  against  their  enemies  but 
against  their  friends.  A  straw  carried  on  the  person  was  to  point 
out  to  each  other  the  men  who  wore  prepared  to  take  part  in  at- 
tacking and  plundering  the  Chians.  Such  friends  had  Chios 
gained  in  exchange  for  the  protection  which  while  they  were  allies 
of  Athens  had  never  failed  them.  Sorely  troubled  by  the  discovery 
of  this  conspriacy,  Eteonikos  at  first  knew  not  what  to  do.  Sup- 
pression by  force  was  not  to  be  thought  of.  He  resolved  by  a  swift 
blow  to  appeal  to  the  personal  fears  of  the  conspirators.  Attended 
by  fifteen  men  carrying  daggers  he  walked  down  the  street  of  the 
city,  and  seeing  a  straw  on  the  dress  of  a  man  who  was  returning 
from  the  house  of  his  physician,  he  gave  the  signal  for  putting  him 
to  death.  To  the  crowd  which  gathered  round  eagerly  asking  the 
reason  for  this  summary  execution  the  simple  answer  returned  was 
that  he  was  wearing  a  straw.  Each  straw-bearer,  as  he  heard  the  news, 
flung  away  tlie  sign  which  might  at  any  moment  bring  on  him 
the  same  doom  :  and  the  plot  being  thus  broken  up,  Eteonikos, 
summoning  the  Chian  oligarchs,  pointed  out  to  them  frankly  the 
dangers  involved  in  military  discontent  if  it  should  pass  a  certain 
limit,  and  the  absolute  need  of  relieving  the  Avants  of  the  men  by 
an  immediate  and  large  contribution.  His  advice  was  taken,  and 
having  ordered  his  men  to  man  their  triremes  he  sailed  round  his 
fleet,  distributing  a  month's  pay  to  each  man,  without  uttering  a 
word  or  making  a  sign  which  implied  knowledge  of  the  conspiracy. 
The  policy  of  Lysandros  now  worked  as  he  had  intended  that  it 
should  work.  Eager  embassies,  sent  not  only  by  the  members  of 
the  clubs  which  he  had  set  up  but  by  Cyrus  himself,     .       .  , 

1  111-  •  r,     r       ■  1      •        Appoint- 

demanded  hisre-appointment.      Ketusmg to  grant  their    meutof 
request  in  form,  the  ephors  complied  with  it  in  sub-   ^Jsec^'tm-y 
stance.     Spartan  custom   forbade   the  appointment  of   of  Arakos. 
the  same  man  more  than  once  to  the  office  of  admiral ; 
but  Arakos  might  be  sent  out  nominally  in  the  command  which 
should  be  really  exercised  by  his  scribe  Lysandros.'     Early  in  the 

»  Xen.  H.  ii.  1,  7. 


476  THE   EMPIRE   OF   ATHENS.  [BOOK  III. 

year  the  secretary  took  zealou?ly  in  band  the  ^vork  of  reconstruc- 
tion. The  uiihounded  trust  of  Cyrus  iu  his  iiicorruptibihiy  was 
displayed  by  making  the  Spartan  secretary  master  of  all  his  pri- 
vate revenues  and  of  all  his  reserved  funds.  One  condition  only,  not 
altoo-ether  in  accordance  wiih  the  spirit  of  earlier  days,  he  imposed 
upon  him.  Lysandros  must  promise  not  to  engage  the  Athenian 
fleet  unless  the  advantage  of  numbers  was  decidedly  on  his  own  side.' 
The  activity  of  this  commander  stands  out  in  singular  contrast 
with  the  slowness  or  even  idleness  of  the  Athenian  generals,  to  two 

a.,^.,„or./\  of  whom  at  least  this  inaction   must  have  been  both 
Surprise  and.  -.-i^i  -it  t  i       •    j 

capture  of      gallino-  and  humiliatmg.      \\  hile  Lysandros  was  busied 

niaiffleetat  in  the  citics  of  tlie  Asiatic  coast  and  while  he  even 
Aiiros-pota-  found  time  for  a  luirried.  voyage  to  the  coast  of  Attica 
to  concert  measures  Avilh  Agis  at  Dekeleia,  they  were 
doing  nothing.  Borne  down  by  the  majority  of  their  colleagues, 
Konon  and  Philokles  perhaps  never  suspected  that  the  vast  resources 
placed  by  Cyrus  in  the  hands  of  Lysandros  might  be  better  em- 
ployed in  corrupting  Athenian  admirals  than  in  building  sliipsand 
assaulting  cities  ;  but  they  must  luive  felt  with  a  sinking  of  lieart 
that  tlie  political  condition  of  Athens  even  more  than  the  failure  of 
her  revemics  and  the  breaking  up  of  her  confederacy  was  chilling  the 
zeal  of  her  children,  if  not  fostering  treachery  in  her  camps  and 
fleets.  At  last  when  from  Rhodes  Lysandros  sailed  to  the  Spartan 
station  at  Abydos  and  thence  advanced  to  the  assault  of  Lampsakos, 
the  Athenian  fleet  followed  him,  keeping  on  the  seaward  side  of 
Chios.  They  had  reached  the  entrance  to  the  Hellespont  and  were 
taking  their  morning  meal  at  Elaious,  when  they  received  the 
tidings  that  tlieir  allies  of  Lampsakos  had  been  conquered  and 
the  town  plundered.  Their  next  meal  was  taken  at  Sestos,  their 
evening  meal  at  Aigospotamoi,  the  Goat's  Stream,  whence  that 
goodly  fleet  of  1  SO  triremes  was  never  to  return.  At  daybreak  on 
the  following  day  Lvsandros  gave  orders  to  lils  men  to  man  the 
sliips  with  all  speed,  but  in  no  case  to  break  the  order  of  battle  by 
advancing  to  attack  tlie  enemy.  The  orders  of  Lysandros  made  it 
impossible  to  repeat  the  tactics  of  Alkibiades  at  Kyzikos  ;"  but  it 
was  manifestly  a  case  in  wliich  notliing  could  be  gained  ami  much 
might  be  lost  by  delay.  Such,  however,  was  not  the  opinion,  or 
at  least  not  the  expressed  opinion,  of  Adeimantos,  Menandrcs, 
Tydciis,  and  Kephisodotos.  The  evening  was  closing  in  when, 
having  faced  its  enemy  to  no  purpose  all  day,  the  Athenian  fleet 
fell  bark  on  Aigospotamoi,  followed  bv  a  Peloponnesian  squadron 
under  strict  orders  not  to  return  until  the  crews  of  the  Athenian 
triremes  were  all  fairly  landed  ;  and  not  until  he  received  these 

'Xen.  //.  ii.  1,  14.  »  See  p,  450. 


Chap.  X.]  THE  IONIAN  WAR.  477 

tidings,  did  Lysandros  allow  his  own  men  to  leave  their  ships  and 
take  their  evening  meal.  The  monotony  of  tliis  ceremony,  useless 
for  the  Athenians  but  eminently  useful  for  the  plans  of  Lysandros, 
was  unbroken  for  four  successive  days.  The  Spartan  deet  was 
supplied  from  Lampsakos ;  and  his  triremes  could  be  manned  al- 
most at  a  moment's  warning.  The  Athenian  station  was  merely 
on  the  open  beach,  and  the  nearest  town,  Sestos,  was  distant  nearly 
two  miles.  Over  this  wide  extent  of  ground  the  men  were  daily 
scattered  in  order  to  get  their  food,  and  the  fleet  was  left  dangerous- 
ly unguarded.  From  his  forts  on  the  Chersonesos  Alkibiades  could 
see  distinctly  the  rashness  and  perils  of  these  dispositions.  Going 
down  to  the  camp'  he  remonstrated  with  the  generals  for  retaining 
their  ships  in  a  place  where  tliey  had  not  the  protection  of  a  harbor 
and  a  base  of  supplies  from  a  city  close  at  hand,  and  earnestly  in- 
treated  them  to  fall  back  on  Sestos,  from  which  they  could  at  their 
pleasure  advance  to  attack  or  to  engage  the  enemy. ^  His  advice  was 
rudely  rejected,  and  Tydeus  and  Menandros  dismissed  him  with 
the  rebuff  that  they  were  now  generals,  not  he.  On  the  fifth  day 
Lysandros  resolved  to  carry  out  the  plan  for  which  we  can  scarce- 
ly doubt  that  he  had  been  making  his  preparations  on  both  sides 
of  the  strait.  Each  day  had  increased  the  confidence  and  added 
to  the  carelessness  of  the  Athenian  army  ;  and  if  there  were  trai- 
tors among  their  leaders,  these  would  take  care  to  encourage  to 
the  utmost  that  contempt  for  the  enemy  which  led  them  thus  rashly 
to  neglect  discipline.  On  the  fifth  day  the  order  given  to  the 
squadron  which,  as  usual,  followed  the  Athenian  fleet  to  Aigospo- 
tamoi  was  to  wait  until  the  enemy  Avas  thoroughly  dispersed  over 
the  country,  and  then,  as  they  came  back,  to  hoist  a  shield  as  a 
signal.  At  the  sight  of  this  token  the  order  was  issued  for  instant 
md  rapid  onset,  and  every  man  was  at  once  in  his  place  and  the 
whole  fieet  in  motion.  In  a  few  minutes  the  work  was  done. 
Konon  alone  was  at  his  post.  Philokles  perhaps  was  a^so  close  at 
hand  :  but  these  could  do  little  or  nothing.  Such  as  were  within 
reach  hurried  back  to  their  ships  ;  but  of  the  triremes  thus  manned 
some  had  only  two  banks  of  rowers,  some  only  one,  while  by  far 
the  greater  number  were  empty.  It  is  absurd  to  speak  of  this 
surprise  as  a  battle.  A  few  blows  may  perhaps  have  been  struck  : 
but  of  these  no  account  was  taken.  The  army  of  Athens  had  been 
cheated,  and  their  whole  fleet  was  insnared.  Konon  saw  at  a 
glance  that  nothing  could  be  done  ;  and  while  the  Spartans  were 

*  The    narrative   of   Xenophon,  ades  credit  for  disinterested  counsel 

ZT.ii.  1,25,  implies  a  personal  inter-  in  the   manifest   interests  of  his 

view.  country.  He  had, indeed, at  tlietime 

^  No  man  is  wholly  evil :  and  in  no  motive  for  giving  any  other, 
this  instance  v^e  Juay  give  Alkibi- 


478  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  III. 

busied  in  capturing  tl)e  ships  and  surrounding  the  prisoners  on  the 

shore,  he  hastened  with  eight  vessels  besides  his  own,  the  sacred 

Paralian  trireme  being  one  of  them,  to  Abarnis,  the  promontory  to 

the  east  of  Lampsakos,  and  thence  took  away  the  large  sails  of  the 

Peloponnesian  fleet,     lie  thus  greatly  lessened  their  powers  of 

pursuit,  and  then  making  his  way  down   the  Hellespont  while 

Lysandros  was  still  employed  at  Aigospotamoi,  he  hastened  to  his 

friend  Euagoras  in  Kypros  (Cyprus),  while  the  Paralian  ship  went 

on    its   miserable   errand  to  Athens.     A\  ith  greater    speed   the 

Milesian  privateer  Theopompos  set  off  on   his  voyage  to   Sparta, 

charged  by  Lysandros  to  convey  the  good  news  to  the  ephors  ;   and 

almost  before  eight-and-forty  hours  were  passed,  he  had  reached 

the  Lakonian  coast.     Not  long  after  him  Gylippos  followed  with 

the  spoils.     Fifteen  hundred  talents  of  silver  were  placed   in   his 

keeping,  put  up  in  sacks,  each  of  which  furnished  the  ephors  with 

the  means  for  ascertaining  the  amount  deposited  in  them.  Knowing 

nothing  of  this  Gylippos  unripped  the  bags,  and  having  taken  out 

thirty,  some  said  three  hundred,  talents,  handed  over  the  rest  as 

the  full  amount  intnisted  to  him  ;  and  the  career  of  the  man  who 

had  ruined  the  Athenians  at  Syracuse  closed  with  a  sentence  of 

death  for  theft.' 

The  Athenian  triremes  and  their  crews,  with  the  exception  of 

those  who  contrived  to  escape  to   Sestos  and   some    neighboring 

„  forts,  were  carried  to  Lampsakos  ;  and  there  Lvsandros 

Treatment  of  ,  -i    ^        i    .  •        i  .1      "    • 

the  Athenian  sunnnoned    a  council  to  determme  how  the  prisoners 

Eysandros*^  should  be  dealt  with.     At  once  all  tongues  were  let 

loose    against  the   Athenians.     Not   only   were    their 

iniquities  in  times  past  laid  again  to  their  charge,  but  terrible  things 

were  said  of  mutilations  which  in  the  event  of  their  being  victorious 

at  Aigospotamoi  they  intended  to  inflict  upon  their  enemies.    There 

is  absolutely  no  justification  for  a  charge  which  in  the  absence  of 

all  proof  may  be  dismissed  as  a  liorrible  calumny.     Nevertheless, 

it  was  decreed  that  Philokles  with  all  the  Athenian  prisoners,  4,000 

we  are  told,  in  number,"  should  be  put  to  death.     The  general 

'  It  was  paid  that  he  died  by  As  most  dee])ly  interested  in  the 
Btarvatinn  :  but  whether  the  story  safety  of  the  Heet,  tliey  would  pro- 
of Pnusimins  was  in  his  cnse  re-  baltly  be  nearer  at  hand  than  their 
pealed, or  wlietiier  lie<b<'(i  in  exile,  allii  s;  but  if  Adeimantos  was  with 
wo  rnnnot  .'.ay.  Diod.  xiii.  lOG.  some  of  his  colleagues  a  traitor,  ho 
Plut.  AiA.  ".2M.  LysAii-ll.  Athcn.  and  they  would  take  care  that  their 
ri.  p.  234.  men  should  be  well  out  of  the  way 

'Pans.  ix.   32,  G.     It  seems  on  of  offeriTi<r  any  resistance.    Fortius 

the  whole  most  unlikely  that  tlie  very  reason,  however,  they  would 

numberof  prisoners  exceeded  six  or  be   nearer    to   a  place   of  refuge, 

seven  thou-and;  nor  can  webesure  Philokles  doubtless   did  wliat  he 

that  the  number  of  .Athenians  cap-  could  to  jirevent  the  mischief,  and 

tured  amounted  to  4,01)0,  merely  be-  the  ^neater  number  of  the  prison- 

cauao  wo  are  told  so  by  Pausauias.  ers  belonged  probably  to  Lis  divi- 


Chap.  X.]  THE  IONIAN  WAR.  473 

arrayed  himself  in  white  garments,  and  having  heard  the  question 
by  which  Lysandros  asked  him  what  a  man  deserved  who  had  open- 
ed the  gates  of  hxwless  wickedness  against  Hellenes/  was  taken  away 
at  the  head  of  the  long  procession  to  the  ground  of  slaughter.  The 
language  of  Xenophon  implies  that  to  the  question  of  Lysandros 
Philokies  vouchsafed  no  answer ;  but  whatever  reply  he  might  have 
made  would  assuredly  have  been  suppressed  by  the  historian  who 
wrote  in  the  interests  not  of  truth  but  of  Sparta.  The  fact  is  that, 
with  little  kindliness,  probably,  and  with  less  mercy,  Philokies  was 
faitliful  to  his  country.  His  name  is  therefore  blackened.  Adei- 
mantos  was  spared  from  the  slaughter  because  he  liad,  as  many  felt 
sure  and  some  openly  said,  betrayed  the  Athenian  fleet  to  Lysan- 
dros ;  and  as  it  was  needful  to  cloke  his  treachery  and  to  assign  a 
decent  pretext  for  suffering  liim  to  live,  it  was  said  that  he  opposed 
himself  to  the  alleged  brutality  of  his  colleague.'^  Lastly  Xenophon 
has  carefully  drawn  a  veil  over  the  details  of  this  shameful  cata- 
strophe. If  the  surprise  was  accomplished  by  Persian  gold  on  the 
one  side  and  Athenian  greed  on  the  other,  the  result  might  bring  a 
blush  even  to  the  cheek  of  the  conqueror  :  but  if  it  be  so,  then  the 
treachery  could  not  be  confined  to  one  man  alone.  If  Adeimantos 
only  had  been  acting  in  the  interests  of  Lysandros,  he  would  have 
been  in  an  impotent  minority,  and  his  constant  and  factious  oppo- 
sition to  his  colleagues  could  scarcely  have  failed  to  throw  suspicion 
on  his  motives  and  his  conduct.  But  if  the  number  of  the  traitors 
were  nearly  equal  to  that  of  the  faithful  generals,  the  energy  of  the 
latter  might  be  paralysed  without  any  appearance  of  dishonesty  or 
disaffection.  A  still  better  color  might  be  thrown  over  their 
advice  or  suggestions,  if  they  should  happen  to  be  in  the  majority  ; 
and  this  good  fortune  seems  to  have  befallen  Adeimantos.  Of  the 
six  generals  Philokies  and  Konon  are  beyond  suspicion  ;  of  none  of 
tJie  others  have  we  any  evidence  that  they  were  put  to  death  after 
the  battle.  Of  Adeimantos  it  is  expressly  said  that  he  was  saved 
from  the  massacre.  Xenophon,  who  says  that  others  were  taken  be- 
sides Adeimantos  and  Philokies,  is  specially  careful  to  avoid  saying 
that  they  took  all  their  colleagues  (with  the  exception,  of  course, 
of  Konon)  :  nor  does  he  any  more  than  Diodoros  distinctly  speak 
of  the  execution  of  any  other  general  than  Philokies.  According  to 
Pausanias  Tydeus   was  bribed  not  less  than  Adeimantos  f  and 

aion.     The  only  commander  who  alleged  fact  beyond  tliat  of  Adei- 

was  at  all  sutficieiitly  on  his  guard  mantes  himself.     We  could  not  be- 

<rot  away  with  nine  ships,  that  is,  lieve  Adeimantos,  even  if  lie  had 

with  at  least  1,800  men.  solemnly  sworn  to  the  fact;  nor  can 

'  up^afj.evo(:  Etr'EUT/uagTTapavo/ielv.  we  believe  the  historian  in  a  matter 

Xen.  H.  ii.  1,  83.  which  must  be  represented  to  the 

^  It   is   obvious  that   Xenophon  credit  of  Lysandros. 

could  have  no  authority  for  this  ^  Paus.  iv.  17,  2 ;  x.  9,  5. 


480  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  HL 

Lvsandros  could  scarcely  afford  to  keep  his  faith,  such  as  it  was, 
with  one  and  to  break  it  with  the  other.  There  remain  only 
Menamlros  and  Kephi^odotos ;  and  it  is  significant  that  of  these 
two  the  former  should  have  associated  himself  with  Tydeus  in  his 
insolent  rejection  of  the  counsel  of  Alkibiades  immediately  before 
the  betrayal  of  the  fleet  was  accomplished.  Of  Kephisodotos  no- 
tbin""  can  be  said,  because  nothing  has  been  recorded  ;  but  we  are 
assuredly  not  justified  in  asserting  that  he  was  slain  along  with 
Philokles  without  a  distinct  warrant  for  the  statement.  It  was  the 
conviction  of  Konon'  that  Lysandros  planned  and  Adeimantos  de- 
liberately wrought  the  destruction  of  the  Athenian  fleet.  If  his 
conviction  was  right  (and  while  everything  seems  to  tell  in  its 
favor,  assuredly  nothing  tells  against  it),  the  whole  narrative 
of  this  horrible  and  disgraceful  catastrophe  becomes  luminously 
clear.  On  any  other  supposition  it  is  an  astounding  and  insoluble 
riddle. 

The  news  of  the  ruin  wrought  at  Syracuse  was  conveyed  by  no 
official  dispatch,  and  its  terrors  were  in  somcslight  degree  lessened 
uuerdis-  ^Y  the  gradual  awakening  of  the  people  to  the  know- 
mayatAUi-   ledcfc  of  tlicir  loss.     The  tidinsys  of  the  catastrophe  at 

cnss  on  rc"  n  j. 

ceiptofthe  Aigospotamoi  came  upon  them  with  the  suddenness 
ASfpJtT™  of  ^  thunderbolt.  AVhen  the  men  of  the  I'aralian 
moi.  trireme,    sailing   into   tlic    harbor,    told   their    dismal 

story,  the  cry  of  agony  and  despair,  as  it  passed  along  the  double 
line  of  walls,  rose  into  a  piercing  wail  when  it  reached  the  city. 
All  that  night  the  mourning  went  up  to  heaven,  for  none  could 
close  their  eyes  in  sleep.  Nothing  more  could  be  done.  There 
remained  only  the  fearful  expectation  of  a  doom  very  soon  to  be 
inflicted  on  them  by  an  enemy  not  likely  to  forgive  or  to  deal 
kindly  with  prostrate  foes  absolutely  in  their  power.  For  in  their 
power  they  felt  themselves  already.  They  might  still  be  able  to 
close  their  harbor  gates  ;  they  might  still  man  their  walls  and 
hold  out  within  the  city  :  but  famine  would  do  the  work  of 
Lysandros  far  more  effectually  than  it  could  be  accomj)lislied  by 
fleets  or  armies.  In  this  hour  of  overpowering  dismay,  through 
the  blackness  of  which  not  a  ray  of  light  could  pass,  their  thoughts 
turned  with  terrible  distinctness  to  their  own  misdeeds  in  the  days 
that  were  past,  to  ini(]uities  which  they  had  ruthlessly  committed 
and  to  othei-s  which  they  had  all  but  wrought.  The  wide  prospect 
revealed  not  a  gleam  of  comfort.  Those  frightful  usages  of  war 
on  which  in  their  time  of  strength  they  had  acted  without  scruple 
forbade  the  hope  that  their  enemies  would  bestow  a  thought  on  all 
the  good  which  in  spite  of  much  evil  Athens  might  have  done  to 
llellas.  But  if  they  could  no  longer  hope  that  endurance  might 
'  Dem.  defals.  Lefj.  p.  401. 


Chap.  X.]  THE  IONIAN  WAR.*  481 

be  rewarded  by  victory,  an  unconditional  surrender  which  would 

enable  the  Spartans  to  slay  every  Athenian  citizen  and  to  send 

their  wives  and  children  into  slavery  was  still  out  of  the  question. 

An  assembly  held  on  the  day  after  the  arrival  of  the  Paralian 

trireme  decreed  that  the  entrances  to  the  harbors  should  be  blocked 

up,  one  only  remaining  open,  and  that  every  preparation  should 

be  made  for  undergoing  a  siege. 

Meanwhile  Lysandros  had  better  things  to  do  than  to  hasten 

with  his  fleet  to  the  doomed  city.     He  knew  that  Athens  must 

yield  or  starve,  and  it  was  his  business  to  see  that  the   ^ 

i-r-  i-icfi  Opeiations 

pressure  of  famine   should  make  itselr  felt  at  once.    ofLysan- 

The  submission  of  Clialkedon  and  Byzantion  followed   E^e^anVnl 

of  necessity  the  disaster  at  the  Goat's  River,  and  the   the  Helles- 

Athenian  garrisons  in  these  or  in  other  towns  he  sent   ^°"  ' 

straight  to  Athens,  telling  them  that  their  lives  would  be  spared 

only  on  the  condition  that  they  should  lake  up  their  abode  within 

the  city  walls.     His  own  immediate  work  was  the  establishment  of 

that  Spartan  supremacy  to  which  the  members  of  the  Athenian 

confederacy  had  been  exhorted  to  look  as  the  greatest  of  blessings. 

In  Athens  the  pressure  of  famine  was  daily  becoming  more 
dreadful.  Imports  indeed  there  were  ;  but  these  were  their  own 
Klerouchoi  or  settlers  established  in  the  Chersonesos,  pressure  of 
in  Mel  OS,  Aigina,  and  elsewhere,  their  possessions  in  famine  at 
these  places  being  restored  to  such  of  the  old  in-  "^"''' 
habitants  as  Lysatidros  was  able  to  find  and  send  thither,  or 
granted  to  Spartan  citizens.  The  misery  would  have  passed  the 
bounds  of  endurance,  had  not  some  encouragement  been  given 
by  the  restoration  of  greater  harmony  among  the  citizens.  The 
Psephisraa  of  Patrokleides  embodied  the  whoFesome  lessons  taught 
'jy  extreme  suffering.  By  this  measure  a  complete  amnesty  was 
given  to  all  except  those  of  the  Four  Hundred  who  had  gone  into 
exile  in  order  to  avoid  trial  and  to  those  who  were  lying  under 
sentences  passed  by  the  court  of  Areiopagos.  For  all  others  it 
was  decreed  that  the  documents  relating  to  their  condemnation  or 
recording  their  disgrace  should  be  destroyed  ;  and  the  restoration 
of  a  large  number  of  dishonored  citizens  to  their  full  rights  was 
followed  by  a  kindly  feeling  and  sympathy  between  all  classes 
in  the  city -which  seemed  to  promise  that,  though  the  day  must 
go  against  Athens,  it  yet  should  not  close  in  utter  shame. 

At  last  Lysandros  set  out  for  the  city.  To  the  ephors  at  Sparta 
and  to  Agis  at  Dekeleiahe  sent  messages  announcing  his  approach 
with  a  fleet  of  200  ships.  The  tidings  were  followed  Siege  of  the 
by  the  hasty  departure  of  the  full  Peloponnesian  force  negotiations 
under  the  Spartan  king  Pausanias,  the  Argives  alone  for  peace, 
refusing  to  take   part  in   the   enterprise.     Having  crossed    the 


482  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  HI. 

isthmus,  they  advanced  straight  along  the  Eleusinian  road  and 
took  up  their  position  in  the  Akademia  close  to  the  city  gates ; 
and  shortly  afterwards,  Lysandros,  having  ravaged  Salamis,  ap- 
peared before  Peiraieus  with  150  ships  and  blocked  up  the  entrance 
to  the  harbor.  Scarcely  more  than  ten  years  before,  there  had 
issued  from  this  harbor  that  fleet  (more  magnificent  and  more 
splendidly  equipped,  if  not  so  large)  which  was  to  establish  the 
supremacy  of  Athens  over  Sicily,  and  to  win  for  her,  as  it  was 
hoped,  a  Panhellenic  empire.  Now  it  was  a  question  of  days 
which  should  determine  whether  Athens  could  insist  on  any  terms 
at  all,  or  whether  she  must  submit  without  conditions  to  the 
conquerur.  The  first  embassy  sent  to  Agis,  when  famine  had 
begun  to  reap  its  dismal  harvest  of  death,  ottered  free  alliance  with 
Sparta,  reser\4ng  to  Athens  the  possession  of  Peiraieus  and  the 
Long  Walls.  By  Agis  they  were  referred  to  the  epliors,  who  on 
hearing  from  the  envoys  at  Sellasia  on  the  Lakonian  frontier  what 
they  had  to  offer  bade  them  go  home  again  and,  if  they  cared  to 
have  peace,  to  return  with  more  reasonable  conditions.  This 
rebuflE  seemed  to  crush  such  spirit  as  still  remained  in  the  hearts 
of  the  beleaguered  people.  It  was  taken  as  a  sign  that  the 
Spartans  would  be  satisfied  with  nothing  less  than  their  complete 
destruction  :  but  whatever  doubt  tliere  might  be  on  this  point, 
there  was  none  that  hundreds  or  thousands  must  die  of  starvation 
before  any  terms  could  be  proposed  and  accepted.  One  condition 
there  was  on  which  the  Spartans  had  declared  their  readiness  to 
treat ;  but  no  man  dared  to  urge  compliance  with  this  requisition 
for  pulling  down  one  mile  in  length  of  each  of  the  Long  Walls, 
until  Archestratos  urged  that  it  was  better  to  do  this  than  that  all 
the  people  should  die.'  To  this  shame  they  could  not  yet  bow 
themselves  ;  but  the  increasing  intensity  of  the  famine  convinced 
them  that  something  nmst  be  done  :  and  if  Theramenes  dared  not 
pro[)Ose  the  demolition  of  the  walls,  he  could  offer  to  go  to 
Lysandros,  and  ascertain  whether  this  condition  was  demanded 
ciimply  as  a  guarantee  of  fidelity  on  the  part  of  the  Athenians  or 
whether  it  was  to  be  used  as  the  means  for  reducing  them  to 
slavery.  The  question  was  superfluous.  If  peace  and  independence 
were  promised  on  a  given  condition,  even  Sparta  would  be  held 
bound  to  secure  to  them  that  independence  if  this  condition  should 
be  accepted.  The  mere  putting  of  the  question  was  indeed  a 
virtual  admission  that,  if  the  Spartans  insisted  on  it  simply  as  a 
pledge  of  good  faith,  the  walls  should  be  pulled  down.  But  in 
their  distress  the  Athenians  chose  to  shut  their  eyes  to  the  obvious 
fact,  and  Theramenes  departed  on  his  mission.  Three  months  of 
frightful  misery  had  passed  before  he  was  seen  again.  He  then 
'  Xen.  //.  ii.  2,  15. 


Chap.  X.]  THE   IONIAN  WAR.  483 

caine  to  say  that  during  all  this  time  he  had  been  detained  by 
Lysandros,  who  had  now  sent  hina  back  with  the  answer  that  terms 
of  peace  could  be  taken  into  consideration  only  by  the  ephors. 
There  could  now  be  no  longer  any  holding  back.  An  enemy  was 
within  the  walls  which  could  not  much  longer  be  resisted  ;  and  it 
was  better,  while  time  permitted,  to  obtain,  if  they  could,  some- 
thing better  than  slavery  from  the  enemy  without. 

Intrusted  with  full  powers,  Theramenes  set  out  with  nine 
colleagues  on  the  mission  which  was  to  decide  the  fate  of  Athens. 
At    Sellasia    they     were    called   upon   to   answer   the   _, 

.         ;'  i  r      1        The'surren- 

question  which  had  been  put  to  the  envoys  or  the  derof 
previous  embassy  ;  but  on  the  announcement  that  the  ■^'^^'^"''• 
Athenians  would  be  bound  by  the  stipulations  of  their  com- 
missioners, whatever  these  might  be,  they  were  allowed  to  go  on 
to  Sparta.  Here  they  were  brought  face  to  face  with  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  great  confederacy  to  which  the  power  of  Athens 
had  long  been  a  rock  of  offence  :  and  along  with  many  others  the 
voices  of  the  Corinthians  and  Thebans  were  raised  for  her  utter 
destruction.  Against  this  savage  demand  that  no  terms  should  be 
made  with  their  ancient  enemy  the  Phokians  made  a  noble  protest ;' 
and  the  point  was  overruled  by  the  Spartans,  who  declared  that 
they  would  never  allow  a  city  to  be  inslaved  which  had  done  so 
much  good  to  Hellas  in  the  season  of  her  greatest  need.  It  may  be 
faiily  doubted  whether,  as  they  said  this,  they  thought  so  much  of 
the  benefits  conferred  by  Athens  at  Marathon,  Salainis,  and  Mykalo 
as  on  advantages  which  they  might  receive  from  her  in  times  yet 
to  come.  It  might  for  the  present  suit  Sparta  to  set  up  her 
Harmostai  with  their  dependent  committees  in  the  several  towns 
of  her  confederation  :  but  none  knew  better  than  the  Spartans  that 
the  materials  with  which  they  had  to  deal  were  not  the  most  manage- 
able in  the  world,  and  it  was  possible  that  at  no  very  distant  day  the 
existence  of  Athens  might  be  of  more  value  to  tliem  than  that  of 
Thebes,  even  if  Athens  should  not  be  needed  to  help  them  against 
Thebes.  The  discussion  ended  with  the  decree  (it  can  scarcely  be 
called  by  any  other  name)  that  the  Athenians  must  pull  down  their 
walls,  must  yield  up  all  their  ships  except  twelve,  must  consent  to 
receive  back  their  exiles,  and  must  follow  implicitly  the  biddings 
of  Sparta.  As  Theramenes  and  his  colleagues  made  their  way  with 
tiiese  tidings  from  Peiraieus,  crowds  thronged  round  him  to  learn 
whether  their  miseries  were  now  to  end  or  to  be  borne  until  none 
should  be  left  to  bear  them.  They  were  told,  doubtless,  that  their 
lives  and  tlieir  freedom  were  safe  ;  but  not  until  on  the  following 
day  the  citizens  were  met  in  their  assembly  were  the  precise  terms 
imposed  on  them  made  known.  These  terms,  Theramenes  briefly 
'  Dem.  de  fain.  Leg.  p.  361. 


48-i  THE   EMPIRE   OF  ATHENS.  [Book  HI. 

told  them,  tliov  must  accc2:)t ;  none  otlicrs  were  to  l>e  had.  A  few 
still  raised  their  voices  against  this  last  humiliation  ;  hut  they 
were  borne  down  by  the  vast  majority.  The  submission  of  Athens 
was  made  ;  and  the  long  strife  which,  dating  from  the  surprise  of 
Plataiai  l>y  the  Thebans,  had  lasted  for  sevon-and-twenty  years, 
was  at  an  end.  Into  that  harbor  from  which  iiad  issued  but  a 
little  while  before  the  fleet  which  Adeimantos  decoyed  to  its  own 
ruin  and  the  ruin  of  Athens  Lysandros  now  entered  with  the  fleet 
of  Spaila,  bringing  with  him  those  exiles  whose  crimes  had  made 
their  names  infamous  for  all  time.  While  the  arsenals  were  dis- 
mantled and  the  untinished  ships  in  the  doclcs  burnt,  the  demolition 
of  the  Long  AValls  was  begun  to  the  music  of  flute-players  and  the 
ineasurcd  movements  of  dancing  women.  Twelve  ships  only  were 
left  in  the  desolate  and  dismantled  harbor  :  and  so  began,  ac- 
cording to  Spartan  phrase,  the  first  day  of  freedom  for  Hellas.' 

Thus  passed  away  the  most  .splendid  phase  of  Athenian  his- 
tory. The  great  empire  which  Themistokles  had  shaped  and 
Character  which  Perikles  sought  to  surround  with  impregna- 
aiiii^sparnm  ^''^  safeguards  was  for  the  time  utterly  brought  to 
polity  as  du-  naught.     No  other  end  could  be  looked  for  so  soon 

temiinin''  .',,  ,  .i     ,   ,i  ,   -r\      •  .    ,  •,!      -^ 

the  issue  fts  it  became  clear  that  tlic  great  Donan  state  Avitli  its 
of  the  war.  allies  was  determined  to  resist  and,  if  need  Avere,  to 
fight  against  the  idea  which  underlay  the  polity  of  Athens.  This 
polity  even  in  its  crudest  and  most  imperfect  form  was  a  protest 
against  that  spirit  of  isolation  under  which  the  old  Eupatrid 
hou.ses  had  sprung  up  to  power.'  To  the  form  of  society  thus 
created  the  Spartan  clung  with  vehement  tenacity,  and  in  this 
attitude  he  had  the  sympathy  of  the  Hellenic  world  generally. 
Even  when  the  Athenian  empire  had  reached  its  greatest  extension 
and  her  power  seemed  most  firmly  cemented,  when  moreover  her 
allies  felt  that  they  received  from  her  benefits  and  rights  which  they 
could  never  have  secured  for  them.selves,  these  allies  still  felt  a 
certain  soreness  at  her  interference  with  those  autonomous  instincts 
which  they  invested  Avith  an  inviolable  sanctity.  Their  dependence 
upon  her,  although  they  might  be  utterly  unable  to  defend  them- 
selves, was  still,  to  whatever  an  extent,  an  evil  ;  and  only  when 
after  allowing  oligarchical  factions  to  seduce  them  into  revolt  they 
found  that  ihc  freedom  with  which  they  had  been  lured  onwards 
was  but  a  specious  name  for  grinding  tyranny,  did  the  demos  in 
many  cities  set  itself  sedulously  to  undo  the  niischief  and  make 
common  eause  Avith  the  imperial  city  which  had  proved  itself  the 
only  bulwark  against  the  despotism  of  an  exclusive  order.  But 
the  empire  of  Athens  was  aggressive.  It  could  not  be  otherwise. 
The  necessities  which  gave  birth  to  the  Delian  confederacy  and 
'  Xcn.  //.  ii.  3,  33.  ""  See  p.  13. 


Chap.  X.]  THE  IONIAN  WAR.  485 

■which  through  this  led  to  the  more  highly -developed  supremacy  of 
Athens'  compelled  the  imperial  city  to  interfere  to  a  certain 
extent  with  the  freedom  or  rather  the  license  of  states  which, 
although  they  might  be  able  to  do  little  good,  could  yet  be  powerful 
for  mischief,' and  which,  if  they  did  nothing,  would  reap  the  same 
benefits  with  those  members  of  the  confederacy  who  did  everything. 
How  sHglit  on  the  whole  that  interference  was,  how  jealously 
Athens  guarded  the  liberty  and  rights  of  her  allies  against  her  own 
citizens,  how  great  a  protection  her  course  afforded  to  these  aUies 
in  their  disputes  with  one  another,  and  how  carefully  she  shielded 
them  against  the  attacks  of  foreign  powers,  the  whole  course  of  this 
history  has  shown.  Briefl}', — with  all  their  faults  and  with  crimes 
the  stains  of  w^liich  no  tears  could  ever  wash  out,  the  Athenians 
Avere  fighting  for  a  law  and  an  order  which,  they  felt,  could  not  be 
mahitained  at  all  if  it  was  to  be  confined  within  the  bounds  of  a 
single  city.  So  far  as  they  went,  they  were  working  to  make  a 
nation  :  but  into  a  nation  the  Hellenic  tribes  and  cities  were 
detennined  that  they  should  not  be  moulded.  The  resistance 
which  Athens  encountered  compelled  her  to  keep  her  allies  more 
closely  under  control,  and  imparted  to  her  government  an  appear- 
ance of  despotism  which,  however,  was  at  its  worst  a  slight  yoke 
indeed  when  compared  with  the  horrors  of  Spartan  rule.  She  had 
attempted  great  things  for  which  the  world  was  not  yet  ripe  ;  and 
the  states  which  had  been  induced  to  band  themselves  against  her 
awoke  for  the  most  part  to  the  conviction  that  they  had  suffered 
themselves  to  be  cheated  by  a  lie.  In  her  relations  with  her  allies 
Athens  exhibited  a  dignity  and  a  justice  which,  if  they  have 
marked  the  dealings  of  any  other  people,  have  marked  those  only 
of  England. 

But  from  the  tragic  drama  which  we  have  now  traced  to  its 
catastrophe  we  cannot  turn  without  the  feeling  (more  painful  far 
than  that  with  which  we  read  of  the  last  fearful  days  The  social 
of  the  Athenians  at  Syracuse),  that  we  have  gone  t/J'|jf°"f^'*' 
through  the  history  not  of  the  people  but  only  of  the  Hellas, 
smallest  fraction  of  it.  From  the  narrative  of  political  events,  of 
a  real  and  for  the  most  part  wholesome  political  growth,  the 
curtain  is  from  time  to  time  lifted  to  reveal  a  picture  so  horrible 
that  duty  alone  can  constrain  us  to  keep  our  eyes  fixed  upon  it  at 
all.  We  have  had  to  watch  the  growth  of  a  civilisation  founded 
on  that  instinct  of  isolation  and  despotism  which  marks  the  beast 
in  his  den  f  and  this  stamp,  even  in  the  midst  of  the  splendor, 
the  grace,  the  learning  and  wisdom  of  the  age  of  Perikles  and 
Plato,  Greek  life,  even  at  Athens,  never  loses.  When  Aristag()ras 
visited  Athens,  he  found  there  three  myriads  of  citizens  not  iudis- 
'  See  p.  246.  '^  See  p.  6. 


486  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ATHENS.  [Book  HI. 

posed  to  take  up  his  cause.*  What  the  proportion  may  have  been 
iTi  Ills  day  between  the  numbers  of  the  free  citizens,  the  resident 
foreii^ners,  and  the  slaves,  we  know  not ;  but  respecting  all  the  vast 
tlironi?  except  the  men  who  possessed  the  franchise  and  ordered  the 
state  history  keeps  an  ominous  silence.  For  their  occupations,  their 
pleasures,  and  their  pains,  the  free  citizen  had  a  profound  disregard 
or  contempt ;  and  to  them  were  abandoned  as  coarse  and  degrading 
those  tasks  of  commerce  and  manufacture  which  constitute  the 
very  kernel  of  modern  English  and  Eui'opean  prosperity.''  Defeat 
in  battle  and  the  sack  of  cities  may  exhibit  to  us  thousands  of  men 
slaughtered  in  cold  blood  on  the  field  or  departing  into  a  liopeless 
slavery.  Athenian  gentlemen,  refined  and  delicate,  nurtured 
amongst  all  the  glories  of  the  highest  art,  trained  in  the  schools  of 
the  highest  science,  were  thrown  to  rot  in  the  quaiTies  of  Syracuse, 
and  taken  out  to  be  classed  henceforth  among  those  whom  wise 
men  like  Aristotle  vouchsafed  to  regard  as  animated  machines. 
Based  really  on  the  tiger-like  system  wliicli  limits  action  strictly 
by  power,  Greek  slavery  was  only  in  the  false  and  ridiculous 
philcjsophy  of  a  later  age  made  to  rest  on  distinctions  to  which 
nature  was  every  day  giving  the  lie.  AVith  the  refutation  of  the 
monstrous  falsehoods  which  characterise  the  special  pleadhigs  of 
Aristotle  on  this  subject  we  arc  imt  here  concerned  :  but  it  is  the 
business  of  the  historian  to  note  that  of  all  the  inhabitants  of  a 
given  land  ninetecn-twentieths  are  never  heard  of,  or  that,  if  they 
appear  at  all,  it  is  only  to  be  tortured  in  courts  of  justice  for  the 
benefit  of  free  citizens.  Behind  this  same  dark  and  almost  im- 
penetrable veil  are  liidden  the  wives,  sisters,  and  daughters  of  the 
men  whose  names  are  familiar  sounds  in  every  land.  Nowhere 
among  the  Hellenic  tribes  was  the  idea  conceived  which  English- 
men attach  to  the  life  of  the  family.  The  quiet  happiness  of  well- 
ordered  English  homes  had  never  dawned  upon  the  Hellenic  mind. 
In  its  place  there  was  the  degrading  companionship  of  female 
slaves,  the  more  refined  but  not  less  sensual  society  of  the  Hetairai, 
and,  most  prominent  of  all,  the  loathsome  and  unnatural  debauchery 
which  drew  down  the  scathing  condenniation  of  the  great  Apostle 
of  the  (ientiles.'  It  is  shameful  to  l)e  driven  even  to  speak  of  such 
things ;  but  we  have  no  real  grasp  on  tlic  history  of  the  people  if 
we  fail  to  see  that  in  the  days  of  Perikles,  and  even  earlier,  those 
dreadful  evils  were  at  work  of  which  Polybios  bitterly  deplored 
the  results  in  the  decay  and  extinction  of  families,  in  the  desolation 
of  the  country,  and  the  degeneracy  of  its  soil. 

'  Hprod.  V.  97.     See  p.  139.  out  witli    sufficient    clearness    in 

"  Kor   tlie   liilfafnoi    rixvai,   see      tlie  Cliariklcs  of  Bekker,  Excursus 
l><'illiiijjt!r.  TIk  Jew  and  till'.  Gentile,      to  Scene  vii.,  on  the  Slaves. 
ii.  225.     The  horrible  evils  of  Hel-  '  Rom.  i. 

lenic  slavery  generally  are  brought 


BOOK    IV. 

THE  EMPIRE   OF  SPARTA. 


CHAPTER  I. 

FROM    THE    SURRENDER    OF    ATHENS    TO    THE    RETURN    OF 
XENOPHON    FROM    ASIA. 

The  fall  of  Athens  rendered  inevitable  the  subjugation  of  the 
Hellenic   race  by  some  foreign  power.     The  victory  of  Sparta 
was  virtually  the  assertion  that  a  Greek  nation  should   Establish- 
never  be  called  into  existence  :  and  from  this  point  the   ment  of 

,„,,  -1,1.    Spartan  su- 

history  of  the  several  (xreek  states  becomes  again,  w^nat  premacy. 
it  had  been  before  the  rise  of  the  Athenian  empire,  the  ^^  ^•'^• 
history  of  a  number  of  centrifugal  units,  by  whom  the  principle 
of  isolation  was  regarded  not  merely  as  a  safeguard,  but  as  the 
very  essence  of  freedom.  The  supremacy  of  Athens  was  indeed 
succeeded  by  the  supremacy  of  Sparta  :  but  the  former,  as  it  became 
gradually  extended,  would  first  have  softened  and  then  have 
removed  those  ancient  prejudices  which  lay  as  a  cankerworm  at  the 
root  of  Greek  political  life.  The  establishment  of  Spartan  supre- 
macy soon  dispelled  the  illusion  that  the  only  hindrance  to  Hel- 
lenic freedom  lay  in  Athenian  power.  With  the  snaring  of  the 
Athenian  fleet  at  Aigospotamoi  the  mask  was  thrown  ofE,  and 
Sparta  through  her  administrators  entered  on  a  course  of  t}Tanny 
at  which  even  oligarchs  stood  aghast.  In  each  city  the  oligarchical 
party,  which  in  the  conspiracy  of  the  Four  Hundred  had  shown 
itself  at  Athens  in  its  true  colors,  knew  that  they  had  in  Sparta 
an  ally  which  would  not  fail  to  back  tbem  up  in  systematic  and 
high-handed  oppi-ession.  The  seed  thus  sown  soon  bore  an  abun- 
dant harvest,  and  the  reapers  appeared  in  the  sovereigns  of  Make- 
donia. 

To   all  who   had  taken  part  in  the   conspiracy  of  the    Four 
Hundred  or  approved  their  policy,  the  entry  of  Lysandros  into 
Athens  was  a  day  of  rejoicing.     Even  the  more  mode-   The  tyranny 
rate  oligarchs  looked  forward  now  to  a  government  in   ^^j^f 
which  the  culture  of  I'efined  gentlemen  would  stand  out   at  Athens. 
in  marked  contrast  with  the  vulgarity  of  popular  debaters.    To  such 


488  THE  EMPIRE  OF  SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

a  society  Theramencs,  who  had  never  liked  the  idea  of  things  going 
farther*  than  lie  wished,  was  most  willing  to  join  himself;  and 
when,  along  with  Kritias,  Onomakies,  Aristoteles,  and  Drakontides, 
he  became  a  member  of  the  board  of  thirty  men  chosen  to  draw  up 
a  new  constitution  for  the  city,  he  may  have  thought  himself  suffi- 
ciently rewarded  for  all  his  lies,  treacheries,  and  murders,  lliis 
board  had  been  appointed,  we  are  told,'  by  a  vote  of  the  people  ; 
but  it  was  a  vote  extorted  by  the  declaration  of  Theramencs  tiiat 
such  was  the  Avill  of  the  Spartans,  and  by  the  warning  of  Lysan- 
dros  (wlio  liimself  appeared  in  the  assembly),  that  tlieir  failure  to 
destroy  the  Long  Walls  within  the  given  time  had  left  them  wholly 
at  his  mercy.  The  task  of  drawing  up  a  constitution  was  left  to  a 
more  convenient  season  :  the  business  of  cutting  down  political 
opponents  was  at  once  begun  bravely,  and  by  none  moi'e  bravely 
than  by  Theramencs.  He  was,  in  fact,  anxious  to  show  by  his  zeal 
how  intensely  he  hated  the  democracy  which  had  been  overthrown  : 
but  he  had  sense  enough  to  see  that  there  was  no  use  in  slaying 
men  from  whom  they  had  nothing  to  fear,  and  from  whose  good- 
will they  had  much  to  gain.  He  was,  therefore,  a  strenuous 
member  of  the  new  Board,  so  long  as  it  busied  itself  in  appointing 
a  new  senate  of  subservient  partisans,  in  setting  up  another  Board 
of  eleven  to  preside  over  the  police  (in  other  words,  to  carry  out 
judicial  murders),  and  finally  in  sweeping  away  those  citizens  who 
had  distinguished  themselves  by  their  attachment  to  the  old  consti- 
tution. He  thought  it  time  to  draw  back  when  some  of  liis 
colleagues  declared  that  the  good  work  Avould  not  be  brought  to  an 
end  witliout  the  aid  of  a  Spartan  garrison.  But  Kritias  was  not 
to  be  withheld,  and  his  envoys  brought  from  Sparta  a  force  of 
hoplites,  who  under  Kallibios  as  their  Haraiost  were  installed  in 
the  Akropolis.  The  Thirty  were  now  free  to  get  rid  of  all  whom 
they  were  plea.sed  to  term  Malignants  :"  and  among  these  vic- 
tims were  the  brother  and  the  son  of  Nikias  who  had  been  slain 
at  Syracuse,  men  as  innocent  of  any  democratic  leaniiigs  as  that 
general  himself.  Among  them  also  was  Leon  of  Salamis  whom 
Sokrates  with  four  other  citizens  was  bidden  to  apprehend  and 
bring  before  the  Thirty.  With  commendable  prudence  these 
tyrants  had  liit  upon  the  clever  plan  of  making  men  who  dis- 
liked their  policy  participators  in  their  crimes.  Sokrates  behaved 
now  as  he  liad  behaved  during  the  trial  of  the  generals  after 
Argennonssai ;  and  his  disregard  of  their  commands  was  allowed  to 
go  unnoticed.  Like  the  rest,  Leon  was  made  to  drink  the  liemlock 
juice  not  because  he  loved  the  old  laws,  but  because  he  had  money 
which  could  be  lavished  on  the  Spartan  assassins  in  the  Akropo- 
lis. This  was  opening  a  mine  which,  as  it  seemed  to  Theramenes," 
'  Xen.  //.  ii.  3.  2.  "  Xen.  //.  ii.  :].  1.3.  »  Xen.  U.  ii.  3.  39-41. 


Chap.  I.]   XENOPHON  AND  THE  TEN  THOUSAND.      489 

it  might  be  dangerous  to  work  too  far.  For  him,  the  point  of 
danger  was  determined  by  the  power  of  the  rulers.  So  far  as  these 
could  not  sustain  themselves  by  force,  they  must  depend  on  the 
affections  of  the  people,  or  they  must  fall.  For  such  expostulations 
Kritias  had  a  brief  answer.  No  despot  ever  counted  himself  safe  in 
his  seat,  until  he  had  got  rid  of  all  who  on  any  grounds  might  be 
obnoxious,to  him  :  and  if  Theramenes  thought  that  they  were  not 
tryants  because,  instead  of  being  one  man,  they  were  thirty  in 
number,  he  was  a  simpleton.  In  no  way  daunted  by  this  rejoinder, 
Theramenes  insisted  that  the  Thirty  could  not  maintain  themselves 
without  adequate  support.  Kritias  answered  him  by  putting  forth 
a  list  of  enfranchised  citizens  containing  thi'ce  thousand  names. 
Theramenes  was  not  to  be  thus  blinded.  He  denied  that  there  was 
any  magic  virtue  in  the  number  chosen,  and  he  denounced  the  list 
as  a  sham  now,  as  he  had  in  like  maimer  dealt  with  the  invisible 
Five  Thousand,  when  he  had  grown  tired  of  doing  work  without  pay 
for  the  Four  Hundred.'  P^ven  if  the  Three  Thousand  should  be 
trustworthy,  the  power  of  the  Thirty  would  be  by  no  means  what 
it  ought  to  be,  if  they  wished  to  insure  their  safety.  Theramenes 
wished  to  enfranchise  a  larger  number  of  the  people  ;  Kritias  re- 
solved to  disappoint  him  b}'^  disarming  them.  The  weapons  seized 
by  a  stratagem  were  placed  in  the  Akropolis  :  and  all  check  to  the 
lust  of  the  Thirty  was  finally  removed.  The  daggers  of  their 
bravoes  settled  scores  witii  all  whom  they  hated  or  whose 
money  they  wished  to  steal.  Thus  far  they  had  found  their  victims 
amongst  the  citizens  :  they  now  thought  that  a  raid  upon  the 
Metoikoi  or  resident  aliens  might  be  turned  to  good  profit.  Each 
one  of  the  Thirty  was  to  pick  out  his  prey  among  the  wealthiest  of 
this  industrious  class,  and  to  cement  more  closely  with  the  blood 
of  these  victims  their  fellowship  of  iniquity.  Theramenes  alone, 
it  would  seem,  refused  to  join  in  this  infamous  scheme.  The 
Sycophants,^  whom  Kritias  regarded  with  special  hatred,  did  not 
murder  those  whom  they  plundered  :  the  Thirty,  it  seemed,  wished 
to  slay  only  because  they  were  resolved  to  steal.  The  plain  speak- 
'  See  p.  439.  ness  and  who  had  no  character  to 

'^  All  constitutions  have  tlieir  lose.  At  Athens  this  class  was  un- 
faults.  One  grave  defect  in  tlie  happily  large.  They  went  by  the 
Athenian  constitution  lay  in  the  nameof  SykopUantai.i.e.  men  who 
system  of  the  Dikasteries.  When  accused  citizens  of  exportin<r  figs, 
the  citizens  were  paid  for  each  day  the  law  against  such  exportation 
spent  in  the  Jury  Courts,  the  temp-  having  been  continued  long  after 
tation  to  multiply  accusations  was  the  need  of  it  had  ceased  to  be  felt, 
not  easily  resisted.  Heavy  penal-  and  when,  therefore,  the  application 
ties,  it  is  true,  were  assigned  for  of  it  had  come  to  be  looked  upon 
prosecutors  who  brought  frivolous  as  malicious.  Hence  all  frivolous 
charges  ;  but  these  could  not  unfre-  charges  became  included  under  the 
quently  be  evaded  by  men  who  were  head  of  Sycophancy, 
not  ashamed  to  stoop  to  any  mcan- 
21* 


490  THE  EMPIRE  OF  SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

iiiii  of  Tlieraineiies  roused  the  fears  of  the  Tyrants  :  and  the  mind  of 
Kritias  was  made  up.  It  was  clear  that  Theramenes  was  walking 
on  the  path  which  he  had  already  trodden  in  the  days  of  the  Four 
Hundred,  and  either  he  must  fall  or  they.  The  senate  was 
summoned  to  the  council  chamber,  round  which  the  Myrmidons  ul 
the  Tliii-ty  with  hidden  daggers  kept  guard,  while  Kritias  j)roceede 
to  warn  the  senators  that  he  and  they  were  exposed  to  a  comm 
danger  and  that  this  danger  came  from  Theramenes.  'No  revolu- 
tions could  he  achieved  without  bloodshed,  least  of  all  at  Athens 
where  the  number  of  the  citizens  was  so  extravagantly  large  and 
where  they  had  for  ages  grown  up  with  a  prejudice  and  a  liking 
for  freedom.  Between  themselves  and  this  liberty-loving  Demos 
there  could  be  only  war  to  the  death,  and  with  a  view  to  their  de- 
struction they  had  set  up  a  more  wholesome  government  with  the 
aid  of  their  saviours  the  Spartans.'  From  this  government 
Theramenes  wished  to  withdraw,  just  when  the  passions  of  the 
people  were  most  roused  by  the  strong  remedies  applied  to  reduce 
them  to  order.  In  this  he  was  doing  just  what  they  n^ight  look  for. 
His  whole  career  had  well  won  for  him  the  name  of  the  buskin 
which  might  be  placed  on  either  foot  at  will."  He  had  led  on  the 
Four  Hundred  against  the  Demos,  until  it  became  convenient  for 
him  to  betray  them,  and  he  had  sacrificed  the  generals  to  his  ven- 
geance because  he  had  failed  to  carry  out  their  order  to  rescue 
the  shipwrecked  crews  at  x\.rgennoussai. 

Theramenes  felt  himself  to  be  in  deadly  peril  ;  but  lie  felt  also 
that  it  would  be  his  wisest  course  to  take  the  last  charge  first.  He 
The  (loatl  f  ^^*^"i^'<^^  emphatically  the  fact  that  the  accusation  of  the 
Theramenes.  generals  came  from  him.  They  were  their  own  accu- 
^'^'  sers,  as  blaming  Theramenes  and  his  colleagues  for  not 
rescuing  the  men,  when  the  violence  of  the  storm  made  the  task 
impossible  ;  they  had  asserted  that  to  be  practicable  which  was  not 
so,  and  had  straightway  departed,  leaving  their  lieutenants  to  their 
fate.^  But  he  was  more  concerned  with  the  present  than  with  the 
j)ast ;  and  he  was  anxious  to  open  their  eyes  to  the  gulf  which  was 
yawning  at  their  feet.  They  were  acting  on  a  policy  which  would 
^^  in  little  favor  at  Sparta.  Did  they  suppose  that  Kallibios  and 
his  soldiers  would  have  been  sent  to  Athens  if  the  Spartans  were 
to  get  no  good  from  so  doing  ?     The  Thirty  were  simply  destroy- 

^  Tolc  ■n-epiauaaaiv7'//iuc.     Xen. //.  it  is  hard  to  understand  how  the 

ii.  3,  25.  Tiiirty  could  without  laujrliter  lis- 

Kothornos.  ten  to  a  story  which  charfjed  the 

Xen.    //.    ii.    :],    3,5.     On    this  generals  with  quietly  sailing  away 

frijjhtful  coil  of  liescnouph  perhaps  durin<;  a  storm  which  made  it  ab- 

lias  been  said  already,  p.  467.  It  is  solutely  impossible  for  Theramenea 

jKJSsiblethatthereportofXenophon  and  liis  colleaj^ues  to  carry  out  their 

miiv   lint  be  accurate  ;  but  if  it  be  orders  for  tlie  rescue  of  the  men. 


Chap.  I.J  XENOPHON  AND  THE  TEN  THOUSAND.      491 

ing  the  city  ;  and  the  Spartans  could  have  done  this  without  the 
least  trouble  by  prolonging  the  siege  for  a  few  weeks  longer.  The 
charges  of  Kritias  were  all  false.  Jle  and  they  who  worked  with 
him  were  the  real  foes  of  the  state,  by  multiplying  their  enemies 
and  lessening  the  number  of  their  friends.  They  had  driven  into 
exile  men  like  Thrasyboulos  and  Anytos  ;  and  by  their  lawless  vio- 
lence they  Avere  really  strengthening  the  hands  of  these  fugitives, 
whose  hopes  of  bringing  back  the  old  state  of  things  would  fade 
away  if  the  Thirty  would  administer  true  judgment  and  obey  the 
laws.  The  truth  and  force  of  this  reply  called  forth  the  cheers  of 
the  senators,  and  alarmed  the  Tyrants  ;  but  Kritias  was  prepared 
for  everything.  Going  out  of  the  chamber,- he  ordered  his  bravoes 
to  advance  to  the  bar  within  which  the  senators  sat,  and  then  re- 
turning, told  them  that  it  was  his  duty  not  to  allow  his  friends  to 
d(>ceive  themselves.  The  gentlemen  on  the  other  side  of  the  rail- 
ings were  determined  that  the  man  who  was  seeking  to  upset  the 
oligarchy  should  not  escape  ;  nor  could  he  deny  that  they  were 
right.  The  need  was,  in  short,  urgent.  By  one  of  the  laws  passed 
since  the  happy  conquest  of  the  city,  the  Thirty  were  empowered 
to  put  to  death  without  trial  anyone  not  included  in  the  list  of  en- 
franchised citizens ;  and  Kritias  took  it  on  himself  to  expunge  from 
that  list  the  name  of  Theramenes.  On  hearing  these  words  the 
victim  leaped  to  the  altar,  and,  protesting  against  this  violation  of 
justice,  warned  the  senators  that  that  which  was  now  done  to  him 
might  at  any  moment  be  done  to  them.  The  only  reply  of  Kritias 
was  a  command  to  the  Eleven  executioners  to  seize  Theramenes. 
'  We  hand  over  to  you,'  he  said,  '  a  man  condemned  according  to 
the  law.  Do  ye  what  is  needful.'  Theramenes  was  dragged  from 
the  council  chamber  through  the  Agora,  protesting  loudly  against 
the  monstrous  iniquity  done  in  the  sight  of  gods  and  men.  '  It  will 
be  the  worse  for  you,  if  you  will  not  be  silent,'  cried  Satyros,  the 
leader  of  the  Eleven.  '  And  how  will  it  be  the  better  for  me  if  I 
obey  you  V  answered  Theramenes.  In  the  dungeon  he  presently 
drank  the  hemlock  juice,  casting  out  the  drops  which  remained 
in  the  cup  with  the  parting  salutation,  'This  for  the  handsome 
Kritias." 

The  day  of  retribution  for  the  Thirty  was  drawing  nio-h,  and 
the  vengeance  was  to  come  from  the  exiles  named  by  Theramenes  ; 
but  for  the  time  being  his  death  left  them  in  a  very   ^ 

,.  »    ,.  =>T„  »    ,         .  ,    •'     Occupation 

paradise  or  license,  ilie  gates  or  the  city  were  shut  ofPhyieby 
to  all  whose  names  were  not  included  in  their  list  of  [mde^Ti^ra- 
citizens  ;  and  the  owners  of  property  in  the  country  sybouios. 
were  dragged  from  their  homes  and  slain,  because  Kritias  wished 
to  have  their  lands  himself  or  to  bestow  them  on  his  accomplices. 
'  Xen.  H.  ii.  3,  56. 


402  THE   EMPIRE   OF   SPARTA.  [BOOK  IV. 

Those  who  could  escape  fled,  and  tlie  neighboring  cities  were 
filled  witli  futjitives.  Of  these  Tlirasyboulos  with  a  small  company 
settino-  out  from  Thebes,  where  the  old  hatred  of  the  Athenian 
demos  Avas  fast  turning  into  sympathy,  seized  the  fortress  of  Phyle 
which,  like  other  outlying  posts,  had  been  dismantled  by  the 
Tvrants  ;  and  Kritias  learnt  that  a  body  of  exiles  was  in  possession 
of  an  almost  impregnable  rock,  jutting  from  the  main  range  of 
Parnes  with  which  it  was  joined  by  a  narrow  and  precipitous  ridge. 
At  once  he  set  out  with  the  Three  Thousand  and  the  Horsemen  or 
Knights.  The  day  was  brilliantly  fine,  but  his  expectations  of  imme- 
diate victory  were  signally  foiled,  and  they  were  preparing  for  a 
siege  wlien  a  heavy  fall  of  snow  drove  them  back  to  the  city.  Two 
tribes  of  Horsemen  were,  however,  sent  with  the  Lakonian  garrison 
to  check  any  raids  of  tlie  exiles  ;  but  Thrasyboulos  had  now  VOO 
men  on  liis  rock,  and  going  down  by  night  he  fell  on  them  in  the 
early  morning.  Some  were  asleep  ;  others  were  grooming  their 
horses.  The  attack  was  completely  successful,  and  the  oligarchic 
force  was  driven  off  witli  the  loss  of  more  than  120  hoplitcs. 

The  Tyi-ants  now  thought  it  best  to  look  out  for  a  refuge,  in 
the  event  of  their  l>eing  expelled  from  Athens.  Kritias  fixed  on 
Maspacreof  Eleusis,  and  going  thither  with  his  colleagues,  sum- 
iiians  by\hc  moned  all  Ihc  Eleusinians  of  military  age  to  give  in  their 
Thirty.  names.     P]ach  citizen,  as  he  did  so,  was  sent  out  by  a 

postern  gate  opening  on  the  beach,  where  he  found  himself  between 
two  files  of  liorsemen  and  was  immediately  bound.  All  were  taken 
to  Athens,  wliere  Kritias,  sunnnoning  the  Three  Thousand  and  the 
Knights,  told  them  that  they  must  share  the  perils  as  well  as  reap 
the  fruits  of  power.  '  In  short,'  he  said,  '  you  must  sail  in  the 
same  boat  with  us.  Here  are  these  men  ;  you  must  condemn  them 
to  death.'  Condemned  they  therefore  were,  and  slain.  The  votes 
were  given  o[)enly,  and  open  voting  at  Athens  was  always  regarded 
as  voting  under  restraint.  The  issue,  wc  arc  told,  was  well  pleas- 
ing to  those  citi.:cns,  in  whom  lust  of  gain  and  delight  in  thievery 
had  swallowed  up  all  other  passions. 

Thnusyboulos  and  tlie  exiles  now  marched  to  Pciraieus  ;  and  the 
demolition  of  the  walls,  on  which  Sparta  Imd  relied  for  the  sup- 
Victory  of  pression  of  popular  government,  became  the  direct 
lo8^ami(i™tii  '"^''"'s  "f  its  restoration.  The  temple  of  Artemis  in 
ofKritia!?.  Mounychia,  approachable  only  by  a  steep  flight  of 
steps,  furnished  a  strong  post,  from  wliich  darters  could  shower 
their  weapons  over  the  heads  of  their  own  lioplitos  on  the  advancing 
enemy.  The  latter  wavered,  and  the  lioplites,  rusliing  down,  put 
them  to  flight.  Seventy  or  more  were  slain,  and  among  the  dead  was 
Kritias.  Instead  of  attempting  to  carry  off  the  bodies  by  force,  the 
soldiers  of  the  Tyrants  demanded  the  usual  truce  for  burial,  and  the 


CuAP.  I.]  XENOPHON  AND  THE  TEN  THOUSAND.      493 

two  parties  were  thus  thrown  together.  Among  the  exiles  was 
Kleokritos,  the  herald  of  the  class  called  Mystai  in  the  Eleusinian 
mysteries.  Exerting  a  voice  of  singular  power  he  besought  silence, 
and  then,  in  simple  words,  asked  why  his  countrymen  should  seek 
his  death  and  that  of  his  fellow-fugitives.  '  We  have  done  you  no 
harm  ;  we  have  taken  part  with  you  in  the  most  solemn  feasts ; 
we  have  been  your  comrades  in  peace  and  war.  Why  should  you 
obey  the  Thirty,  the  most  impious  of  tyrants,  who  seek  to  keep  up 
an  endless  civil  strife,  and  who,  in  eight  months,  have  slain  more 
Athenians  than  all  the  Peloponnesians  killed  in  ten  years  of  war? 
Be  sure  that  those  of  you  whom  we  have  this  day  been  compelled 
to  strike  down  have  cost  us  as  many  tears  as  they  have  cost  you.' 

So  manifest  was  the  impression  made  by  tliese  words  that  the 
Thirty  gave  orders  for  an  immediate  retreat  into  the  city.  On  the 
following  morning  they  found  but  a  scanty  attendance 
of  senators  in  the  council  chamber,  while  the  Three  Lysandros 
Thousand,  broken  up  into  groups  outside,  were  engaged  *"  Athens, 
in  vehement  debate.  Those  who  had  abetted  the  despots  in  their 
iniquities  insisted,  of  course,  on  the  extermination  of  the  exiles; 
the  more  moderate  protested  against  the  ruining  of  the  state  by 
the  scoundrels  who  were  now  in  power.  The  upshot  December, 
was  the  deposition  of  the  Thirty,  who  fled  to  Eleusis,  404b.c. 
and  the  election  of  a  new  Board  of  Ten,  one  from  each  of  the  tribes. 
This  election  was  a  compromise,  and  it  was  a  compromise  which 
settled  nothing.  Of  these  ten  two  liad  been  among  the  Thirty  ;  all 
probably  desired  anything  rather  than  the  restoration  of  democracy, 
and,  believing  that  each  man  had  his  price,  sought  to  bribe  Thrasy- 
boulos  and  his  conu'ades  to  desert  their  party  and  join  the  oligarchs. 
The  offer  was  spurned,  and  the  strife  went  on  ;  but  the  exiles  in 
Peiraieus  daily  grew  stronger  both  in  men  and  arms,  nor  had 
many  days  passed  before  envoys  were  sent  out  from  the  Ten  in  the 
city  and  from  the  Thirty  in  Eleusis  to  pray  for  Lakedaimonian  help, 
on  the  ground  that  Athens  had  revolted  from  Sparta.  Lysandros, 
eagerly  supporting  the  request,  urged  that  he  himself  might  be  sent 
with  an  army  by  land,  while  his  brother  Libys  should  sail  with  a  fleet 
of  forty  ships  to  blockade  Peiraieus.  His  proposal  was  accepted, 
and  the  man  who,  ten  months  before,  had  left  Athens  in  ruin, 
stood  once  more  within  the  borders  of  Attica. 

This  general  had,  in  the  meanwhile,  crushed  tlie  resistance  of 
the  Samian   Demos  which  refused  to  submit  when  the  Athenian 
fleet  had  been  ensnared  at  Aigospotamoi.     The  Samian   operations 
people  knew  well  what  they  had  to  expect  from  the   ^'^^'^ft^e 
men  whom  Xenophon  calls  the  ancient  citizens,^  that  Egean. 
is,  from  the  oligarchs  wliose  treacherous  schemes  had  been  discon- 
>  Xen.  //.  ii.  3,  7. 


494:  THE   EMPIRE  OF  SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

certed  by  tlie  revolution  in  favor  of  Atliens  eig-lit  years  before.' 
But,  although  they  held  out  against  a  blockade  of  man  yraonths, 
the  triumph  of  the  Eupatrids  was  certain.  The  Demos  agreed  at 
length  to  surrender  on  condition  of  being  allowed  to  depart  each 
man  with  one  garment.  The  city  with  all  its  contents  was  handed 
over  to  the  oligarchs,  who  found  themselves  under  the  yoke  of  a 
board  of  ten  Spartans,  with  Thorax  for  harmost  or  governor.  So 
ended,  in  a  distant  island,  the  long  struggle  which,  had  begun, 
nearly  eight-and-twenty  years  earlier,  with  the  surprise  of  Plataiai 
by  the  Thebans.  But  Lysandros  had  not  merely  ended  the  strife. 
He  had  secured  for  himself  personally  a  power  such  as  no  Greek, 
thus  far,  had  ever  attained.  The  Dekarchiai,  or  Boards  of  Ten, 
left  in  the  conquered  cities,  were  all  his  creations,  prepared  to  carry 
out  his  will  to  the  uttermost,  and  to  resist  any  men  or  any  measures 
to  which  his  inclinations  might  be  opposed.  He  now  sailed  home 
with  the  proW'-ornaments  of  all  the  ships  captured  at  Aigospotamoi, 
with  a  vast  assortment  of  golden  crowns  voted  to  him  in  tlitferent 
cities,  and  with  the  huge  sum  of  470  talents,  the  residue  of  the 
money  which  Cyrus  had  placed  in  his  hands  for  the  purpose  of 
humiliating  Athens.  With  his  fleet  came  the  Avhole  Athenian 
navy  with  the  exception  of  the  twelve  triremes  which  alone  re- 
mained in  the  basin  of  Peiraieus.  The  empire  of  Sparta  was  estab- 
lished ;  but  Lysandros  was  fully  resolved  that  her  empire  should 
be  empire  for  himself  also. 

The  success  of  his  plan  depended,  necessarily,  on  the  continuance 
of  the  sentiment  which  had  animated  the  allies  of  Sparta  to  the 
March  of  close  of  the  Peloponnesiau  war.  That  sentiment  had 
Pausanias,  root  in  the  notion  of  city  autonomy,  and  was  sustained 
kinir?S°  simply  by  fear  of  Athens.  AVitli  the  fall  of  the  im- 
Attica.  perial  city,   the  bond  which  held  Spartaus,  Thebans. 

and  Corinthians  together  was  really  loosened,  although,  in  the  tirst 
moments  of  vindictive  rage,  the  Theban  and  Corinthian  leaders  in- 
sisted that  Athens  should  be  treated  as  Plataiai  had  been  treated 
by  Archidamos.  The  feeling  rapidly  cooled  down  when  it  became 
apparent  that  the  promises  made  by  the  Spartans  were  a  mere 
cheat,  that  by  means  of  the  harmosts  and  the  dekarchies  Sparta 
carried  out  a  system  of  tyranny  such  as  the  Hellenic  world  had  not 
yet  seen,  and  that  Athens  w^as  needed  as  an  instrument  for  counter- 
acting the  power  which  had  overwhelmed  her.  They  had  further 
causes  of  offence.  Sparta  liad  used  them  freely  to  do  her  hard 
Avork  ;  but,  if  she  allowed  them  the  empty  honor  of  statues  and 
inscriptions,  she  steadily  refused  to  share  with  them  the  golden 
harvest  which  she  had  i-caped  during  the  war.  Nor  was  it  likely 
tliat  the  pre-eminent  glory  and  power  of  Lysandros  would  be  agree- 
able to  the  Herakleid  kings  of  his  own  city.  The  honors  heaped 
'  See  p.  418. 


Chap.  I.]      XENOPHON  AND  THE  TEN  THOUSAND.  495 

on  the  successful  leader  roused  tlie  jealousy  and  the  wrath  of 
Pausanias,  one  of  these  kings  ;  and  Pausanias,  when  Lysandros 
had  set  out  for  Eleusis,  prayed  that  he  too  might  be  allowed  to 
lead  a  Spartan  force  into  Attica.  For  this  expedition  contingents 
were  furnished  by  all  the  allies  except  the  Thebans  and  Corinthians. 
A  few  months  had  sufficed  to  strengthen  in  them  the  suspicion 
that  Sparta  meant  to  make  Athens  a  mere  dependency  on  herself, 
and  so  to  encroach  on  the  freedom  of  her  neighbors.  They  refused 
therefore  to  join,  on  the  plea  that  the  convention  made  after  the 
surrender  of  the  city  had  not  been  violated. 

The  presence  of  Pausanias,  although  Lysandros  stood  by.  his 
side,  encouraged  many  to  express  freely  their  opinion  of  the  tyrants 
who  had  fled  to  Eleusis,  as  well  as  of  those  who  still   ,^.  , 

.  V  ictorv  of 

held  sway  in  Athens.  In  the  complaints  thus  made  Pausanias. 
the  king  probably  saw  fresh  evidence  of  the  schemes  pressimiof 
which  had  awakened  his  jealousy  ;  but  his  first  act  was  the  tyranny 
to  sunnnon  Thrasyboulos  and  his  followers  to  disperse. 
Their  refusal  was  followed  by  a  series  of  slight  engagements,  ending 
with  one  in  which  the  exiles  lost  150  men.  Pausanias  was  thus 
victorious,  and  he  could  therefore  afford  now  to  act  on  his  better 
judgment.  Under  a  truce  granted  by  him  envoys  were  sent  by 
the  exiles  to  Sparta,  and  with  them  went  two  citizens  belonging 
to  the  party  opposed  to  the  Ten  within  the  city.  On  their  side  the 
Ten,  wdio  in  the  opinion  of  Xenophon  constituted  the  state,  dis- 
patched messengers  offering  the  unconditional  surrender  of  the  city, 
and  demanding  the  like  submission  from  the  exiles  in  Peiraieus,  if 
these  were  sincere  in  their  desire  for  peace.  The  Spartans  answered 
by  appointing  fifteen  commissioners  to  settle  matters  along  with 
Pausanias.  The  convention  agreed  upon  restoring  the  exiles  to  their 
homes,  and  secured  an  amnesty  to  all  except  the  Thirty  with  their 
Eleven  executioners,  and  the  Ten  who  had  done  what  they  could 
to  carry  on  the  work  of  the  expelled  tyrants,  Eleusis  was  left  as 
an  independent  town  which  might  be  used  as  a  place  of  refuge  by 
such  as  feared  to  remain  at  Athens.  But  if  the  exiles  were  ready 
to  forgive,  the  Thirty  were  not  disposed  to  abandon  their  con- 
spiracy. The  fact  became  known  that  they  were  enlisting  an  army 
of  mercenaries,  and  the  people,  who  had  just  restored  the  old  demo- 
cratic constitution  as  it  stood  before  the  surrender  of     .„„ 

403  B.C. 

the  city,  marched  against  them.     Their  generals  who     Spring.' 
came  out  to  ask  for  a  conference   were  seized  and  slain  ;  the  sur- 
vivors of  the  Thirty  fled  from  Attica;  and  the  other  Athenians  in 
Eleusis  accepted  the  peace  which  the  Demos  again  offered  to  them. 

The    Athenian    demos   had    been    guilty    of  •  great 
crimes.     They  had  fallen   during  the  last  generation    ofthede- 
into  the  perilous  habit  of  mind  which  sets  lightly   by   i"°cracy. 


496  THE  EMPIRE  OF  SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

constitutional  forms,  and  by  doing  as  they  liked  in  the  case  of 
the  victors  of  Argennoussai  they  had  sealed  their  downfall  :  but 
both  after  the  overthrow  of  the  Four  Hundred'  and  on  the  ex- 
pulsion of  the  Thirty  and  the  Ten,  they  behaved  with  a  deliberate 
and  settled  moderation  to  which  it  is  not  easy  to  do  full  justice. 
The  amnesty  embiaced  all  citizens  except  the  tyrants  themselves 
and  their  executioners  ;  and  even  these  might,  if  they  pleased,  re- 
sume their  citizenship  on  passing  the  usual  trial  of' magistrates  at 
tlie  end  of  their  term  of  otfice.  The  assembly  Avhich  restored  the 
old  constitution  decreed  also,  by  the  Psephisma  proposed  by  Tisa- 
menos,  that  the  laws  which  bore  the  names  of  Solon  and  of  Drakou 
should  be  amended  wherever  their  provisions  Avere  found  incon- 
sistent \vith  the  recent  amnesty.  All  laws  and  decrees  of  the  people 
passed  before  the  suppression  of  the  Demos  were  pronounced  to  be 
valid  ;  all  legislation  effected  during  the  usurpation  of  the  Thirty 
and  the  Ten  was  declared  to  be  illegal  and  void.  By  this  decree 
all  lands  reverted  at  once  to  the  owners  who  possessed  them  before 
the  surrender  of  the  city  to  Lysandros ;  but  there  remained,  as 
rankling  wounds  in  those  who  had  suffered  from  them,  the  whole- 
sale thefts  of  money  and  movable  property,  by  which  the  Thirty 
had  enriched  themselves  and  their  partisans.  With  a  moderation 
which  by  some  might  be  mistaken  for  apathy,  the  people,  who  were 
at  the  moment  smarting  \inder  the  effects  of  these  iniquities,  de- 
creed that  no  prosecutions  for  damages  should  be  allowed  which 
had  reference  to  offences  committed  before  the  Archonship  of 
Eukleides,  which  marked  the  new  birth  of  the  Athenian  constitu- 
tion— the  archonship  of  Pythodoros  during  the  rule  of  the  despots 
being  stigmatised  as  the  Anarchy.  Anyone  against  whom  such  an 
action  might  be  brought  might  plead  in  bar  of  it  the  special  pro- 
vision of  the  amnesty,  and  if  the  plea  were  admitted,  the  accuser 
would  not  merely  be  debarred  from  proceeding  with  his  suit,  but 
would  liave  to  pav  to  the  defendant  one-sixth  part  of  the  amount 
of  his  claim.  This  decree,  of  course,  interfered  in  no  way  with 
the  decisions  of  cases  settled  under  the  old  democracy  ;  but  it  effec- 
tually sheltered  the  robbers  of  personal  property  who  worshipped 
the  Sj)artans  as  their  saviours.  The  despots  whom  these  men  put 
down  liad  glutted  themselves  with  the  spoils  of  the  rich  :  the  vic- 
torious exiles  received  no  other  reward  tlian  the  wreath  of  olive 
which  expressed  the  gratitude  of  their  countrymen,  together  with 
the  sum  of  a  thousand  drarhmas  for  a  common  sacrifice  to  the  gods. 
Finally,  the  Ten  had  borrowed  from  Sparta  a  hundred  talents  to 
be  employed  against  the  exiles  in  I'ciraieus.  It  might  fairly  have 
been  pleaded  that  this  money  shoidd  be  repaid  by  those  to  whom 
it  had  been  lent  or  by  their  representatives.  The  people  insisted 
'  See  p.  443. 


Chap.  I.]   XENOPHON  AND  THE  TEN  THOUSAND.      497 

on  treating  the  debt  as  a  public  one,  and  discharged  it  as  soon  as 
their  treasury'  enabled  them  to  do  so.  As  a  foil  to  this  picture, 
than  which  we  can  find  nothing  more  to  the  credit  of  any  people 
in  any  age,  we  might  be  disposed  to  set  the  exclusive  spirit  which 
by  the  psephisma  of  Aristophon  restricted  the  citizenship  to  the 
sons  of  parents  who  both  were  Athenian  citizens.  In  the  days  of 
her  maritiinc  empire  Athens  had  been  content  to  insist  only  ou 
the  citizenship  of  the  father,  and  had  granted  the  right  of  inter- 
marriage with  people  beyond  the  borders  of  Attica.  She  was  then 
carrying  out  a  plan  which  slowly  but  surely  would  soften  and  re- 
move the  bitter  feelings  of  exclusivcness  inherited  from  the  earliest 
Aryan  society,  and  in  the  end  make  the  distinctions  between  Spar 
tans,  Boiotians,  Corinthians,  and  Athenians  just  those  distinctions 
which  exist  between  the  men  of  Cornwall  and  Kent,  of  Sussex  and 
Northumberland.  That  empii'c  liad  fallen,  and  with  it  had  faded 
away  those  larger  aspirations  which  would  in  the  end  have  unfolded 
themselves  into  the  ideas  of  national  unity  in  place  of  city  autonomy. 
Athens  was  again  a  single  city  and  nothing  more  ;  and  the  centri- 
fugal spirit  which  marked  all  other  Hellenic  cities  reasserted  its 
dominion  here. 

Before  the  victory  of  Thrasyboulos  had  been  achieved  at  Athens, 
the  stormy  life  of  Alkibiades  had  been  ended  by  murder.  After 
the  disaster  of  Aigospotamoi  he  felt  that  his  forts  Last  schemes 
on  the  Thrakian  Chersonese  would  be  but  a  poor  de-  ^kiwad^g"^ 
fence  against  his  Spartan  enemies,  and  taking  refuge  4Wb.c. 
with  Pharnabazos,  he  soon  saw  through  the  schemes  of  Cyrus  for 
dethroning  his  brother  Artaxerxes  who  liad  succeeded  his  father 
Dareios  Nothos.  These  schemes  he  was  eager  to  reveal  to  the 
monarch  himself  at  Sousa,  and  for  this  purpose  he  besought  the 
satrap  to  send  him  thither  with  the  Athenian  envoys'  avIio  after 
a  detention  of  three  years  had  found  their  way  down  to  the 
coast.  With  this  request  Pharnabazos,  not  liking  the  Spartans 
and  specially  jealous  of  Lysandros,  was  not  indisposed  to  comply  ; 
and  had  he  gone  to  the  capital,  it  is  probable  that  the  attempt  of 
Cyrus  which  led  him  to  his  death  at  Kunaxa  would  never  have 
been  made.  But  the  eyes  of  that  prince  were  as  keenly  watchful 
as  those  of  Alkibiades  :  and  the  Spartans  must  have  known  the 
dangers  which  they  might  incur  from  his  intercourse  with  the  men 
expelled  from  the  various  cities  by  the  Lysandrian  Dccemvirates. 
Yet  it  is  not  likely  that  Pharnabazos  would  be  determined  even  bv 
the  most  urgent  remonstrances  of  Sparta  to  take  the  life  of  a  man 
whom  he  had  received  as  a  guest  and  to  whom  he  had  assigned  an 
abode  within  his  satrapy.  The  command  of  Cyrus  must  liave 
been  added  to  the  requests  from  Sparta  :  and  in  obedience  to  the 
1  See  p.  453. 


498  THE  EMPIRE  OF   SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

former  the  order  was  given  for  his  assassination.  The  murderers, 
it  is  said,  were  afraid  to  enter  the  house  where  he  Uved  in  a  Phiy- 
gian  village,  and  set  it  on  fire.  Their  victim  rushed  out  armed  only 
with  a  dagger,  and  was  struck  down  by  a  shower  of  arrows. 

So  died  the  greatest  perhaps,  and  the  most  systematic,  of 
traitors.  From  first  to  last,  this  brilliant  and  daring  man  w?.s  his 
General  re-  *^^^"  S^^  '  ^'^*^  ^^  order  to  cxalt  the  object  of  his  wor- 
viewof  his  ship  he  stuck  at  no  crime  and  cared  for  no  law.  The 
most  enormous  treachery  cost  him  no  efioit ;  the  most 
frightful  calamities  brought  about  by  that  treachery  caused  him  no 
remorse.  He  had  a  right,  which  nothing  could  take  away,  to 
avenge  himself  of  hir,  enemies,  and  his  vengeance  must  be  on  a 
scale  proportioned  to  his  own  importance.  Of  any  duty  to  his 
country  or  to  her  constitution  he  knew  nothing.  If  the  conferring 
of  a  benefit  upon  her  should  be  to  his  own  interest,  the  boon  should 
be  bestowed  ;  nay,  her  generals  should  even  have  the  benefit  of 
his  good  advice,  if  no  selfish  considerations  interfered  with  the 
giving  of  it.  Down  to  the  time  when  the  Athenian  camp  was 
formed  in  Samos,  Ids  whole  career  may  be  described  as  uniformly 
infamous.  From  tliat  time,  as  some  have  thought,  he  was  animated 
by  a  real  patriotism  and  deserved  well  of  his  country.  How  far 
such  an  opinion  may  be  maintained,  the  facts  related  in  the  past 
history  may  perhaps  show,  lie  cheated  his  countiymen  to  the 
destruction  of  their  constitution  by  telling  them  the  lie  that  the 
Persian  king  longed  for  their  friendship  and  was  repelled  only  by 
their  popular  government.'  In  order  to  cover  this  falsehood,  he 
was  compelled  to  lie  again  when,  taking  him  at  his  word,  the 
Athenian  envoys  appeared  before  Tissaphernes."  When  he  bad 
found  it  convenient  to  take  up  the  cause  of  the  democracy  Avhich 
lie  had  professed  both  to  despise  and  to  hate,  he  again  cheated  the 
Athenians  by  assurances,  which  he  knew  to  be  false,  of  the  sincere 
and  profound  friendship  felt  for  them  by  Tissaphernes.^  By 
falsehood,  again,  he  took  credit  to  himself  for  preventing  the 
Phenician  fleet  from  a[)Dearing  on  the  side  of  the  Spartans,  when 
he  knew  that  the  satrap  had  made  up  his  mind  that  it  should  not 
appear  on  the  scene  »>f  war  at  all.*  In  no  one  of  these  instances 
were  his  acts  disinterested  or  his  professions  sincere  ;  and  with 
his  long  course  of  fraud  and  falsehood  his  conference  with  the 
generals  at  Aigospotamoi  stands  out  in  solitary  contiast.  Here 
bevond  doubt  he  was  right ;  but  he  was  an  exile  from  his 
country,  he  was  under  the  ban  of  Sparta,  and  he  knew  that  he  had 
an  enemy  in  Tissaphernes.  From  the  two  latter  he  had  nothing  to 
expect :  in  Athens  he  might  yet  hope  lo  gain  a  footing,  and  his 
own  interest  would  prompt  him  to  utter  a  protest  against  the  infa- 

'  See  p.  427.  "  See  p.  431.  '  See  p.  438.  *  See  p.  445. 


Chap.  I.]      XENOPHON  AND  THE  TEN  THOUSAND.  499 

tiiatioii  which  was  flinging  away  the  Athenian  navy.  The  actions 
of  his  whole  Hfe  were  in  harmony  with  the  creed  of  a  man  who 
knew  no  deity  but  liimself. 

The  scliemes  which  Alkibiades  was  anxions  to  reveal  to  tlie 
Persian  king  were  destined  to  bring  about  a  series  of  events, 
which,  if  they  do  not  belong  strictly  to  Greek  history,  pieasof  Cy- 
vet  throw  a  wonderful  liorht  on  certain  characteristics  of   rusforthe 

•  (IctnroiiG- 

Greek  military  life,  as  well  as  on  the  state  of  things  ment  of 
generally  at  the  end  of  the  Peloponnesian  war.  The  Artaxerxes. 
close  of  the  long  strife  left  without  employ  ment  large  bodies  of  men 
who  had  been  engaged  in  warfare  so  long  as  to  feel  little  desire  for 
more  peaceful  work.  Of  all  the  good  qualities  of  Hellenic  soldiers 
no  foreigner  was  so  thoroughly  aware  as  Cyrus.  His  dealings  with 
Lysandros  and  the  forces  under  his  command  had  shown  him  the 
steadiness  of  their  obedience  under  discipline,  their  powers  of 
endurance  under  hardship,  and  the  sturdiness  of  their  self-depen- 
dence in  circumstances  of  difficulty  and  danger.  Of  these  splendid 
instruments  he  resolved  to  avail  himself,  when  on  his  father's  death 
he  found  that  the  prize  which  he  coveted  had  slipped  . 
from  his  grasp.  Dareios  had  not  declared  him  his  suc- 
cessor, and  Artaxerxes,'  his  elder  brother,  though  not  born  like 
himself  in  the  purple,  sat  on  the  tiirone.  Burning  with  rage,  Cyrus 
made  his  way  to  the  Egean  coast,  with  the  determination  of 
avenging  himself  tirst  on  Tissaphcrnes  who  had  charged  him  with 
plotting  against  his  brother  and  then  of  sweeping  that  brother  from 
his  path.  The  war  which  he  now  openly  carried  on  against 
Tissaphcrnes  led  the  Ionian  cities  to  revolt  from  that  satrap  and 
submit  themselves  to  Cyrus,  while  it  blinded  Artaxerxes  to  the 
further  designs  for  which  that  war  served  as  a  cloak.  Miietoswas 
still  in  the  hands  of  Tissaphcrnes  ;  and  the  siege  of  this  city  might 
be  made  an  excuse  for  raising  forces  to  be  used  hereafter  in  more 
serious  undertakings.  He  might  still  further  promote  his  own  ends 
by  seeming  to  spend  his  money  solely  in  the  interest  of  his  friends. 
For  this  purpose  he  found  a  thoroughly  congenial  spirit  in  the 
Lakedaimonian  Klearchos  who,  having  been  banished,  it  is  said, 
for  gross  insubordination  to  the  Ephors  as  well  as  for  execrable 
tyranny  while  llarniostes  of  Byzantion,  was  eager  to  engage  himself 
in  any  service  which  promised  to  feed  his  appetite  for  war.  The 
large  sum  of  10,000  dareiks  placed  in  his  hands  by  the  prince 
enabled  Klearchos  to  raise  a  mercenary  force  which  he  employed 
against  the  Thrakians  of  the  Chersonesos,  but  which  was  to  be  at 
the  orders  of  Cyrus  in  the  event  of  his  needing  them.  Similar  gifts 
to  Aristippos  the  Aleuad'^  procured  another  large  force  in  Thes- 

'  Called  Miiemon,  it  is  said,  from         *  See  p.  35. 
the  excellence  of  his  memory. 


500  THE   EMPIRE  OF   SPAKTA.  [Book  IV. 

saly  :  others  were  raised  by  tlio  Arkadian  Sophaiiietos,  the  Achaiari 
Sokrates,  and  the  Buiotiaii  rroxeiios,  to  be  led,  so  Cyrus  declartd, 
against  the  Tisidiau  rebels.'  The  ami}  thus  raised  could  be  Jnci  eased 
by  withdrawing  from  the  forces  under  the  command  of  the  Arka- 
dian Xenias  all  except  those  which  were  absolutely  needed  for  the 
protection  of  tlie  Ionian  cities  of  Asia  Minor.  All  tlie  troo])s  thus 
enlisted  were  gathered  at  Sardeis,  when  Cyrus  delermined  toplay 
out  his  game.  He  saw  around  him  a  hundred  thousand  non- 
Hellenic  troops  whom  he  despised,  and  upwardsof  seven  thousand 
Greek  lioplites  whose  presence  was  to  him  a  suicpledge  of  victoiy. 
In  this  brilliant  array  was  the  future  historian  of  the  expedition  and. 
of  the  more  famous  retreat  which  followed  it.  On  the  invitation 
of  Proxenos,  Xcuophon,  the  friend  of  Sokrates  who  still  lives  for  ns 
in  his  pages,  had  left  Athens  where  life  prol)ably  was  not  altogether 
a  paradise  for  the  men  belonging  to  that  class  of  Knights  (Hippeis) 
■who  had  been  the  foremost  sn])porters  of  the  detested  Thirty. 
Lured  by  the  highly  colored  pictures  of  his  friend  who  spoke  of 
Cyrus  as  immeasurably  dearer  to  him  than  his  country,  Xenophon 
appeared  before  the  prince  at  Sardeis^  and  was  in- 
^'^'  duced  to  join,  as  one  of  the  few  Greek  horsemen  in  his 
camp,  under  the  assurance  that  he  was  marcliing  to  punish  tlie 
Pisidians  and  that  at  the  close  of  the  expedition  he  should  at  once 
return  home  Avith  an  ample  recompense  for  his  toil.  This  dehrsion 
was  shared  by  all  the  Greek  commanders  except  Klearchos,  who  w'as 
alone  admitted  to  the  secret  from  the  first,  and  who  had,  it  would 
seem,  declared  himself  fully  able  to  meet  any  opposition  Avhich 
might  be  made  when  his  real  object  sliould  become  known.  On 
reaching  the  Phrygian  city  of  Kolossai  the  number  of  the  Greek 
troops  was  increased  by  the  arrival  of  1,000  hoplitcs  and  500  pel- 
tasts  under  the  Thessalian  Menon.  A  review  of  liis  army  at 
Kclainai,  through  which  his  forefather  Xerxes  Avas  said  to  have 
led  his  millions  of  slaves,  delighted  the  more  keensighted  Cyrus 
with  the  knowledge  that  he  was  the  leader  of  more  than  11,000 
Hellenic  freemen.  Taking  much  the  same  track  which  was  after- 
wards to  be  followed  by  the  crusaders  under  Godfrey  andTancred, 
Cyrus  found  that  the  impregnable  pass  of  the  Tauric  range,  known 
as  the  Kilikian  gates,  had  been  left  without  defenders.  The  Kili- 
kian  chief,  bearing  the  liereditary  name  Syennesis,  had  fallen  back 
on  learning  that  Menon  had  managed  to  cross  tlie  mountains  by  the 
pass  in  his  rear,  and  that  the  coast  was  threatened  by  a  l*eloponiie- 
sian  rieet  under  Samios.^ 

'  Xen.  AiKih.  i.  1  ;  ii.  6.  on  the  part  of  Syennesis  to  defeiul 

^  Xt'ii.  Aiiiih.  iii.  1,  9.  the   mountain  pass.      The  tacts  re- 

'  Xen.  II.  iii.  1,  jrives  the  latter  lated  certainly  seem  to  imply  tlint 

fact  as  the  real  cause  of  the  failure  his  resistance  was  chiefly  for  iho 


Chap.  I]     XENOPHON  AND  THE  TEN  THOUSAND.  ^01 

On  reacliiiig  Tarsos  the  Greek  mercenaries  necessarily  discovered 
that  they  had  been  drawn  thus  far  by  a  mere  feint.  They  had 
left  the  Pisidians  far  behind  them.  The  real  ob-  rpj^^  Greek 
ject  aimed  at  must  therefore  be  the  overthrow  of  the  mercenaries. 
Great  King  himself.  But  they  had  been  hired  for  no  such  pur- 
pose, and  they  shrank  from  plunging  into  a  mysterious  country 
which  would  place  a  thousand  leagues  between  them  and  the  sea. 
Klearchos  was  the  only  man  in  the  secret,  and  when  the  order  came 
to  march  on,  it  was  met  by  a  flat  refusal  which  called  forth  sum- 
mary punishment.  But  the  army  was  not  in  the  humor  to  be 
deterred  even  by  tlie  harshest  measures,  and  the  cruelties  of  Klear- 
chos would  disgrace  a  savage.  Violence  provoked  resistance,  and 
Klearchos,  having  narrowly  escaped  being  stoned  to  death,  thought 
it  prudent  to  take  another  course,  and  summoned  his  men  to  a 
general  assembly.  There  is  something  ludicrous  in  the  picture  in 
which  Xenophon  represents  this  terrible  ruffian  as  standing  before 
them  for  a  long  time  weeping  like  a  woman.  Hideous  in  face, 
timber-toned  in  voice,  he  had  brought  his  men  by  a  studied  system 
of  severity  to  fear  himself  more  than  they  feared  the  enemy.' 
Beyond  the  excellent  discipline  which  he  maintained  he  had  no 
title  to  their  consideration  ;  and  yet  he  knew  that  something  might 
be  gained  from  Greek  soldiers  by  showers  of  crocodile's  tears 
before  he  began  his  address.  The  whole  scene  was  a  sham.  He 
had  told  Cyrus  that  such  a  mutiny  was  to  be  looked  for  as  soon  as 
the  men  should  begin  to  see  that  Pisidia  was  not  to  be  the  limit  of 
their  march,  and  he  had  assured  him  that  he  knew  thoroughly  how 
to  deal  with  it.  Thus  prepared  lie  began  amidst  sobs  and  tears  to 
inform  his  silent  and  astonished  hearers  how  keenly  the  present 
state  of  things  distressed  him.  He  owed  Cyrus  a  heavy  debt  of 
''•ratitude.  The  prince  had  bestowed  on  him  10,000  dareiks,  which 
ne  had  spent  not  on  himself  but  in  levying  men  and  in  providing 
for  their  comfort  and  efficiency.  Their  refusal  to  march  on  would 
therefore  compel  him  cither  to  be  ungrateful  to  Cyrus  or  to  be 
treacherous  to  them.  He  could  have  no  hesitation  in  choosing. 
He  should  abide  by  their  decision  ;  but  for  obvious  reasons  he 
could  do  so  only  as  their  comrade,  not  as  their  leader.     He  would 

sake  of  keepinji  up  appearances,  if  the  matter.  The  Ephors  refused  to 
Artaxerxes  should  be  successful  in  engage  in  any  contest  with  the 
resisting  Cyrus, — an  event  which  Persian  king  ;  but  when  Cyrus 
heprobablydidnotexpect.  Hiswife  urged  his  claim  on  their  gratitude 
Epyaxa  had  joined  the  prince  on  for  his  help  in  their  struggle  with 
his  march  through  Plirygia,  bring-  Athens,  they  could  not  help  send- 
ing himalargesumofmoney  which  iug  tlie  fleet  under  Samios  with 
relieved  him  from  almost  over-  orders  to  aid  Cyrus,  if  there  should 
whelming  difficulties.  Nor  can  be  need  of  so  doing, 
much  more  be  said,  perhaps,  for  '  Xeu.  Anab.  ii.  6,  9. 
the  earnestness  of  the^Spartans  in 


502  THE  EMPIRE  OF  SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

become  one  of  tlicm,  and  obey  whatever  officer  they  might  elect. 
They  Avere  to  him  country,  friends,  alUes,  his  all,  for  without  them 
he  was  worth  nothing,  without  them  he  could  neither  injure  an 
enemy  nor  help  a  friend.  In  this  sense  his  words  were  undoubtedly 
true.  His  address  was  received  with  hearty  cheers,  and  more  than 
2,000  men  left  the  encampment  of  Xenias  and  Pasion  and  took  up 
their  position  by  that  of  Klearchos. 

The  tidings  of  the  nmtiny  caused  to  Cyrus  deep  perplexity. 
He  sent  for  Klearchos :  but  that  leader,  while  he  refused  to  go. 
Reluctance  sent  a  private  message  to  assure  him  that  he  would  set 
tomardr*^^^  cverytJiiug  straight  in  tlie  end,  and  requested  him  to 
with  Cyrus,  repeat  his  summons  again  and  again  in  order  that, 
again  and  again,  he  might  refuse  to  comply  with  it.  In  a  second 
assembly  the  resolution  was  taken  to  ask  Cyrus  plainly  what  he 
wished  and  intended  to  do.  By  his  answer  they  might  decide 
whether  to  go  on  or  not.  Cyrus,  instructed,  we  cannot  doubt,  by 
Klearchos,  told  them  that  lie  must  advance  some  300  miles  further 
to  the  Euphrates,  where  he  had  to  punish  his  enemy  Abrokomas. 
If  they  should  find  him  there,  he  would  punish  him  ;  if  Abrokomas 
should  have  fled  still  further, — wliy,  then,  they  would  consider 
what  it  might  be  best  to  do.  The  soldiers  knew  well  enough 
what  the  excuse  meant ;  but  they  had  not  been  told  in  so  many 
words  tliat  they  were  marching  against  the  king,  retreat  was 
practically  impossible,  and  their  reluctance  was  in  some  mea- 
sure overcome  by  a  promised   increase  of  fifty  per  cent,  to  their 

The  sequel  of  the  story  to  the  catastrophe  at  Kunaxa  exhibits 
little  more  than  tlie  incompetence  of  Persians  in  contests  with  a 
The  march  disciplined  enemy.  Mountain  jiasses,  rivers,  canals, 
to  Kunaxa.  ^\\  of  them  presenting  barriers  almost  insuperable,  arc 
successively  abandoned,  to  the  astonishment  and  the  benefit  of  the 
invader.  At  Thapsakos  on  the  Euphrates  the  army  was  plainly 
informed  that  the  enemy  wliom  Cyrus  wished  to  punisli  was  not 
Abrokomas  but  Artaxerxes.  The  announcement  was  received 
with  nnumurs;  but  these  were  confined  to  an  expression  of  their 
dissatisfaction  at  having  been  deceived  and  to  a  demand  for  a  re- 
comju'tise  such  as  that  which  Cyrus  liad  given  to  his  Hellenic 
guards  when  he  went  to  see  his  father  Dareios  in  his  last  illness. 
Cyrus  promised  them  a  donation  f)f  five  silver  minas  (nearly  20/.) 
each  as  soon  as  they  should  reach  JJahylon,  together  with  full  pay 
until  they  should  again  reach  Ionia.  In  a  review  which  he  lu'ld 
soon  afterwards  Cyrus  bade  his  (Jreek  soldiers  act  worthily  of 
their  freedom, — a  blessing  for  which  he  lieartily  envied  them,  and 
in  exchange  for  which  lie  would  gladly  yield  up  all  that  he  pos- 
sessed. 


Chap.  I.]   XENOPHON  AND  THE  TEN  THOUSAND.      503 

In  the  course  of  the  march  the  prophet  Silanos  had  told  Cyras 
that  no  battle  would  take  place  for  ten  days,  and  the  prince  had 
promised  to  give  him  3,000  dareiks  if  his  words  should  Battle  of 
prove  true.  The  ten  days  had  passed  without  any  en-  amideat'ii of 
gagement,  and  Cyrus  fulfilled  his  promise.  He  had  Cyrus. 
well-nigh  convinced  himself  that  Artaxerxes  had  given  up  all  in- 
tention of  fighting;  and  this  impression  was  strengthened  v.'hen  he 
found  that  'not  a  man  had  been  left  to  defend  a  trench,  thirty  feet 
broad  and  eighteen  feet  deep,  which  had  been  dug  specially  to 
oppose  the  Cyreian  army,  and  which  extended  for  a  space  of  about 
forty  English  miles,  as  far  as  the  wall  of  Media,  along  the-  plain 
lying  between  the  Euphrates  and  the  Tigris,  Between  the  former 
river  and  the  trench  a  passage  of  only  twenty  feet  in  width  had 
been  left ;  and  a  few  well-armed  and  well-disciplined  companies 
might  have  held  such  a  passage  against  a  host.  Having  passed 
this  narrow  inlet,  Cyrus  saw,  not  indeed  his  enemy,  but  clear 
traces  of  his  recent  flight.  He  began  to  look  upon  his  prize  as 
won  without  a  blow.  On  the  second  day  after  passing  the  trench 
the  army  was  approaching  the  station  appointed  for  the  noon- 
tide meal,  when  the  tidings  were  brought  that  Artaxerxes  was 
advancing  across  the  plain  with  his  army  in  order  of  battle.  One 
or  two  hours  still  passed  before  the  cloud  of  dust  was  seen  which 
shrouded  the  royal  squadrons,  and  the  Cyreians  had  thus  ample 
time  to  form  in  lighting  array.  The  dispositions  of  Cyrus  were 
simple  and  judicious.  His  object  was  to  strike  straight  at  the 
centre  of  the  Persian  host  which  surrounded  the  king;  and  this 
work  of  paramount  importance  he  assigned  to  the  Greeks,  whose 
first  interest  it  was  to  secure  the  safety  of  Cyrus.  But  the  tendency 
of  Greek  hoplites  in  a  battle  was  always  to  work  to  the  right ;  and 
in  the  battle,  while  his  Greek  troops  had  already  won  an  easy 
victory  and  were  pursuing  the  enemy  opposed  to  them,  the  force 
surrounding  the  king  stretched  away  to  the  left  and  threatened  to 
outflank  the  army  of  Cyrus,  who  instantly  charged  with  his  guard 
of  six  hundred  horsemen.  The  onset  was  thoroughly  successful. 
The  ranks  of  the  royal  troops  were  broken,  and  the  Cyreians 
hastened  away  in  pursuit,  leaving  the  prince  attended  only  by  a 
small  knot  of  men.  At  that  muinent  Cyrus  caught  sight  of  his 
brother,  and  the  feeling  of  personal  rage,  thus  roused  to  boiling 
heat,  cast  to  the  winds  all  restraints  of  prudence.  '  I  see  the  man,^ 
he  cried,  as  he  dashed  at  the  king,  wounding  him  through  the 
breastplate.  In  the  next  instant  he  was  himself  struck  down  by  a 
severe  blow  in  the  eye,  and  in  a  few  moments  more  he  was  slain 
with  eiglit  of  his  bravest  men. 

The   head   and  the  right  hand   of  Cyrus  paraded  in  the  front 


504  THE  EMPIRE   OF   SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

ranks  of  Artaxerxes  sliowed  to  the  native  army  of  the  prince 
Perplexities  that  the  strife  was  at  an  end,  and  the  discovery  of  his 
and  dangers   f\eath  was  followed  by  their  immediate  fiio-ht  to  the 

of  the  Cv-  .  1.11  11  •      1      1  -lie  mi 

reian  Greeks,  station  which  tlicy  had  occupied  the  night  before.  The 
Greeks  were  three  or  four  miles  distant  pursuing  the  Persians  whom 
they  had  routed,  when  they  heard  that  the  enemy  liad  been  victorious 
on  the  left.  Hurrying  back,  they  found  the  king's  troops  moving 
towards  them  in  order  of  battle  ;  but  the  onset  of  the  Greeks  again 
filled  them  with  terror,  and  these  also  lied  in  dismay.  Still  nothing 
was  known  of  Cyrus,  and  vain  guesses  were  made  of  the  reasons 
whicli  might  keep  him  out  of  sight.  At  length  going  back  to  the 
camp,  the  Greeks  found  it  plundered,  although  the  ravagers  were 
gone.  The  suddenness  with  which  the  battle  began  had  left  them 
no  time  for  their  noonday  meal,  and  there  was  nothing  forth- 
coming for  their  supper.  On  the  next  morning  they  learnt  that 
Cyrus  had  been  killed  and  that  their  own  victory  had  been  won  in 
vain.  But  when  Phalinos,  an  Arkadian  Greek,  appearing  along  with 
the  surgeon  and  historian  Ktesias,  as  an  envoy  from  the  king,  bade 
them  lay  down  their  arms,  Kleai'chos  answered  that  such  commands 
were  not  usually  obeyed  by  conquerors,  and  asked  Phalinos  what 
advice  he,  as  a  Greek,  would  under  tiie  circumstances  give  to  his 
countrymen.  '  If  I  could  see  but  one  chance  iu  your  favor  out  of 
ten  thousand,'  was  the  answer,  '  I  should  urge  you  to  hold  out  to 
the  uttermost ;  but  I  see  none,  so  I  counsel  you  to  take  what  you 
can  get.'  '  That  is  what  you  think,'  retorted  K'earchos  ;  '  now  go 
and  tell  the  king  from  us,  that  if  he  wishes  to  have  us  as  Jiis 
friends,  we  shall  be  of  more  use  to  him  with  our  arms  than  with- 
out them,  and  if  he  would  treat  ns  as  enemies,  we  shall  with  our 
weapons  be  of  more  use  to  ourselves.'  Phalinos,  promising  to  take 
back  this  message,  added  tliat  the  king  j)roclaiuied  a  truce  so  long 
as  the  Greeks  remained  where  they  were,  while  any  change  of 
position  would  be  regarded  as  a  declaration  of  war.  '  What  am  I 
to  say  about  this  ? '  asked  L'halinos.  '  Say  tluit  we  are  of  the  same 
mind  with  the  king.'  '  And  what  mind  is  that  ?'  he  asked  again. 
'  Why,  that  there  is  to  he  truce,  if  we  stay  where  we  are,  and  war, 
if  wc  move.'  At  best  their  situation  was  full  of  danger.  On  hearing 
of  the  death  of  Cyrus,  they  had  sent  to  Ariaios  the  commander  of 
his  native  army,  oflTcring  to  place  him  on  the  Persian  throne,  as, 
being  the  victors,  they  had  both  the  right  and  the  power  to  do. 
This  offer  Ariaios  had  declined,  on  the  ground  that  the  Persian 
grandees  would  never  submit  to  such  an  arrangement,  and  he  had 
announced  at  the  same  time  his  purpose  of  immediate  retreat. 
The  only  course  open  to  them,  as  it  seemed,  was  to  retreat  along 
with  him.  A  solemn  compact  made  with  Ariaios  was  followed 
by  a  resolution  to  manh  onwards  with  the  utmost  speed,    liefore 


CuAP.  1]      XENOPHON  AND  THE  TEN  THOUSAND.  505 

the  day  closed  they  saw,  as  they  thought,  the  main  body  of  their 
eiicmies.  The  night  was  spent  in  a  state  of  noisy  confusion  ■vvliich 
xo  frightened  the  array  of  Artaxerxes  that  in  the  morning  not  a 
man  or  beast  was  visible  ;  and  the  wholesome  effects  of  this  alarm 
were  seen  in  the  arrival  of  heralds  who  came  not  with  demands 
for  surrender  but  with  proposals  for  a  truce.  Klearchos  received 
the  offer  with  the  rejoinder  that  before  the  truce  there  must  be 
a  battle,  for  his  men  were  hungry  and  they  must  have  something  to 
eat,  and  no  man  should  dare  to  talk  to  them  about  peace  who 
failed  to  furnish  them  a  dinner.  The  answer,  allowing  the  justice 
of  their  demand,  was  brought  back  with  a  speed  which  convinced 
the  Greeks  that  the  king  or  his  responsible  agent  must  be  close  at 
hand  :  and  the  concession  showed  that  the  best  method  of  dealing 
with  Persians  was  bravado.  At  tlie  end  of  three  days  Tissaphernes 
appeared,  charged,  as  he  said,  by  the  king  to  ask  why  the  Greeks 
had  come  up  against  him.  Klearchos  answered  in  words  perfectly 
true  in  every  mouth  but  his  own,  that  they  had  set  out  without 
the  least  idea  of  their  destination,  that  Cyrus  had  led  them  on  by 
vague  pretexts  and  promises  from  one  stage  to  another,  and  that 
the  Greeks,  having  received  much  good  at  his  hands,  shrank  from 
deserting  a  benefactor  in  the  hour  of  his  need.  Cyrus  Avas  now 
dead  ;  with  the  king  they  had  no  quarrel,  and  their  only  wish  was 
to  return  home  without  doing  him  any  harm,  if  they  should  be 
suffered  to  depart  unmolested.  Tissaphernes  promised  to  deliver 
their  message,  and  bound  them  to  observe  the  truce  until  they  saw 
him  again. 

Twenty  days  passed,  and  still  there  was  no  sign  of  the  coming 
of  the   satrap.     The  king  and  his  advisers  had  probably  taken 
the  true  measure  of  their  position.     The  presence  of   Efforts  of 
the  Greeks  was  dangerous  chiefly  in  the  effect  which  it  ^"^p^revent* 
might  have  on  the  Babylonians.     The  memory  of  their   the  Greeks 

•      ,.i  J  j£  •  u  -J.    from  march- 

ancient  independence  and    or  previous  revolts  agamst   ingtoBaby- 

the  Persian  king  might  quicken  their  impatience  of  the  ^°"- 
inordinate  burden  laid  on  them  in  the  slmpe  of  yearly  tribute.  It 
was  therefore  of  the  first  consequence  to  isolate  the  Greeks  and  to 
bring  home  to  them  the  overwhelming  perils  by  which  they  were 
surrounded.  The  first  step  was  to  detach  from  them  the  native 
army  of  Cyrus,  and  this  was  done  by  offering  to  the  latter  a  com- 
plete amnesty  for  the  past.  The  estrangement  thus  caused  between 
them  and  the  Greek  mercenary  force  clearly  revealed  the  purpose 
of  the  king  :  but  when  the  Greeks  expressed  their  fears  to  their 
general,  Klearchos  could  only  insist  on  the  difficulty  or  the  impos- 
sibility of  retreating  against  the  will  of  the  despot,  and  on  the 
unlikelihood  that  Artaxerxes  would  have  entered  into  a  solemn 
compact  with  them,  if  his  only  desire  was  to  destroy  them.  Such 
23 


506  THE  EMPIRE  OF   SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

treachery  would  make  bis  name  vile  among  Greeks  and  barbarians 
alike. 

At  lengtli  Tissaphernes  came,  fully  prepared  for  his  returning 
to  his  satrapy,  and  the  whole  Cyreiau  army  set  out  on  its  retreat. 
Treacherv'of  ^^^  Greeks  marched  as  a  distinct  body  and  with  the 
Tissapher-  utmost  caution  ;  but  in  spite  of  the  care  with  which 
hrthc'm'ur?  their  leaders  sought  to  keep  them  asunder,  their  forag- 
(ler  of  Kie-  j,jor  parties  would  from  time  to  time  come  into  collision, 
other  Greek  and  thus  aggravate  the  evil  feeling  already  awakened 
leaders.  between  them.     They  were  now    moving  nearly  due 

east.     Three  marches  brought  them  to  tlie  wall  of  Media,  two  more 
to  the  flourishing  town  of  Sittako  on  the  Tigris,  not  far  from  thc^ 
present  Bagdad.     From  this  point,  after  crossing  the  river,  four 
marches  in  a  northwesterly  direction  brought  them  to  the  city  of 
Opis  near  the  river  Physkos.     A  halt  of  three  days  on  the  banks  of 
the  Great  Zab  was  marked  by  so  manifest  an  increase  of  suspicion 
and  irritation  between  the  Greeks  and  the  forces  of  Tissaphernes, 
that  Klearchos  resolved  to  do  what  he  could  to  bring  this  wretched 
state  of  tilings  to  an  end,  and  demanded  an  interview  with  the 
satrap.     His  words  tauglit  Tissaphernes  how  to  lay  liis  snare.     Ex- 
aggerating, and  beyond  doubt  with  a  set  purpose,  the  means  which 
he  had  of  annoying  and  ruining  them,  he  cordially  invited  Klear- 
chos with  all  his  generals  and  chief  officers  to  a  conference  in  his 
tent  on  the  following  day.     "With  astonishing  simplicity  Klearchos 
promised  to  bring  them  all,  and  with  infatuation   still  more  mar- 
vellous refused  to  be  turned  from  his  purpose,  when  warned  that 
Tissaphernes  was  not  to  be  trusted.     On  the  following  day  he  ap- 
peared at  the  tent-door,  accompanied  by  the  Thcssalian  Menon,  the 
Arkadian  Agias,  the  Achaian  Sokrates,  and  the  lioiotian  I'roxenos. 
Twenty  Lochagoi  or  captains  with  200  men,  forming  their  escort, 
remained  outside,  while  the  generals  had  entered  the  tent.     Pre- 
sently the  signal  was  given.     The  generals  were  seized  and  bound, 
the  officers  and  soldiers  outside  were  cut  down.     One  man  only, 
Nikarchos  an  Arkadian,'   escaped  into  the  Greek  camp  with  a 
ghastly  and  fearful  wound,  and  told  the  terrible  story.     Fearing 
insta,nt  attack,  the  Greeks  flew  to  their  arms.     Tliere  can  be  little 
doubt  that  by  an  instant  onslaught  the  Persians  might  have  crashed 
them  through  sheer  fright  and  force  of  numbers  ;  but  here,  as  else- 
where, they  showed  themselves  impotent  for  all  active  opposition. 
Nothing  followed  beyond  a  visitfrom  Ariaios  and  some  other  gran- 
dees with  a  guard  of  about  300  men,  who  demanded  to  speak  with 
the  Greek  leaders.     In  the  absence  of  the  Spartan  Cheirisophos,  the 
Orchomenian  K leanor  and  Sopliaim-tosof  Sty mphalos  came  forward 

'This  man  lived  to  desert  his  couiitryraen  Boon  afterwnrds.     Xen. 
Anrih.  in.  3.  5. 


Chap.  I.]      XENOPHON  AND  THE  TEN  THOUSAND.  507 

with  Xenoplioii  and  were  informed  that  Klearchos  had  paid  with 
his  hfe  the  penalty  of  his  treachery,  while  Proxenos  and  Menou 
were  to  be  highly  rewarded  for  revealing  his  crimes.  The  speaker 
wound  up  with  a  demand  for  the  instantsurrenderof  their  arms  and 
was  met  by  an  outburst  of  indignant  wrath  at  the  monstrous  and 
godless  conduct  of  Tissaphernes.  '  If  Klearchos  Avas  a  traitor  and 
has  met  a  traitor's  doom,'  said  Xenophon,  '  be  it  so.  But  you  say 
that  Proxenos  and  Menou  are  your  benefactors.  They  are  also  our 
leaders.     Send  them  to  us,  and  then  everything  can  be  settled.' 

The  Persians  had  thought  that  the  power  of  the  Greeks  lay 
only  in  the  generals,  and  that  if  these  could  be  cut  off  like  the 
locks  of  Samson,  the  giant  would  be  powerless  in  their 
hands.'  They  were  wholly  mistaken.  For  the  moment,  Xenophcn, 
indeed,  there  was  universal  depi'ession.  The  men  lay  pt^jntecfone 
about,  as  chance  placed  them,  thinking  little  of  the  of  the  new 
duty  of  keeping  guard  or  the  need  of  preparing  food,  but  ^^^^'^^  "■ 
lost  in  a  vain  yearning  for  the  homes,  the  parents,  Avives,  children, 
kinsfolk,  whom  they  dared  not  hope  to  see  again.  Scarcely  a  man 
in  the  army  closed  his  eyes  in  sleep,  and  among  these  weary  watchers 
was  the  Athenian  Xenoplion.  Having  joined  as  a  simple  volunteer, 
he  had  no  official  rank  ;  but  none  the  less  the  common  peril  pressed 
heavily  on  his  heart.  '  Why  do  I  lie  here  ? '  he  asked  himself. 
'  The  night  is  creeping  on.  The  morning,  it  is  likely,  will  bring 
the  enemy,  and  defeat  will  be  followed  by  insults,  tortures,  and 
death.  Yet  here  all  lie,  as  though  it  were  a  time  for  rest ;  and  am 
I  to  wait  until  some  officer  comes  forward  to  give  counsel  and  to 
act  ?  To  whom  am  I  to  look  for  this,  and  am  1  not  old  enough  for 
the  task  ?  Assuredly  I  shall  be  but  little  the  older,  if  this  coming 
day  sees  me  a  captive.'  Rising  up  hastily  and  summoning  the 
captains  who  had  served  under  his  friend  Proxenos,  Xenophon  with 
manly  courage  and  good  sense  told  them  that  on  the  whole  the 
present  state  of  things  was  better  than  that  which  had  preceded  it. 
The  treaty  made  with  Tissaphernes  had  hampered  and  clogged 
them  ;  the  atrocious  treachery  by  which  the  Persians  had  broken 
the  compact  had  at  least  left  them  free,  and  they  could  now  trust 
to  the  strength  of  their  weapons  and  their  muscles,  and  to  the  help 
of  the  gods  Avho  fight  against  the  perjured.  For  himself  he  was 
willing,  he  added,  either  to  follow  or  to  lead.  One  voice  only  was 
jraised  against  the  general  shout  which  sumnioned  Xenophon  to 
take  the  command  ;  and  that  voice  spoke  of  the  impossibility  of 
escaping  unless  they  came  to  terms  Avith  the  king.  The  reply  was 
obvious.  So  long  as  he  thought  that  he  could  do  so  with  safety, 
the  king  had  tried  to  bully  them  into  surrender  ;  on  their  blnnt 
refusal  he  had  at  once  offered  a  truce.  Again,  Klearchos  and  hia 
Xen.  Anab.  iii.  2,  29. 


50S  THE   EMPIRE   OF   SPAETA.  [BOOK  IV. 

fellow-generals  had  trusted  Tissapbernes,  and  what  had  been  the 
issue  ?  It  Avas  idle  to  talk  of  peace  :  and  the  man  "svho  had  pro- 
posed it  was  thrust  out  of  the  assembly.  The  rest  went  throughout 
the  army,  summoning  the  officers  who  had  not  followed  Klearchos 
into  the  snare.  AVlieu  these  were  gathered,  to  the  number  of  per- 
haps a  hundred,  midnight  had  already  come.  x\t  tlie  request  of 
the  Eleian  Hieronymos,  Xenophon  again  addressed  them.  Dwell- 
ing on  the  splendid  opportunity  which  they  had  of  doing  a 
righteous  work,  he  exhorted  them  to  display  a  double  portion  of 
zeal  and  self-sacrifice. 

A  stronger  contrast  could  scarcely  be  drawn  between  the  pre- 
sence of  mind  and  readiness  of  resource  with  which  Xenophon  met 
Preparations  3"  emergency  wholly  unlooked  for,  and  the  utter  inca- 
for  retreat,  pacity  and  helplessness  by  which  Xikias  at  Syracuse 
not  only  lost  a  series  of  golden  opportunities,  but  in  spite  of  all 
the  efforts  of  his  colleague  Demosthenes  dragged  to  ruin  a  far 
larger  and  more  magnificently  equipped  armament.  In  fact,  the 
genius  of  that  gifted  and  conscientious  leader,  who  but  for  Nikias 
would  have  l)rought  the  whole  Athenian  force  in  safety  from 
Sicily,  is  largely  reproduced  in  Xenophon.  In  both  there  is  the 
same  power  of  grappling  with  circumstances,  the  same  simplicity 
of  expression,  the  same  endurance  under  pressing  difticulties.  In 
the  council  which  followed  the  election  of  the  generals,  Xenophon 
told  bis  colleagues  that  if  they  had  behaved  as  brave  men  while 
they  were  seeking  to  place  Cyrus  on  the  Persian  throne,  their  duty 
was  increased  tenfold  now  that  the  safety  of  the  whole  army  was 
at  stake.  They  must  show  the  Persians  not  only  that  they  mean 
to  go  home,  but  that  they  are  fully  able  to  carry  out  their  purpose, 
and  that  in  place  of  the  one  Klearchos  whom  they  had  entrapped 
the  Greeks  had  now  a  thousand.  Time  pressed  ;  they  nuist  hasten 
away.  To  do  so  with  the  greatest  chance  of  success  they  must 
have  as  few  incumbrances  as  possible.  The  waggons  and  all  super- 
fluous baggage  must  be  burnt,  as  so  to  leave  the  largest  number  of 
soldiers  availal)le  for  action.  The  effect  of  these  energetic  counsels 
was  seen  on  the  arrival  of  another  Persian  deputation  headed  by 
Mithridates,  who  began  to  i)reach  on  the  old  text  of  Tissaphernes 
and  Ariaios.  It  was  decided  at  once  that  no  more  messages  should 
be  received,  and  that  all  heralds  should  be  sent  away  unheard. 

The  Greeks  now  crossed  the  Zab  ;  but  they  had  not  advanced 
far  when  they  were  attacked  by  Mithridates  at  the  licad  of  a  force 
_  ,     of  slingers  and  mounted  bowmen,  whose  weapons  went 

theZalj  much  rurther  tlian  those  of  the  archers  and  javehnmen 

"^^"^^  in  the  army  of  the  Greeks.     An  attempt  to  repel  them 

by  an  attack  of  hoplites  ended  in  severe  loss  ;  but  like  Gylippos 


Chap.  I.]   XENOPHON  AND  THE  TEN  THOUSAND.      509 

at  Syracuse,'  Xenophon  took  on  liimself  the  full  discredit  of  the 
defeat,  and  urged  the  formation  of  a  new  force  of  Rhodian  archers 
and  of  cavalry  who  might  be  supplied  with  such  horses  as  could  be 
spared  from  indispensable  service  as  baggage  carriers. 

When  on  the  following  day  Mithridates  hung  on  their  raai'ch 
with  1,000  horsemen  and  4,000  archers  and  slingers,  under  the 
conviction  that  with  this  force  he  would  make  them  passage  of 
all  prisoners  before  the  day  was  done,  he  found  him-  chianmoun- 
self  speedily  undeceived.  Many  of  his  people  were  tains, 
slain,  and  the  Greeks,  to  frighten  them  more  thoroughly,  hacked 
and  mutilated  their  bodies.  But  the  march  of  the  Greeks  was 
still  perilous  and  toilsome  ;  nor  could  anything  have  brought 
them  safely  through,  had  not  Xenophon  acquired  over  them  a 
moral  ascendancy,  which  called  forth  an  obedience  highly  credit- 
able to  m3n  so  situated.  The  real  struggle  came  when,  about 
fifty  miles  to  the  north  of  the  Great  Zab  river,  they  approached 
the  terrible  rocks  and  defiles  which  sheltered  the  fastnesses  of 
the  Karduchian  mountaineers.  In  these  fierce  hillmen  they  en- 
countered enemies  very  different  from  the  Persians  whose  despot 
reigned  only  over  the  plains,  and  whose  armies  had  in  vain 
striven  to  assail  their  terrible  strongholds.  Here  there  was 
nothing  to  save  them  from  destruction  but  a  swiftness  of  move- 
ment which  should  put  them  in  possession  of  one  commanding 
lieight  above  another  before  the  barbarians  could  reach  them.  In 
each  instance  the  feat  was  successfully  accomplished.  At  length 
they  found  themselves  in  the  Armenian  satrapy  of  Tiribazos,  a 
man  far  more  formidable  than  Tissaphernes.  Nor  was  this  the 
only  addition  to  tlieir  dangers.  The  table  lands  of  Armenia 
stand  high  up  among  the  mighty  chains  of  mountains  which 
rise  into  their  most  tremendous  masses  between  the  Euxine  and 
the  (Jaspian  seas.  These  bare  regions  are  exposed  to  merciless 
winds  and  fearful  snowstorms  ;  and  the  Greeks  were  crossing 
them  in  the  depth  of  winter.  But  in  spite  of  all  obstacles  they 
not  only  held  on,  but  struck  hard  blows  at  their  enemies.  The 
camp  of  Tiribazos  was  attacked,  his  men  put  to  flight,  his  tent 
taken  with  a  rich  booty  of  goblets  and  other  vessels.  The  suc- 
cessful crossing  of  the  Euphrates,^  not  far  from  its  source,  was 
followed  by  weather  so  bad  and  by  a  wind  so  piercingly  cold  that 
tlie  prophets  offered  a  sacrifice  to  the  wind  god.  The  remedy,  we 
are  told,  vvas  instantly  effectual.  The  storm  went  down  and  the 
temperature  rose  ;  but  the  snow  was  six  feet  deep,  and  men  and 
beasts  alike  suffered  miserably. 

The  enemy  was  close  behind  them  and  might  fall  at  any  moment 

'  See  p.  388.  ^  The  Eastern  branch,  now  called  the  Murad. 


510  THE  EMPIRE  OF   SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

on  their  sick.  By  a  feigned  attack,  to  Avhich  the  frost-hitten 
soldiers  added  what  effect  they  coukl  by  shouting  and  clashing 
their  shields,  Xenophon  frightened  off  the  natives  in  the  rear.  By 
careful  treatmeat  of  the  headman  of  a  village  Avhere  they  found 
both  food  and  quarters,  lie  obtained  a  guide  whose  services  were 
lost  to  them  a  week  later  by  the  imprudence  of  Cheirisophos.  The 
Spartan  leader  had  allowed  the  man  to  walk  unbound,  and  had 
struck  him  for  his  failure  to  bring  them  to  fresh  villages.  The 
headman  naturally  ran  off  during  the  night,  and  the  Greeks  made 
their  way  as  they  could  after  five  marches  to  the  banks  of  a  stream 
which  Xenophon  calls  the  Phasis.'  This  river  they  crossed  only  to 
find  themselves  somewhat  further  on  face  to  face  with  the  tribesmen 
of  the  Chalybes,  Taochoi,  and  Phasianoi,  who  blocked  the  pass  to  the 
plain  bevond.  The  advice  of  Cheirisophos  was  that  they  should  defer 
their  attack  to  the  following  day  ;  Kleanor  advised  them  to  eat  and 
then  fall  on  at  once,  unless  they  wished  to  double  the  confidence  and 
probably  the  numbers  of  their  enemies.  More  cool,  and  taking  a 
better  view  of  the  position,  Xenophon  told  them  that  an  immediate 
attack  would  be  not  only  most  perilous  but  wholly  superfluous.  It 
was  easier  to  find  some  other  path  in  the  darkness  of  night  than  to 
fight  their  way  up  a  pass  by  sunlight.  His  advice  was  taken, 
and  the  pass  was  carried.  The  barbarians  fled,  leaving  not  many 
dead  but  a  large  number  of  wickerwork  shields,  which  the  Greeks 
rendered  useless  by  cutting  them  with  their  daggers. 

Five  marches  brought  them  from  this  pass  through  a  plain, 
the  villages  of  which  yielded  fair  supplies,  to  a  stronghold  in 
Journey  of  wliicli  the  Taochoi  iiad  gathered  their  women,  their 
the  Greeks  children,  and  their  cattle,  trusting  simply  to  the  strength 
Theches.  of  thcir  unfortified  position.  The  cattle  seized  on  this 
400B.C.  fastness  supplied  the  army  with  food  till  they  reached 
the  river  Harpasos,  after  the  passage  of  which  four  marches 
brought  them  to  the  large  and  flourishing  city  of  Gymnias.  A 
guide  sent  to  them  by  the  headman  of  this  place  gaged  his  life  as  a 
forfeit  if  be  failed  to  bring  them  within  five  days  to  the  sight  of 
the  sea  ;  but  thev  had  not  marched  far  before  he  besought  them  to 
ravage  and  destroy  the  surrounding  country.  His  zeal  was  now 
explained ;  but  he  also  kept  his  word.  On  the  fifth  day  the 
mountain  called  Theches  rose  before  them.  As  the  foremost  men 
reached  the  summit,  they  saw  far  away  the  waters  of  the 
p]uxine  stretching  out  into  the  blue  distance.  The  shout  of  joy 
with  which  they  greeted  the  longed-for  sight  swelled  to  tumult 
as  others  hurried  up  after  them.  To  Xenophon  the  din  seemed  to 
betoken  a  sudden   onslaught  of   enemies  in  front,   for  the   in- 

'  This  stream  cannot  be  identified.     It  was,  of  course,  not  the  same 
%a  the  Phasis  of  the  Kolchiaii  land. 


CiiAP.  I.]      XENOPHON  AND  THE  TEN  THOUSAND.  511 

habitants  of  the  country  which  they  had  burnt  and  harried  hung  on 
them  in  the  rear.  Hurriedly  mounting  his  horse,  he  spurred  on  with 
the  cavalry.  As  he  approached  the  summit,  he  could  distinguish 
the  exulting  cry,  the  Sea,  the  Sea,  which  seemed  to  give  the  assur- 
ance that  their  long  toil  was  already  ended.  The  vehement 
southern  nature,  repressed  thus  far  or  borne  down,  burst  out  in 
sobs  and  tears.  Officers  and  men  threw  themselves  weeping  into 
each  other's  arms.  Then,  as  the  baggage  train  came  up  and  all 
were  now  in  safety,  a  sudden  impulse  drove  the  soldiers  to 
gather  stones,  and  a  mighty  cairn  was  raised  to  mark  the  spot 
where  the  sea  greeted  the  Ten  Thousand  on  their  wonderful  march 
from  the  plains  of  Babylon. 

On  the  opposite  side  of  the  stream  which  bordered  the  country 
of  the  Makrones,  a  large  gathering  of  natives  threatened  an  oppo- 
sition whicli  the  nature  of  the  banks,  rough  with  stones  and  brush- 
wood, might  render  serious.  Happily  a  man  in  the  army,  who  had. 
been  a  slave  at  Athens  and  had  perhaps  been  among  those  who 
made  their  escape  to  Dekeleia,  professed  to  recognise  in  their 
speech  his  own  mother  tongue,  and  was  commissioned  Arrival  at 
to  ask  them  the  reason  of  their  opposition.  '  Simply  Trapezous. 
because  you  are  invading  our  country,'  was  the  answer  ;  and  the 
reply  that  the  Greeks  wished  only  for  a  passage  to  the  sea  on  their 
way  to  Hellas  after  making  war  with  the  Great  King  converted 
them  from  angry  enemies  into  zealous  friends.  Further  on  the  Kol- 
chians  offered  a  more  stubborn  resistance,  but  were  put  to  flight, 
and  the  army  reached  at  last  the  Hellenic  city  and  Sinopean  colony 
of  Trapezous  (Trebizond).'  The  sojourn  of  a  month  in  the  neigh- 
boring Kolchian  villages,  gave  time  not  only  for  rest  and  re- 
freshment but  for  plundeiing  forays  into  the  surrounding  country. 

They  had  reached  the  sea,''  but  their  troubles  were  not  at  an  end. 
The  feeling  of  disgust  at  long-continued  hardships  broke  out  in 
the  passionate  exclamation  of  the  Thourian  Antileon.  ,,  ,  , 
'  I  am  sick  of  running,  drilling,  keeping  guard,  and  Trapezous 
fighting.  I  will  have  no  more  of  these  worries:  <^o ^'^'''isous. 
what  I  want  is  to  lay  myself  down  in  a  ship  and  be  carried  to 
Hellas  stretched   out  in   the   slumber  of   Odysseus.     His  words 

*  See  p.  57.  their  northward  marches,  are  the 

''The  line  of  the   Greek  march  Kentrites,  tlie  Te]eboap,  the  Harpa- 

from  Kiiiiaxa  can  be  traced  with  sos,  and  tlie  Euphrates.     The  first 

tolerable   clearness  and   certainty  of  these  is  iu  all  probability  the 

until  they  enter  the  mountain  re-  Bulitan-Chai,  which aftera  westerly 

prions  of  the  KarduchiansorKoords.  course  falls  into  the  Tigris.     The 

From  that   time   until  they  reach  Teleboas    may    be    the     Kara-su 

Trapezous,  the   tracks  assiofned  to  (Black  Water)  which  runs  into  the 

them  are  in  great  measure  conjee-  Eastern  Euphrates  or  Murad,  and 

tural.   Thechief  rivers  which  Xeno-  the  Harpasos  may  be  the  Tchoruk- 

phon  represents  them  as  crossing  on  su.    The  only  warm  spring  known 


512  THE  EMPIRE  OF  SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

were  received  with  shouts  of  applause :  but  whatever  Ihoir 
wishes  might  be,  ships  were  not  forthcoming,  and  Cheirisophos 
undertook  to  go  and  get  them  from  his  friend  Anaxibios,  the 
harraost  of  Byzantion.  llis  departure  left  to  Xenophon  the  task 
of  regulating  the  whole  army  until  his  return.  To  all  his  counsels 
about  the  discipline  of  the  camp  and  the  arrangement  of  forag- 
ing expeditions  they  gave  unanimous  assent :  when  in  the  event 
of  other  means  failing  them  he  urged  the  need  of  insisting  that  the 
inhabitants  of  the  maritime  cities  should  put  the  roads  in  good  order 
for  their  march,  his  proposal  was  met  by  angry  and  even  wrathful 
murmurs.  They  would  not  stir  a  step  by  land  :  they  were  quite  willing 
to  gather  a  fleet  of  transports  by  seizing  such  merchant  vessels  as 
might  be  passing.  Many  were  thus  seized,  their  rudders  taken  off  and 
their  cargoes  put  under  guard,  to  be  restored  to  the  owners  together 
with  a  fair  recompense  in  money  for  the  use  of  the  ships  when 
they  should  be  no  longer  needed.  Time  passed  on.  Their  wants 
were  supplied  chieflv  by  inroads  into  the  lands  of  hostile  tribes; 
but  Cheirisophos  did  not  return,  and  the  hated  niarch  by  land 
was  seen  to  be  inevitable  for  all  who  could  not  be  taken  into  the 
merchantmen.  Room  could  be  found  only  for  the  sick,  for  the 
women  and  children,  and  the  men  who  might  be  over  forty  years 
of  age.  These  were  accordingly  embarked,  and  three  days  later 
the  fleet  and  the  amiy  reached  Kerasous,'  another  colony  from 
Sinope.  During  the  ten  days  spent  here,  a  review  showed  that 
they  could  still  muster  8,600  heavy-anned  men,  making  up  with 
the  light-armed  troops  a  total  exceeding  a  myriad.  No  such  Greek 
force  had  been  seen  in  the  countries  bordering  on  the  Black  Sea, 
and  no  Greek  force  had  performed  with  so  little  loss  an  exploit 
altogether  unparalleled  in  the  history  of  Hellenic  waifare.     The 

to  exist  south  of  the  Bingol-dajih  northward  and  then,  alter  the  cross- 
has  been  naturally  supposed  to  be  in<i  of  the  Euphrates,  westward.  If 
the  hot  sprin<^  mentioned  in  the  the  time  spent  on  tlu^  march  seem 
narrative  of  theretreat.  Withmoro  long,  this  impression  will  be  at 
likelihood  the  city  of  (Jymnias  has  once  removed  when  we  take  into 
been  identified  with  tlie  modern  account  the  enormous  dilficulties 
town  Gumisch-Kliana,  notable  for  of  a  winter  journeyevenformoderii 
its  silver  mine,  which  would  ac-  travellers  amoufr  tue  mountains  of 
count  for  the  size  and  prosperity  of  Armenia;  and  tlie  (treeks  were 
the  ancient  city.  The  name  The-  frequently  without  jiuides, fighting 
ches  seems  to  be  preserved  in  that  their  way  throujrh  the  territories  of 
of  the  mountain-range  known  as  hostile  clans,  and  dependent  for 
tiio  Tekieh-Dagh  ;  but  the  spot  their  support  on  what  they  might 
wliere  the  soldiers  first  caught  sight  get  either  by  ])urchase  or  by  force. 
of  the  sea  is  not  determined.  He-  '  The  fact  here  stated  proves  of 
yond  these  conjectures,  with  their  itself  that  this  Kerasous  is  not  the 
different  degrees  of  likelihood,  we  town  which  now  bears  the  eame 
can  speak  with  confidence  only  of  name.  The  modern  Kerasoun,  it  is 
thegeneraldirectionoftheir  march,  asserted,  could  not  be  reached  from 
which    must     ut   first  have  been  Trebizond  in  less  than  ten  days. 


Chap.  I.J   XENOPHON  AND  THE  TEX  THOUSAND.      513 

lives  of  2,000  men,'  or  more,  had  it  is  trae  been  sacrificed  in  the 
march  between  Sardeis  and  Kuna.va,  among  the  Kardnchiaii 
defiles  and  in  the  deadly  c;old  of  an  Armenian  winter ;  bnt  few 
retreats,  nevertheless,  have  under  like  circumstances  been  effected 
at  so  small  a  sacrifice.  The  fame  of  this  great  achievement  pre- 
ceded them  from  one  Hellenic  city  to  another ;  but  admiration 
for  the  skill  of  the  leaders  and  the  endurance  of  the  men  had  a 
hard  struggle  with  the  stronger  feelings  of  suspicion  and  fear. 
Their  intentions  and  wishes  could  not  be  known  until  they  were 
clearly  announced  ;  and  even  then  the  harsh  measures  forced  upon 
Xenophon  and  his  followers  in  order  to  obtain  the  indispensable 
supplies  of  food  might  seem  to  give  the  lie  to  their  professions. 
This  uncertainty  as  to  their  character  might  at  one  moment  make 
the  inhabitants  of  the  cities  which  they  approached  nervously 
afraid  of  admitting  them  within  their  walls,  and  at  another 
feverishly  anxious  to  be  rid  of  guests  so-  burdensome  and  so  for- 
midable. 

Passing  on  from  Kerasous,  the  army  reached  the  borders  of  the 
Mosynoikoi,  who  by  their  messenger  the  Trapezuntine  Timesitheos 
declared  that  they  would  not  let  the  (rreeks  pass 
through  their  land,  if  they  came  with  any  hostile  in-  the  envoys 
tent,  ibut  added  that  they  would  not  be  sorry  to  have  ffomSiuopS. 
their  services  against  some  neighboring  enemies.  The  bargain 
was  struck  ;  but  the  discipline  of  the  Greeks  was  no  longer  what 
it  had  been,  and  the  first  enterprise  undertaken  ended  in  some- 
thing like  ignominious  defeat.  The  attack  had  been  irregular,  and 
Xenophon  expressed  himself  as  rather  gratified  than  vexed  at  a 
reverse  which  showed  to  them  the  true  character  of  their  guides 
and  the  paramount  need  of  maintaining  order  among  themselves. 
A  second  foray  carried  out  with  their  old  discipline  yielded 
abundant  booty,  and  the  stores  of  bread  and  grain  sustained  the 
army  on  their  march  through  the  lands  of  barbarous  tribes,  until 
they  reached  another  of  those  isolated  settlements  which  Greek 
enterprise  had  scattered  far  beyond  the  bounds  of  Continuous 
or  Continental  Hellas.^  At  this  city  of  Kotyora,  a  colony 
from  Sinope,  the  Cyreians  ended  their  land  march,  but  not  their 
troubles.  Eight  months  had  passed  since  the  prince  who  had 
lured  them  to  the  great  Mesopotamian  plam  had  flung  away  his 

'  The  total  numbers  of  the  infr  the  peltastai  and  other  light- 
Greeks  jjathered  at  Issos  fell  short  armed  troops,  the  men  who  had 
of  14,000  by  only  100.  But  one  dropped  away  in  tlie  interval 
thousand  had,  by  whatever  means,  would  be  not  far  short  of  3,000, — a 
disappeared  before  the  battle  of  loss  which,  if  desertions  be  taken 
Kunuxa.  If  the  numbers  reviewed  into  account,  is  in  no  way  surpris- 
at  Kerasous  amounted  to  about  a  inir. 
myriad  (Xen.  An.  v.  7,  9),  includ-  ^  See  Book  I.  eh.  8. 


514  THE  EMPIRE  OF  SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

life  on  the  field  of  Kunaxa,  and  during  those  months  tliey  had 
worked  or  fought  their  way  over  not  less  than  2,300  miles. 
Here  for  five-and-forty  days  the  army  rested,  while  processions 
and  games,  celebrated  according  to  the  usages  of  the  several 
Hellenic  tribes  represented  among  the  troops,  expressed  their 
gratitude  to  the  gods.  The  fame  of  their  achievements  and  the 
tidings  of  their  arrival  at  Kotyora  roused  at  Sinope  feelings  of 
fear,  bordering  on  dismay,  which  found  vent  in  angrj'  remon- 
Ktrances.  As  spokesman  of  their  envoys,  Hekatonymos,  begin- 
ning with  compliments  on  their  valor  and  endurance,  charged 
the  Cyreian  generals  with  forcing  their  way  into  an  Hellenic  city 
and  plundering  its  territories,  and  threatened  to  bring  on  them 
the  forces  of  the  Paphlagonian  chief  Korylas,  if  this  offence 
should  be  continued. 

The  Sinopeans  had  made  a  false  move.  Among  the  leaders  of 
the  Ten  Thousand  Avas,  as  we  have  seen,  one  whose  fertility  of 
Reply  of  resource  and  readiness  of  speech  never  failed  him  :  and 
Xenophon.  in  Xcnoplion,  true  Athenian  by  training,  though  not 
in  temper,  thev  found  their  match.  '  If  the  men  of  Kotyora,'  he 
replied,  'have  suffered  any  hurt  at  our  hands,  it  is  tliey  whoare  to 
blame.  They  shut  their  gates  against  us,  and  would  not  admit  us 
to  market,  letting  us  know  at  the  same  time  that  they  were  acting 
by  the  orders  of  the  Harmost  whom  you  set  over  them.  We  in- 
sisted, it  is  true,  that  they  should  receive  our  sick,  and  when  they 
refused,  wc  forced  an  entrance  for  them  ;  but  the  men  so  brought 
in  are  living  at  their  own  charges.  As  to  Korylas,  your  threats 
are  thrown  away.  We  know  that  there  is  nothing  which  would 
please  him  more  than  to  become  master  of  your  city  and  of  the  sea 
coast;  and  wc  can  easily  gain  his  fricudsliip  by  promising  to  help 
him  in  the  matters  which  he  has  at  heart.' 

Knowing  that  there  was  but  too  much  truth  in  those  word.s, 
the  colleagues  of  Hekatonymos  hastened  to  disclaim  all  complicity 
Alk'"cd  (liffl-  '"  ^"^  unfriendly  speech,  and  to  say  that  their  mission 
cuities  of  the  ^vas  not   merclv  to  promise   them    hearty   hospitality 

land  inarcli  ,         ^,  i      i  t'    ^  i     ^  i  i-      '       i         i       xT 

from  Koty-  when  tlicy  reached  Kotyora,  but  to  relieve  ahundantly 
*"■*•  their  immediate   wants.     On  the  following  day  when 

the  Cyreian  generals  in  "full  assembly  consulted  the  Sinopcan 
envoys  on  the  course  which  they  ought  to  take,  Hekatonymos 
apologised  for  his  intemperate  threats,  and  hastened  to  give  his 
disinterested  advice.  Enumerating  the  perils  which  they  would 
encounter,  whether  from  hostile  tribes  or  in  the  passage  of  impe- 
tuous rivers,  he  insisted  that  the  land  journey  was  not  merely 
difficult  but  impossible  ;  but  to  Sinope  and  thence  to  Horaklcia 
they  could  go  by  sea,  and  at  the  latter  place  they  would  find  no 
la  k   of  vessels  to  take  them  wherever  they  might  choose  to  go. 


Chap.  I.]      XENOPHON  AND  THE  TEN  THOUSAND.  515 

Of  the  hearers  of  Hekatonymos  some  thought  that  he  spoke  in 
the  interests  of  Korylas,  others  that  he  was  fishing  for  bribes  for 
himself,  others  again  that  lie  wished  to  prevent  their  harming  the 
Sinopean  territory  by  a  kind  march.  Nevertheless,  the  decision 
was  in  favor  of  the  sea  voyage. 

Wlien  at  length  the  army  landed  at  Sinope,'  they  were  received 
with  somo  show  of  hospitality ;  but  the  corn  and  wine  which  re- 
freshed their  bodies  could  not  make  them  forget  that  Election  of 
their  purses  were  empty.  Here  they  were,  fast  ap-  as'^ge"!"^}'"^ 
proaching  the  boundaries  of  the  Hellenic  world,  and  witti.su- 
they  were  no  richer  than  when  they  had  left  Sardeis.  ^owr. 
The  mischief  of  having  many  masters  seemed  to  be  400b.c. 
the  cause  of  their  poverty  ;  the  remedy  therefore  lay  in  giving 
absolute  power  to  a  single  general,  and  their  choice  fell  upon 
Xenophon.  He  received  the  invitation  with  a  natural  feeling  of 
pleasui'e  in  the  thought  that  his  fame  would  now  travel  quicker  to 
Athens,  and  that  he  could  return  home  a  greater  man.  There  was, 
further,  the  more  generous  desire  of  improving  the  fortunes  of  his 
comrades  ;  but  his  habitual  caution  warned  him  that  he  might  pay 
dearly  for  this  pre-eminence,  and  again  following  the  advice  of  his 
master,  Sokrates,  he  sought  by  sacrifice  to  ascertain  the  will  of 
Zeus  the  King.  The  vision  of  an  eagle  sitting  down  made  his 
path  still  more  clear :  had  he  seen  the  royal  bird  on  the  wing  he 
might  have  stretched  out  his  hand  to  grasp  the  sceptre  offered  to 
him.  As  it  was,  he  told  the  Cyreians,  when  ne.vt  they  met,  that 
as  an  Athenian  he  could  not  presume  to  take  the  supreme  commanc' 
over  the  representatives  of  the  imperial  city  which  had  humbled 
Athens  in  the  dust.  In  his  place  the  soldiers  chose  the  Spartan 
Cheirisophos,  who  had  returned,  not,  as  they  had  hoped,  with  a 
fleet,  but  in  a  single  trireme,  charged  with  specious  compliments 
from  the  Byzantine  harmost  Anaxibios  and  with  vague  promises 
that  the  army  should  be  taken  into  pay  so  soon  as  they  reached  the 
Propontis. 

At  Chrysopolis  Xenophon  received  proposals  from  the  Thrakian 
chief  Seuthes,  who  begged  him  to  bring  the  Cyreians  across  the 
sea  and  engage  them  in   his  service.     His  reply  was  ^ 

11.  1   ^  TreaciiGry  of 

that  their  passage  was  already  determined  on,  that  he  Anaxibios, 
himself  meant  to  leave  the  army,  and  that  Seuthes  might  quenulf-*^ 
make  what  agreements   he  pleased  with  those  who  re-  mult  at  By- 
mained  behind  him.    The  Cyreians  reached  Byzantion  ^'^'^'■^'^°» 
cheered  with  the  hope  that  their  troubles  were  ended  ;  but  they  were 
never  more  mistaken.    The  harmost  Anaxibios  had  promised  them 
pay  from  the  moment  of  their  landing  :  his  only  anxietv,  when  they 

This  city  was  a  colony  from  Miletos. 


516  THE  EMPIRE  OF  SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

entered  the  city,  was  to  get  them  out  again  with  the  utmost  speed. 
Xenophoii  was  accordingly  chaiged  to  suiniiion  them  to  a  muster 
without  the  walls ;  aud  Anaxibios  was  explaining  to  the  generals 
the  arrangements  which  he  had  made  for  their  payment  on  their 
reaching  the  Chersonesos,  when  by  some  means  or  other  the 
soldiers  who  were  without  the  city  learnt  how  tliey  were  to  be 
again  clieated.  Eteonikos,  whom  we  have  already  met  at  Chios 
and  on  the  Thraceward  coasts,'  stood  at  the  gate,  ready  to  shut  it 
as  soon  as  the  last  man  should  have  j)assed  out.  With  cries  of 
anger  the  soldiers  seized  their  arms  and  hurried  back  to  the  gate 
only  to  see  the  ponderous  doors  closed  in  their  faces  and  hear  the 
bolt  shot  home.  Their  threats  were  seconded  effectually  by  other 
Cyreians  who,  not  having  yet  left  the  city,  split  the  bars  with 
hatchets  and  let  their  comrades  in.  In  wild  terror  Anaxibios  ran 
to  the  sea  and  getting  into  a  boat  made  his  escape  to  the  Akropolis, 
while  the  indignant  soldiers  besought  Xenophon  to  avail  himself  of 
the  golden  opportunity.  '  Now,'  they  said,  '  you  can  help  us  in- 
deed, and  we  can  make  you  great.  You  have  a  city,  you  have 
triremes,  you  have  money,  you  have  an  army.'  With  a  presence 
of  mind  which  probably  no  other  of  the  generals  could  liave  main- 
tained, Xenophon,  pretending  to  throw  himself  into  their  humor, 
commanded  them  to  resume  at  once  their  strict  military  array.  His 
order  was  obeyed,  and  he  then  went  on  to  show  them  the  desperate 
straits  to  which  successful  violence  must  bring  them.  With  the 
readiness  of  Athenian  eloquence  he  bade  them  remember  how 
completely  the  power  of  Sparta  must  iu  the  end  bear  down  any 
opposition  which  they  might  make  to  it.  Athens  had  entered  into 
the  struggle  with  her  confederacy,  relying  on  the  wealth  of  an 
empire  such  as  the  Hellenic  world  had  never  yet  seen  ;  the  issue 
had  been  the  demolition  of  her  walls  and  tlic  complete  establish- 
ment of  Spartan  despotism.  For  himself  he  would  rather  be  ten 
thousand  fathoms  underground  than  lead  them  to  certain  ruin. 

By  his  advice  the  Cyreians  sent  a  messenger  to  inform  Anaxi- 
bios that  they  had  entered  Byzantion  not  witli  any  purpose  of 
Intri'^cs  of  violence  but  solely  as  relying  on  liis  promises,  and  that 
Anaxibios.  now  they  would  go  out  peaceably,  not  because  he  had 
deceived  them,  but  bi-causc  they  acknowledged  the  constraints  of 
duty  and  law.  We  cannot  doubt  that  the  people  of  Byzantion 
were  thus  saved  from  indiscriminate  pillage,  and  the  Spartans 
froTii  the  necessity  of  wreaking  a  terrible  revenge  on  the  men 
wliom  their  ofKccrs  had  goaded  into  frantic  wrath.  The  prevention 
of  so  great  a  calamity  was  a  worthy  ending  of  the  many  good 
deeds  done  by  a  man  in  whom  Athenian  culture  had  not  strength- 
ened the  love  of  his  native  state.  Although  the  dark  cloud  still 
'  See  p.  474  et  seq. 


CriAP.  I]      XENOPHON  AND  THE  TEN  THOUSAND.  517 

lowered  over  tlie  remnant  of  the  Ten  Thousand,  and  they  were 
still  to  encounter  much  distress  and  danger,  the  sequel  of  the  t-tory 
was  to  exhibit  Xenophon  in  the  light  of  the  successful  adventurer 
as  well  as  in  that  of  the  general  who  has  to  hope  against  hope  in 
his  struggle  with  overwhelming  difficulties.  For  the  present, 
Xenophon  left  the  army  and  returned  with  Kleandros  into  Byzan- 
tion,  having  bidden  his  comrades,  as  he  thought,  a  final  farewell. 
For  these  the  prospect  was  far  from  encouraging.  They  were 
tempted  in  the  first  instance  by  the  proposals  of  the  Theban  Koira- 
tadas,  a  professional  leader  of  Condottieri  (a  class  of  men  of 
whom  we  now  hear  for  the  first  time) ;  but  the  matter  ended  only 
in  disappointment,  and  disappointment  led  to  angry  disputes 
among  the  leaders.  Some  wished  t)  enter  the  service  of  Seuthes  ; 
Xeon,  who  on  the  death  of  Cheirisophos  had  been  chosen  to  take 
his  place,  was  anxious  to  march  to  the  Chersonese  ;  Timasion  was 
eag(ir  to  cross  back  into  Asia  and  thence  to  sail  home  ;  and  the 
number  of  desertions  seemed  to  make  it  likely  that  the  great 
Cyreian  army  would  soon  melt  away.  Such  a  result  Anaxibios  in 
his  present  mood  most  heartily  desired  ;  but  his  feelings  were  soon 
to  undergo  a  great  revulsion.  On  his  voyage  from  Byzantion  he  met 
Aristarchos,  who  had  been  sent  fiom  Sparta  to  succeed  Kleandros 
as  governor  of  Byzantion,  and  who  told  him  that  he  himself  was  to 
be  superseded  by  Polos.  Resolved  to  sting  where  he  could  not 
.strike,  Anaxibios  as  he  parted  with  Aristarchos  charged  him  to  sell 
all  the  Cyreians  whom  he  might  find  within  the  walls  of  the  city. 
These  were  the  sick  to  whom  Kleandros  had  gladly  furnished 
shelter:  by  Aristarchos  all  (and  their  number  was  at  least  400) 
were  sold  into  slavery.  We  seek  with  loathing  to  escape  from  an 
atmosphere  laden  with  intolerable  selfishness.  No  sooner  has 
Anaxibios  insured  the  commission  of  this  wrong  against  the  sick 
Cyreians  in  Byzantion  than  he  turns  to  the  plan  of  employing 
their  former  comrades  in  a  private  war  against  Pharnabazos,  who 
had  treated  him  with  contempt  when  he  found  that  the  sceptre  of 
office  had  fallen  from  his  hands.  As  eagerly  as  he  had  before 
sought  to  break  them  up,  so  now  he  earnestly  besought  Xenophon 
to  get  them  all  together  and  bring  them  to  Perinthos  for  immediate 
transportation  into  Asia.  Crossing  the  Propontis  from  Parion 
Xenophon  appeared  again  among  the  Cyreians,  to  their  great 
delight.  The  scheme  of  Anaxibios  was  agreed  to  with  hearty 
readiness,  and  the  army  marched  hastily  to  the  place  of  embarka- 
tion. But  Aristarchos,  the  new  harmost  of  Byzantion,  although 
he  was  ready  to  sell  Greek  freemen  into  slavery,  had  no  friendly 
feeling  for  the  man  who  suggested  the  crime.  Hurrying  to  Perin- 
thos, he  forbade  the  passage  of  the  troops  across  the  sea  :  and  when 
Xenophon  replied  that  he  was  acting  by  the  orders  of  Anaxibios, 


5I&  THE  EMPIRE  OF  SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

Aristarchos  answered  briefly, 'Anaxibios  is  no  longer  admiral,  and 
if  I  catch  any  of  you  on  the  sea  I  will  sink  you.'  The  plan  was 
thus  foiled,  for  the  attempt  to  cross  in  face  of  the  Spartan  fleet 
would  be  madness.  But  Aristarchos  was  not  to  be  thus  contented, 
and  when  he  summoned  all  the  Cyreian  officers  to  his  presence, 
Xenophon  understood  the  meaning  of  a  warning  which  he  had 
received  against  entering  the  walls  of  the  town.  Remaining  out- 
side under  pretence  of  sacriticing,  he  learnt  that  Aristarchos  had 
dismissed  his  colleagues  with  orders  to  come  again  in  the  afternoon. 
The  trap  was  set  not  by  a  Persian  satrap  but  by  a  Spartan  har- 
most ;  and  Xenophon  might  have  been  forgiven  if  he  had  supposed 
that  a  Greek  would  scarcely  stoop  to  the  treachery  which  liad 
lured  Klearchos  to  his  doom.'  More  cautious  than  the  victims  of 
Tissaphernes,  Xenophon  set  out  at  once  for  the  camp  of  Seuthes, 
and  there  entered  into  engagements  which  seemed  to  promise  not 
merely  maintenance  but  wealth  for  the  Cyreians.  Disappointment 
again  awaited  them.  The  pleasures  of  attacking  and  burning 
Thrakian  villages  were  not  lieightened  by  the  bitter  cold  of  a 
Thrakian  winter ;  and  when  the  paymaster  of  Seuthes,  a  Greek 
named  Hei'akleides,  ofEc^red  them  as  payment  for  a  month  the 
wages  of  twenty  days,  Xenophon  lost  the  favor  of  that  chief  by 
insisting  on  the  rights  of  the  soldiers,  while  the  latter  were  led  to 
believe  that  the  man  to  whom  they  owed  their  salvation  after  the 
fight  of  Kunaxa  was  enriching  himself  at  their  cost.  Months  thus 
dragged  their  weary  length  along,  until  at  last  messengers  came 
with  the  tidings  that  the  Spartan  state  needed  their  services  in  the 
war  which  the  Spartans  had  declared  against  Tissaphernes.  The 
news  filled  Seuthes  with  the  hope  that  he  might  avoid  paying  the 
money  due  to  them,  while  it  let  loose  among  the  Cyreians  the 
tongues  of  all  who  suspected  or  hated  Xenophon.  The  charges 
brought  against  him  were  not  only  triumphantly  rebutted,  but  by 
the  dexterity  of  an  Athenian  named  Polykrates  were  turned  against 
Ilerakleides.  That  worthy  man  lost  no  time  in  warning  Seuthes 
that  prudence  suggested  instant  flight  for  both.  Mounting  their 
horses  at  once,  the  cliief  and  his  paymaster  hurried  away. 

But  the  power  or  tlie  fear  of  Sjiarta  was  too  great  even  for 
Seuthes.  Threats  of  determined  action  in  case  of  refusal  extorted 
OncrnUons  from  him  the  wages  due  to  the  Cyreians,  whose  num- 
reiii'iHiir  '^'^''■'^  ^^'^'■^  "^^^  reduced  to  6,000,  and  the  army  at 
Asia  Minor.  length  crossed  to  Lampsakos,  where  Xenophon  found 
of  Xen.ri'.hoii  :in  old  friend  in  the  Phliasian  prophet  Eukleides.  The 
toAthfiis  latter,  expressing  liis  jov  at  seeing  liiin  safe,  asked  him 
how  nnich  money  he  had.  '  I  have  sold  my  horse,'  was  the  answer, 
'  for  fifty  dareiks,  to  furnish  me  with  the  means  of  getting  home. 
•  See  p.  506. 


Ohap.  1.]   XENOPHON  AND  THE  TEN  THOUSAND.      519 

The  seer,  supposino,' that  he  must  have  returned  laden  with  wealth, 
could  scarcely  believe  him  ;  but  when  on  questioning  him  further  he 
learnt  that  Xenophon,  although  he  had  sacrificed  to  Zeus  the  King, 
had  offered  nothing  since  he  left  Athens  to  Zeus  the  Kindly/ 
the  mystery  was  explained.  The  kindly  god  must  receive  a  whole 
burnt  offering  :  and  a  slaugliter  of  little  pigs  in  his  honor  was 
followed  at-  once  by  a  distribution  of  pay  to  the  army  and  by  the 
restoration  of  his  favorite  horse,  which  the  Spartans  had  repur- 
chased and  for  which  they  refused  any  recompense  at  his  liands. 
He  thus  had  not  only  his  horse  but  more  than  a  year's  pay  in 
advance.  The  kindly  Zeus  was  indeed  working  zealously  on  his 
behalf  :  but  when,  having  marched  by  Antandros  to  Atarneus,  the 
army  reached  Pergainos,  a  prospect  of  still  greater  luck  was  opened 
for  Xenophon.  His  hostess,  Hellas,  the  wife  of  Gongylos,'^  told 
him  that  he  might  win  a  splendid  prize  by  seizing  the  tower  or 
castle  of  a  wealthy  Persian  named  Asidates.  The  sacrifices  at 
once  favored  the  enterprise  ;  but  a  vigorous  attack  by  600  of  his 
comrades  ended  in  a  retreat  which  at  the  cost  of  wounds  to  nearly 
half  their  men  enabled  them  to  bring  back  about  200  captives  and 
some  cattle.  On  the  next  day  the  assault,  repeated  with  the  full 
force  of  the  army,  was  followed  by  the  capture  of  Asidates  himself 
with  his  whole  family  and  all  his  property.  '  Thus  came  true,' 
says  Xenophon,  with  a  faith  which  nothing  can  daunt  or  shake, 
'  the  signs  of  the  victims  offered  before  the  first  attack  : '  and  thus 
also  were  more  than  realised  any  visions  of  wealth  which  may 
have  floated  before  his  eyes  as  he  started  on  the  eastward  march 
from  Sardeis.  With  eager  gratitude  his  comrades  bade  him  make 
his  own  choice  out  of  all  the  spoil ;  and  Xenophon  returned  to 
Athens^  a  rich  man,  to  find  that  the  great  teacher  whose  wisdom 
he  revered  and  by  whose  counsels  he  was  guided  had  drunk  the 
fatal  draught  of  hemlock  a  few  days  or  a  few  weeks  before  his 
arrival. 

'  Zeus  Meilicliios.    Xeii.  An.  vii.  lose  all  political  existence.     This 

8,  4.  lact    alone    justifies    the    careful 

^  This  was  a  descendant  of  the  study  of  a  narrative  which  otlier- 

Eretrian  Gongylod  who  in  tliePer-  wise  might  have  been   passed  by 

sian  War   had   taken  the   side  of  witli  a  very  brief  notice.     It  must 

Xerxes.     Xen.  //.  iii.  1,  6.  further  be  remembered  that  tliis 

^  The  signification  of  the  expedi-  expedition  of  the   Ten  Thousand, 

tion  and  retreat  of  the  Ten  Thou-  although  owing   to  the  death  ot 

sand  is  pretty  much  that  of  the  Cyrus   it  failed  to  dethrone  Arta- 

campaignsof  Alexander.   Ifneitlier  xerxes,  left  on  the  Hellenic  world 

can  be  said  strictly  to  belong  to  the  generally  a   profound    impression 

history  of  the  Greek  country,  they  that  the  Persian  empire  could  not 

both  form  part  of  the  history  of  the  possibly  withstand  the  determined 

artificial  Greek  people  which  conies  assault  of  a  Greek  army  well  dis- 

into  prominence  just  as  the  ancient  cii>liued  and  well  provided,  under 

Hellenic  cities  dwindle  away  and  the  command  of  an  able  and  am- 


520  THE  EMPIRE  OF  SPARTA.  [Book  IV 


CHAPTER  II. 

SOKR.\TES. 

SoKBATES  had  already  reached  an  age  of  more  than  seventy  years/ 
•when  three  Athenian  citizens,  the  leather-seller  Anytos,  the  poet 
^harces  Meletos,  and  the  rhetor  Lykon,  brought  against  him 
brought  three  charges,  the  first  of  rejecting  the  gods  vvor- 
kfatefby°  shipped  at  Athens,  the  second  of  setting  np  new 
Anytos,  Me-   deities  of  his  own,  the  third  of  corrupting  the  youth 

iGtO^    21110.  1  o  •< 

Lykon.  of  the   cilv.     Of  these  three  men  Anytos,  as  many 

100  B.C.  ^vuuld  liave  it,  had  escaped  condemnation  for  his 
failure  to  relieve  the  garrison  at  Pylos  only  by  bribing  tlie  jury- 
men who  tried  him.^  During  the  tyranny  which  ensued  on  the 
fall  of  Athens  he  had  been  nearly  ruined  in  his  estate  :  and  his 
eagerness  to  retrieve  his  broken  fortunes  roused  in  him  a  feeling  of 
indio"nation  when  he  was  told  that  Sokrates  had  spoken  of  his  son 
as  far  too  fine  a  youth  to  be  put  to  an  unsavory  trade.  The  other 
two  had,  so  far  as  we  can  learn,  no  further  causes  for  antipathy  to 
Sokrates  than  those  which  affected  the  classes  to  which  they  seve- 
rally belonged.  Of  these  classes  Sokrates,  for  whatever  reasons, 
had  incurred  the  determined  enmity. 

As  a  citizen,  this  illustrious  man  had  lived  a  life  not  merely 
blameless  but  deserving  the  gratitude  of  his  countrymen.  He  had 
Earlvlifeof  l>ehaved  with  credit  among  the  Athenian  hoplites 
Sokrates.  at  Potidaia  and  Delion  ;  with  righteous  zeal  he  had 
finnly  opposed  the  madness  of  the  people  whom  Theramencs  was 
hounding  on  to  the  murder  of  the  generals,  after  Argennoussai  f 
with  the  same  fearless  composure  he  had  gone  quietly  home  when 
the  Thirty  despots  commissioned  him  with  four  others  to  arrest 
and  bring  before  them  the  Salaminian  Leon.^  Of  his  earlier  life 
there  is  little  to  say.  He  may  have  followed  for  a  time  the  occu- 
pation of  his  father  Sophroniskos,  and  he  may  have  carved  the 
group  of  Charitcs  which  were  shown  in  the  Akropolisas  his  work. 
Some  said  that  as  a  young  man   he   had   lived   viciously  ;    but, 

bitious  {Tpneral.     Tliis  conviction,  of    Hellas    to    the   plains  of  the 

3xprf8S('d  acrain  and  jijrain  by  rlie-  Penjab. 

toricians  like  Lvsiaa  and  Isokrates,  "Etj]  yEyovuc  TrXetu  tiSSofif/KOvra 

tended  jin-atly/we  cannot  doubt,  to  Plato,  Apol.  Soln:  p.  17.     Tliis  fact 

determine  tliJpiirpose  of  Alexander  may  be  accepted  without  entering 

the  (Jreat  ;  and  thus  the  masterly  here  into  questions  concerning  the 

retreat  of  Xenophon  became  direct-  genuineness  of  the  celebrated  Apo- 

ly  a  cause  of  the  expedition,  which  logy.           '  See  p.  452. 

carried  the  name  and  the  language  '  See  p.  471.           *  See  p.  488. 


Chap.  II.]  SOKRATES.  521 

altliough  witli  his  thorough  frankness  he  admitted  that  the  work  of 
self-discipline  was  witli  hiui  a  severe  struggle,  there  seems  to  be 
no  ground  for  the  imputation.  That  he  betook  himself  with  some 
eagerness  to  tlie  study  of  physics  may  fairly  be  gathered  from  the 
Platonic  dialogue  iu  which  Sokrates  is  represented  as  receiving 
the  instructions  of  ]'armenides.  By  that  philosopher  he  is  said  to 
have  been' counselled  to  test  all  theories  and  inferences  by  the 
method  of  his  pupil  the  Eleatic  Zenon, — in  other  words,  not  merely 
to  assure  himself  that  the  conclusion  was  warranted  by  the  pre- 
misses, but  to  weigh  carefully  all  that  could  be  urged  against  the 
latter. 

Such  tests,  it  is  obvious,  might  be  used  to  upset  the  system  of 
which  Zenon  was  so  vehement  a  champion.  It  was  almost  impos- 
sible that  Sokrates  could  fail  to  discover  the  verbalism  ^.^j^  , 
in  which  the  Eleatic  philosophers  often  involved  them-  the  science 
selves  ;  nor  in  the  hypotheses  maintained  by  one  philo-  "  y^'^^. 
sopher  after  another  could  he  well  see  nuich  more  than  a  series  of 
guesses  of  which  the  latest  lield  its  ground  only  until  some  other 
1  hiiiker  came  forward  to  prove  its  absurdity.  Beyond  all  doubt,  the 
formation  of  these  theories  by  exploding  the  old  mythological  creed 
vastly  aided  the  growth  of  the  human  mind  ;  but  it  would  have 
been  strange  indeed  if  some  one  liad  not  sooner  or  later  risen  to  pro- 
test against  the  multiplication  of  hypotheses  for  which  it  was  im- 
possible to  adduce  the  manifest  eviclence  of  fact.  Such  a  thinker 
arose  in  Sokrates,  in  whose  mind  the  contradictory  conclusions  of 
the  philosophers  (or,  as  they  were  called.  Sophists)  caused  a  revul- 
sion never  to  be  overcome.  The  uncertainty  of  tlie  explanations 
offered  for  the  motions  of  the  planets  or  the  changes  of  the  seasons 
Avas  for  him  the  proof  that  they  who  attempted  to  explain  such 
things  were  invading  a  region  into  wliich  the  gods  would  allow  no 
prying.  Whatever  astronomical  knowledge  might  be  needed  for 
navigation  or  other  practical  purposes  might,  he  thought,  be  easily 
learnt  from  night-watchers  and  pilots ;  but  attempts  to  determine  the 
distances  of  the  planets  and  the  modes  of  their  revolution  betrayed 
impiety  of  the  same  kind  which  led  Anaxagoras  to  assert  the 
identity  of  Fire  and  the  Sun. 

Turning,  therefore,  with  disgust  from  the  wranglings  of  philo- 
sophers who  reviled  each  other  with  the  fury  of  lunatics,'  Sokrates 

beheld  before  him,  as  he  th(>u(>'ht,  a  vast  field  iu  which  „  ,     ,         , 
'  ?•!,•  T1--     Sokrates  and 

tlie  plough  liad  scarcely  turned  a  sino-le  furrow,     it  it  the  science 
was  impossible  for  man  to  determine  what  were  the  '^®" 

constituents  of  the  sun,  it  was  surely  not  impossible  for  him  to 
ascertain  the  conditions  of  his  own  life,  the  laws  which  he  must 
obey,  the  nature  of  his  relations  to  other  men,  and  the  character  of 
■Xen.  Mem.  I.  i.  14. 


522  THE  EMPIRE  OF  SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

human  action.  Stnrting  with  the  assured  couvictiou  that  the  sjods 
were  everywhere  present,  and  that  from  tlieni  nothing  was  hid 
even  to  the  thoughts  and  intents  of  the  heart,  he  held  it  to  be  his 
duty  to  ascertain  the  boundaries  which  separated  the  province  of 
liuman  reason  from  that  of  the  divine  government  of  the  world. 
Nor  was  he  at  any  loss  to  find  them.  AUhougli  the  interference 
of  the  gods  in  human  affairs  was  constant,  it  was  exercised  only  in 
matters  the  results  of  which  were  uncertain  ;  and  it  was  absurd,  if 
not  impious,  to  ask  for  their  lielp  where  the  suppliant  needed  only 
to  exercise  the  faculties  with  which  they  had  endowed  him.  From 
the  time  of  his  boyhood  he  had  heard  an  inward  voice  which, 
without  telling  him  what  he  should  do,  warned  him  against  any 
given  action.'  This  was  styled  by  some  of  liis  disciples  the  Dai- 
monion  or  Daemon,  which,  by  revealing  to  him  dangers  to  be 
avoided,  made  his  way  plain  before  his  face.  It  was  a  divine 
guide  of  which  he  spoke  not  less  familiarly  than  of  other  personal 
characteristics  ;  and  as  he  made  no  mystery  of  it  in  his  own  case, 
so  it  must  at  the  least  be  noted  that  he  nowhere  explicitly  speaks 
of  it  as  a  privilege  peculiar  to  himself. 

lie  was  still  a  young  man  (how  young  we  know  not)  when  the 
sense  of  a  divine  mission,  binding  him  to  devote  liis  whole  life  to 
^,       ,,  .       the  service  of  his  fellows,  broke  upon  liis  mind.     As 

The  religious       .,,  icitti  ii  iti 

mission  of  With  tlic  youtliiul  Hebrew  prophet  wlio  saw  the  Lord 
Sokrates.  upon  liis  throne,  liigh  and  lifted  up,"  the  profoundest 
sense  of  personal  unworthiness  was  blended  with  unhesitating 
eagerness  to  obey.  The  rigid  a[)plication  of  the  ZcMionic  method  to 
his  own  conceptions  had  convinced  him  of  his  absolute  ignorance 
of  matters  in  which  true  knowledge  was  of  vital  moment  to  his 
moral  health,  and  had  perliaps  made  him  suspect  that  the  know- 
ledge vaunted  by  others  was  not  more  solid  or  real  than  his  own. 
But,  however  this  might  be,  it  was  his  duty  henceforth  to  proclaim 
himsi'lf  the  Apostle  of  Truth,  not  in  the  sense  wiiicli  would  claim 
for  him  the  possession  of  truth,  but  only  as  attesting  the  devotion 
of  his  life  to  its  discovery  and  its  promulgation.  Abandoning  his 
occ'ifiation  as  a  sculptor,  retaining,  it  would  seem,  no  means  of 
making  an  income,  he  made  it  liis  business  to  put  all  men  to  the 
test,  so  that  the  reality  or  the  hollowness  of  their  professions  might 
for  their  own  higher  good  and  ha|»pinessbc  made  known  to  them- 
selves and  to  the  world.  If  tlie  actjuisition  of  Truth,  that  is,  of 
real  knowledge,  be  the  one  thing  needful,  the  conceit  of  knowledge 
without  the  reality  must  be  the  greatest  of  all  evils.  The  presence 
of  this  conceit,  wlierever  it  cxist.s,  must  be  made  manifest  in  con- 

'  Tliia  is  the  account  put  into  his     3,  12,  its  commands  were  positive 
iimvuli  by  Plato,  Apol.  Sukr.  p.  31.     as  well  as  negative. 
According  to  Xenopbon,  Mem.  iv.  *  Isaiah  vi.  1. 


Chap.  II.]  SOKRATES.  523 

fusion  of  thouglit,  if  only  the  probe  be  pushed  home  with  sufficient 
vio-or  and  pertinacity.  For  himself  he  had  nothing  to  fear  or  to 
hide.  He  went  forth  (as  a  man  knowing  himself  to  be  ignorant 
and  having,  as  he  supposed,  emptied  liimself  of  all  prejudices  and 
preconceptions),  to  ascertain  whether  or  how  far  others  who  talked 
glibly  abont  freedom  and  forms  of  government,  about  science  and 
art,  thebry  and  practice,  law  and  justice,  really  attached  a  clear 
meaning  to  the  words  which  they  used  and  regulated  their  lives 
by  their  conceptions.  Tn  the  discharge  of  this  mission  he  might 
be  seen  at  all  times  of  the  day  in  all  places  of  public  resort,  seeking 
the  conversation  of  all  and  shunning  none.  In  the  Agora  and  the 
(xymnasion  his  voice  might  be  heard,  asking  those  who  chose  to 
listen  to  him  what  they  meant  by  speaking  of  certain  things  as  just 
or  expedient  or  benehcial,  and  of  certain  other  things  as  inexpe- 
dient or  unjust  or  hurtful.  The  perfect  frankness  of  the  man,  the 
ingenuous  confession  of  his  ovvn  ignorance,  the  dexterity  with 
which  by  tiank  movements  he  led  his  hearers  to  make  statements 
conclusively  proving  their  mere  pretence  to  knowledge,  the  earnest- 
ness which  convinced  them  that,  if  he  exposed  their  shallowness, 
it  was  only  in  order  that  they  might  work  their  way  to  the  real 
treasures  which  awaited  all  disinterested  seekers,  could  not  fail  to 
gather  round  him  knots  of  listeners,  of  whom  many  became  his 
disciples  or,  as  he  would  prefer  to  have  them,  his  friends.  The 
impression  thus  made  led  some  to  regard  him  as  a  man  of  whom 
the  world  had  not  yet  seen  the  peer  ;  and  the  resolution  to  ascer- 
tain the  truth  of  this  fact  by  a  reference  to  the  Delphian  oracle 
was  the  natural  consequence  oi'  this  conviction. 

The  answer  brought  back  by  Chairephon  from  the  shrine  of 
Phoibos  was  that  of  all  men  Sokrates  was  the  wisest.  In  Sokrates 
himself  these  words  awakened  no  feeling  of  self-  goi-rates  and 
gratulation,  but  merely  a  desire  to  solve  that  which  the  Elenchos 
he  felt  sure  must  be  a  riddle  or  enigma.  He  was  at  of  cross-ex- 
once  conscious  of  his  own  ignorance  and  convinced  of  ^iiiiioation. 
the  perfect  veracity  of  the  god.  He  betook  himself  therefore  to 
a  statesman  of  wide  repute  for  his  wisdom,  but  he  soon  satisfied 
himself  that  his  supposed  knowledge  was  a  mere  mask.  When, 
however,  he  sought  to  convince  the  statesman  of  this  fact,  he  found 
that  he  had  only  luade  him  his  enemy  ;  and  he  returned  home, 
assured  that  thus  far  the  Delphian  priestess  was  right.  His  ovvn 
ignorance  and  that  of  the  statesman  were  on  a  par ;  but  he  was 
conscious  of  it  and  as  eager  to  acknowledge  it  as  the  statesman  was 
to  deny  it ;  and  so  far  he  was  the  wiser  man.  The  experiment  was 
tried  on  others  (r(;luctantly  and  with  pain  and  fear,  because  he  saw 
the  strength  of  the  resentment  which  he  roused),  and  always  with 
the  same  result.     He  went  to  the  poets,  with  something  like  the 


524  THE  EMPIRE  OF  SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

assuruiicc  that  they  could  explain  the  principles  of  their  art  and 
analyse  the  merits  of  compositions  which  charmed  the  world.  To 
his  amazement  he  found  that  their  poems  were  thrown  off  under  a 
species  of  enthusiasm  which  left  them  on  a  par  with  sibyls  and 
soothsayers.  He  visited  and  talked  with  the  artisans  ;  but  if  he 
discovered  that  they  were  masters  of  many  curious  processes  of 
which  he  himself  knew  nothing,  he  saw  also  that  they  regarded 
their  technical  skill  as  a  justification  for  pronouncing  judgments 
on  questions  with  which  they  had  no  acquaintance  whatever, 
llence  when  he  asked  himself  whether  he  would  exchange  his 
own  general  consciousness  of  ignorance  for  the  partial  knowledge 
wliicl:  sought  to  pass  itself  off  as  omniscience,  he  was  constrained 
to  answer  the  question  in  the  negative,  and  so  to  admit  that  the 
Delphian  priestess  had  spoken  the  truth  to  Chairephon.' 

The  course  which  Sokrates  had  adopted  would,  it  is  obvious, 
win  for  him  the  esteem  and  gratitude  only  of  those  in  whom  the 
TheSokratic  ^*^^'^  ^^  truth,  although  possibly  dormant,  had  not  been 
metliod  iu  choked  by  a  slavish  submission  to  popular  beliefs  and 
totheAthe-  prejudices.  It  is  not  less  clear  that  in  cities  which 
nian  drama.  ^[[^[  jj^^  allow  large  scope  for  the  discussion  of  opinions 
and  the  criticism  of  persons  and  acts  Ids  career  would  have  been 
summarily  cut  short.  In  Sparta  the  mere  idea  of  a  man  standing 
forth  without  let  or  hindrance  in  the  market-place  to  question  the 
nature  of  family  relations  and  the  limits  of  state  authority  would 
be  ludicrous  and  absurd.  In  other  cities  the  tire  which  he  sought 
to  kindle  would  speedily  have  died  out  for  lack  of  fuel.  In  Athens 
the  causes  which  had  contributed  to  the  growth  of  democracy 
gathered  round  him  a  band  of  devoted  folh)wers,  and  at  the  same 
time  roused  feelings  of  opposition  which  ended  in  liis  trial  and 
condemnation.  In  no  other  city  had  the  people  generally  received 
an  intellectual  education  so  stimulating  to  the  analytical  powers  of 
the  human  mind.  In  a,  theatre  capable,  it  is  said,  of  holding 
30,000  spectators  tliey  listened  to  the  wondei-ful  dramas  which 
year  by  year  shed  a  dazzling  splendor  over  tlie  great  Dioiiysian 
festivals.  In  the  choric  odes  of  these  dramas  they  lieard  the  most 
exquisite  of  lyric  strains,  wliicli  ranged  with  the  most  graceful  or 
the  most  powerful  touch  over  the  whole  scale  of  human  emotion, 
wakeninir  the  mind  to  the  subtlest  liarmonies  of  form  and  color, 
feeding  the  sense  of  beauty  with  images  glorified  by  the  radiance 
of  Hellenic  sunshine,  raising  the  heart  to  that  holy  abode  of  purity 
and  jieace  which  is  the  source  of  the  Eternal  Law  of  liighteousness, 
and  tilling  it  with  yearnings  for  a  more  intimate  communion  with 
Him  wlio  is  the  same  yesterday,  to-day,  and   for  ever.'     In  the 

'  PI.  Apol.  Sokr.  p.  23.  cify  any  of  the  thousand  passajjes 

*  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  spe-    which  justify  the  assertions  made 


Chap.  II.]  SOKRATES  525 

discourse  of  the  actors  (for  the  Greek  tragedy  was  rather  a  dis- 
course ahout  action  than  an  e^diibition  of  the  action  itself)  they 
listened  to  discussions  which  touched  and  even  went  to  the  root  of 
some  of  the  most  momentous  questions  affecting  the  interests  or 
the  duties  of  mankind.  The  pleadings  of  love  were  blended  in 
Antigone  .with  a  consciousness  of  duty  which  shrunk  not  from 
resistance  to  the  supreme  power  of  the  state  :  the  same  sense  of 
obedience  to  a  law  which  can  never  fail  constrained  the  benefactor 
of  mankind  to  defy  the  majesty  of  Zeus  himself,  and  to  endure  his 
utmost  vengeance  on  the  desolate  crags  of  Caucasus.  There  was, 
in  short,  scarcely  a  problem  arising  out  of  the  varied  circumstances 
and  conflicting  duties  of  human  life  which  was  not  at  the  least 
discussed  by  the  Greek  tragic  poets. 

Nor  Avas  this  the  only  mode  in  which  the  tragic  drama  in- 
flnenced  the  life  of  the  Athenian  citizen.  The  law  of  Athens  did 
not  allow  the  employment  of  professional  advocates.  Political  ia- 
A  man  might,  if  he  pleased,  betake  himself  to  the  fhe^Auic^ 
rhetoricians  who  like  Lysias  and  Antiphon  made  their  drama, 
livelihood  by  writing  speeches  for  others  :  but  in  his  own  person 
he  mnst  accuse  and  in  his  own  person  he  must  plead  his  cause 
before  a  court  consisting  of  hundreds,  perhaps  thousands,  of  his 
fellow-citizens.  At  the  least  he  must  learn  by  heart  the  speech  of 
the  rhetor,  if  he  had  money  enough  to  pay  for  it ;  but  the  delivery 
of  such  a  speech  would  be  a  hard,  if  not  an  impossible,  task  for  one 
who  had  had  no  previous  rhetorical  training.  No  one  coidd  be 
sure  that  he  should  not  be  called  upon  either  to  face  an  accuser  or 
to  bring  a  charge  against  a  man  who  had  injured  him  :  in  either 
case  lack  of  readiness  in  speech  and  argument  might  involve  not 
merely  failure  but  ruin.  If  an  Athenian  citizen  so  failed,  the 
Jame  lay  at  his  own  door.  lie  was  a  member  of  the  only  parlia- 
ment known  to  Athenian  law,  and  he  had  the  invaluable  privilege 
of  listening  to  the  greatest  of  human  orators.  The  education  which 
he  thus  received  was  supplemented  by  the  tragic  drama.  The 
great  masterpieces  exhibited  year  by  year  furnished  him  with 
examples  of  almost  every  form  of  case  which  could  be  brought  be- 
fore a  court  of  law.  In  the  speeches  whether  of  accusation,  de- 
fence, or  explanation,  which  taken  together  made  up  the  body  of 
the  tragedy,  he  had  specimens  of  finished  pleading  in  which  the 
arguments  were  arranged  in  the  modes  most  sure  to  persuade  and 

in  this  sentence,     Amonfj  the  most  which   was    yearly   multiplied,   it 

beautiful  and  perhaps  the  most  stir-  miffht  almost  seem,  without  effort 

ring  are  such  choruses  as  those  of  and  without  toil,  we  may  rise  to 

the  Oidipous  Tyrannos,  862  et  seq.  some  faint  idea  ol  the  ennobling  in- 

of  Sophokles.     But  when  we  con-  fiuences  of  the  tragic  drama  on  the 

elder  that  we  possess  now  only  a  Athenian  mind, 
few  fragments  of  the  vast  treasure 


526  THE   EMPIRE   OF   SPARTA.  [BoOK  IV. 

convince  the  hearer  or  to  rouse  his  feelings  of  indulgence  or  sym- 
pathy. The  tragic  drama  thus  supplied  abundant  material  oi  the 
highest  kind  for  the  political  education  of  tlie  Athenian  citizen  ; 
and  of  this  education  the  two  most  important  branches  were, 
necessarily,  rhetoric  and  dialectic. 

These  two  terms  denoted  simply  the  materials  employed  in  dis- 
cussion and  the  garb  with  which  they  were  clothed.  The  business 
Rhetoric  and  ^f  the  former  was  to  impart  not  merely  readiness  of 
Dialectic.  speech  but  the  graces  of  consummate  eloquence,  to 
analyse  the  emotions  of  the  human  mind,  to  determine  the  methods 
most  sure  to  awaken  them,  and  to  draw  out  systematically  the 
lines  of  argument  to  be  used  under  any  given  circumstances.  These 
lines  of  argument  were  termed  Topoi  or  commonplaces ;  and  the 
task  of  arranging  these  Topics  and  of  imparting  a  careful  training 
in  the  art  of  Rhetoric  generallv  would  furnish  occupation  enough 
to  fill  up  the  whole  time  of  a  teacher.  The  burden  would  become 
t.vei  whelming,  if  in  addition  to  this  he  were  Compelled  to  discuss 
v.ith  his  pupil  all  the  problems  which  had  exercised  the  ingenuity 
and  subtlety  of  philosophers.  The  two  things  undoubtedly  con- 
verged. It  was  vastly  to  the  advantage  of  the  orator  that  he 
should  be  able  to  detect  and  hunt  out  a  fallacy,  to  draw  out  all 
that  could  possibly  be  said  against  his  own  hypotheses  or  conclu- 
sions :  but  his  business  in  a  court  of  law  or  a  popular  assembly 
was  not  the  business  of  philosophical  disputants  in  the  groves  of 
the  Academy.  For  him  the  goal  to  be  aimed  at  was  Persuasion  : 
for  the  latter  it  was  the  discovery  of  truth,  or  the  exposure  of 
falseh(K)d  as  a  necessary  step  to  that  discovery.  Hence,  although 
Rhetoric  and  Dialectic  were  complemcntarv  j)artsof  the  same  train- 
ing, and  although  instruction  in  both  might  have  been  given  by  the 
same  teachers,  the  two  occupations  in  point  of  fact  diverged,  until 
the  two  classes  became  not  merely  distinct  but  vehemently  opposed 
to  each  other. 

Between  the  objects  aimed  at  by  the  Sophist,  the  Rhetor,  and 
the  Dialectician  there  was  no  real  inconsistency.  The  })rovinces  of 
influeDce  of  ^^'  three  were  included  in  the  vast  scope  of  the  tragic 
the  Sophists,  drama;  each  had  to  analyse  from  his  own  point  of 
view  the  masterpieces  of  eloquence,  learning,  and  wisdom  which 
vcarlv  delighted  them  in  the  great  Dionysian  theatre.  The  in- 
'ttncncc  of  all  three  tended  in  one  direction,  and  that  direction  was 
a  wliolesome  one.  Unprincipled  men,  like  Alkiltiades  aiidlvritias, 
might  employ  their  eloquence  to  pervert  justice  and  deprave  the 
public  mind  ;  but  this  evil  was  counterbalanced  by  the  greater 
power  imparted  to  those  who  desired  to  use  aright  the  divine  gift 
of  speech.  The  teai  her  of  philosophy  might  possibly  venture  to 
preach  a  lax  morality  ;  but  the  succesa  of  such  men  is  almost  in- 


Chap.  II.]  SOKRATES.  527 

finitely  rare,  and  failure  would  for  them  be  financial  ruin.  The 
dialectician  might  Avaste  his  time  in  trying  to  make  bricks  without 
clay ;  but  the  mischief  would  soon  work  its  own  cure  by  driving 
away  all  who  had  no  mind  to  tire  themselves  by  eiforts  to  fill  the 
sieve  of  the  Danaides.  As  a  rule,  all  three  classes  of  teachers 
worked  conscientiously  each  in  his  own  sphere,  and  the  sophists 
deserved  as  little  as  the  dialecticians  to  be  held  up  to  contempt 
and  ridicule.  They  were  so  held  up,  it  must  be  remembered,  not 
by  Sokrates  but  by  Plato.  To  that  gi'eatman,  who  declared  war 
on  all  society  as  it  then  existed  and  who  made  no  secret  of  his.wish 
to  remodel  it,  two  characteristics  of  the  Sophists  were  especially 
repulsive.  They  would  not  trouble  themselves  with  abstract  specu- 
lations and  sublime  ideas,  and  they  taught  for  pay.  For  these  two 
crimes  they  were  stigmatised  as  seeking  to  corrupt  the  public 
mind  for  the  sake  of  reaping  a  larger  harvest,  with  deliberately 
maintaining  beliefs  which  they  knew  to  be  false,  and  with 
familiarising  their  pupils  with  arguments  which  would  make  the 
worse  appear  the  better  reason.  So  persistently  were  these  charges 
repeated  that  in  later  times  at  least  the  name  Sophist  has  been 
supposed  to  denote  teachers  who  led  men  to  act  deliberately  on 
sordid  motives  and  to  make  influence,  wealth,  and  power  the 
one  object  of  their  lives  for  the  sake  of  promoting  not  the  interests 
of  others  but  their  own.  The  worth  of  the  charge  is  best  measured 
by  an  appeal  to  facts  ;  and  in  thus  turning  to  facts,  we  have  only 
to  remember  that  one  or  two  instances  of  mean-minded  or  dis- 
honest Sophists,  furnish  no  justification  for  imputing  meanness  and 
dishonesty  to  Sophists  as  a  class. 

But  in  truth  the  need  of  such  an  appeal  is  not  urgent.  In  his 
ideal  picture  of  a  Commonwealth  Plato'  asserts  emphatically  that 
his  quarrel  is  not  with  the  Sophists  but  with  the  Effects  of  the 
existing  framework  and  order  of  society.       In  such  a  teaching  of 

•  •  the  SoDuists 

state  of  things  the  faults  of  the  teachers  must  answer  on  Athenian 
precisely  to  the  faults  of  the  system  in  which  they  character. 
find  themselves  entangled.  If  they  rose  greatly  above  it,  their 
trade  would  be  at  an  end.  Clearly  they  must  take  things  as  they 
are,  doing  all  that  they  can  to  improve  them  without  coming  into 
direct  collision  with  authority,  unless  indeed  they  are  prepared 
like  Sokrates  to  give  up  not  merely  worldly  goods  but  life  itself 
in  defence  of  the  truth.  In  these  words  we  have  a  full  refutation 
of  the  charge  Avhich  insinuates  that  the  degeneracy  of  the 
Athenian  people  during  the  Peloponnesian  war,  such  as  it  may 
have  been,  was  directly  the  result  of  the  teaching  of  the  Sophists, 
That  a  change  for  the  worse  had  come  over  them,  can  scarcely  be 
denied  :^  but  this  change  was  due  not  to  the  evil  influence  of  any 

»  Rep.  vi.  6,  p.  493  &c.  »  See  p.  448. 


528  THE   EMPIRE  OF  SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

class  of  tcacliers,  but  primarily  to  the  ahamloninciit  of  the  policy 
earnestly  enjoined  on  them  hy  I'erikles,  and  in  the  next  place  to 
that  disreirard  of  constitutional  forms  Avhich  first  made  the  revolu- 
tion of  the  F'oiir  Hundred  possible,  and  at  last  in  the  terrible 
tragedy  which  followed  the  victory  of  Argennoussai  brought  forth 
as  its  fruit  the  doctrine  that  the  Demos  had  a  right  to  do  as  it 
pleased  them. 

It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  go  further.  Criticisms  of  the  doc- 
trines ascribed  to  the  most  eminent  of  the  Sophists  may  lay  bare 
Ethical  Jissumptions  similar  to  those   which  underlie  the  doc- 

Sok°rates*'and  triucs  of  Sokrates  and  Plato  liimself  ;  but  they  will 
Prodikos.  scarcely  do  more,  and  to  some  of  these  doctrines  it  is 
possible  that  we  may  attach  a  wrong  meaning.  The  position  of 
Protagoras,  that  man  is  the  measure  of  all  things  existing  or  not 
existing,  may  possibly  l)e  at  bottom  in  agreement  with  the  axiom 
which  I)es  Cartes  makes  the  foundation  of  his  reasoning.  If  again 
it  be  said  that  I'rodikos  was  spoken  of  as  a  corrupter  of  youth, 
we  have  to  remember  that  the  same  charge  was  urged  against 
Isokrates  and  proved  fatal  to  the  greater  teacher  whom  I'lato  puts 
forward  as  a  foil  to  these  pestilent  money-getters.  But  it  is  more 
important  to  note  that  in  Prodikos  we  have  a  man  whose  teacliing, 
although  perhaps  less  profound,  is  both  wider  and  more  generous 
than  that  of  Sokrates  himself.  With  the  latter  the  one  end  of  the 
good  man  is  the  formation  of  liis  own  character,  ^'irtuc  is  a  thing 
to  be  learnt ;  and  although  virtue  when  learnt  will  make  a  man 
act  by  others  as  lie  ought  to  act,  still  it  is  to  the  ac(juiring  of 
knowledge  that  his  whole  mind  and  heart  is  in  the  first  instance  to 
be  turned,  \^'ith  I'rodikos  virtue  lies  in  no  consideration  of  ends, 
in  no  thought  of  the  liap])iness  which  it  may  bring  to  the  actor; 
it  is  something  which  nuist  spring  directly  from  the  generous  and 
un.selfish  .spirit,  spurred  on  wholly  by  the  desire  of  doing  good  to 
others.  To  say  that  the  exquisite  Apologue  of  this  Sophist, 
known  as  tlie  Choice  of  Herakles,  holds  out  political  power  as  the 
prize  of  exertion,  is  to  assert  simply  that  which  is  not  true.  If 
influence  and  power  be  the  consequence  of  a  perfectly  righteous 
life,  we  caimot  deprecate  these  consequences  without  desiring 
further  that  virtue  and  righteousness  should  be  something  different 
from  what  they  are.  I>ut  assuredly  no  such  ulterior  objects  arc 
set  before  the  youthful  Herakles  by  the  being  who  st>eks  to  turn 
him  away  from  the  seductions  of  Kakiaor  Vice  who  lures  him  to 
idleness  and  self-indulgence.  '  I  have  no  fair  words,'  she  says, 
'  wherewith  to  cheat  thee.  Nothing  good  is  ever  reached  without 
labor  ;  nothing  great  is  ever  won  without  toil.  If  thou  seekestfor 
fruit  from  the  earth,  thou  must  tend  and  till  it ;  if  thou  longest  for 
tlic  love  of  men,  thou  nmst  do  them  good.'  If  this  apologue  luivc 
'  See  Tales  of  AurUnt  fhrrrc.     Thn  Toils  of  Herakles. 


Ohai'.  it.]  SOKRATES.  529 

any  meaning,  it  is  that  the  object  of  virtue  is  not  reputation,  but 
the  benefit  of  others;  not  power  and  influence,  but  the  answer  of 
a  good  conscience.  Four-ar.d-twenty  centuries  have  passed  away, 
and  during  nineteen  of  these  Cliristianity  lias  been  at  work  in  the 
world :  but  we  have  reached  no  higher  theory  of  life  than  that  of 
Prodi kos,  and  for  the  picture  which  he  drew  of  the  righteous  life 
we  arc  iildcbtcd  to  the  pages  of  Xcnophon.'  It  is  a  more  prejudice 
Avhioh  prevents  any  from  seeing  a  spirit  not  less  lofty  in  the  asser- 
tion of  Protagoras  that  the  great  lesson  to  be  learnt  is  the  right 
management  of  our  own  households  and  the  most  efficient  action 
in  the  concerns  of  the  state  ;^  and  we  may  be  sure  that  the  counsel 
■which  Hippias  is  said  to  have  put  into  the  mouth  of  Nestor  in  his 
colloquy  with  Xeoptolenios  would  be  not  more  acceptable  to  the 
natural  man  than  the  self-sacrilice  enjoined  by  Prodikos. 

It  is  true  indeed  that  in  the  Platonic  dialogue  in  which  Polos 
not  without  rudeness  takes  his  stand  on  the  popular  opinion  and 
feeling  of  the  time,  Kallikles  is  also  introduced  as  pro-  Ethical 
pounding  a  theory  of  what  he  calls  natural  justice  ascdbedto 
which  might  seem  to  show  the  worthlessness  of  law.  Kallikles. 
His  position  is  that  law  is  an  artificial  restraint  })ut  by  the  weaker 
multitude  on  the  stronger  individual,  who  at  starting  found  abso- 
lute right  in  his  absolute  might.  These  gigantic  creatures  submit 
to  the  shackles  imposed  by  the  multitude  only  because  they  cannot 
help  it ;  but  if  circumstances  should  put  it  in  their  power,  thev 
will  vindicate  their  own  ability  and  stand  forth  the  avowed  as- 
sertors  of  a  philosophy  which  has  their  own  pleasure  for  its  single 
aim.^  There  is  after  all  nothing  very  terrible  in  this  theory,  which 
may  be  accepted  as  in  tolerable  accordance  with  fact.  Such  noble 
savages  might  be  found  in  many  an  Hellenic  city  ;  they  are  to  be 
*ound  still,  too  frequently,  in  our  large  towns,  and  when  these 
e.ssert  their  liberty,  society  drags  them  before  its  bar,  tries,  con- 
demns, and  hangs  them.  But  whatever  may  be  the  worth  of  the 
theory,  Kallikles,  it  must  be  noted,  was  not  a  sophist ;  and  the  fact 
that  he  vaunts  his  own  boldness  in  giving  utterance  to  opinions 
which  Polos  the  Sophist  was  constrained  to  dissemble  if  he  enter- 
tained them,  proves  conclusively  that  such  doctrines  could  not  be 
safely  preached  at  Athens  and  therefore  that  the  preaching  of  them 
cannot  be  laid  to  the  charge  of  the  Sophists. 

The  accusations  brought  against  the  Sophists  amount  therefore 
to  no  more  than  this,  that  some  Sophists  may  have  been  uncon- 

'  Mem.  ii.  1.     Sokrates  is  here  objectiou  to  this  application  :  but 

represented  as  recitin<j:  the  Apo-  this  lesson  is  not  tlie  main  object 

loguetoinforcehiswarninjras'ainst  of  the  Apologue, 

sloth.    '  Avoid  soft  things  lest  liard  ^  Plat.  Protarj.  c.  9,  p.  318  a. 

things  fall  upon  thee. '    There  is  no  ^  Plat.  Gorfj.  v.  38,  p.  483  E. 
23 


530  THE  EMPIRE  OF  SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

scientions  and  some  greedy  :  but  the  instances  of  proved  dis- 
honesty are  rare,  nor  is  there  any  reason  for  supposing  that  their 
Character  of  avarice  exceeded  that  of  the  paid  teachers  of  the  present 
teachei^of  *^^'^y  '^^^^  ^^^  ^^^  supposed  to  disgrace  themseh'es  or 
Athens.  corrupt  Others  because  they  receive  a  recompense  for 

work  done.  That  in  the  matter  of  money  the  feelhig  of  some  was 
highly  honorable  is  proved  by  Plato  himself,  who  represents  Pro- 
tagoras as  telling  those  who  think  his  demands  too  great  that  he  is 
ready  to  acce[)t  whatever  they  may  consider  a  fair  equivalent  of 
his  toil,  asking  them  only  to  go  into  a  temple  and  there  make  oath 
that  this  is  their  conscientious  opinion.'  Put  we  have  evidence  in 
their  favor  of  another  kind.  All  the  influences  with  which  we 
have  been  thus  far  concerned  must  have  tended,  if  the  charges 
against  the  Sophists  as  a  class  be  dismissed  as  unfounded,  to  raise 
the  tone  of  popular  feeling  at  Athens,  to  bring  into  action  the 
highest  jiowers  of  thought,  and  thus  to  render  them  better  citizens 
as  well  as  better  men.  Put  at  Athens,  as  elsewhere,  there  nnist 
always  be  some,  few  or  many  (and  it  is  well  if  they  be  not  an 
overwhelming  majority),  to  whom  all  mental  exertion  is  irksome, 
all  examination  of  evidence  an  unwelcome  task,  all  search  for  truth 
an  intolerable  l)urden.  There,  as  elsewhere,  men  w(juld  not  be 
wanting  who  would  oppose  at  the  least  a  passive  resistance  to 
all  studies  tending  to  enlarge  the  sphere  of  thought  or  to  upset 
generally  received  opinions.  To  such  men  the  past  is  always  a 
golden  age  the  serenity  of  which  Avas  undisturbed  by  any  influx 
of  new  ideas ;  and  it  is  always  this  increase  of  m.ental  activity 
which  rouses  their  fiercest  wrath.  To  the  freedom  of  discussion 
which  is  the  indispensable  condition  of  this  growth  such  men  are 
vehemently  opposed ;  and  at  Athens  they  professed  to  look  back 
with  fond  regret  to  the  happy  time  when,  instead  of  indulging  in 
endless  talk  and  hair-splitting  distinctions,  the  good  mariners  of 
Peiraieiis  and  Mounychia  could  do  nothing  more  than  call  for 
their  bannocks  and  cry  out  '  Kuppapai.''^ 

This  party  of  inert  resistance,  where  open  opposition  was  im- 
practicable, had  its  stronghold  in  Attic  comedy,  an  institution  of 
Origin  and  which  the  spirit  was  wholly  in  harmony  with  its 
Atticcol'^  **'  origin.  In  all  Aryan  tribes,  and  ])robably  among  all 
mcdy.  tlie  families  of   mankind,    the    imagination    was    first 

impressed  by  the  plienomena  of  death  and  reproduction  ;  and  the 
active  and  jiassive  principles  of  Nature  were  denoted  by  em- 
blems  .sufficiently   significimt.'     So  sprang  up  the  Mysteries  of 

'  Plat.  Proliu/.  c.  IG,  p.  ;]28  «.  in  405  n.c.  the  year  of  tlie  fatal 

"^  The  Yo-hcavc  <)  of  English  sea-  (•atastroi)lu'  of  Ai,<,''ospntanioi. 

men.     The  Krojr.s  of  Aristo|)hane8.  ^  See  Miftliolor/i/  of  the  .  1  ri/aii  Ntv- 

who  puts  this  si-ntinient  into  tlie  tioiis.  Book  II.  cli.  ii.  section  12. 
mouth  of  ^"Escln  lo.s,  was  exhibited 


Omap.  II.]  SOKRATES.  531 

whicli  those  celebrated  at  Eleusis  were  to  Athenians  the  most 
familiar.  From  indetinitely  early,  perhaps  from  the  earliest,  times, 
the  dialogue  which  accompanied  the  celebration  of  these  Mysteries 
was  marked  by  biting  gibes  and  jests  of  the  coarsest  kind,  having 
their  relation  at  first  to  the  grief  of  the  Mourning  Mother  for  the 
absence  or  loss  of  her  Summer-child,  and  thence  passing  on  to 
rude  abu^e  or  slander  of  the  spectators.  These  outbursts  of  Fes- 
ceniiine  licence  gradually  received  a  more  regular  form  at  the  hands 
of  men  who  with  the  love  of  unmeasured  ridicule  united  high 
poetical  power.  Eleven  plays  of  Aristophanes  are  all  that  remains 
of  that  rich  harvest  of  raillery  and  wit,  of  incisive  sarcasm  and 
keen  dissection  of  character,  of  delicate  grace  and  touching  tender- 
ness, which  delighted  even  those  against  whom  the  shafts  of  the 
poets  were  aimed.  These  plays  furnish  abundant  evidence  of  the 
freedom  with  which  the  comic  poets  ranged  over  the  field  which 
they  regarded  as  their  own.  This  field  had  practically  no  bounds. 
The  gods  themselves  were  no  more  safe  from  their  ridicule  than 
the  meanest  speaker  in  the  Athenian  assembly,  while  many  of  their 
most  telling  jests  were  directed  against  the  Athenian  constitution. 
More  particularly  all  novelties  were  treated  with  merciless  severity  ; 
and  in  the  period  of  unparalleled  growth  which  preceded  and  even 
accompanied  the  struggle  with  Sparta  Athens  had  every  year 
something  new  to  show,  especially  in  the  regions  of  philosophy 
and  science,  the  great  objects  of  their  fear  and  hatred. 

The  stream  which  flowed  from  this  source  came  from  no  foun- 
tain of  sweet  waters.  It  began  with  wanton  insolence  and  furious 
fun,  and  its  course  was  swollen  by  tributaries  of  slander 
and  falsehood.  If  in  the  history  of  the  twenty  years  the  comic 
which  inmiediately  preceded  the  Pcloponnesian  war  P^^'^- 
anytliing  be  clear,  it  is  the  fact  that  the  struggle  was  forced  on 
Athens  against  her  will  and  in  spite  of  singular  moderation  and 
forbearance  in  her  relations  with  the  Spartan  confederacy.  The  con- 
sciousness of  this  fact  pressed  heavily  on  the  Spartans,  who  after 
the  peace  of  Nikias  candidly  confessed  that  in  the  war  which  pre- 
ceded it  the  Athenians  were  in  the  right  and  themselves  wholly 
in  the  wrong.'  Yet  Aristophanes  could  hold  up  Pcriklos  to  the 
hatred  of  his  countrymen  as  the  sole  cause  of  a  strife  which  but 
for  him  would  never  have  been  begun,  and  as  having  brought  it 
about  not  to  increase  the  greatness  of  Athens  or  to  carry  out  any 
definite  policy,  but  from  mere  blind  rage  at  some  offence  given  by 
the  Megarians  to  Aspasia.  With  not  less  contempt  for  truth 
Kleon,  the  man  who  might  rather  be  described  as  bullying  the 
people  into  acts  of  barbarous  cruelty,  is  represented  as  pandering 
to  their  vices  by  mean  and  fulsome  flattery.'^  He  is  further  de- 
•  See  pages  367,  390.  *  See  p.  299. 


532  THE  EMPIRE   OF   SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

scribed  as  tlirastino;  liiraself  into  the  office  of  general  and  reaping 
another  man's  liarvest,  when  one  of  the  most  disgraceful  scenes 
ever  witnessed  in  the  Athenian  assembly  had  made  it  notorious 
that  the  office  was  thrust  upon  liim  sorely  against  Ids  will,  and 
when  the  poet  knew  further  that  at  Sphakteria  he  had  insisted  on 
acting  as  the  subordinate  officer  of  Demosthenes."  Peisandros, 
again,  one  of  the  chief  agents  in  carryhig  out  the  conspiracy  of  the 
Four  Hundred,  was  a  man  not  without  his  vices,  and  his  treason 
to  Athens  was  of  the  deepest  dye  :  but  if  Thncydides  is  to  bo 
trusted,  he  executed  his  miserable  task  with  remai-kable  readiness 
and  courage.^  In  the  2:)ages  of  Aristophanes  lie  is  a  mere  coward. 
For  the  historian  contradictions  tlius  flagrant  fully  justify  the  rule 
tliat  no  statement  of  any  comic  poet  atlecting  the  policy  or  the 
personal  character  of  public  men  shall  be  accepted  unless  these  are 
borne  out  by  the  distinct  testimony  of  otlier  contemporary  writers. 
For  those  to  whom  such  unsupported  accusations  seem  to  furnish 
the  true  reading  of  the  history  the  pages  of  Aristophanes  m  ill 
lurnish  abundant  resources  ;  but  it  is  well  to  know  that  tlie  result 
of  groping  among  them  will  only  be  to  make  every  man  filthy  and 
all  tlie  pur^Kjses  of  life  ridiculous.  It  is  well  also  to  know  (and 
indeed  too  great  stress  can  scarcely  be  laid  upon  the  fact),  that  the 
assaults  of  the  comic  poets  had  no  effect  either  in  bringing  about 
constitutional  changes  or  in  assisting  the  growth  of  physical  re- 
search or  of  moral  or  metaphysical  philosophy.  They  succeeded 
at  the  utmost  iu  awakening  or  strengthening  the  feelings  of  suspi- 
cion, dislike,  or  resentment  against  individual  men  ;  and  perhaps 
their  greatest  success  was  achieved  at  the  cost  of  Sokrates. 

The  time  during  which  Sokrates  busied  himself  with  matters 
of  phy.sical  science  nnist  have  been  brief  indeed  ;  and  those  of  the 
Aristopiia-  Athenians  who  listened  to  his  incessant  public  conver- 
nic  carica-      sations  must  lono-  liave  known  him  to  be  the  most 

turc's  of  so-  _    _         o  ...  .         . 

kratc's.  uncompromising  opponent  of  such  investigations,  when 

Aristophanes  was  overcome  by  the  irrc'sistil)le  temptation  of  putting 
liis  ngly  face  upon  the  stage  to  be  hooted  by  all  whose  worst 
enemy  was  philosophy.  The  picture  which  the  spectators  were 
invited  to  look  upon  was  that  of  a  man  slung  up  in  a  basket,  peer- 
ing at  the  sun  with  the  hope  of  understanding  its  constitution 
and  addressing  his  prayers  to  the  clouds  whom  ho  was  pleased  to 
worship  as  his  deities,  or  else  as  surrounded  by  pupils  not  less 
mad  than  himself,  and  in  their  company  poring  over  astronomical 
diatrrams  inscribed  on  the  sand  at  his  feet.  The])irture  isasmuch 
the  revei*s(!  of  the  truth  as  are  the  caricatures  of  I'erikles,  Kleon,  and 
I'eisandros;  but  in  the  case  of  Sokrates  the  calumny  told  power- 
fully on  the  large  body  of  men  who  have  a  vested  interest  in 
'  See  p.  323.  »  See  p.  428  et  seq. 


Chap.  II.]  SOKRATES.  533 

i(>;nor;iiice  aiul  for  whom  increase  of  knowledge  means  starvation. 
So  lasting  in  this  instance  Avas  the  effect  produced  that,  if  the 
Platonic  Apology  is  to  be  trusted,  Sokrates  admitted  a  greater 
difficulty  iu  dealing  with  tliese  old  slanders  than  with  the  recent 
charges  of  Meletos,  Anytos,  and  Lykon. 

The  himpoons  of  Aristophanes  may  liave  been  a  secondary 
cause  of  the  prejudice  of  which  Sokrates  candidly  confessed  the 
.strength  :  but  we  must  look  elsewhere  for  the  real  causes  of 
causes  which  gave  it  strength,  if  they  did  not  call  it  larity'of'^'^' 
into  being.  AVhen  under  the  conviction  of  his  divine  Sokrates. 
mission  he  first  a[)peared  in  the  Athenian  Agora,  he  addressed  liis 
que-stions  to  the  humbler  citizens  who  would  be  likely  to  fall  into 
conversation  with  a  man  comparatively  unknown.  The  answer 
brought  by  Chairephon  from  Delphoi  compelled  him  to  take  an- 
other course,  if  he  wished  to  reconcile  the  truthfulness  of  the  god 
with  his  own  everpresent  and  overpowering  sense  of  ignorance. 
Henceforth  he  nmst  question  the  greatest  statesmen,  the  most 
famous  poets,  and  the  most  illustrious  philosophers  of  the  city  ; 
and  he  proceeded  to  do  so  with  a  subtlety  and  pertinacity  which 
invariably  succeeded  in  showing  either  that  the  man  interrogated 
knew  not  his  own  science  or  art,  or  that  the  knowledge  of  some 
one  thing  had  led  him  to  regard  himself  as  knowing  everything. 
In  the  method  which  he  employed  there  was  nothing  strictly  new. 
Philosophers  who  had  gone  before  him  or  were  then  living  liad 
insisted  on  the  need  of  the  most  careful  definitions,  and  had  main- 
tained that  these  definitions  must  be  founded  on  facts.  It  had 
been  their  aim  and  effort,  as  it  was  his  own,  to  wage  war  not  only 
against  the  ^^I'^itence  to  knowledge  without  the  corresponding 
reality  (in  other  words,  against  delusion  or  wilful  falsehood),  but 
against  the  illogical  credulity  which  will  accept  as  true  that  which 
at  best  is  doubtful,  and  which  refuses  to  weigh  everything  that 
may  be  urged  against  any  proposition  whatsoever.  But  all  these 
were  men  who  had  imparted  such  knowledge  as  they  possessed 
only  to  their  pupils,  and  had  done  so  for  a  price  ;  and  the  number 
of  such  pupils  would  not  be  oppressively  large.  Not  one  of  them 
had  held  it  to  be  his  mission  to  stand  up  in  the  marlcet-place  and 
lift  up  his  voice  against  the  hollowness  of  popular  beliefs  and  the 
hypocrisy  of  self-styled  philosophers.  When,  then,  Solcrates,  not 
as  a  teacher  but  simply  as  one  aware  of  his  own  ignorance  and 
anxious  only  to  learn,  addressed  to  statesmen  and  men  of  scientific 
reputation  questions  on  the  simplest  elements  of  the  subjects  with 
which  they  professed  to  deal,  and  gradually  drew  from  them  the 
humiliating  confession  that  even  of  those  elements  they  had  no 
real  knowledge  whatever,  it  was  natural  that  the  feelings  of  sur- 
prise and  mortification  should  pass  rapidly  through  the   stage  of 


534  THE  EMPIRE  OF   SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

resentment  into  that  of  abiding  hatred.  That  such  an  admission 
should  be  extorted  from  them  with  regard  to  matters  of  the  utmost 
moment  to  mankind  and.  most  nearly  concerning  themselves,  was 
most  of  all  irritating  The  Athenian  was  in  the  constant  habit  of 
talking  about  Law,  Justice,  Equity,  Freedom,  Expedience,  and  of 
speaking  about  them  with  a  positiveness  which  showed  not  only 
the  importance  of  the  subject  but  his  tinn  persuasion  that  his 
knowledge  of  it  was  solid  and  adequate.  Tlie  cross-examination 
of  Sokrates  brought  to  light  a  multitude  of  discordant  opinions  and 
a  blind  obstinacy  in  maintaining  them.  In  short,  all  these  things 
which  they  professed  to  know  so  well  were  for  them,  (whatever 
might  be  their  intrinsic  value,)  mere  idols  of  the  market-place  or 
the  cave,  objects  to  be  religiously  worshipped  and  to  be  stoutly 
defended  against  all  who  might  assail  them.  That  which  hap- 
pened in  the  days  of  Sokrates  has  become  for  historians,  if  not  for 
men  generally,  a  familiar  phenomenon.  Of  the  hearers  whose 
dislike  he  thus  incurred  some  contented  themselves  with  abusing 
him,  others  pelted  him.  But  there  is  much  Sokratic  work  to  be 
done  still,  and  for  the  most])art  it  receives  a  corresponding  recom- 
pense. A  very  large  proportion  of  the  names  or  nouns  which  we 
use  are  either  abstract  or  general  names.  Of  both  these  classes  of 
words  we  pick  up  some  vague  and  crude  notions  in  the  days  of 
childhood  and  youth  :  as  years  go  on,  wo  attach  to  them  the  idea 
which  may  be  in  vogue  amongst  our  friends  and  companions,  our 
religious  or  political  party.  Of  few,  perhaps  of  none,  can  we  give 
a  clear  and  exact  definition  ;  and  yet  perhaps  every  one  of  them 
is  the  subject  of  vehement  and  long-contimied  controversy.  AVe 
have  but  to  put  together  a  list  of  such  words,  and  we  shall  see 
at  once  liow  we  should  be  likely  to  fare  if  we  were  submitted  to 
the  searching  scrutiny  of  the  Sokratic  Elenchos.  Nature,  Law, 
Freedom,  Necessity,  Body,  Substance,  Matter,  Church,  State, 
Revelation,  Inspiration,  Knowledge,  Belief.'  Sacrifice,  Atonement, 
Punishment,  Propitiation,  Person,  are  iill,  with  many  more,  terms 
in  constant  use,  and  yet  .scarcely  less  freipiently  employed  with  in- 
consistent, if  not  contradictory  meanings.  They  are,  moreover, 
terms  which  are  rending  the  world  asunder,  nor  is  the  generation 
yet  bom  which  will  see  the  end  of  the  long  and  painful  conflict 
involved  in  the  task  of  defining  them. 

If  the  process  of  having  our  notions  of  abstract  or  general  names 
taken  to  pieces  and  exhibited  in  their  naked  crndeness  and  poverty 
Inflnen  c  of  '^^'^'•''^  ^'^  ^^^  many  at  the  present  day  a  highly  irri- 
Sokrau'Hon  tating  process,  we  inust  remember  that  at  Athens  it 
theyoun},'.  would  be  even  more  likely  to  annoy  all  whom  it 
might  fail  to  conciliate.  Happily  for  the  advancement  of  truth  the 
'  Max  Miiller.  Lectures  on  Language,  ii,  526. 


Chap.  II.]  SOKRATES.  535 

number  of  those  who  were  not  repelled  by  it  was  not  small.  At 
all  times  some  will  be  found  in  whom  the  pain  of  giving  up  old 
prejudices  and  abandoning  old  beliefs,  if  these  are  proved  to  be 
untenable,  is  cheerfully  encountered  at  the  call  of  duty.  Great 
though  the  struggle  may  be,  it  is  followed  and  more  than  com- 
j)eiisated  by  the  pure  delight  which  a  man  must  feel  when  he 
becomes  conscious  that  he  has  no  secondary  motives  to  gratify,  no 
propositions  in  reserve  which  must  be  maintained  at  all  costs, — 
that  henceforth  his  one  object  istoascertain  the  truth,  to  test  every 
conviction  or  belief  by  fact,  and  to  accept  the  conclusions. estab- 
lished by  fact  without  regard  to  consequences.  This  most  en- 
nobling of  all  pleasures  was  the  reward  of  those  Athenians,  mostly 
young  men,  who  were  not  to  be  scared  by  the  heavy  yoke  of  self- 
examination  which  Sohrates  sought  to  put  upon  them.  In  these 
Ills  method,  cold  and  negative  though  it  might  seem  to  others, 
kindled  a  glow  of  esteem,  admiration,  and  love.  It  pulled  to  pieces 
their  flimsy  fancies,  but  it  did  so  only  to  show  them  that  there  was 
solid  truth  within  their  reach,  and  that  the  purifying  of  the  intellect 
was  the  necessary  condition  for  attaining  to  it.  Defeat  left  them 
encouraged,  not  depressed.  Henceforth  they  knew  how  to  search, 
and  they  set  about  the  task  with  eagerness  increased  tenfold. 

But  the  noblest  weapons  may  be  turned  to  vile  uses  ;  nor  would 
such  men  as  Alkibiades  and  Kritias  be  slow  in  perceiving  that 
they  might  employ  for  the  furtherance  of  merely  intercourse 
selfish  ends  the  readiness  of  argument  which  they  ofSokrates 
might  acquire  by  intercourse  with  Sokrates.  That  and\\lki-'^^ 
they  resorted  to  him  from  this  motive  alone,  we  could  blades, 
scarcely  fail  to  gather  from  the  whole  of  their  later  history,  even 
if  Xenophon  had  not  emphatically  asserted  the  fact.  But  the  ill 
repute  which  their  long  course  of  insolence  and  crime  brought  upon 
them  reacted  upon  their  teacher  ;  and  the  men  whose  vanity  or  self- 
esteem  he  had  offended  were  not  likely  to  ask  themselves  whether 
they  were  justified  in  holding  all  instructors  responsible  for  all 
the  misdoings  of  all  their  pupils. 

Nor  would  the  dispositions  of  the  Sophists  as  a  class  towards 
the  great  wielder  of  the  Elenchos  run  counter  to  the  feelings 
of  dislike  or  anger  kindled  in  more  vulgar  minds,  sokrates  and 
Not  a  few  of  them  probably  would  be  under  little  the  Sophists, 
temptation  to  quarrel  either  with  his  philosophy  or  with  his 
method.  Many  of  them  were  familiar  with  the  dialectic  of  Zonon  ; 
and  all  that  can  be  said  is  that  Sokrates  used  to  better  purpose 
the  weapon  which  that  dialectic  placed  in  his  hands.  But  although 
under  other  circumstances  they  might  have  been  ready  to  admit 
that  he  did  with  vastly  more  of  thoroughness  the  work  which  they 
were  striving  to  do  to  the  best  of  their  powers,  they  were  not 


536  THE  EMPIRE  OF  SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

ready  to  admit  this  in  the  case  of  a  man  wliose  mode  of  life,  whether 
designedly  or  not,  threw  a  slur  on  their  whole  class.  For  them 
teaching  was  their  means  of  livelihood  ;  and  Sokrates  obstinately, 
and  as  they  would  have  it,  ostentatiously  refused  to  receive  money 
for  his  instructions  and  thereby,  as  he  said,  to  forfeit  liis  absolute 
independence  and  bid  farewell  to  an  uncompromising  devotion  to 
truth.  This  mode  of  putting  the  matter  involved  for  them  an 
imputation  of  the  most  galling  kind.  It  implied  that  they  were 
slaves  to  the  desire  for  wealth,  that  they  had  deliberately  re- 
nounced their  freedom,  and  made  up  their  minds  to  get  their  living 
by  upholding  a  system  which  they  knew  to  be  imperfect  and  lialf 
suspected  to  be  rotten.  It  implied  further  that  the  disinterested 
search  for  truth  had  for  them  no  charm  :  and  tliey  had  no  notion 
of  having  this  slight  put  upon  them  by  a  man  who  chose  to  pro- 
claim himself  the  diviriely-commissioned  apostle  of  Righteousness 
and  Truth. 

But  when  we  come  to  the  trial  in  which  the  jealousies 
smouldering  for  five-and-twenty  years  burst  into  flame,  we  are 
„,    ^ .  ,        constrained  to  admit  that  our  knowledge  is  unfortu- 

The  trial  r^f      ^  p      i 

and  defence  natcly  scanty.  Of  the  speeches  of  the  accusers  we 
of  Sokrates.  ]^jjyg"jjQ  fuitlier  information  in  detail  than  the  notices 
in  the  two  Apologies  which  bear  respectively  the  names  of  I'lato 
and  Xenophon.  The  genuineness  of  the  latter  is  not  beyond 
question  :  and  how  far  the  former  represents  the  defence  actually 
made  by  the  philosopher,  must  remain,  to  say  the  lea^■t,  uncertain. 
In  the  Platonic  Apology  Sokrates  is  made  to  confess  his  total 
want  of  practice  in  speaking  before  a  public  assembly;  in  the 
Xenophontic  treatise  he  is  described  as  telling  his  friend  Ilermo- 
genes  that  in  obedience  to  the  warning  voice  of  tlie  I)aimonion  he 
had  abandoned  all  thought  of  preparing  any  defence.  Yet,  if  we 
are  to  believe  Plato,  lie  defended  liimself  not  merely  with  astonish- 
ing readiness  (for  this  from  his  consciousness  of  innocence  and  of 
general  uprightness  we  might  liave  looked  for)  but  with  the  pecidiar 
cluquence  of  which  Pluto  was  the  mn'i\ailed  master ;  and  moreover 
he  spoke  after  a  fashion  which  assuredly  seems  to  represent  rather 
the  tliouglits  of  Plato  writing  many  years  later  than  those  which 
would  j>robably  liave  passed  through  the  mind  of  Sokrates.  If  we 
are  to  credit  the  alleged  rei)ort  of  Ilermogenes,  we  must  admit 
that  lie  approached  the  tribunal  with  a  temper  dangerously  near  to 
that  of  the  suicide,  unless  we  allow  that  under  certain  circum- 
stances a  man  may  be  justified  in  resolving,  if  it  be  possible,  to  bring 
about  his  own  conviction.  In  the  Platonic  Apology  lie  delibe- 
rately ascribes  his  liolding  aloof  from  politics  to  the  conviction  that 
otherwise  liis  life  would  be  the  forfeit.  'Any  man,' he  says,  '  who 
should  dare  to  speak  truthfully  of  your  many  iniquities  would 


Chap.  II.]  SOKRATES.  53T 

assuredly  be  soon  put  to  death;  the  man  therefore  a\  ho  desires  to 
be  a  champion  of  justice  must  live  the  life  of  a  private  citizen,  if 
he  wishes  to  live  at  all."  This  is  strange  language  indeed  from 
one  who  in  the  same  defence  recounts  with  honest  satisfaction  his 
resistance  to  the  fury  of  the  nuiltitude  which  demanded  the 
slaught^-r  of  the  six  generals,  and  who  but  four  years  before  his 
trial  had  quietly  disregarded  tlie  orders  of  Kritias  and  his  fellow 
tjTants.  In  short,  if  Sokrates  spoke  thus,  he  must  have  spoken 
falsely  :  and  for  such  a  supposition  there  is  no  room.  But  what- 
ever may  have  been  his  real  defence,  sufficient  ground  for  believing 
that  to  it  he  owed  his  condemnation  seems  to  be  furnished  by  the 
fact  that  the  verdict  was  carried  by  the  small  majority  of  thirty 
out  of  more  than  500  jurymen.  When  the  number  of  those  who 
actually  acquitted  him  Avas  so  large,  we  can  scarcely  doubt  that 
many  more  would  have  followed  their  example  had  not  something 
in  the  tone  of  the  defence  changed  the  current  of  their  feelings. 
It  is  at  the  least  certain  that  men  not  violently  prejudiced  against 
him  would  admit  that  the  first  two  charges  of  the  prosecutors  were 
triumphantly  rebutted,  or  rather  that  they  had  not  even  a  color- 
able foundation.  Sokrates  was  accused  of  rejecting  the  gods 
worshipped  by  the  city, — and  it  was  proved  that  they  had  no  more 
assiduous  worshipper  ;  of  setting  up  new  deities  of  his  own, — and 
it  was  proved  not  only  that  this  could  refer  merely  to  the  warning 
voice  which  he  had  heard  from  the  days  of  his  childhood,  but  that 
he  emphatically  disclaimed  on  the  score  of  this  voice  the  posses- 
sion of  any  peculiar  privilege  or  any  relation  to  the  Divine  Being 
different  in  kind  from  that  vouchsafed  to  others  of  his  countrymen."'' 
There  remained  only  the  third  charade  ;  and  this,  we  may  remark, 
specified  no  definite  offence.  It  was  urged  that  he  had  corrupted 
young  men  by  teaching  them  not  to  respect  their  parents  and  by 
leading  them  to  regard  with  contempt  the  constitution  of  their 
country.  As  to  the  former  ])Iea,  he  had  told  them  that  parents 
who  were  mad  might  be  rightly  put  under  restraint  bv  their  chil- 
dren ;^  but  he  had  also  told  them  that  if  they  desired  to  have  the 
love  of  their  fathers  and  mothers,  brothers  and  sisters,  they  must 
not  rely  on  the  mere  fact  of  kinship  but  must  prove  the  reality  of 
this  desire  by  the  actual  offices  of  love."  On  the  latter  head  it 
was  argued  that  the  contempt  which  Sokrates  had  openly  avowed 
for  the  system  of  choosing  any  public  officers  by  lot  would  have 

'  Plat.  Apol.  Sokr.  oh.  xix.  p.  31.  tion  ;  but  he  carefully  avoids  tlie 

"  This,  at  least,  is  the  statement  assertion    that    tlie    Divine    Wi'\ 

of  tlie  Xenopliontic  Apolorry,  13.  which  is  made  known  to  himself 

All  that  he  says  is  that  he  rewards  may  not  be  made  known  to  others. 

this  voice  as  indicatino;  the  will  of  ^  Xen.  Mfm.  i.  2,  49. 

the  gods  more  surely  than  signs  or  *  Ibid.  i.  2,  55. 

omens  or  any  other  form  of  divina- 
23* 


538  THE  EMPIRE  OF   SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

for  its  natural  consequence  lawlessness  and  violence  in  those  who 
heard  him.  The  argument  is  one  which  cannot  be  sustained 
except  on  the  theory  which  would  lay  a  ban  on  all  political  dis- 
cussion ;  and  least  of  all  was  it  tenable  at  Athens,  where  the 
Demus  had  for  years  endured  with  calmness  the  cutting  ridicule  of 
comic  poets.  But  beyond  this  Sokrates  might  appeal  to  the  con- 
sistent obedience  to  law  which  had  marked  his  whole  life  and 
which  alone  had  prompted  the  resistance  which  he  had  offered, 
once  to  the  Demos,  and  once  to  the  Thirty  Tyrants.  Nor  can  we 
doubt  that  among  the  jurymen  there  were  many  more  than  six  or 
seven  so  far  wavering  in  their  opinion  as  to  be  accessible  to  all 
considerations  of  any  force  in  his  favor.  But  undoubtedly  there 
were  many  more  who  took  their  places  on  the  seats  of  the  Dikasts 
with  feelings  of  extreme  irritation  against  a  man  who  baffled, 
perplexed,  and  worried  them.  How  should  they  understand 
a  teacher  who  seemed  at  one  time  to  speak  of  the  marvellous 
powers  of  Themistokles  or  Perikles  as  divine  gifts  which  with  all 
their  efforts  and  by  the  aid  of  the  best  instructors  they  could  not 
transmit  to  their  offspring,  and  at  another  to  insist  that  ail  wrong 
action  was  the  result  of  ignorance,  and  that  if  men  knew 
thoroughly  what  would  be  the  consequences  of  their  deeds,  they 
would  act  rightly,  since  only  by  right  action  could  a  man  insure 
his  own  happiness,  and  since  no  man  was  willingly  his  own 
enemy,  or,  to  put  it  otherwise,  sought  his  own  misery  ?  What 
were  they  to  make  of  a  philosopher  who  told  them  in  one  breath 
that  virtue  sprang  up  spontaneously  in  some  men  and  refused  to 
grow  in  others,  and  in  another  that  virtue  was  knowledge  and 
therefore  could  be  imparted  by  teaching  ?  This  too  was  the 
man  who  had  been  going  about,  during  the  lifetime  of  a  generation, 
entangling  high  and  low,  rich  and  poor,  in  the  meshes  of  his 
subtle  logic,  and  compelling  all  to  confess  themselves  fools  and 
madmen.  In  such  men  the  antipathy  which  through  so  many 
years  had  been  gaining  strength  would  eagerly  seize  on  in- 
ferences gathered  from  isolated  or  distorted  passages,  and  would 
impel  them  to  get  rid  of  a  man  whose  society  was  so  manifestly 
unwholesome  and  so  specially  fatal  to  the  young.  The  latitude 
allowed  bv  the  law  of  libel,  as  it  stood  not  long  ago  in  this  coun- 
try and  still  stands  elsewhere,  would  make  the  task  of  conviction 
in  such  a  case  easy  and  light.  On  this  subject  Athenian  opinion 
claimed  even  a  larger  freedom  of  inteqiretation  ;  nor  would 
Sokrates  himself  have  denied  any  more  than  John  IIuss  that  the 
mischievous  teacher  was  a  man  who  should  be  put  down. 

If  to  men  in  such  a  temper  as  this  Sokrates  spoke  at  all  as  he 
is  said  to  have  spoken  in  the  Platonic  or  Xenophontic  Apology, 
the  smallness  of  the  majority  \yhich  condemned  him  becomes  the 


Chap.  II.]  SOKRATES.  539 

real  and  pe  -haps  only  matter  for  astonisliment.  Athenian  jury- 
men beyoni  all  doubt  were  fully  impressed  with  a  sense  of  their 
own  dignity,  and  we  have  seen  more  than  once  that  The  Apolo- 
they  were  flattered  by  the  exhibition  of  feelings  which  llfon  aiui'^^ 
betrayed  an  awe  of  their  power.  They  were  ac-  Plato, 
customed  to  hear  impassioned  appeals  to  their  sympathy,  inforced 
by  the  tears  of  the  accused  and  the  entreaties  of  his  kinsmen  or 
his  friends.  With  a  dignity  which  should  have  been  more  forcible 
than  mean  prostrations  and  piteous  prayers  for  mercy,  Sokrates 
told  them,  it  is  said,  that  for  him  there  should  be  no  such  efforts  to 
divert  the  question  to  a  false  issue.  If  he  had  offended,  he  was 
read)'^  to  pay  the  penalty.  If  he  had  not,  it  was  their  duty  to 
acquit  him.  But  if  thus  far  his  words  did  honor  to  his  judges, 
the  case  was  altered  when  he  went  on  to  tell  them  that  he  had 
come  into  court  without  having  bestowed  a  thought  on  his  de- 
fence, and  that  there  was  no  need  to  do  so,  partly  because  his  want  of 
practice  in  speaking  before  a  public  assembly  would  make  prepara- 
tion of  little  use  and  partly  because  his  whole  life  disproved  com- 
pletely all  the  charges  brought  against  him.  When  further  he 
went  on  to  tell  them  that  far  from  having  broken  any  law  he  had 
spent  his  life  in  trying  to  open  men's  eyes  to  the  nature  and  obliga- 
tions of  law,  and  that  thus  he  had  been  their  greatest  benefactor, — 
when  he  assured  them  that  if  they  condemned  him  they  would  hurt 
not  him  but  themselves  only, — when  he  warned  them  that,  as 
they  had  thus  far  had  none  who  had  devoted  themselves  without 
pay  or  reward  to  promoting  the  highest  good  of  their  citizens  by 
assailing  the  strongholds  of  ignorance  and  vice,  so  if  they  should 
put  him  to  death  they  would  And  none  to  take  his  place  and  to 
carry  on  a  work  indispensable  for  the  welfare  of  the  commonwealth, 
he  was  stringing  together  a  series  of  considerations  each  of  which 
would  weight  the  balance  more  and  more  heavily  against  him. 
Their  irritation  would  reach  its  highest  pitch  when  with  the  de- 
hberate  design,  it  is  said,  of  extorting  an  adverse  verdict  he 
warned  them  that  their  sentence,  whatever  it  might  be, -would  be 
a  matter  of  indifference  to  himself.  Of  death  he  knew  nothing, 
and  it  was  absurd  to  fear  that  which  might  be  the  greatest  of  ail 
blessings  ;  but  if  they  fancied  that  acquittal  conld  win  from  him  a 
promise  to  change  his  mode  of  life,  they  were  altogether  mistaken. 
'  If  you  tell  me,'  he  said,  according  to  the  Platonic  Apology, 
'  that  you  Avill  acquit  me  on  the  condition  that  I  pledge  myself  to 
abandon  the  search  for  truth  which  is  the  work  of  the  philosopher, 
and  that  death  should  be  the  penalty  for  the  breaking  of  my  word, 
my  answer  will  be  that  I  must  obey  God  rather  than  you  ;  that 
while  there  is  breath  in  my  body,  I  must  go  on,  testing  and  prob- 
ing every  man  I  meet,  whether  citizen  or  alien,  but  the  citizens 


540  THE   EMPIRE  OF  SPARTA.  [Book  TV, 

most  of  all  because  they  are  nearest  to  me  •.  that  I  must  do  this 
in  obedience  to  iny  divine  mission,  and  that  this  my  disinterested 
work  is  for  you  the  greatest  and  the  most  lasting  benefit,  as  it  is  for 
me  a  task  in  whicli  1  dare  not  suffer  myself  eitlier  to  flag  or  to 
fail.' 

A  defence  sucli  as  tliis  in  outline  seems  to  be  needed  in  order 
to  make  the  result  of  the  trial   intelligible.     Of  the  jurymen  who 

na  t  « *i,  came  into  court  with  wavering  minds  not  a  few  would 
Effect  of  the    ,  ,  .  ,        i    p     ^i  i  i  i  i     i 

defence  on  be  turned  agamst  the  deiendant  when  lie  told  them 
the  jnrymen.  ^j^.^^  j^jg  business  was  to  offer  an  apology  not  for  him- 
self but  for  his  judges,'  and  that  acquittal  would  but  set  him  free 
to  prove  yet  again  that  reputations  for  wisdom  were  cheaply 
earned  by  a  pretence  of  knowledge  without  the  reality.  It  is  true  that 
irritation  at  the  language  of  the  accused  and  the  establishment  <.f 
his  guilt  arc  two  Avholly  different  things,  and  that  it"  the  Athe- 
nian dikasts  acted  from  the  former  feeling,  they  were  guilty  of 
judicial  murder  when  they  passed  sentence  on  Sokrates.  In  a 
strict  view  of  the  matter  the  admission  must  be  made  :  but  severity 
against  the  Athenians  for  this  great  wrong  cannot  be  justified  un- 
less we  condemn  still  more  severely  the  thousand  iniquities  pcr[)e- 
trated  by  English  juries  through  a  long  series  of  centuries. 

But  even  if  we  accept  these  general  outlines,  the  details  of  the 
picture  as  filled  in  whether  in  the  Platonic  or  Xenophontic  Apo- 

„  ..  ,  logics  must  remain  uncertain,  if  not,  to  a  large  extent, 
Motives  of       .   °      Ti  ,  IP  •  1 

Sokrates  in  incredible.  A  man  at  the  age  of  seventy  is  scarcely 
his  defence,  justified  in  getting  himself  condemned  to  death,  be- 
cause he  prefers  to  die  in  the  plenitude  of  his  powers  rather  than 
to  live  on  until  he  loses  his  teeth  or  his  powers  of  digestion,  argu- 
ment, and  memory.  The  philosopher  who  addresses  his  judges 
with  a  very  faint  hope,  but  with  not  the  least  wish,  of  procuring 
an  acquittal,  and  who  does  so  because  he  has  convinced  himself 
that  death  inflicted  by  the  state,  while  it  must  add  to  his  reputa- 
tion, may  save  him  from  long-continued  sickness  and  wasting 
pain,  is  prompted,  we  might  fairly  say,  by  not  the  most  lofty  or  dis- 
interested motives.  At  a  more  advanced  age,  when  the  powers  of  his 
body,  if  not  those  of  his  mind,  were  failing,  Faraday  in  answer  to 
a  friend  who  asked  him  how  he  was,  could  answer  gently,  '  Just 
waiting.'  The  meekness  of  the  English  philosopher  stands  out  in 
marked  contra.st  with  the  haste  of  the  Athenian  to  escape  the 
feebleness  and  the  annoyances  of  old  age.  If  by  so  saying  we 
seem  to  reflect  harshly  on  Sokrates,  we  have  to  remember  that  we 
are  judging  him  by  a  portraiture  the  exact  fidelity  of  which 
we  liave  no  means  of  jvscertaining. 

'  Plat.  Apol.  8okr.  ch.  xviii.  p.  30,  3. 


Chap.  II.]  SOKKATES.  541 

Even  after  condemnation  Athenian  custom  allowed  the  de- 
fendant to  make  a  counter  proposal,  in  mitigation  of  the  penalty 
demanded  by  the  accuser.  But  of  the  two  penalties  Value  piu 
thus  put  before  them  the  jurymen  must  choose  one  :  on  his^own^ 
it  was  not  in  their  power  to  impose  any  other.  Hence  work. 
it  was  to  the  last  degree  unlikely  that  they^  would  ratify  the  pro- 
position of  the  criminal,  if  by  naming  a  merely  nominal  punishment 
it  practically  reversed  their  verdict  of  guilty^  Here  again  we 
have  a  picture  which,  we  can  scarcely  doubt,  has  been,  to  say  the 
least,  largely  touched  up  by  the  master  hand  of  Plato.  If  it  can 
be  trusted,  we  should  be  bound  to  admit  that  8okrates  did  his 
best  to  inflame  the  animosity  of  his  opponents  and  to  alienate  the 
waverers.  Ending  his  speech  with  the  statement  that  all  his 
worldly  goods  would  not  exceed  the  value  of  a  mina,  but  that 
Plato  with  some  others  of  his  friends  wished  to  become  sui'eties 
for  the  payment  of  a  sum  of  thirty  minai,  he  projiosed  this  fine  as 
a  substitute  for  the  penalty  sought  by  Anytos  and  his  colleagues. 
Had  he  done  this  with.iut  preface  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  of 
the  small  majority  which  condemned  him  many  would  gladlv 
have  accepted  it.  The  infliction  of  any  penalty  would  stamp  with 
the  seal  of  public  disapprobation  the  practice  of  setting  verbal 
traps  to  catch  the  ignorant  or  the  unwary  ;  and  even  if  Sokrates 
should  persist  in  the  practice,  they  could  affect  to  discern  in  it 
such  modifications  as  would  confine  it  within  decent  limits,  and 
to  wait  patiently  the  end  of  a  long  life,  which  could  not  now  be 
far  off.  But,  if  we  may  believe  Plato,  Sokrates  was  determined 
that  his  judges  should  pass  the  capital  .sentence  unless  they  chose 
to  become  his  converts.  All  minor  penalties,  he  told  them,  would 
for  him  be  intolerable.  Prison  life  with  the  Eleven  for  his  only 
visitants  would  be  a  burden  greater  than  he  could  bear  :  and  the 
idea  of  liis  living  in  exile  would  be  absurd.  Wherever  his  abode 
might  be,  there  must  he  be  instant,  in  season  and  out  of  season, 
in  the  great  work  for  which  he  carried  about  with  himself  a 
divine  commission.  If  his  own  countrymen  with  all  the  tolerance  of 
Athenian  society,  with  all  the  benefits  of  Athenian  intellectual 
discipline,  had  been  unable  to  put  up  with  the  searching  scrutiny 
which  had  exposed  the  hollowness  of  their  pretensions  to  know- 
ledge, was  it  likely  that  he  would  fare  better  in  cities  where  for- 
bearance was  a  thing  unknown,  and  where  departures  from  the  old 
paths  were  regarded  as  offences  to  be  summarily  punished  ?  But 
in  truth  why  should  he  be  punished  at  all  ?  At  least  how  could 
he  with  any  honesty  admit  the  justice  of  any  sentence  passed  upon 
him,  when  he  was  not  more  conscious  of  his  existence  than  he  was 
of  the  fact  that  he  had  devoted  his  whole  life  with  absolute  dis- 
interestedness to  the  promotion  of  their  highest  good  ?    He  was  old 


542  THE  EMPIRE  OF  SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

now,  and  the  weakness  of  age  must  soon  creep  upon  him  and 
might  perhaps  demand  a  less  severe  mode  of  hving  than  that  to 
■which  he  had  hitherto  subjected  himself.  But  under  whatever 
conditions  leisure  was  for  him  a  matter  of  the  first  moment, — 
lei.sure  which  should  enable  him  to  pry  into  the  mental  state  of 
all  whom  he  might  meet,  compelling  them  to  take  stock  of  their 
supposed  stores  of  knowledge,  to  keep  only  that  which  was  real 
and  to  cast  away  the  counterfeit.  Such  leisure  it  was  in  their 
power  to  insure  to  him  by  ordering  that  lienceforth  he  should  be 
maintained  in  the  Prytaneion  at  the  public  cost.  This,  it  is  true, 
was  a  rare  and  exceptional  honor  granted  only  to  the  most  dis- 
tinguished of  their  citizens ;  but  had  he  not  deserved  it  far  more 
than  men  who  were  supposed  to  shed  lustre  on  the  city  because 
their  horses  and  chariots  had  won  prizes  at  the  great  Olympic 
festival  ?  '  Such  victories,'  he  said,  '  merely  make  you  seem  to 
be  happy ;  I  make  you  happy  in  reality,  or  strive  to  do  so.  You 
would  not  wish  me  to  deceive  you  or  to  say  less  than  the  truth ; 
and  if  I  nmst  put  a  value  on  myself  or  rather  on  my  life  as  a 
citizen,  the  recompense  which  I  have  named  is  that  to  which  I  re- 
gard myself  as  fairly  intitled.' 

His  words  did  their  work.  By  what  majority  we  know  not, 
the  Dikasts  passed  sentence  that  Sokrates  should  be  dealt  with  by 
Address  of  ^^^^  Eleven.  The  result,  we  are  told,  was  that  which 
Sokrates  he  had  looked  for  and,  indeed,  desired.  Now  that  the 
sentence  of  G^d  J'^d  Come,  he  had  the  satisfaction  of  knowing  that 
death.  through  his  trial,  as  in  his  previous  relations  with  his 

countrymen,  he  had  acted  rightly.  Not  once,  since  it  began,  had 
the  warning  voice  bidden  him  hold  back  a  single  utterance.  It 
was  the  divine  will  that  he  should  now  depart,  and  to  that  will  he 
yielded  a  hearty  and  glad  submission.  With  the  exquisitely 
beautiful  address  which  gives  the  })arting  benediction  of  a  spirit 
wholly  absorbed  in  the  love  of  others  and  yearning  for  union  with 
the  eternal  righteousness,  all  are  familiar  whether  in  the  Greek  of 
Plato  or  the  scarcely  less  stately  Latin  of  Cicero.  AVith  a  hesi- 
tation scarcely  to  be  expected  after  the  undoubting  conviction 
expressed  in  the  Gorgias'  he  tells  them  that  death  is  either  a  sleep 
in  which  the  senses  which  trouble  us  are  at  rest  for  ever,  or  else  a 
gate  tlirough  which  the  )ipright  pass  to  the  society  of  just  men  made 

'  Ixxxii.  p.  526.     Sokrates,  it  is  are  needed  only  to  make  the  fact 

true,  is  represented  us  sayinfj  that  which  underlies  them  apjjrehensi- 

his  picture  of  tliojndfjment  of  the  hie  by  the  human  mind  :   l)iitlhata 

deadmijrlit  bedespised  asamythor  epiritual  scrutiny  awaits  men  after 

an  olJ  woman's  tale  ;  but  lie  insists  death  and  that  men  are  responsible 

that  such  contempt  can  be  juatitied  for  the  state;  in  which  they  approach 

only  if  we  can  produce  a  better  pic-  it,    lie   expresses    himself  as  thor- 

turo  in  its  stead.  Clearly  tliedetails  ougUly  assured. 


Chap.  II.J  SOKRATES.  543 

perfect.  In  the  former  case  it  is  at  the  least  no  evil :  in  the  latter 
it  is  the  greatest  of  all  blessings.  The  dying,  he  added,  were  sup- 
posed to  see  farther  than  other  men  ;  and  they  must  forgive  him, 
if,  looking,  as  he  now  could,  into  the  future,  he  told  them  that  any 
hopes  which  they  might  have  of  arresting  his  work  by  liis  death 
must  bet  disappointed.  In  the  course  of  his  defence  he  had  indeed 
uttered  a  warning  not  easily  reconciled  with  his  dying  prophecy. 
He  had  told  them'  that  by  getting  rid  of  him  they  would  lose  the 
only  man  who  would  stick  to  the  city  like  a  fly  to  a  high-bred 
horse  which  needed  a  sting  to  keep  it  from  lapsing  into  shiggish- 
ness.  He  now  told  them^  that  his  work  would  be  carried  on  with 
tenfold  greater  zeal  by  a  band  of  young  disciples  whose  youthful 
energy  would  render  their  assaults  both  more  frequent  and  less 
agreeable.  For  tliemselves  his  death  was  a  mistake.  The  true 
method  of  avoiding  humiliating  confessions  of  ignorance  was  not 
by  slaying  others  but  by  giving  tliemselves  up  to  the  task  of  self- 
improvement  in  obedience  to  the  precept  inscribed  in  the  Delphian 
temple,  '  Know  thyself.'  But  that  which  for  them  Avas  a  blunder 
Avas  for  him  the  happiest  of  all  events.  Whatever  death  might  be, 
no  harm  could  ever  befall  the  good  ;  and  he  trusted  that  they  too 
might  face  death  with  the  supreme  consolation  imparted  by  this 
conviction.  Lastly  he  commended  to  them  his  children  as  persons 
needing  the  friendly  discipline  Avhich  he  had  applied  to  all.  '  If 
they  fancy  themselves  to  be  something  Avhen  they  are  nothing,  and 
follow  their  own  desires,  treat  them  as  I  have  treated  you  :  and 
you  will  then  have  given  me  an  abundant  recompense  for  all  my 
toil.  But  it  is  time  for  me  to  go  to  my  death,  for  you  to  return 
to  your  active  life.  Which  of  these  two  things  is  the  better,  no 
man  can  say.     God  alone  knows.' 

By  a  singular  accident  the  sentence  was  passed  on  the  day 
Avhich  followed  the  crowning  of  the  Sacred  Ship  before  its  depar- 
ture for  Delos.  Each  year  this  trireme,  bearing  on  its 
stern  the  garland  placed  upon  it  by  the  priest  of  sSes^"^ 
Apollon,  went  on  the  pilgrimage  to  that  holy  island  399  b.c. 
in  memory  of  the  deliverance  wrought  for  the  tribute  children  by 
the  slayer  of  the  Minotauros.  From  the  moment  Avhen  this  wreath 
was  put  in  its  place  to  the  hour  when  the  vessel  again  entered  the 
haven  of  Peiraieus,  no  capital  sentence  could  be  executed ;  and 
Sokrates  thus  remained  for  some  thirty  days,  chained  in  his  cell, 
but  cheered,  if  his  serene  soul  needed  any  comfort,  by  the  devotion 
of  his  friends  whoAvere  allowed  free  access  to  him.     To  these  his 

'  P]at.    Apol.^  Sok7:  cb.  xviii.  p.     as  amountinor  to  a  contradiction, 
31  A.     See  ch.  iv.  and  may  aid  us  in  determinintj  tlie 

^  Plat.  Apol.    Sokr.   ch.  xxx.  p.     accnracy  of  the  picture  drawn  for 
40  A.     The  difiference  between  the     us  in  tlu;  Platonic  Apology, 
two  statements  may  fairly  be  taken  " 


54r-i  THE  EMPIRE  OF   SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

sentence  was  not  so  gratifying  as  it  was  to  liimself,  and  Kriton, 
we  are  told,  had  arranged  a  plan  for  escape  to  be  carried  out  by 
bribing  tlie  gaoler.  With  some  indignation  Sokrates  rejected  a 
proposal  which  would  fasten  on  him  the  guilt  of  disobeying  the 
law, — the  very  crime  for  Avhich  he  had  been  tried  and  of  whic]i  up 
to  that  time  he  knew  himself  to  be  Avholly  guiltless.  The  days 
which  might  still  remain  to  him,  be  they  few  or  many,  must  be 
spent  in  meditation  on  the  eternal  truths,  which  formed  the  unfail- 
ing inheritance  of  those  who  sincerely  sought  them.  Of  that 
solemn  time  the  I'haidon  of  Plato  has  left  to  us  an.  imperishable 
monument.  UnrutSed  by  a  single  disturbing  thought,  Sokrates 
poured  out  for  his  friends  those  treasures  of  positive  knowledge  of 
which  during  his  i)ublic  career  he  had  been  regarded  as  somewhat 
chary  ;  and  wlien  at  last  he  had  taken  the  liemloek  juice  and  his 
eyes  grew  heavy,  lie  bade  Kriton  remember  that  he  owed  a  cock 
to  Asklepios.  With  the  gentle  playfulness  fif  one  who  felt  that  in 
all  conditions  lie  had  a  home  in  God  he  prayed  his  friend  by  no 
means  to  forget  the  debt.  Tlie  cock  was  the  bird  which  heralded 
the  return  of  light  and  life  to  the  darkened  earth,  and  Asklepios 
was  the  Great  Healer  whose  voice  brought  back  the  dead  from 
their  graves.  So,  with  the  conviction  that  the  life  here  is  the 
portal  to  the  life  hereafter,  passed  away  the  man  who  in  the  words 
of  his  disciple  was  of  all  men  the  most  excellent,  the  most  wise, 
and  the  most  just. 

If  we  are  compelled  to  admit  that  neither  in  the  method  of 
Sokrates  nor  in  the  matter  of  his  philosophy  was  there  any  absolute 
Peculiarities  oriijinalitv,  the  enormous  power  with  which  he  wielded 
thodof"so-  ^^"^  weapons  employed  by  his  j)redecessors,  the  un- 
krates.  flinching  honesty  with  which  he  applied  his  principles 

so  far  as  he  felt  that  their  sphere  extended,  and  the  profound  im- 
pression which  he  left  on  the  minds  of  his  companions  remain  not 
the  less  unquestionable  facts.  The  rule  of  submitting  all  proposi- 
tions to  a  searching  test,  and  of  weighing  all  that  could  be  said 
against  as  well  as  for  them,  was  certainly  not  struck  out  by  him- 
self ;  but  if  by  the  Sokratic  Elenchos  we  mean  that  examination 
by  short  oral  questions  which  ended  with  convincing  his  hearers 
of  their  ignorance  even  on  common  subjects,  then  we  must  allow 
that  he  not  merelv  devised  this  mode  of  negative  analysis  but 
carried  it  to  perfection.  In  fact,  it  was  never  again  used  with 
the  same  systematic  perseverance  and  the  same  unfailing  subtlety. 
Nor  could  it  be  so  used  except  bv  men  who  chose  to  sulmiit  to  the 
hard  conditions  which  Sokrates  imjioscd  upon  himself.  Xo  one 
<'ould  hope  to  achieve  anvthing  liki'  the  same  success,  unless  like 
him  they  devoted  their  lives  to  the  one  work  of  addressing  all  men 
indiscriminately,  unmasking  hypocrisy,  pretence,  and  falsehood, 


CnAP.  II.]  SOKRATES.  545 

whether  in  the  most  eminent  of  their  countrymen  or  the  most 
humble.  At  all  hours  they  must  be  ready  to  put  or  to  answer 
questions,  and  the  long  toil  of  untwisting  the  tangled  fallacies 
which  held  together  the  tottering  body  of  popular  opinion  and 
traditional  belief  must  be  undergone  witliout  pay,  for  with  the 
touch  of  coin  the  charm  of  the  <|uestioner  would  lose  its  power. 
In  this  complete  abandonment  of  himself  to  his  work  Sokrates 
stands  alone  ;  and  the  Platonic  dialogues,  which  may  give  us  some 
idea  of  his  wonderful  conversations,  alone  remain  to  show  how 
much  may  be  done  not  merely  to  expose  falsehood  but  to  inipart 
positive  knowledge  by  sliort  questions  on  the  most  ordinary  topics, 
all  directed  with  consummate  skill  to  a  predetermined  end. 

Nor  must  we  forget  that  this  ruthless  tearing  ofiE  of  the  mask 
behind  which  Folly  and  Falsehood  passed  themselves  off  for  Wis- 
dom and  Truth  was  with  Sokrates  the  mere  prelude,  Hisne"-ative 
yet  the  indispensable  prelude,  to  the  real  work  of  con-  and  positive 
structlon  without   which  the  negative  process  would  "' 

be  of  no  profit.  Speaking  always  not  as  the  teacher  but  as  the 
learner,  sifting  the  opinions  of  his  hearers  with  the  one  purpose  of 
clearing  the  ground  for  the  reception  of  trutli,  he  so  tempered  the 
pain  which  he  could  not  help  inflicting  as  to  make  it  a  stimulus  to 
earnest  and  patient  search ;  and  with  tliose  wlio  at  bottom  were 
honest  and  truth-loving  men  he  never  failed.  Failure  ensued  only 
when  the  hearer  had  committed  himself  to  a  system  from  which 
he  derived  profit,  and  whicli  he  was  resolved  to  uphold  at  what- 
ever cost :  and  with  such  men  the  name  of  Sokrates  stirred  up 
feelings  of  dangerous  animosity.  Thus  doing  thoroughly  what  other 
philosophers  had  done  only  in  part,  he  succeeded  in  pulling  to  pieces 
a  vast  mass  of  error  which  was  yearly  swelling  to  more  gigantic 
proportions.  Nor  was  this  all.  He  showed  that  in  the  study  of 
mankind  and  of  societv  there  was  a  boundless  field  in  which  the 
careful  observation  of  fact  would  yield  an  abundant  harvest  of 
positive  knowledge,  and  that  the  attainment  of  this  Iviiowledge  Avas 
the  indispensable  condition  of  human  well-being.  That  any  know- 
ledge could  be  gained  without  careful  and  unprejudiced  study  and 
search,  he  denied  altogether ;  that  a  man  could  do  just,  or  tempe- 
rate, or  brave  acts  without  first  knowing  what  Justice,  Temperance, 
and  Bravery  were,  he  denied  not  less  strenuously.  But  he  asserted 
with  unvvearied  iteration  that  in  ascertaining  the  nature  of  these 
and  all  other  moral  qualities  there  lay  a  province  of  inquiry  which 
would  always  yield  solid  results. 

He  held,  in  short,  that  the  field  thus  marked  out  was  the  only 
one  in  which  the  human  intellect  could  be  legitimately  exercised. 
In  the  method  by  which  he  would  have  this  field  surveyed  he  was 
in  perfect  harmony  with  the  philosophy  of  Bacon.     The  assump- 


546  THE  EMPIRE  OF  SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

tions  by  ■which  lie  sought  to  shut  the  gates  against  physical  re^ 
search,  and  the  over-sanguine  hopes  Avhich  pictured  to  him  a  co- 
-,   .    ,    ,      herent  fabric  of  ethical  science   almost  as  a  present 

Protest  of  11      r  1  !•      T  -i  1 

Sokrates  reality,  sprang  naturally  irom  the  state  or  philosophy 
8ica'l"re-^''^  in  his  earlier  years.  The  absurd  and  random  guesses  by 
search.  Avhich  men  of  the  highest  eminence  sought  to  explain 

natural  phenomena  Avere  put  forth  in  a  succession  of-  theories  not 
much  more  long-lived  than  the  gourd  of  the  prophet  which  sprang 
up  in  a  night  and  died  in  a  night.  From  the  labyrinth  of  contra- 
dictory conclusions  which  was  becoming  continually  more  intricate, 
what  inference  could  a  really  unprejudiced  and  honest  thinker 
draw  than  that  they  who  troubled  themselves  with  such  things 
were  altogether  on  the  wrong  track?  Without  pausing  to  con- 
sider whether  the  alleged  facts  on  which  these  theories  were  built 
had  been  really  observed,  or  still  more  whether  a  vastly  larger 
array  of  facts  must  not  be  brought  together  before  any  theorising 
at  all  could  be  justified,  he  jumped  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
absurdities  of  natural  philosophers  were  a  righteous  })unisliment 
inflicted  bv  the  gods  for  intrusion  into  their  own  hallowed  and 
inviolable  domain.  Having  assumed  thus  much,  he  naturally 
assumed  still  more.  If  there  could  be  no  science,  properly  so 
called,  of  things  physical,  yet  a  large  amount  of  practical  guidance 
in  the  affairs  of  human  life  was  vouchsafed  through  the  less  usual 
phenomena  of  nature.  In  oracles,  in  signs  and  portents,  in  the 
bodies  of  animals  offered  in  sacrifice,  in  visions  and  dreams  men 
were  brought  into  direct  communication  with  the  deity  ;  and  thus, 
although  his  countrymen  could  scarcely  be  brought  to  believe  it, 
Sokrates  was. almost  a  bigoted  adherent  of  the  traditional  religion 
of  Athens.  The  man  who  wielded  the  Elendios  to  such  terrible 
effect  in  the  wide  field  of  human  duty  could  not  see  that  he  was 
stringing  together  a  multitude  of  assumptions  respecting  a  theology 
of  which  Tliueydides  fully  saw  the  hollowness  and  tlie  mischief. 

During  the  centuries  which  have  passed  since  his  death  the 
conditions  of  the  two  great  controversies  into  which  he  plunged 
„   ,  have   been   strangelv  reversed.     The   laws   or  rules  by 

pcriKof  wliieli  the  movements  of  suns  with  their  planets  are 
physical'"  regulated  have  been  read  with  an  accuracy  which  has 
philosophy,  led  to  the  discovery  of  worlds  unseen.  The  nature 
of  liuman  sensation,  the  relation  of  the  mind  to  the  brain,  of 
morality  to  religion,  the  origin  of  law,  and  the  true  purpose  of 
society  are,  with  many  other  questions,  debated  now  more  vehe- 
mently tlian  in  any  earlier  age  ;  and  it  may  perhaps  be  not  unfairly 
said  that  the  new  forms  recently  given  to  old  discussions  arise  from 
the  reapplication  of  the  method  of  Sokrates.  That  method  was  to 
prove  fatjil  not  only  to  his  assumptions,  but  to  not  a  few  of  his 


Chap.  III.]  GROWTH  OF  THEBAN  POWER.  547 

conclusions  in  Ethics  which  he  regarded  as  vesting  on  unassailable 
fonndalions  of  fact.  But  after  all  qualifications  he  performed  a 
mighty  work,  a  work  not  the  less  astonishing  because,  in  spite  of 
the  genial  and  loving  nature  of  the  man,  it  was  addressed  rather  to 
the  hea^l  than  to  the  heart.  It  may  be  easy  to  show,  as  he  insisted, 
that  right  action  could  .spring  only  from  right  knowledge,  and  that 
no  man  can  be  truthful  or  gcuprous  or  just  until  he  can  give  an 
accurate  definition  of  justice,  truth,  and  generosity.  Yet  such 
teaching  as  this  will  go  but  a  little  way  towards  lightening  the 
agony  of  human  life.  There  was  no  such  insistance  on  this  puri- 
fying intellectual  process  in  the  words  of  Him  who  cheered  the 
weary  and  heavy  laden  with  the  glad  tidings  that  they  were  all 
children  of  their  Father  who  is  in  heaven.  The  Sermon  on  the 
Mount  has  been  the  consolation  of  millions;  the  Sokratic  philo- 
sophy has  at  best  ennobled  the  minds  of  a  scanty  band  of  earnest 
thinkers. 


CHAPTER    HI. 


FROM  THE  RETURN  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND  TO  THE  BATTLE  OP 

LEUKTRA. 

From  the  departure  of  Xerxes  to  the  outbreak  of  the  Pelopoimesian 
war  Hellenic  history  is  the  history  of  an  attempt  to  maintain  a 
confederacy  which  tended  to  niould  isolated  tribes  character  ot 
into  a  nation,  and  of  a  determined  opposition  which  at  Greek  his- 
length  ended  in  its  destruction.  From  the  day  when  the  fall  of 
the  Long  Walls  of  iVthens  were  overthrown  down  uie'battieot 
to  the  hour  when  the  hoplites  of  Kleombrotos  were  Leuktra. 
crushed  by  the  mighty  mass  of  the  Theban  phalanx  at  Leuktra, 
the  history  of  Greece  is  the  narrative  of  a  tyranny  without  prin- 
ciple, save  indeed  that  of  lawless  self-gratification,'  and  of  a  single 
effort  in  the  direction  of  national  union  which  might  have  changed 
the  fortunes  of  the  Hellenic  world,  had  it  not  been  put  down  in 
blood.  In  short,  from  first  to  last,  Greek  history  during  this 
whole  period  lays  bare  the  enormous  mischief  wrought  by  a  poli- 
tical theory  that  will  not  apply  to  cities  the  rules  which  each  city 
scrupled  not  to  inforce  on  its  individual  citizens. 

'  This  statement  is  that  of  Xeno-  to   do  what   it  liked,  see  p.  471. 

phnnliims«ir,^l«Y/&.  vi.  4.13.  In  its  But  tlie  acts  of  the  Demos,  even  if 

worstinomentsthe  Athenian  people  iniquitous,  must  be  preceded  by  a 

had  never  propounded  a  worse  doc-  vote  of  the   majority.     Under  the 

Irine  tlian  the  theory   which   as-  Spartan  empire  each  Spartan  citi- 

serted  that  the  Demos  had  a  right  zen  was  the  law  to  himself. 


5-iS  THE  EMPIRE  OF   SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

Six  months,  perhaps  six  weeks,  sufficed  to  show  tlie  most  vehe- 
ment uf  tbe  Spartan  allies  what  sort  of  bargain  they  had  made 
and  wluit  kind  of  work  they  had  been  helping  to  do. 
gi\Tn°to  the  The  day  which  saw  the  downfall  of  the  Athenian 
f^^cS^ar"^^  wails  was  for  them  tlie  triamph  of  the  gospel  which 
chic  factions  Brasidas  had  preached,'  and  it  wiis  not  convenient  for 
and  other  them  to  ponder  then  the  parable  of  his  address  to  the 
c''i^-  2)ec>ple  of  Akanthos.     Their  eyes  were  opened  when 

a  few  days  or  a  few  months  later  it  became  plain 
that  the  freedom  which  they  had  lielped  to  win  meant  freedom 
otdv  for  the  Spartans,  and  that  the  Spartans  used  the  term  to 
denote  the  power  of  doing  what  they  chose  themselves  and  of 
compelling  everyone  else  to  do  the  same.  They  had  been  looking 
forward  to  a  time  when  each  city  should  be  left  to  manage  its  own 
atfairs,  without  visits  from  Athenian  or  other  tiibute-gatherers : 
they  now  found  each  city  assessed  in  sums  the  total  of  which 
yielded  a  thousand  talents,  while  the  Aki'opo lis  became  the  strong- 
hold of  a  Peloponnesian  garrist)n  under  a  Spartan  harmost.  These 
garrisons  were  not  indeed  introduced  by  the  mere  force  of  Si)artan 
power.  The  triumph  of  Sparta  was  in  each  city  the  triumph  of 
the  few  who  vaunted  themselves  as  the  aristocracy  of  birth  and 
wealth.  The  events  which  happened  at  Athens  exhibited  only  on 
a  larger  scale  the  course  which  events  were  taking  elsewhere.  In 
each  city  the  leaders  of  the  oligarchical  party  seized  power  for  the 
expressed  purpose  of  enjoying  themselves  at  the  expense  of  the 
people,  and  were  abetted  in  their  evildoing  by  the  members  of 
their  clubs,  as  the  Thirty  at  Athens  were  supported  by  their 
zealous  comrades,  the  Knights  or  Horsemen. 

In  Asia  Minor  the  Greek  cities  had  at  first  been  surrendered  to 
the  Persian  king,"  Abydos  alone  remaining  under  the  rule  of  the 
T  .  •         .    Spartan  harmost  Derkvllidas.     But  Lvsandros,  foiled 

Intritjncs  of     .  '         i     ,  ,.  ,  i     '  <•     i       n-.!  •  "    »    i  <•  i 

L.vcaiKiros.  lu  uphokling  the  rule  of  the  llurty  at  Atliens,  tound 
403  B.C.  ^]|.,^  jj^j  Ij.^j  plenty  to  do  when  he  was  dis{)atched  by 
the  Spartans  to  the  ea.stern  coasts  of  the  Egean,  llis  zeal  on 
behalf  of  the  Dekarchies  which  he  had  established  called  forth 
complaints  not  only  from  the  cities  but  from  the  satrap  Tharna- 
bazos.  The  latter  could  not  be  disregarded,  and  Lysandros, 
recalled  home,  found  the  position  of  a  simple  citizen  so  intolerable 
that  he  besought  leave  to  undertake  a  pilgrimage  to  the  Libyan 
oracle  of  Amoun.'  His  visits  to  fate-giving  temples  were  not 
confined  to  this  distant  shrine.  He  was  seen  at  Dodona  and  at 
1  )elphr)i ;  and  at  each  besought  encouragement  for  the  plan  wliich, 
as  he  hoped,  might  make  bin)  one  of  the  Sj)artan  kings.     The  goal, 

'  See  p.  335.  "  For  the  treaties  on  this  subject  see  pp.  417,  422. 

'  See  p.  120. 


Cn.vr.  Ill]  GROWTH  OF  THEBAN  POWER.  549 

Ave  init^ht  think,  w;is  not  iiiueh  worth  the  effort  of  ?cckuni;  it ;  and 
oven  tlie  intrusion  of  n  )ii;in  not  belonginjjj  to  the  stock  of  the 
lloriikloids  into  the  linos  roprcsentino;  the  houses  of  Eurysthenes 
;uul  I'roklos  could  scurcelv  he  (lijjinilied  with  theniuue  of  a  political 
revolution.  Sparta  was  ruled  not  hy  the  kinijs,  but  by  the  ephors,' 
whoso,  coinuiissioners  now  hampered  their  action  even  in  the 
command  of  the  Spartan  armies.  Still  it  was  possible  that  by  a 
man  of  vigorous  intellect  and  powerful  will  the  oflice  mio-ht  be 
made  the  means  of  exereisini«;  a  largely  extended  intluence.  Unable 
to  secure  it  for  himself,  he  used  all  his  strength  to  bring  about  the 
election  of  one  on  whose  hearty  obedience  he  felt  that  ho  could 
count.      He  found  himself  signally  mistaken. 

The  punishment  of  the  Eleians  for  affronts  and  wrongs  done  to 
Sparta  twenty  years  before  was  the  last  work  of  King  .Vgis,  under 
whom  the  Spartan  force  at  Dekeleia  had  dealt  a  fatal  rmiishnu'iit. 
blow  to  imperial  Athens.  The  P^leiaus  had  dared  to  1^,'',^'"'  ''^''''" 
exclude  S})arta  from  the  great  ()lym{)ian  festival  in  4ix)  n.c. 
the  year  marked  by  the  magnilicent  display  of  .Vlkibiades  \'  the}' 
had  broken  away  from  her  confecK'raey,  and  had  appeared  amongst 
her  enemies  in  the  light  of  Mantineia.  For  these  oirences  their 
land  w;is  twice  invaded  by  a  Spartan  army.  An  earthtjuake  cut 
short  the  first  expedition  :  the  second  ended  in  a  discomliture, 
which  might  have  been  rendered  more  luimiliating  had  the  Spar- 
tans listened  to  the  recpicst  of  the  men  of  Pisa  that  the  presidency 
of  the  games  might  be  transferred  to  themselves. 

About  twelve  months  later  tlieir  conqueror  Agis  died  ;  and  on 
the  suggestion  of  Lysandros,  who  would  have  secured  the  succes- 
sion for  himself  if  he  could,  Agesilaos,  his  younger  Election  of 
brother,  stood  forth  to  dispute  the  title  of  his  son  Airosiimw  us 
o^eotycliidea,  a  boy  now  about  tifteen  years  of  age.  The  sparia. 
old  scandal  was  revived  which  represented  him  as  the  aiW)  »•(". 
son  not  of  Agis  but  of  Alkibiades  ;  but  prob:d)l3'  the  eloipiencc  of 
Lysandros  on  behalf  of  Agesilaos  was  aided  more  powi'rrully  by  the 
reputation  whicli  Agesilaos,  with  his  genial  countenance  antl  affable 
manner,  had  accjuired  as  a  zealous  disciple  and  champion  of  the 
military  monasticism  of  Sparta.  Faithful  in  his  friendships  and 
too  ready  to  overlook  in  his  friends  inicpiities  which  he  would 
have  shrunk  from  committing  himself,  he  had  only  one  defect 
which  threatened  to  stand  seriously  in  his  way.  lie  was  lame  in 
one  leg,  and  the  subtlety  of  Lysandros  was  needed  to  explain  away 
the  prophecies  which  warned  Sparta  against  allowing  her  power  to 
be  endangered  by  a  lame  reign.  Events  were  to  occur  before  his 
death  whicli  in  the  belief  of  many  fully  justified  the  old  ]>rediction. 
For  the  present  the  objection  was  set  aside  on  the  ground  that  the 
'  See  p.  30.  ^  See  p.  35. 


550  THE  EMPIRE  OF  SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

oracle  spoke  not  of  any  bodily  blemish  but  of  the  reign  of  one  who 
had  not  in  his  veins  tlie  blood  of  Herakles.  The  ephors  at  least 
were  soon  won  over  by  the  new  king.  Far  from  showing  the 
luiuglitiness  by  which  some  among  his  predecessors  may  have 
sought  to  make  up  for  scanty  prerogative,  Agesilaos  always  rose 
at  their  entrance,  while  he  sought  their  goodwill  by  frequent  gifts 
which  the  wealth  inherited  from  his  brother  Agis  enabled  him 
freely  to  bestow.  Clad  in  the  garb  of  an  ordinary  citizen,  he 
still  subjected  liimself  to  the  public  discipline,  and  thus  showed 
that  in  his  own  person  at  least  he  was  not  corrupted  either  by  his 
own  fortune  or  by  the  vast  treasures  poured  since  the  catastrophe 
of  Aigospotamoi  into  a  city  where  the  possession  of  gold  or  silver 
money  was  a  capital  offence. 

In  spite  of  all  enactments,  liowever,  the  influx  of  this  wealth 
liad  an  immediate  effect  in  aggravating  the  inequalities,  already 
Eflfectsof  great  enough,  which  threatened  to  produce  a  terrible 
the  inniix  of  Jiarvest  of  discontent  and  hatred.  Failure  to  pay  the 
s>parta.  contributions  needed  for  the  })ublic  messes  had  long 

been  multiplying  the  number  of  the  Inferiors,  or  Ilypomeiones,'  by 
thrusting  down  among  them  men  whose  citizenship,  although 
not  lost,  was  in  abeyance,  and  who,  if  fortune  favored  them, 
might  under  tlie  title  of  Mothakes  re.aune  the  franchise.  These 
men,  smarting  under  bitter  feelings  of  disappointment,  would  see 
themselves  shut  out  from  the  splendid  prizes  bestowed  on  the  more 
powerful  citizens  in  the  various  parts  of  the  great  Spartan  empire. 
While  their  own  property  was  being  continually  absorbed  into  that 
of  richer  men,  they  would  look  on  Spartans  for  whom  influence, 
not  merit,  had  secured  office,  in  other  words,  boundless  wealth 
abroad.  That  the  dull  and  rigid  routine  of  Spartan  life  tended  to 
foster  an  irrepressible  yearning  (in  vulgar  English  jjluase)  to  have 
their  fling  elsewhere  and  to  create  an  inordinate  appetite  for  money 
among  men  who  were  allowed  to  use  only  lieavy  lumps  of  iron, 
cannot  be  denied.  The  luxurious  sensuality  to  which  the  con- 
queror (if  J'lataiai"  abandoned  himself  was  but  the  first  symptom 
of  the  disease  wliioh  brought  home  to  the  Spartans  the  conviction 
that  their  citizens  were  not  much  deserving  of  trust  away  from 
home.  That  such  a  state  of  things  was  full  of  danger  for  Sparta 
we  learn  on  the  clear  testimony  of  the  philo-Lakonian  Xenophon, 
who  mourns  that  greediness  for  foreign  service  wliich  pointed  to  a 
desire  for  luxuries  not  allowed  at  home,  and  was  the  cause  of  a 
degeneracy  not  unlike  that  which  the  austerer  citizens  of  Rome 
deplored  in  the  later  ages  of  the  commonwealth.  The  men  de- 
barred from  these  easy  modes  of  enrichment  simply  because  they 
had  failed  to  pay  their  yearly  subscription  to  the  Syssitia  wouhl  bo 
'  See  p.  33.  '  See  p.  478. 


Chap.  III.]         GROWTH  OF  THEBAN   POWER.  551 

dangerous  companions  for  the  Neodamodes  or  infrancbised  Helots 
as  well  as  for  the  gi-eat  body  of  subject  Lakonians  over  whom 
through  the  Krypteia'  the  state  exercised  a  ceaseless  and  most 
anxious  supervision. 

Agesilaos  had  been  king  for  scarcely  a  year  when  as  he  was 
offering  a  public  sacrifice  the  prophet  announced  that  the  victims 
clearly  revealed  the  existence  of  a  dangerous  conspiracy.  ,^^^  ^^^^^  . 
The  signs  furnished  l)y  a  second  victim  were  even  more  racy  of  Ki- 
alarming.  When  the  third  was  slain,  the  prophet  "'^^'"^• 
declared  that  according  to  the  tokens  they  were  in  the  very  midst 
of  their  enemies.  That  a  plot  was  being  arranged,  the  sequel 
sufliciently  showed.  Whether  the  prophet  thus  warned  Agesilaos 
or  whether,  if  he  so  warned  him,  he  was  himself  possessed  of  the 
secret,  it  might  be  rash  to  say  ;  but  lapse  of  time  was  never  held  to 
invalidate  the  force  of  heaven-sent  signs,'^  and  some  five  days  had 
passed  before  some  man  (who  he  may  have  been,  we  are  not  told) 
came  forward  to  denounce  Kinadon  as  the  traitor.  It  is  possible 
and  even  likely  that  this  man  may  have  offered  himself  and  been 
accepted  as  an  accomplice  in  the  conspiracy  ;  but  it  is  absurd  to 
put  faith  in  the  tales  which  such  miscreants  may  be  pleased  to  tell, 
and  the  story  of  this  informer  exhibits  Kinadon  simply  as  an  in- 
fatuated fool.  That  a  man  who  had  been  constantly  employed  by 
tlie  Ephors  on  secret  missions  should  pick  out  this  informer  for 
the  expressed  purpose  of  taking  him  through  the  Agora  and  begging 
him  to  count  the  Spartiatai  there  present,  in  order  that  he  might 
see  who  were  to  be  assassinated  and  who  were  to  be  assassins,  is 
altogether  incredible.  It  is  enough  to  say  that  the  Ephors  acted 
with  more  than  their  usual  craft  and  secrecy.  Kinadon  was  dis- 
patched on  a  secret  errand  to  Anion  ;  but  the  men  sent  with  him 
were  ordered  to  seize  their  commander  at  some  distance  from  the 
city.  To  the  question  by  which  the  Ephors  demanded  the  reason 
for  his  enterprise  his  answer  was  that  he  was  determined  to  be 
the  peer  of  the  first  man  in  Sparta.  It  is  almost  superfluous  to 
add  that  torture  was  used  to  wring  from  him  the  names  of  his 
accomplices,  and  that  with  them,  with  his  hands  manacled  and 
his  neck  laden  with  a  heavy  wooden  collar,  he  Avas  scourged  and 
goaded  through  the  city  and  then  beheaded.^ 

When  the  Spartans,  if  the  tale  be  true,^  had  by  a  treachery 
which  would  do  credit  to  Belial  himself  got  rid  of  the 
Helots   who  had  ventured   their  lives   to   succor  the   rations  in 
hoplites  in  Sphakteria,  they  thought  it  prudent  to  send   Asia  Minor. 

^  See  p.  32.  this   story.     But   if    its   truth    be 

^  See  p.  SIO.  granted,    it   stands    amon<rst    the 

^  Xen.  Hcllen.  iii.  3.  most  lieinous  in  the  catalogue  of 

*  I  have  expressed  my  doubts  of  human  crimes.     See  p.  329. 


552  THE  EMPIRE  OF  SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

on  foreifjn  scnice  those  who  might  be  disagreeably  ini|uisitive  or 
dano-erously  indignant  at  home.  The  same  policy  now  prompted 
them  to  dispatch  Agesilaos  to  Asia,  where  Sparta  had  been  com- 
pelled to  take  a  course  very  different  from  that  to  which  she  had 
pledged  herself  in  her  covenants  with  Tissaphernes.  By  aiding 
Cyrus  she  had  incurred  the  enmity  of  the  Great  King,  and  even 
prudence  seemed  to  justify  her  in  using  for  the  benelit  of  the 
Asiatic  Greeks  the  survivors  of  the  Ten  Thousand  whom  Xenophon 
was  bringing  back  with  him  from  the  field  of  Kunaxa.  But  Thim- 
bron,  sent  out  with  a  laro;c  army,  failed  everywhere  aud 
in  everything,  was  recalled  and  banished,  and  Derkylli- 
das  put  in  his  place.  This  officer  was  doubly  favored.  First,  it 
would  seem  that  Xenophon  returned  with  him  to  take  the  com- 
mand of  the  Cyreiau  troops ;  and,  secondly,  all  difficulties  as  to 
the  payment  of  his  men  were  removed  by  the  lucky  accident  which 
made  liim  master  of  the  vast  wealth  of  Mania,  widow  of  Zenis  who 
liad  governed  Aiolis  under  Pharnabazos.  This  spirited  woman, 
who  had  succeeded  to  her  husband's  power  on  her  promise  of  dis- 
charging all  his  duties,  had  with  her  son  fallen  a  victim  to  the  greed 
of  her  son-in-law  Meidias,  Avho  thought  b\r  tlie  murder  to  become 
master  of  the  cities  of  Skepsis,  Gergis,  and  Kebren.  The  first  two 
of  these  he  occupied  ;  the  third  the  governor  insisted  on  liolding 
for  I'harnabazos,  but  the  garrison  surrendered  to  Derkyllidas,  wdio 
went  on  to  Skepsis  and  there  got  possession  of  Meidias  himself. 
Henceforth  the  task  of  the  Spartan  general  was  an  easy  one. 
Meidias  was  compelled  to  order  the  gates  of  Gergis  to  be  opcued,  to 
draw  up  an  inventory  of  liis  own  property  (which  he  made  as  large 
as  possible),  to  admit  that  Mania  was  a  dependent  of  Pharnabazos, 
and  that  her  treasure  therefore  escheated  to  Derkyllidas  with  whom 
the  satrap  was  at  war.  The  luurderer  was  dismissed  to  live  as 
best  he  might  in  his  father's  liouse  at  Skepsi.s,  and  Derkyllidas  be- 
came possessed  of  a  sum  c{]aal  at  least  to  a  year's  pay  for  8,000  men.' 

In  the  following:  sprint;  while  lie  was  at   Lampsakos, 

commissioners  arrived  from  Sparta  to  tell  him  that  his 
command  was  continued  for  another  year,  and  to  express  the  satis- 
faction of  the  Ephora  with  the  improved  conduct  of  the  Cyreians. 
A\  hen  this  announcement  was  made  to  the  troops,  their  leader  (wo 
cannot  doubt  that  it  was  Xenophon  himself)  answered  that  the 
rliange  lay  not  in  the  men  but  in  the  new  Spartan  commander. 
I'rohably  the  wealth  of  Mania,  by  smoothing  the  way  of  Derkylli- 
das, had  iiiuch  to  do  with  winniiin-  for  him  the  delicate  praise  ini- 
])lied  in  these  words. 

The  next  year  was  spent  chiefiy  in  the  siege    of  Atarneus.      Its 
reduction  in  the  eighth  month  of  the  blockade  (397  b.c.)  wasfol- 
'  Xen.  7/.  iii.  1,  28. 


Chap.  III.J         GROWTH  OF   THEBAN   POWER. 


553 


lowed  by  larger  operations  in  Karia  where  Derkyllidas  found  him- 
self opposed  to  the  combined  forces  of  Pharnabazos  and  Tissa- 
phernes.  On  the  banks  of  the  Maiandros  [Meander]  the  satraps 
had  a  splendid  opportunity  for  dealing  a  heavy  blow  on  Mission  of 
their  enemy  ;  but'  Tissaphernes,  deaf  to  the  intreaties  if^  Mfnor." 
of  his  colleague,  insisted  on  a  conference,  and  in  the  396  b.c. 
minds  of  the  Greeks  the  impression  was  strengthened  that  prompti- 
tude oS  action  was  not  to  be  expected  from  Persians.  The  con- 
ference ended  only  in  a  truce.  Derkyllidas  demanded  the  indepen- 
dence of  the  Greek  cities:  the  satraps  insisted  on  the  departure 
not  only  of  the  Peloponnesian  army  but  of  all  Spartan  harmosts  from 
the  territories  of  the  Great  King.  The  former  would  agree"  only 
to  refer  the  question  to  the  Ephoi-s ;  but  (he  truce  had  not  been 
long  made  when  Agesilaos  was  dispatched,  Avith  thirty  Spartiatai 
and  a  large  force  of  Neodamodes  and  allies,  to  settle  the  alfairs 
of  the  Asiatic  Greeks.  He  was  accompanied  by  Lysandros,  who 
reckoned  on  being  the  real  master  of  the  thirty  I'eers  and  on 
directing  through  them  all  the  actions  of  the  King.  But  Agesilaos 
set  out  with  hopes  and  plans  inspired  by  an  ambition  wider  even 
than  that  of  Lysandros.  The  latter  was  intent  on  re-estabUsh- 
ing  his  hateful  Decemvirates :  the  former  dreamt  of  nothing 
less  than  a  march  to  Sousa  and  the  overthrow  of  Persian  power. 
With  his  heart  set  on  this  great  enterprise,  he  resolved  like  Aga- 
memnon to  offer  sacrifice  at  Aulis,  before  he  invaded  the  country  of 
the  Great  King.  There  accordingly  he  landed,  and  the  ceremonial 
was  actually  being  carried  out  when  a  body  of  horsemen  sent  by 
the  Boiotarchs  forbade  the  sacrifice  and  hurled  the  victims  from 
the  altar. 

The  Thebans  thus  followed  up  by  a  serious  insult  the  refusal 
which  they  had  already  given  to  a  request  for  troops  to  serve  with 
Agesilaos  in  Asia.  In  this  refusal  they  were  sup-  Discontent 
ported  not  merely  by  the  Athenians  but  by  their  old  °j!j,'g?^^i''^.o. 
allies  the  Corinthians,  in  conjmiction  with  whom  they  ri'nthians 
had  sought  to  deal  with  Athens  as  tliey  had  dealt  withSpat-ta. 
with  Plataiai.  These  acts  now  belonged  to  a  past  Avhich  they 
were  anxious  to  forget.  The  freedom  for  which  they  had  lavished 
their  money  and  their  blood  during  seven-and-twenty  years  had 
vanished  into  thin  air.  Nay,  they  had  already  to  face  the  stern 
realities  of  a  tyranny  with  which  the  yoke  of  imperial  Athens, 
taken  at  its  worst,  was  a  light  burden  indeed.  The  victory  which 
they  had  helped  to  win  had  brought  to  the  conquerors  not  only 
vast  power  but  vast  wealth  ;  and  of  this  immense  treasure  Spartan 
greed  allowed  not  a  fraction  to  be  shared  among  the  allies.  Of 
these  allies  Thebes  and  Corinth  alone  had  the  courage  to  demand 
their  right ;  and  the  contemptuous  refusal  given  to  the  request  of 
24 


554  THE   EMPIRE   OF   SPARTA.  [BOOK  IV. 

these  once  powerful  cities  kept  all  the  others  silent,  Sparta  was 
indeed  enriching  her  citizens  :  but  she  was  to  pay  a  heavy  penalty 
for  licr  folly  by  and  by. 

Tlie  cloud  was  gathering  even  now.  The  tidings  which  had 
made  the  Spartans  anxious  to  send  Agesilaos  to  Asia  with  all 
Activity  of  specd  dlsclosed  an  ominous  picture  of  the  activity 
Konon'un-  manifest  in  Phenician  and  Kilikian  ports.  Triremes 
tccti'oiiof*'  were  being  rapidly  manned  or  repaired  or  built;  and 
Etiagoras,  |^|j^.  fleet,  when  readv,  was  to  be  under  the  command 
despot  of  .  1-1  1  •!•  1  1    -  II 

Salamis.         01  a  mjm  or  whose  abihty  and  energy  the^'  were  well 

398 B.C.  aware  and  whose  hatred  they  had  just  cause  to  fear. 
During  the  seven  years  which  had  passed  since  the  great  treason  of 
Aigospotamoi'  Konon  had  been  quietly  biding  his  time  under  the 
protection  of  Euagoras,  despot  of  the  Kyprian  (Cyprian)  Salamis. 
Six  years  before  Konon  brought  to  his  harbor  the  triremes  which 
he  had  saved  from  the  general  wreck,  this  Hellenic  prince,  of  whom 
Isokrates  speaks  in  terms  of  the  loftiest  eulogy,  had  surprised  and 
slain  a  Phenician  who  had  won  his  place  by  murder  and  who 
sought  the  life  of  Euagoras  himself.  Acknowledged  as  despot,  he 
ruled  with  a  bcnificence  rarely  seen  in  Hellenic  autocrats,  adminis- 
tering an  cvenhanded  justice  and  seekingmostof  allto]>lant  inhis 
city  the  highest  forms  of  Hellenic  culture.  Athenians  driven  away 
from  the  Chersonesos  or  elsewhere  by  the  stern  orders  of  Lysan- 
dros  found  a  ready  refuge  within  his  walls;  and  the  fact  that 
Spartan  power  could  not  follow  them  thither  sufficiently  attests 
his  strength.  At  a  later  time  he  was  to  become  the  antagonist  of 
the  Great  King,  to  achieve  some  great  successes,  to  come  out  of 
the  contest  without  much  humiliation,  and  to  be  struck  down  tinally 
by  an  assassin's  dagger.  But  for  the  present  his  alliance  witl)  Persia, 
involving  the  payment  of  tribute  yet  not  otherwise  affronting  his 
dignity,  greatly  {)romoted  the  plans  of  Konon  and  the  reaction 
which  he  was  striving  to  bring  about  in  favor  of  AtJiens. 

The  appearance  of  Agesilaos  on  Asiatic  soil  was  not  without 
its  immediate  effect  on  the  two  satraps.  To  his  demand  of  iiide- 
Mip.Mioii  of  pendence  for  the  (jreek  cities  they  replied  by  asking  a 
t'^fh"'ii°i^  further  annistice  which  would  enable  them  to  refer 
lespont.  the  matter  to   Sousa.     The  truce  granted  for   threo 

^^^■°-  months  seemed  to  Lysandros  to  furnish  an  excellent 
opportunity  for  reasserting  the  intluence  which  he  had  exercised 
during  the  lifetime  of  Cyrus.  His  old  partisans  hurried  in  crowds 
to  Ephesos  ;  but  Agesilaos  had  no  mind  that  any  other  should  hold 
court  in  his  jircsonce,  even  though  that  other  be  the  man  to  whom 
he  owed  liis  throne.  Hence  all  who  souglit  an  introduction  to 
him  through  Ly.'^andros  were  dismissed  with  a  peremptory  refusal 
•  See  p.  47G. 


Chap.  III.]  GROWTH   OF   THEBAN    POWER.  555 

to  their  petitions.  Stung  by  these  manifest  slights,  Lysandros 
exclaimed  bitterly,  '  You  know  well,  Agesilaos,  how  to  put  down 
your  friends.'  'Indeed  I  do,'  was  the  answer,  'but  only  iu  the 
case  of  those  who  wish  to  put  me  in  the  shade.  I  should  be 
ashamed  of  myself  if  I  did  not  know  how  to  show  my  gratitude  to 
those  who  give  me  due  honor.'  Lysandros  had  the  good  sense  to 
see  that  the  contest  was  vain,  and  at  his  own  request  lie  was  sent 
on  a  mission  to  the  Hellespont,  where  he  did  good  work  for  Sparta. 

The  three  months  assigned  for  the  armistice  had  not  come  to  an 
end  when  Tissaphernes,  emboldened  by  large  reinforcements  to  his 
army,  insisted  on  the  immediate  departure  of  Agesilaos 
from   Asia,   under  threat  of  war  in    case  of   refusal,   deatii  of  Tis- 
Thanking  the  satrap  for  thus  setting  the  gods   against  ^P^ernes. 
him  by  his  pei'jury,  the  Spartan  King  plunged  eagerly  into  a  con- 
test which  brought  him  not  a  little  booty  and  enabled  him  to  ex- 
hibit the  more  generous  features  of  his  character  in  the  treatment 
of  his  prisoners.    On  the  Persian  side  Tissaphernes  achieved  practi- 
cally nothing,  and  a  victory  won  some  months  later  by 
Agesilaos   near   Sardeis   seems  to   have  filled  up  the 
measure  of  his  iniquities  in  the  eyes  of  the  Persian  King.    Availing 
herself  of  the  present  temper  of  Artaxerxes,  Pary satis  seized  eagerly 
the  opportunity  of  avenging  herself  on  a  man  whom  she  regarded 
as  the  murderer  of  her  son  Cyrus.     At  her  entreaty  Tithraiistes 
was  sent  down  with  an  order  for  his  death,  and  Tissaphernes  was 
beheaded  at  Kolossai. 

The  new  satrap  was  able  to  disclaim  all  connivance  in  the 
treachery  which  had  led  to  the  recent  contest,  and  in  his  turn  he 
insisted  on  the  depai'ture  of  x\gesilaos,  pledging  him-  Anti-Spar- 
self  that  the  Asiatic  Hellenes  should  have  full  auto-  1^ ViS^^ 
nomy  on  the  one  condition  that  they  punctually  paid  395  b.c. 
their  tribute.  Pending  the  reference  of  this  question  to  Sparta, 
Agesilaos  agreed  to  a  truce  for  six  months,  and  received  from 
Tithraustcs  the  sum  of  thirty  talents  to  reuiovehis  troops  from  his 
satrapy  to  that  of  Pharnabazos.  By  such  slender  links  was  the  ill- 
ceraented  mass  of  the  Persian  empire  held  together.^  Meanwhile 
Konon  had  not  been  idle  ;  and  Pharnabazos,  the  most  high-spirited 
and  generous  of  all  the  Persian  rulers  whom  the  history  of  this  age 
brings  before  us,  had  obtained  for  him  the  conunaud  of  a  fleet  of 
forty  triremes  with  which  he  sailed  to  the  port  of  Kaunos.  Here 
he  was  blockaded  by  a  fleet  of  120  vessels  under  the  Spartan 
Pharax,  until  the  reinforcement  of  40  Persian  ships  drove  Pharax  to 
Rhodes,  only  to  learn  that  the  Spartan  tyranny  was  there  rousing  a 
dangerous  spirit  of  resistance.  His  fleet  was  still,  partially  at  least, 
in  the  Rhodian  liarbor,  when  the  people,  rising  in  revolt,  com- 
■  See  p.  127. 


556  THE   EMPIRE   OF  SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

pelled  liim  to  liurry  away.  Wc  can  scarcely  lay  too  great  stress  on 
tlie  fact  that  whenever  the  olitrarchic  factions  in  the  cities  of  the 
Athenian  confederacy  had  determined  on  an  alliance  with  Sparta, 
thev  waited  not  raerel}'  nntil  all  Athenian  sliips  were  absent,  but 
until  a  Peloponnesian  force  was  present  strong  enougli  to  overcome 
the  philo-Athenian  demos.  In  the  present  instance  the  Spartan 
admiral  found  himself  ignominiously  thrust  out,  while  his  enemies 
without  a  blow  gained  a  rich  and  unlooked-for  booty.  The  mer- 
cantile fleet,  sent  by  the  Egvptian  King  Nepheres  Avith  corn  and 
other  stores  for  the  benefit  of  Lakedaimonians,  entered-the  Rhodiaji 
harbor,  knowing  nothing  of  recent  changes,  and  was  seized  as  a 
prize  by  Konon.  At  Sparta  the  tidings  of  these  events  roused  ve- 
hement indignation.  The  Rhodian  Dorieus,  whom  the  Athenians 
had  not  merely  spared  but  honored  when  he  stood  a  prisoner  be- 
fore tliem,'  seems  at  this  time  to  have  been  somewhere  near  the 
Peloponnesos.  AVitli  the  revolt  he  had  nothing  to  do  ;  and  with 
the  memory  of  his  splendid  victories  at  the  Olympic  and  other 
festivals  was  linked  the  remembrance  of  his  enthusiastic  zeal  in  the 
service  of  Sparta,  a  zeal  which  had  brought  on  him  a  sentence  of 
banishment  at  the  liands  of  his  countrymen.  But  gratitude  and 
generosity  found  no  genial  soil  in  Sparta.  Dorieus  Avas  arrested, 
brought  to  Sparta,  and  there  murdered. 

Yet  the  Spartan  commander  may  well  have  regarded  the  revolt 

of  Rhodes  and  the  reappearance  of  Konon  as  matters  of  no  great 

siijnificance.      Months   passed    on,    and    Lis    fleet    did 

XllCrG3,SC(l  ^  ,         ^  .  ,         ,  . 

power  of  nothing.  The  Persian  ofticers  had  little  inclination  to 
Konon.  serve  under  a  Greek,  while  the  satraps  had  no   mind 

to  waste  tlieir  own  revenues  on  the  war.  Little,  it  was  clear,  could 
be  done  without  a  decisive  order  from  Sousa,  and  to 
Sousa  accordingly  Konon  liastened,  not  indeed  to 
prostrate  himself  at  the  feet  of  the  king  of  kings,  but  to  convey 
to  hiiu,  through  his  friend  the  physician  Ktesias,  his  conviction  that 
the  maritime  empire  of  Sparta  might  be  easily  overthrown,  if  only 
the  King  chose  to  engage  heartily  in  the  contest.  Artaxerxes 
listened  with  more  than  willingness.  The  Spartans  had  abetted 
his  brother  Cyrus  in  his  treason,  and  were  now  keeping  from  him 
Greek  cities  which  might  yield  him  rich  tribute.  Konon  received 
not  merely  the  order  which  lie  sought,  together  Avitli  a  large  grant 
of  money,  but  the  power  of  naming  any  Persian  oSicer  as  his  col- 
league. His  choice  fell  naturally  on  Pharnabazos,  who  was  eager 
to  .settle  scores  with  Agesilaos  for  the  ravaging  of  his  satrapy.  lie 
was  aided  not  less  zealously  by  his  generous  friend  Euagoras,  who 
served  in  j)erson  with  his  own  triremes. 

'  Pan.s.,  vi.  7,  2. 


Cn.vp.  III.]  GROWTH   OF   THEBAN   POWER.  557 

The  expectations  of  Konon  were  more  tliau  justified  in  the 
first  battle  which  followed  this  vigorous  alliance.  Acting  on  full 
powers   received    from   home,   Agesilaos    had   named      „   „     , 

xiflttlG  of 

as  admiral  of  the  Spartan  fleet  his  brother-in-law  Knidos. 
Peisandros,  a  young  man  whose  ambition  and  con-  394  b,c. 
fidcnce  far  exceeded  his  skill  as  a  general.'  The  advantage  of 
mimbers  was,  it  seems,  on  the  side  of  Konon  ;  but  had  the  dis- 
parity been  even  greater  than  it  was,  Peisandros  was  well  aAvarc 
that  lie  could  not  afford  to  decline  an  engagement.  The  Greek 
cities  on  the  mainland  were  retained  in  the  Spartan  confederacy 
against  their  will  :  and  a  confession  of  inferiority  by  sea  would  lead 
in  the  islands  to  something  more  than  discontent.  But  it  was  be- 
yond his  power  to  impart  his  own  courage  to  others,  and.  seeing 
themselves  outuinbered,  his  Asiatic  allies  fled  on  the  attack  of 
Konon  withont  striking  a  blow.  Peisandros  might,  like  the 
crews  of  many  of  his  ships,  have  made  his  escape  to  land  ;  but 
following  the  old  Spartan  tradition,  he  cliose  rather  to  die  fighting. 
So  with  the  loss  of  more  than  half  the  fleet  ended  the  battle  fought 
ofE  the  promontory  of  Knidos  at  the  southern  end  of  the  Keramic 
Gulf.  By  Xenophon  it  is  dismissed  in  a  parenthesis  ;  but  in 
reality  it  destroyed  the  maritime  supremacy  of  Sparta,  and  had 
further  consequences  which  were  soon  felt  throughout  her  land 
empire.  Ten  years  only  had  passed  away  since  the  catastrophe  of 
Aigospotamoi :  but  the  Spartans  cannot  be  charged  with  failure  in 
compressing  into  that  short  period  the  largest  possible  amount  of 
misgovernment  and  tyranny. 

In  the   West  also   dangers   had   long    been    thickening,   and 
Agesilaos  was  to  witness  some  resolute  assaults  on  that  fabric  of 
power  which  when  he  became  king  seemed  to  defy  Boiotian 
all    attack.     Sparta   had   then    her    harmost    in     the  Thebeflnd" 
Thessalian   Pharsalos,   and  the   colony    of    Ilerakleia  Sparia. 
which  a  few  years  previously  had  been  only  a  source  L5^sa,K°ros. 
of   weakness  now  served  as  the   stronghold   for  the     395  b.c. 
maintenance    of    empire   in    those    distant    regions.     But    fear, 
jealousy,  and  hatred  were  soon  to  kindle  a  flame  nearer  home. 
Persian  money  sent  by  the  satrap  Tithraustes  strengthened  the 
hands  of  the  anti-Spartan  party  in  Thebes  and  Corinth  ;  and  if  the 
Rhodian  Timokrates  who  acted  as  his  envoy  did  not  visit  Athens, 
he  may  have  felt  that  in  that  city  on  which  the  hand  of  Sparta 
had  fallen   most  heavily  there  was   little  work  for  him  to   do. 
Elsewhere  his  mission  was  the  more  successfnl  because  the  money 
which  he  brought  was  bestowed  and  received  not  as  a  bribe  but 
honestly  as  the  means  of  rendering  resistance  possible.      A  quarrel 
between  the  Phokians  and  Opountian  Lokrians  for  a  piece  of 
'  Xen.  H.  ill.  4,  29. 


558  THE  EMPIRE  OF   SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

borderland  brought  about  open  strife  between  Thebes  and  Sparta. 
The  Lokrians  appealed  to  the  former:  the  latter,  taking  up  with 
vehement  eagerness  the  cause  of  the  Phokians,  resolved  that  the 
war  thus  begun  should  end  in  the  humiliation  of  Thebes.  Orders 
were  given  that  Lysandros  should  start  from  Ilerakleia  on  the 
north  with  as  large  a  force  as  he  could  muster  from  the  tribes  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Oita,  and  that  King  Pausanias  should  meet  him 
on  a  given  day  in  the  territory  of  Haliartos  on  the  southern  shore 
of  the  Kopaic  lake.  Whether  from  over  haste  on  the  part  of 
Lysandros  or  slowness  on  that  of  Pausanias  the  meeting  never 
took  place.  Marching  from  Herakleia,  Lysandros  found  his  ay  ay 
into  Boiotia  made  easy  by  the  revolt  of  Orchomenos  from  the 
Theban  confederacy  ;  but  he  was  disappointed  in  his  hope  that  the 
Haliartiaus  would  on  his  summons  take  the  same  course.  Pau- 
sanias was  not  yet  come  ;  and  Lysandros,  too  impatient  to  wait, 
advanced  to  the  wall  and  was  searching  for  a  place  where  the 
assault  might  be  madf  with  most  effect,  when  the  sight  of  a  Theban 
force  hurrying  towards  the  city  encouraged  tbe  Haliartiaus  to 
throw  open  their  gates  and  sally  out  against  the  enemy.  Lysandros, 
taken  by  surprise,  was  amongst  the  first  to  fall ;  and  although  the 
loss  in  the  battle  was  not  large,  his  army  melted  away  during  the 
coming  night.  The  men  composing  it  had  been  brought  and  held 
together  chiefly  by  his  personal  influence  ;  and  this  spell  was 
broken  by  his  death. 

The  army  of  Pausanias  might  of  itself  liave  turned  the  for- 
tunes of  the  day  against  the  Boiotians  taken  singly  ;  but  on  ap- 
.„.  ,  proachins:  Haliartos  he  found  that  the  men  led  by 
tween  Lysandros  were  gone  home,  and  on  the  day  following 

Athens  ^^Re-  ^  h^rge  Athenian  force  of  hoplites  and  horsemen  made 
treat  of  Pau-   its  appearance  under  Thrasyboulos,  the  hero  of  Phvle. 

saiiias  from  j    V,   •      •  rn  i  •,  •  i  .  r  o      '  i. 

Boiotia.  and  Peiraieus.      Ihe  ambition   and  tyranny  or  oparta 

39.5  B.C.  ],a(j  tiiuj,  united  Thebes  with  the  city  which  until 
Sparta  began  her  reign  of  freedom  she  had  hated  with  the  bitterest 
enmity.  The  Thebans  liad  no  sooner  heard  that  they  were  to  be 
attacked  by  two  armies,  the  one  from  the  north,  the  other  from 
the  south,  than  they  sent  to  Athens  envoys  charged  to  say  that 
their  city  was  in  no  way  responsible  for  the  ferocious  sentiment 
expressed  by  the  Theban  who  happened  to  be  present  at  the  de- 
bate which  after  the  surrender  of  the  city  was  to  determine  the 
fate  of  Athens.  That  man  spoke  on  his  own  authority  alone  : 
Thebes  had  since  that  time  shown  her  real  disposition  by  refusing 
to  aid  the  Spartans  again.st  Thrasyboulos  and  his  fcHow  exiles. 
She  had  thus  a  title  to  the  gratitude  of  the  Athenian  Demos,  and 
she  counted  with  not  less  confidence  on  the  goodwill  of  the 
Athenian  oligarchs.     So  far  as  the  Spartans  were  concerned,  these 


Ch.\p.  III.]  GROWTH   OF   THEBAN   POWER.  559 

had  been  abandoned  without  scruple  to  the  vengeance  of  the  people, 
and  if  they  were  still  living,  it  was  owing  only  to  the  singular 
moderation  which  chose  to  <h'aw  a  veil  over  the  feuds  and  ini- 
quities of  the  past.  The  arguments  of  the  Theban  envoy  might 
betray  rather  a  sellish  fear  than  a  generous  patriotism  ;  but  the 
Athenians,  the  oligarchs  not  less  than  the  people,  contented  them- 
selves with  reminding  him  that  the  aid  of  the  Thebans  had  been 
only  passive,  and  decreed  a  defensive  alliance  with  Thebes.  It 
became,  therefore,  a  serious  question  for  Pausanias  wliether  he 
should  risk  a  battle  with  enemies  thus  strengthened  with  aid  from 
Athens,  when  even  victory  could  do  no  more  than  enable  him  to 
recover  the  body  of  Lysandros,  while  defeat  in  the  present  temper 
of  the  allies  might  be  followed  by  serious,  if  not  disastrous,  results. 
In  the  coimcil  held  to  decide  whether  by  asking  a  truce  for  the 
burial  of  the  dead  they  should  virtually  acknowledge  their  defeat, 
a  few  Spartans  insisted  that  the  only  thing  to  be  feared  was  dis- 
grace ;  but  they  were  overborne  by  the  vast  majority  who  saw  that 
the  allies  were  not  to  be  depended  on.  The  issue  proved  that  they 
were  right :  for  when  the  request  for  a  truce  was  sent  and  tlie 
Thebans  had  granted  it  on  condition^  that  they  should  imme- 
diately quit  Boiotia,  the  allies  received  Ihe  news  with  undisguised 
satisfaction,  and  submitted  with  meekness  even  to  the  blows  of  the 
Thebans  who  watched  their  retreat  and  struck  all  who  strayed  from 
the  ranks  into  the  cultivated  grounds  on  either  side  of  the  road. 

Pausanias  himself    throughout   the  business   was    at  least  as 
guiltless  as  the  Athenian  generals  at  Argennoussai :  on  reaching 
Spaita  he  found  that  the  popular  temper  threatened   corintwan 
him  with  the   fate  of  those  unfortunate  men,  and  he   "'^''■ 
promptly  took  sanctuary  at  Tegea.     Here  he  spent  the  rest  of  his 
life  under  the  sentence  of  death  which  was  passed  on  him  in  his 
absence,  his  son  Agesipolis  being  chosen  king  in  his  place.     In  the 
bitter  sorrow  of  the  moment  the  Spartans  may  have  felt  that  in 
Lysandros  tliey  had  lost  their  tutelary  genius  ;  and  the  feeling 
may  have  been  strengthened  by  the  tidings  that  Thebes,  Athens, 
Corinth,  and  Argos  were  united  against  them  in  a  confederacy 
which   embraced   among  others  the  Chalkidians  of  Thrace,  the 
Euboians,  and  the  Akarnanians,  and  that  the  Theban  Ismenias 
had  succeeded  in  w^resting  from  them  their  colony  of  Ilerakleia, 
In  the   synod  of  the  confederates  held  at  Corinth  the  language 
of  the    speakers  was  full  of  eager  confidence.       The      394^0 
mightiest  rivers  sprang  from  scanty  sources  ;  and  the 
streani   of   Spartan   power   could  easily  be   cut  off  at  its  head, 
although  the  influx  of  tributaries  might  swell  it  to  an  irresistible 

^  Greek   morality  required   that    be   granted  unconditionally.     See 
truces  for  burying  the  dead  should    p.  333. 


560  THE  EMPIRE  OF   SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

volume  at  a  distance.  So  said  the  Corinthian  Timolaos,  adding 
that  as  men  who  wish  to  destroy  a  wasp's  nest  apply  fire  to  it 
while  the  wasps  arc  within,  so  should  Spartans  be  attacked  in 
Sparta.  The  confederate  army  set  out  accordingly  for  that 
mysterious  city  ;  but  they  had  not  advanced  beyond  Jsemea  when 
they  learnt  that  the  Spartans  had  already  passed  their  border. 
Falling  back  on  Corinth,  they  awaited  the  coming  of  the  enemy. 
In  the  battle  which  ensued  the  Spartans  with  little  loss  to  them- 
selves bore  down  all  opposed  to  them,  but  their  allies  were  not  only 
defeated  but  showed  by  their  lack  of  firmness  how,  little  their 
hearts  were  in  the  cause  for  which  they  were  fighting. 

The  indecisiveness  of  the  battle  fully  justifies  the  step  Avhich 
the  Ephors  had  already  taken  of  recalling  Agesilaos.  Their 
The  recall  of  decision  reached  him  just  when  the  full  tide  of  success 
Agesilaos.  was  carrying  him  onwards,  as  he  hoped,  to  Sousa. 
The  dream  would  in  any  case  have  been  rudely  disturbed  so 
soon  as  he  should  learn  the  catastrophe  of  Knidos  ;  but  at  the 
moment  it  seemed  both  to  himself  and  to  his  friends  that  he  was 
called  away  from  a  work  Avhich  would  requite  on  the  barbarian 
the  wrongs  done  to  Hellas  by  Xerxes.  In  the  first  stirrings  of 
their  grief  his  allies  were  eager  to  accompany  him  to  Sparta  ; 
and  although  many  drew  back  when  they  remembered  that  he  was 
returning  to  fight  not  against  barbarians  but  against  Greeks,  yet  a 
large  body  resolved  to  cast  in  their  lot  with  his.  Among  these  were 
many  Cyreians,  headed  by  Xenophon. 

On  his  outward  voyage  Agesilaos  had  likened  himself  to 
Agamemnon.  On  returning  from  Asia  he  was  constrained  to 
Battle  of  follow  the  line  of  march  taken  by  Xerxes.  At 
Koroneia.  Amphipolis  Derkyllidas  met  him  Avith  tidings  of  the 
^'^'  victory  won  at  Corinth  ;  the  thought  of  the  task 
which  he  had  been  compelled  to  abandon  left  no  room  for  any 
feeling  but  that  of  grief  that  so  much  blood  had  been  shed  to  so 
little  purpose.  Bearing  down  all  opposition  made  to  his  onward 
march,  he  reached  the  IJoiotian  Chaironeia.  Here  an  earth(]uake 
filled  him  with  gloomy  forebodings  which  were  realised  a  few  days 
later  by  the  news  of  the  battle  of  Knidos.  Taking  in  at  once  the 
full  significance  of  this  great  event,  Agesilaos,  by  a  device  not 
uidike  that  t>f  Eteonikos  after  the  disaster  at  Argennoussai,'  in- 
formed his  army  that  the  Lakedaimonian  fleet  had  won  a  great 
victory,  but  that  he  had  to  mourn  the  death  of  his  brother-in-law 
Pcisandros,  His  next  march  brought  him  to  the  scene  of  the  memo- 
rable battle  which  fifty-five  years  ago  finally  dispelled  the  dream  of 
Athenian  supremacy  in  lioiotia.^  Here  in  the  plain  of  Koroneia 
(a  name  as.sociatcd  for  the  Athenians  with  that  of  their  luckless 
•  See  p.  4G3.  ''  Sec  p.  253. 


CuAi'.  III.]  GROWTH  OF  THEBAN  POWER.  5G1 

general  Tolmides)  the  confederate  army  awaited  his  coming,  witli 
liopes  undoubtedly  raised  high  by  the  tidings  of  Konon's  success, 
if  these  had  then  reached  tliem.  Their  confidence  availed  them 
but  Httle.  The  weight  of  tlic  Peloponnesian  hoplites  was  still  a 
force  too  mighty  to  be  withstood  by  any  but  troops  of  the  first 
quality.  The  division  of  Herippidas,  including  the  Cyreians 
under  Xenophon,  bore  down  the  men  opposed  to  them,  while  on 
the  side  of  the  confederates  the  Argives  without  striking  a  blow 
fled  up  the  slopes  of  Ilelikon.  Thither  the  Thebans,  who  had  put 
to  flight  the  Orchomenians  opposed  to  them,  resolved  to  force  their 
way  on  returning  from  the  jinrsuit.  Their  path  was  barred  by 
the  hoplites  of  Agesilaos ;  the  two  masses  met  in  direct  en- 
counter ;  and  a  conflict  ensued  which  marked  a  new  era  in  the 
history  of  Greek  warfare.  It  was  a  strife  in  which  the  front  ranks 
of  men  all  of  tried  courage  and  skill  received  a  tremendous 
impetus  from  the  weight  of  the  hinder  ranks  consisting  of  warriors 
not  less  formidable.  The  ghastly  sight  presented  the  next  day  by 
the  battle  field  attested  the  desperate  ferocity  of  a  struggle  which 
had  been  carried  on  not  with  wild  and  piercing  cries  but  with  the 
subdued  murmur  of  men  intent  on  business  which  they  knew  to  be 
deadly. 

In  a  certain  sense  Agesilaos  had  won  a  real  victory.  lie  was 
master  of  the  battle  ground,  and  even  the  Thebans  formally  ad- 
mitted their  defeat  by  asking  a  truce  for  the  burial  of  Return  of 
the  dead  ;  but  the  latter  on  the  other  hand  had  fully  f =^rta''°' ^'^ 
carried  out  their  purpose  of  forcing  their  way  through  394  b.c. 
the  Spartans  to  the  high  grounds  where  their  allies  had  taken 
refuge,  and  in  the  mind  of  Agesilaos  the  sense  of  their  tremendous 
power  was  even  deeper  than  that  of  his  own  success.  That  suc- 
cess, moreover,  brought  him  no  solid  fruit.  He  returned  home  by 
way  of  Delphoi  and  across  the  Corinthian  Gulf,  as  he  might  have 
done  without  fighting  this  (h'cadful  battle.  At  Sparta  he  was 
received  with  profound  respect.  The  simplicity  with  which  lie 
still  submitted  himself  to  the  public  discipline  not  only  showed 
that  the  man  was  unchanged,  but  won  for  him  a  deference  not  so 
readily  paid  to  men  like  Lysandros. 

The  victory  of  Konon  at  Knidos  warned  the  harmosts  of  the 
Hellenic  towns  on  the  Egean  coast  that  they  would  do  well  to  seek 
a  refuge  elsewhere.  Their  rule  rested,  they  knew,  tj^^  ygi^^ii^j. 
only  on  terror,  and  this  they  could  no  longer  inspire,  ingot"  the 
For  their  good  fortune  but  for  the  mischief  of  Sparta  Long  Walls. 
Abydos  remained  obstinately  faithful  to  the  Pelopon-  393 b.c. 
nesian  cause.  To  Abydos  therefore  the  harmosts  fled,  and  there 
with  the  townsmen  they  held  the  place  against  all  the  threats  and 
efforts  of  Phaniabazos.  The  satrap  vowed  vengeance  and  he  kept 
24* 


562  THE  EMPIRE  OF  SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

his  word.  Embarking  with  Koiion,  he  sailed  first  to  Kythera, 
tlieii  to  the  Corinthian  Isthmus,  through  -waters  wliere  no  Persian 
ship  ]iad  been  seen  since  the  day  of  the.  fight  at  Salamis.  Here 
ho  cheered  the  allies  nut  only  with  promises  of  hearty  support  but 
with  substantial  aid  in  money,  and  then  left  his  fleet  with  Konon 
for  the  execution  of  a  more  momentous  work,  which  nothing  but 
an  astonishing  combination  of  circumstances  during  this  particular 
year  rendered  possible.  The  way  by  sea  to  Athens  was  barred  to 
the  Sj)artans  by  the  destruction  of  their  navy  :  the  way  by  land 
was  blocked  for  the  present,  but  for  a  few  months  only,  by  the 
confederate  lines  at  Corinth  ;  and  Konon  availed  himself  of  this 
precious  opportunity  to  rebuild  the  walls  thrown  down  by  Lysan- 
dros.'  The  I'eiraieus  thus  again  formed  with  Athens  a  single 
fortress,  and  this  vast  gain  for  her  power  and  her  commerce  was 
directly  the  result  of  the  tenacity  with  which  Abydos  held  out 
against  the  satrap  Pharnabazos. 

But  the  Greek  world  generally  had  by  its  incessant  feuds  been 
now  brought  to  this  pass  that  any  special  benefit  secured  by  one 
Miseion  of  city  was  surc  to  excite  the  fears  or  the  jealousy  of 
Antaikidas     others;  and  thus  the  rebuilding  of  the  Athenian  walls 

to  tuG  Per-  . 

eiaii  king.  rewakencd  at  Corinth  the  suspicions  which  had  been 
392  B.C.  ^„]y  luijyd  ]t)y  the  more  immediate  pressure  of  Spartan 
injustice  and  tyraimy.  The  philo-Lakonian  party  thus  stirred  to 
activity  were  forming  designs  for  betraying  the  city,  when  the 
ruling  oligarchs  anticipated  them  by  a  massacre  from  which  some 
of  them  escaped  with  Pasimelos  who  succeeded  in  seizing  the  Akro- 
korinthos.  Solemn  promises  of  amnesty  secured  the  submission 
of  these  men  ;  but  the  close  alliance  subsequently  formed  with 
Argos  again  roused  their  wrath,  nor  did  Pasimelos  feel  any  scruples 
in  betraying  the  city  to  the  Spartans,  who  by  pulling  down  por- 
tions of  the  Long  Walls  which  joined  Corinth  to  its  j)ort  Lechaion 
on  the  ('Orinthian  Gulf  left  a  way  open  across  the  i>thnHis  to 
Attica  and  Poiotia.  The  danger  to  which  they  were  thus  exposed 
determined  the  Athenians  to  repair  the  breach  thus 
made.  With  the  rapidity  which  had  astonished  and 
alarmed  the  Syracusans^  they  built  up  the  shattered  portion  of  the 
western  wall,  leaving  it  to  their  allies  to  restore  the  other.  A  few 
rnontlis  only  passed  before  they  were  again  thrown  down  by  the 
Lakedaiinonians ;  and  ambassadors  a[)peared  at  Sparta  both  from 
Athens  and  Thebes  to  treat  for  peace.  For  the  time  the  negotia- 
tions came  to  nothing  :  but  the  destruction   of  a  Lakedaimonian 


'  Konon  rebuilt  tin?  two  parallel      third  or  Plialcric  wall  was  rightly 
walls  JDiniiif;  Athens  to  tlie  great     judged  to  be  unnecessary, 
harbor.     The    restoration  of    tlie         '' See  p.  383. 


Chap.  III.]  GROWTH   OF   THEBAN   POWER.  563 

force  by  the  peltasts  or  light-armed  mercenaries  of  the  Athenian 
Iphikratet-  awakened  in  the  Spartan  mind  feelings  not  vinlike  those 
with  which  they  heard  of  the  slaughter  of  their  hoplites  in  Sphak- 
teria  by  the  light-armed  troops  of  Demosthenes  and  Kleon.'  In 
their  alarm  they  determined  to  send  envoys  not  to  the  cities  con- 
federated against  them,  but  to  the  Persian  king  whom  they  were 
ready  to  worship  as  the  supreme  arbiter  in  Hellenic  affairs. 
Hitherto  they  had  used  the  term  freedom  in  the  sense  most  con- 
venient to  themselves:  but  the  effort  to  inforce  this  interpretation 
had  failed,  and  the  time  was  therefore  come  to  play  another  card 
in  the  game  which  must  at  whatever  cost  be  made  to  end  in  the 
profit  of  Sparta.  This  card  was  the  absolute  autonomy  or  inde- 
pendence of  every  Hellenic  city, — in  other  words,  the  suppression 
of  every  local  confederacy,  except,  of  course,  her  own.  Henceforth 
Thebes  and  Athens,  Corinth  and  Argos  were  not  to  have  any 
allies;  and  in  theory  the  pettiest  townships  of  Boiotia  and  Attica 
were  to  stand  as  completely  by  themselves  as  the  most  prominent 
cities  of  the  Hellenic  world.  With  these  propositions  the  Spartan 
Antalkidas  was  dispatched  to  Tiribazos,  satrap  of  Armenia  during 
the  retreat  of  the  Cyreians,  now  viceroy  of  Ionia  in  the  place  of 
Tithraustes.  For  the  present  his  only  success  was  the  arrest  and 
detention  of  the  Athenian  Konon,  which  he  secured  through  his 
influence  with  Tiribazos.  So  ended  the  public  career  of  a  man 
whose  loss  to  Athens  was  irreparable.  lie  escaped,  it  would  seem, 
to  Kypros  (Cyprus)  and  there  died  in  the  house  of  his  friend 
Euagoras. 

The  gratitude  of  Athens  to  tlie  Salaminian  prince  led  soon  to 
another  loss  scarcely  less  severe  than  that  of  Konon.  The  relations 
of  Euagoras  to  the  Persian  court  had  undergone  a  Death  of 
great  change ;  and  the  Athenian  ships  which  in  boufos!" 
company  with  the  Salaminian  triremes  had  worked  in  3S9b.c. 
alliance  with  the  Persian  fleet  were  now  needed  to  fight  in  his 
quarrel  with  Artaxerxes.  With  forty  triremes  Thrasyboulos  sailed 
first  to  Byzantion,  and  again  made  Atliens  the  mistress  of  the 
Bosporos,''  and  thence  coasting  along  the  eastern  shores  of  the 
Egean  met  his  death  at  Aspendos  at  the  hands  of  natives  irritated 
by  the  wrongdoing  of  some  of  his  men.  Athens  had  thus  lost  not 
only  the  man  to  whom  she  owed  her  Long  Walls,  but  even  the 
more  devoted  citizen  who  in  the  hour  of  his  victory  had  delibe- 
rately chosen  to  throw  a  veil  over  the  long  catalogue  of  iniquities  by 
which  the  Thirty  and  their  minions  had  earned  their  title  to  the 
lasting  hatred  of  their  countrymen. 

These  losses  were  sustained  at  a  time  when  Athens  could  little 
afford  to  bear  them.     Aigina,  the  eyesore  of  Peiraieus,'  was  again 
»  See  p.  323.  »  See  p.  450.  =  See  p.  378. 


564  THE  EMPIRE  OF  SPAETA.  [Book  IV. 

held  by  si^cli  of  the  old  inhabitants  of  the  island  as  Lysandros 
conld  find  after  the  fall  of  the  imperial  city.  These  Aiginetans 
j.^.  ,.  f  whose  inclinations  would  have  kept  them  c^uiet  were 
Telciitiason  o-oaded  by  the  Spartan  harmost  to  assaults  on  Athe- 
rafens!'  "ian    shipping.      By    way  of   reprisal    the    Athenian 

388 B.C.  Chabrias,  on  his  way  with  ten  triremes  lo  the  aid  of 
Euao'oras,  landed  on  the  island  and  taking  the  Spartan  troops 
under  Gorgopas  by  surprise,  slew  their  leader  and  put  them  to 
flight  with  severe  loss.  Defeat  and  lack  of  pay  roused  among 
these  troops  a  discontent  which  threatened  to  be  dangerous,  when 
Teleutias,  the  brother  of  Agesilaos,  sent  from  Sparta  to  quiet  them 
told  them  that  brave  men  had  always  a  ready  mode  of  winning 
their  pay  by  their  swords,  and  pledged  himself  to  win  it  for  them 
if  only  they  would  agree  to  follow  him.  Their  destination  was  the 
Peiraieus,  but  unlike  Brasidas'  Teleutias  kept  it  a  secret,  and 
leaving  Aigina  after  nightfall  found  liimself  before  dawn  close  to 
the  entrance  of  the  harbor,  open  still  as  in  the  days  of  Brasidas. 
No  such  attacks  were  looked  for,  noi*  had  any  preparations  been 
made  to  meet  them.  The  cries  of  those  who  even  at  that  early 
hour  chanced  to  be  stirring  sent  the  news  through  Peiraieus :  from 
Peiraieus  it  was  carried  to  Athens  where  the  general  belief  was 
that  the  harbor  had  been  actually  taken.  But  before  the  hoplites 
could  huiTy  down,  Teleutias  had  sailed  away  with  many  merchant 
ships,  with  some  triremes,  and  with  enormous  plunder. 

Oppressed  with  the  burden  of  carrying  on  a  wearisome  and 

unprofitable   war,   the  Athenians  became  almost  helpless  against 

Spartan  intrigues.     On  all   sides   there  was  a  widc- 

Antalkidas.     spread  feeling  of  mingled  disgust  and  fear  ;  and  when 

^^  ^■^-  at  length  Antalkidas  returned  with  a  peace  sent  down, 
so  the  phrase  ran,  from  Sousa,  it  was  accepted  by  all  in  the  sense 
which  Sparta  chose  to  put  npon  it.  The  Thebans  alone  claimed 
to  take  the  oath  in  the  name  of  the  Boiotian  confederacy.  The 
claim  seemed  to  Agesilaos  to  furnish  that  opportunity  for  revenge 
against  Thebes  for  which  he  had  long  been  yearning.  '  If  you  do 
not  swear  for  yourselves  and  yourselves  only,'  he  said,  '  you  will 
be  shut  out  from  the  treaty.'  In  the  feverish  hope  that  they  Avould 
thus  bar  themselves,  he  hastened  to  lead  an  army  across  the 
border.  At  Tegea  he  was  met  by  Theban  envoys  who  declared 
themselves  ready  to  swear  for  Thebes  alone,  Agesilaos  was  baulked 
of  his  vengeance  in  blood ;  but  he  had  the  satisfaction  of  knowing 
that  he  had  left  the  proud  Boiotian  city  a  mere  unit  amongst  a 
crowd  of  paltry  towns  and  villages. 

The  I'ersian  king  chose  to  regard  the  acceptance  of  the  peace 
hy  the  Spartans  as  an  act  of  submission  not  less  significant  than 
'  See  p.  292. 


Chap.  III.]  GROWTH  OF  THEBAN   POWER.  565 

the  offering  of  earth  and  water.'  In  the  disgrace  which  it  in- 
volved the  one  was  as  ignominious  as  the  other  ;  but  Sparta  had  now 
not  even  the  poor  excuse  which  long  ago"  she  had  put  g^^.^^^  ^^ 
forward  for  calling  in  tlie  aid  of  the  barbarian.  She  the  Peace  of 
was  no  longer  struggling  for  self-preservation.  The  ^u  the  posi- 
fear  that  Athens  inio-ht  be  once  more  on  the  road  to  tionof 
empire,  absurd  though  under  the  changed  conditiotis  of 
the  Greek  world  such  fear  must  be,  may  together  with  the  con- 
sciousness of  her  own  unpopularity  have  prompted  that  cession  of 
the  islands  of  Lemnos,  Imbros,  and  Skyros,  which  gave  to  Athens 
a  faint  semblance  of  maritime  power.  Otherwise  the  purposes 
of  SpartJi  were  fully  achieved.  She  had  obtained  the  sanction  of 
the  Persian  king  to  a  policy  which  isolated  the  Hellenic  cities,  at 
a  time  when  there  was  no  confederate  empire  to  break  up  except 
her  own  ;  and  that  the  provisions  of  the  peace  should  be  applied 
within  the  limits  of  her  own  alliance  was  no  part  of  her  intention. 
Freedom  and  independence  were  words  wliicli  she  still  used,  which 
she  had  always  used,  in  the  sense  which,  as  Periklcs  had  told  his 
countrymen,  meant  nothing  but  lier  own  aggrandisement.  That 
the  people  in  each  city  was  to  determine  its  own  form  of  govern- 
ment, was  a  thing  not  to  be  thought  of  ;  and  ref  nsal  to  pay  the 
yearly  tribute  was  to  be  punished  as  treason  or  rebellion.  In 
short,  by  Sparta  the  peace  of  Antalkidas  was  adopted  with  the 
settled  resolution  to  divide  and  govern  ;  and  all  those  of  her  acts, 
which  might  seem  at  first  sight  to  have  a  different  meaning,  carry 
out  in  every  instance  this  golden  rule  of  despotism.  It  was  the 
curse  of  the  Hellenic  race,  and  the  ruin  ultimately  of  Sparta  itself, 
that  this  maxim  flattered  an  instinct  which  they  had  cherished 
with  blind  obstina(;y,  until  it  became  their  bane.  But  for  Sparta, 
the  consolidation  of  the  Athenian  empire  would  long  ago  have 
restrained  this  self-isolating  sentiment  within  its  proper  limits. 
When  the  Lesbians  meditated  revolt,  tlieir  envoys  at  Olympia  had 
nothing  more  to  say  for  themsolves  than  that  Athens  had  offended 
this  feeling  f  and  we  shall  see  by-and-by  in  a  signal  instance  how 
thoroughly  even  the  men  who  professed  to  resent  this  offence  most 
keenly  were  conscious  of  its  transient  and  therefore  worthless 
character.  In  theory  the  Spartans  by  inforcing  the  peace  of 
Antalkidas  restored  to  the  several  Greek  states  the  absolute  power 
of  managing  their  own  affairs,  and  of  making  war  upon  one 
another.  In  practice  Sparta  was  resolved  that  their  armies  should 
move  only  at  her  dictation,  that  into  her  treasury  should  flow  the 
tril)ute  the  gathering  of  which  was  denounced  as  the  worst  crime 
of  imperial  Athens,  and  that  in  the  government  of  the  oligarchical 

'  See  p.  147.  ^  See  p,  375. 

»  See  p.  396. 


566  THE  EMPIRE  OF  SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

factions  she  should  have  the  strongest  material  guarantee  for  the 
absolute  submission  of  the  Greek  cities. 

To  secure  this  result  the  Hellenic  states  of  Lesser  Asia  -were 
abandoned  to  the  tender  mercies  of  Persian  taxgatlierers,  and  left  to 
The  restora-  feel  the  full  bitteniess  of  the  slavery  from  which  Athens 
tionofPia-     had  rescued  them  some  ninety  years  aaro.     The  work 

3S6B.C.  was  not  so  easy  as  the  Spartans  had  hoped  that  it 
might  be.  Thebes  had  been  willing,  if  not  eager,  to  see  Athens 
humbled  :  but  she  was  not  willing  to  give  up  her  own  Hegemonia 
over  the  Boiotian  cities, — a  primacy  which  she  claimed  by  a  title 
as  ancient  as  that  of  Athens  to  her  demoi  or  townships,  and  in 
which,  with  the  exception  of  Thespiai'  and  Orchomenos,  all  the 
existing  towns  readily  acquiesced.  There  was  danger  in  the  dis- 
affection of  these  cities  ;  and  the  Spartans  resolved  therefore  on  a 
measure  which  they  might  proclaim  as  an  act  of  homage  to  the 
dearest  feelings  of  the  Greek  heart.  The  fugitive  IMataians  had 
been  driven  by  Lysaudros  after  the  catastrophe  of  Aigospotamoi 
from  their  abode  in  Skione.'^  They  were  now  living  in  Athens, 
when  they  were  invited  to  return  with  their  families  to  their  old 
home  under  the  heights  of  Kithairon.  If  the  Plataians  returned 
thither  with  any  thought  of  enjoying  again  the  measure  of  freedom 
which  their  alliance  with  Athens  had  secured  to  them,  they  soon 
found  themselves  mistaken.  Their  city  was  restored  simply  to  be 
a  thorn  in  the  side  of  the  Thebans  :  and  a  Spartan  garrison  inforced 
its  obedience  to  the  rules  imposed  on  Spartan  allies. 

Their  hand  fell  next  on  the  Mantineians,  who  were  accused 
of  friendly  feelings  towards  the  Argives,  shown  by  supplying  thein 
Breaking  up  with  corn  in  time  of  war,  and  b}'  their  evident  satis- 
Mantineia°'   faction  at  such  reverses  as  befell   the   Sj)artan   arms. 

38C-5B.C.  Nothing  more  was  needed  to  justify  the  appearance  of 
envoys  at  Maiitineia  with  a  demand  not  merely  that  the  walls  of 
the  city  sliould  be  thrown  down,  but  that  four-tifths  of  its  in- 
habitants should  make  for  themselves  a  home  in  four  distinct 
townsliips.  The  rejection  of  these  terms  was  followed  by  a  siege 
which  Agesipolis  speedily  brought  to  an  end  by  damming  upon  the 
lower  side  tlic  stream  which  flowed  through  the  town.  The  walls 
and  houses,  built  of  sun-dried  bricks,  were  tottering  on  their 
foundations  when  the  Mantineians  yielded  to  their  fate,  to  lind 
themselves  soon,  as  Xenophon  would  have  us  believe,'  vastly  the 
better  and  happier  for  the  change.  They  were  now  freed  from  the 
rule  of  their  luitrful  demagogues,  and  Sparta,  instead  of  the 
single  city  of  Mantiueia,  had  five  distinct  allies  to   each  of  which 

'  The  Thebans  had  done  little  to         "  Time.  v.  32. 
win  tlieir  love,  and  much  to  excite         ^  Xen.  //.  v.  2,  7. 
lljeir  wrath.     Thuc.  iv.  133. 


Chap.  III.]  GROWTH  OF  THEBAN  POWER.  567 

she  paid  the  compliment  of  sending  liei*  Xenagos.'  If  his  picture 
be  true,  it  is  strange  that  after  the  fight  at  Leuktra,  barely  fifteen 
years  later,  they  should  run  with  such  feverish  haste  to  restore  the 
city  from  which  they  had  been  driven. 

Elsewhere  things  were  going  not  altogether  as  the  Spartans 
would  have  wished.  Athens,  strengthened  by  the  possession  of 
Lemnos,  Imbros,  and  Skyros,  was  gradually  increasing  Formation 
her  scailty  fleet.  The  harbor  of  Peiraieus  Avilh  its  of  the  oii'n- 
crowd  of  merchant  vessels  exhibited  something  like  federacy.'" 
the  stirring  industry  of  former  times.  The  islanders  '^^'^  ^■^■ 
of  the  Egean,  ve.xed  by  the  raids  of  pirates  who,  in  the  absence  of 
any  dominant  maritime  power,  could  sweep  the  seas  almost  at  their 
will,  were  learning  that  tribute  paid  for  the  protection  of  Athens 
whose  interest  it  was  to  put  down  these  marauders  was  a  less  costly 
burden  than  tribute  paid  to  Sparta  which  cared  nothing  whether 
they  were  put  down  or  not.  Thus  the  influence  of  Athens  was 
becoming  constantly  more  widely  felt,  when  Kleigenes,  sent  with 
other  envoys  from  Akanthos,  appeared  at  Sparta  with  the  air 
of  a  man  oppressed  with  a  mysterious  and  dreadful  secret.  The 
Spartans  could  not  be  aware,  he  thought,  of  the  terrible  things 
then  going  on  in  Hellas,  or  of  the  dangers  which  threatened  thera 
if  they  failed  to  take  strong  measures  of  repression.  The  danger 
came  from  no  less  a  city  than  the  Chalkidian  Olynthos,"  a  city 
which  had  taken  advantage  of  the  troubles  of  the  Makedonian 
King  Amyntas  to  lay  the  foundations  of  a  confederacy,  which  ex- 
tended to  all  its  members  the  benefits  of  a  common  law  and  a 
common  citizenship,  of  unrestricted  intermarriage,  of  unfettered 
commerce  and  acquisition  of  property  in  land.  These  terms  were 
gladly  accepted  by  some  of  their  weaker  and  by  some  too  of  their 
le.ss  insignificant  neighbors  ;  nor  were  they  less  cheerfully  wel- 
comed even  by  the  Makedonian  cities  which  had  known  hitherto 
no  other  system  than  that  of  despotism  varied  only  by  a  somewhat 
frequent  change  of  masters. 

The  paramount  need  of  securing  a  free  area  for  the  action  of  the 
new  confederacy  had  after  this  great  success  compelled  the  Olyn- 
thians  to  invite  the   adhesion   of  Akanthos  and  Apol-   opposition 
Ionia ;  but  the  people  of  these  cities  had  no  mind  to   ^^  Akanthos 
give  up   the   theories  of  which  Brasidas  during  his   nia. 
sojourn  among  them  had  been  so   earnest  a  preacher.^      ^^  ^■'^' 
They  wished  to  keep   strictly  to   their  own  customs   and  to  have 
nothing   to   do   with   their  neighbors.     Nor  was  this   all.     The 
Spartans  might  in  some  measure  estimate  the  peril  of  the   crisis, 

'  This  officer  commanded  the  con-         ^  See  p.  64. 
tingeuts  furnished  by  the  allies  or         ^  See  p.  335. 
Bubjects  of  Sparta. 


5fi8  THE   EMPIRE  OF   SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

■when  they  learnt  tliat  Boiotian  and  Athenian  envoys  were  already 
at  Olynthos,  and  that  the  dynthianshad  resolved  to  add  their  own 
voice  to  that  of  Thebes  and  Athens  in  calling  upon  all  the  Greek 
cities  to  enter  into  the  new  alliance.  In  any  case  they  could  not 
but  see  the  absurdity  of  trying-  to  keep  the  Boiotian  cities  disunited, 
while  they  allowed  the  Olynthians  to  form  a  society  which,  if  not 
bi'oken  up,  must  become  an  empire.  Let  the  Spartans  look  to  it. 
It  would  soon  be  too  late  :  but  at  present  many  pf  the  members 
had  not  yet  shaken  off  the  true  Greek  sentiment  of  self-isolation, 
and  might  easily  be  detached  from  the  pernicious  company  of  the 
Olynthians.  Still  if  anything  was  to  be  done,  it  must  be  done  at 
once.  The  exclusive  bigotry  of  the  good  old  times  was  a  plant 
apt  to  wither  away  under  a  moderate  amount  of  sunshine  ;  and  if 
this  sentiment  failed  them,  there  would  be  nothing  left  to  which 
the  Spartans  could  appeal. 

The  picture  drawn  by  Kleigcncs  was  strictly  true.  It  brings 
before  ns  one  of  the  few  honest  eiforts  of  the  more  soberminded 
.       .  Greeks,  which  make  us  for  tlie  moment  dream  that  a 

Amyiitas  inn-  •  •    i  i  i  i  c  i 

Kins?  of  real   llellemc  nation    might  liave    been   lorined,  and  a 

Makcdoina.  ^jjij-j-jei.  raised  against  the  overgrowth  of  Makedonian 
and  Roman  power.  It  was  quite  true  that  the  Olynthians  had 
resolved  to  defend  themselves  and  to  rescue  their  neighbors  from 
oppression,  at  a  time  when  a  horde  of  Illyrian  savages  liad  driven 
off  the  usui'per  Amyntas,  who  had  worked  his  way  to  the  Make- 
donian throne  by  murder.  Amyntas  had  slain  I'ausanias  the  son 
of  Aeropos,  and  Aeropos  had  slain  Orestes,  the  infant  son  of 
Archelaos,  who,  having  for  years  ruled  the  country  vigorouslj', 
had  fallen  a  victim  to  the  passions  of  two  young  men  with  whom 
he  had  been  connected  in  an  unspeakably  loathsome  intimacy. 
But  Archelaos  had  become  King  only  by  slaying  liis  brother,  the 
legitimate  son  of  his  father,  that  King  Berdikkas  whose  chief  con- 
tril)utions  to  Athens  took  the  form,  it  was  said,  of  shiploads  of 
lies.'  These  usurpers  and  murderers  belonged,  it  is  asserted,  to 
the  royal  race  ;  but,  however  this  may  be,  the  Amyntas  with 
whose  subjects  the  Olynthians  had  to  deal  is  at  least  notorious  as 
the  father  of  Bhilip  and  the  grandfather  of  Alexander  the  Great. 
It  is  painful  to  think  of  the  bright  dawn  of  the  Olyntliian  con- 
federacy as  closing  in  darkness  and  blood  ;  but  in  such  a  case  the 
„     ,  ..         Spartans    were    not    likely  to    liesitatc.     The    picture 

Resolution  I  -1        I'l    •  "  1        •!        r        1  •   1 

of  S|)iiriii  to  drawn  by  Kleigcnes  was  one  every  detau  of  whicli 
oiynn,i;"in'"'  \v()uld  rouse  their  fiercest  antipathy.  The  work  which  ii 
roiifi'dafy.  dcpictod  was  the  work  of  Athens,  pnro;ed,  it  may  be, 
of  many  defects  and  some  blots  which  the  circum- 
stances attending  the  growth  of  her  empire  made  it  impossible  for 

'  See  p.  353. 


Chap  III.]  GROWTH  OF  THEBAN  POWER.  5(59 

Athens  to  avoid',  but  the  same  work  still  as  extending  to  all  alike 
the  benefits  of  law,  eompelling  all  to  sacrifice  just  so  much  of  their 
independence  as  was  needful  for  the  general  welfare,  and  insisting 
on  the  co-operation  of  all  towards  the  maintenance  of  an  order 
essential  to  the  safety  alike  of  the  rich  and  the  poor.  To  use  tlie 
metaphor  of  the  Korinthian  Timolaos"  the  Spartans  resolved  to 
burn  the  wasps  in  their  nest ;  and  circumstances  singularly  favored 
the  enterprise. 

The  great  hindrance  which  lay  in  their  way  was  Thebes ;  and 
so  long  as  she  did  not  break  the  terms  of  the  Peace  of  Antalki- 
das,  the  task  of  dealing  with  her  might  seem  perhaps   seizure  of 
perplexing.     But  Spartan   zeal  was  not  easily  bafiied.    theThcban 
While  Eudamidas  was  ordered  to  lead  his  men  with  the   Phoibidas. 
utmost  speed  to  Olynthos,  his  brother  Phoibidas,  avIio      382  b.c. 
was  to  bring  on  the  rest  of  the  ai*my,  received  secret  instructions  to 
do  what  he  could  for  Sparta  as  he  passed  Thebes.    There  Leontia- 
des  with  the  philo-Lakouian  party  was  eagerly  awaiting  him  ;  and 
Phoibidas  was  lucky  in  the  time  of  his  coming.     During  his  stay 
the  day  came  round  for  the  feast  of  Thesmophoria,  and  accord- 
ing to  the  old  usage  the  Kadmeia  was  given  over  to  the  sole  occu- 
pation of  the  women.    On  that  day  Phoibidas,  intending  to  set  out 
on  his  northward  march,  was  called  back  by  Leontiades,  who,  lead- 
ing him  straight  to  the  Akropolis,  opened  its  gates. 

Hastening  to  the  senate-house  where  the  council  was  assembled, 
Leontiades  addressed  them  as  Polemarch,  telling  them  that  the 
Spartans  had  possession  of  the  citadel  and  of  all  their  . 
women,  Init  that  no  one  would  be  the  worse  for  the  execution  of 
change  except  traitors.  Of  these,  he  added,  Ismenias,  i^i^enias. 
the  head  of  the  anti-Spartan  party,  was  the  chief  :  and  by  his  orders 
Ismenias  was  arrested  and  dragged  away.  Of  those  who  sided  with 
him  300  took  refuge  at  Athens,  while  Ismenias  himself,  arraigned 
before  a  court  consisting  of  three  Spartan  commissioners  and  one 
from  each  of  the  allied  cities,  was  charged  with  being  the  foremost 
man  in  stirring  up  the  war  which  had  ended  with  the  peace  of 
Antalkidas.  Neither  by  the  terms  of  that  peace  nor  on  any  other 
grounds  had  the  court  any  jurisdiction  :  but  his  death  was  a  ne- 
cessity for  Leontiades  and  his  partisans,  and  Ismenias  accordingly 
Avas  condemned  and  executed. 

Phoibidas  had  done  a  service  to  his  country  scarcely  inferior  to 
that  of  Lysandros  at  Aigospotamoi :  and  both  acts  were  alike  in  the 
blackness  of  the  treachery  by  which  they  were  accom-  suppression 
plished,  unless  it  be  urged  that  the  arm  of  Phoibidas  thJin^^^!^^"' 
was  directed  against  a  city  with  which  Sparta  pro-  federacy. 
fessed  to  be  at  peace.  In  Sparta  the  tidings  called  forth  exprcs- 
1  See  p.  246.  '  See  p.  560. 


570  THE  EMPIRE  OF   SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

sions  of  indignation  wliich  in  a  few  may  liave  been  sincere  ;  and 
the  secrecy  of  the  Spartan  system  enabled  the  Ephors  to  disavow 
instructions  which  had  probably  specified  no  service  in  particular. 
"With  liis  usual  straightforwardness  Agesilaos  cut  the  matter  short  by 
telling  them  that  the  only  question  for  debate  was  whether  the  action 
of  I'hoibidas  was  for  the  welfare  of  Sparta  or  whether  it  was  not. 
In  the  former  case,  he  deserved  only  gratitude.  No  law  forbade  any 
man  to  benefit  his  country  without  orders.  Phoibidas  was  removed 
from  his  command  and  sentenced  to  a  fine  probably  never  paid  ; 
and  here,  so  far  as  the  Spartans  were  concerned,  the  matter  ended. 
Their  garrison  continued  to  hold  the  Kadmeia  ;  and  their  army  was 
enabled  to  act  against  the  Olynthians  without  dread  of  a  formidable 
enemy  in  the  rear.  Even  tlius  the  task  of  subduing  them  was  not 
easy.     The  army  of  Eudamidas  was  reinforced  by  a 

quo  Ti  c  •  . 

still  larger  army  under  Teleutias  ;  but   tlie   spring   of 

the  following  year  found  the  Olyntliians  not  less  energetic  in  their 

defence.     In   a  battle  which  they  provoked  Teleutias 

381 B  c  .  .    X  • 

was  slain,  and  his  army  scattered  ;  but  the   Spartans 
remained  only  the  more  resolute  in  their  purpose.    Agesipolis,  dis- 
patched with  a  third  army,  died   of  fever  brought  on 
by  the  summer  heat ;  but  by  his   successor  Polybiades 
the   Olynthians  were   shut  up  within  their  city.     Famine  did  its 
work.     Olynthos  submitted,  and  became  a  member  of 
the  Spartan  confederacy.    Her  Makedonian  allies  passed 
again  under  the  sway  of  Amyntas  who  had  both  pleaded  and  fought 
ag'ainst  the  Olynthians  -with  the  utmost  earnestness.     His  zeal  was 
amply  justified.     The   confederacy  thus   overthrown  would  have 
been  probably  an  insurmountable  barrier  in  the  way  of  his  ambition 
and  of  the  more  daring  energy  of  his  successors.    The  Spartans  had 
indeed  done  him  good  service  :  tliey  had  not  the  less  sealed  their 
own  ruin.   lTnhaj)i)ily  this  ruin  embraced  others  besides  themselves. 
The  sacrifice  of  Sparta  alone  would  have  been  but  a  poor  offering 
to  the  Genius  of  Exclusiveness.    East  and  West  alike  were  to  feel 
for  a  long  series  of  centuries  the  results  of  her  systematically  selfish 
and  treacherous  policy. 

Nor  can  it  be  said  that  even  at  the  time  there  were  wanting 
men  who  saw  the  real  nature  of  the  work  which  she  was  doing. 
Orniionsof  In  the  oration  read  before  the  Greeks  assembled  for 
ifokrMh'.'''  the  celebration  of  the  99th  Olympiad  the  rhetor  Lysias 
8:n  ii.c.  found  it  convenient  to  express  his  astonishment  that 
Sparta  couM  quietly  sit  still  while  in  the  east  the  Persian  king 
was  master  of  a  (ireek  fleet  more  ])owerful  than  her  own,  while  in 
the  west  Dioiiysios  the  despot  of  Svracuse  possessed  a  navy  still 
more  formidable,  ;iiid  whiit;  on  the  north  the  Makedonian  .\myntas 
was  building  up  a  firm  empire  in  his  own  country,  incroaching  on 


CiiAP.  III.]  GROWTH   OF   THEBAN    POWER.  571 

the  territories  of  the  Greek  cities,  and  iiislaving  these  cities  thera- 
seh^es.  We  cannot  suppose  hiiu  to  have  been  ignorant  of  the  fact 
that  Sparta  had  deliberately  played  into  the  hands  of  all  these  three 
despots,  and  that  to  her  they  owed  a  very  large  measure  of  their 
power.  As  things  then  stood,  it  was  perhaps  an  act  of  sufficient 
boldness  in  the  presence  of  the  representatives  of  Dionysios  him- 
self to  declare  that  the  Greek  world  was  on  fire  at  both  ends  and 
that  Spaj'ta  was  doing  nothing  to  quench  the  flames.  Four  years 
later  before  the  same   auijust  assembly  Isokrates  could       „„„ 

,  ,  "  .  1-1  1  380  B.C. 

in  language  as  vehement  as  it  was  plain  charge  the 
Spartans  with  deliberate  treachery  for  conduct  at  which  Lysias 
had  expressed  only  surprise.  He  not  onl}',  saw  but  could  tell 
them  that  they  were  aiding  Artaxerxes,  Ainyntas,  and  Dionysios 
to  eat  the  very  life  out  of  Hellas  and  leaving  it  absolutely  helpless 
against  any  powerful  foreign  invadei*.  Finally,  Xenophon,the 
great  worshipper  of  Sparta,  could  treat  the  act  of  Phoibidas  in 
surprising  the  Kadmeia  as  Thucydides  treats  the  massacre  at 
Melos  by  the  Athenians.'  It  is  for  him  the  great  turning-point  of 
their  history,  marking  the  moment  at  which  the  gods  who  have 
their  eye  on  all  wicked  men  intervened  to  put  them  down.^  The 
enthusiasm  even  of  Xenophon  was  quenched  by  an  act  of  treachery 
committed  against  a  Greek  city  in  time  of  peace  ;  and  his  eyes 
became  suddenly  opened  to  the  fact  that  Spartan  promises  of  in- 
dependence and  freedom  were  nothing  but  a  cheat  and  a  snare. 

Visible  signs  of  Divine  Judgment  were,  in  his  belief,  not  long 
Avanting.  At  no  time,  to  all  appearance,  had  the  empire  of  Sparta 
been  more  mio;hty  ;  at  no  time  had  her  heel  pressed  „ 

1  -1      '     -^     1  IT-  •       .  11         Conspiracy 

more  heavily  upon  her  allies,  or  in  truer  phrase  her  of  Peiopidns. 
slaves.  The  only  city  of  which  she  had  a  genuine  3.9  b.c 
dread  was  kept  down  by  a  Spartan  garrison  aided  effectually  by  a 
faction  ready  at  all  costs  to  maintain  her  supremacy  and  thus  to 
secure  for  themselves  unbounded  license.  In  this  very  city  their 
power  was  to  receive  a  terrible  blow,  and  seven  men  alone  were  to 
inflict  it.  Of  these  men  the  most  conspicuous  were  Pelopidas  and 
Mellon.  With  their  fellow-exiles  at  Athens  they  had  waited  long 
in  the  hopes  of  some  more  open  resistance  :  but  the  bounds  of  their 
patience  were  now  reached,  and  they  resolved  to  do  by  assassina- 
tion the  work  which  they  could  not  achieve  in  open  war.  We 
shrink,  and  shrink  with  a  righteous  horror,  from  the  thought  of 
employing  such  devices  ;  but  if  ever  such  an  attempt  might  be 
palliated  or  condoned,  the  more  merciful  sentence  would  be  justi- 
fied in  the  case  of  Pelopidas  and  his  comrades.  But  for  the 
iniquitous  usurpation  of  Leontiades  and  his  abettors  Thebes  would 
now  have  been  at  war  with  Sparta  ;  nor  can  it  w'ell  be  denied  that 
'  See  p.  359.  '  Xen.  ff.  v.  4,  1. 


572  THE   EMPIRE    OF   SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

for  the  Tliebaiis  the  Spartans  bad  put  themselves  beyond  the  pale 
of  law  by  seizing  their  citadel  in  time  of  peac-e  an-l  without  the 
faintest  plea  of  otfence  or  injury.  As  to  Leontiade- a.id  his  parti- 
sans, it  would  be  almost  a  bathos  to  speak  of  them  as  murderers  ; 
but  if  their  enormous  crimes  cannot  be  held  to  justify  the  use  of 
the  dagger  against  tlieir  persons,  so  neither  can  we  deny  that  no 
criminals  ever  more  righteously  deserved  a  harder  punishment.  Of 
the  attempt  itself  it  may  be  enough  to  say  that  the  conspirators 
had  the  aid  of  Phyllidas,  the  secretary  of  the  polemarchs,  in  gaining 
access  to  their  victims,  two  of  whom,  Archias  and'Philippos,  thev 
were  tlius  enabled  to  slay  at  a  banquet.  Leontiades  after  a  hard 
struggle  was  killed. in  his  own  house. 

A\'ith  the  secret  conspiracy  Epameinondas  Avould  have  nothing 
to  do  ;  but  when  the  tyrants  had  ceased  to  live,  he  was  among 
.  the  first  to  appear  in  the  Agora  and  amonnr  the  most 
the  Spartan  zealous  in  calling  the  people  to  amis.  The  shout  of 
fhe'^Kad-'"  exultation  which  ran  through  the  city  as  the  tidings 
meia.  became  generally  known,  brought  dismay  to  the  Spar- 

tans in  the  Kadmeia.  The  garrisons  of  Thespiai  and 
Plataiai  could  not  reach  them,  and  their  enemies  were  being  hourly 
reinforced  by  volunteers  from  Attica  and  Thebans  returning  from 
exile.  Availing  themselves  of  the  enthusiasm  of  the  moment, 
Pelopidas  and  Mellon,  who  Avith  a  citizen  named  Charon  liad  been 
appointed  Boiotarchs,  resolved  to  carry  the  citadel  by  assault :  and 
the  order  for  attack  had  been  already  given  wlien  tlie  Spartan 
commander  proposed  a  capitulation.  The  Thebans  willingly  al- 
lowed them  to  depart  with  the  honors  of  war  ;  but  no  honors 
awaited  tliem  at  home.  Two,  if  we  are  to  believe  ])iodoros,'  were 
put  to  death  ;  the  third  was  punished  with  a  crushing  fine  ;  and 
Kleombrotos,  now  king  in  place  of  his  brother  Agesipolis,  was  dis- 
patched to  take  vengeance  on  the  Thebans.  His  line  of  march 
took  him  close  along  the  frontier  of  Attica  ;  and  while  the  sight  of 
liis  men  revived  in  the  Athenians  tlie  old  feelings  of  horror  with 
wliich  they  had  regarded  the  occupation  of  Dekeleia,  Kleombrotos 
availed  himself  of  the  impression  thus  made  to  demand  the  punish- 
ment of  two  of  tlieir  generals  who  liad  aided  the  enterprise  of 
Pelopidas  and  his  comrades.  The  charge,  if  wc  may  follow  the 
story  of  Xenophon,  was  undeniably  true.  These  men  had  acted  on 
their  own  responsibility,  and  therefore  had  run  the  risk  of  involving 
their  countrymen  in  a  war  which  they  had  not  sanctioned.  The 
Athenians  might  liave  retorted  that  in  the  case  of  I'hoibidas 
Agesilaos  had  laid  down  a  principle  capable  of  general  application. 
They  may  have  felt  indeed  that  the  retort  must  be  backed  up  with 
a  force  which  they  know  that  they  did  not  possess  ;  but  in  putting 

■  XV.  27. 


Chap.  III.]         GROWTH  OF   THEBAN   POWER.  573 

tlio  two  generals  on  their  trial  it  is  more  likely  that  they  acted 
from  an  honest  sense  of  duty.  The  fonnalities  iniquitously  set  at 
nought  in  the  case  of  the  victors  of  Argennoussai  now  secured  to 
each  a  separate  trial.  The  first  general  was  condemned  and 
executed  ;  the  second,  before  his  trial  came  on,  contrived  to  make 
his  escape,  and  Avas  sentenced  to  exile  in  his  absence. 

With  one-third  of  his  forces  Kleombrotos  had  left  at  Thespiai 
the  harinost  Sphodrias  with  orders  to  do  all  that  he  could  against 
the  Thebans.  The  memory  of  the  recent  exploit  of  Attempt  of 
Teleutias  made  him  tliink  that  more  might  be  done  on'poinfiens 
against  Athens.  In  short  he  resolved  to  attempt  by  379  b.c. 
land  what  Teleutias  had  achieved  by  sea.  But  he  started  fr.om 
Thespiai  too  late  to  reach  Peiraieus  before  dawn.  The  morning 
found  him  at  Eleusis,  nearly  ten  miles  from  the  harbor.  He  at 
once  retreated,  doing,  however,  as  much  mischief  as  he  could  to 
the  inhabitants  by  the  way.  The  Spartan  envoys  who  had  come 
to  complain  of  the  two  generals  had  not  yet  left  Athens.  W^lien 
brought  before  the  indignant  Demos,  they  answered  forcibly  enough 
that  had  they  been  abettors  of  the  enterprise  they  would  have 
taken  care  not  to  be  found  in  the  enemy's  city.  The  act  of  Spho- 
drias, they  assured  the  Athenians,  would  be  regarded,  as  they 
themselves  regarded  it,  with  not  less  horror  than  astonishment ; 
and  death  would  be  the  penalty  of  his  crime  in  attacking  a  state 
with  which  Sparta  was  at  peace.  Satisfied  with  this  assurance, 
the  Athenians  foolishly  let  the  envoys  go.  Their  forbearance  was 
rewarded  by  the  acquittal  of  Sphodrias,  strictly  because  his  son 
Kleonymos  stood  to  Archidamos  son  of  Agesilaos  in  the  infamous 
relation  of  Carr,  Viscount  Rochester  and  Earl  of  Somerset,  to 
James  I.'     The  argument  of  Agesilaos  went  siraight  to  its  mark. 

^  It  lias  bedn  urtred  that  too  great  tiou  of  the  notary  Sprot,  and  to  the 

ciress  should  not  be  laid  on  the  [)er-  forging  of  the  Logan  or  Restalrig 

sonal  vices,  or,  as  some  would  prefer  letters  in  order  to  cover  the  infamy 

to  call  tliein,  the  tastes   and  appe-  of  this  execution.     In    short,  the 

tites  of  kings  or  other  rulers, — that  personal  tastes  or  vices  of  James 

80  far  as  such  personal  attributes  led  to  a  series   of  violent  interfe- 

iufluence  the  conduct  of   govern-  rences  with  law,  and  went  far  to- 

meiit,  they  should  be  brought  into  wards  establishing  that  theory  of 

tlie  picture,  but  no  further.     This  despotism  which  plunged  the  na- 

is  probably  not  less  j  ust  than  true,  tion  into  years  of  war  and  brouglit 

But  the  case  of  Sphodrias  is  dis-  his  son  to  the  scaffold, 
tinctly  one  in   which  war  results         It  may  be  true  that  the  historian 

from  the  monstrously  vicious  rela-  is  not  justified  in  parading  private 

tions  of  two  young  men.     In  the  vices  merely  as  vices,  and  it  may  be 

same  manner,  of  James  VI.  it  may  argued  that  '  the  wives  of  Charles 

be  said  that  his  tastes  led  to  the  I.  and  Lewis  XVI.  did  just  as  much 

murder  of  Alexander  Ruthven,  and  harm  publicly  by  their  operation  on 

not  merely  this,  but  to  the  extirpa-  the  course  of  government  as  the 

tion  of  his  family,  to  the  infamous  mistresses  of  Charles  II.  or  of  Lewis 

farce  which  ended  with  the  execu-  XV.'  But  even  if  the  former  propo- 


574  THE  EMPIRE  OF  SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

The  guilt  of  Spliodrias,  he  said,  could  not  possibly  be  denied  ;  but 
it  was  not  the  less  iiiipossil)le  to  put  to  deatli  one  who,  whether  as 
boy,  youth,  or  man,  had  stood  among  the  foremost  of  his  coiintry- 
men.  Spai-ta  could  not  spare  such  citizens,  and  justice  must  in 
such  cases  give  place  to  expedience. 

Tlic  decision  saved  Spliodrias  :  but  it  called  into  existence  a 
new  confederacy  in  which  Thebes  gladly  enrolled  herself  under 
Formation  Athens.  In  its  general  purpose  this  society  closely 
of  a  new         resembled   the    old   Athenian    empire   to    which    the 

Athenian  rni     t  iii  i  ii  i 

Confederacy.  Ibebans  had  shown  themselves  the  most  deter- 
mined enemies  ;  but  as  little  as  possible  was  said  of  those  duties 
which  had  bred  jealousy  and  disaffection  among  the  old  allies  of 
Athens.  There  were  to  be  no  more  Klerouchiai,'  and  no  Athenian 
under  any  pristence  was  to  become  a  landowner  iii  the  territories  of 
any  city  enrolled  in  the  new  alliance.  Alone;  with  Timotheosthe 
son  of  Konou  and  the  orator  Kallistratos  Chiibrias  had  such  suc- 
cess in  the  Egean  islands  and  elsewhere  that  Athens  soon  stood  at 
the  head  of  seventy  confederate  cities.  But  between  the  old  state 
of  things  and  the  new  there  was  this  difference,  that  Athens  had 
no  coercive  power,  and  that  the  allies  were  not  really  bound  to  do 
more  than  thev  liked.  Tlie  circumstances  of  the  moment  created  a 
vehement  enthusiasm  ;  but  the  flame  soon  died  out,  and  Athens 
herself  regarded  with  more  than  coldness  the  successes  of  the  most 
powerful  amongst  her  allies. 

For  the  moment  there  was  nothing  to  excite  lier  jealousy  even 
in  the  ardor  with  which  the  Thebans  organised  the  celebrated 
Epanuinon-  body  of  troops  known  as  the  Sacred  Band,  and  in  the 
sai-r'd\}an"d  ^'•1,^"''^'"  ability  displayed  by  their  leader  Epameinon- 
ofTiubes.  das.  It  is  impossible  to  believe  that  the  shameful 
intimacy  which  linke<l  together  each  couple  in  this  brilliant 
company  could  tend  to  keep  alive  all  that  was  generous  and  high- 
minded  in  their  disposition.  Were  it  so,  the  emphatic  assertion  of 
Aristotle  that  true  friendship  cannot  possibly  be  founded  in  wicked- 
ness would  be  signally  disproved.  The  loathsome  vice  thus  thrust 
on  our  notice  was  in  truth  the  banc  of  Hellenic  society  ;  but  wc 
may  mark  with  thankfulness  the  better  impulses  Avhich  in  what- 
ever me;usiu"e  counteracted  this  dreadful  evil.  It  is  enough  to  say 
that  it  did  not  impair  their  courage,  and  they  were  happy  in  having 
as  their  leader  the  noblest  of  all  Theban  citizens.  Sprung  from 
the  ancient  stock  of  the  Spartoi,  the  children  of  the  dragon's  teeth 

Bitinn  be  nllowfid   to  pass  itnchal-  conduct  of  the  Spartans  in  the  case 

Icnjjntl,  to  tho  latter  it  must  be  re-  of  Spliodrias  cannot  be  understood 

j)lied  that  tbo  minions  of  Janit-s  I.  or  explained  without  a  reft'rence  to 

were  more   ]towerfiil   ihau  any  of  tlie  personal  tastes  or  appetites  of 

these, and  that  his  hist  ry  is  ublank  Archidamos  and  Kleonymos. 
without  them.     In  like  manner  the         '  See  p.  94. 


CnAp.  III.]  GROWTH   OF   THEBAN   POWER. 


5Y5 


sown  by  Kadmos,  Epameinondas  liad  attained  an  eminence  in  art 
and  science  very  rarely  acquired  by  liis  countiymen.  Born  to  no 
great  iidieritance,  lie  had  made  no  effort  to  amass  wealth  ;  and  this 
merit  of  personal  integrity,  always  appreciated  in  Greece,'  was 
happily  combined  with  the  strength  of  mind  in  which  men  pecu- 
niarily incorruptible  have  sometimes  been  f(^und,  like  Nikias, 
fatally  deficient. 

If  during  the  next  five  years  the  Spartans  strove   resolutely    to 
prop  up  their  tottering  empire,  the  course  of  events  went  slowly, 
perhaps,  but  steadily  against  them.     The  year  which      Decline  of 
followed  the  attempt  of  Sphodri as  witnessed  a  Spartan       power"^ 
invasion  of   Boiotia  and  the  more  significant  sight  of         378  b.c. 
Peloponnesiau  hoplites  even   under  Agesilaos  declining  to   cross 
spears  with  the  troops  of  the  Athenian  Chabrias.     On  his   return 
home  Agesilaos  left  Phoibidas   at  Thespiai ;   before   many  weeks 
were  past,  the  hero  of  the  Kadnieia  was  slain  and  his  troops  scat- 
tered by  the  Theban  cavalry.     During  the   next  vear 
Agesilaos  again  took  the  fifild ;  he   returned    home, 
after  doing  but  little,  stretched  on  a  couch,  from  which  for  a  long 
time  he  was  unable  to  rise.     Some  injury  to  his  sound  leg  had  been 
aggravated  by  lack  of  skill  on  the  part  of  the  surgeons  who  attended 
him.      Nor  was  his  successor  Kleombrotos  more  fortu- 
nate by  land,  while  in  a  battle   fought  off   Naxos  the 
Spartan   admiral   Pollis    was   utterly  defeated   by   the   Athenian 
Chabrias.    Eight  of  the  Peloponnesiau  ships  were  taken  with  their 
crews,  four-and-twenty  more  were  destroyed,  and  Chabrias  might 
have  made  the  ruin  as  complete,  so  Diodoros  tells  us,^  as  that   of 
Argennoussai,  had  not  the  recompense  dealt  out  to  the  commanders 
in  that  memorable  conflict  withheld  him  from  pursuing  the  enemy 
while  Athenian  seamen  were  needing  his  help. 

This  great  success  added  largely  to  the  power  not  of  Athens 
only,  but  of  Thebes.     To  the  former  besides  3,000  prisoners  and 
more  than  100  talents  in  money  it  brought  the  ad-  Renewed 
hesion  of  seventeen  cities  to  her  new  confederacy  :  to   jealousy  be- 
thc  latter,  by  clearing  the  Egean  of  all  hostile  forces,   Athens  and 
it  insured  the  safe  transit  of  the  corn  needed  to  supply   Thebes, 
the  crops  ruined  by  two  successive  invasions.    But  the  jealousy  of 
Athens  was  already  awake,  and  it  found  open  expression  Avhen  the 
Thebans  refused  to  contribute  towards  the  expenses  of  the  war  by 
sea.    They  were  probably  unable  to  do  so  ;  but  the  Athenians,  not 
easily  convinced   of  this,    would  hear   with  increased 
dissatisfaction  that  the  Theban  Pelopidas  had  defeated 
the  Peloponnesiaiis  under  Gorgoleou  and  Theopompos  in  the  open 
field,  slaying  their  two  commanders  ;  that  Thebes  had  practically 
'  See  p.  311.  ="  XV.  35. 


576  THE   EMPIRE  OF   SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

recovered  lier  Hegemonia  over  the  Boiotian  cities,  and  that  she 
Avas  preparing  a  lleet  at  lier  port  of  Kreusis  on  the  Corinthian 
Gulf. 

Under  tlie  fatal  conditions  which  Spartan  supremacy  had 
imposed  upon  Hellenic  life  nothing  more  was  needed  to  make 
Peace  be-  Athens  seek  peace  with  her  deadly  enemy.  The  pro- 
'"s*?ind^'^'  pos^'  "^^^  li^ppily  timed,  at  least  for  Sparta.  Only 
Sparta.  eight  years  before,  she  had  forcibly  put  down  the  con- 

federacy which  might  have  served  as  a  permanent  bulwark  against 
Makedonian  aggression  ;  and  in  that  short  time  her  power  had 
been  so  shaken  that  she  found  herself  compelled  to  reject  the 
prayer  of  the  Pharsalian  Polydamas,  and  allow  a  zealous  ally  to 
strengthen  the  hands  of  a  hostile  despot. 

This  despot  was  lason  of  Pherai.  During  the  few  years  which 
had  witnessed  the  decay  of  Spartan  power  almost  all  the  Thes- 
Ias6n  of  salian  cities  of  any  importance  had  become  his  allies 
Pherai,  Ta-     or  his   subiects  with  the   e.Kception  of  Pharsalos  :  and 

*'os  oi  Thcs- 

saly.  to   Polydamas   as    its   most   powerful   citizen  he  now 

3.4 B.C.  proposed  a  convention  which,  as  he  asserted,  would 
make  Thes.saly  the  dominant  power  in  flellas.  Polydamas  an- 
swered that  he  could  do  nothing  without  consulting  the  Spartans  ; 
and  before  these  he  laid  the  e.xact  facts  of  the  case.  '  We  cannot 
help  you,'  wsis  the  answer,  '  you  must  make  for  yourself  the  best 
terms  that  3'ou  can.'  The  Olynthians  had  been  crushed  becau.se 
they  had  striven  to  lay  the  foundations  of  a  society  which  miirht 
liave  grown  into  a  Greek  nation.  If  vengeance  be  worth  a  thouiiht, 
they  were  fully  avenged  when  the  Piiar.sali<uis,  bidden  to  look  to 
themselves,  added  their  votes  to  those  which  made  lason  of  Pherai 
the  Tagos  of  all  Thessaly. 

An  opportunity  for  doing  Sparta  a  mischief  soon  presented 
itself,  and  lasun  readily  seized  it.  Korkyra  had  again  become  the 
Renewed  ally  of  Athens,  As  in  the  old  days'  there  were  not 
spurta'aiid"  ''ickiiig  exiles  of  the  oligarchical  faction  who  sought  to 
Atheus.  gain  their  ends  by  bringing  Lakedainionians  into  the 
island  ;  and  these,  too,  made  their  petition  at  a  suitable  time.  The 
recent  peace  with  Athens  had  been  broken  almost  as  soon  as  it  was 
made.  Timothe-os  had  landed  on  Zakynthos  .some  exiles  belonging 
to  that  island  who  had  been  serving  in  his  fleet.  The  Zakynthians 
forwarded  a  vehement  complaint  to  Sparta,  and  Sparta,  at  once  de- 
claring war  against  Athens,  dispatched  Mnasip^)os  to  blockade 
Korkyra  and  to  ravage  its  lands. 

The  long  peace  which  the  island  had  now  enjoyed  had  restored  it 
to  the  splendid  cultivation  which   made   Chios  a  paradise   until 

'  See  p.  ;J09. 


Chap.  III.]  GROWTH  OP  THEBAN    POWER.  577 

the  Chianschose  to  throw  ill  their  lot  with  Sparta.'  The  hixuriant 
crops  were  now  destroyed,  the  vines  cut  down,  the  farm  build- 
ings levelled  with  the  ground.  But  600  Athenian 
peltasts,  conveyed  across  Thessaly  by  lason  of  Plierai,  in  Korkyra. 
managed  to  effect  their  entrance  into  the  town,  and  373  b.c. 
making  a  sally  with  the  inhabitants  routed  the  besiegers  and  slew 
their  general.  At  this  moment  signals  announced  the  approach  of 
the  Athenian  Heet,  and  the  Peloponnesians  at  once  left  the  island. 
This  effectual  aid  ought  to  have  been  given  before  ;  but  Timotheos 
had  been  busy  in  the  Egean,  and,  as  it  seems,  he  retui'ned  to  Athens 
to  find  that  the  great  success  which  he  had  achieved  would  not 
condone  his  delay,  and  that  a  second  fleet  had  already  set  off  for 
Korkyra  under  Iphikrates,  Chabrias,  and  Kallistratos.  On  reaching 
the  island  these  generals  found  that  not  much  was  left  for  them  to 
do  :  but  Iphikrates  had  heard  that  ten  triremes  belonging  to  the 
Syracusau  despot  Dionysios  were  on  their  way  from  Sicily.  These 
ships  he  determined  to  seize.  The  scouts  posted  on  the  hills  had 
no  sooner  notified  their  approach  than  he  swooped  down  on  them 
with  twenty  triremes,  and  of  the  ten  vessels  one  only  escaped. 

To  the  Spartans  it  seemed  that  things  were  going  against  them 
not  on  the  earth  only  but  in  the  heavens.  The  great  lamp  or  rod 
of  flame  suspended  in  the  sky  for  many  days  together  seizure  of 
poi-tended  some  grave  disaster,  and  fully  justified  a  ^jg^heba^ 
fresh  appeal  to  the  despot  who  luled  at  Sousa.  A  re-  372  b.c. 
script  from  the  Great  King  once  more  ordered  the  Greeks  to  settle 
all  their  quarrels  and  live  peaceably  each  in  liis  autonomous  city  ; 
and  this  time  Athens  was  scarcely  less  anxious  than  Sparta  to  abide 
by  his  decree.  The  power  of  the  latter  had  been  sensibly  diminished 
by  land,  and  had  in  fact  vanished  from  the  sea.  This  was  of  itself 
enough  to  bring  about  a  change  in  the  public  opinion  of  Athens 
towards  her  old  enemy  ;  but  the  steady  progress  of  Thebes  was 
strengthening  a  feeling  of  positive  jealousy,  which  likewise  told  in 
favor  of  Sparta.  The  re-establishment  of  Plataiai  with  a  Spartan 
garrison  might  seem  a  measure  not  much  to  the  liking  of  the 
Athenians  :  but  these  may  have  felt  that  the  ties  which  bound  the 
l^lataians  to  their  Peloponnesian  benefactors  would  prove  less  strong 
than  the  spell  of  a  friendship  unbroken  for  more  than  a  century. 
Such  at  least  was  the  feeling  of  the  Thebans  who  complained  that 
the  new  town  was  simply  a  hostile  stronghold  set  up  in  their  own 
land,  and  if  we  may  accept  the  narrative  of  Diodoros,"  even  charged 
the  Plataians  with  a  deliberate  plan  of  surrendering  their  city  to 
the  Athenians.  The  Thebans  accordingly  resolved  to  do  what  they 
had  done  before,  and  the  precautions  of  the  Plataians  were  foiled 

'  See  p.  416.  "  xv.  46. 

25 


578  THE  EMPIRE  OF   SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

by  a  stratagem  which  shut  them  out  from  their  city  and  compelled 
them  to  take  refuge  once  more  in  Athens. 

The  new  disaster  which  thus  befell  their  ancient  friends  roused 
at  Athens  a  deep  indignation.     An  appeal  was  made,  it  would 
seem,  to  the   conditions  laid   down   by  the   Peace  of 
of  war  by       Antalkidas  ;  but  the  reply  was  ready  that  at  the  time 
against  Avheu  that  peace  was  promulgated  Plataiai  was  uot  in 

Thebes.         existence,  and  could  have  no  title  to  indepeudence  by 

'  ■^■^'  the  terms  of  that  convention.  The  answer  was  con- 
clusive ;  but  it  strengthened  the  resolution  of  the  Athenians  to  put 
an  end  to  the  war,  and  their  envoys  headed  by  the  orator  Kalli- 
stratos  appeared  in  the  congress  now  held  at  Sparta  to  propose  a 
division  of  power  which  the  circumstances  of  the  time  rendered  both 
reasonable  and  necessary.  No  city  could  for  the  present  dispute 
tlie  pre-eminence  of  Athens  on  the  sea  ;  bat  if  Athens  was  content 
to  allow  to  Sparta  precedence  on  land,  she  must  insist  that  the 
terms  of  the  peace  should  no  longer  be  a  snare  and  a  delusion,  that 
the  autonomy  of  cities  should  mean  real  independence,  and  that 
Spartan  harmosts  and  Spartan  garrisons  must  at  once  become 
things  of  the  past.  Consenting  to  abide  by  these  terms,  Sparta 
nevertheless  took  the  oaths  for  her  allies  as  well  as  for  herself,  while 
Athens  and  the  cities  in  alliance  with  her  took  them  separately. 
When  they  were  tendered  t<>  Epameinondas,  the  envoy  of  Tliebcs, 
he  replied  that  he  nuist  take  them  as  representing  not  Thebes  ak)ne 
but  the  J>oi()tian  confederacy.  To  the  retort  of  Agesilaos  that  the 
Boiotian  cities  had  as  much  right  to  swear  separately  as  Thebes 
herself,  Epameinondas,  waving  the  obvious  rejoinder  that  Sparta 
had  sworn  for  all  her  allies,  replied  by  basing  the  Theban  claims  on 
reasons  which  tilled  his  hearers  with  dismay.  Thebes  was  for 
Boiotia  what  Athens  was  for  her  Demoi  and  what  Sparta  perhaps 
was  fur  the  townships  of  Lakonia.  The  right  of  the  latter  might  be 
more  questionable  if,  as  I>rasidas  affirmed,  it  was  based  simply  upon 
conquest ;'  the  title  of  Thebes  to  her  supremacy  stretched  back  to 
days  long  preceding  the  dawn  of  history,  to  days  as  distant 
perhaps  as  those  of  Theseus,  the  founder  of  the  present  Athenian 
commonwealth.  The  controversy  was  one  into  which  the  Spartans 
would  not  and  dared  not  enter.  Leaping  from  his  seat  in  rage, 
Agesilaos  bade  him  say  out  distinctly  whether  he  would  leave  the 
Boiotian  cities  autonomous  or  whether  he  would  not.  '  Yes,  wc 
will,  if  you  will  leave  Lakonia  independent  in  like  manner.'  Agesi- 
laos answered  by  wiping  out  the  name  of  Thebes  from  the  treaty 
and  by  a  declaration  of  instant  war.  Three  weeks  later  E{)amei- 
nondas  took  signal  vengeance  by  shattering  the  empire  of  Sparta 
on  the  Held  of  J^euktra. 

'  Thuc.  iv.  12G. 


Chap.  III.]  GROWTH  OF  THEBAN  POWER. 


579 


The  terms  of  the  peace  required  that  all  armies  now  in  the  field 
should  be  disbanded  ;  nor  could  those  terms  be  regarded  as  being 
kept  with  tolerable  decency,  if  this  ceremony  should  j^jj^j-g^jof 
not  be  gone  thi'oiagh.  Caring  nothing  for  such  scruples,  Kieombrotos 
the  Spartans  sent  orders  to  Kieombrotos,  then  at  the  toLeuktra. 
head  of  a  Peloponnesiau  army  in  Phokis,  to  turn  his  arms  at  once 
against  the  Thebans.  No  one  doubted  tbe  issue.  The  only  question 
discussed  related  to  the  mode  in  which  Sparta  would  treat  the 
rebellious  city.  The  history  of  Mantincia  and  Plataiai  suggested 
effectual  methods  of  punishment,  unless  indeed  Sparta  should  be 
pleased  thus  late  in  the  day  to  inforce  the  sentence  passed  against 
the  Thebans  a  hundred  years  ago  for  taking  tbe  part  of  Xerxes. 
With  this  serene  sense  of  superiority  Kieombrotos  encamped  his 
army  on  the  high  ground  near  Leuktra  between  the  mighty  masses 
of  Helikon  and  Kithairon.  From  this  point  his  way  lay  open  to 
Thebes  and  to  the  port  of  Kreusis  in  his  rear  :  and  the  advantages 
which  he  thus  gained  were  fully  appreciated  by  the  Thebans  who 
but  for  Epamcinondas  would  have  made  up  their  minds  to  with- 
draw within  their  walls  and  try  the  chances  of  a  siege.  The  dislike 
of  facing  the  redoubtable  warriors  of  Sparta  was  heightened  by 
alarming  signs  which  Nikias  would  have  interpreted  as  tokens  of 
divine  displeasure.  It  was  the  worthier  task  of  Epameinondas  to 
read  them  in  a  more  cheerful  sense,  and  to  make  the  most  of  such 
favorable  omens  as  might  be  reported  whether  from  Thebes  or 
from  the  shrine  of  Trophonios  at  Lebadeia.  As  it  so  happened, 
close  by  their  camp  stood  one  of  those  memorials  of  infamous 
wrong  which  rose  up  not  unfrequently  in  the  track  of  the  Spartan 
conquerors.  The  daughters  of  Skedasos,  subjected  to  shameless 
outrage,  liad  slain  themselves  ;  their  father,  having  vainly  sought 
"edress  at  Sparta,  came  back  and  slew  himself  also.  Not  the  most 
earnest  eloquence  of  a  tried  and  fearless  general  could  appeal  to 
their  inmost  heart  with  the  force  of  this  silent  monument  of  high- 
handed and  pitiless  iniquity.  Crowning  the  tomb  with  wreaths, 
the  Thebans  resolved  to  exert  their  whole  might  in  the  effort  to 
punish  their  murderers.  On  their  side,  the  Spartans  impetuously 
clamored  for  instant  conflict.  Although  the  temper  of  their  allies 
was  not  altogether  to  be  trusted,  they  felt  sure  that  attack 
would  be  rewarded  with  victory,  and  they  made  ready  for  battle 
according  to  the  old  methods  of  the  Lykourgean  discipline.  But 
they  had  to  deal  with  a  general  who  refused  to  be  hampered  by 
traditions.  To  Epameinondas  it  was  plain  that  his  force  must  be 
concentrated  with  the  utmost  possible  weight  on  the  chief  strength 
of  the  enemy, — in  other  words,  on  the  Spartan  hoplites  to  whom 
the  right  wing  belonged  by  prerogative.     If  these  could  be  over- 


580  THE  EMPIRE  OP   SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

bome,  he  needed  to  trouble  himself  but  little,  with  the  not  over- 
zealous  efforts  of  the  Spartan  allies  along  their  whole  front.  The 
heavy-armed  men  were  therefore  drawn  up  to  the  depth  of  fifty 
shields,  to  give  welcome  to  the  Spartan  King.  At  their  head  stood 
the  Sacred  Band  under  Pelopidas. 

Wholly  unaware  of  this  change  of  tactic,  the  Spartans,  drawn 
up  twelve  deep,  saw  with  comparative  unconcern  the   ineffectual 

Tj  *.i  .  onset  and  confused  retreat  of  their  cavalry.  But  as 
Battle  of  ,  .  <•     1       r,  11-  "  1 

Leuktra.        the  main  mass  or  the  Spartan  nophtes  came  to  close 

371  B.C.  quarters  with  the  enemy,  they  felt  at  once  that  for  what- 
ever reason  the  encounter  would  strain  their  powers  to  the  utter- 
most. With  the  dauntless  bravery  which  none  had  ever  called  into 
question  they  thrust  themselves  against  the  wall  of  shields  wliich 
bore  down  upon  them  with  increasing  weight.  To  their  amazement 
they  found  that  they  were  laboring  against  a  mass  vastly  exceeding 
their  own  in  mere  physical  momentum.  All  that  brave  and  strong 
men  could  do  they  did ;  but  all  was  done  in  vain.  The  Sacred 
Band,  pushed  on  by  men  as  heavily  armed  and  as  determined  as 
themselves,  were  hurled  onwards  with  the  weight  of  an  avalanche  ; 
and  tlie  Spartans  lay  crushed  beneath  the  advancing  mass. 
AVounded  early  in  the  fight,  Kleombrotos  was  carried  back  to  liis 
camp  a  dving  man  ;  and  when  such  as  escaped  tlie  carnage  were 
there  gathered  again  beyond  the  enemy's  reach,  it  was  found  that 
three  liinidred  genuine  Spartans  were  all  that  remained  of  the  seven 
hundred  who  had  descended  the  hill  with  the  conviction  that  they 
were  marching  to  immediate  victory. 

The  Divine  Nemesis  had  done  her  work.  A  Spartan  king,  the 
first  since  Leonidas,  had  been  slain  ;  and  with  the  polemarch  Deinon 
Lo8f>of  the  the  treacherous  Sphodrias  and  his  son  Kleonymos  were 
Spartans.  among  the  dead.  A  few  Spartans,  caring  nothing  per- 
haps for  life  after  defeat,  or  dreading  still  more  the  reproaclies  of 
tlieir  countrvmen,  insisted  that  they  should  renew  the  battle  and 
thus  recover  tlie  slain.  The  rest  saw  that  if  they  fought  they  would 
liave  to  fight  alone,  for  to  many  of  their  allies  their  disaster  was  a 
cause  for  anything  but  grief,  while  all  were  eager  to  get  away. 
There  was  no  help  but  to  confess  themselves  beaten  men  by  asking 
for  the  Iturial  truce.  The  prayer  was  granted  on  the  condition  that 
the  I'eloponnesian  allies  should  bury  their  dead  before  the  Spar- 
tans,— a  precaution  which  showed  liow  shrewdly  the  Thebans  sus- 
pected the  real  facts,  and  how  warmly  they  appreciated  the  personal 
bravery  and  prowess  of  the  genuine  Spartan  citizens.  The  task  of 
the  allies  was  soon  over.  They  had  very  few  dead  to  bury.  The 
whole  brunt  of  the  battle  had  fallen  on  the  Spartans,  nor  could  the 
latter  throw  a  veil  over  the  calamity  which  had  befallen  them. 
The   bodies  of  tlic  warriors  were  given  up :  their  shields  were 


Chap.  III.]  GROWTH   OP   THEBAN   POWER.  581 

carried  away  and  luing  up  in  the  temple  of  Demeter  Thesmophoros 
at  Thebes. 

So  ended  the  fight  which  left  Epameinondas  the  first  general 
of  his  age,  and  so  fell  a  power  which  had  fully  earned  its  title  to 
stability,  if  grinding  tyranny  and  law-defying  oppres-  -o,  r  « 
siveness  could  confer  such  right.  If  we  had  nothing  the  tidings 
more  than  the  dry  record  of  Xenophon,  we  should  ^^  »parta. 
never  have  known  that  Epameinondas  saw  the  fight  at  Leuktra,  n.^r 
should  we  have  known  the  full  significance  of  the  Spartan  defeat. 
It  was  to  him  some  satisfaction  to  think  that  at  the  first  his  friends 
had  been  victorious,  for  only  in  that  case  could  they  have" borne 
Kleombrotos  alive  from  the  field ;  that  the  tidings  of  the  great 
catastrophe,  brought  to  Sparta  during  the  celebration  of  the 
Gymnopaidiai,  were  by  the  orders  of  the  Ephors  received  without 
a  sign  of  emotion  ;  and  that  on  the  morrow  they  who  appeared  with 
cheerful  faces  and  exulting  mien  in  the  Agora  were  the  kinsfolk  of 
the  dead,  while  the  kindred  of  the  survivors  bore  themselves  like 
men  oppressed  by  the  deepest  ignominy.  As  he  wrote  the  words, 
the  historian,  we  can  scarcely  doubt,  had  in  mind  his  own  narrative 
of  the  awful  night  when  the  long  unbroken  wail  rising  fi'om 
Peiraieus  carried  to  Athens  the  tidings  of  the  treachery  which  bad 
ruined  them  at  Aigospotamoi.*  The  Lykourgean  discipline,  which 
crushed  all  that  imparted  grace  and  beauty  to  life  at  Athens,  would 
indeed  have  been  worth  little  if  it  had,. failed  to  produce  the  sem- 
blance of  an  unconcern  which  treated  the  more  generous  and  tender 
instincts  of  humanity  as  the  worst  of  vices. 

Another  act  in  the  great  drama  had  been  thus  played  out ;  and 
the  whole  Hellenic  world  had  at  length  learnt  that  the  promises 
of  freedom  made  by  Sparta  had  been  from  beo-inning  „^ 
to  end  a  lie, — a  lie  scantily  veiled  at  first  by  the  spartan  go- 
rhetoric  of  Brasidas,  but  put  forth  afterw^ards  in  the  ^emment. 
nakedness  of  unblushing  effrontery.  Not  a  single  pledge  liad  she 
redeemed  :  not  a  single  burden  had  been  removed,  not  a  single 
abuse  redressed.  She  had  hailed  the  downfall  of  Athens  as  the 
beginning  of  a  golden  age  for  Hellas,  and  in  order  to  realise  it  she 
liad  aided  and  abetted  her  victorious  generals  in  setting  up  every- 
where societies  of  murderers.'"'  Her  enemies  were  prostrate  ;  and 
she   trampled  on  them   without  a  touch   of  commiseration.     Her 

'  See  p.  480.  lessof  the  oligarchical  factions  who 

^  I  have  been  charged  with  beinfr  {governed  by  means  of  the  Spartan 

over-severe   to    Sparta.     I   would  {rarrisons.     Lysandros  in  his  own 

jrladly  be  couvinced  that  I  have  person  is  char tjed  by  Plutarch,  X?/.s. 

been:  but  until  lam  so  convinced,  c.  19,  with  countless  murders.    The 

I  cannot  modify  my  words.     1  am  language  of  Plutarch  could  hardly 

speaking  here  cliietly  of  the  Lysan-  be  made  stronger. 
drian  Decemvirates,  but  scarcely 


582  THE  EMPIRE  OF  SPARTA.  [Book  IV. 

allies  were  too  much  overpowered  by  the  consciousness  of  their 
inferiority  really  to  dispute  her  will :  and  she  refused  to  share  her 
spoils  with  the  partners  of  her  robberies.  She  had  put  down  the 
Athenian  empire  with  the  courts  whicli  at  the  least  oifered  to  the 
free  or  the  subject  allies  the  means  of  redress  for  wrongs  inflicted 
or  received ;  and  by  way  of  improving  matters  she  had  with 
gigantic  cruelty  let  loose  upon  them  a  crowd  of  rapacious  and 
lustful  tyrants,  against  whom  she  would  hear  no  complaint.  Well 
might  the  blood  of  the  Thebans  boil  in  their  veins  as  they  looked  on 
the  graves  of  Skedasos  and  his  daughters  on  the  field  of  Leuktra  ; 
and  well  may  we  contrast  the  merciless  iniquity  of  the  Spartan 
government  with  that  judicial  impartiality  of  the  Athenian  demos 
which  even  a  general  Avho  had  done  the  good  service  of  Paches 
dared  not  to  face.' 

In  short,  the  supremacy  of  Sparta  had  been  from  first  to  last 
the  supremacy  of  high-handed  violence  and  wanton  tyranny.  The 
Inevitable  philo-Lakonian  Xenophon  could  speak  of  it  as  a  sys- 
resuitsof  tem  uudcr  which  each  individual  Spartan  could  do  as 
principles  of  he  pleased,  and  none  could  say  him  nay  without  insuring 
action.  jjjg   Q^y,^   immediate   ruin.''     Nor  could  it  have  been 

anything  else  but  what  it  was.  Much  has  been  said  of  the  golden 
opportunities  which  the  course  of  events  offered  to  Sparta,  and 
which  she  deliberately  threw  away,  opportunities  presented  first 
in  the  unlimited  freedom  of  action  which  followed  the  seizure  of 
the  Athenian  fleet  at  Aigospotamoi,  and  again  when  the  return  of 
the  Cyreian  Greeks  placed  her  at  the  head  of  a  splendid  army  in 
her  involuntary  conflict  with  the  I'ersian  king.  But  in  truth  it  is 
absurd  to  speak  of  opportunities  of  feasting  on  the  loveliest  of 
landscapes  to  the  man  who  has  extinguished  in  himself  all  sense  of 
beauty,  of  opportunities  for  generous  action  to  the  man  whose  whole 
life  exhibits  nothing  but  the  working  of  unvarying  and  consistent 
selfishness.  Whetlicr  ahvr  Aigospotamoi  or  after  the  return  of 
the  Ten  Thousand,  it  Avas  impossible  for  Sparta  to  do  anything  to- 
wards establishing  a  real  I'anhellenic  union,  in  other  words,  a  real 
Greek  nation,  without  reverting  in  greater  or  less  degree  to  the 
work  of  Athens.  Any  such  union  must  involve  the  imposition  of 
limits  on  the  action  of  individual  cities,  the  endurance  of  con)mon 
burdens,  the  inforccment  of  a  common  law.  All  this  with  what- 
ever failures  Athens  had  striven  to  do  and  had  in  part  done.  To 
go  back  to  any  such  system  would  be  for  the  Spartans  what  the 
changing  of  his  skin  would  be  to  the  Ethiopian,  or  of  his  spots  to 
the  lcoj)ard. 

'  See  p.  303.  =  Xen.  Anab.  vi.  4,  12. 


BOOK    V. 

THE  RISE  AND  CULMINATION  OF  THE  MAKEDONIAN 
POWER. 


CHAPTER  I. 

FROM  THE  BATTLE  OP  LEUKTRA  TO  THE  DEATH  OF 
EPAMEINONDAS. 

For  nine  years  after  the  battle  of  Leiiktra  Epameinondas  remain- 
ed the  tutelary  genius  of  Thebes  ;  and  only  Spartan  bigotry 
could  deny  that  he  guarded  her  interests  with  a  large-  General 
ness  of  mind  which  strove  to  promote  the  permanent  poi'cy  of 
good  of  Hellas  generally.  But  although  the  two  nondas. 
great  political  measures  with  which  his  name  is  most  3(  1-362  b.c. 
closely  associated  were  conceived  in  something  like  the  generous 
and  far-seeing  spirit  of  Perikles,  their  fruits  were  inevitably 
blighted  by  the  deadly  influences  fostered  by  Spartan  supremacy. 
Of  course,  these  measures  annoyed  and  hampered  the  Spartans. 
They  were  designed  to  do  so,  for  Epameinondas  well  knew  that 
there  could  be  but  one  effectual  mode  of  dealing  with  their  system  ; 
and  this  mode  was  its  complete  suppression.  If  the  Athenians 
could  have  remained  true  to  the  principles  which  guided  the 
policy  of  Perikles,  the  founding  of  Megalopolis  and  the  restoration 
of  Messene  sixty  years  earlier  might  have  repressed  for  ever  the 
miserable  jealousies  which  rent  the  Hellenic  world  asunder,  and 
have  helped  Athens  to  finish  her  great  Avork  without  offending 
fatally  the  prejudices  which  had  their  root  in  pre-historic  ages.  But 
the  very  fact  that  Sparta  could  no  longer  trample  on  her  subjects  or 
her  allies  sufficed  of  itself  to  change  the  current  of  popular  feeling 
towards  her.  If  Sparta  was  humbled,  this  must  mean  that  some 
other  city  wdiich  thus  punished  her  was  set  u{)  on  high ;  nor 
would  anything  more  be  needed  than  this  exaltation  to  convert 
friendship  into  fear  and  fear  into  hatred.  Thus  in  the  years  which 
passed  between  the  fight  at  Leuktra  and  the  last  exploit  of 
Epameinondas  at  Mantineia  the  quarrels  arising  out  of  the  sus- 
picions and  jealousies  of  a  hundred  cities,  each  acting  on  its  own 
theory  of  the  balance  of  power,  involved  not  unfrequently  compli- 


584  THE  KINGS  OF  MACEDON.  [Book  V. 

cations  as  intricate  as  tliey   were  profitless.     But  if  tlie  Greeks 

chose  to  indulge  in  the  warfare  of  kites  and  crows,  they  were  only 

doing  the  work  of  the  eagle  which  the  avenging  Ate  would  sooner 

or  later  let  loose  upon  them. 

For  the  prosent,  there  was  little  commiseration  felt  anywhere 

for  Spartan  siitfering ;  and  these  sufierings  were  severe  enough. 

_     .       ^     Hitherto  Sparta  had  shown  her  macrnanimitv  bv  treat- 
Treatment        .  -ITI  1  1  '^  •'I'^Pl 

of  iiiu  hop-  ing  witli  studied  cruelty  and  contempt  such  of  her 
ombrotos'^  citizens  as  might  return  home  after  defeat.  The 
at  Sparta.  hoplitcs  taken  in  Sphakteria  Avere  degraded  from  their 
citizenship ;'  nor  would  anything  have  saved  the 
comrades  of  Kleombrotos  from  systematic  insult  but  the  fact  that 
their  number  was  too  great.  The  Lykourgean  polity  had  long 
tended  to  thin  tlie  ranks  of  the  Spartiatai,  and  the  men  thus 
thrown  down  to  the  level  of  infranchised  Helots  Avere  tempted  to 
become  more  anti-Spartan  than  the  Helots  themselves  and  to 
make  common  cause  whether  with  them  or  with  the  discontented 
Perioikoi.  The  conspiracy  of  Ivinadon  had  taught  the  Spartans 
a  wholesome  lesson  :  and  they  now  made  a  virtue  of  necessity  by 
suspending  in  this  instance  and  in  this  instance  only  the  penalties 
due  to  men  beaten  on  the  field  of  battle. 

The  sudden  disruption  of  the  Spartan  empire  was  followed 
naturally  by  vehement  commotions  in  the  Greek  cities  generally. 
_  .  ^  ,  Like  snow  meltincr  before  the  summer  sun,  the  Spar- 
of  Orchome-  tan  liarniosts  vanished  with  their  garrisons  from  the 
Thespki  by  ''iHicd  citics ;  the  decemvirates  who  had  ruled  by 
Thebes.         their  means  were  put  down,  and  their  partisans  for  the 

371  EC  ■  • 

most  part  deprived  of  their  property  and  banished. 
In  all  cases  these  changes  were  attended  naturally  with  outbursts 
of  vehement  feeling  which  might  easily  run  on  into  injustice  and 
bloodshed  ;  and  the  Spartans,  hurled  from  the  plenitude  of  power, 
found  themselves  compelled  to  watch  events  in  silence,  while  the 
streets  of  Argos  ran  red  with  the  blood  of  phiio-Lakonian  citizens. 
In  the  first  flush  of  triumph  the  strongest  impulse  of  the  Thebans 
was  to  avenge  themselves  on  their  enemies  :  and  of  these  the 
Orchonienians  and  Thespians  seemed  the  chief.  The  former  had 
befriended  Kleombrotos  in  his  last  invasion  :  the  latter  had  shrunk 
from  taking  part  in  the  fight  at  Leuktra.  Happily  the  influence 
of  Epameinondas  saved  the  Orchonienians  for  the  present  from  the 
fate  which  Kleon  designed  for  the  Mytilenaians  ;^  the  Thespians,* 
drivcii  from  their  city,  found  refuge  at  Athens. 

Bat  tiic  humiliation  of  Sparta  was  not  confined  to  the  expulsion 
of  her  liarmosts,  the  ruin  of  her  friends,  or  even  the   authority 

'  Time.  v.  34,  2.      »  See  p.  298.      Thespians  after  the  fall  of  Plataiai, 
'  For  the  harsli  treatment  of  the    see  Time.  iv.  133,  1. 


Chap.  I.]  CAMPAIGNS  OF  EPAMEINONDAS.  585 

assumed  by  Athens  as  guardian  of  the  Peace  of  Antalkidas. 
While  many  of  the  Greelc  cities  (how  many  or  which,  we  can- 
not say)  iindertools  to  maintain  this  peace  under  lier  Amphiktyo- 
presidency,  the  Thebans  appealed  to  a  tribunal  of  ?.'^" '^fV" 
whose  action  we  hear  nothing  during  the  whole  of  Spar'ta. 
the  weary  struggle  between  Athens  and  Sparta.'  The  371  b.c. 
duty  of  watching  over  the  interests  of  the  Del{)hian  temple  might 
easily  be  held  to  involve  the  duty  of  punishing  all  offenders 
against  religion  ;  nor  could  any  offences  against  religion  well  be 
more  heinous  than  the  attempts  to  seize  or  injure  an  Hellenic  city 
in  time  of  festival  or  without  a  formal  declaration  of  war.  Athens 
might  thus  have  demanded  judgment  against  Sphodrias  and  his 
partisans  for  their  iniquitous  designs  on  Peiraieus  :  but  Thebes,  it 
seems,  actually  pleaded  before  the  Amphiktyonia  for  a  verdict 
which  might  vindicate  the  divine  justice  against  the  men  who  had 
seized  their  Akropolis.  The  assembly  sentenced  Sparta  to  a  line 
of  500  talents  :  and  although  no  notice  was  taken  of  the  sentence 
even  when  the  fine  was  doubled,  the  purpose  of  the  Thebans  was 
fully  ariswered.  The  verdict  of  the  most  august  Hellenic  tribunal 
had  marked  her  as  an  offender  against  divine  not  less  than  luimaii 
law  :  and  not  a  voice  had  been  raised  in  her  defence. 

When  the  city  of  Mantineia  was  broken  up  by  the  Spartans, 
the  historian  Xenophon  found  it  convenient  to  say  that  after  a 
little  while  the  citizens  vastly  preferred  the  new  state  Re-ostab- 
of  things  to  the  old.  He  mnst  therefore  have  felt  a  Mauiiiloiif 
surprise  which  he  does  not  care  to  express  when,  37i  b.c. 
immediately  after  the  Theban  victory,  the  Mantineians  abandoned 
their  villages  and  with  the  fraction  which  had  been  allowed  to  re- 
main set  about  the  re-establishment  of  their  old  home.  Keenly 
feeling  the  blow,  the  Spartans  could  only  send  Agesilaos  to  entreat 
that  they  would  wait  for  the  formal  sanction  which  Sparta  was 
ready  to  give  them.  The  haughty  King  was  rewarded  with  the 
reply  that  the  ceremony  was  superfluous,  since  the  decision  to 
restore  the  city  had  been  already  taken.  Nor  was  this  all.  The 
resolution  of  the  Mantineians  had  quickened  throughout  tiie  coun- 
try tlie  desire  for  a  Pan-Arkadian  union.  The  opposition  of  Tegea, 
the  ancient  ally  of  Sparta,  was  set  aside  by  a  revolution  which 
drove  out  the  philo-Lakonian  party  ;  and  an  invasion  of  Arkadia 
by  Agesilaos  was  followed  immediately  by  overtures  from  the 
Arkadians,  first  to  Athens,  and  then,  on  their  rejection  by  the 
Athenians,  to  Thebes. 

For  this  invitation  which  lie  felt  sure  must  come  Epameinondas 
had  been  eagerly  waiting.    He  had  convinced  himself  that  Spartan 
ambition  could  be  effectually  repressed  only  by  setting  up  a  counter* 
'  See  p.  23. 
25* 


586  THE  KINGS  OF  MACEDON.  [Book  V, 

acting  force  which  ■would  give  to  Spartan  armies  enough  to  do 
without  crossing  the  Corinthian  isthmus ;  and  he  had  determined 
Invasion  of  *^"  ^^^^  measures  by  Avhich,  as  lie  thought,  this  result 
Lakonia  by  could  most  certainly  be  obtained.  But  he  entered  the 
das!™*^"'""'   Peloponnesos,  ni)t  prepared  for  the  more  dai-ing  enter- 

370B.C.  prise  which  was  to  push  to  its  furthest  limit  the  mortifi- 
cation and  ignominy  of  Sparta.  The  splendid  appearance  and  disci- 
pline of  his  Boiotian  troops  and  the  manifest  efficiency  of  his  allies 
awakened  in  the  Arkadians  and  others  who  joined  him  an  enthu- 
siasm as  deep  as  that  which  the  sight  of  Italy  from  the  Alpine  pass 
excited  in  the  followers  of  Hannibal,  Eagerly  assuring  Epamei- 
nondas  that  the  road  to  Sparta  lay  open,  they  besought  him  to 
strike  a  blow  on  that  tyrant  city  whose  mysterious  territory  no  in- 
vading army  had  thus  far  entered.  The  bait  was  tempting ; 
and  although  the  danger  of  advancing  thus  far  into  an  unknown 
land,  and  the  knowledge  that  the  plau  could  not  be  carried  out 
within  his  legal  time  of  command,  seemed  to  justify  Epameinoudas 
in  rejecting  their  prayer,  the  order  for  the  march  was  again  given, 
and  in  four  different  streams  the  invaders  poured  into  a  region 
hitherto  regarded  as  inviolable.  In  vain  Ischolaos  strove  to  stem 
the  torrent :  he  was  swept  away  by  the  Arkadians  who  hurried 
on  to  join  the  Thebans  at  Karyai.  The  flames  which  consumed 
Sellasia  lieralded  the  approach  of  the  enemy  to  the  very  citadel  of 
S^iartan  power.  The  spears  and  helmets  of  the  Theban  soldiers 
flashed  near  the  bridge  which  spanned  the  Eurotas,  and  marked 
the  progress  of  the  ruin  which  swallowed  up  houses,  crops,  and 
cattle  until  it  reached  Amyklai. 

The  destroyer  thus  stood  at  tlie  very  doors  of  the  oppressor, 
who  had  good  cause  to  fear  the  rottenness  of  the  materials  with 
Appeal  of  which  he  had  chosen  to  construct  his  home.  The  fear  of 
the  t^jiartans  the  still  greater  wretchedness  which  invasion  might  in- 
Athens.  volve  for  them  led  G,000  of  the  Helots,  it  is  said,  to  rise 

^^^■^-  at  the  call  of  Agesilaos  for  the  defence  of  the  country  ; 
but  manv  nevertheless  (.'ither  looke<l  on  passively  or  made  common 
cause  with  the  invader.  The  old  king  had  not  merely  to  defend 
the  villages  of  his  unwalled  city'  but  to  put  down  conspiracies  within 
it,  while  such  of  the  allied  cities  as  wished  to  give  help  were 
unable  to  approach  it.  The  lion,  shut  up  in  his  den,  was  constrained 
\o  wait  patiently  for  aid,  if  aid  should  ever  reach  liim.  Spartan 
envoys  appeared  at  Athens,  imploring  the  Demos  to  forget  tlie 
wrongs  of  fifty  years  and  strike  a  blow  on  the  traitors  who  had 
prostrated  themselves  before  the  l)arbarian  Xerxes.  Tliere  still 
remained  unexecuted  the  sentence  which  Athens  and  Sparta  liad 
passed  upon  them  for  their  treason  to  the  liberties  of  Hellas  :  nor 
'  See  p.  233. 


Chap.  I.]  CAMPAIGNS  OF  EPAMEINONDAS.  587 

would  the  Athenians  ever  have  a  better  opportunity  for  wiping  ofi 
old  scores  against  men  who,  when  Lysandros  was  conqueror, 
would  have  swept  Athens  from  the  face  of  the  earth,  if  Sparta  had 
not  protested  against  such  outrage.  Struggling  with  some  natural 
reluctance,  the  Athenians  resolved  to  take  the  part  of  their  ancient 
enemies.  The  men  who  now  besought  their  favor  or  rather  their 
mercy  were  men  who  had  assuredly  not  treated  them  well  in  their 
prosperous  times  :  but  as  Athens  could  not  hope  again  to  exercise 
her  old  imperial  power,  she  was  bound  to  set  due  limits  to  the 
aggrandisement  of  Thebes. 

It  was  possible  that  the  army  of  Epameinondas  might"  even 
have  carried  the  streets  of  Sparta  itself  by  assault.  But  it  was 
not  possible  to  foresee  what  the  enemy,  pushed  to  bay,  Formation 
might  do  in  his  despair,  and  it  would  be  folly  to  en-  poi^'^°*'^"' 
counter  the  risk  while  more  impoi'tant  work  summoned  3(j9  b.c. 
him  elsewhither.  Marching  southwards  from  Amyklai,  he  ravaged 
the  land  until  he  reached  the  Lakonian  port  of  Gytheion.  The 
seizure  of  this  place  would  have  made  him  master  of  the  poor  fleet 
then  possessed  by  Sparta  ;  but  his  efforts  to  reduce  it  failed  and  he 
resolved  to  hasten  back  into  Arkadia.  He  had  already  passed  the 
Lakonian  border,  before  Iphikrates,  heading  a  large  force  of  volun- 
teers, could  set  out  from  Athens  ;  and  he  now  addressed  himself 
to  the  task  of  building  up  permanent  bulwarks  against  Spartan 
aggression.  On  the  plain  contained  in  the  angle  lying  between 
the  Alpheios  and  the  Ilelisson,  he  laid  the  foundations  of  the  Great 
City,  Megalopolis,  which  was  to  serve  as  a  centre  of  common 
action  not  supplied  by  Tegea  or  Orchomenos.  Here  was  to  meet 
under  the  name  of  the  Ten  Thousand  the  synod  in  which  probably 
every  citizen  of  the  allied  towns  was  intitled  to  take  his  place. 
The  men  belonging  to  forty  Arkadian  townships  furnished  a  popu- 
lation for  the  new  city  which  was  to  remain  for  a  hundred  and 
fifty  years  a  memorial  of  the  wise  statesmanship  of  Epameinondas, 

But  infinitely  more  galling  to  Spartan  haughtiness  was  the 
sight  of  their  ancient  slaves,  as  they  chose  to  call  them,  re-esta- 
blished in  the  home  which  even  Aristomenes  had  Restoration 
been  unable  to  defend.'  The  fall  of  Athens  had  been  senians  und 
followed  by  the  expulsion  of  the  Messenians  from  building  of 
Naupaktos,  Pylos,  and  Kephallcnia  ;  and  in  scattei'ed  369  b.c. 
companies  this  unfortunate  folk  had  been  driven  to  seek  asylums 
in  places  as  distant  even  as  the  Libyan  Ilesperides.  From  this 
remote  Greek  colony  or  from  nearer  abodes  they  now  hurried  back 
to  their  old  country  at  the  call  of  a  hero  as  great  as  Aristomenes 
and  more  successful ;  and  the  new  city  Messene  (no  such  common 
centre  had  ever  as  yet  existed)  rose  on  the  summit  of  Ithom^,  and 
'  See  p.  36. 


588  THE  KINGS  OF  MACEDON.  [Book  V. 

looked  down  from  its  lieiglit  of  2,500  feet  on  the  happy  plain  of 
Makaria.  The  divine  sanction  for  the  choice  thus  made  was  signi- 
fied in  a  dream  vouschafed  to  the  Argeian  leader  Epiteles ;"  and 
the  bitterest  enemies  of  Sparta  were  thus  established  firmly 
through  the  whole  region  lying  between  the  Neda  on  the  north 
and  Cape  Akritas  in  the  south.  The  injury  intliuted  on  Athens 
by  the  fortification  of  Dekeleia  was  more  than  requited  by  the 
restoration  of  the  Messenians.  A  refuge  was  again-  opened  for 
discontented  Helots  :  and  they  hastened  to  avail  themselves  of  it 
with  an  eagerness  which  showed  that  in  their  opinion  slavery  was 
not  an  excellent  thing. 

So  mighty  Avas  the  work  which  Epameinondas  had  achieved, 
when,  having  beaten  back  the  troops  of  Iphikrates  under  Mount 
Reception  of  Oueiou,  he  stood  before  the  Theban  assembly  to  defend 
das'at^'°°°"  liiinself  for  retaining  his  command  four  months  be- 
Thebes.  yond  the  legal  time.     Anticipating  any  charges  which 

might  be  brought  against  him  (and  he  knew  that  many  would 
rejoice  in  his  disgrace  and  ruin),  he  pleaded  on  behalf  of  his  col- 
leagues as  well  as  for  himself  the  necessities  of  a  case  in  which 
they,  as  servants  of  the  state,  could  avail  themselves  of  a  p;olden 
opportunity  only  by  breaking  the  letter  of  the  laws  which,  bound 
them.  The  liumiliation  of  Sparta,  begun  on  the  field  of  ijeuktra, 
had  been  completed  l)y  the  desolation  of  the  whole  valley  of  the 
Eurotas,  by  the  re-establishment  of  Mantineia,  by  the  ioundation 
of  Megalopolis,  and  the  restoration  of  the  Messenians.  For  the 
first  time  in  their  history  the  Spartans,  if  bent  upon  tiggrcssion, 
would  have  to  fight  their  w'ay  before  they  reached  tlui  Corinthian 
isthmus.  All  this  had  been  achieved  at  the  cost  of  a  technical 
irregularity,  and  it  remained  for  the  Thebans  to  grant  or  refuse  a 
decree  of  indemnity.  This  straightforward  statement  succeeded 
at  least  in  keeping  his  enemies  silent,  while  from  the  people  lie 
with  his  colleagues  received  an  enthusiastic  acquittal.  The  fol- 
lowing year  again  saw  lilpameinondas  and  I'elopidas  among  the 
number  of  the  Boiotarchs. 

Elsewhere  the  course  of  events  seemed  cliiefly  to  bring  into 
clear  light  the  thousand  elements  of  dissatisfaction  and  discontent, 
Relation  of  '^^  jealousy  and  suspicion.  These  are  seen  at  work 
the  Athc-  now  hcrc,  now  there, — the  only  certainty  being  that 
Aiiiyn"a8.'  the  prosperity  of  one  city  is  sure  to  excite  the  ill-will 
370  B.C.  of  another.  The  alliance  of  lason  of  Pherai  with  the 
Thebans  sufficed  of  itself  to  make  the  Makedonian  chief  gravitate  to 
Athens,  and  tlie  same  reason  tended  to  win  the  favor  of  the  2\.tbe- 
nians  for  Amyntas.  This  prince  was  struggling  with  many  grave, 
if  not  alarming,  difficulties,  unconscious  that  the  unpopularity  wuich 

'  See  p.  33. 


Chap.  I.]  CAMPAIGNS  OF  EPAMEINONDAS.  589 

Athens  was  provoking  by  ill-jndged  revivals  of  ancient  claims  or 
usages  were  surely  doing  his  work,  and  that  his  son  Philip  would 
reap  the  fruits  of  a  policy  which  her  allies  were  beginning  to 
regard  as  unjust  and  oppressive.  For  the  present  Athens  was 
specially  anxious  to  recover  the  long-lost  Aniphipolis ;  and  she 
was  deluding  herself  with  the  thought  that  this  result  would  be 
furthered,  if  Perdikkas  acknowledged  the  justice  of  her  claim. 
This  admission  was  made  ;  but  the  Athenians  were  no  more  pre- 
pared now  to  put  forth  their  full  strength  in  tlie  enterprise  than 
they  were  in  the  days  of  Kleon,  and  the  people  of  Amphipolis  had 
no  heart  except  for  their  second  founder  Brasidas.  While  the 
former  put  off  all  strenuous  action,  the  aspect  of  the  Hellenic 
world  was  suddenly  changed  by  the  assassination  of  Assassina- 
the  Pheraian  despot  and  the  death  of  the  Makedonian  omlerai*"" 
Amyntas.  At  Pherai  lason  was  succeeded  by  his  sons  370  b.c. 
Polyphron  and  Polydoros  :  the  former  killed  the  latter  and  was 
himself  slain  by  another  brother,  Alexandros,  whose  reign  seems 
to  have  been  one  unbroken  course  of  iniquity.  In 
AFakedonia,  another  Alexandros,  the  son  of  Amyntas,  fairs  in  Ma- 
was  after  two  years  murdered ;  and  Eurydike,  the  i^^^^'oni'i- 
widow  of  the  latter,  hastened  with  her  two  younger  sons,  Per- 
dikkas and  Philip,  to  implore  the  protection  and  aid  of  the  x\the- 
nian  Iphikrates.  This  help  was  vigorously  given  ;  and  thus  was 
established  the  dynasty  which  a  few  years  later  was  to  sweep 
away  the  autonomy  of  the  Hellenic  cities  and  give  a  new  direction 
to  Hellenic  energy. 

Meanwhile  after  a  long  debate  Athens  and  Sparta  had  agreed,  on 
the  proposal  of  Kephisodotos,  to  share  alternately  the  supreme 
command  both  by  land  and  sea  for  periods  of  five  Alliance  be- 
days  ;  and  a  large  force  of  Athenians  and  other  allies  tween  Ath- 
of  the  Lakedaimonians  intrenched  themselves  iinder  sparta. 
Mount  Oneion,  resolved  seemingly  to  bar  the  way  for  3G9b.c. 
any  Theban  army.  Epameinondas  determined  at  once  to  test  their 
purpose.  Taking  them  at  unawares,  he  brought  his  main  strength 
to  bear  on  the  Lakedaimonians  as  holding  the  weakest  position. 
These  were  beaten  off,  and  liis  roadway  left  clear  by  the  retreat  of 
the  Spartan  Polemarch,  who  confessed  himself  defeated.  15ut  a 
more  serious  danger  menaced  him  from  Arkadia.  There,  as  else- 
where, success  fostered  ambition,  and  tiie  Ten  Thousand  listened 
eagerly  to  the  pleadings  of  one  of  their  number,  who  insisted  on 
their  right  to  share  the  supreme  power  with  the  Thebans.  '  If  you 
do  not  urge  your  claim,'  he  said,  '  you  will  find  that  the  Thebans 
are  only  Spartans  under  another  name.'  Such  language  tended, 
not  lef<s  than  the  triumphant  march  of  the  Arkadians  to  Asine,  a 
port  a  few  miles  to  the  northeast  of  Cape  Akritas,  to  turn  the 
goodwill  of  the  Thebans  to  suspicion  and  dislike. 


590  THE  KINGS  OF  MACEDON.  [CookV. 

Tlie  disturbing  elements  were  mnltiplied  wiieu   Pliiliskos,  the 

envoy  of  the  Plirygiau  satrap  Ariobarzanes,  appeared  at  Delphoi 

The  Tear-    ^^  insist  On  the  maintenance  of  the  Peace  of  Antal- 

less  Battle,  kidas.     Sparta  at  once  made  her  submission  to  this 

proposal   dependent  wholly   on  the  surrender  of  the 

Messenians  to   their  ancient   lords ;  and   their   indignation   was 

heightened  when  in  the  Olympic  festival  from  which   they  were 

excluded  a  Messenian  youth  was  registered  as  conqueror  in  the 

footrace  for  boys.     But  the  feeling  of  liumiliation  was  suddenly 

changed  for  that  of  deep  and  overpowering  joy  when  the  tidings 

were  brought  to  Sparta  that  aided  by  a  force  sent  over  by  the 

Syracusan  despot  Dionysios  Archidamos  had  without  the  loss  of  a 

man  slain  ten  thousand  Arkadians  at  Midca.     The  Spartans  might 

well  call  the  fight  the  Tearless  Battle,  and  feel  that  the  bitterness 

of  Leuktra  had  in  some  measure  passed  away. 

Nor  was  the  chastisement  thus  dealt  out  to  the  Arkadians 
altogether  irritating  to  the  Thebans.  These  saw  in  the  event  not 
„, .  ,  merely   a  wholesome   lesson   for  Arkadian   arroo-ance 

Third  expe-     ,■'«,,.  i     t  • 

dition  of  but  a  proof  that  tlieir  own  presence  was  needed  again 
das'iiito"pcl  ^"  ^^^^  Peloponnesos,  Once  more  crossing  the  Corin- 
loponnesos.  thiau  isthmus,  Epameinondas  appeared  on  the  scene 
of  his  former  exploits,  and  added  the  Achaian  cities 
to  the  Theban  confederacy.  The  moderation  which  withheld  him 
from  interfering  with  the  government  of  these  towns  would  have 
made  them  hearty  in  the  new  alliance  ;  but  the  Thebans  insisted 
on  setting  up  democracies  in  all  of  them,  the  oligarchic  citizens 
thus  driven  into  exile  found  themselves  strong  enough  to  effect 
their  restoration  by  force,  and  the  Achaians  again  became  allies  of 
Sparta. 

Looking  on  tliese  defections  as  signs  that  their  own  power  was 
on  the  wane,  the  Thebans  resolved  to  adopt  the  favorite  method 
Theban  em-  of  the  Spartans ;  and  their  envoys,  Pelopidas  and 
Souwi.'*'  Ismenias,  appeared  at  Sousa  as  suppliants  for  a  royal 
366  B.C.  rescript.  Armed  with  the  authority  of  the  Persian 
king,  they  returned  to  proclaim  the  supremacy  of  Thebes  and  the 
complete  independence  of  Mcssene.  But  when  the  Theban  allies 
were  invited  to  swear  to  peace  thus  enjoined,  it  became  manifest 
that  the  appeal  to  I'ersia  was  not  likely  to  make  the  sky  clearer  in 
Ilellas.  The  Arkadians  insisted  that  the  allies  ought  to  meet  in 
the  country  which  was  the  theatre  of  war,  while  the  Corinthians 
refused  to  take  any  oaths  which  pledged  them  to  engagements 
with  the  Persian  king. 

On  all  sides  feelings  of  ill-will  were  growing  apace.  Tlie 
Athenian  town  of  Oropos,  seized  by  some  exiles,  was  handed  over 
to  the  Thebans  ;  and  the  anger  of  the  Athenians  was  followed  by 


Chap.  I.]  CAMPAIGNS   OF   EPAMEINONDAS.  591 

their  allyino;  themselves  Avith  the  Arkadians,  and  by  an  ineffectual 
attempt  to  seize  the  friendly  city  of  Corinth.  The  only  result  of 
this  faithless  act  was  to   excite  in  the  Corinthians  a   „ 

i  GflCG  DG- 

desire   for  peace,   which   could  not  be  repressed   by   tween 
Spartan  protests  against  any  arrangements  recognising  codntri  with 
the    independence    of    Messenc.     Others   besides   the   other  cities. 
Corinthians  were  weary  of  the  contest,  and  these  all 
signed  at  Thebes  the  peace  which  insured  to  the  Messenians  their 
freedom  and  to  which  therefore  Sparta  could  be  no  party. 

Amidst  the  complications  which  must  arise  from  the  conflicting 
interests  of  independent  cities  the  recovery  or  conquest  of  Samos' 
by  Timotheos  seemed  to  afford  a  better  promise  for  Recovery  of 
the  permanent  revival   of  Athenian  empire.     It  quick-    Samosto 

f  .         ,        TT   II       •        •   •  ex  r  •       1  -1  theAtheuian 

ened  in  the  Hellenic  cities  or  Lesser  Asia  the  wisli  to  alliance. 
shake  off  the  Persian  yoke,  and  tempted  even  Persian  ^''^  ^•*^- 
satraps  to  renounce  their  allegiance  to  the  Great  King.  But  like 
all  other  advantages  gained  by  the  Athenians  after  the  establish- 
ment of  Spartan  supremacy,  it  came  too  late.  Forty  years  of 
Spartan  or  Persian  rule  had  effectually  quenched  the  spirit  which 
during  the  tyranny  of  the  Four  Hundred  had  been  the  main- 
stay of  Athenian  freedom.^  The  victory  of  Timotheos  was  fol- 
lowed by  the  expulsion  or  flight  of  many  citizens  of  the  oligar- 
chical party,  into  whose  lands  the  Athenians,  forgetting  or  breaking 
their  recent  pledges  to  the  contrary,  introduced  a  large  body  of 
Klerouchoi.^ 

Nor  was  it  in  Samos  only  that  the  Athenian  citizens  found  a 
home.  By  the  help  of  the  satrap  Ariobarzanes  Athens  had  again 
obtained  a  hold  on  the  Thraldan  Chersonesos,  and  the  operations 
possession  of  Sestos  went  near  to  placing  in  her  hands  kiau'ciwrso- 
the  key  to  the  corn-growing  lands  of  the  Euxine.  In  nesoe. 
the  struggle  with  the  Thrakian  prince  Kotys,  who  claimed  the 
whole  Chersonesos  as  his  own,  her  general  Timotheos  was  opposed 
for  a  time  even  in  the  field  to  the  Athenian  Iphikrates,  the  son-in- 
law  of  that  savage  chieftain.  For  three  years  Iphikrates  had  been 
the  Athenian  general  on  the  northern  coasts  of  the  Egean  ;  but  his 
chief  instruments  had  been  not  Athenian  citizens  fighting  the 
battles  of  their  country  in  a  cau.se  which  they  believed  to  be 
righteous,  but  the  mercenaries  who  under  the  Euboian  Charidemos 
hired  out  their  strength  to  the  highest  bidder.  So  deeply  had  the 
canker  eaten  into  the  more  generous  feelings  even  of  ordinary 
Athenians  ia  the  days  of  Perikles. 

'  Timotheos  recovered  the  island     session  of  it  is  not  known, 
from  the  Persian  satrap  Tijjranes  ;        *  See  p.  436. 
but  how  or  when  Tigranes  got  pos-        ^  See  pp.  94 ;  574. 


592  THE   KINGS  OF  MACEDON.  [Book  V, 

AVliile  Timotheos  was  striving  to  extend  the  lUcaritiine  influence 
of  Athens  and  making  vain  efforts  to  recover  Aniphipolis,  the 
Thebans  by  the  urgent  advice  of  Epamcinondas  were 
^''^'  building  a  fleet  which  should  contest  the  mastery  of  the 
sea  with  the  Athenian  navy.  That  tieet  actually  appeared  in  the 
Hellespont,  and  might  liave  appeared  again  to  better 
purpose,  had  not  the  great  Theban  leader  been  sum- 
moned away  to  his  old  field  of  action  in  the  west.  Thither  his 
Battle  of  Ky-  friend  Pelopidas  was  not  to  accompany  him.  At  the 
Deat^i'^^'^''"'  I'cad  of  a  Theban  army  this  brave  and  upright  citizen 
Pelopidas.  had  marclied  into  Thessaly  to  punish  the  cruel  tyrant 
of  l*herai.  After  an  obstinate  fight  at  Kynos-kephalai,  the  Hound's 
Ileads,^  his  forces  were  already  winning  the  victory,  when  he  saw 
the  Phcraian  Alexandros  trying  to  rally  his  broken  troops.  The 
sight  of  the  man  who  had  seized  him  treacherously  in  time  of 
peace  and  kept  him  shut  up  for  months  in  a  dungeon,  roused  in 
him  a  paroxysm  of  fury  equalled  only  by  the  rage  of  Cyrus  on  find- 
ing himself  close  to  his  brother  on  the  field  of  Kunaxa.  AVith 
lieadlong  eagerness  Pelopidas,  fiinging  away  all  thought  of  others, 
rushed  upon  his  encany,  to  die  by  the  s[)ears  of  his  guards.  By 
his  death  Thebes  lost  her  left  hand  :  she  was  soon  to  lose  her 
right.  ]>ut  in  tlie  meanwhile  a  larger  array  avenged  his  death,  and 
for  the  moment  Thebes  was  supreme  in  Thessaly  as  well  as  in 
Boiotia. 

In  Peloponnesos  the  antagonistic  interests  of  liostile  states  or 
cities  were  producing  their  natural  results.  In  alliance  with  the 
Coniiiitsin  Arkadians  the  men  of  Pisa  had  succeeded  in  inforcing 
ni^sjs'^'"*^""  their  claim  to  the  presidency  of  the  Olympian  festival, 
8G4B.C.  and  in  excluding  the  Eleians  from  the  scene  of  their 
ancient  greatnens.  In  the  midst  of  the  games  the  dispossessed 
Eleians  appeared  in  arms,  and  vindicated  at  least  their  bravery 
against  their  enemies.  The  death  of  their  leader  and  their  manifest 
inferiority  in  numbers  compelled  them  to  retreat  :  but  the  mere 
struggle  suUiced  to  rouse  a  strong  feeling  in  their  favor  ;  and  this 
sympathy  was  deepened  when  the  men  of  Pisa  sanctioned  the  rob- 
bing of  the  temple  treasures  to  pay  the  troops  of  their  Arkadian 
allies.  It  was  easy  to  speak  of  sucli  acts  as  sacrilege ;  and  the  Man- 
tineians  found  it  convenient  under  cover  of  tliis  term  to  express 
their  jealousy  and  dislike  for  the  people  of  Tegea  and  Megalopolis, 
and  their  desire  ft)r  the  friendship  of  Sparta  which  liad  broken  up 
their  community  not  many  years  ago.  Even  the  Counci  or  Synod  of 
ll)e  Ten  Thousand  entered  their  protest  against  the  robbing  of  the 
temples  ;  and  the  cutting  off  of  .supplies  naturally  roused  a  dislike 
for  military  service  among  tlic  poorer  citizens.  Seeing  tlieir  way 
'  The  name  may  be  compared  witli  that  of  Kynos-sema.     See  p.  447. 


Chap.  I.]  CAMPAIGNS  OF  EPAMEINONDAS.  593 

to  revolution,  the  wealthier  men  hastened  to  fill  the  places  thus 
left  open,  and  to  work  for  union  Avith  Sparta,  the  great  friend  of 
oligarchs.  The  popular  leaders,  filled  with  fear,  earnestly  besought 
help  from  Thebes  :  but  the  Ten  Thousand  by  a  majority  repudiated 
the  invitation  thus  sent,  and  resolved  on  a  peace  which  restored 
the  guardianship  of  Olympia  to  the  Eleians. 

Siich  was  the  result  of  the  grand  effort  of  Epameinondas  to 
raise  up  against  Sparta  a  permanent  bulwark  to  the  north  and  to 
the  west.     Instead  of  the  union  which  he  had  hoped   _ 

AT        •      •  1  f  r        Resentment 

to  see  among  the  men    or    legea,  Mantineia,  and  JMe-  oftheThe- 

galopolis,  he'had  found  little  "more  than  jealousy  of  i'hc"ArS*a-"**^ 
Theban  ascendency,  and  the  alienation  of  the  Achaians  dians. 
by  measures  in  complete  discordance  with  his  own. 
This  was  the  reward  of  the  Thebans  for  entering  the  Peloponnesos 
five  years  ago  at  the  intreaty  of  the  Arkadians  themselves  to  free 
them  from  a  bondage  which  they  declared  to  bo  intolerable. 
'  Well  may  we  call  such  conduct  treachery,'  was  the  indignant 
reply  of  Epameinondas  to  the  envoys  of  the  Ten  Thousand  ;  '  you 
may  be  sure  that  we  shall  come  again,  and  with  the  aid  of  our 
friends  carry  on  the  war  in  your  land." 

With  the  full  purpose  of  striking  a  blow  as  severe  as  that  which 
he  had  dealt  on  the  enemies  of  Thebes  at  Leuktra,  Epameinondas 
entered  the  Peloponnesos  at  the  head  of  all  the  Boio  March  of 
tian  and  Euboian  contingents,  and  with  a  body  of  ,^^,'Xs''to 
Thessalian  troops  amongst  which  were  the  soldiers  of  Sparta, 
the  humbled  despot  of  Pherai.  He  had  hoped  to  cut  off  at  Nemea 
the  Athenian  troops  which  were  going  to  join  his  enemies ;  but 
these  came  not,  and  the  tidings  that  they  had  given  up  the  idea  of 
the  land  march  and  were  going  round  by  sea  determined  him  to 
hasten  on  to  Tegea.  Here  he  would  be  joined  by  his  allies  the 
Argives  and  the  Messenians,  together  with  the  Megalopolitans  and 
other  Arkadians  who  refused  to  throw  in  their  lot  with  the  Spar- 
tans ;  and  hither  would  hasten  all  the  troops  which  Sparta  could 
muster  to  aid  her  in  repelling  the  invader.  Ready  and  eager  for 
the  great  encounter,  Epameinondas  yet  knew  that  a  bloodless  tri- 
umph won  by  skill  was  far  more  glorious  than  victory  won  through 
the  carnage  of  a  battle-field.  The  whole  army  of  Sparta  under 
Agesilaos,  now  80  years  old,  was  hurrying  nortt  wards  by  a^eircui- 
tous  route,  while  Tegea,  where  the  Theban  troops  were  comfoVtably 
lodged,  was  on  the  direct  road  to  the  once  imperial  city.  That 
city,  in  the  words  of  the  philo-Lakonian  Xenophon,"  was  now  left 
like  a  mere  nest  of  fledglings  abandoned  by  the  parent  birds  ;  and 
thither  Epameinondas  led  his  men  with  a  speed  which  must  have 
insured  its  destruction,  had  not  a  Kretan  runner,  exerting  his  utmost 
'  Xeu.  U.  vii.  4.  40.  '  U.  vii.  5,  10. 


594r  THE  KINGS  OF  MACEDON.  [Book  V. 

strength,  warned  Agesilaos  of  the  imminent  ruin.  The  return  of 
the  Spartans  averted  the  catastrophe.  No  one  had  ever  impugned 
their  bravery,  and  it  was  no  part  of  tlie  Theban  leader's  plan  to 
waste  time  and  toil  on  a  task  in  which  success  would  bring  results 
in  no  proportion  to  its  risks.  The  Spartans,  so  far  as  there  was  any 
opportunity  for  fighting,  fought  bravely  ;  and  Xenophon  records 
the  defeat  of  some  Theban  hoplites  by  Archidamos,  the  son  of  the 
old  king,  with  an  outburst  of  exultation  over  the  fire-breathers  who 
were  ignominiously  driven  back.  But  the  historian  docs  well  to 
take  no  notice  of  the  extravagant  story  which  tells  how  the  naked 
Isidas  rushed  with  shield  and  spear  alone  upon  his  enemies,  who 
suffered  him  to  take  his  fill  of  slaughter  and  return  to  his  friends 
unhurt.  Fables  not  less  absurd  had  been  told  of  Brasidas  on  the 
shore  of  Pylos,'  and  were  to  be  told  again  of  Epameinondas  on  the 
field  of  Mantineia.  Such  myths,  harmless  though  they  may  be, 
are  best  treated  by  silence.  But  in  fact  there  Avas  no  more  work 
for  Epameinondas  to  do  at  Sparta.  He  had  been  foiled  in  a  scheme 
which  might  have  ended  the  war  at  a  stroke  ;  but  if  he  must  fall 
back  on  his  original  plan  of  a  pitched  battle,  it  might  yet  be  possible 
to  secure  by  skill  and  speed  an  advantage  which  Avould  leave  his 
enemies  at  his  mercy. 

With  a  rapidity  equal  to  that  of  his  southward  march  he 
hurried  back  to  Tegea.  His  ineu  needed  rest,  and  under  ordinary 
Failure  of  leaders  they  would  all  have  insisted  on  having  it.  But 
to'suipdse'^  Epameinondas  saw  that  for  his  horsemen  there  could  at 
Mantineia.  Tcgea  be  no  reposc.  He  told  them  that  Mantineia  was 
now  practically  undefended,  as  its  troops  had  joined  the  Spartan 
army  in  their  rear,  and  that  by  a  sudden  onset  they  might  not  only 
occupy  the  city  but  seize  on  the  free  people  who  with  their  slaves 
and  property  would  still  be  in  the  open  country.  At  the  bidding  of 
no  other  man  would  they  have  set  out,  wearied  themselves  and  with 
tired  horses,  on  a  ten  miles  march  ;  but  at  his  command  they  went 
cheerfally,  believing,  as  he  believed,  that  they  would  meet  with  no 
resistance.  He  had  every  reason  for  so  thinking ;  but  as  it  so 
happened,  the  Athenian  cavalry  had  just  been  admitted  within 
the  walls  of  the  town,  and  were  preparing  their  first  meal  when  the 
Theban  horsemen  were  seen  within  a  mile  of  the  gates.  At  the 
intreaty  of  the  Mantineians  the  Athenians  mounted  their  horses  and 
sallied  forth.  Tired  though  they  may  have  been,  they  encountered 
men  even  more  fatigued  than  themselves,  and  drove  them  back. 
Thus  Avas  foiled  the  second  of  two  admirably  laid  plans,  either  of 
which,  if  successful,  Avould  have  decided  the  issue  of  the  struggle, 
but  of  which  the  failure  left  Epameinondas  simply  Avhere  he  was 
when  he  crossed  the  Corinthian  isthmus.  His  resolution  was  for 
'  See  p.  316. 


Chap.  I.]  CAMPAIGNS  OF  EPAMEINONDAS.  595 

immediate  battle,  and  it  was  made  known  to  men  who  were  as 
eager  for  it  as  himself.  There  was  no  time  to  be  lost,  says 
Xenophon.  His  term  of  office  would  soon  come  to  an  end ;  and  if 
le  departed  without  changing  the  condition  of  things,  it  would  be 
a  virtual  abandonment  of  his  Arkadian  allies  to  the  vengeance  of 
their  enemies.  The  words  of  the  historian  imply  rather  than  assert 
that  Epameinondas  was  anxious  and  perplexed  :  but  any  such 
charge  is  refuted  by  his  own  narrative.  The  Thebaii  general  had 
made  up  his  mind  to  apply  here  the  tactic  which  had  done  such 
execution  at  Leuktra,  and  his  men,  remembering  the  achievements 
of  that  memorable  day,  looked  forward  to  the  battle  with  unclouded 
confidence  in  his  genius. 

At  a  distance  nearly  midway  between  the  cities  of  Te.gea  on  the 
south  and  of  Mantineia  on  the  north  the  great  plain  (now  known 
by  the  name  of  Tripohtza),  shut  in  on  all  sides  by  Rattle  of 
mountains  and  reaching  in  its  broadest  part  a  width  of  Mantineia. 
eight  miles,  narrows  until  it  leaves  a  passage  barely  a 
mile  wide.  A  little  to  the  north  of  this  pass  and  about  five  miles 
to  the  south  of  Mantineia  were  drawn  up  the  Spartans  with  their 
allies, — whether  under  either  or  both  of  their  Kings,  we  cannot 
say.  Issuing  from  the  northern  gate  of  Tegea,  Epameinondas  ad- 
vanced straight  towards  this  narrow  neck ;  but  the  impression  on 
the  mind  of  the  enemy  that  he  meant  to  close  with  them  at  once 
was  weakened  when  they  saw  him  turn  up  the  slopes  of  the  Maina- 
lian  range  to  the  left.  From  that  point  they  watched  him  move 
onwards  until  the  form  of  the  ground  brought  him  very  near  their 
right  flank ;  but  the  order  issued  to  the  Thebans  to  ground  their 
arms  and  perha[)s  some  simulated  signs  of  encampment  effectually 
blinded  the  eyes  of  the  Spartans  to  his  real  design.  They  broke  up 
their  army  aiTd  laid  aside  their  weapons,  while  the  cavalry  took  the 
saddles  and  bridles  off  from  their  horses.  In  the  midst  of  this  dis- 
order in  the  enemy's  camp  the  mighty  mass  of  the  Theban  Phalanx 
was  set  in  motion.  During  the  few  minutes  which  passed  before 
the  clash  of  battle,  the  Peloponnesians  hastened  as  best  they  could 
to  resume  their  fighting  order.  The  Mantineians  and  Spartans 
on  the  right,  exposed  to  the  full  brunt  of  the  tremendous  charge, 
stood  their  ground  with  a  firmness  never  surpassed  in  the  palmiest 
days  of  their  history.  But  the  Theban  wedge  came  on,  as  the  his- 
torian puts  it,  with  the  impetus  of  a  trireme,  and  once  more  even 
Spartan  valor  gave  way  before  it.  The  issue  of  the  day  was  almost 
decided  before  the  Theban  allies  joined  battle  with  the  forces 
opposed  to  them.  Here  also  the  ev'cnt  was  not  doubtful.  Much 
had  been  expected  from  the  Athenian  cavalry  whose  timely  presence 
had  saved  the  city  of  Mantineia ;  but  they  were  effectually  kept  in 


596  THE    KINGS   OF  MACEDON.  [Book  V. 

cneck  by  a  reserved  force  wliieli  was  ready  to  attack  tliem  in  the 
rear  if  they  attempted  any  forward  movement. 

Retreat  was  fast  becoming  tiight,  and  the  memory  of  the  Spar- 
tan victory  in  this  same  valley  in  the  days  of  Alkibiadcs'  seemed 
_     .    ,        likely  to  be  clouded  by   a  catastrophe  as  terrible  as 
Epamcinou-   that  of  Leuktra,  when  Epameinondas,  clieering  on  his 
^*'  men  to  the  pursuit,  was  struck  by   a   spear,   the   iiead 

of  which  broke  off  and  remained  in  his  bi'east.  The  wound  was 
mortal  ;  and  the  tidings  that  Epameinondas  had  seen  his  last  fight 
ran  like  fire  through  the  whole  army,  producing  everywhere  the 
same  absolute  })rostration  of  strength  and  will.  Had  he  lived,  even 
his  influence  would  at  this  instart  of  decisive  victory  scarcely 
have  restrained  them  from  the  fury  of  pursuit ;  yet  the  mere  know- 
ledge that  their  general  must  die  so  paralysed  their  arms  that 
almost  in  strictness  of  speech  not  another  blow  was  struck,  nor  a 
single  effort  made  to  complete  the  work  which  lay  nearest  to  their 
leader's  heart.  Tne  system  which  required  the  Hellenic  com- 
mander to  charge  on  foot  at  the  head  of  his  troops  clothed  in  their 
armor  and  bearing  their  weaj^ons  may  in  its  working  have  been 
rather  mischievous  than  beneficial.  At  Syracuse,  by  the  death  of 
Lamaclios,  it  involved  possibly  the  ruin  of  the  whole  Athenian 
armament ;"  but  there  is  perhaps  no  other  instance  in  whicli  men 
in  the  full  swing  of  success  showed  that  their  enthusiasm  and  their 
very  powei-s  of  action  were  bound  up  with  the  life  and  safety  of 
their  leader.  This  astonisliing  paralysis  of  energy  was  a  sinister 
omen  for  the  future  history  of  Thebes  ;  and  the  moral  mischief  of 
the  temper  which  led  men  thus  to  depend  on  tbeir  commanders 
was  to  be  illustrated  once  and  for  all  on  the  fatal  field  of  Chaironeia. 
Here  on  the  Mantineian  plain  the  exultation  of  victory  was  .  ex- 
changed in  a  moment  for  bitter  but  unavailing  soitow,  as  they 
crowded  round  the  dying  chief,  whose  life  must  end,  so  the 
surgeons  said,  with  the  drawing  of  the  spearhead  from  the  wound. 
Three  questions  only  he  asked.  The  first  was  about  his  shield, 
which  his  shield-bearer  held  up  before  his  eyes  ;  then  he  desired  to 
know  how  the  day  was  going,  and  when  he  learnt  that  the  Boio- 
tians  were  the  conquerors,  he  asked  lastly  for  lolaidas  and  Dai- 
phantos,  adding  a  wish  to  see  them.  He  was  told  that  they 
were  both  slain.  '  Then  you  must  make  peace  with  the  enemy,'  he 
said,  and  ordering  the  spearhead  to  be  drawn  from  his  breast, 
died  with  the  serenity  of  a  brave  man  who  has  done  his  duty. 

So  passed  away  the  Hannibal  of  Thebes,  the  leader  with  whom 

the  power  of  his  city  may  fairly  be  said  to  have  begun  and  ended. 

From  first  to   last  his  political   and   military   career,   extending 

over  sixteen  years,  exhibits  scarcely  a  point  for  censure,  unless  au 

'  See  p.  354.  '  See  p.  384. 


Chap.  I.]  CAMPAIGNS  OF  EPAMEINONDAS.  597 

exception  be  to  be  made  against  his  plan  of  establishing  a  Theban 
navy.  Not  willing  to  take  part  in  private  conspiracies,  he  de- 
votes himself  to  the  defence  of  his  conntry  which  the  Review  of 
assassin's  dao-o-er  has  delivered  from  an  odious  tyranny  ;  the  career 
and  with  this  selr-devotion  there  is  mingled  nothing  of  uoncfas. 
that  personal  ambition  through  which  the  Spartan  Lysandros 
covered  himself  with  infamy,  nothing  of  that  lust  for  money  which 
brought  on  Gyiippos  the  punishment  of  a  common  thief,  nothing 
of  that  savage  vindictiveness  which  would  lead  men  like  Kleon  or 
Agesilaos  to  condemn  a  whole  people  to  death  or  slavery.  With 
a  mind  trained  by  the  best  teachers  of  the  age  and  opened  to  all 
the  ennobling  influences  of  the  most  splendid  literature  which  the 
world  has  ever  yet  seen,  Epameinondas  astonished  his  countrymen 
with  an  eloquence  never  heard  before  and  never  to  be  heard  again 
from  Boiotian  lips,  with  a  generosity  and  forbearance  which  led 
them  to  commit  their  crimes  in  his  absence  and  without  his  know- 
ledge, and  with  a  military  genius  which  upset  the  traditional 
system  of  men  who  held  that  that  system  could  never  be  supplanted 
by  any  other.  Amid  the  shifting  scenes  of  the  interpolitical  intrigues, 
jealousies,  and  feuds,  which  make  up  the  general  course  of  Greek 
liistory  after  the  fall  of  the  Athenian  empire,  the  far-seeing  wis- 
dom of  Epameinondas  devised  a  scheme  which,  if  honestly  and 
thoroughly  carried  out,  might  have  made  something  like  national 
union  possible  for  cities  which  now  spent  their  time  in  hating  and 
injuring  each  other.  Free,  moreover,  from  the  gross  superstition 
which  even  a  man  like  Sokrates  fostered  in  himself  and  in  his 
pupils,  he  could  face  dangers  in  the  generous  spirit  of  the  Homeric 
Hektor,  and  nerve  his  comrades  to  the  utmost  endurance  when  the 
besotted  credulity  of  a  man  like  Nikias  would  have  left  them 
powerless  for  thought  or  action.  '  You  die  childless,'  said  a  friend 
to  him  in  his  last  moments, — his  voice  choked  by  his  tears.  '  Nay,' 
said  Epameinondas,  'I  leave  two  daughters,  the  victory  of  Leuktra 
and  the  victory  of  Mantineia.' 


CHAPTER  II. 

FROM    THE    DEATH    OF    EPAMEINONDAS    TO    THE    BATTLE    OP 
CHAIRONEIA. 

So  small,  says  Xenophon,*  was  the  effect  of  the  last  battle  fought 
by  Epameinondas,  that  the  confusion  and  disorder  which  prevailed 

'  B.  vii.  5,  37. 


598  THE  KINGS  OF  MACEDON.  [Book  V. 

befoi'e  it  was  increased  ratlier  than  lessened.  The  assertion  is 
not  true,  unless  it  be  held  to  mean  that  no  settlement  -svas  worthy 
of  being  taken  into  account,  which  either  had  not  the  full  ap- 
proval  of  Sparta,  or  failed  to  secure  to  some  one  city 
the  battle  of  the  power  of  tyrannising  over  or  at  the  least  dic- 
Mantiueia.  bating  to  all  Others.  Neither  of  these  results,  it  is  true, 
followed  the  battle,  in  which,  although  the  death  of  the  Theban 
leader  put  a  stop  to  all  pursuit  and  so  enabled  the  Spartans  with 
some  color  to  set  up  a  trophy,  the  latter  nevertheless  acknowledged 
their  defeat  by  asking  a  truce  for  the  burial  of  their  dead.  It  is 
true,  too,  that  the  victory  brought  to  Thebes  neither  any  new 
territory  nor  any  addition  to  her  power ;  but  it  enabled  her  to 
secure  a  peace  which  established  the  independence  of  Messcne,  and 
rescued  Tegca  and  Megalopolis  from  a  combination  of  enemies 
which  must,  if  unbroken,  have  ended  in  their  downfall  and  ruin. 
In  other  words,  it  maintained  the  great  work  of  ilpameinondas, 
and  this,  it  must  be  admitted,  was  a  solid  gain  ;  but  we  cannot 
doubt  that  the  grief  with  Avhich  the  Thebans  heard  of  the  death  of 
their  illustrious  general  was  rendered  tenfold  more  poignant  by  the 
thought  that  if  his  followers  had  been  somewhat  less  the  slaves  of 
his  genius  and  somewhat  more  the  self-relying  servants  of  their 
country,  the  peace,  which  now  secured  to  each  side  such  possessions 
as  it  might  have  at  the  moment,  would  assuredly  have  led  to 
arrangements  of  which  the  good  efEects  might  have  been  felt  for 
generations. 

But  if  in  the  work  of  Epameinondas  we  see  a  consistent  and  on 
the  whole  a  beneficent  purpose,  a  review  of  the  events  which 
Death  of  during  the  three  years  immediately  following  the  battle 
Eiypt''"'^'"  of  Mantineia  tended  to  restore  to  Athens  the  appear- 
361  B.C.  anee  rather  than  the  reality  of  a  maritime  empire 
involves  little  interest  except  of  a  painful  or  repulsive  kind.  We 
first  find  Sparta,  seemingly  in  utier  disgust  at  the  position  of 
affairs  nearer  home,  sending  Agesilaos  to  receive  the  wages  of  a 
mercenary  leader  from  one  or  other  of  the  Egyptian  princes  in 
revolt  against  the  Persian  king.  In  the  distant  land  of  the  Nile 
her  power  seems  to  be  so  far  felt  as  to  enable  the  man  whose  cause 
she  espouses  to  win  a  victory  over  his  rival.  The  gratitude  of 
Nektanebis  was  testified  by  the  gift  of  230  talents  to  the  Spartan 
people  :  but  Agesilaos  did  not  live  to  carry  the  splendid  present 
home.  "Weighed  down  with  the  toils  of  more  than  eighty  years 
he  died  on  the  road  to  Kyrene,  and  his  l)ody  embalmed  in  wax  was 
taken  to  Sparta  for  the  solemn  ceremonies  which  the  Lykourgean 
s)'stem  assigned  for  the  funerals  of  S])artan  kings.  So  passed  away 
the  greatest  man,  in  whom  we  may  see  the  genuine  result  of  Spar- 
tan discipline  acting  on  tho  best  material.     Bnisidas,  both  as  a 


Chap.  II.]  PHILIP  OF  MACEDON.  599 

soldier  and  as  a  statesman,  displayed  incomparably  higher  powers  ; 
but  in  his  readiness  of  resource,  in  his  versatility,  and  in  his 
eloquence,  Brasidas  is  as  pre-eminently  Athenian  as  the  philo- 
Lakonian  Xenophon.  A  man  like  xVgesilaos  could  be  produced 
only  by  the  rigid  monotony  of  Spartan  routine. 

When  from  Sparta  we  turn  to  Athens,  we  see  her  sending  out 
general  after  general  to  recover  some  ancient  possession  or  to  put 
down  some  new  enemy,  and  in  almost  every  case  accus-  ^^^^^  ^^ 
ing  the  general,  on  his  return,  of  inefficiency,  negligence,  Athenian 
or  treachery,  and  visiting  tliese  offences  either  with  a  s*'"'^'"'*  '*'"i'- 
severe  tine  or  more  commonly  with  death.  These  generals,  it  must 
be  further  noted,  are  sent  out  with  scanty  means,  perhaps  with  none 
— unsupported  or  but  feebly  supported  by  citizen- soldiers  with  a 
real  interest  in  the  struggle, — and  left  to  do  what  they  can  by  means 
of  the  mercenary  bands  who  now  become  the  plague  and  bane  of  the 
Hellenic  world.  Thus  scarcely  more  than  two  months  had  passed 
from  the  battle  of  Mantineia,  when  an  Athenian  fleet  was  dispatched 
under  Leosthenes  to  operate  against  the  navy  of  the  Pheraian  despot 
Alexandros.  Leosthenes  was  defeated,  and  his  enemies,  if  we 
may  believe  the  story,  repeated  not  without  success  the  attempt  of 
Teleutias'  on  the  Peiraieus.  This  failure  cost  Leosthenes  his  life. 
The   same  fate   befell   Kallistlienes  who  had  not  pre-     „„„    „ 

T-  362  B.C. 

vented  the  people  of  Amphipolis  from  surrendermg 
their  city  to  the  Makedonian  king  Perdikkas.  Others  were  accused 
either  of  incompetence  or  corruption  ;  and  if  in  one  or  two  cases 
the  issue  of  the  trial  is  not  known,  there  is  seemingly  but  too 
much  reason  for  thinking  that  the  error  of  the  Athenian  jury  did 
not  lie  in  the  direction  of  excessive  lenity. 

Still    in   spite   of  punishments  Athens  found  some  who  were 
willing,  in  whatever  way,  to  serve  her,  while  the  assassination  of 
Kotys  left  to  her  a  far  less  formidable   enemy  in  his   Greatest  ex- 
vouno;  son   Kersobleptes.     Poorly   supported   by   the   tension  of 
11        rii         1  ii  •  •  J.    1     i    tlie  second 

mercenary  leader  Charidemos,  tins  prince  was  at  last  Athenian 

compelled  to  yield  up  the  whole  Chersonesos  to  Athens,    ''™p''"'^- 
with  the   exception    of  the    town    of    Kardia.      This 
surrender  marks  the  greatest  extent  reached  by  the  second  mari- 
time empire  of  Athens,  if  we  may  treat  as   a  reality  that  short- 
lived and  ill-cemented  dominion. 

The  truth  is  that  the  real  significance  of  Greek  history  at  this 
time  lies  not  so  much  in  the  obstacles  which  the  Hellenic  cities 
were  raising  up  or  multiplying  in  the  way  of  national  union  (for 
such  union  had  long  been,  if  it  had  not  always  been,  a  mere 
dream),  but  in  the  rapidity  with  which  almost  every  event  was 

'  See  p.  566. 


600  THE  KINGS  OF  MACEDON.  [Book  V. 

preparing  the  way  for  a  foreign  conqueror.    So  great  and  so  fierce 

.      had  become  the  antipathies  felt  by  rival  or  subject  cities 

Makedonian   towards  each  other,  that  without  perhaps  a  single  ex- 

powcr.  ception  they  wei'e  ready  to  invite  the   interference   of 

an  alien  rather  than  make  up  their  own   unreasonable  but  deadly 

quarrels.     The  new   maritime  empire  of  Athens,  such  as  it  was, 

had  been   acquired  in  great  part  at  the  expense  of  the  Olynthian 

confederacy  :  and  the  forcible  suppression  of  this  confederacy  was 

the  removal  of  the  last  bulwark  against  Makedonian  aggression. 

The   death  of  Perdikkas,  the  great  ally  of  Athens  in 

this  work  of  conquest,  brought  his  brother  Philip,  the 

future  father  of  Alexander  the  Great,  more  than  one  step   nearer 

to  the  Makedonian  throne. 

The  road  to  this  high  place  was  still  full  of  dangers,  but  they 
were  dangers  which  might  be  well  overcome  by  a  man  who  cared 
Relations  of  not  how  he  reached  his  ends.  Philip  had  three  half- 
Philip  (father  ]^fQljjgj.g_     One  he  killed  :  the  other  two  escaped  him 

of  Alcxan-  iiji-i  tt  i  i-  iri 

der  the  Only  Dv  uiglit.     He  took  on  lumsclt  the  management 

thtfAthe-^^  of  affairs,  at  first  only  us  regent  for  his  nephew 
nians.  Amyntas  son  of  his  brother  Perdikkas ;  he  soon  found 

it  necessary  to  comply  with  an  invitation  which  prayed  him  to 
assume  the  kingly  office  in  his  own  person.  The  Athenians 
espoused  the  cause  of  Argaios,  anotlier  claimant  of  tlie  Make- 
donian crown ;  but  Philip  cooled  their  zeal  in  his  behalf  by  offer- 
ing to  surrender  to  them  Amphipolis,  the  great  object  of  their 
desires  since  the  day  when  it  was  wrested  from  them  by  Brasidas. 
Argaios,  thus  left  to  himself,  soon  fell  into  Philip's  liands  ;  and  the 
Athenians,  soothed  by  the  liberation  of  the  Athenian  captives,  made 
peace  on  the  terms  proposed  by  the  Makedonian  king,  whose 
garrison  was  accordingly  withdrawn  from  Ampliipolis. 

This  fact  sufficiently  shows  that  Philip  expected  prompt  action 
on  the  part  of  the  Athenians  for  the  recovery  of  their  long-coveted 
_.  .  ,.  colony.  A  few  months  later  he  was  compelled  himself 
tion  of  the  to  besiege  the  place.  i3ut  tor  Jus  own  previous  act 
f^r  personal  ^'^"^  t"''  would  never  have  been  needed  ;  and  unless  we 
military  affirm  that  he  deliberately  incurred  superfluous  trouble, 
^^^  ^'  we  must  give  him  credit  for  a  belief  that  the  departure 
of  liis  own  troops  woidd  be  followed  by  the  forcible  entry  of  the 
Athenians.  Keen-sighted  though  Philip  v.as,  and  rapidly  as  he 
was  gaining  experience  in  the  best  modes  of  dealing  with  his 
neighbors,  lie  had  yet  to  learn  what  an  enormous  advantage  for 
the  carrying  out  of  all  his  plans  he  would  have  in  the  present 
temper  and  habits  of  the  Athenian  people.  The  fiery  energy 
which  in  the  days  of  Perikles  seemed  to  confer  on  the  unwearied 
Demos  almost  a  character  of  ubiquity  had  given  way  to  an  inert- 


Chap.  11.]  PHILIP  OF   MACEDON.  601 

ness  which  preferred  to  hire  others  to  fight  their  battles.  With 
the  growing  disinclination  to  personal  service  was  combined  a 
dilatoriness  in  action  which  let  slip  almost  every  opportunity  for 
striking  a  vigorous  blow,  for  winning  some  rich  prize,  or  for 
recovering  some  old  possession. 

This  slowness  and  hesitation  in  the  once  imperial  people  stood 
out  in  fatal  contrast  with  the  firm  will,  the  astute  policy,  and  the 
rapid  execution  of  the  almost  unknown  adversary  who  ^ariyiife 
not  I'nany  years  hence  was  to  be  proclaimed  leader  and  andcharac- 
lord  of  all  the  states  of  Hellas.  They  cannot  indeed  ^er  of  Philip, 
be  blamed  for  failing  to  discern  from  the  first  the  genius  which  in 
Philip  delighted  in  grappling  with  and  overcoming  difficulties  and 
which  never  alarmed  an  enemy  until  he  was  ready  to  close  "with 
him  ;  but  they  knew  that  he  had  spent  three  years  as  a  hostage  at 
Thebes,  that  there  he  had  been  brought  into  personal  contact  with 
Epameinondas,  and  that  thus  he  had  seen  how  mighty  a  work 
might  be  achieved,  by  the  union  of  eloquence  with  a  strong  will, 
and  of  a  far-seeing  policy  with  the  military  ability  needed  for  its 
support.  Above  all,  he,  as  they  knew,  had  witnessed  there  the  disci- 
pline and  organisation  of  the  Tlieban  army  ;  he  had  seen  the  tremen- 
dous wedge  of  the  Theban  phalanx  sot  in  motion  with  the  velocity 
and  impetus  of  a  ship  of  war  ;  and  the  contemplation  of  the  new 
tactic  which  had  proved  itself  more  than  a  match  for  the  ancient 
system  of  Sparta  liad  produced  its  natural  result  on  a  mind  above 
all  things  practical  and  animated  by  the  old  Athenian  conviction 
that  in  war  as  in  other  things  the  highest  science  generally  carries 
the  day.  The  Athenians  could  not  indeed  know  that  the  courteous 
and  well-cultured  youth  would  arm  his  phalanx  with  a  weapon 
which  would  bear  down  even  the  Sacred  Band  of  the  Thebans ; 
but  their  whole  history  taught  them  the  lesson  that  with  such  an 
adversary  procrastination  must  mean  ruin.  The  warning  was  given 
in  vain.  Unable  to  mark  out  and  to  adhere  to  a  definite  policy, 
they  found  themselves  drawn  hither  and  thither  by  conflictino- 
calls,  the  prospect  of  advantage  in  one  direction  being  balanced  by 
a  threatened  loss  in  another,  while  both  the  loss  and  the  gain 
tended  to  put  out  of  sight  some  third  object  which  they  ought  to 
have  regarded  as  of  paramount  importance. 

During  the  year  which  followed  the  evacuation  of  Amphipolis 
by  the  troops  of  Philip,  dissensions  in  the  cities  of  Euboia  which 
since  the  fight  at  Leuktra  had  been  enrolled  in  the  list   Recovery  of 
of  Boiotian  confederates  provoked  a  Theban  invasion,   Euboia  by 
and  made  an  opening  for  Athenian  interference.     The   nians. 
rescue   of  Chalkis  and  Eretria  from  the  doom  which      ^^^  ^■"^• 
seemed  impending  over  them  might  be  the  means  of  restoring  the 
ancient  empire  of  Athens,  and  the  earnest  entreaties  of  Timotheos 
26 


602  THE  KINGS  OF  MACEDON.  [Book  V. 

roused  liis  countrymen  to  something  like  their  former  energy.  '  The 
Thebans  are  in  tlie  island,'  he  said  ;  '  will  you  spend  your  time  in 
thinking  of  -what  you  should  do  ?  Will  you  not  rise  up  and  go 
straight  to  Peiraieus,  and  drag  down  your  triremes  into  the  sea?' 
In  five  days,  we  are  told,  Timotheos  had  landed  with  his  army  in 
Euboia,  and  in  less  than  a  month  the  island  was  restored  to  the 
Athenian  alliance. 

This  great  gain  preceded  at  the  utmost  only  by  a  few  weeks  or 
months  the  outbreak  of  a  strife,  known  as  the  Social  War,  which 
Social  War.  lasting  for  more  than  two  years  left  Athens  miserably 
357-355  B.C.  impovei'ished,  and  scattered  to  the  winds  the  hope  that 
her  ancient  supremacy  by  sea  could  ever  be  permanently  restored. 
In  her  new  confederacy  the  several  allies  had  their  representatives 
in  the  synods  held  at  Athens,  while  they  were  freed  from  the 
burdens  which  fifty  years  earlier  had  furnished  matter  for  constant 
and  vehement  complaint ;  but  even  thus  so  slight  was  the  attach- 
ment felt  for  her  by  the  allies  generally,  and  so  strong  the  attraction 
which  drew^them  from  her,  that  without  greatly  caring  to  explain 
the  reason  the  cities  of  Kos,  Rhodes,  Chios,  and  Byzantion  asserted 
their  independence  and  determined  to  abide  the  issue  of  war.  In 
Chios  the  dominant  oligarchy  would  gladly  seize  any  occasion  for 
revolt,  while  the  men  of  Byzantion  had  their  special  quaiTcl  with 
Athens  in  reference  to  the  transit  of  corn  ships  from  the  Euxine  to 
the  Egean  :  but  in  all  likelihood  the  deepest  and  most  abiding 
grievance  lay  in  the  mode  in  which  Athens,  like  most  other  Greek 
states,  now  carried  on  her  wars.  Her  citizens  would  not  serve  : 
her  mercenaries,  scantly  paid,  eked  out  their  pay  with  plunder, 
sometimes  putting  aside  the  objects  of  their  expeditions  for  mere 
marauding  forays  into  the  lands  even  of  neutrals  or  friends.  The 
efforts  made  by  Athens  to  crush  the  revolt  tended  only  to  weaken 
herself  and  to  strengthen  the  Makedonian  king.  Sent  with  a  fleet 
to  Chios,  Cliabrias  fell  in  battle  ;  at  the  Hellespont  Iphikratcs, 
Timotheos,  and  Chares  seemed  to  be  preparing  for  vigorous  action 
when  a  sudden  storm  abated  the  ardor  of  the  two  foniier  generals. 
Chares,  insisting  that  the  tempest  was  not  such  as  to  justify  hesi- 
tation, engaged  the  enemy  and  was  repulsed  with  loss,  and  on 
returning  to  Athens  charged  his  comrades  with  treacheiy.  Wit- 
nesses on  both  sides  appeared,  the  one  to  assert  the  fury  of  the 
storm,  the  other  to  deny  it.  The  result  was  the  acquittal  of  Iphi- 
krates,  although  he  took  upon  himself  the  full  responsibility  of 
Avhat  had  been  done,  and  the   cojidemnation   of  Timo- 

357  B.C. 

thcos  to  the  enormous  fine  of  100  talents.  The  former, 
it  seems,  was  an  orator  of  no  mean  merit,  with  popular  and  winning 
manners;  the  latter,  caring  nothing  for  the  favor  of  the  people 
and  doing  little  to  consult  their  tastes,  found  few  to  sympathise 


Chap.  II.]  PHILIP  OF  MACEDON.  603 

vitli  liiin  in  misfortune.  The  partisans  of  Iphikrates  appeared  in 
irnis,  it  is  said,  near  the  court  where  his  trial  was  going  on,  and 
the  jurymen  discreetly  acquitted  him  :  Timotheos  had  no  such 
help,  and  judgment  went  against  him.  Such  was  the  miserable 
liarvest  reaped  from  the  seed  sown  by  Theramenes.  The  memory 
of  Argennoussai  paralysed  the  arms  of  the  best  generals  ;  and  the 
perversion  of  justice  Avas  the  natural^  if  not  the  necessary,  conse- 
quence of  this  fatal  state  of  things. 

Thus  almost  iit  the  outset  of  a  struggle  with  the  most  important 
cities  in  her  confederacy  Athens  was  deprived  or  had  deprived 
herself  of  all  the  generals  who  might,  if  they  liad  been  Character 
allowed  fair  freedom  of  action,  have  served  her  effi-  Athenmn 
ciently.  Chabrias  Avas  dead  ;  Timotheos  was  in  exile,  generals. 
amerced  in  a  penalty  exceeding  his  powers  of  payment ;  Iphikrates) 
although  acquitted,  appears  no  more  as  a  military  leader.  There 
remain  only  Chares  and  Phokion,  the  former  a  man  chores  and 
with  nothing  but  his  courage  to  commend  him,  the  Phokion. 
hitter  a  man  whose  virtues  Avere  more  mischievous  to  tlie  state 
tliau  the  vices  of  his  colleagues.  In  Phokion  the  personal  incor- 
ruptibility of  Nikias  was  united  with  luore  than  respectable  mili- 
tary talent  and  an  ascetic  hardness  of  life  more  in  accordance  with 
Spartan  than  Athenian  habits.  Caring  nothing  for  the  luxuries 
AV'hicli  Aveallh  might  procure,  he  Inid  no  motives  to  court  the  pojv 
ular  favor  for  the  sake  of  amassing  money,  Avhile  his  bluntness  in 
speech  and  the  freedom  of  his  censure  shielded  him  from  all  impu- 
tations of  time-serving  flattery.  He  professed  indeed  to  despise 
eloquence  as  much  as  he  despised  riches  :  but  Demosthenes  spoke 
of  him  as  the  axe  which  clove  his  labored  oratory  asunder,  and  we 
may  perhaps  be  not  far  in  tliinking  that  the  happy  abruptness 
and  pithiness  of  his  speeches  were  at  the  least  as  much  the  results 
of  studied  art  as  of  natural  rudeness.  Such  a  man,  so  thorough- 
ly possessing  the  contidence  of  the  Athenians  as  to  be  elected 
general  during  forty  five  consecutive  years,  might,  had  he  chosen 
so  to  do,  have  revived  in  his  countrymen  something  of  the  vigor 
which  distinguished  the  Demos  in  the  days  of  Perikles.  In  such 
a  task  lie  would  have  had  everything  in  his  favor,  while  every- 
thing Avould  have  tended  to  increase  the  difficulties  of  the  only 
antagonist  from  wliom  he  had  anything  to  fear.  The  Makedonian 
king  was  lighting  his  Avay  onwards  amongst  obstacles  Avhich  a  de- 
termined and  sagacious  enemy  miglit  easily  have  rendered  insur- 
mountable. He  had  to  Avin  over  or  to  crush  cities  which  might  have 
been  made  the  steadfast  allies  of  Athens ;  and  Phokion  might  by 
advocating  an  energetic  resistance  have  added  to  his  fame  as  a 
general.  Whether  he  felt  that  his  own  importance  Avould  be  in- 
creased by  a  resolute  war  policy,  is,  to  say  the  least,  most  uncertain  ; 


604  THE  KINGS  OF  MACEDON.  [Book  V. 

but  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  in  insisting  on  a  policy  of  a  very 
different  kind  he  earned  for  himself  tlie  reputation  of  a  man  who 
for  the  sake  of  peace  sacritices  distinctions  which  he  could  not  fail 
to  win.  Phokion  became  thus  (unwittingly  it  may  be)  the  most 
dangerous  enemy  of  Athens.  The  sternness  of  his  character  and 
the  integrity  of  his  private  life  insured  to  him  a  trust  fully  equal 
to  that  which  had  been  reposed  in  Nikias,  and  he  used  it  to  blind 
his  countrymen  to  signs  of  appalling  significance  and  to  make  them 
deaf  to  tlie  warnings  which  told  them  that  they  were  walking  on 
the  brink  of  a  precipice.  He  might  have  dealt  a  deathblow  to  the 
ambition  of  Philip  and  changed  the  course  perhaps  of  European 
history  :  but  lie  cliose  deliberately  to  foster  all  that  was  weak  and 
ungenerous  in  the  Athenian  character,  to  assure  them  that  there 
was  and  there  could  be  no  need  of  extraordinary  exertion,  no  need 
to  leave  their  pleasant  home  life  for  the  hard  realities  of  warfare, 
no  need  to  stint  their  enjoyments  in  order  to  provide  tlie  means  of 
putting  down  the  sleepless  and  unscrupulous  conspirator  who,  if 
he  failed  to  snare  his  prey,  awaited  patiently  the  right  moment  for 
springing  upon  him.  Phokion,  in  short,  fell  in  with  the  Atheni- 
can  humor;  and  the  pre-eminence  thus  cheaply  gained  sealed  the 
doom  not  of  Athens  alone  but  of  the  whole  Hellenic  world. 

Things  were,  in  truth,  going  just  as  Philip  would  ha\e  them. 
Sent  out  with  a  powerful  fleet.  Chares  instead  of  fighting  with  the 
Reduction  of  revolted  allies  took  service  with  the  satrap  Artabazos; 
bv^Phin"''^  and  although  he  won  from  liim  a  ricli  recompense  for 
"358  B.C.  •  defeating  the  troops  of  the  Persian  king,  the  complaints 
and  threats  of  the  latter  made  the  Athenians  as  willing  to  concede 
the  independence  of  their  allies  as  these  were  anxious  to  acquire  it. 
Before  this  exhausting  and  useless  struggle  reached  its  close,  Atu- 
phipolis  had  already  fallen.  Her  envoys  had  appeared  at  Athens 
to  pray  for  aid  against  the  besiegers  whom  by  themselves  they 
were  unable  to  withstand  :  but  the  hatred  of  two  generations  left 
no  room  for  sympathy  with  their  troubles,  and  Philip  guarded 
himself  effectually  against  the  interference  of  the  Athenians  by 
assuring  them  that  lie  was  besieging  the  city  only  because  he 
wished  to  hand  it  over  to  them.  The  promptness  with  which  he 
had  fulfilled  his  former  engagement  to  evacuate  the  place  secured 
ample  credit  for  his  present  promi.ses,  and  the  Athenians  sat  still 
wliilc  Philij)  became  master  of  the  gates  of  Thrace.  This  time  the 
pledge  was  not  redeemed  ;  but  when  the  Olynthians,  fully  seeing 
the  results  of  this  momentous  conquest,  songlit  to  form  an  alliance 
with  Atliens,  the  ])artisans  of  the  Makedonian  king  cheated  the 
people  with  bright  pictures  of  his  friendship  for  them  and  of  the 
benefits  which  they  would  receive  at  his  hands,  and  the  ( )lynthian 
proposal  was  sununarily  rejected. 


Chap.  II.]  PHILIP  OF  MACEDON.  005 

Philip  had,  again,  achieved  his  purpose.  While  the  wrath  of 
the  Olynthians  was  still  hot  against  the  Athenians,  he  offered  him- 
self as  their  ally,  and  proved  the   sincerity   of  his  in-    ....  , 

•  ' .  i^  .  .  !•   n     •  1    •        Alliance  of 

tentions  by  putting  them  m  possession   or  1  otidaia.    Philip  with 

Thus  disarming  their  opposition,  he  struck  blow  after   twans^"" 

blow  against  the   power  which   alone  blocked  his  way      356  b.c. 

to  empire,  until  Methone  remained  the  only  town  on  the  Thennaic 

gulf  in  alliante  with  Athens.     The   Greeks   were  indeed  serving 

liim"  well.      His  armies  were  becoming  instruments  of  wonderful 

power;  but  he  found  allies    still    more  potent    in  the  incurable 

feuds  of  the  Uellenic  cities  and  the  personal  corruption  of  Hellenic 

citizens. 

These  deadly  feuds  were  now  to  kindle  the  fiercer  flame  of  a 
religious  war.  Unable  to  win  the  hearty  support  of  willing  allies, 
the  Thebans  had  resolved  to  employ  once  more  for  the 
furtherance  of  their  ends  the  judicial  powers  of  the  kians  fined 
Amphiktyonic  assembly.  The  Spartans  were  already  p^jktyonic' 
under  the  ban.  The  victims  now  were  the  Phokians,  assembly, 
wlio  on  some  trifling  charge  were  sentenced  to  a 
luinous  fine,  and  on  failing  to  pay  it  within  a  specified  time  were 
condemned  to  the  punishment  which  had  been  inflicted  on  Kirrha 
in  the  days  of  Solon.'  In  getting  this  sentence  passed  the  Thebans 
overshot  their  mark.  On  the  suggestion  of  Philomelos  the  Phoki- 
ans resolved  to  inforce  their  ancient  claim  to  the  presidency  of 
the  Delphian  temple.  Hastening  to  Sparta,  Philomelos  found  in 
King  Archidamos  a  friend  who,  although  he  could  not  commit 
the  state  in  the  matter,  did  wdiat  he  could  to  help  him  by  gifts  of 
money  and  men.  His  own  wealth  enabled  him  to  double  the  sum 
thus  gained,  and  at  the  head  of  an  army  so  raised  he  seized  the 
Del})hian  temple  and  town.  His  envoys  were  at  once  sent  round 
to  the  chief  Hellenic  cities,  to  say  that  the  Phokians  were  but  re- 
asserting their  ancient  rights,  that  the  temple  treasures  should  be 
scrupulously  guarded,  and  the  temple  itself  remain  open  as  in 
times  past  for  the  pilgrim  or  the  inquirer.  The  result  might  have 
been  foreseen.  Sparta  and  Athens  declared  their  readiness  to  sup- 
port the  Phokian  claim  :  the  Thebans  vehemently  denounced  it. 
It  was  but  the  old  strife  in  a  new  and  a  more  deadly  form  ;  the 
quarrel  was  to  be  fought  out  with  the  added  horrors  of  a  crusade. 

The  promises  made  by  Philomelos  and  his  brother  or  colleague 
Onomarchos  were  kept  necessarily  but  for  a  little  while.     Thebes 
was  gathering  a   large   army  to   attack   them ;  from   rpj^^  sacred 
Sparta  and   Athens   it    seemed    useless   to    look   for   War. 
active  help,  and   mercenaries  must  be  paid.     It  was 
impossible  to  resist  the  pressure  put  upon  them.     The  wealth   of 
'  Paus.  X.  37. 


606  THE  KINGS  OF  MACEDON.  [Book  V. 

the  temple,  taken  first  strictly  as  a  loan,  was  afterwards  more  free- 
ly used,  until  at  length  the  sacrilege  ended  in  confiscation  ;  and 
lono"  before  the  ten  years  of  this  desperate  struggle  had  come  to  an 
end,  the  ten  thousand  talents  which  represented  the  value  of  the 
Delphian  treasures  had  all  been  spent  or  wasted. 

After  some  successes  won  at  a  fearful  cost,  the  mercenar}-  army 

of  Philomelos  was  defeated  and  Philomelos  himself  slain,     AVitlx 

the   temple    treasures  his   successor   Onftniarchos  not 

Philomelos.    merely  levied  another  army  but  practically  made  him- 

355-1  B.C.  gg]f  (Jespot.  ^Vhen  the  Makedonian  Philip  attacked 
Lykophron  the  tyrant  of  Pherai,  he  found  in  the  Phokian  general 
an  enemy  vastly  more  formidable  than  any  Hellenic  leader  whom 
he  had  thus  far  encountered.  The  mere  fact  that  I'hilip  could 
thus  turn  liis  attention  to  the  affairs  of  Tliessaly  attests  the  rapid 
growth  of  liis  power.  Methone,  the  last  city  remaining  to  Ath- 
ens on  the  Thennaic  gulf,  was  now  his  ;  and  if  he  thus  had  no  fur- 
ther hindrances  nearer  home,  lie  was  indirectly  aided  by  the 
Spartans,  who  thought  that  they  might  now  carry  out  their  long- 
cherished  desire  of  undoing  the  work  of  Epameinondas.  His 
Thessalian  campaign  bade  fair  at  first  to  be  a  success  ;  but  Onomar- 
clios  avenged  the  defeat  of  his  brother  Phayllos  in  two  bloody 
battles,  and  Philip  was  compelled  for  the  time  to  abandon  Thessa- 
ly.  His  army  seemed  disorganised,  and  he  had  to  put  forth  all 
his  powers   of   persuasion   before  he  could  prevail  on 

^^  ^'^'      them  to  resume  the  strife. 

His  efforts  were  amply  rewarded.  Powerfully  aided  by  the 
Tliessalian  cavalry,  he  encountered  the  Phokians  in  a  battle  in 
jj  ,  .  .  which  Onomarchos  was  slain  with,  it  is  said,  6,000 
Onomarchos  of  his  men.  Philip  was  thus  the  victorious  chamjuoii 
Afa^S.*'^    of  the  Delphian   god,  and  the  master  also   of   IMierai, 

352  B.C.  which  Lykophron,  deprived  of  Phokian  aid,  was  com- 
pelled to  surrender.  Never  lingering  when  there  was  work  to  be 
done,  lie  hastened  to  besiege  Pagasai,  the  only  maritime  inlet  of 
Thessalian  trade.  Once  more  a  prayer  for  help  came  to  Athens, 
and  this  time  it  was  heard.  The  people  resolved  that  a  force 
should  be  sent.  They  kept  their  word,  but  it  came  too  late.  Phi- 
lip was  already  master  of  the  mercantile  marine  which  filled  the 
harbor,  master  of  the  large  revemies  arising  from  the  import  and 
expoit  duties  collected  there,  and  master  of  a  singularly  strong  po- 
sition from  which  liis  privateers  might  issue  for  the  annoyance  of 
the  Athenian  coasts  and  the  destruction  of  Athenian  trading  ships. 
Tliis  con(]uest  alone  might  well  excite  both  fear  and  anger  in  a 
people  who  could  at  least  look  back  upon  a  splendid  pa.st  ;  but 
■when  it  became  known  that  J^hilip  had  actually  reached  Ther- 
mopylai  and  that  this  narrow  inlet  into  Southern  Hellas   was  all 


CUAP.  II.]  PHILIP   OF   MACEDON.  607 

that  remained  to  save  Attica  itself  from  the  ravage  of  his  armies, 
the  limits  of  Athenian  forbearance  were  reached.  Rating  at  its 
true  vahio  the  pretence  that  he  came  as  the  cliampion  Portificatiou 
of  iVpollon  to  purge  his  temple  of  sacrilegious  in-  pyiaibyth'e 
vaders,  they  sent  out  under  Nausikles  a  powerful  Athenians, 
force,  which  so  rapidly  reached  and  so  effectually  fortified  the 
pals  that  Philip  gave  up  all  thought  of  attacking  it. 

Nothing  more,  we  might  suppose,  could  be  needed  to  convince 
them  that  there  was  but  one  way  of  dealing  with  this  indefatigable 
aggressor,  and  that  this  mode  lay  in  that  promptitude  •jjg.joj.tof 
and  vigor  of  action  which  could  be  secured  only  by  Philip's  ill- 
large  personal  self-sacrifice.  Opportunity  after  oppor-  death^° 
tunity  for  checking  his  career  had  been  allowed  to  slip,  351  b.c. 
and  they  had  already  suft'ered  his  power  to  reach  a  dangerous 
height :  but  they  should  now  at  least  have  learnt  the  lesson  that 
Athens  could  hold  her  own  only  by  steady  unintermitted  watch- 
fulness, and  by  the  constant  readiness  of  her  citizens  to  midcrgo 
the  hardships  of  warfare  whether  against  Philip  or  in  case  of  his 
death  against  those  who  might  take  his  place.  At  tiie  least  their 
experience  at  Thermopylai  should  have  taught  them  that  the  em- 
ployment of  mercenaries  under  professional  condottieri  was  not 
merely  a  crime  but  a  blunder,  and  tluit  the}^  were  but  playing 
their  enemy's  game  in  making  use  of  men  whose  wages  were  most 
irregularly  paid,  and  sometimes  not  paid  at  all,  and  who  therefore 
became  a  terror  rather  to  their  allies  than  to  their  adversaries. 
Events  were  soon  to  show  how  far  they  had  learnt  the  lesson. 
Not  many  months  had  passed  before  the  tidings  that  Philip  was 
besieging  Ileraion  Teichos  (the  wall  of  Here)  near  the  Thrakian 
Chersonesos  renewed  at  Athens  the  feeling  of  lively  alarm.  The 
people  again  resolved  on  vigorous  measures  ;  but  Heraion  Teichos 
was  more  distant  than  Thermopylai,  and  more  time  was  allowed  to 
slip  by  in  the  task  of  preparation.  In  the  meanwhile  reports  came 
first  that  Philip  was  ill,  then  that  he  was  dead.  The  first  report 
was  true,  the  second  false  :  but  the  Athenians  could  not  be  brought 
to  see  that  if  even  his  death  should  have  furnished  a  strong  reason 
for  immediate  action,  his  illness  made  the  same  course  even  more 
imperatively  necessary.  Now,  if  ever,  we  might  have  supposed 
that  men  like  Phokion  would  have  urged  them  vehemently  not  to 
let  the  grass  grow  under  their  feet ;  but  Phokion  either  was  silent 
or  fostered  the  delusion  that  they  miglit  safely  fold  their  bands 
and  rest.  One  man  only  had  the  wisdom  to  see  and  the  courage 
to  tell  them  that  with  their  present  temper  and  habits  they  would 
soon  raise  up  against  themselves  another  Philip,  even  if  the 
Philip  whom  they  had  scared  away  from  Thermopylai  should  be 
dead. 


608  THE  KINGS  OF  MACEDON.  [Book  V. 

That  man  was  Demosthenes,  a  man  who  from  the  first  braced 
himself  to  tlie  hardest  of  all  tasks, — the  guiding,  namely,  of  a 
BejnnniiK'  of  ^^'^^^le  people  in  a  path  which  had  become  intensely  irk- 
the  public  some  and  tedious  to  them.  No  loftier  image  of  duty 
mosthenes.  cheerfully  faced  and  in  spite  of  a  thousand  temptations 
353  Bc.  to  easiness  and  sloth  resolutely  discharged  has  ever 
been  furnished  by  statesmen  of  any  age  or  country.  As  compared 
with  a  man  like  Phokion,  he  liad  good  reason,  and,  it  might  bc 
thought,  full  justification  for  taking  the  easier  course.  AVholly 
lacking  the  great  bodily  strength  of  that  popular  general,  conscious 
probably  that  a  weakly  constitution  left  to  liim  no  great  powers 
of  physical  endurance,  and  knowing  certainly  that  he  could  pre- 
tend to  no  special  military  genius,  lie  yet  deliberately  rejected  the 
policy  by  which  Phokion  earned  the  favor  of  the  people,  and  he 
did  so  because,  even  before  he  knew  in  what  quarter  the  real  dan- 
ger lay,  he  saw  the  signs  of  the  fatal  disease  which  was  paralysing 
the  whole  body  of  the  state.  With  all  the  enthusiasm  and  the 
self-devotion  of  Sokrates,  he  consecrated  his  life  to  a  Avork  com- 
parable strictly  to  that  of  the  physician  who  can  save  his  patient's 
life  only  by  putting  him  to  excruciating  pain.  Soon  convinced 
that  he  had  undertaken  the  mission  of  Kasandra,  he  allowed  no 
failure  to  damp  his  energy,  and  was  contentto  toil  on  in  his  thank- 
less task,  although  he  knew  that  every  false  step  (and  at  this  time 
the  Athenians  seldom  took  a  step  which  was  not  false)  rendered 
it  more  difficult  to  apply  his  remedies  and  more  rash  to  look  for 
any  real  benefit  from  them.  Once  only  in  his  whole  career  were 
the  eyes  of  the  Athenians  opened  fully  to  the  stern  realities  which 
had  thrown  for  years  their  dark  shadows  across  his  mind  ;  and 
then  also,  the  burst  of  zeal  awakened  by  liis  words  and  by  the  over- 
powering dangers  of  the  situation  came  altogether  too  late.  Thus 
Demosthenes  had  practically  to  go  through  life  in  a  solitude  which 
may  well  be  called  appalling,* — seeing  that  the  danger  to  Athens 
and  to  Hellas  generally  lay  in  the  aggrandisement  of  Philip  as 
clearly  as  William  of  Orange  discerned  the  ends  for  which 
Lewis  XIV.  was  striving  and  plotting,  yet  unable  to  convince 
his  hearers  that  his  fears  had  any  solid  foundation. 

Left  at  the  age  of  seven  years  on  his  father's  death  the  heir  to 
great  wealth,  Demosthenes  found  on  reaching  the  age  of  citizen- 
Early  life  ship  that  the  neglect  and  dishonesty  of  his  guardians 
and  tniining  ],.jj  reduced  his  patrimony  to  a  })ittance.  With  such 
thenes.  instruction    as  he  could  get  from  teachers  of  rhetoric, 

the  boy  was  compelled  to  appear  before  a  jury  court  of  his 
countrymen  and  plead  his  own  cause.  He  gained  the  verdict 
which  lie  desired  ;  and  if  ho  found  that  even  this  verdict  was  in- 


CnAP.  II.J  PHILIP   OF  MACEDON.  f)09 

efiectual  ao-ainst  the  hard-hearted  men  who  liad  robbed  him,  still 
it  taught  him  once  for  all  how  great  a  power  for  good  or  evil  was 
wielded  by  the  orator.  But  for  the  present  it  left  him  also  with 
an  overpowering  sense  of  his  deficiency  as  a  speaker.  He  could 
make  no  boast  of  bodily  strength  ;  the  Muse  of  Eloquence  had 
endowed  him  neither  with  richness  of  voice  nor  Avith  readiness  of 
utterance.  The  Phalerean  Demetrios  speaks  of  the  orator  in  his 
later  years  as  telling  him  that  he  corrected  his  stammering  speech 
by , declaiming  with  pebbles  in  his  mouth,  and  the  defects  of  his 
elocution  by  practising  long  periods  at  running  speed,  while  he 
overcame  the  rudeness  of  his  action  by  watcliing  his  gestures  in  a 
mirror.  Whether  Demosthenes,  towards  the  close  of  his  career, 
may  have  exaggerated  unconsciously  the  difliculLies  with  which 
he  had  to  contend  in  liis  youth,  we  cannot  say.  The  story  went 
that  constant  declamation  on  the  sea  shore  removed  altogether 
the  nervousness  which  he  had  felt  in  facing  a  formidable  or  un- 
ruly asseniblv,  and' that  he  completed  his  training  by  shutting 
liim-ielf  up  for  months  in  an  underground  chamber  with  half  his 
hair  shaved  off  by  way  of  guarding  against  any  temptations  to 
show  himself  in  public.  But  whatever  his  difficulties  may  have 
been,  svo  know  that  they  were  bravely  overcome,  and  that  the 
instruction  of  the  rhetor  Isaios  and  the  teaching,  still  more  valua- 
ble perhaps,  of  the  tragic  actor  Satyros,  were  supplemented  by  his 
unwearied  study  of  the  history  of  Thucydides.  Eight  times,  ac- 
cording to  one  story,  he  wrote  out  the  whole  of  it ;  according  to 
another,  he  learnt  it  all  by  heart.  But  however  this  may  be,  the 
Thriasiaii  Eunoraos  judged  rightly  when  he  cheered  the  youthful 
speaker  in  his  most  desponding  moments  by  telling  him  that  of 
all  later  Athenians  he  approached  most  nearly  to  the  model  of 
Pcrikles.  How  thoroughly  he  had  imbibed  the  spirit  and  wisdom 
of  that  (Treat  man  and  of  his  not  less  illustrious  liistorian,  his 
whole  career  furnishes  abundant  evidence.  For  the  restoration 
of  the  old  Athe  liau  empire  he  knew  that  it  was  useless  to  hope  ; 
and  dealing  honestly  with  present  circumstances  he  acknowledged 
that  in  the  interest  of  Athens  both  Thebes  and  Sparta  ought  to  be 
kept  weak,  and  contended  that  Athens  ought  to  reject  without 
hesitation  the  Spartan  request  for  aid  against  Megalopolis  and 
Messene.  No  bribe  which  promised  to  the  Athenians  the  restora- 
tion of  Oropos  should  induce  them  to  lend  a  hand  in  breaking  the 
fetters  which  Epameinondas  had  placed  on  the  limbs  of  their  ancient 
enemies.  They  should,  rather,  be  ready  to  take  those  cities  under 
their  own  protection,  or  even  to  ally  themselves  with  the  Thebans 
in  their  defence.  Nor  can  it  be  denied  that,  as  things  went,  he 
was  right.  It  was  this  conviction  which  led  him  in  liis  first 
pubUc  speeches  before  the  Assembly  to  quiet  the  fears  of  Persian 
26* 


610  THE  KINGS  OP  MACEDON.  [Book  V- 

invasion  which  disturbed  the  people  at  the  close  of  the  Social 
War,  and  more  particularly  (in  contrast  Avith  the  day-dreams  of 
Isokrates)  to  dissuade  them  from  all  acts  wliich  might  give  the 
Persian  king  a  provocation  to  war.  Such  a  war,  he  insisted, 
would  be  interpreted  instantly  by  the  Greek  states  hostile  to  or 
jealous  of  Atliens  as  an  evidence  of  liis  kindly  feeling  towards 
themselves ;  nor  did  the  bitterness  of  this  sarcasm  one  Avhit  ex- 
ceed its  truth.  In  any  case,  the  one  thing  of  paramount  impor- 
tance was  that  her  citizens  should  be  ready  to  serve  in  their  own 
persons,  and  freely  to  stint  or  even  to  sacrifice  the  pleasures  and 
luxuries  of  their  city  life.  Nor  could  they  need  any  further  evi- 
dence to  assure  them  of  this  than  the  fact  that  whenever  the 
Athenian  people  acted  jointly,  resolutely,  and  instantly,  there  had 
been  no  instance  of  failure,  and  whenever  they  shrank  from  such 
action,  no  instance  of  success. 

But  the  noxious  plant  of  treachery,  which  revealed  its  deadly 
power  at  Aigospotamoi,  had  from  that  time  taken  firm  root  in 
^       .,.         Athenian  soil,  and  found  there  a  cono-enial  atmosphere. 

Opposition        ,  ..,,.,.  ''i  '• 

of^schines  At  no  1*ime  in  Athenian  history  was  there  a  greater 
to  ti^^policy  rieed  of  upright  and  incorruptible  statesmen  ;  at  no 
of  Bemosthe-  time  was  Athens  cursed  with  a  treason  so  insidious,  so 
"^^'  persistent,  and  so  ruinous  as  that  of  ^Eschines.     That 

treason  was  still  a  thing  of  the  future,  and  ^Eschines  was  yet  to 
display  something  like  the  patriotism  of  Wentworth  in  the  English 
House  of  Commons  before  the  fascination  of  Philip,  like  that  of 
Charles  the  First,  should  convert  him  into  a  traitor  as  dangerous 
as  the  Strafford  of  the  House  of  Lords.  But  among  men  of  the 
oligarchical  party  wlio  had  never  brought  themselves  to  acquiesce 
cheerfully  in  the  rule  of  the  people,  there  were  not  wanting  many 
in  whom  a  statesman  as  politic  and  crafty  as  Philip  would  even  with- 
out direct  bribery  find  most  convenient  tools.  Such  men  as  these 
opposed  more  than  a  passive  resistance  to  the  scheme  by  which 
Demosthenes  proposed  to  put  an  elfectnal  check  on  the  aggrandise- 
ment of  the  Makcdonian  king.  The  Athenians  must  have  two 
fleets  and  two  armies  to  serve  with  those  fleets.  The  one  must  be 
kept  in  reserve,  ready  to  be  called  out  at  a  moment's  notice,  to 
meet  liim  at  any  point  where  he  might  present  himself  as  an 
aggressor,  or  where  there  was  reason  for  supposing  that  lie  meant 
to  strike  a  sudden  and  unforeseen  blow  :  the  other  should  be  sent 
out  with  ample  equii>ments  and  funds  to  carry  the  war  into  his 
own  territory,  and  to  keep  him  fully  occupied  and  even  distracted 
with  the  multiplicity  and  the  constancy  of  their  attacks.  To 
carry  out  this  plan  there  was  need  botli  of  men  and  money.  The 
men  must  be  the  citizens  of  Athens  themselves ;  the  money  must 
be  supplied  by  a  self-denial  certainly  not  in  excess  of  their  powers. 


Chap.  II.]  PHILIP  OP  MACEDON.  611 

They  must  spend  less  time  and  money  on  their  festivals,  and  with 
their  generals  they  must  give  themselves  to  the  hard  work  which 
had  made  Athens  great  after  the  humiliation  of  Xerxes.  The 
plan  proposed  involved  no  impossible  effort ;  but  the  self-denial 
which  it  imposed  was  unpleasant,  and  a  man  so  honest  and  brave 
as  Phokion  saw  no  need  of  putting  on  them  this  heavy  burden. 
Philip,  if  not  dead,  was  sick  ;  and  if  he  was  not  sick,  he  spoke  of 
hinaself  as  a  friend  who  courted  only  their  hearty  alliance.  It  was 
not  a  man  like  Phokion  who  could  see  from  the  beginning  the 
course  which  things  were  likely  to  take,  and  which  under  certain 
conditions  they  must  take.  If  he  had  seen  it,  we  may  perhaps  give 
him  credit  for  an  honesty  which  would  have  impelled  him  to  ex- 
press his  convictions.  Demosthenes  had  both  the  foresight  and  the 
honesty  ;  and  he  had  to  bear  silently  the  pain  which  he  felt  when, 
his  own  proposals  having  been  rejected,  his  countrymen 
contented  themselves  with  sending  to  the  Chersonesos 
the  Condottiero  Charidemos  with  a  little  money  and  with  ten  tri- 
remes which  he  was  to  fill  as  best  he  could  with  mercenaries. 

The  kindly  feelings  of  Philip  for  the  Athenians  and  for  the 
Hellenes  generally  were  now  to  be  shown  in  his  conduct  to  the 
Olvnthians.     With  these   he  had  contracted  an  alii-    _     . 

J  KornissiiGSS 

ance  cemented  by  the  cession  of  Potidaia  and  An  the-  of  theAthe- 
mous.  But  when- that  agreenient  was  made,  Athens  "glia^d^o 
was  still  a  state  whose  power  might  be  felt  on  the  oiynthos. 
Thermaic  gulf.  With  the  fall  of  Methono  she  ceased 
to  be  an  object  of  dread  ;  and  to  fall  from  this  high  state  was 
commonly,  for  Hellenic  cities,  much  the  same  as  becoming  an 
object  of  love  to  their  former  enemies.  There  had  been  a  time 
when  the  formation  of  a  true  Hellenic  confederacy,  with  Oiynthos 
at  its  head,  nay,  even  of  a  true  Greek  nation,  might  have  seemed, 
to  say  the  least,  just  possible.  The  deadly  enmity  of  Sparta  had 
long  since  scattered  that  hope  to  the  winds  ;'  and  the  gallantry 
which  prompted  that  effort  was  never  again  seen  among  the 
Olynthians,  perhaps  never  again  felt.  But  although  the  wealthier 
citizens  might  reap  benefits  many  and  great  from  a  connexion  with 
Philip,  although  through  hini  they  might  amass  wealth  from  Thra- 
kian  forests  and  mines,  and  although  they  might  find  it  easy  to  con- 
done his  assaults  on  other  cities  for  liis  professions  of  friendship  to 
themselves,  the  main  body  of  the  Olynthian  people  was  not  to  be 
thus  cheated.  For  these  Athens  remained  the  only  refuge  ;  and 
the  memory  of  past  wrongs  was  not  allowed  to  interfere  with  the 
resolution  to  ask  her  aid.  That  prayer  was  supported  by  Demos- 
thenes,^ who  placed  in  sharp  contrast  their  present  inertness  with  the 

'  See  p.  568.  stands  second  iu  the  edited  order. 

'^  In  the  Olynthiac  oration,  which     This  oration  says  little  or  nothing 


612  THE  KINGS  OF  MACEDON.  fBooK  V. 

energy  of  their  forefathers  and  the  restless  activity  of  Philip.  The 
alliance  Avas  accepted,  but  in  true  accordance  Avith  modern  Athe- 
nian habits  no  effectual  aid  yvas  sent ;  and  an  arrangeniont  which 
the  Olynthians  made  without  any  intention  of  offering  direct  pro- 
vocation to  Philip  was  construed  by  him  as  a  deliberate  offence. 

It  was  not  long  before  Demosthenes  was  compelled  to  address 
his  countrymen  on  behalf  of  Olynthos  not  as  a  city  with  which 
Repeated  friendship  was  a  matter  of  good  policy,  but  as  one  which, 
Dcmosfhe°^  if  Conquered,  would  leave  Philip  free  to  turn  his  arms 
nes.  against  Attica  itself.     Again   he  repeated  the  advice 

which  had  been  already  rejected.  If  tJiey  were  wise  men,  they 
would  at  once  see  the  paramount  need  of  two  forces,  of  which  the 
one  should  be  sent  to  defend  Olynthos,  while  the  other  should  dis- 
tract his  attention  by  attacking  him  elsewhere.  These  two  mea- 
sures, carried  out  together,  would  insure  success  ;  neither  by  itself 
would  be  of  much  use.  In  the  matter  of  ways  and  means  he 
would  say  only  that  money  nuist  be  found,  and  that  the  existing 
law  respecting  the  Theoric  Fund,  whatever  might  be  its  intrinsic 
justice  or  value,  could  not  in  the  least  alter  the  exigen- 
350  B.C.  ^y  ^^£  ^|j^  case.  Again  he  spoke  to  deaf  ears,  for  it 
cannot  be  said  that  the  sending  of  a  mercenary  force,  without 
funds  to  pay  them,  was  any  substantial  compliance  with  his  ad- 
vice. Such  as  it  was,  this  force  gained  some  advantages  over 
Philip,  which  seem  to  have  been  treated  at  Athens  as  a  splendid 
victory  ;  and  it  became  the  duty  of  Demosthenes  to  warn  them 
against  the  folly  of  thinking  that  their  work  was  at  an  end.  So  far 
as  Philip  was  concerned,  defeat,  however  severe  (and  there  was  no 
reason  for  supposing  that  the  present  one  was  really  severe),  would 
be  simply  a  sickness  which  might  interrupt  his  action  but  would 
not  paralyse  his  energy  ;  and  they  would  only  be  cheating  them- 
selves if  they  chose  to  fancy  the  contrary.  For  the  breathing 
time  which  their  victory  might  give  them  they  might  be  thankful  ; 
but  it  should  at  the  same  time  spur  them  on  to  redoubled  efforts. 
The  crisis  was  really  not  less  urgent ;  and  their  business  was  to 
appoint  Nomothetai  who  might  remove  any  laws  pertaining  to  the 
Theoric  Fund  or  to  military  service  which  they  might  find  to  be 
injurious  to  the  true  interests  of  the  state. 

That  this  last  proposal  was  not  adopted,  there  can  be  no  doubt. 
The  attention  of  the  Athenians  was,  perha})s,  too  soon  distracted 
by  the  revolt  of  Euboia,  which  had  been  now  for  about  eight  years 
in  alliance  with  them.     Here,  too,  the  partisans  of  Philip  had  been 

about  tbepower  of  Pliilip,  nordoes  liance  which  might  serve  to  keep 

it  even  npeak  of  the  Olynthians  as  Philip  in  eflFectual  check.     It  seems 

hardly  pressed.     It  merely  urjjos  imjio.ssible  to  ascribo  this  oration  to 

the  need  of  ombracinfj  an  opportn-  any  later  time, 
nity,  thus  ofiFered  to  them,  of  an  al- 


Chap.  II.] 


PHILIP  OF  MACEDON. 


613 


busy.     Among  these  Ploutarchos  of  Eretria,  under  tbe  guise   of 
frioudsliip   for   Athens,   besought  her   aid.     Phokion   Revolt  of 
landed  ou  the  islaud  only  to  find  that  Ploutarchos  was   Euboiafrom 

1  Ml  Alliens. 

a  traitor  ;  but  his  skill  as  a  general  averted  the  catas-  349  b.c. 
troplie,  and  the  Athenians  were  gladdened  by  the  tiding-s  (brought 
to  them  by  ^schines,  who  had  here  distinguished  liimself)  of  a 
victory  won  at  Tamynai.  For  the  present  the  war  in  Euboia, 
which  dragged  its  weary  length  for  nearly  three  years,  did  little 
morfe  than  furnish  to  Meidias  an  excuse  for  brutally  assaulting 
Demosthenes  at  the  great  Dionysian  festival,  and  to  others  a  plea 
for  abusing  him  as  a  deserter. 

In  the  Chalkidic  peninsula  the  Athenians  behaved  more  vigor- 
ously, and  the  result  naturally  was  a  more  pressing  need  for  money. 
Demosthenes  had  said  that  under  the  existing  laws  no  ppoposition 
man  would  be  found  rash  enough  to  incur  the  risk  of  of  Apollodo- 
a  charge  for  illegal  procedure'  by  making  any  direct  in^thtTThel 
motion  with  regard  to  the  Theoric  Fund.  Apollo-  one  Fund, 
doros,  one  of  the  senators,  Avas,  it  seems,  more  courageous  ;  and  the 


'  The  Graplie  Paranomon.  Tliis 
suit  might  be  brought  at  any  time 
within  the  period  of  twelve  months 
against  the  proposer  of  any  law,  if 
his  measure  should  be  found  to  be 
in  antagonism  with  any  existing 
law.  If  the  charge  was  not 
brought  within  the  year,  the  pro- 
poser was  scathless ;  but  his  law 
might  be  indicted  and  condemned, 
the  distinction  being  drawn  by  the 
preposition  employed  before  the 
name  of  the  accused,  Kara  'Apcaro- 
K/HiTovg  denoting  a  suit  in  wliich 
the  proposer  was  personally  liable, 
TTpog  AETrrivrjv,  marking  a  prosecu- 
tion brought  after  the  lapse  of 
more  than  one  year.  Tlius  the  bur- 
den was  laid  upon  the  legislator 
not  only  of  taking  care  that  his  own 
measure  was  good  and  wholesome, 
but  of  seeing  that  it  contradicted 
no  existing  enactments. 

In  favor  of  ijWs  usage  it  may  bo 
argued  that  it  rendered  impossible 
the  massing  of  vast  mountains  of  le- 
gislation (as  in  the  case  of  the  Eng- 
lish statutes),  of  which  few  may 
say  how  much  is  inforce,howmucli 
obsolete,  how  much  formally  re- 
pealed ;  and  that  it  left  no  room  for 
that  not  very  grateful  portion  of  the 
labors  of  English  judges,  which 
consists  in  so  far  explaining  away 


inconsistencies  and  contradictions 
as  to  give  to  the  general  body  of 
statutes  an  appearance  of  harmony 
which  they  do  not  possess. 

In  point  of  fact,  the  usages 
thus  sanctioned  are  certainly  not 
amongst  the  most  creditable  fea- 
tures of  the  Athenian  constitution. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the 
original  intention  was  to  confine 
these  suits  to  cases  of  formal  contra- 
diction between  new  and  old  enact- 
ments ;  and  thus  far  it  might  be 
urged  that  little  hardship  was  in- 
flicted on  the  proposers  of  new  laws. 
The  case  was  altered  when  the  in- 
consistence was  said  to  lie  not  in  the 
letter  but  in  the  spirit  of  the  two 
laws,  and  when,  further,  the  plea 
of  illegality  in  thecarrying  of  alaw 
was  made  an  excuse  for  running 
off  into  general  reviews  of  the  po- 
litical career  of  statesmen,  and 
holding  them  up  as  fit  objects  for 
the  contempt  or  hatred  of  the  peo- 
ple. Such  an  abuse  of  this  charge 
of  illegal  legislation  brought  by 
iEschines  nominally  against  Kte- 
siphon  called  forth  from  Demos- 
thenes the  most  splendid  speech  of 
his  own  and  perhaps  of  any  other 
age  ;  but  it  is  not  a  little  to  the 
discredit  of  the  professedly  legis- 
lative processes  at  Athens  that  such 


61i 


THE  KINGS  OF  MACEDON. 


[Book  V. 


wliole  senate,  we  are  told,  unanimously  adopting  his  proposal, 
gave  liini  leave  to  submit  to  the  people  a  vote  which,  after  the  pay- 
ment of  the  sums  needed  for  the  jieace  establishment,  would  de- 
vote all  surplus  revenue  to  the  support  of  the  war  instead  of  to  the 
Theoric  Fund.  The  Demos  also,  it  is  said,  accepted  the  plan  with 
enthusiasm,  although  we  can  scarcely  suppose  that  the  Makedonian 
party  would  be  so  cowed  as  to  register  not  a  single  opposing  vote. 
But  as  the  law  stood,  the  proposal  was  undeniably  illegal;  and 
under  the  usual  writ  in  such  cases,  obtained  by  a  citizen  named 
Stephanos,  ApoUodoros  was  tried  and  condemned  to  a  fine  which, 
it  seems,  was  actually  paid.  Thus  again  was  a  Avar  starved,  the 
vigorous  maintenance  of  which  was  of  vital  moment  not  only  to  the 
welfare  but  even  to  the  existence  of  Athens.' 

pnlsivenessof  the  Athenian  Demos 
be  not  the  least  tenable  of  all.  It 
resolves  itself  simply  into  the  as- 
sertion that  the  Athenians  could 
not  be  brought  to  regard  them- 
selves as  responsible  for  their  own 
decisions  and  their  own  acts.  This 
dangerous,  if  not  fatal,  fault  is  seen 
repeatedly  in  their  history.  It  is 
disgracefully  prominent  in  their 
dealings  with  Mihiades,  p.  159  ;  it 
comes  out  wretchedly  in  the  de- 
bates about  Sphakteria,  p.  323,  as 
well  as  after  the  catastrophe  at 
Syracuse,  p.  412.  In  the  same 
fashion,  when  they  came  to  see 
that  the  execution  of  the  six  gene- 
rals, p.  473,  was  a  mere  murder, 
the  Demos  wished  to  punish  their 
advisers  ;  and  the  Graphe  Parano- 
mon  was  little  more  than  a  device 
for  thus  shifting  on  others  the  re- 
sponsibility which,  by  approving 
their  counsel  or  passing  an  enact- 
ment proposed  by  them,  the  people 
had  really  taken  upon  themselves. 
'  It  is  obvious  that  the  people 
would  beset  against  this  diversion 
of  the  Theoric  Fund,  if  it  became 
clear  that  the  measure  was  urged 
by  the  wealthier  citizens  as  a  de- 
vice for  freeing  themselves  from 
direct  taxation.  This  was  no  part  of 
the  scheme  of  Demosthenes,  whose 
mind  was  si't  on  tliri'e  things, — 
the  support  of  the  army  by  the  per- 
sonal service  of  the  citizens,  the 
maintenance  of  tlie  revenue  both 
by  direct  and  indirect  taxation,  and 
the  reservation,  for  purposes  of  war, 


an  occasion  should  have  been  fur- 
nished at  all. 

In  truth,  it  is  not  easy  to  discover 
a  valid  defence  of  the  practice. 
Mr.  Grote  regards  it  as  having 
been  rendered  necessary  at  Athens 
by  the  impulsiveness  of  the  De- 
mos, which  needed  to  be  guarded 
against  being  led  away  by  the  elo- 
quence or  the  enthusiasm  of  their 
orators.  On  this  Sir  Robert  Collier 
justly  remarks,  'Whether  this  is 
in  eifect  an  argument  in  favor  of 
the  GrapJie  Paranomon,  or  against 
the  Athenian  democracy,  may  ad- 
mit of  question.'  {Translation  of 
the  Oratioa  of  Demosthenes  on  the 
Croicn,  Pref.,  p.  x.)  This  is  the 
very  least  that  can  be  said  ;  nor 
can  Sir  E.  Collier  be  charged  with 
any  undue  severity  of  criticism 
when  he  adds  that  the  Graphe 
Paranomon  became  '  an  engine  of 
warfare  wielded  against  each  other 
by  political  partisans,  who,  as  they 
became  ascendant  in  turn,  indicted, 
almost  as  a  matter  of  course,  their 
principal  opponents'  {ih.).  The  case 
of  ApoUodoros  is  a  signal  instance 
of  this ;  but  the  privilege  was 
never  more  grossly  abused  than  in 
the  case  of  the  generals  who  were 
victorious  at  Argennoussai  (see  pp. 
470-472).  It  is  not  too  much  to 
say  that  this  utterly  discreditable 
manoeuvre  sealed  the  doom  not 
merely  of  the  generals  but  of 
Athens  itself ;  and  it  may  fairly  be 
doubted  whether  the  plea,  in  favor 
of  the  practice,  based  on  the   im- 


Chap.  II.]  PHILIP  OP  MACEDON.  615 

Of  the  various  steps  wliicn  led  to  the  great   catastrophe  not 
much  is  known ;  nor  would  there,   perhaps,   be   much  profit    in 
dwelling  on  incidents  which  would  only  show  how  well  Athenian 
slackness    and    procrastination    played     into    Philip's      pan  of 
hands.     Three  years  had  passed  away  from  the  time      oiynthos. 
when  he  openly  declared  war  on   Oiynthos   before  the   city   was 
taken.     During  these  years,  or  during  the  last  two  of  them,  he 
had  seized  thirty-two  Chalkidic  cities,  all  of  Avhich,  perhaps,  were 
treated    not    less    severely   than   Oiynthos.     Uere  tlie 
people  were  all  sold  into  slavery,  and  the  town  itself,         '  ^''^' 
it  is  said,  was  dismantled.     This  great  peninsula,  once   so   busy 
with  Greek  industry  in  its  most  attractive  forms,  was  now  a  desert 
in  whicli  sliattered  walls  and  crumbling  houses  attested  the  an- 
cient greatness  of  cities  inhabited   only  by  slaves  to   produce   a 
revenue  for  their  lords. 

The  tidings  of  the  fall  of  Oiynthos  excited  at  Athens  feelings 
both  of  indignation  and  of  grief.  Not  a  few  Athenian  citizens 
found  in  the  city  were  now  in  slavery,  while  others,  Temporary 
settled  in  the  Thrakian  Chersonesos,  were  makino;  J^S'^emeut 
their  way  home,  well  knowing  that  nothing  remained  ^Eschines 
to  save  them  from  the  grasp  of  Philip.  For  the  then?.!"""'' 
moment  the  thoughts  of  the  Athenians  turned  to  the  348-7  b.c. 
formation  of  a  Pan-IIellenic  confederacy,  and  ^-Eschines  was  sent 
with  otlier  envoys  into  Peloponncsos.  From  the  Ten  Thousand  at 
Megalopolis  his  pictures  of  Philip's  iniquities  drew  forth  sympathy 
and  some  vague  promises  of  help  ;  and  his  own  indignation  against 
that  subtle  leader  was  increased  by  seeing  on  his  return  to  Athens 
the  files  of  Greek  captives  from  Chalkidike  wliom  their  fellow- 
Greeks  were  driving  before  them  to  slavery.  But  however  intense 
may  have  been  their  feelings  of  pain  and  anger,  ^Eschines  could 
not  shut  his  eyes  to  the  dangers  of  protracted  warfare  ;  and  it 
must  be  admitted  tliat  at  this  moment  his  convictions  were  shared 
by  Demosthenes.  It  was  clear  that  not  much  help  could  be 
looked  for  from  Peloponnesian  allies,  while  there  seemed  to  be  im- 
minent danger  that  Philip  might  become  master  of  Thermoj^ylai. 

Wearied  out  with  a  struggle'  which  they  found  themselves 
unable  to  bring  to  an  end  by  their  own  strength,  the  Thebans 
had  resolved  to  call  in  the  aid  of  Philip,  and   Philip   «„■„„„    - 

^_  111  1       Aiiuiuce  oi 

was  only  too  ready  to  give  it,  and  tlms  to  become  the  Philip  witii 
recognised  leader  of  a  crusade  to  avenge  the  wrongs  of  "^  e^ans. 
ApoUon.  Throughout  Phokis  this  news  spread  dismay  ;  and  an 
embassy  to  Athens,  beseeching  help,  roused  there  the  energy  which 
had  long  been  slumbering.  But  when  the  Athenian  general  ap- 
peared to  take  possession  of  the  pass,  he  found  that  the  invitation 
of  the  surplus  remaining  after  the  ordinary  peace  establishment, 
disbursements   necessary  for    the         '  See  p.  606. 


616  THE  KINGS  OF  MACEDON.  [Book  V. 

had  come  from  a  party  not  in  power,  and  that  his  interference 
only  roused  the  wrath  of  the  Phokian  chief,  Phalaikos.  This 
man  was  the  son  of  Onomarchos,  the  second  of  the  four  Phokian 
leaders  during  the  Sacred  War,  and  had  become  general  or  tyrant 
four  years  before  on  the  death  of  Phayllos.  Tliat  his  refusal  to 
receive  the  Athenians  as  guardians  of  Thermopylai  was  prompted 
by  no  desire  to  come  to  terms  with  Philip  is  clear  from  the  fact 
that  he  protracted  the  struggle  for  ten  months  longer,  and  then 
made  his  submission  only  because  he  was  led  to  believe  that  Ath- 
ens had  pledged  herself  to  carry  out,  by  force  if  need  be,  the  de 
signs  of  Philip.  But  to  the  Athenians,  who  knew  only  that  the 
conduct  of  Phalaikos  was  evidence  of  his  ill-will  and  dislike  to- 
wards themselves,  and  who  could  not  be  sure  of  his  feelings  to- 
wards Philip,  the  slight  thus  put  upon  them  seemed  to  justify  the 
strongest  suspicions. 

For  the  present,  it  seemed  thai  no  better  mode  of  dealing  with 
the  matter  could  be  found  than  by  arranging  a  peace  ^vith  Philip,  to 
,,.   .       ^      whom   overtures   had    been    made    already.       Eleven 

Mission  of  ,         c  ji        ..1        •  p  "li     •         !!• 

^schines  envovs,  ten  from  the  Athenians,  one  irom  their  allies, 
envovs'to'^  were  accordingly  sent,  to  ascertain  the  terms  on  which 
Philip.  a  treaty  could   be  made.     The   wily   Makedonian   was 

well  aware  that  negotiations  carried  on  in  his  own 
presence  were  vastly  more  to  his  interest  than  negotiations  carried 
on  at  Athens ;  and  he  might  well  hope  to  find  new  converts 
among  the  envoys,  of  whom  three  were  already  his  devoted  ser- 
vants. This  hope  was  realised,  and  realised  to  the  ruin  of  Athens 
and  to  the  destruction  of  Hellenic  freedom  and  independence,  if, 
since  the  days  of  Aigospotainoi,  such  things  could  be  said  to  exist. 
The  story  of  this  first  embassy  comes  to  us  almost  wholly  from 
^schines,  and  it  is  impussible  to  say  how  far  the  motives  by  which 
Conversion  he  vvas  actuated  when  telling  the  tale  may  have  led 
of ^^schi-  j^-j^  ^^  garble  or  to  falsify  it.  '  Certain  it  is  that  the 
man  who  went  with  feelings  or  professions  of  righteous  wrath 
returned  with  sentiments  of  enthusiastic  admiration  for  the  prince 
-V  whom  he  had  denounced  as  the  common  enemy  of  Hellas,  and 
that  from  this  time  forth  he  steadily  played  that  despot's  game. 
Whether  his  ears  had  caught  the  Seiren's  strain  before  he  left 
Athens,  it  is  perhaps  impossible  to  determine  ;  l)ut  if  we  accept  the 
yersion  Avhicli  he  has  given  us  as  a  true  report  of  the  speech  which 
he  made  to  Philip,  we  may  fairly  suspect  that  he  was  already  under 
— ^he  spell  before  he  crossed  the  Makedonian  border.  It  seems  in- 
credible that  a  man  of  common  sense  and  common  honesty,  seek- 
ing earnestly  to  advance  the  interests  of  his  country,  should  con- 
front a  conqueror  in  the  full  tide  of  victoiy  with  a  demand  utter- 
ly   extravagant   and   preposterous.      Before    a   court    ho   might 


Chap.  IL]  PHILIP  OF  MACEDON.  617 

have  insisted  not  only  on  tlie  restoration  of  Ampliipolis,  although  it 
had  now  been  in  Philip's  possession  for  twelve  years,  but  also  on 
complete  satisfaction  for  all  wrongs  inflicted  at  any  time  by  Make- 
donian  kings  on  Athens  or  on  her  allies ;  but  it  is  almost  beyond 
the  powers  of  belief  that  he  should  make  such  a  demand  now  except  i 
for  the  purpose  of  showing  to  Philip  that  he  was  not  in  earnest,  V 
and  of  cheating  his  countrymen  into  the  idea  that4ie  had  pleaded 
their  cause  with  singular  boldness  and  devotion,  if  not  with  com--' 
plete  success.  By  his  own  showing  he  stands  convicted  of  absolute 
incompetence  as  an  envoy  ;  nor  can  we  acquit  him  of  folly  except 
by  charging  him  with  crime.  Hence  also  it  is  not  easy  to  decide 
what  may  be  the  real  meaning  and  value  of  the  accusations  which  he 
brings  against  his  colleague  Demosthenes.  It  is  at  the  least  possible 
that  his  alleged  intractability,  rudeness,  and  arrogance  may  be  only 
convenient  names  for  the  straightforward  conduct  of  a  man  who 
had  begun  to  suspect  that  he  was  in  the  company  of  traitors. 

Some  three  months  later  the  ambassadors   returned  to  Athens, 
bringing  with   them  a  letter  from  Philip,  couched   in  honeyed 
terms,  but  revealing  nevertheless  the  hard  fact  that  no   Reply  of 
peace  could  be  granted  unless  it  secured  to  each  party    Philip  to  the 
its  possessions  at  the  moment  of   its  ratification.     If   forpeace! 
then  any  arrangement  was  to  be  made  at  all,  it  was      346  b.c. 
clearly  indispensable  in  the  interests  of  Athens  that  it  should  be 
made  at  once.     Philip  was  advancing  from  conquesjb  to  conquest,"] 
and  they  might  be  sure  that  he  would  not  stay  his  hand  until  he 
had  himself  taken  the  oaths,  even  if  he  should  do  so  then.     The  > 
proceedings  were  accordingly  urged  on  rapidly  ;  and  on  the  pro- 
posal of  Philokratps  the  people  woi:,e  inyited  to  consider  wl^ether 
they  would  makejnot  merely  peaccybut  ''^  permanent  alliance jvith 
the  Makedonian  king.     The  proposal  wasncarried,  the  only  "clause 
struck  out  being  one  which   excluded  from  the  benefits  of  the 
treaty  the  Phokians^  and  the  town  of  Halos.     Painful  though   it 
may  have  been  to /Demosthenes  to  acquiesce  in  such  a  covenant,  j 
there  can  be  no  doubt  that  he  expressed  his  approval  of  it.     Pie 
might  fairly  do  so.    A\nien  Euboulos,  the  friend  of  ^schines,  told 
the  people  that,  if  they  rejected  the  peace,  they  must  submit  to 
personal  service,  to  increased  taxation,  and  to  forfeit  the  Theoric 
Fund,  Demosthenes  could  not  deny  that  they  had  no  other  alter- 
native, and  that,  if  they  would  not  brace  themselves  up  for  the 
effort,  nothing  remained  but  to  make  terms  with  the   conqueror. 
He  might  further  have  said  that  so  long  as  the  Phokians  were 
included  among  the   allies  of  Athens,  Thermopylai  was  safe,  and 
Attica  was  safe  also  ;  but  the  envoys  sent  by  Philip  to  complete  the 
treaty  soon  made  it  known  that  their  master  would  not  allow  the 
Phokian  name  to  appear  in  it,  nor  can  we  have  much  doubt  that  his 


618  THE   KINGS  OF  MACEDON.  [Book  V- 

determination  was  known  also  both  to  Philokrates,  wlio  had  oiigi- 
nally  proposed  their  exclusion  in  terms,  and  to  Machines. 

On  no  other  supposition  can  we  explain  the  falsehoods  by 
-which,  when  his  envoys  had  discharged  their  errand,  they  sought 
Omission  of  ^^  hoodwink  the  people  to  his  real  designs.  Philip 
thePhokian  insisted  On  the  exclusion  of  the  Phokians,  but  this 
the  treaty.  was"  only  from  his  genuine  love  both  for  them  and  for 
346  B.C.  ^]^Q  Athenians.  He  could  not  acknowledge  the  former 
as  his  allies,  because  they  Avere  at  war  with  the  Thebans,  whom 
he  was  compelled  to  style  his  friends  ;  but  the  alliance  of  Athens 
would  so  strengthen  his  hands  as  to  enable  him  to  show  his  true 
colors,  and  then  they  would  see  him  crush  Thebes,  set  free  the 
subject  cities  which  she  now  kept  down,  and  even  restore  to  the 
Athenians  the  long-lost  and  dearly  coveted  Amphipolis.  If,  then, 
the  latter  would  swear  to  the  peace  without  specifying  the 
Phokians  among  their  allies,  this  would  not  only  be  no  treachery 
to  thera,  but  a  positive  benefit,  as  it  would  prevent  the  Thebans 
from  seeing  through  the  real  designs  of  Philip.  This  omission  to 
specify  the  Phokians  was,  it  must  be  noted,  a  very  different  thing 
on  any  such  hypothesis  from  their  exclusion  in  terms  ;  and  if  the 
issue  of  the  whole  struggle,  if  the  ultimate  predominance  of  Philip 
and  the  downfall  of  Athens  and  of  Hellas  depended  on  the  resolu- 
tion now  taken,  the  blame  of  the  result  cannot  be  laid  upon 
Demosthenes^  If  for  himself  he  disbelieved  the  statements  of 
^schines,  he  must  have  known  that  without  fresh  evidence  of 
Phihp's  double-dealing  he  could  obtain  no  hearing  from  the 
assembly,  and  that  in  the  lack  of  such  evidence  there  was  little 
hope  or  none  of  inducing  them  to  reconsider  the  question. 

What  Philip  wanted  most  of  all  was  time.  Every  day  gained 
made  it  possible  for  him  to  achieve  some  new  conquest,  while 
jj  ,  ,  Athens  assuredly  was  not  moving  onwards  to  victory, 
^schines  in  For  this  very  reason  it  was  to  her  interest  to  bind 
wi^'a^e-"  ^^'^  Philip  by  a  personal  engagement,  for  there  was  but 
menfaof        too  much  reason  for  fearing  that  he  would   set  aside 

'  ^^'  or  evade   any  pledges  which  might  be  given  by  his 

envoys.  It  was  therefore  the  duty  of  the  Athenian  ambassadors 
(the  same  men  who  had  been  sent  on  the  first  mission),  to  hasten 
with  all  speed  to  the  place  where  PhiUp  might  be,  and  there  to 
receive  his  oaths  without  the  loss  of  an  hour.  There  is  not  the 
slightest  evidence  even  for  the  suspicion  that  Demosthenes  failed 
in  this  duty.  The  liistory  of  the  embassy  places  it  beyond  doubt 
that  in  every  case  he  was  outvoted  ;  that  his  own  dispatches  to 
the  Athenians  revealing  the  true  state  of  afi^airs  were  suppressed ; 
that  false  reports  were  sent  in  their  stead ;  and  that  when  he 
wished  to  return  home  himself,  he  was  forcibly  hindered  by  Phihp 


Chap.  II.]  PHILIP   OF  MACEDON.  619 

from  so  doing.  Wq  can  therefore  see  at  once  the  drift  of  the 
policy  which  kept  yEschines  and  his  colleagues  at  Athens  for  nine 
days  after  the  oaths  had  been  taken  by  the  representatives  of 
Philip  ;  which  allowed  fifty  more  days  to  pass  before  they  had. 
their  first  interview  with  him  ;  and.  which  induced  them,  when 
they  were  brought  into  his  presence,  to  say  nothing  about  the 
speci^al  errand  on  which  they  had  been  sent.  It  had  been  pro- 
vided in  the  treaty,  that  all  conquests  made  since  the  swearing 
of  the  oaths  should  be  void  ;  but  it  was  absurd  to  suppose  that 
t*Iiilip  would  abide  by  this  provision  when  they  had.  allowed  him 
time  enough  to  subjugate  whole  countries  before  they  cama  to 
him.  It  is  impossible  to  believe  that  these  delays  arose  from  any 
other  cause  than  the  deliberate  purpose  of  playing  into  his  hands 
by  a  preconcerted  scheme. 

Nearly  a  quarter  of  a  year  had  passed  before  the  envoys  returned 
to  Athens.     They  had  at  last  administered  the  oaths  to  Philip  at 
Pherai, — in  other  words,  when  he  was  once  more  with    March  of 
his  army  close  to  Thermopvlai.     Not  one  of  his  allies   J,'1''''p*'° 

1  uGrDiopy- 

had  they  taken  the  trouble  to  visit ;  but  to  shield  them  lai. 
from  the  anger  of  the  people,  they  carried  with  them  3^6 b.c. 
a  letter,  in  which  Philip  said  that  he  had  purposely  kept  them 
about  him,  because  he  wanted  their  aid  in  settling  the  quarrel 
between  the  cities  of  Halos  and  Pharsalos.  The  plea  was  trans- 
parently false  ;  but  the  envoys  had  a  harder  task  before  them,  and 
it  must  be  allowed  that  they  were  found  not  unequal  to  it.  As  a 
senator  for  that  year,  Demosthenes  was  able  at  once  to  make  his 
report  to  his  fellow-councillors.  In  so  doing,  he  told  the  plain 
unvarnished  tale,  which  left  on  their  minds  no  doubt  whatever  of 
the  treachery  of  ^'Eschines,  and  ended  by  beseeching  them  not  to 
allow  the  Phokians  to  be  betrayed  as  the  Olynthians  and  others 
had  been  betrayed  before  them.  A  fleet  of  fifty  triremes  was 
ready  to  be  used  on  any  emergency,  and  the  Senate  resolved  to 
propose  to  the  people  that  it  should  be  used  now.  But  when 
(probably  on  the  next  day)  the  assembly  met,  ^schines,  feeling 
that  for  himself  and  his  fellow-conspirators  life  and  death  hung 
in  the  balance,  hastened  to  tell  his  countrj-men  in  one  breath  that 
Philip  had  taken  the  oath,  and  was  by  that  time  at  Thermopylai. 
But  lie  added  with  unblushing  impudence,  that  this  high-minded 
and  honorable  sovereign  had  come  solely  to  avenge  the  cause  of 
the  Phokians  by  putting  down  their  deadly  enemies  the  Thebans  ; 
that,  in  fact,  he  would  make  the  Thebans  restore  the  treasures 
which  Philomelos  and  his  successors  had  taken  from  the  Delphian 
temple  ;  and  that  he  would  confer  on  the  Athenians  sundry  benefits, 
some  of  which  yEschines  could  not  w  ith  prudence  particularise. 
Not  only  was  the  plot  thickening,  but  the  movement  of  the 


620  THE   KINGS   OF  MACEDON.  [Book  V. 

actors  ill  it  was  becoming  more  rapid.  Fooled  with  the  promise 
ihat  they  should  see  the  humiliation  of  ThelK's,  the  Athenians 
who  had  been  induced  to  omit  the  name  of  the  Phokians  from  the 
Ending  of  list  of  their  allies  were  by  an  infatuation  immeasurably 
WariSythe  luorc  gTOss  cheated  into  the  declaration,  that  if  the 
siiiTencier  of  pjiokians  would  not  surrender  Delphoi  to  the  Amphik- 
Pnabiikos.  •ii         iii-  ii  ii  i 

34GB.C.       tyonic  body,  the  Athenians  would  compel  them  to   do 

so  by  force.  The  Phokians  were  not  to  be  thus  blinded.  Thev 
had  listened  thus  far  time  after  time  to  .speeches  which  told  them 
that  things  done  apparently  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  them 
were  really  done  only  for  tlic  sake  of  insuring  their  safety  and  their 
welfare  ;  but  they  felt  that  the  mask  had  at  length  been  flung 
aside  when  they  heard  the  conditional  declaration  of  war  put  out 
against  them  by  the  Athenians.  Within  three  days  Phalaikos  had 
put  an  end  to  the  Sacred  War  bv  making  his  subrais- 
PMlIp  with  sion  to  Philip  ;  and  Philip,  master  of  Phokis,  threw 
Tiiebes.  off  all  disguise  and  declared  himself  the  hearty  friend 

and  ally  of  Thebes. 

The  Athenian  people  were  assembled  in  Peiraieus  when  the 
tidings  came  that  the  man  whom  ^Eschines  was  never  weary  of 
Treacheiyof  jH'aising  was  in  possession  of  Therraopylai.  At  once 
^sciimes.  they  passed  the  vote  Avhich  at  the  beginning  of  the 
Peloponnesian  war  liad  brought  the  country  population  of  Attica 
into  Athens  ;  but  Philip  had  as  yet  no  intention  of  attacking 
them.  Without  striking  a  blow,  lie  had  broken  np  the  power  of 
Phalaikos,  and  wrested  from  him  the  whole  Phokian  territory ; 
but  he  well  knew  that,  even  if  he  should  .succeed  in  conquering 
Athens,  victory  must  be  preceded  by  a  terrible  struggle.  He  was 
soon  joined  by  ^schincs,  who  went  to  him  through  Thebes, 
although  he  had  lately  denounced  the  Thebans  as  thirsting  for 
his  blood  ;  and  that  trusty  servant,  who  probably  concocted  with 
him  a  fresh  letter  to  cajole  his  countrymen,  returned  to  Athens  to 
say  with  effrontery  seldom  surpassed  that  Philip,  sorely  against  his 
Avill,  had  been  constrained  by  the  Thebans  to  crush  the  Phokians, 
and  so  to  give  offence  to  the  Athenians,  with  whom  he  heartily 
desired  to  be  at  peace.  Peace  was  accordingly  made,  and  the 
Athenians  were  left  at  leisure  to  contemplate  the  ruin  caused  by 
their  persistence  in  a  policy  against  which  Demosthenes  had  for 
years,  in  season  and  out  of  season,  protested  in  vain.  The  cities 
of  Phokis  were  all  broken  up  ;  the  vengeance  of  the  Thebans  was 
let  loose  upon  their  miserable  inhabitants  ;  and  murder,  lust,  and 
violence  made  the  whole  land  a  howling  wilderness. 

Meanwhile  Philip  was  exalted  to  a  greatness  which  in  his  most 
sanguine  moments  he  could  scarcely  have  dared  to  hope  for.  He 
had   restored  the  Delphians  to  the  guardianship  of  the  temple  ; 


Chap.  II.]  PHILIP  OF  MACEDON.  621 

lie  liad  summoned  together  the  Amphiktyonic  council ;  and  by  it 
he  had  been  solemnly  recognised  as  a  member  of  the  Amphiktyonic 
brotherhood.  The  two  votes  hitherto  belonging  to  Election  of 
the  Phokians  were  transferred  to  him,  and  he  could  ^''"^1'  '"'^" 
now  interfere  and  dictate  in  Hellenic  affairs  as  the  chosen  tyonic  bro- 
champion  of  the  god  of  Dclphoi.  For  ^schines  it  '^'lerhood. 
may'be  enough  to  say  that  he  was  content  to  bask  in  the  radi- 
ance of  his  master's  greatness.  Thus  much  at  least  is  certain  (as 
Demosthenes  himself  puts  it),  that  only  on  the  hypothesis  of  his 
treachery  can  we  account  for  his  subsequent  behavior.  An  honest 
but  weak-minded  man  might  be  fooled  twice  or  thrice  by  a 
wily  and  unscrupulous  plotter  ;  but  so  soon  as  he  discovered  the 
cheat,  his  indignation  against  the  man  who  had  thus  plunged  him 
in  the  mire  would  be  the  more  vehement  and  lasting.  With 
^schincs,  Demosthenes  insists,  there  was  no  indignation  at  all. 
Before  the  occupation  of  Thermopylai  he  had  been  content  to  be- 
spatter Philip  with  indiscriminate  praises  ;  but  after  that  time 
he  was  eager  to  proclaim  his  enthusiastic  devotion  to  his  service. 
Attempts  to  screen  this  coTisummatc  traitor  on  the  score  of  igno- 
rance are  absurd.  ^Eschines  l)etrays  liis  full  knowledge  of  Philip's 
designs,  when  he  admits  that  he  had  counselled  him  so  to  use  his 
power  on  becoming  master  of  Thermopylai  as  to  protect  the 
Boiotian  cities  against  the  cruelty  and  tyranny  of  Thebes.  Pro- 
bably he  would  not  himself  have  journeyed  through  Thebes  had 
he  not  taken  care  to  inform  its  citizens  that  his  expressions  were 
frenerally  to  be  interpreted  by  their  contraries. 

The  seqiiel  of  the  story  to  the  dismal  day  of  Chaironeiamay  be 
briefly  told.  With  the  exception  of  one  or  two  vivid  pictures  w^e 
know  it  only  in  its  outlines  ;  and  these  bring  before  Day-dreams 
us  only  the  old  struggle  of  one  clear-sighted  and  ofisokrates. 
honest  man  against  an  indifference  or  an  apathy  in  which  treason 
found  its  most  etficient  instrument.  While  Isokrates  was  inditing 
orations  urging  Philip  to  lead  the  combined  armaments  of  the 
chief  Hellenic  cities  against  the  Persian  king,  Demosthenes,  with 
the  true  moderation  of  genuine  patriotism,  besought  his  countrymen 
to  acquiesce  in  the  peace  which  they  had  been  constrained  to 
accept.  To  Demosthenes  the  avoidance  of  any  offence  which,  by 
placing  Athens  under  the  Amphiktyonic  ban,  might  give  Philip  the 
handle  which  he  needed,  was,  under  the  circumstances  of  the 
moment,  a  matter  of  the  first  importance  :  to  Isokrates  the  vain 
pretence  of  vengeance  for  wrongs  done  by  Xerxes  brought  with  it 
more  than  a  compensation  for  ignominious  subservience  to  a  foreign 
dictator.  To  the  weaker  mind  of  Isokrates  the  condition  of  the 
slave  seemed  changed  if  he  were  decked  out  with  the  trappings  of 
a  conqueior  ;  in  the  healthy  judgment  of  Demosthenes,  the  only 


622  THE  KINGS  OF  MACEDON.  [Book  V. 

hope  of  safety  lav  in  the  union  of  caution  Avith  promptitude,  and 
tlie  most  strenuous  effort  was  amply  rewarded  by  a  slight  gain,  so 
lono"  as  this  gain  were  real.  But  if  Isokrates  could  banish  from  his 
thouo-hts  the  degradation  of  the  Greeks  at  home  by  framing  pictures 
of  Greeks  triumphant  at  Sousa,  for  Demosthenes  this  artificial 
greatness  had  no  value  whatever,  fie  could  foresee  with  over- 
powering vividness  the  colossal  proportions  which  the  Makedonian 
empire  must  shortly  reach,  unless  at  the  eleventh  hour  Spaita, 
Thebes,  and  Athens  could  lay  aside  their  feuds,  and  go  hand  in 
hand  against  the  common  enemy.  He  could  see  that  in  the 
jealousies  which  kept  the  fiellenic  cities  apart  Philip  had  for  the 
present  precisely  those  conditions  which  he  most  earnestly  coveted, 
and  that  so  long  as  these  dissensions  were  continued,  he  could 
safely  multiplv  his  conquests  in  Ambrakia  and  Thrace,  in  Elis  and 
Epeiros,  in  the  Corinthian  gulf  and  among  the  strongliolds  of 
Illyrian  and  Paionian  mountaineers.  But  if  Demosthenes  had  at 
the  first  hoped  that  peace  might  be  permanently  maintained,  the 
course  pursued  by  Philip  speedily  taught  him  that  Athens  was  left 
to  herself  onlv  until  he  should  be  ready  to  crush  her  ;  nor  could  he 
well  fail  to  see  that  the  catastrophe  could  not  very  long  be  post- 
poned. 

A  dispute  respecting  the  islet  of  Ilalonnesos  brought  Athens 
almost  to  the  verge  of  open  war.  Philip  had  seized  it,  as  he  pre- 
■"Jispntes be-  tended,  from  the  pirate  Sostratos,  and,  having  so  taken 
xween  the  it^  he  ofEered  to  hand  it  over  as  a  gift  to  the  Athenians, 
and  Philip,  who  claimed  it  as  their  ancient  possession.  If  no 
a43B.c.  modern  statesman  could  be  found  to  listen  to  such  a 
proposal,  we  must  hold  the  Athenians  fully  justified  in  rejecting  it. 
Xor  was  it  here  only  tliat  Philip  was  carrying  on  war  with  a  people 
with  Avhom  he  professed  to  be  at  peace.  The  active  alliance  of  the 
Byzantians  would  enable  him  to  cut  oS  the  supplies  of  corn  on 
which  Athens  in  great  measure  depended  ;  and  this  alliance  he  was 
striving  to  bring  about,  when  the  eloquence  of  Demosthenes  in- 
duced them  to  make  common  cause  with  the  one  city  Avhich,  if  it 
were  not  indeed  already  too  late,  might  break  in  upon  his  course  of 
uninterrapted  conquest.  The  anger  of  Philip  showed  itself  not' 
merely  in  the  siege  of  Perinthos,  but  in  the  march  of 
his  army  across  the  Chcrsonesos.  This  ravaging  of 
^their  territories  exhausted  the  patience  of  the  Athenians,  who  de- 
clared war  against  Philip,  while  Demosthenes,  it  would  seem,  was 
still  absent  on  his  mission.  The  step  was  one  of  which  he  would 
gladly  liave  taken  to  himself  the  credit ;  we  may,  therefore,  well 
believe  him  when  he  tells  us  that  it  was  not  taken  on  his  advice. 

The  semblance  of  peace  whicli  for  six  years  had  tied  the  hands 


Chap.  II.]  PHILIP  OF  MACEDON,  623 

not  of  the  Makedonian  conqueror,  but  of  his  enfeebled  enemies,  was 
now  exchanged  for  the  reality  of  open  war  ;  andPhili^^  Eevived 
found  it  convenient  to  string  together  a  multitude  of  ^j^g'iv^he-^ 
charges  all  designed  to  show  that  the  war  was  brought  nians. 
about  wholly  by  the  provocation  of  Athens.  Iler  orators  made  a 
trade  of  exciting  the  people  against  their  most  friendly  and  peace- 
loving  neighbor  ;  and  the  people,  carried  away  by  their  love  of 
war,  had  plunged  into  a  struggle  with  a  king  who  desired  nothing 
less  than  their  cordial  friendship.  The  form  into  which  he  chose 
to  throw  his  accusations  fully  proves  his  talent  for  biting  satire  ; 
but  he  was  now  to  learn  for  a  while  that  Athenian  energy  could 
still  weigh  down  the  balance  against  him.  Compelled  to  abandon 
the  siege  of  Perinthos,  he  tlew  to  the  assault  of  Byzantion.  He 
had  thought  to  carry  the  place  by  the  suddenness  of  his  attack, 
and  liere,  too,  he  was  batfled.  Athens  remained  mistress  of  the 
highwav  to  the  Euxine  ;  and  Demosthenes,  cheered  by  the  grati- 
tude of  his  countrymen,  Avent  manfully  onwards  in  the  great  work 
of  his  life.  The  Athenians  were  beginning  to  see  the  true  character 
of  their  adversary,  and  the  need  of  strenuous  resistance.  Seizing  the 
opportune  moment,  the  great  orator  besought  them  to  Financial 
place  on  a  better  footins;  the  system  which  reflated  con-   reforms  of 

•  1       •  <•  p  mi         <■        i  11-         Demosthe- 

tributions  tor  purposes  or  war.  ihus  tar  the  wealthier  nes. 
citizens,  divided  into  certain  classes  by  fixed  limits  of  339  b.c. 
income,  had  been  called  upon  to  take  part  in  the  equipment  of 
the  navy  ;  but  all  the  members  in  any  class  were  assessed  in  precisely 
the  same  sum.  On  the  suggestion  of  Demosthenes,  each  man  was 
now  called  upon  to  contribute  according  to  his  rated  property.  The 
aggregate  revenue  was  thus  largely  increased,  the  burden  on  the  less 
wealthy  contributors  was  sensibly  lessened,  and  the  navy  was  put 
into  a  state  of  efficiency  which  would  have  done  no  discredit  to 
the  city  in  the  palmiest  days  of  her  empire. 

But  the  evil  genius  of  Athens  and  of  Hellas  was  now  to  work 
busily  elsewhere.  After  the  battle  which  destroyed  the  army  of 
Mardonios  at  Plataiai,'  the  Athenians  had  placed  in  _  .  .  , 
the  Delphian  temple  some  gilt  shields,  bearing  an  theThird 
inscription  which  marked  them  as  spoils  taken  from  ^^ciedwar. 
the  Persians  and  Thebans  when  they  fought  together  against  the 
Greeks.  Through  lapse  of  time  the  gold  had  become  tarnished  and 
the  inscriptions  so  faded  as  to  be  almost  illegible.  The  Athenians, 
therefore,  ordered  them  to  be  burnished,  and  the  visitors  could  now 
read  at  a  glance  the  words  which  recorded  the  ancient  treacherv'  of 
the  Tliebans.  With  some  fairness  and  force  it  might  have  been 
urged  that  this  jiarading  of  old  misdeeds  was  both  injudicious  and 

'  See  p.  225. 


624  THE  KINGS  OF  MACEDON.  [Book  V. 

malignant ;  but  the  Lokrians  of  Aniphissa,  who  stood  forth  as 
accusers,  cliose  rather  to  arraign  the  Athenians  on  the  ground  of 
impiety  for  setting  up  these  offerings  without  going  through  the 
usual  ceremonies  of  re-consecration.  In  the  default  of  the  Hier- 
omnemon'  Diognetos,  who  was  prostrate  with  fever,  it  fell  to  the 
lot  of  ^Eschines  to  reply  to  this  charge.  He  might  have  insisted 
that  from  lack  of  the  previous  notice,  to  wliich  all  members  of  the 
Amphiktyonic  brotherhood  Avcre  intitled,  the  case  could  not  be 
heard  in  the  present  session  of  the  council  ;  and  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that  this  plea  must  have  insured  its  postponement.  He 
might  also  have  argued  the  matter  on  its  merits,  and  have  urged 
that  the  Athenians  had  a  perfect  right  to  regild  the  letters  of 
a  faded  inscription.  He  chose  to  do  neitlier, — in  all  likelihood 
because  he  saw  that  the  Assembly  was  in  a  state  of  dangerous  ex- 
citement. The  element  of  religious  animosity,  which  liad  been 
allowed  full  play  during  the  ten  years  of  the  last  Sacred  AVar,  was 
not  easily  to  be  repressed  ;  and  ^Eschines,  as  he  tells  us,  felt 
instinctively  that  tlie  charge  of  impiety  would  be  effectually  met 
only  by  prompt  retort.  From  the  lofty  platform  of  the  temple  lie 
could  look  down  on  the  haven  of  Kirrha  enlivened  with  the  ships 
which  brought  crowds  of  pilgrims  to  tlie  Delphian  shrine,  and 
surrounded  by  the  olive  groves  and  corn  fields  which  interposed  a 
girdle  of  verdure  between  the  city  and  the  dreary  desert  beyond 
them.  From  this  pleasant  and  busy  scene  he  coiild  draw  the  eyes  of 
liisliearers  to  the  brazen  plate  on  the  wall,  hard  by,  which  recorded 
the  sentence  of  the  xVmphiktyonic  judges  in  the  days  of  Solon. 
Tl'hat  strip  of  luxurious  vegetation  was  a  deadly  offence  against 
the  Delphian  god  ;  the  wea'.th  of  the  Kirrhaian  port  was  amassed 
in  direct  defiance  of  the  judgment  pronounced  by  the  mouth 
of  his  ministers.  If  he  wished  to  I'ckindle  the  slumbering  fires 
of  religious  fanaticifsm,  he  had  but  to  point  the  contrast  between 
the  prosperity  of  the  pilgrims'  haven  and  the  desolation  to  which 
the  whole  plain  had  been  doomed  for  ever.  Seeing  that  he  could 
thus  turn  the  tables  on  tiie  accusers  of  Athens,  ^Eschines  hesitated 
not  for  an  instant.  There,  on  the  wall  before  them,  was  the  fatal 
record  ;  and  there,  on  the  plain  below,  they  might  sec  the  groves 
wliich  bore  witness  to  the  impiety  of  generations,  and  the  haven 
where  the  dock-owners  enriched  themselves  by  tolls  the  gathering 
of  which  was  a  profanation.  '  It  is  for  you,'  he  said,  addressing  the 
Council,  '  to  take  vengeance  for  the  sacrilege  ;  and  if  you  fail  to 
do  so,  you  can  no  longer  with  a  clear  conscience  take  part  in  the  wor- 
ship of  the  god.'  His  words  roused  in  his  hearers  an  ungovernable 
wrath  :  but  the  <lay  was  Avearing  on,  and  time  was  lacking  to  finish 

'  The  secretary  sent  by  each  State  to  the  meetings  of  the  Amphikty- 
onic council. 


Chap.  II.]  PHILIP  OF  MACEDON.  625 

the  work  before  the  sun  went  down.  With  the  dawn,  however, 
the  whole  Delphian  people  must  be  ready  with  their  pickaxes  and 
their  spades,  to  throw  down  the  accursed  walls  and  uproot  the 
hateful  vineyards.  Such  was  the  bidding  of  the  herald  ;  and  on 
th\s  errand  of  destruction  tlie  Delphians  in  the  tranquil  light 
of  a  spring  morning  streamed  forth  from  their  gates,  burning  with 
rage  against  a  people  for  whom  but  a  few  hours  ago  they  would 
have  expressed  no  feelings  but  those  of  kindly  friendship.  In 
utter  amazement  the  Lokrians  of  Amphissa  beheld  the  distant 
flames  as  they  rose  from  the  harbor  and  the  liouses  of  Kirrha. 
Hurrying  down  with  all  speed,  they  caught  the  plunderers  red- 
handed  and  drove  them  back  to  Delphoi ;  but  reverence  for  the 
Amphiktyonic  tribunal  withheld  tliem,  it  is  said,  from  all  attempts 
to  wash  out  the  wrong  in  blood.  Such  was  the  issue  of  the  retort 
of  u-Eschines,  and  such  were  the  exploits  for  whicli  he  unblushingly 
claimed  the  gratitude  of  his  countrymen. 

The    wrath    of    the    crusaders    was   now   turned    against   the 
Amphissians.     A  special    meeting  of  the  Amphiktyons  was  to 
determine  the  measure  of  the  punishment  to  be  meted  out  to 
them.     These  were  godless  rebels  who  must  be  forcibly  put  down  : 
the  Athenians  were  champions   of  the  god,  deserving  all  honor. 
The  Demos  on  the  return  of  ^^schines  were  naturally  tempted  to 
lay  this  flattering  unction  to  their  souls,  and  to  resent   j^gfyg^iof 
the   freedom  with  which  Demosthenes  warned  them    thcAtiie- 
tliat  yEschines   was   bringing  an    Amphiktyonic    war   Th^bansto 
within   the   borders   of    Attica  itself.     But  it  was  no   f"f'^Ti,^y'^ 
hard  task  to  convince  them  that  the  building  of  the  city    puiktyonic 
of  Kirrha  and  the  cultivation  of   the  land  around  it   ^'^^^f^^^' 
were  offences  only  against  the  sentence   of  men  who 
had   been   dead   well  nigh  two  hundred  years,  while  they  vastly 
promoted  the  comfort  and  security  of  the  pilgrims  who  crowded  to 
the  Delphian  festivals  ;  and  thus  ^Eschines  found  himself  foiled  by 
the  resolution  of  the  people  to  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  special 
Amphiktyonic  meeting  to  which  he  had  invited  them.     The  fact 
that  the  Thebans  came  to  the  same  decision  seems  to  indicate  the 
growth  of  a  more  friendly  feeling  on  their  part  towards  the  Athe- 
nians, and  to  account  for  the  slender  success  which  attended  the 
operations  of  the  I'emaining  Amphiktyons. 

At  the  regular  meeting  held  in  the  autumn  the  Athenian  envoys 
were,  it  seems,  present ;  nor  can  we  doubt  that  Philip  also  was 
there  represented.  As  a  member  of  the  brotherhood,  fortification 
he  had  a  right  to  interfere  in  person  ;  but  it  was  more  of  Eiateiaby 
in  accordance  with  the  policy  of  his  life  to  wait  with  P'^^^p- 
patience  for  the  invitation  which  he  knew  was  coming.  He  liad 
no  sooner  received  it  than  he  announced  his  immediate  purpose  of 
27 


626  THE  KINGS  OF  MACEDON.  [Book  V. 

marching  to  the  help  of  the  god  ;  but  instead  of  hastening  through 
the  desolate  Phokis  to  Delphoi,  he  paused  hy  the  way  to  ve-fortify 
the  dismantled  town  of  Elateia.  Any  further  attempt  to  keep  up 
the  pretence  of  Amphiktyonic  execution  against  the  Lokrians 
would  now  have  been  absurd.  The  mask  was  therefore  flung 
aside,  and  his  envoys  appeared  at  Thebes  to  say  that  he  was  going 
to  punish  the  Athenians,  and  to  demand  their  aid  in  the  enter- 
prise. Of  their  compliance  he  entertained  no  doubt.  He  knew 
well  how  wide  a  gulf  had  separated  Thebes  from  Athens  ;  he  knew 
that  if  he  had  made  a  free  passage  into  Attica  the  condition  of 
his  help  during  the  last  Sacred  War,  he  would  have  encountered  no 
opposition  ;  and  he  felt  that  having  given  that  help  unconditionally, 
he  might  now  fairly  look  for  his  reward.  Assuredly  he  would  not 
have  been  disappointed,  if  at  this  moment  -L^scliines  could  have 
carried  the  Athenians  with  liim. 

The  Prytaneis  were  seated  at  their  evening  meal  when  tlie  mes- 
senger reached  Athens  with  the  tidings  that  Philip  liad  established 
himself  at  Elateia.     At  once  they  cleared  the  market- 
Demosthenes  place,  and  sent  the  herald  to  summon  the  people  to  the 
that  the         assembly  at  break  of  day.     "When  however  the  senate 

Athenians        ,      ,  "  ■    •        i      i  c  i 

should  aid  had  explained  the  reason  tor  the  summons  and  the 
the  Thebans.  pj^J2ens  were  invited  to  speak,  there  was  for  a  while  a 
dead  silence.  All  felt,  says  Demosthenes,  that  neither  patriotism  nor 
wealth  could  supply  the  lack  of  the  one  thing  needful  in  a  counsellor 
at  this  crisis, — the  knowledge,  namely,  of  the  real  motives  by  which 
Philip  was  guided.  Conscious  that  he  had  divined  these  motives 
but  too  well,  Demosthenes  at  length  came  forward  to  cheer  them 
with  tlie  assurance  that  they  might  yet,  if  they  bestirred  themselves, 
check  him  in  his  triumphant  career.  They  might  suppose  or  they 
might  have  been  told  that  the  Thebans  were  to  a  man  on  Philip's 
side.  The  very  fact  that  he  was  fortifying  Elateia  conclusively  re- 
futed such  a  notion.  The  hearty  support  of  the  Thebans  would  liave 
rendered  that  task  superfluous,  and  the  Athenians  would  by  this 
time  have  seen  hisarmy  within  their  borders.  ButPhiliphad  not  thi? 
support  ;  and  it  remained  for  the  Athenians  to  determine  whether 
thev  Avould  avail  themselves  of  the  friendly  feeling  which  many 
Tliebans  fissuredly  entertained  for  them.  If  tliey  chose  to  liar[) 
upon  the  miserable  quarrels  of  tluir  p;ust  liistory,  the  golden  oppor- 
timity  would  soon  be  lost :  if  on  the  other  hand  they  would  ofl'er 
to  help  them  at  once  and  with  all  their  forces  and  unconditionally, 
he  felt  assured  that  their  offer  would  be  joyfully  welcomed,  and  a 
foundation  laid  for  harmonious  action  which  might  lead  to  true 
and  permanent  union. 

The   proposal    was  carried  without  a  dissentient  voice.     Even 


Chap.  II.]  PHILIP  OF  MACEDON,  627 

^^llschinos  felt  tliat  in  the  supreme  exaltation  of  the  moment  he 
dared  not  put  before  them  his  poisoned  cup  of  flattery  Alliance 
and  treason.  He  saw  that  for  once  the  people  were  in  Thebes'and 
earnest,  and  to  his  dismay  he  learnt  that  the  same  Athens, 
spirit  had  been  kindled  in  the  Thebans.  Nor  w^asthe  disappoint- 
me^it  of  Philip  less  keen  than  that  of  his  worshipper.  He  had  fully 
counted  on  their  neutrality  at  least,  if  not  on  their  enthusiastic 
support,  and  now  he  must  tight  his  way  through  Boiotia  instead  of 
marching  leisurely  across  it  into  Attica.  At  Athens  Demosthenes 
had  at  length  acquired  an  influence  scarcely  less  than  that  which 
had  been  exercised  by  Perikles.  By  his  advice  everything  was 
made  to  give  way  to  the  indispensable  needs  of  the  hour.  The  new 
works  at  the  Peiraieus  were  suspended  ;  the  existing  law  respecting 
the  Theoric  Fund  was  repealed,  and  the  revenue  which  would  have 
been  spent  on  religious  celebrations  was  diverted  tG  the  purposes 
of  the  war. 

During  the  ten  months  which  passed  between  the  fortification 
of  Elateia  and  the  catastrophe  which  closed  the  struggle,  the  allies 
were  not  idle.  Demosthenes  was  crowned  for  some  _ 
successes  gained  by  their  combined  forces,  and  a  more  Chaironeia. 
serious  hindrance  was  placed  in  Philip's  path  by  the  338  b.c. 
re-establishment  of  Phokis.  On  the  other  hand  that  unwearied 
and  politic  leader  fulfilled  the  mission  which  the  Amphiktyons  had 
laid  upon  him.  The  sentence  passed  in  the  time  of  Solon  was  again 
put  in  force,  and  the  Amphissians  were  driven  into  exile.  Of  the 
incidents  immediately  preceding  the  fatal  fight  of  Chaironeiawe 
know  nothing,  of  the  battle  itself  little  more  than  the  result.  It 
is  enough  to  say  that  on  the  one  side  was  the  most  consummate 
general  of  the  age,  on  the  other  no  one  commander  of  more  than 
«.verage  military  talent ;  that  among  the  allies  citizens  who  had  to 
overcome  a  strong  repugnance  to  personal  service  were  pitted  against 
veteran  mountaineers  such  as  those  which  won  for  the  elder  Cyrus 
a  hundred  victories  ;'  that  if  the  Thebans  had  their  Sacred  Band 
and  the  phalanx  which  had  wrought  wonders  when  wielded  by 
Epameinondas,  their  discipline  was  now  more  slack  and  their  ardor 
less  vehement,  while  lastly  the  tactic  which  had  won  the  day  at 
Leuktra  and  Mantineia  was  more  than  counteracted  by  the  new 
weapon  with  Avhich  Philip  had  armed  his  columns.  The  long 
sarissa  or  pike  could  do  terrible  execution  at  a  distance  which  the 
Theban  spear  failed  to  reach.  The  struggle  was  fierce  and  obsti 
nate  ;  but  at  length  the  youthful  Alexander  saw  the  Sacred  Band 
borne  down  beneath  his  father's  hosts,  and  the  iron  discipline  of 
his  northern  warriors  shatter  the  hopes  of  Thebes  and  Athens. 

'  See  p.  113. 


628  THE  KINGS  OF  MACEDON.  [Book  V. 

The  loss  on  the  side  of  the  allies,  both  of  the  slain  and  of  pris- 
oners, was  terrible.  The  two  Athenian  leaders  escaped  from  the 
Increased  ^^^1^  i  ^^^  by  a  practice  which  had  now  become  a  habit 
ipfluence  of  {^jj^  people  summoned  Lysikles  before  their  bar  and  con- 
nes  after  demncd  him  to  death.  The  Theban  general  Theao^enes 
the  defeat.  ^^^^  among  the  dead  :  but  his  countrymen  stigmatised 
him  as  a  traitor.  Both  the  men  were  in  all  likelihood  innocent :  but  a 
people  must  be  far  gone  on  the  downward  path  when  they  can  habi- 
tually treat  failure  after  honest  effort  as  a  crime.'  If  some  in  like 
manner  taunted  Demosthenes  with  gross  cowardice,  the  fact  that 
his  influence  was  increased  rather  than  abated  proves  conclusively 
that  the  charge  was  not  credited  by  the  Athenians  generally. 
Either  by  his  advice  or  by  that  of  Hypereides  decrees  were  passed 
ordering  the  country  population  to  take  refuge  in  the  outlying  forts 
or  within  the  walls  of  Athens,  removing  the  civil  disabilities  of  all 
citizens  who  had  been  deprived  of  their  franchise,  granting  citizen- 
ship to  the  Metoikoi  and  freedom  to  the  slaves  on  condition  of  their 
bearing  arms  for  the  defence  of  the  city.  All  that  was  needed  for 
the  repair  of  the  walls  or  fortifications  was  done  with  that  rapidity 
which  had  always  characterised  Athenian  workmen  ;  and  Athens 
stood  ready  for  a  siege,  for  which  she  might  fairly  expect  a  success- 
ful issue,  so  long  as  her  fleets,  unaffected  by  the  recent  disasters, 
remained  supreme  at  sea.  The  tidings  of  the  catastrophe  had  been 
received  with  dismay  ;  but  calmer  thought  soon  showed  the  wide 
contrast  between  their  present  circumstances  and  the  hopelessness 
of  their  position  when  they  learnt  that  their  fleet  and  army  had 
both  been  destroyed  at  Syracuse. 

For  the  present  they  had  nothing  to  fear.  Philip  shrank  pro- 
bably from  an  enterprise  which  might  involve  months  of  toil  and 
Surrender  ^  riiiuous  outlay,  while  it  might  also  awaken  a  genuine 
of  Thebes.  Pan-IIelleiiic  spirit  which  was  now  either  dormant  or 
dead.  His  wrath  burst  not  on  the  Athenians  but  on  the  people 
who  had  changed  sides  when  it  was  too  late  and  had  appeared 
with  his  enemies  on  the  field  of  Chaironeia.     Ilis  Theban  prisoners 

'  According  to  Diodoros,  xvi.  88,  niahon  eliould   be   sliot  after   the 

the  invective  of  the  orator  Lykour-  battle   of  Sedan,   or   tlioujrht   the 

gros,  hia  accuser,  reviled  him  eim-  worse   of  the  Emperor   Napoleon 

ply  for  his  failure.     The  man  who  because,  in  his  own  words,  be  had 

could  endure  to  live  wlien  he  had  been  unable  to  die  at  the  head  of 

lelt  a  thousand  citizens  dead  upon  his   army.     The  querulous   beha- 

the  field,  and  two  thousand  more  vior  of   the  Athenians  presentB  a 

in  captivity,  was  in  his  judpjnient  mournful  contrast  to  the  manliness 

deserving   of  death.     The  Demos  of  the  Roman  senate  which  could 

shared  this  opinion,  and  Lysikles  thank  the  {jeneral  whose  army  had 

was  condemned.     In  all  the  ajrony  bisen  cut  to  pieces,  because  he  hud 

caused  by  disasters  far  more  terrific,  not    despaired    of    the     commoa- 

no  one  proposed  that  Marshal  Mac-  wealth. 


Chap.  II.]  PHILIP  OF  MACEDON.  629 

were  sold  into  slavery  :  and  when  Thebes  itself,  whether  by 
blockade  or  otherwise,  fell  into  his  hands,  many  of  the  citizens 
were  slain,  many  banished,  and  the  old  despotism  of  the  days  of 
Phoibidas  was  restored,  with  only  the  difference  that  the  Kadmeia 
w^s  held  by  a  Makedonian  instead  of  by  a  Spartan  garrison.  The 
Athenians,  he  saw,  might  be  made  more  useful  by  taking  another 
course.  In  the  devotion  of  ^schines,  who  now  threw  off  all  dis- 
guise and  proclaimed  his  personal  friendship  and  affection  for  the 
conqueror,  he  had  an  instrument  more  powerful  than  squadrons  of 
armed  men.  It  was  his  purpose  to  combine  the  forces  of  the  chief 
Hellenic  cities  under  his  own  command  ;  and  to  men  like  ^Esehines, 
who  could  share  the  drunken  revels  which  celebrated  his  victory,' 
he  nmst  look  for  the  success  of  his  scheme. 

From  the  mission  which  he  had  offered  to  undertake,  ^Eschines 
same  back  with  loud  praises  of  the  generosity  which  consented 
to  release  without  ransom  all  the  Athenian  prisoners    .  , 

1  1     •     <■  •        c  c  /-\  1        Acknowl- 

and  to  restore  their  irontier  fortress  ot  Uropos,  on  the   edijment  of 
one  condition  that  they  should   publicly  acknowledge   ^'J-emlf 
Philip   as  supreme  chief  of  all  the  Hellenes  in  peace   chief  of  all 
and   in  war.     The  terms  obtained  by  Demades  were 
accepted.    Probably  even  Demosthenes  felt  that  further  resistance 
was  for  the  present  at  least  impossible,  while  the   adulations  with 
which  his  countrymen  greeted  their  new  lord  must  have  left  him 
with  little  hopes  for  the  future.    The  Athenians  were  now  paying 
the  penalty  of  the  infatuation  which  had  left  the  Olynthian  con- 
federacy at  the  mercy  of  the  man  whom  they  were  now  content 
to  approach  as  apt  disciples  in  the  school  of  flattery. 

There  was,  in  fact,  not  much  more  work  to  be  done.  Philip 
passed  on  into  Peloponnesos,  and  treating  with  contempt  the 
refusal  of  the  Spartans  to  acknowledge  his  supremacy,  Espeditioa 
summoned  a  congi-ess  of  his  dependent  allies  to  meet  [Jfto  pgi^. 
him  at  Corinth  and  discuss  a  plan  for  the  conquest  of  pounesos. 
Persia.  Among  these  subjects  appeared  the  Athenians,  to  sanc- 
tion an  enterprise  which  the  achievements  of  the  Ten  Thousand 
had  shown  to  be  practicable,  if  not  easy,  and  which  Isokrates  had 
held  up  to  the  ambition  or  the  avarice  of  his  countrymen.  The 
scheme,  which  in  his  Panegyric  had  attracted  them  with  its 
glowing  colors,  lost  its  special  charms  when  it  was  seen  to  mean 
nothing  more  than  obedience  to  the  dictates  of  a  foreign  master. 
To  the  Greeks  of  Lesser  Asia  the  overthrow  of  the  Persian 
despot  would  bring  not  the  coveted  liberty  of  tearing  each  other  in 
[)ieces,  but  merely  a  change  of  lords.  To  the  world  at  large  it 
was  a  matter  of  not  much  consequence  ;  and  for  themselves  it  may 

^  Demosth.  On  the  Crown,  p.  321. 


630  THE  KINGS  OF  MACEDON.  [Book  V. 

be  doubted  whether  the  strono;  repression  of  a  foreign  poAver  was 
not  a  better  thing  than  the  freedom  which  during  the  whole  course 
of  their  history  had  been  httle  more  than  a  fine  name  for  feuds, 
factions,  and  internecine  war. 


CHAPTER  III. 

ALEXANDER  THE  GREAT. 


The  young  Alexander,  commonly  called  the  Great,  was  born 
when  his  father  had  just  entered  on  his  career  of  successful  war 
and  still  more  successful  diplomacy.  He  inherited  the  qualities  of 
„   ,  both  his  parents,  and  the  result  Avas  the  combination 

of  Alexander  of  a  boundless  ambition  Avitli  sober  and  practical 
the  Great,  -wisdom  in  dealing  with  the  exigencies  of  the  moment. 
He  grew  up  with  the  consciousness  that  he  was  the  heir  of 
a  king  Avhose  poAver  was  rising  Avith  A'ast  and  rapid  strides  ;  and 
the  stories  told  of  him  attest  at  the  least  the  early  aAA-akening  of 
a  mind  foiTned  in  the  mould  of  the  heroes  of  mythical  Hellas.  Nay, 
the  blood  of  Achilleus  Avas  floAA'ing,  as  he  belicA-ed,  in  his  A'eins ; 
and  the  flattery  of  his  Akarnanian  tutor  Lysimachos,  Avho  addressed 
him  as  the  Son  of  Peleus,  may  have  strengthened  in  him  his  pas- 
sionate love  of  the  immortal  poems  Avhich  told  the  story  of  that 
fiery  Avarrior.  By  another  tutor,  the  Molossian  Leonidas,  his  vehe- 
ment impulses  Avere  checked  by  a  Avholesome  discipline,  Avliile  his 
ambition  Avas  quickened  by  a  rebuke  which,  on  his  placing  too  much 
incense  in  the  censer,  bade  him  Avait  until  he  became  master  of  the 
lands  in  Avhicli  the  frankincense  grcAV.  But  the  genius  of  Alex- 
ander was  moulded  in  a  far  greater  degree  by  that  of  Aristotle,  the 
greatest  conqueror  in  the  Avorld  of  thought.  At  the  age  of  thirteen 
he  became  for  three  years  the  pupil  of  a  man,  Avho  had  examined 
Avith  keen  scrutiny  the  political  growth  and  the  constitutions  of  a 
crowd  of  states,  and  who  had  brought  together  a  vast  amount  of 
facts  and  observations  for  the  systematic  cultivation  of  physical 
science.  During  these  three  years  the  boy  aAvoke  to  the  knoAvledge 
that  a  wonderful  Avorld  lay  before  him  of  Avliich  he  had  seen  little, 
and  thrcAv  himself  Avith  insatiable  eagerness  into  the  task  of  gather- 
ing, it  is  said,  at  any  cost  a  collection  fui-  the  study  of  natural  history. 
^Vhile  his  mind  was  thus  urged  in  one  direction,  he  listened  to 
stories  Avhich  told  him  of  the  great  (piarrel  still  to  be  fought  out 
hetAveen  the  East  and  the  West,  and  learnt  to  look  upon  himself 
as  the  champion  of  Hellas  against  the  barbarian  despot  of  Sousa. 


Chap.  III.]  ALEXANDER  THE  GREAT.  631 

Tlie  future  conqueror  was  sixteen  years  of  age  when  he  was 
left  at  home  as  regent  while  his  father  besieged  Byzan-  340  b.c. 
tion  and  Perinthos.  Two  years  later  the  alliance  of  Thebes  and 
Athens  was  wrecked  on  the  fatal  field  of  Chaironeia.  But  the  pros- 
pects of  Alexander  himself  became  now  for  a  time  dark  and  uncer- 
tain. The  admiration  which  Philip  had  once  felt  for  Olympias, 
Alexander's  mother,  had  long  since  given  way  to  dislike  ^g^^^  jj^ 
and  even  to  dread  of  her  furious  and  vindictive  temper,  thehouse 
The  Molossian  princess  was  divorced,  and  Kleopatra  °*  ^'  'P' 
the  daughter  of  the  Makedonian  Attalos  took  her  place.  This  act 
roused  the  wrath  not  only  of  Olympias  but  of  her  son,  who,  if  the 
tale  is  to  be  believed,  hurled  a  goblet  at  Attalos  when  at  the  mar- 
riage feast  the  latter  expressed  a  hope  that  Philip  might  soon  have 
a  legitimate  successor  to  his  power.  Blind  with  rage,  Philip,  the 
story  goes  on  to  say,  rushed  on  his  son  with  his  drawn  sword, 
but  stumbled  and  fell  partly  from  passion,  more  from  drunkenness, 
while  Alexander  with  lofty  contempt  bade  the  guests  look  at  the  man 
wli(^  wished  to  extend  his  conquests  from  Europe  into  Asia  while  he 
was  unable  to  convey  himself  steadily  from  one  couch  to  another. 
With  Olympias  Alexander  took  refuge  in  Epeiros.  Kleopatra 
became  the  mother  of  a  son.  Her  father  Attalos  rose  higher  in  the 
king's  favor,  and  not  a  few  of  Alexander's  friends  were  banished. 

The  feuds  in  his  family  formed  no  subject  of  pleasant  thought 
to  Philip  himself,  who  sought  to  counteract  their  ill  effects  by 
arranging  a  marriage  between  his  daughter  Kleopatra  Assassina- 
and  her  uncle,  the  Epeirot  King,  Alexander,  the  a^^i^aP"^^^ 
brother  of  Olympias.  The  marriage  feast  was  cele-  saes.c. 
brated  at  Aigai.  Clothed  in  a  white  robe,  and  walking  purposely 
apart  from  his  guards,  Philip  was  approaching  the  theatre  when  he 
was  struck  dead  by  the  dagger  of  Pausanias,  a  man  who,  having  been 
horribly  wronged  by  Attalos,  had  in  vain  sought  redress  from  the 
king.  The  murderer  was  at  once  cut  down  ;  and  it  became  iuipos- 
sible  to  learn  from  him  whether  he  had  or  had  not  any  accomplices 
in  his  crime.  Some  were  suspected  and  put  to  death,  others  who 
were  at  a  safe  distance  were  eager  to  accuse  themselves  :  but  if  the 
Persian  king  boasted,  as  it  is  said,  of  his  share  in  the  matter,  he 
took  credit  to  himself  for  an  incitement  which  to  a  man  in  the 
position  of  Pausanias  was  at  the  least  superfluous. 

It  is  certain  that  Alexander,  if  he  mourned  his  father's  death 
at  all,  can  have  deplored  it  only  as  involving  himself  in  political 
difficulties ;  but  he  took   care  to   act  as  if  he  were    , , 
grieved  by  it,  and  (if  we  may  give  credit  to  the  ex-   becomes 
tant  writings  of  historians   of  which  unfortunately  not  ^'"^' 
one  is  contemporaneous)  he  avenged  it  we  are  told  by  putting  out 
of  the  way  all  whose  claims  or  designs  might  clash  with  his  own. 
Among  these  was  his  cousin  Amyntas,  the  son  of  Perdikkas,  elder 


632  THE  KINGS  OF  MACEDON.  [Book  V. 

brother  of  Pliilip,  together  wiili  the  infant  son  of  Ivleopatra,  who 
fell  a  victim  herself  to  the  unforgiving  Olynipias. 

The  Greeks  of  Thebes  and  Athens  knew  little  what  sort  of  man 
liad  taken  the  place  of  Philip.  Demosthenes,  who,  although  he  was 
Alexander  at  monrning  for  the  death  of  liis  own  daugliter,  appeared 
Thermopy-     j,j  fgg^al  attire  to  announce  the  death  of  the  Make- 

336  B.C.  donian  king,  held  up  Alexander  to  ridicule  as  a 
bragging  and  senseless  Margites  ;  and,  not  in  Atliens  merely  or  in 
Sparta,  it  was  believed  that  the  hour  had  come  for  shaking  off  the 
oppressor's  yoke.  But  they  were  to  reckon  with  one  who  could 
swoop  on  his  prey  with  the  swiftness  of  tlie  eagle.  Barely  two 
months  had  passed  from  the  death  of  his  father,  before  the  youth 
of  twenty  years  stood  with  his  army  on  the  plains  of  Tliessaly. 
The  argument  of  the  Makedonian  phalanx  was  not  be  resisted. 
Tlie  Thessalians  recognised  him  as  the  Ilegemon  or  leader  of  the 
Greeks  :  and  the  youthful  king  passed  on  to  Thebes,  wliich  had 
been  held  by  a  Makedonian  garrison  since  the  fatal  tiglit  at 
Chaironeia.  Thence  he  betook  himself  across  the  isthmus  to 
Corinth  ;  and  Athenian  envoys  headed  by  Demades,  and  accom- 
panied by  Demosthenes  as  far  as  the  frontier,  carried  to  Alexander 
apologies  more  abject  and  lionors  more  extravagant  than  any 
which  had  been  paid  to  his  father.  Ho  received  them  at  Corinth  in 
an  assembly  from  which  he  demanded  the  title  of  supreme  leader  of 
the  Hellenic  armies,  and  to  which  lie  guaranteed  in  his  turn  the 
autonomy  of  every  Hellenic  city.  None  knew  better  than  Alexander 
that  from  the  whole  armory  of  weapons  which  might  be  forged  to 
crush  the  independence  of  [lellas  none  would  more  elfectually  do 
his  Avork  tlian  a  theory  of  freedom  which  meant  disunion,  and  of 
self-government  wliich  meant  endless  feud,  faction,  and  war. 

When,  a  little  while  after  his  gloriticalion  at  Corinth,  Alexander 
set  out  on  an  expedition  across  the  mighty  barrier  of  the  Balkan 
range,  he  disappeared  from  the  world  of  the  Greeks.  Silence 
^  .       led  to  rumors   of  his  defeat,  and  the  rumors  of  de- 

of  Thebes,      feat  were  followed  by  more  coniident  assertions  of  his 

^^^■^-  death.  At  Thebes  and  at  Athens  the  tidings  were 
received  by  some  with  eager  belief.  The  covenant  made  with 
Alexander  was  made  only  with  him  personally.  The  Theban 
exiles  at  Athens  were  anxious  to  repeat  the  attempt  which,  half 
a  century  earlier,  had  been  made  against  the  Spartan  garrison  of 
the  Kadmeia  by  J  'elopidas  ;  and  with  helj)  in  arms  and  money  from 
Demosthenes  and  other  Athenians  they  entered  Thebes,  obtained 
from  the  assembly  a  declaration  of  its  autonomy,  and  summoned 
the  garrison  in  the  citadel  to  surrender.  The  answer  was  a 
blank  refusal  ;  and  a  double  line  of  circumvallation  was  drawn 
around  the  Kadmeia,  while  envoys  were  sent  to  call  forth  aid  from 


Chap.  III.]  ALEXANDER  THE  GREAT.  633 

every  quarter.  The  belief  in  Alexander's  death  was  dispelled  not 
by  any  o-radual  reports  of  his  escape  from  the  barbarians,  but  sud- 
denly l»y  his  own  appearance  at  the  Boiotiaii  Onchestos.  lie  had 
just  defeated  his  enemies  when  he  heard  of  the  i-evolt  of 
Thebes,  and  he  determined  to  smite  the  rebels  without  turning 
aside  to  take  even  a  day's  rest  at  Pel  la.  Within  a  fortnight  he  had 
occupied  the  pass  of  Thermopylai,  and  two  days  later  his  army  was 
encamped  on  the  southern  side  of  Thebes,  thus  cutting  off  all 
chances  of  aid  from  Athens.  It  was  his  wish  to  avoid  an  assault : 
and  he  contented  himself  Avith  demanding  the  surrender  o.f  two 
only  of  the  anti-Makedonian  leaders,  offering  to  re-admit  the 
rest  to  the  convention  made  at  Corinth  during  the  preceding 
year.  The  citizens  generally  were  anxious  to  submit :  but  the 
exiles  felt  or  feared  themselves  to  be  too  deeply  committed,  and 
the  answer  took  the  form  of  a  defiance  accompanied  by  a  demand 
for  the  surrender  of  Antipatros  and  Philotas  They  had  sealed  their 
own  doom.  Personal  bravery  Avas  of  no  use  against  the  discipline, 
the  numbers,  and  the  engines  of  the  enemy.  The  defenders  were 
driven  back  into  the  city  :  the  invaders  burst  in  with  them,  and 
the  slaughter  which  followed  was  by  no  means  inflicted  by  the 
Makedonians  alone.  The  Plataians,  Thespians,  and  Orchomenians 
felt  that  they  had  old  scores  to  settle.  To  their  decision  and  to 
that  of  the  rest  of  his  Greek  allies  Alexander  submitted  the  treat- 
ment of  the  city.  The  sentence  was  promptly  pronounced.  The 
measure  which  the  Thebans  would  have  dealt  out  to  Athens  on  its 
surrender  to  Lysandros  should  now  be  dealt  out  to  themselves. 
The  walls  and  every  building  within  them  were  to  be  rased  to  the 
ground  ;  its  territory  was  to  be  shared  by  the  allies ;  the  whole 
people  (priests  and  priestesses  with  the  Proxenoi  or  friends  of  the 
Makedonians  being  the  only  exceptions)  were  to  be  sold  as  slaves, 
and  such  as  had  escaped  were  to  be  pronounced  outlaws  whom  no 
Greek  city  should  dare  to  harbor.  As  they  had  said,  so  was  it 
done,  the  house  of  the  poet  Pindar  alone  being  spared  from  demo- 
lition and  his  descendants  alone  being  allowed  to  retain  their  free- 
dom. It  was  convenient  for  Arrian  to  say  that  this  frightful  havoc 
was  wrought  not  by  Alexander,  but  by  his  Greek  allies.  The 
jackals  had  done  the  lion's  work  :  but  there  can  be  little  doubt  that 
they  had  done  it  precisely  as  he  wished  it  to  be  done.  His  end 
was  gained.  The  spirit  of  the  Greeks  was  crushed,  A  great  city 
was  blotted  out,  and  the  worship  of  its  gods  was  ended  with  its 
ruin.  These  gods  were  in  due  time,  it  was  believed,  to  take  ven- 
geance on  the  conqueror.  Dionysos,  the  lord  of  the  wine-cup  and 
the  revel,  the  special  guardian  and  patron  of  the  Theban  city  and 
land,  was  not  to  be  defied  and  insulted  with  impunity  ;  and  his 
hand  was  seen  in  the  awful  crimes  committed  in  the  far  East  by  the 
27* 


634  THE  KINGS  OF  MACEDON.  [Book  V. 

drunken  madman  whose  victories  had  led  him  to  believe  in  his  own 
divinity. 

But  for  the  present  the  only  hindrance  to  his  eastern  enterprise 
was  removed   from  the   path   of  Alexander.     Without   turning 

.  ,  aside  to  Athens  he  went  on  to  Corinth  to  receive  again 
Corinth.         the  adulations  of  the  independent  Greeks,  and  to  find 

^^^■*''  a  less  courtly  speaker,  it  is  said,  in  the  Cynic  Diogenes 
who,  on  being  asked  wbether  Alexander  could  do  anything  to 
serve  him,  replied  from  his  tub  that  he  might  stand  aside  out  of 
his  sunshine.  From  Corinth  he  returned  to  Makedonia,  having  left 
Greece  for  the  last  time. 

Six  months  later  he  set  off  from  Pella,  and  crossed  the  Helles- 
pont at  Sestos,  to  appease  at  Ilion  by  a  costly  saci'ifice  the  wrath 
Pagggo-g  of  of  the  luckless  Priam,  and  then  marched  on,  with  not 
theHelles-     more  perhaps  than  30,000  infantry  and  4,000  cavalry 

334  B.C.       and  with  a  treasure  chest  almost  empty,  to  destroy  the 

AprU.  monarchy  of  Cyrus.  With  him  went  men  who  were 
to  be  linked  with  the  memory  of  his  worst  crimes  and  of  his  most 
astonishing  triumphs, — Hephaistion,  Kleitos,  Eumenes,  Seleukos, 
Ptolemy  the  son  of  Lagos,  Parmenion  with  his  sons  Philotas  and 
Nikanor.  His  work  was  more  than  half  done  when  he  stood  with 
his  army  on  Asiatic  soil.  The  Persian  fleet  might  have  baffled  him 
at  the  outset ;  but  his  Makedonian  phalanx  was  a  perfect  military 
machine  which  placed  every  enemy  at  a  serious  disadvantage. 

The  effects  of  their  discipline  on  the  ill-trained  and  ill-officered 
forces  of  the  Persians  were  to  be  seen  at  once  on  the  banks  of  the 
March  of  Granikos,  a  little  stream  flowing  to  the  Propontis  from 
Alexander  to  the  slopes  of  Ida.  Losing,  it  is  said,  only  60  of  his 
Gordion.  cavalry  and  30  of  his  Infantry,  he  annihilated  the 
Persian  force,  2,000  out  of  20,000  infantry  being  taken  prisoners, 
and  nearly  all  the  rest  slain.  The  terror  of  his  name  did  his  work, 
as  he  marched  southwards.  The  citadel  of  Sardeis  might  with 
ea.se  have  been  held  against  him  :  before  he  came  in  sight  of  the  city, 
the  Persian  governor  hastened  to  surrender  it  Avith  the  town  and 
all  its  treasure.  At  Epliesos  he  found  the  cit}^  abandoned  by  its 
garrison  :  Miletos  he  carried  by  stomi.  Before  Halikarnassos  he 
encountered  a  more  obstinate  resistance  from  tlie  Athenian 
Ephialtes ;  but  the  generalship  and  the  valor  of  the  latter  were 
of  no  avail.  Alexander  entered  Halikarnassos,  and  the  Pthodian 
Memnon  remained  shut  up  in  the  citadel.  Leaving  Ptolemy  with 
333  Bc  '^'^OO  men  to  blockade  it,  Alexander  spent  the  winter 
in  the  conquest  of  Lykia,  Pamphylia,  and  Pisidia, 
ending  his  campaign  at  Gordion  on  the  river  Sangarios, 

Here  was  preserved  the  ancient  waggon  of  Gordios,  the  mythi- 
cal   I'hrygian   king.     Whoever  could  untie  the   knot,  curiously 


Chap.  III.]  ALEXANDER  THE  GREAT.  035 

twisted  with  fibres  of  the  cornel  tree,  wliich  fastened  its  pole  to 
the  yoke,  was,  so  the  story  ran,  to  be  lord  of  Asia.  Alexander, 
as  much  at  a  loss  as  others  to  unloose  it,  cut  it  with  his  Battle  of 
sword  :  but  the  prophecy  was  none  the  less  held  to  be  Issos. 
fulfilled.  If  he  was  thus  favored  by  sentiment,  he  was  favored 
still  more  by  the  death  of  thefehodian  Memnon)without  whom 
the  Persian  fleet  became  practically  useless,  and  by  the  infatuation 
which  led  Dareios  to  abandon  the  policy  of  defence  by  sea  for 
offensive  warfare  by  land.  From  all  parts  of  his  vast  empire  was 
gathered  a  host  which  numbered,  as  some  said,  600,000  men  ;  and 
the  despot  was  as  much  elated  at  the  sight  as  Xerxes  when  he 
looked  down  on  his  motley  multitudes  at  Doriskos.  Like  Xerxes, 
he  had  one,  the  Athenian  exile  Charidemos,  by  his  side  to  warn 
him  that  Asiatic  myriads  were  not  to  be  trusted  in  an  encounter 
with  the  disciplined  thousands  of  Alexander;  but  he  lacked  the 
generosity  which  made  Xerxes  dismiss  Demaratos  with  a  smile  for 
his  goodwill.  Dareios  seized  the  exile  with  his  own  hand  and  gave 
him  over  to  the  executioner.  '  My  avenger,'  said  Charidemos, 
'  will  soon  teach  you  that  I  have  spoken  the  truth.'  The  Persian 
acted  as  though  he  wished  to  bring  about  the  speediest  fulfilment 
of  the  prediction.  Between  himself  and  the  invader  lay  the  huge 
range  of  Tauros  and  the  passes  of  the  Armenian,  Kilikian,  andAssy- 
rian  gates,  all  of  them  practically  impregnable  ;  but  the  warning 
of  Mcmnon  to  confine  himself  to  these  defences  was  cast  to  the 
winds.  The'Greek  mercenaries  were  withdrawn  from  the  fleet  to 
be  added  to  the  land  forces  :  but  although  a  hundred  of  these 
could  have  effectually  barred  the  passage  of  Alexander,  the  invader 
was  suffered  to  cross  the  mountain  defile  without  the  loss  of  a  man. 
Nay,  so  great  was  the  contempt  of  Dareios  for  the  fe  w  thousands  of 
the  enemy  that  he  wished  to  give  them  a  free  path  until  they  reached 
the  plain  from  which,  as  he  thought,  he  would  sweep  them  away. 
But  he  could  not  wait  patiently  for  Alexander  at  Sochoi  to  the  east 
of  the  Amanian  range.  Alexander  had  been  ill,  and  he  had  work 
to  do  in  subjugating  western  Kilikia.  When  at  length  the  invader 
set  out  on  his  march  towards  the  southern  Amanian  pass,  Dareios 
with  his  huge  unwieldy  train  crossed  the  northern  pass  and  took 
possession  of  Issos  two  days  after  Alexander  had  left  it.  lie  had 
placed  himself  in  a  trap.  Alexander  hurried  back  to  the  Kilikian 
gates,  and  thence  advanced  to  the  slaughter,  for  battle  it  cannot  be 
called.  In  a  space  barely  more  than  a  mile  and  a  half  in  width, 
hemmed  in  by  the  mountains  on  the  one  side  and  the  sea  on  the 
other,  Dareios  on  his  royal  chariot,  in  the  midst  of  multitudes  who 
had  scarcely  room  to  move,  awaited  the  attack.  Alexander  fell 
suddenly  on  his  right  wing.  The  first  onset  was  enough.  The 
Persians  broke  and  fled.     Dareios,  thinking  himself  in  danger, 


636  THE  KINGS  OF  MACEDON.  [Book  V. 

turned  his  chariot  and  fled  amongst  the  foremost.  The  Persian 
centre  behaved  well,  but  it  mattered  little  now  what  they  might 
do.  Even  the  Greek  mercenaries,  the  best  troops  in  the  Persian 
service,  were  pushed  back  and  scattered.  The  work  of  death  was 
done  as  much  by  the  Persians  themselves  as  by  their  pursuers. 
Four  thousand  talents  filled  the  treasure-chests  of  the  conqueror ; 
and  the  wife,  mother,  and  son  of  Dareios  appearing  before  him  as 
prisoners  were  told  that  they  should  retain  their  royal  titles,  his 
enterprise  being  directed  not  against  Dareios  personally  but  to 
decide  fairly  and  openly  who  should  be  lord  of  Asia. 

The  true  value  of  armed  Asiatic  hordes  was  now  as  clear  as 
the  sun  at  noonday.  Parmenion  advanced  to  attack  Damascus  ; 
Expedition  but  he  needed  not  to  strike  a  blow.  The  governor 
iikia.  Fall  allowed  the  treasures  in  his  charge  to  fall  into  his 
of  Tyre.  hands  and  then  suiTcndered  the  city.  Alexander  him- 
self marched  southwards  to  Phenicia.  At  Marathons  he  replied  to 
a  letter  in  wliich  Dareios  demanded  the  restoration  of  his  family 
and  reproached  him  for  his  wanton  aggression.  His  answer  repeated 
what  he  had  already  said  to  his  wife,  adding  that  if  he  wrote  again 
Dareios  must  address  him  not  as  his  equal  but  as  his  lord.  '  I  am 
now  master  of  Asia,'  lie  wrote,  '  and  if  you  will  not  own  me  as 
such,  I  shall  treat  you  as  an  evildoer.  If  you  wish  to  debate  the 
point,  do  so  like  a  man  on  the  field  of  battle,  I  shall  take  care  to 
find  you  wherever  you  may  be.'  The  island  city  of  Arados  was 
surrendered  on  liis  approach.  Sidon  opened  her  gates.  Frum  the 
Tyrians  he  received  a  submission  which  only  refused  his  request  to 
offer  within  their  walls  a  sacrifice  to  their  god  Melkarth  whom  he 
chose  to  identify  with  his  own  alleged  progenitor  Herakles.  This 
reservation  he  determined  to  treat  as  a  defiance.  For  seven  months 
the  siesje  went  on  :  but  the  issue  was  certain.     When 

332  B  c  ^ 

at  lengtli  the  southern  wall  was  breached,  Alexander 
was  among  the  foremost  Avho  found  their  way  in.  The  Tyrians 
sold  their  lives  dearly,  and  Alexander  on  getting  possession  of  the 
city  lianged  2,000  of  them,  it  is  said,  on  the  seashore.  The  sur- 
vivors with  the  women  and  children  were  sold  as  slaves. 

Before  the  catastroplie  of  the  great  I'henician  city  Alexander 
had  received  a  second  letter  in  which  Dareios  offered  him  his 
March  into  daughter  in  marriage  together  with  the  session  of  all 
FoumViti"  of  lii'ids  to  the  west  of  the  fcluphrates.  '  Were  I  Alex- 
Alexandria,  jinder,'  said  Parmenion  (if  we  may  believe  the  story), 
'I  should  take  these  terms  and  run  no  further  risk.'  '  So  should 
I,'  answered  Alexander,  '  if  I  were  Parmenion  :  but  as  I  am  Alex- 
ander, I  cannot.'  So  he  wrote  to  Dareios  after  this  fashion.  '  You 
offer  me  part  of  your  possessions,  Mhen  I  am  lord  of  all.  I  will 
not  take  it.  If  I  choose  to  marry  your  daughter,  I  will  do  so, 
whether  you  like  it  or  not.     Come  to  me  yourself,  if  you  wish  for 


Chap.  III.]  ALEXANDER  THE  GREAT.  63Y 

gentle  treatment.'  Dareios  sent  no  more  letters.  The  issue,  he 
saw,  must  be  determined  by  the  sword.  For  the  present  he  was 
left  to  himself.  Alexander's  face  was  turned  towards  Egypt. 
Gaza  stood  in  his  path  and  dared  to  resist  his  will.  A  siege  of 
tvyo  months  was  followed  by  a  ruin  as  complete  as  that  of  Tyre. 
From  Gaza  a  march  of  seven  days  brought  him  to  Pelonsion.  The 
Persian  governor  opened  its  gates  to  receive  him,  and  the  Egyptians 
expressed  their  delight  at  exchanging  a  Persian  for  a  Makedonian 
master.  Marching  in  triumph  to  Memphis,  he  offered  solemn 
sacrifice  to  the  calf-god  Apis,  and  then  with  tlie  true  instinct  of 
the  ruler  and  the  statesman  he  hastened  to  found  for  his  new  king- 
dom the  new  capital  which  after  nearly  two  millenniums  remains 
a  highway  for  the  commerce  of  three  continents. 

Success  thus  unparalleled  was,  it  would  seem,  already  producing 
its  effects  upon  him.  Calmly  reviewing  the  marvellous  course  of 
his  march  from  Sestos  and  Ilion  to  the  Egyptian  Mem-  Battle  of 
phis,  he  could  explain  it  only  on  the  supposition  that  Ga'iftlame^a. 
he  was  no  child  of  a  human  father,  and  he  determined  33i  »•«• 
to  obtain  from  the  oracle  of  Amoun  in  the  Libyan  Oasis  a  solution 
of  this  mystery.  The  response  greeted  him  as  the  son  not  of  Phi  lip 
but  of  Zeus ;  and  he  returned  with  the  conviction  that  the  divine 
honors  paid  to  Herakles  and  Perseus  were  his  own  by  indubitable 
right.  Marching  back  into  Phenicia,  he  hastened  to  Thapsakos 
and  there  crossed  the  Euphrates.  Thence  turning  northwards  he 
made  a  sweep  which  brought  him  to  the  Tigris  below  Nineveh 
(Mosul),  and  then  without  opposition  crossed  a  stream  where  the 
resistance  of  a  few  hundreds  miglit  have  destroyed  his  whole  force. 
After  a  few  days'  march  to  the  southeast  he  received  the  news  that 
Dareios  with  his  army  was  close  at  hand.  Still  convinced  that 
mere  numbers  must  with  ample  space  decide  the  issue  of  any  fight, 
and  attributing  his  defeat  at  Issos  only  to  the  cramped  position  of 
his  troops,  the  Persian  king  had  gathered  avast  horde,  which  some 
represent  as  more  tiian  a  million,  on  the  broad  plain  stretching 
from  Gaugamela  eastward  to  Arbela.  His  hopes  were  further 
raised  by  changes  made  in  the  weapons  of  his  troops  and  more 
especially  in  the  array  of  his  war-chariots.  For  the  Makedonians 
it  is  enough  to  say  that  they  were  led  by  a  man  whose  generalship 
had  never  shone  more  conspicuously  than  in  the  cautious  arrange- 
ments which  preceded  the  battle  of  Arbela,  or  rather  of  Gauge- 
mela.  All  went  as  he  had  anticipated.  As  at  Issos,  the  despot 
fled  ;  and  the  bravery  and  even  gallantry  of  the  Persians  opposed 
to  Parmenion  were  of  no  avail  when  the  main  body  luid  hurried 
away  after  the  king.  So  ended  the  last  of  the  three  battles  which 
had  sufficed  to  destroy  the  Persian  empire,  or  rather  to  put  Alex- 
ander in  the  place  of  the  Great  King  ;  and  the  first  scene  in  the 
great  drama  of  Alexander's  life  was  ended. 


638  THE  KINGS  OF  MACEDON.  [Book  V. 

The  victory  of  Gaugamela  opened  for  tlie  conqueror  the  gates 

of  Babylon  and  Sousa.    The  treasures  found  in  the  former  furnished 

,      ,  an  ample   donative  for  all  his  men  :  those    of   Sousa 

Surrender  of  ^      ,     .      .  .  ,  ,  ,  .,,. 

Babylon,  amounted,  it  IS  said,  to  nearly  twelv^e  million  pounds 
and^Pasar-'  Sterling.  The  Persian  king  had  wasted  men  on  the 
gadai.  battlefield  ;  he  had  hoarded   coin,  which,  freely  spent 

331-330  BC-  1  '  '  J      I 

■  in  getting  up  a  Greek  army  under  Greek  generals, 
might  have  rendered  the  enterprise  of  Alexander  impossible.  From 
Sousa  Alexander  turned  his  face  towards  Persepolis,  the  ancient 
capital  of  Cyrus.  Before  him  lay  the  fastnesses  of  the  Uxians  to 
whom  the  Persian  monarch s  had  been  accustomerl  to  pay  tribute 
when  they  went  from  the  one  capital  to  the  other.  The  same 
demand  was  now  made  to  Alexander,  who  told  them  to  come  to 
the  pass  and  take  it,  and  then  following  a  new  track  which  had 
been  pointed  out  to  him  descended  on  their  villages  and  taught 
them  that  they  had  now  to  deal  with  a  sovereign  of  another  kind. 
With  Persepolis  Pasargadai,  the  city  which  contained  the  tomb  of 
Cyrus,  opened  its  gates  to  receive  the  avenger  of  the  iniquities 
of  Xerxes.  As  such,  he  determined  to  intliot  on  Dareios  a  signal 
punishment.  Five  thousand  camels  and  a  crowd  of  mules  bore 
away  the  treasure  amounting,  it  is  said,  to  nearly  thirty  millions 
of  pounds  sterling  ;  and  then  the  citadel  was  set  on  fire.  The  men 
in  the  city  were  killed,  the  women  made  slaves  ;  and  smoking 
ruins  alone  remained  to  tell  of  a  sentence  deliberately  passed  and 
coolly  executed.' 

For  a  month  he  allowed  his  main  army  to  rest  near  Persepolis  : 
for  himself  there  could  be  no  repose.  With  his  cavalry  he  overran 
Death  of  ^"*^  ^^  spite  of  the  rigors  of  winter  in  a  desolate  land 
Dareios.  ]\o.  subdued  the  whole  region  of  Farsistan.  Then  re- 
turning to  Persepolis,  he  set  forth  on  his  march  to 
Media  where  the  fugitive  king  had  hoped  to  be  safe  from  his  })ur- 
suit.  Dareios  had  left  Agbatana  eight  days  before  his  pursuer 
could  reach  it.  In  this  ancient  fastness  of  the  Median  and  Persian 
sovereigns  Alexander  deposited  his  treasures,  exceeding  it  is  said 
forty  millions  sterling  in  amount,  under  the  charge  of  a  strong 
Makedonian  garrison,  headed  by  Parmenion.  lie  then  hastened 
on  towards  the  Caspian  gates,  and  learnt,  when  he  had  passed 
them,  that  Dareios  had  been  dethroned  and  was  now  the  prisoner 
of  the  Paktriun  satrap  Bcssos.  The  tidings  made  Alexander  still 
more  eager  to  seize  him.  His  efforts  were  so  far  successful  that 
Bessos  felt  escape  to  be  hopeless  unless  Dareios  could  be  made  to 
leave  liis  chariot  and  flv  on  horsoback.  Dareios  refused  to  obey. 
He  was  found  soon  afterwards  by  a  Makedonian  soldier,  mortally 
wounded,  and  <licd  before  Alexander  could  come  to  him. 

The  conqueror  now  sat  on  the  tb.rone  of  Xerxes  a.id  felt  or  pro- 

'  Curlius,  vii.  23  ;  Strabo.  xv.   p.   814;  Contents  to  Book   XV^TT.  of 
Dinflorop 


Chap.  III.]  ALEXANDER  THE  GREAT.  639 

fessed  to  feel  himself  his  successor.  Ilis  course  of  conquest  was 
still  unbroken  ;  but  successful  forays  against  the  Mar- 
dians  on  the  northern  slopes  of  Mount  Elbruz,  against  piinotasand 
the  Arians  of  the  modern  Herat  and  the  Drangians  of  Parmenion. 
tlip  present  Seiestan,  were  followed  by  an  exploit  of  another  sort. 
He  had  heard  that  a  conspiracy  against  himself  had  been  revealed 
to  Philotas,  son  of  Parmenion,  and  that  Philotas  for  two  days  had 
kept  the  secret  to  himself.  On  being  asked  why  he-  had  done 
this,  Philotas  answered  that  his  information  came  from  a  worthless 
source  and  deserved  no  notice.  Alexander  professed  himself  fully 
satisfied  with  the  explanation ;  but  Philotas,  it  seems,  had  spoken 
freely  to  his  mistress  Antigone  of  the  large  share  which  he  and 
his  father  had  had  in  the  conquests  of  Alexander,  and  Antigone 
had  in  her  turn  become  an  informer.  Of  real  evidence  against  Phi- 
lotas there  was  not  a  shred,  and  a  letter  from  Parmenion  to  his  son, 
found  when  Philotas  was  treacherously  arrested,  cuuld  tell  against 
them  only  in  the  eyes  of  one  who  was  resolved  that  Philotas  should 
die.  But  Alexander  could  not  rest  content  with  his  death  alone. 
There  had  been  nothing  yet,  even  in  the  way  of  shadowy  slander, 
to  criminate  Parmenion  ;  and  he  resolved  that  the  needful  charges 
should  be  drawn  by  tortures  from  his  son.  Hidden  by  a  curtain, 
the  conqueror  of  the  world  watched  the  agonies  and  scofEed  at  the 
screams  of  the  friend  who  had  fought  by  his  side  in  a  hundred 
fights.'  The  issue  was,  or  was  said  to  be,  what  he  desired.  Philotas 
had  confessed  ;  and  Alexander  sent  off  to  Agbatana  a  man  bearing 
two  dispatches,  one  to  cheat  Parmenion  into  a  false  security,  the 
other  conveying  to  the  oflBcers  next  to  him  in  command  the  real 
order  for  his  assassination.  The  old  man  was  reading  the  lying 
letter  of  the  despot,  when  he  received  a  mortal  stab  in  his  back. 
The  soldiers  on  hearing  of  this  dastardly  deed  furiously  de- 
manded the  surrender  of  the  assassins,  and  were  with  difficulty 
withheld  from  taking  summary  vengeance  on  seeing  the  written 
orders  of  Alexander.  The  command  of  Philotas,  who  had  been 
at  the  head  of  the  Companion-cavalry,  was  shared  between  Kleitos 
and  Hephaistion  ;  and  Alexander  turned  from  private  murder  to 
public  war. 

The  autumn  and  winter  were  spent  in  overruning  parts  of  the 
modern  Afghanistan  and  Cabul,  in  the  foundation  of  the  Caucasian 
Alexandria,  and  in  the  passage  of  the  Hindu-Kush.  passao-e  of 
He  was  now  in  the  satrapy  of  Bessos.  The  surrender  the  Jaxartes 
of  Aornos  and  of  Baktra  was  followed  by  the  passage  "  "  ^'^' 
of  the  Oxus,  and  by  the  betrayal  of  Bessos,  who  was  sent  naked 
and  in  chains  to  the  city  which  had  been  his  capital.  His  next 
exploit  was  the  slaughter,  in  Sogdiana,  of  the  descendants  of  the 
Milesian  Branchidai  who,  having  incurred  the  hatred  of  their 
^  Plutarch,  Alex.  49  ;  Curtius,  vi.  11,  15. 


6iO  THE  KINGS  OF  MACEDON.  [Book  V, 

fellow-Greeks  for  surrendering  to  Xerxes  the  treasures  of  their 
temple,  had  followed  the  despot  on  his  retreat,  and  had  been  by 
him  placed  in  this  distant  region.  Five  generations  had  passed 
away  since  that  time,  -when  Alexander  gave  the  order  that  not 
one  of  them,  man,  woman,  or  child,  should  be  left  alive.  The 
massacre  was  followed  by  the  destruction  of  their  city,  their 
gardens,  and  their  groves,  of  everything,  in  shorty  which  might 
serve  to  sliow  that  the  place  had  ever  been  inhabited.  Thence,  by 
way  of  Marakanda  (Samarcand)  he  reached  the  Jaxartes  (which 
he  believed  to  be  the  Tanais  or  Don),  and  on  its  banks  laid  the 
foundations  of  another  Alexandria.'  Presently  he  crossed  the 
river  to  chase  some  Scythians  who  showed  themselves  on  the 
further  side  ;  and  the  end  of  this  chase  which  was  extended  over 
a  few  miles  marked  the  northernmost  point  reached  in  his  cam- 
paign.  The  winter  was  spent  in  the  Baktrian  city  of 
Zariaspa,  where  Alexander,  summoning  Bessos  before 
him,  had  his  nose  and  ears  cut  off,'  and  then  sent  him  to  be  killed 
by  his  countrymen  at  Agbatana. 

In  the  following  summer,  his  army  was  gathered  again  at 
Marakanda.  Repose  from  field-Avork  left  room  for  the  display  of 
Murder  of  ^^^^  overbearing  pride  natural  in  one  who  had  con- 
Kk-itos.  vinced  himself  that  he  was  a  god,  and  for  the  bound- 
less flattery  of  those  who  found  their  interest  in 
keeping  up  the  delusion.  But  there  were  not  wanting  others  to 
whom  this  arrogance  and  servility  were  intensely  disgusting.  The 
anger  of  tliese  men  was  the  more  fierce  from  the  necessity  of 
avoiding  all  open  expression  of  it ;  but  in  the  banquets  of  the 
divine  son  of  Amoun,  there  was  always  a  risk  that  these  pent-up 
feelings  might  burst  forth  like  a  winter  torrent.  The  catastrophe 
was  not  long  in  coming.  In  a  feast  at  Marakanda,  Alexander, 
boasting  of  all  that  he  had  done  since  the  death  of  his  father,  took 
credit  farther  for  the  victories  of  Philip  in  the  later  years  of  his 
reign.  The  patience  of  Kleitos  had  long  been  severely  taxed,  and 
in  the  heat  of  the  banquet  all  thought  of  prudence  was  cast  aside. 
lie  spoke  his  mind  plauily,  telling  Alexander  that  all  liis  exploits 
taken  together  were  not  ecjiial  to  those  of  the  man  who  had  found 
Makedonia  a  poor  and  distracted  country  and  had  left  it  a  mighty 
and  coherent  monarchy,  and  that  his  own  greatest  victories  had 
been  won  through  the  aid  of  Philip's  old  soldiers,  some  of  whom 
he  had  murdered.  Stung  to  the  quick,  Alexander  gave  utterance 
to  his  burning  rage  :  but  liis  retort  only  led  Kleitos  to  remind  him 
of  the  battlefield  of  the  Granikos,  where  he  had  saved  Alexander 
from  death  by  cutting  off  the  arm  of  the  Persian  whose  sword  was 
raised  to  smite  him,  and  to  warn  him  that,  if  he  could  not  bear 
*  Arrian,  iv.  3  ;  Curt.  vii.  6.  ^  Arrian,  iv.  7,  5. 


Chap.  III.]  ALEXANDER  THE  GREAT.  641 

to  listen  to  the  words  of  truth,  he  had  better  confine  himself  to 
the  society  of  slaves.  Alexander. felt  for  his  dagger  ;  it  had  been 
purposely  placed  out  of  his  reach.  He  called  to  his  guards  to 
sound  an  alarm  ;  they  hesitated  to  obey  the  orders  of  a  raving 
dr,unkard.  Some  of  the  more  sober  and  moderate  of  the  party 
held  him  in  their  arms,  praying  him  to  do  nothing  hastily.  By 
way  of  answer,  he  reviled  them  for  keeping  him  a  prisoner  as 
Bessos  had  kept  Dareios.  Shaking  himself  free,  he  snatched  a 
pike  from  one  of  the  guards,  and  thrust  it  through  the  body  of 
Kleitos,  bidding  him  go  to  Philip  and  Parmenion.'  The  rage  of 
the  tiger  was  followed  by  a  furious  reinorse,  in  which,  with  con- 
siderable tnith,  he  denounced  himself  as  unfit  to  live.  For  three 
days  he  would  neither  eat  nor  drink,  and  the  army,  alarmed  at  the 
threatened  starvation  of  their  king,  voted  that  Kleitos  had  been 
justly  slain,  and  that  the  body  should  not  receive  burial.  By  re- 
versing this  vote,  Alexander  seemed  to  feel  that  he  had  gone  far 
towards  acquitting  himself.  Whatever  inight  be  lacking  to  restore 
his  self-complacence  wa?  supplied  by  a  prophet,  who  assured  him 
that  the  disaster  had  been  brought  about  wholly  by  the  wine-god 
Dionysos  to  whom  he  had  offered  no  sacrifice  on  the  day  of  the 
banquet.  It  is  not  easy  to  determine  whether  the  fitter  object  for 
loathing  be  the  drunken  murderer,  or  the  wretches  who  could 
speak  of  his  mental  agonies  after  his  crime  as  entitling  him  to 
sympathy  and  praise. 

A  few  weeks  after  the  murder  of  Kleitos,  Alexander  captured 
the  Sogdian  rock,  a  fastness  from  which  common  care  would  pro- 
bably have  sent  him  away  bafiied.  Having  next  re- ,,  , 
duced  the  rock  of  Chorienes,  he  returned  to  Baktra  Kallisthenes. 
to  celebrate  his  marriage  with  Roxana,  the  daughter  of  328  b.c. 
Oxyartes,  who  had  been  among  the  captives  taken  on  the  Sogdian 
rock.  The  marriage  feast  was  seized  by  Alexander  as  an  oppor- 
tunity for  extracting  from  his  Greek  and  Makedonian  followers  a 
public  acknowledgment  of  his  divinity.  It  was  arranged  that 
the  sophist  Anaxarchos,  or,  as  some  said,  the  Sicilian  Kleon, 
should  make  a  speech,  advising  all  to  worship  at  once  the  man 
whom  they  would  certainly  have  to  worship  as  a  god  after  his 
death.  The  speech  was  delivered.  The  silence  of  most  of  the 
Makedonian  officers,  who  sat  unmoved,  sufficiently  expressed  their 
disgust ;  but  no  one  ventured  to  speak,  until  the  Olynthian  Kallis- 
thenes, the  nephew  of  Aristotle  and  the  author  of  a  history  which 
brought  the  narrative  of  Alexander's  campaigns  at  least  to  the 
battle  of  Gaugamela,  insisted  on  the  impiety  of  all  attempts  to  con- 
found the  distinction  between  gods  and  men.     Conceding  to  the 

'  Curt.  viii.  1  ;  Arrian,  iv.  1  ;  Plutarch,  Alex.  50-1. 


642  THE  KINGS  OF  MACEDON.  [Book  V. 

conqueror  the  highest  place  amongst  niiUtary  leaders  and  the  first 
rank  amongst  statesmen,  he  rebuked  Anaxarchos  for  making  a  sug- 
gestion which  ought  to  have  come  from  anyone  rather  than  from 
himself/  The  applause  which  his  words  drew  from  the  Makedo- 
nians  showed  Alexander  that  open  opposition  would  be  useless  ; 
but  he  was  none  the  more  turned  from  his  purpose.  It  was  not  long 
before  he  found  a  pretext  for  the  murder  of  Kallisthenes.  A  con- 
spiracy was  discovered  amongst  his  pages.  These  unfortunate 
men  were  tortured  (but  without  extracting  from  them  anything  to 
implicate  Kallisthenes),  and  then  stoned  to  death,  as  Alexander 
would  have  it,  not  by  his  orders,  but  by  the  loyal  impulse  of  liis 
army.  Kallisthenes,  he  was  resolved,  he  said,  himself  to  punish, 
together  with  those  who  had  sent  him, — an  insinuation  manifestly 
against  his  uncle  Aristotle,  possibly  also  against  all  those  Greeks 
for  whom  freedom  of  speech  and  action  had  not  yet  altogether  lost 
its  value.  The  philosopher  who  had  extolled  Alexander  as  the 
greatest  of  earthly  generals  and  statesmen  was  first  put  to  tlie 
torture  and  then  hanged,  and  the  conqueror  went  quietly  on  to 
subdue  the  regions  between  the  Hindu  Kush  and  the  right  bank  of 
the  Indus,  and  to  storm  the  impregnable  rock  of  Aornos.  It  was 
the  old  story.  On  the  one  side  Avas  an  iron  discipline,  a  careful 
commissariat,  and  Aveapons  with  which  none  others  could  compete  ; 
on  the  other,  a  total  want  of  concert,  utter  ignorance  of  all  scientific 
warfare,  and  a  vague  fear  of  the  masses  of  men  who,  acting  with 
the  precision  of  machinery,  swept  away  everything  that  came  in 
their  path. 

The  next  river  to  be  crossed  was  the  Indus.  The  bridge  was  con- 
structed by  Ilephuistion  and  Perdikkas  probably  near  the  present 
Alexander  in  Attock.  Tlie  surrender  of  Taxila  left  Alexander  an 
the  land  of  open  path  until  he  reached  the  Ilydaspes  (Jelum), 
Streams.  where  Poros  was  beaten  only  after  a  severe  struggle. 
326 B.C.  iji^e  Indian  prince  was  taken  prisoner  and  treated 
with  the  courtesy  which  the  family  of  Dareios  had  received  aftoi-  the 
battle  of  Issos.  Uere  died  Alexander's  horse  Boukephalos  (Buce- 
phalus) ;  and  the  loss  was  commemorated  by  the  founding  of 
Boukephalia.  The  passage  of  the  Akesines  (Chenab),  running  with 
a  full  and  impetuous  stream,  was  not  accomplished  without  much 
danger :  that  of  the  Hydraotcs  (Ravee)  presented  less  formidable 
difficulties,  but  he  was  encountered  on  the  other  side  by  Indians 
who  intrenched  themselves  strongly  in  their  town  of  Sangala. 
Their  resistance  ended,  it  is  said,  in  the  slaughter  of  1 7,000  and  the 
capture  of  70,000.  About  forty  miles  furtlier  to  the  south-cast 
fl<>wed  the  llyphasis  (Sutlej).     He  approached  its  banks  in  the 

•  Arrian,  iv.  11. 


Chap.  III.]  ALEXANDER  THE  GREAT.  643 

full  confidence  that  a  few  days  more  would  bring  him  to  the  mighty 
stream  of  the  Ganges,  But  he  had  reached  the  goal  of  his  con- 
quests. The  order  for  crossing  the  stream  called  forth  murmurs 
and  protests  at  once  from  his  officers  and  from  the  soldiers,  who 
expressed  plainly  their  refusal  to  march  they  knew  not  whither. 
Alexander,  in  ire,  laid  before  his  officers  liis  schemes  of  further 
conquest :  but  when  he  offered  the  sacrifice  customary  before 
crossing  a  river,  the  signs  were  pronounced  to  be  unfavorable. 
The  die  was  cast.  Twelve  mighty  altars  remained  to  show  that 
Alexander  liad  advanced  thus  far  on  his  conquest  of  the  world  ;  and 
in  the  midst  of  deluges  of  rain  the  army  set  out  on  its  westward 
journey.  The  reinforcements  which  he  found  on  reaching  the 
Hydaspes  might,  if  they  had  advanced  as  far  as  the  Hyphasis, 
have  turned  the  scale  in  favor  of  further  progress  to  the  east : 
they  enabled  Alexander  to  undertake  with  greater  ease  Nov. "326 
a  voyage  down  the  Hydaspes  to  its  junction  with  the  Aug.  325b.c. 
Indus  after  receiving  the  waters  of  the  Akesines,  Hydraotes,  and 
Hyphasis,  and  thence  onwards  to  the  Indian  ocean. 

From  the  mouth  of  the  Indus  he  ordered  his  admiral  Nearchos 
to  take  the  fleet  along  the  shores  of  the  ocean  and  the  Persian  Gulf 
to  the  mouth   of  the  Tigris.     The  armv  marched  by   „  , 

111  1      1       /-I     1        •         1  /v    "•  <•  Return  to 

land  tlirough  the  Gedrosian  desert,  suneruig  more  from  Sousa. 
thirst  and  sickness  than  they  had  suifered  in  all  their  324  b.c. 
battles  and  forced  marches.  At  length  he  reached  Pasargadai  to 
find  the  toinb  of  Cyrus  broken  open  and  plundered,  and  to  avenge 
the  insult  offered  to  the  man  whom  he  regarded  as  the  founder  of 
his  own  dynasty.  Early  in  the  following  year  he  entered  Sousa,  and 
there  celebrated  his  marriage  with  Stateira,  the  daughter  of  Dareios, 
and  Parysatis,  the  daughter  of  Ochos  the  predecessor  of  Dareios. 
These  Asiatizing  marriages  were  by  many  regarded  with  feelings  of 
dislike  ;  and  Alexander  sought  to  render  them  popular  by  offering 
to  pay  the  debts  of  his  soldiers — a  strange  mode  of  winning  over 
sober  and  steady  men  who  had  no  debts,  but  an  effectual  argu- 
ment for  the  spendthrifts  and  ruffians  of  his  army.  His  new 
levies  of  Persian  youths,  armed  and  disciplined  after  the  Make- 
donian  fashion,  had  now  made  him  independent  of  his  veterarU 
soldiers  ;  and  his  declared  intention  of  sending  home  the  aged  and 
wounded  among  them  called  forth  the  angry  remonstrances  of  their 
comrades,  who  bade  him  complete  his  schemes  of  conquest  with  the 
aid  of  his  father  Amoun.  Alexander  rushed  into  the  throng,  seized 
some  and  had  them  executed,  and  then  disbanded  the  whole  force. 
For  two  days  he  shut  himself  up  in  his  palace,  leaving  the  soldiers 
without  orders  ;  on  the  third  he  marshalled  his  Persian  levies 
(Epigonoi,  as  he  called  them)  into  divisions,  bearing  the  Makedonian 
military  titles,  under  Persian  officers.     The  spirit  of  the  veterans 


644  THE  KINGS  OF  MACEDON.  [Book  V. 

was  completely  broken  by  this  thorough  ignoring  of  their  existence. 
They  threw  down  their  arms  at  the  palace  gates  and  begged  forgive- 
ness with  cries  and  tears.  Alexander  accepted  their  contrition,  and* 
the  restoration  of  harmony  was  celebrated  by  a  sumptuous  sacrifice. 
But  for  Alexander  past  victories  were  only  a  stimulus  to  further 
exploits.  Arabia  still  remained  unsubdued,  and  for  this  conquest 
„    ,,    ,        a  vast  addition  was   needed  to  his  fleet.     Orders  were 

Death  of  t^i        •    •       c  i  •  <■      i  • 

Hephaisitiou.  Sent  to  1  henicia  ror  the  construction  or  ships,  which 
324  B.C.  ^vere  to  be  taken  to  pieces  and  sent  overland  to  Thap- 
sakos  on  the  Euphrates,  while  others  were  to  be  built  at  Babylon. 
But  the  shadows  of  death  were  soon  to  fall  upon  him.  The 
journey  to  Agbatana  was  marked  by  a  violent  quarrel  between 
Eumenesand  Ilephaistion  ;  their  reconciliation  was  soon  followed 
by  the  death  of  the  latter  from  an  attack  of  fever.  Tlie  grief  of 
the  conqueror  was  as  fierce  as  that  of  Achilleus  ;  it  would  perhaps 
be  not  unfair  to  set  it  down  as  a  deliberate  imitation  of  it.  For 
two  days  he  neither  ate  nor  drank  ;  he  cut  his  hair  short,  and  ordered 
that  the  horses  and  mules  in  his  army  should  have  their  manes 
docked  also.  Human  blood  could  scarcely  be  shed  with  pnidence 
on  his  pyre  ;  but  he  was  resolved  that  his  friend  should  begin  his 
life  in  the  unseen  world  with  unstinted  wealth,  and  the  precious 
things  burnt  on  his  funeral  pile  at  Babylon  (the  sides  of  the  square 
being  a  furlong  in  length)  represented,  it  is  said,  a  sum  of  nearly  two 
million  and  a  half  pounds  sterling.  Messengers  were  sent  to  the 
Egyptian  oracle  to  ask  if  the  dead  man  might  be  woi-shipped  as  a 
god  ;  and  Eumenes,  with  many  others,  took  care  to  anticipate  its 
answer  by  offering  him  such  honors  as  might  fall  in  with  the 
liumor  of  the  divine  mourner.  His  grief  seemed  to  serve  no 
other  purpose  than  to  render  his  bursts  of  passion  more  fearful. 
None  dared  to  address  liiin  except  in  the  language  of  the  most 
grovelling  flattery  ;  and,  in  the  words  of  Plutarch,  his  only  conso- 
lation ftas  found  in  his  old  habit  of  man-hunting.  The  diversion 
was  this  time  furnished  by  the  Kossaians,  some  mountain  tribes 
between  Media  and  Farsistan. 

His  march  to  Ixibvlon  steeped  hun  still  more  in  the  intoxication 
of  success.  As  he  ailvanced  on  his  path,  he  was  met  by  ambassa- 
Death  of  dors  not  only  from  lUyrians  and  Thrakians,  from  Sicily 
AUxiinder at  r^y^f[    Sardinia,    from   Libya  and   Carthage,   but   from 

Biitjjlon.  .  J  p   ' 

;i23jB.c.  Lucanians  and  Etruscans,  and,  as  some  said,  irom  Kome 
itself.  He  received  the  worship  of  Ethiopians  and  Scythians,  of 
Iberians  and  (xauls,  and  even  of  (ireeks,  who  entered  his  presence 
with  wreaths  on  their  heads,  f>fferin!4  him  golden  crowns.  The  lord 
of  all  the  earth  could  scarcely  look  for  wider  acknowledgment 
or  more  devout  submission  ;  but  his  self-gratulation  may  have 
been  damped  by  the  warning  of  the  Chaldean  priests,  that  it  would 


Chap.  III.J  ALEXANDER  THE  GREAT.  645 

be  safer  for  him  not  to  enter  tlie  walls  of  Babylon.  For  a  while 
he  hesitated  ;  but  he  had  more  to  do  tlian  to  heed  their  words. 
The  preparations  for  his  Arabian  campaign  must  be  hurried  on. 
All  that  inio-ht  be  needed  must  be  done  to  improve  the  navigation 
of  the  Euphrates  ;  a  new  city  must  be  built  to  rival  perhaps  the 
Alexandria  which  he  had  founded  on  the  banks  of  the  Nile  ;  and 
his  Persian  levies  must  be  disciplined  into  masses  as  formidable  as 
those  which  had  fought  his  own  battles  and  the  battles  of  the  father 
whom  he  disowned.  More  than  all,  he  had  to  celebrate-  the 
obsequies  of  Ilephaistion,  whose  body  had  been  brought  to  Babylon 
from  Agbatana,  The  feasting  which  everywhere  accompanied  the 
funeral  rites  of  the  ancient  Aryans  was  exaggerated  by  the  Make- 
donians,  as  by  other  half-rude  or  savage  tribes,  into  prolonged 
revelry.  Alexander  spent  the  whole  night  in  the  house  of  his 
friend  Medios  in  drinking,  and  the  whole  of  the  next  day  in 
sleeping  ofE  his  drunkenness.  Throughout  the  following  night  the 
same  orgies  were  repeated.'  When  he  awoke  in  the  morning,  he 
was  unable  to  rise.  Fever  had  laid  its  grasp  upon  him,  and  each  day 
its  grasp  became  tighter,  while  he  busied  himself  incessantly  with 
giving  orders  about  his  army,  his  fleet,  his  generals,  until  at  length 
the  powers  of  speech  began  to  fail.  When  asked  to  name  his 
successor,  he  said  that  he  left  his  kingdom  to  the  strongest  (or  the 
worthiest).  His  signet  ring  he  took  from  his  finger  and  gave  to  Per- 
dikkas.  Throughout  the  army  the  tidings  of  his  illness  spread 
consternation.  Old  grudges  were  all  forgotten.  His  veterans  forced 
themselves  into  his  presence,  and  with  tears  bade  farewell  to  their 
general  whose  signs  showed  that  he  still  knew  them.  A  few  hours 
later  Alexander  died,  after  a  reign  of  less  than  thirteen  years,  and 
before  he  had  reached  the  age  of  thirty-three. 

That  the  schemes  with  which  almost  to  the  last  moment  he 
had  been  absorbingly  busied  must,  had  he  lived,  have  been  in  great 
part  realised,  can  scarcely  be  doubted,  unless  we  sup-  purposes 
pose  that  causes  were  at  work  which  at  no  distant  of'^i^xan^^* 
period  would  disturb  and  upset  the  balance  of  his  der. 
military  judgment,  and  deprive  him  of  that  marvellous  power  of 
combination,  and  of  shaping  means  to  circumstances,  in  which 
Hannibal  and  Napoleon  are  his  only  peers.  It  would  be  rash  to 
say  that  such  a  darkening  of  his  splendid  powers  might  not  have 
been  brought  about  even  before  he  could  reach  middle  age.  In 
truth,  except  as  a  general,  he  had  lost  the  balance  of  his  mind 
already.  The  despot  who  fancied  himself  a  god,  who  could  thrust 
a  pike  through  the  body  of  one  friend,  and  sneer  at  the  cries  drawn 
forth  from  another  by  the  agonies  of  torture,  who  could  order  the 

'  Arrian,  vii.  24-5. 


G46  THE   KINGS  OF  MACEDON.  [Book  V. 

massacre  of  Imndreds  or  of  tliousands  for  tlie  offences  of  their  remote 
forefathers,  was  already  far  removed  from  the  far-sighted  prudence 
of  the  politic  statesman  and  ruler.  His  conquests  served  great 
ends  ;  and  before  he  set  out  on  his  career  of  victory,  he  may  have 
had  some  faint  and  distant  vision  of  these  ends.  Desire  for  know- 
ledge, the  wish  to  see  new  forms  of  human  and  of  animal  life,  the 
curiosity  of  traversing  unknown  lands,  of  laying  open  their  re- 
sources, of  bringing  them  all  within  the  limits  and  the  influence  of 
the  Makedonian,  or,  as  he  sometimes  put  it,  the  Hellenic  world, 
the  eagerness  to  establish  overall  known,  possibly  overall  unknown 
regions,  a  mighty  and  centralised  empire  which  should  avail  itself 
to  the  full  of  all  their  forces  and  throw  down  the  barriers  which 
rendered  the  interchange  of  their  wealth  impossible,  may,  to  some 
extent,  have  mingled  with  his  alleged  or  h'is  real  purpose  of 
avenging  on  the  Persian  king  the  misdoings  of  Xerxes,  Dareios,  and 
Kambyses.  But  there  is  little  evidence  or  none  that  these  motives 
retained  their  power  as  he  advanced  further  on  his  path  of  victory, 
while  there  seems  to  be  evidence  only  too  abundant  that  all  other 
motives  were  gradually  and  even  fast  losing  strength  as  the  mere 
lust  of  conquest  grew  with  his  belief  or  his  fancy  of  his  superhuman 
power  and  origin.  During  his  sojourn  with  Aristotle  he  must  have 
learnt  that  real  knowledge  can  be  reached,  and  good  government 
insured,  only  where  there  is  freedom  of  thought  and  speech,  and 
where  the  people  obey  their  own  laws.  A  few  years  later  he  liad 
come  to  look  on  Aristotle  as  an  enemy  to  be  punished  with  scarcely 
less  severity  than  Kallisthenes  :  he  had  put  on  the  robes  and  tlie 
habits  of  a  Persian  despot,  and  substituted  his  own  arbitrary  will 
for  the  judicial  processes  of  law.  I'ersian  customs,  Persian  adora- 
tion and  flattery,  were  putting  more  and  more  in  the  background 
the  civilisation  which  rests  on  the  recognised  rights  and  liberties 
of  the  people ;  and  when  he  wasted  millions  on  the  pyre  of  He- 
phaistion,  it  may  almost  be  said  that  the  results  which  he  had 
achieved  were  precisely  tliose  which  would  have  followed  if  Xerxes 
liad  been  the  concjueror  at  Salamis,  I'lataiai,  and  Mykale.  If  at 
the  outset  he  wished  to  llellenize  Asia,  his  history  seems  to  show 
that  he  achieved  at  least  as  much  success  in  Asiatiziiig  Hellas. 
Nor  can  we  shut  our  eyes  to  the  vast  difterence  of  the  conditions 
under  which  his  own  wars  were  carried  on  from  those  against  which 
his  father  had  to  struggle.  Philip  made  his  rude  and  ill-armed 
mountaineers  victorious  over  the  discipline,  the  weapons,  and  the 
bravery  of  the  Greeks.  Alexander  found  those  mountaineers 
brought  to  the  highest  state  of  efhciency  under  a  military  organiza- 
tion as  complete  as  it  was  elaborate,  and  led  by  generals  each  one 
of  whom  was  almost  the  equal  of  Philip  himself.  With  these 
forces  and  these  ofHcers  he  undertook  an  enterprise  in  which  the 


Chap.  III.]  ALEXANDER   THE  GREAT.  647 

younger  Cyrus  liad  all  but  succeeded,  and  undertook  it  under 
conditions  wliicli  would  have  rendered  any  disaster  fatal.  He 
started  with  an  almost  empty  chest,  leaving  his  commissariat  prac- 
tically to  take  care  of  itself,  and  trusting  that  Antipatros  would  be 
able  to  maintain  his  authority  in  Greece  without  a  reverse.  In 
such  an  enterprise  he  must,  it  is  obvious,  have  failed,  had  lie  been 
compelled  to  face  such  enemies  as  those  with  which  Philip  had  to 
struggle  through  a  long  series  of  years.  In  short,  Kleitos  may 
have  been  impohtic  in  his  utterances  at  the  fatal  banquet ;  .but 
what  he  said  was  true.  It  would  be  unfair  to  place  Alexander  in 
the  ranks  of  tliose  scourges  of  mankind  amongst  whom  Alaric  and 
Attila,  Genghiz  and  Timour  stand  pre-eminent.  Of  the  several 
accounts  of  his  career  which  have  come  down  to  us,  not  one  un- 
happily is  strictly  contemporary  ;  and  mere  fairness  calls  upon  us 
to  give  him  the  benefit  of  a  doubt  when  this  doubt  can  be  justly 
entertained  in  reference  even  to  deeds  which  carry  with  them  an 
unutterable  horror  and  shame.  It  is  impossible  to  deny  that  with 
a  higher  sense  of  duty  Alexander  would  better  have  deserved  the 
title  of  Great.  As  it  is,  we  must  be  content  to  say  that  in  dealing 
with  the  necessities  of  the  moment  he  is  unsurpassed  by  any 
general,  whether  of  ancient  or  of  modern  times. 


BOOK    VI. 

LATER  F0BTUNE8    OF   TEE  HELLENIC  PEOPLE. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE    LAMIAN    WAR. SICILIAN    AFFAIRS    FROM  THE   USURPATION    OF 

THE    ELDER  DIONYSIOS    TO    THE    RESIGNATION    OF  TIMOLEON, 

From  the  splendid  but  rapidly  shifting  scenes  of  Alexander's 
Eastern  conquests,  we  can  turn  to  no  movements  of  large  or 
Course  of  abiding  interest  in  the  several  Hellenic  cities.  Com- 
l^enfsin  bined  action  had  been  always  difficult.  We  can 
Alexander's  scarcely  say  that  it  had  been  realised  during  the 
absence.  struggle  against  Xerxes  ;  and  since  the  fall  of  Athens,  at 
least,  it  had  become  impossible.  Spasmodic  efforts  might  show 
what  under  other  circumstances  the  people  might  have  done  :  but 
their  only  result  was  disaster.  Isolated  in  her  desperate  struggle, 
o„n  Thebes  had  been  levelled  with  the  dust :  a  catastrophe 

330  B.C.  ,  1  1  •    •  r 

scarcely  less  complete  had  put  an  end  to  the  rising  or 
the  Spartan  king,  Agis,  in  the  Pelopoimesos.  Like  Leonidas  and 
Kleombroto.s,  Agis  fell  on  the  battle-field  ;  and  with  him  Sparta 
lost  such  little  strength  as  she  had  thus  far  retained.  The  victory 
of  Alexander's  viceroy,  Antipatros,  liad  fastened  the  Makedonian 
yoke  more  firmly  on  all  the  Greek  !<tates,  and  nothing  remained, 
even  for  those  who  most  heartily  loathed  it,  but  to  continue  their 
confidence  in  the  men  who  had  done  what  they  could  to  avert  the 
ggg     ,         humiliation.     In  the  year  which  ended   the   career  of 

riiilip  by  the  daijger  of  l*aiisanias,  ^f^X-hincs  liad 
arrested,  by  the  writ  of  illegal  procedure,  the  propo.'^al  of  Ktcsij)l)on 
to  crown  Demosthenes.  The  issuing  of  this  writ  made  it  impossible 
to  bring  before  the  people  the  motion  which  had  received  the 
sanction  of  the  Senate,  until  the  question  should  have  been  judi- 
cially tried.  But  ^Eschines  was  in  no  hurry  to  bring  it  forward. 
More  than  once  tlie  accu.sers  of  Demosthenes  had  failed  to  secure 
the  votes  of  one-fifth  of  the  jurymen  ;  and  ^Eschines  must,  of 
course,  run  the  same  risk  of  incurring  the  fine  of  a  thousand 
drachmas.  On  his  part,  Demosthcnos,  especially  after  the  fearful 
doom  which  fell  on  Thebes,  might  hesitate  to  provoke  by  a  formal 


CHAP.  I.]  DEMOSTHENES  AND   TIMOLEON.  649 

challenge  a  discussion  which,  as  he  well  knew,  would  involve  a 

minute  scrutiny  of  his  whole  political  career. 

With  the  defeat  and  death  of  Agis  things  were  changed.     The 

Athenian  Demos  might  still  place  their  trust  in  the  integrity  of 

Demosthenes;  but  it  was  the  hour  of  triumph  for  the   contest be- 

partisans  of  the  Makedonian  conquerors,  and  ^Eschines    tween^s- 
I,  ii-ci-'i    chines  unci 

could  venture  to  denounce  tlie  policy  or  his  rival  DemostUe- 
as  from  beginning  to  end  the  cause  of  disaster,  and  ^'^^• 
of  nothing  but  disaster,  to  the  city.  Disdaining  to  reply  to 
the  frivolous  charges  which  accused  him  of  truckling  to  their 
foreign  master,  and  of  failing  to  turn  to  account  excellent  oppor- 
tunities for  organizing  a  powerful  resistance  to  him,  Demosthenes 
confined  himself  to  the  period  which  had  passed  since  345  gp 
the  peace  of  Philokrates,  and  contended  that  the  fearful 
disasters  which  had  befallen  the  Hellenic  world  in  no  way  affected 
the  wisdom  and  the  righteousness  of  his  policy.  He  might  have 
gone  back  to  the  earlier  time  when  the  adoption  of  his  counsel 
would,  beyond  doubt,  have  arrested  the  military  career  of  Philip 
almost  at  the  outset.  He  might  have  claimed  the  merit  of  fore- 
seeing even  then,  and  pointing  out,  the  dangers  hanging  over 
the  divided  cities  of  Greece,  and  the  paramount  need  of  doing  all 
that  they  could  to  support  the  confederacy  of  the  Olynthians.  But 
ho  was  content  to  show  that  in  making  common  cause  with  the 
Thebans  they  had  at  least  done  their  duty,  and  that  if  they  had 
failed  to  do  it,  the  keen  sense  of  disgrace  would  have  been  added 
to  the  bitter  pain  of  defeat.  What  they  had  done,  left  behind  it 
no  sting  of  humiliation.  They  had  acted  as  men  who  put  a  right 
value  on  the  freedom  which  they  had  inherited  from  their  fore- 
fathers ;  nor  apart  from  this  consciousness  was  there  anything  in 
them  to  which  he  might  effectually  appeal.  The  memory  of 
counsels  and  efforts  which,  whatever  may  have  been  the  motives 
which  prompted  them,  had  brought  little  gain  and  enormous  loss, 
would  seem  to  furnish  but  a  frail  support  against  the  insinuations 
and  falsehoods  of  unscrupulous  adversaries.  Demosthenes  could 
rely  on  nothing  else,  and  his  triumphant  acquittal  shows  the  depth 
of  the  sympathy  which  the  main  body  of  the  people  had  learnt  to 
feel  for  him.  He  had  uttered  in  their  hearing  the  funeral  oration 
of  Athenian  freedom,  and  more  than  four-fifths  of  his  judges  pro- 
nounced him  by  their  votes  to  be  deserving  of  their  gratitude. 
^Eschines  mighC,  '?ave  paid  the  fine  and  remained  at  home.  Feeling 
that  this  decision  expressed  the  real  convictions  of  his  country- 
men, he  chose  rather  to  go  into  exile.  Going  to  Rhodes,  he  setup 
a  rhetorical  school,  where,  amongst  other  exercises,  he  declaimed 
the  oration  by  which  Demosthenes  secured  the  acquittal  of 
Ktesiphon.  The  applause  with  which  it  was  received  drew  from 
28 


650  THE  LATER  GREEK  PEOPLE.  [Book  VI. 

him  the  bitter  comment  that  they  would  have   applauded  it  still 
more  if  they  had  heard  the  beast  himself  speak  it, 

^schines  never  saw  Athens  again.  Five  years  later,  Demos- 
thenes was  himself  an  exile.  When,  on  his  return  from  the  regions 
Arrival  of  Avatered  by  the  Indus,  Alexander,  resting  at  Sousa,  sum- 
Athen8°^  **    moned  before  him  the   satraps,  who,   counting  on  his 

324  B.C.  death,  had  done  pretty  much  as  they  pleased,  Har- 
palos,  the  satrap  of  Babylonia,  put  his  treasures  on  ship-board  and 
fled  to  Athens.  Here  he  hoped  that  his  wealtli  lavishly  spent  would 
rouse  the  people  to  a  determined  rebellion  against  their  Makedonian 
masters.  The  first  reports  spoke  of  his  success,  and  so  roused  the 
wrath  of  Alexander,  tliat  he  resolved  to  go  in  person  and  chastise 
the  criminal  at  Athens.  His  mind  was  soon  set  at  rest  by  the 
news  that  the  Athenians  had  refused  to  have  anything  to  do  with 
the  satrap  ;  but  his  money,  or  his  presence,  had  set  in  motion 
agencies  more  easily  stirred  than  repressed.  On  the  one  side,  the 
orator  Ilypereides  took  up  his  cause  with  a  vehemence  which  is 
at  once  explained  if  he  shared  in  the  golden  harvest,  but  which, 
on  any  oth(3r  hAqjothesis,  remains  unintelligible.  The  hatred  of 
Hypereides  for  Makedonian  rule  was  not  more  intense  than  that 
of  Demostheiics ;  yet,  in  this  case,  Demosthenes  agreed  with 
Phokion  that  any  attempt  which  might  bring  down  on  Athens 
the  vengeance  of  the  Makedonian  king  would  be  an  act  of  mad- 
ness. By  their  advice  Ilarpalos  was  arrested,  and  an  order  made 
that  his  treasures  should  be  lodged  in  the  Akropolis,  to  await  the 
decision  of  Alexander. 

Before  the  Assembly  the  satrap  stated  that  his  treasure  amounted 
to  720  talents  ;  on  being  counted,  it  was  found  to  be  no  more  than 
Charges  of  350  talents.  Demosthenes,  it  is  said,  took  no  step 
embezzle-      ^q  remove   the  false  impression,  prevalent  amonof  the 

ment  against  i,         ,  i       i  i      t    i  i  ^i       i 

Doinosthenes  people  generally,  that  the  larger  sum  had  been  lodged 
citizens"  "^  the  treasure  chamber  of  the  Parthenon.  The  charge 
324  B.C.  is  worth  nothing.  So  vast  a  sum  could  not  be  counted 
without  much  time  and  trouble,  and  for  such  purposes  there  were 
special  officers  in  whose  responsibility  Demosthenes  could  liave  no 
share.  The  duty  of  proclaiming  the  truth  lay  with  these  officers, 
and  witli  the  membei-s  of  the  Areiopagos,  who  were  charged  to 
look  into  the  matter.  At  the  end  of  six  months,  the  latter  issued 
their  report,  which  charged  Demosthenes,  among  many  other 
citizens,  with  embezzlement,  the  extent  of  his  criminality  being 
put  down  at  20  talents.  On  this  charge  he  was  tried  and  con- 
demned to  a  fine  of  50  talents.  His  whole  property  was  found  to 
fall  sliort  of  this  sum,  and  the  orator  sought  a  refuge  in  the 
Peloponnesian  Troizen.  That  there  had  been  gross  conniption  it 
is  impossible  to  doubt;  the  question  is  only  whether  the  right 
persons  were  punished,  the  business,  as  a  whole,  being  not  much 


Chap.  I.]  DEMOSTHENES   AND  TIMOLEON.  651 

more  mysterious  than  tlic  murder  of  Sir  Edmondbury  Godfrey.  It 
was  to  the  interest  of  Titus  Gates  to  have  good  evidence  for  liis  plot ; 
it  was  his  business  to  suppress  all  evidence  of  his  crime  ;  nor  v.as 
he  the  first  or  the  last  great  criminal  who  has  fully  succeeded  in 
d(Mng  so.  Hypereides  was  not  less  successful.  Ha  had  done  all 
that  he  could  to  make  his  countrymen  rush  into  a  war  with 
Alexander  on  behalf  of  Harpalos  :  Demosthenes  had  done  all  that 
he  could  to  prevent  them.  The  satrap  had  every  motive  for  attach- 
ing Hypereides  to  himself  by  bribes  ;  with  Demosthenes  he  knew 
that  his  money  would  be  only  wasted.  The  pretence  that  Demos- 
thenes could  have  filched  from  the  treasure  after  its  sequestration 
is  absurd.  From  the  hands  of  Harpalos  it  passed  directly  into  the 
hands  of  the  officers  of  the  exchequer ;  and  any  charge  of  malver- 
sation ought  to  have  been  brought  against  them,  not  against  him. 
Far  more  t^ignificant  is  the  furious  but  perfectly  barren  invective 
of  Hypereides, — -the  stormy  rhetoric  of  a  man  who  can  hide  his 
own  guilt  only  by  throwing  dirt  upon  one  who  is  innocent.  The 
sequestration  of  the  treasure,  and  the  dread  of  Alexander's 
vengeance,  would  furnish  to  those  who  had  received  the  bribes 
ample  motives  for  turning  the  thoughts  of  the  people  into  a  wrong 
channel ;  and  on  none  would  this  motive  act  so  powerfully  as  on 
Hypereides.  The  same  dread  would  infiuence  largely  the  votes  of 
the  jurymen.  Had  Hypereides  been  the  defendant,  they  would 
have  been  as  eager  to  condemn  him  as  he  had  been  earnest  in  his 
advocacy  of  Harpalos.  But  the  defendant  was  Demosthenes,  and, 
although  it  might  be  with  more  reluctance,  they  were  ready  to  con- 
demn him  also.  The  verdict  came  from  a  sense  not  of  truth, 
but  of  expediency.  It  was  necessary  to  prove  to  Alexander  that 
if  there  had  been  embezzlement  the  criminals  had  been  punished  ; 
and  Demosthenes  was  selected  as  the  chief  victim,  because  his 
opposition  to  Harpalos  had  offended  the  less  prudent  members  of 
the  anti-Makcdonian  party,  while  his  whole  career  made  him  an 
object  of  hatred  to  the  other  side. 

A  few  months  later  tlie  death  of  Alexander  re-awakened  hopes 
which  were  to  end  in  terrible  disasters,  and  in  a  servitude  still  more 
ignominious  than  that  which  they  had  endured  already.    jj(,t„rn  of 
Athenian   envoys  were  sent  round  to  the  chief  Greek   Uemosthe- 
cities  to  stir  iip  the  spirit  of  resistance  to  foreign   rule,    exfie!^'''^ 
To  those  who  came  into  the  Peloponnesos  Demosthenes,      ^^^  ^•'^• 
who  was  then  at  Troizen,  gave  aid  so  effectual  and  so  hearty  that 
the    Demos,  filled    with    all   their   old   affection,    rescinded   his 
sontence   of   exile,   and  sent  a  trireme  to  bring  him  back  from 
Aigina.     The  whole  body  of  the  citizens  was  waiting  to  welcome 
him  at  the  Peiraieus.      Not  an  archon  or  a  priest  remained  in  the 
city.     Lifting  his  hands  heavenwards,  the  orator  uttered,  it  is  said, 
a  prayer  of  thanksgiving  that  he  had  been  allowed  to  sec  so  happy 


652  THE  LATER    GREEK    PEOPLE.  [Book  VL 

a  day.  Alkibiades  had  been  attended  by  crowds  from  the  harbor 
to  the  city  ;  but  Alkibiades  had  forced  his  way  back,  while  Demos- 
thenes returned  only  at  the  spontaneous  bidding  of  his  countrymen. 
His  penalty  could  not  in  terms  be  remitted  ;  but  the  people  chose  to 
assign  to  him  50  talents  for  tending  the  altar  of  Zeus  the  Saviour 
in  his  yearly  festival,  and  his  discharge  of  this  office  was  taken  as 
the  payment  of  the  fine. 

Yet,  a  few  months  later,  the  Lamian  war,  into  which  the 
Athenians  with  others  had  plunged  in  the  desperate  hope  of 
Lamian  war.  breaking  the  Makedonian  yoke,  had  ended  in  complete 
''^ao^thenc?"  ^'^^^  irretrievable  disaster,  and  Demosthenes  had  died  at 
323-322  B.C.  the  threshold  of  the  Kalaureian  Sanctuary  of  Poseidon. 
The  poison  which  he  carried  about  him  saved  him  from  the  weapons 
or  tortures  of  the  exile-hunter  Archias  ;  but  some  years  later,  his 
kinsman  Demochares  soothed  the  Athenians  with  the  tale  that  the 
loving  gods  had  taken  away  their  servant  without  stroke  of  disease 
or  feeling  of  pain,  just  when  they  saw  that  continued  life  would 
only  leave  him  in  the  hands  of  unscrupulous  and  merciless  enemies. 
A  brighter  picture  is  brought  before  us  in  another  portion  of 
the  Hellenic  Avorld,  where,  perhaps,  we  might  have  been  least 
Sicilian  his-  disposed  to  look  for  it.  AVhenthe  long  toil  of  Demos- 
tory  after       thencs   came  to  an  end  at  Kalaureia,  the   Corinthian 

the  rum  of  i      i  i  i       t  ne  i  i      oc    •  i • 

the  Athenian  limoleon  had  been  dead  htteeu  years  ;  but  the  Sicilians 
^™gy™!°*  were  still  enjoying  the  blessed  respite  from  factions, 
cuKe.  feud,  and  usuq^ation  which  his  energy,  courage,  and 

devotion  had  won  for  them.  In  the  annals  of  the  years  which 
followed  the  destruction  of  the  Athenian  armament  at  Syracuse, 
we  may  well  be  forgiven  if  we  see  little  more  than  a  catalogue  of 
iniquities  wrought  by  Greeks  on  Greeks  speaking  the  same  language 
and  professing  to  obey  the  same  law.    The  battle  of  Kyzikos'  was 

409  B.C.  followed  by  the  banishment  of  Hermokrates ;  and 
Syracuse  thus  lost  her  greatest  general  at  a  time  when  the  ruin 
of  tlie  Athenian  expedition  had  left  the  sea  open  to  the  fleets  of 
Carthage.  The  old  quarrel  l)et\veen  Egesta  and  Selinous,  Avhich 
had  ended  in  the  annihilation  of  that  magMificent  armament,  now 
brought  about  another  struggle  in  which  Selinous  was  left  a  heap 
of  ruins.  The  invitation  of  the  P]gestaiaiis  had  brought  Hannibal, 
the  son  of  Giskon,  to  Sicily  as  their  avenger.  That  leader  came 
determined  to  offer  up  a  mighty  .sacrifice  to  the  shade  of  his  grand- 
father Hamilkar.  Himcra  was  stormed  and  sacked,  and  the  blood 
of  3,000  victims  flowed  to  appease  the  chief  who  had  been  .slain  in 
the  battle-field  before  its  walls  some  seventy  years  before.'     The 

406  B.C.       ruin    of  Himera  was   followed  by  the   demolition   of 

Akragas ;  and  while  the  spoiler  dashed  in   pieces   the  splendid 

'  See  p.  449.  '  See  p.  67. 


Chap.  I.]  DEMOSTHENES   AND  TIMOLEON.  653 

buildings  of  this  great  city,  tlie  oligarch  Ilipparinos  was  unco.v 
sciously  laying  in  Syracuse  the  foundations  of  a  tyranny  compared 
with  whiob  the  rule  of  Gclon'  might  pass  for  perfect  freedom. 
.  Desperate  in  the  straits  to  which  his  vices  had  reduced  him, 
Hipparinos  found  in  a  young  clerk  employed  in  some  pubUc  officr. 
an  apt  instrument  for  the  overthrow  of  the  Demos.  Despotism 
This  young  man,  known  afterwards  as  the  despot  D^ionysi!^'^'^ 
Dionysios,  began  by  throwing  on  the  Syracusan  405-36rB.c. 
generals  the  blame  for  all  the  disasters  which  had  befallen  their 
arms.  Elected  as  one  among  their  successors,  he  ventured  on 
another  throw  of  the  dice,  and  carried  a  measure  recalling  all 
exiles  to  the  city.  These  came  as  his  devoted  partisans  ;  and  re- 
lying on  their  support,  he  continued  to  charge  his  colleagues  with 
treason  until  the  people  appointed  him  military  dictator.  Dionysios 
took  his  measures  at  once  for  converting  his  dictatorship  into  a 
tyranny  ;  and  the  power  thus  gained  he  kept  for  nearly  forty  years. 
During  this  time  he  crushed  his  people  by  taxes  and  forced  loans, 
or  by  direct  confiscations  ;  but  he  also  enlarge'd  and  strengthened  the 
city,  and  after  a  fearful  struggle,  which  at  one  moment  he  was  at 
the  point  of  giving  up  as  hopeless,  he  so  broke  the  power  of 
Carthage  that  no  serious  attempts  were  again  made  to  molest  him 
in  the  eastern  half  of  the  island. 

So  lived  in  a  splendor  such  as  Syracuse  had  never  yet  seen, 
and  in  a  state  of  personal  terror  which  the  homeless  beggar  might 
regard  with  pity,  the  despot  whose  magnificence  roused  Tyrannyof 
the  wrath  of  the  Greek  pilgrims  at  Olympia,  and  whose  pi^.nyg'Jop'' 
tragedy  on  the  ransoming  of  Hektor,  deemed  worthy  367-343  b.c. 
of  the  first  prize,  was  exhibited  at  the  great  Dionysian  festival  of 
Athens.  On  his  death  he  left  his  power  to  his  son,  the  younger 
Dionysios,  who,  four-and-twenty  years  later,  besought  the  permis- 
sion of  Timoleon  to  seek  a  refuge  at  Corinth.  Less  fortunate  than 
his  father,  he  spent  ten  of  those  years  in  exile  at  Lola'oi,  and  re- 
turned at  length  to  find  that,  if  he  might  still  play  the  tyrant,  it 
must  be  with  power  sadly  cut  down.  Meanwhile  the  disease  had 
spread  far  beyond  the  walls  of  Syracuse  ;  and  the  deadly  quarrels 
of  despot  with  despot,  and  city  with  city,  so  desolated  the  island, 
that  many  in  utter  despair  besought  the  interference  of  Corinth, 
which  had  led  the  van  in  the  colonisation  of  Sicily. 

Sent  out  to  bring  this  chaos,  if  it  might  be  possible,  into  some 
order,  Timoleon  had  to  contend  first  with  Dionysios,  who  departed, 
as  some  would  liave  it,  to  keep  a  school   at  Corinth,   ^^  . 

and  then  with  the  Carthaginians,  whose   fleet  Hiketas   Timoleon. 
admitted  within  the  harbor  of  Syracuse.     The  sudden    ^^^^""^  ^■'^■ 
capture  of  Achradina"  led  Magon,  the  Punic  chief,  to  suspect  that 
'  See  p.  66.  "  See  p.  376. 


654  THE   LATER    GREEK    PEOPLE.  [Book  VL 

he  was  betrayed.  His  retreat  left  Timoleon  master  of  the  whole 
city  ;  but  that  city  ■\\as  almost  in  ruins.  The  grass  which  grew 
in  the  Agora  and  in  the  deserted  streets  furnished  ample  food  for 
horses,  and  attested  the  truth  of  the  old  adage,  that  a  city  without 
inliabitants  was  not  worthy  of  tlic  nanfe.  Gatliercd  from  all  parts 
of  Hellas,  10,000  colonists  were  dispatched  from  Gorinth  at  the 
desire  of  Timoleon  ;  and  so  strong  Avere  the  inducements  which 
343 B.C.  he  held  out,  that  Syracuse  could  soon  boast  a  popula- 
tion of  60,000  citizens.  The  tyrant  was  e.xpelled  ;  the  people 
again  governed  themselves  under  a  magistrate  called  the  Am- 
phipolos  of  the  Olympian  Zeus.  The  beneficent  work  to  which 
Timoleon  had  devoted  himself  had  its  natural  result  in  the  in- 
creased strength  and  prosperity  of  the  Hellenic  cities,  while  it 
excited  the  jealous  fears  of  the  Carthaginians.  The  fearful  defeat 
of  Hasdrubal  and  Hamilkar  on  the  plain  of  the  Krimesos  left 
Timoleon  free  to  achieve  this  great  task  by  expelling  all  the  Sicilian 
tyrants  from  their  cities.  Again  was  the  aid  of  the  Carthaginians 
sought  by  the  despots  of  Katanc  and  Leontinoi ;  but  Giskon 
found  himself  able  to  do  so  little  that  he  accepted  a  peace  which 
recognised  theHalykos  as  the  boundary  which  separated  the  terri- 
tory of  the  Greeks  from  that  of  Carthage.  The  expulsion  of  the 
tyrants  was  followed  by  the  restoration  of  popular  govermnent ; 
and  this  great  object  being  attained,  Timoleon  resigned  his  power. 
Henceforth  lie  lived  as  a  private  citizen  in  Syracuse,  witnessing 
each  year  the  increasing  happiness  of  the  people  whom  he  had 
rescued  from  their  oppressors.  Once  more  lands  which  had  long 
remained  untilled  yielded  the  magnificent  harvests  which  good 
soil  will  rarely  fail  to  rii)cn  under  a  Sicilian  sun  ;  and  the  island 
remained  a  paradise  while  intestine  strife  and  foreign  invaders 
were  making  the  continental  Hellas'  a  desert  from  the  mountain 
range  of  Pindos  to  the  cliffs  of  Kythcra  and  the  shores  of  the 
Saronic  Gulf.  Itisdifticult  to  repress  a  natural  feeling  of  sadness 
when  we  remember  that  Demosthenes  was  not  permitted  to  see  at 
Athens  the  happiness  which,  after  mighty  efforts  crowned  with 
rare  success,  cheered  the  heart  of  Timoleon  in  Sicily. 

See  p.  1. 


Chap.  II.]         ATHENS  AND  CONSTANTINOPLE.  655 


CHAPTER   II. 

FORTUNES  OF  THE  GREEK  PEOPLE,  FROM  THE  LAMIAN  "WAR  TO 
THE  EXPULSION  OF  THE  BAVARIAN  OTHO. 

The  result  of  the  Lainian  War  was  to  leave  Athens  and  the 
Greek  cities  generally  in  the  power  of  xAntipatros,  who  chose  to 
ffovern   them  through   his   creatures.     At  Athens,  the    „       ,    . 

.  .    .  SGC1U61  OT 

haiiishment  of  12,000  citizens  (three-fifths  of  the  whole   thecareerof 
l>ody),    as    not    possessing    property    to    the     amount   ^'^o'^ioii- 
of  2,000  drachmas,  left  the  city  in  the  hands  of  9,000  suhservient 
oligarchs,  at  whose  head  Phokion  held  practically  tlie 
position  of  a  Persian  satrap,  supported   by  the  orator 
Demades.     The  latter  was  unwise  enough,  some  four  years  later, 
to  speak  of  Antipatros  as  an  old  and  rotten  thread 
which  might  easily  be  broken  by  Perdikkas,  the  friend 
of  Philip  and  of  his  son  Alexander  the  Great.     The  general  whom 
he  thus  invited  to  what  he  called  the   deliverance  of  Hellas  was 
slain  by  his  own  soldiers ;  and  the  letter  containing  this  phrase 
came  into  Ihe  possession  of  Antipatros,  who  had  no  hesitation  in 
seizing  Demades  and  procuring  his  death,  though  he  came  as  an 
Athenian   envoy.     Dying  shortly  afterwards,  Antipatros  left  his 
power  not  to  his  son  Kassandros,  but  to  another  veteran  general  of 
Alexander,  Polysperchon  ;  and  Kassandros  at  once  showed  his  real 
intentions  by  sending  Nikanorwith  a  forged  order  from  his  father, 
by  means  of  which  he  was  admitted  into  the  Athenian  fortress  of 
Mounychia,'  then  held  by  Menyllos.     It  was   thus  clear  to  Poly- 
sperchon that  his  own  hopes  of  success  must  depend  on  his  securing 
the  support  of  the  citizens  who  disliked  the  government  of  Anti- 
patros, in  other  words,  by  recalling  the   exiles  and  restoring  the 
subverted    democracies.     Phokion  at  once  saw  the  dangers  by 
which  he  was  thus   threatened,  and  resolved,  so  far  as  he  could, 
to  strengthen  the  hands  of  Nikanor ;  and  he  did  so 
effectually  by  preventing  all   action  on  the  part  of  the 
people,  while  Xikanor  seized  Peiraieus.     His  object  was  to  secure 
Athens  or  the  Athenian  alliance  for  Kassandros.    In  this  he  failed  ; 
and  the  returning  exiles,  now  strong  enough  to  show  their  will  in 
action,  deposed  Phokion  and  his  colleagues  from  their  office,  and 
left  no  otlier  coiu-se  open  to  him  than  an   appeal   to  Polysper- 
chon, who  was  hastening  towards  Athens.     It  so  happened  that 
Phokion   reached  his   camp   about  the  same  time  with  the  Athe- 
nian deputies,  who  appeared  to  accuse  him  and  to  demand  for 

'  See  p.  234. 


656  THE   LATER    GREEK    PEOPLE.  [Book  VI. 

Athens  the  immediate  surrender  of  Peiraious.  With  the  latter 
condition  Polysperchon  was  not  disposed  to  comply  ;  he  was  there- 
fore the  more  ready  to  hid  for  their  favor  by  sending  Phokion  to 
take  his  trial  at  Athens,  and  of  such  a  trial  there  could  be  only 
one  issue.  The  men  who  looked  on  themselves  as  the  restored 
Athenian  Demos  could  regard  only  with  hatred  the  man  who  had 
been  content  to  work  the  will  of  Makedonian  masters  ;  and  so,  by 
the  hemlock-juice,  ended  at  the  age  of  eighty  years  the  life  of  the 
man  who  had  insisted  on  the  folly  of  opposing  the  ambition  or  the 
power  of  Philip  at  a  time  when  Demosthenes  was  striving  to  show 
that  the  task  of  curl)ing  the  one  and  crushing  the  other  was  neither 
impossible  nor  difficult. 

But  in  the  strife  with  Polysperchon  Kassandros  was  to  be  the 
victor ;  and  Demetrios'  was  to  be  the  satrap  of  Kassandros,  as 
Administra-  Phokiou  had  been  that  of  his  father.  The  administra- 
Phalereaif  ^^*-"^  ^^  Dcmetrios,  extended  over  ten  years,  is  said  to 
Demetrios.  have  been  just  and  gentle  ;  it  is  more  to  the  purpose  to 
note  the  debasement  of  Athenian  feeling  which  could  allow  the 
erection  of  360  statues  in  his  honor,  one  for  each  day  of  the 
Athenian  year.  When  from  Athens  Kassandros  marched  into 
the  Peloponnesos,  the  Spartans  thought  that  the  time 
was  come  for  inclosing  their  city  within  walls;  and 
thus  passed  away  another  relic  of  the ,  earlier  days  when  each 
Hellenic  city  was  supposed  to  be  able  to  hold  its  own  against 
assaults  from  without. 

From  this  time  Greece  becomes  little  more  than  a  tool  in  the 

hands   of   competitors  for  empire   elsewhere.      If  to  promote  his 

„    .  own    dcsiijns    Kassandros    could    restore    the    city    of 

Extinction      „,,     ,  ^j  j.  ,    ,,  .1       •  r 

of  the  Ihcbcs,  and  rouse  lor  a  moment  tlie   enthusiasm   or 

Al'cxMdei  ^^^^  Mcsscniaus  and  MegalopoUtaiis  as  they  called  to 
the  Great.  mind  the  benefits  received  from  I'^pameinondas,^  Anti- 
"'"  ^'^'  gonos  could  respond  by  proclamations  declaring  that 
the  Greeks  should  be  free  and  left  to  govern  themselves  without 
the  interference  of  foreign  garrisons ;  and  in  either  case  the  pro- 
posals might  be  made  in  the  name  of  one  member  or  another  of  the 
family  of  Alexander  the  Great.  The  lives  of  these  unfortunate 
men  and  women  hung  indeed  on  a  slender  thread.  When  Kassan- 
dros had  put  to  death  lt<\xana,'  with  her  young  son  Alexandros,  in 
the  fortress  of  Amphipolis,  l*olysperchon  came  forward  with  the 
claims  of  Ilerakles,  the  son  of  Alexander  the  Great  by  Barsino  ; 
but  the  offer  from   Kassandros  of  a  share  in  the  sovereignty  of 

'  Usually  called  tlio  Plialerean,  llio  bosiejjer  of  cities,  and  son  of 

asbeingacitlzenof  the  AtticDemos  Alexander's  general  Antigonos. 

of  Phaleron,  inordertodistinjifuisli  ^  See  p.  587 

bim   from  Demetrios  Poliorketes,  '  See  p.  641. 


CiiAr.  II.]  ATHENS   AND   CONSTANTINOPLE.  657 

Makedonia  sealed  the  doom  of  the  young  prince,  and  his  murder 
was   soon    followed    by   that   of   his   aunt   Kleopatra. 

.       .  303  B  c 

So  by  a  series  of  violent  deaths  inflicted  by  one  or  other 
of  his  generals,  the  family  of  Alexander  the  Great  was  brought  to 
art  end  within  fifteen  years  after  the  close  of  his  fiery  career,  the 
only  exception  being  his  half-sister  Thessalonike,  the  wife  of 
Kassandros  himself.  In  the  following  year,  Demettios  Poliorketes 
appeared  before  Peiraieus  to  carry  out,  as  he  said,  the  plan  of  his 
father  Antigonos,  who  was  resolved  on  securing  absolute  inde- 
pendence to  Athens.  His  arrival  warned  the  Phalerean  Demetrios 
that  there  was  now  for  him  no  safety  but  in  flight.  He  found  a 
refuge  accordingly  with  Ptolemy  in  Egypt,  while  the  Athenians 
used  their  independence  to  proclaim  his  namesake,  the  City-Be- 
sieger, and  his  father  Antigonos,  as  gods  and  saviours,  whose  high 
priest  was  henceforth  to  take  the  place  of  the  Archon  Eponymos, 
and  whose  exploits  were  to  be  embroidered  on  the  sumptuous  robe 
yearly  carried  in  the  Pan-Athenaic  procession  to  the  shrine  of  the 
Virgin-Goddess.  But  while  statues  and  altars  rose  in  his  honor 
and  in  that  of  his  boon-companions,  the  360  figures  of  the  Phale- 
rean Demetrios  were  thrown  down  and  treated  with  the  vilest  in- 
sults. The  son  of  Antigonos  rated  at  their  true  value  these  adula- 
tions of  a  degraded  people. 

Politically  the  feeling  of  independence  was  extinct ;  but  when 
a  decree  was  passed  that  no  philosopher  should  be  allowed  to  teach 
without  the  special  sanction  of  the  Senate  and  people,   Expulsion 
a  better  spirit  was  shown  by  the  men  through  whom   andreturn 
alone  Athens  had  such  greatness  as  she  still  possessed,    nian'phiio- 
Without  one  exception  the  philosophers  left  Athens,    sophers. 
to  return  to  it  in  the  following  year  when   the   law  had  fallen 
through   by  an  action  of  Grapho  Paranomon'  against  its    pro- 
poser.   The  prosecution,  we  may  note,  was  vehemently  opposed  by 
Democharcs,  the  nephew  of  Demosthenes,  who  seems  to  have  been 
honestly  convinced  that  the  practice  of  the  philosophers  was  as 
mischievous  as  their  theories  may  have  been  beautiful. 

Three  years  passed  away  before  Demetrios  Poliorketes  again 
presented  himself  at  Athens.  In  the  meantime  with  his  father  lie 
had  assumed  the  title  of  king,  his  example  being  Woi>hipof 
followed  by  Lysimachos  in  Thrace,  by  Seleukos  in  {^oiiorkJtes 
Syria,  and  by  Ptolemy  in  Egypt.  lie  had  also  tried  at  Athens. 
his  skill,  as  besieger,  with  no  great  success  upon  the  Rhodians, 
who  were  aided  by  Kassandros,  Ptolemy,  and  Lysimachos. 
When  he  reached  Athens,  the  time  was  close  at  hand  for  the 
celebration  of  the  Eleusinian  mysteries,  and  the  Athenians  eagerly 

See  p.  613. 
28* 


058  THE  LATER    GREEK    PEOPLE.  [Book  VI. 

seized  the  opportunity  of  linking  the  name  of  the  goddess  Demetur 
with  that  of  her  favorite  Demetrios.  All  other  gods  were  absent 
or  did  not  exist,  and  without  these  two  they  had  no  means  of 
withstanding  the  inroads,  not  of  barbarians,  but  of  their  Aitolian' 
kinsfolk.  In  truth,  if  the  Athenians  w^ere  to  be  believed,  there 
was  no  need  of  any  other  god  than  Demetrios ;  and  as  a  god, 
whatever  he  commanded  was  by  a  formal  decree  proiiounced  to  be 
Battleof  tioly  io  respect  to  the  other  gods  and  just  in  referenca 
ipsos.  to  men,  although  he  was  defiling  the  Parthenon  itself,  in 

which  he  was  suffered  to  sojourn,  Avith  frightful  and  dis- 
gusting debauchery.  A  few  njonths  later  the  battle  of  Ipsos  broke 
his  fortunes.  His  father  Antigonos  was  slain ;  and  Demetrios, 
sailing  fromEphesos  to  Athens,  was  met  by  envoys  wdio  told  him 
that  the  god  of  the  previous  year  could  not  be  admitted  within  its 
gates.  Athens  now  passed  under  the  power  of  a  Kassandrian  parti- 
san named  Lachares ;   and  when  Demetrios  next  appeared  before 

its  walls,  it  was  to  play  once  more,  and  to  play  with 

success,  the  part  of  a  besieger.  The  death  of  Kassan- 
dros  and  the  murderous  feuds  which  followed  in  his  family  opened 
the  way  to  Demetrios  for  seizing  the  royal  power ;  and  although 
he  Avas  himself  for  a  time  dispossessed  of  it  and  died  a  prisoner 
in  the  hands  of  Seleukos,  yet  his  son  Antigonos  (called  Gonatas, 
„  it  is  said,  from  the  plates  Avhich  he  Avore  to  protect  his 

knees),  contrived  to  regain  it,  and  to  hand  the  sceptre 
on  to  his  descendants,  Avho  held  it  for  more  than  a  hundred  years, 
Fall  of  the  until  Perseus  Avas  cariied  away  as  a  captive  to  grace 
Makedouian   ^]jg  ti'iumph  of  a  Roman  conqueror.    Durinor  this  time 

monarchy.         ,».^.,i.  ,*  t^ 

168  B.C.  tne  Antigonid  kmgs  Averc  the  masters  and  soA'ereigns 
of  Greece  ;  and  Demochares,  the  nephew  of  Demosthenes,  the 
inheritor  of  his  uncle's  patriotism  though  not  of  his  genius,  could 
establish  no  better  title  to  the  gratitude  of  his  countrymen  than 
the  fact  that  he  cut  down  the  cost  of  government  at  Athens  and 
was  a  successful  beggar  at  foreign  courts  for  alms  to  be  bestowed  on 
the  Athenian  people. 

The  degradation  of  the  Athenian  character  Avould  scarcely  lead 
us  to  look  for  a  sounder  state  of  things  elscAvhere.  Yet  the 
The  Achaian  Achaiaiis  of  the  Pclopouncsos  Avere  noAv  to  make  an 
League.  effort  not  unlike  that  Avhich  during  the   time  of  her 

empire  Athens  had  made  to  Avcld  the  Greek  tribes  in  some  sort 
into  one  political  body,  or  at  the  least  to  make  their  common 
interests  a  stronger  motive  for  action  than  local  feuds  and 
jealousies ;  and  the  importance  of  Greek  history  for  the  next  tAvo 
centuries  lies  not  in  the  shiftings  of  opinion  at  Athens  but  in  the 

'  See  p.  2. 


Chap.  II.]  ATHENS   AND   CONSTANTINOPLE.  659 

working  of  tte  Federal  principle  whicli  showed  how  much,  but  for 
the  inherent  defects  of  the  Greek  character,  it  must  have  achieved. 
Tlie  Achaian  cities,  small  and  insignificant  while  Athens,  Thebes, 
and  Sparta  were  great,  saw  the  deadly  evils  which  the  incessant 
strife  between  those  cities  had  brought  about :  and  the  Federal 
league  which  had  existed  for  ages  among  themselves,  as  it  existed 
also  among  Aitolians,  Epeirots,  and  Akarnanians,  seemed  to 
furnish  the  means  at  the  least  for  arresting  their  further  growth. 
The  loose  bond  of  earlier  times  was  indeed  made  more  strict,  as  the 
circle  of  union  became  wider ;  but  no  attempt  was  made  to  inter- 
fere with  the  self-government  or  autonomy  of  the  cities  included 
in  the  league.  The  citizen  of  each  town  had  his  place  in  the 
assembly  of  that  town  :  by  the  same  right  he  had  a  place  in  the 
great  Federal  Council.  In  other  words,  the  Federal  assembly  was 
primary,  not  representative  ;'  and  this  fact  alone  accounts  for  the 
difference  between  the  character  of  this  assembly  and  the  Ekklesia 
of  the  Athenian  Demos.  Both  were  in  theory  democratic  :  but 
at  Athens  each  man  had  the  place  of  meeting  at  his  own  door. 
The  Achaian  had  to  undertake  a  costly,  if  not  difficult,  journey  to 
Aigion  ;  and  hence  it  came  about  that  while  the  Demos  was  ruler 
at  Athens,  the  president  of  the  Achaian  league  exercised  a  power 
far  beyond  that  of  the  Athenian  Probouleutic  Senate.^  At  Athens 
the  poorest  man  might  give  his  vote  ;  the  Federal  assembly  which 
met  twice  yearly  for  three  days  at  Aigion  was  necessarily  a 
gathering  of  the  wealthy.  In  this  council  the  vote  was  taken 
not  by  heads  but  by  cities ;  but  if  this  insured  to  the  few  repre- 
sentatives of  a  distant  town  the  full  weight  of  the  citizens  of  Aigion 
itself,  it  failed  to  give  a  larger  weight  even  to  cities  like  Athens 
and  Sparta,  if  these  should  be  brought  into  the  confederacy. 

The  Aciiaian  League  ceased  to  be  a  league  for  Achaians  only, 
when  the  town  of  Sikyon  was  made  a  member  of  it ;  and  when 
six  years  later  the  Sikyonian  Aratos  was  elected  General 

J  */  Career  of 

or  President,  there  was  no  longer  any  hindrance  to  the  Aratos. 
election  of  an  Athenian  or  a  Corinthian  to  the  same  ^^'  ^•'^■ 
office.  For  two  and  thirty  years  he  was  re-elected  in  each  alternate 
year,  and  his  long  career  was  marked  by  almost  unfailing  success 
in  military  adventures  by  night,  and  by  constant  defeat  in  the  open 
field  by  day.  During  that  time  lie  did  much  to  earn  the  gratitude 
of  his  countrymen,  and  much  also  to  insure  their  ultimate  subjec- 
tion to  some  foreign  power.  The  hindrances  in  his  path  came  in 
part  from  defects  in  his  own  character,  in  part  fi-om  the  faults  of 
the  Hellenic  character  generally.  The  spirit  which  had  animated 
Themistokles  and  Perikles, — a  spirit  which  would  in  the  end  have 

*  See  p.  12.  ^  See  p.  80.     Fn'omnn,  Federal  Oovernment,  i.  265. 


660  THE  LATER    GREEK    PEOPLE.  [Book  VI. 

made  the  whole  Greek  world  share  the  benefits  of  a  system  carried 
out  for  the  common  good  of  all, — had  long  since  faded  away  ;  and 
the  Athenians,  jealous  for  the  jjoor  semblance  of  freedom  left 
to  them  in  their  so-called  autonomy,  not  only  refused  to  join  the 
league,  but  put  crowns  on  their  heads  when  they  heard  that  Aratos 
was  dead.  The  tidings  were  false  ;  and  Aratos  lived  to  show  that 
he  desired  for  the  Athenians  something  better  than  the  isolation 
with  which  they  professed  to  be  content,  but  which  it  was  impos- 
sible for  them  to  enjoy. 

The  work  of  Aratos  was  carried  on  more  worthily  in  the  field, 

often  ably  in  the  council-chamber,  by  the   illustrious  Philopoi- 

Careerof       men  of  Megalopolis,  who,  having  done  all  that  human 

men"^"^"       Strength   and  earnestness  could  do  towards  securing 

183B.C.        the   independence  of    his  country,   died  in  the  same 

year  with  Hannibal,  the  man  who  had  striven  to  divert  from  Rome 

to  Carthage  the  empire  of  the  world.     But  it  was  the  unhappy 

fate  of  the  most  high-minded  of  Hellenic  champions,  that  their 

most  brilliant  successes  should  tend,  scarcely  less  than  their  failures, 

to  frustrate  their  plans  and  shatter  their  hopes  ;  and  Philopoimen, 

who  had  stirred  the  men  of  Megalopolis  to   desperate  resistance 

222 jj  when   the  Spartan  Kleomenes  laid  the  Great  City'  in 

ruins,  helped  chiefly  to  strengthen   the  hands  of  the 

Makedonian    sovereign   when   his   charge    turned  the 

day  against  the  Spartans  on  the  field  of  Sellasia. 

Meanwhile  the  feuds  of  the  Akarnanians  and  Aitolians  were 

preparing  a  way  for  the  great  conquerors  of  the  world  to  step  in 

„         .         and  repress,  if  they  could  not  heal,  incessant  discord. 

Roman  in-        ^  .         ■   r.    i       •  i      ,  ,        c    ^     ■  <•       -r. 

terference  in  Dissatisfied  With  the  result  or  their  request  tor  rvoman 
Hellas.  jjj^^  ^^g  Akarnanians  entered  into  an  alliance  with  the 

pirates  of  Illyria,  and  drew  down  on  themselves  the  forces  both  of 
the  Achaian  and  the  Aitolian  leagues.  Interfering  now  to  some 
purpose,  the  Romans  put  down  the  Illyrian  robbers,  and  Korkyra 
22-  and   Epidamnos"   became   Roman    allies;  and    Roman 

allies  for  tlie  most  part  became   sooner  or  later  Roman 

subjects.  A  few  years  later  the  treaty  made  by  the 
~  ^'^'  Makedonian  king  Philip  with  the  Carthaginian  Han- 
nibal placed  his  Greek  allies,  and  among  these  the   cities  of  the 

Achaian  League,  in  the  number  of    the    enemies    of 

'  Rome  ;  and   Rome,  l)iding   her  time,  requited  the   de- 

Kj^os-**'        fiance  by  shattering  the  power  of  Pliilip   in  the  fight 

kephaiai.        at  Kynoskephalai,  where,  forty-six  years  earlier,  Pelo- 

pidas  had  fallen  in  the  moment  of  victor}^  over  the 
brutal  tyrant  of  Pherai.^     Thirty  years   later  the  sceptre  of  the 

'  Seo  p.  587.  '  See  p.  G2.  *  See  p.  592. 


Chap.  II.J         ATHENS  AND  CONSTANTINOPLE.  661 

Makedonian  kings  was  finally  broken  on  the  field  of  Pydna;  but 

the  catastrophe  was  to  bring  no  real  change  to  the  Hellenic  cities. 
The  tide  of  Roman  conquest  seldom  ebbed  ;  and  the      Battle  of 
struggle    was    ended    when    the    plebeian  Mummius        iesB.c. 
looked  down  upon  the   phindering  of  Corinth.     The      ^^^^  ^^ 
Achaian  League,  as  a  miUtary  power,  was  thus  brought      Corinth, 
to   an   end;  as  a  political   society,  it  was  kept  alive         16b.c. 
through  the  influence  of   Polybios,  and  the   shadow   of   the   old 
confederation  continued  for  some  generations  or  some  centiTi'ies 
to  comfort  those  who  had  lost  the  substance. 

Henceforth,  as  a  Roman  province,  Greece  becomes  important 
not  for  its  political  systems  but  for  its  literature  and  its  art.  In 
one  sense  the  influence  of  both  was  sino-ularly  ffreat ;  it   .  „  . 

o  */  &  '  lnnuGDC6  of 

was  happy  for  the  Greeks  that  it  was  not  greater.  Had  Greek litem- 
the  Romans  been  capable  of  appreciating  the  real  t'l^e  and  art. 
beauty  of  Greek  art,  the  Greek  cities  would  have  undergone  pro- 
bably a  systematic  and  thorough  devastation  :  but  in  spite  of  the 
servile  copying  of  Greek  forms,  whether  in  philosophy  or  in  art, 
the  two  peoples  continued  essentially  distinct,  and  little  happened 
to  break  in  upon  the  inglorious  inactivity  of  the  Greek  cities  until 
the  waves  of  Gothic  invasion  began  to  break  upon  the  Gothic  inva- 
provinces  of  the  Empire.  The  conduct  of  the  Greeks  sious. 
showed  that  political  degradation  had  not  extinguished  their  cour- 
age or  their  aptitude  for  war.  Athens  was  taken  by 
storm  ;  but  Dexippos,  who  wrote  a  history  of  the  time, 
managed  to  recover  the  Akropolis,  and  compelled  the  barbarians 
to  abandon  the  city.  Another  officer,  named  Kleodemos,  defeated 
a  portion  of  the  Gothic  fleet ;  and  the  barbarian  host  was  soon 
after  destroyed  by  the  Roman  armies.  A  hundred  and  thirty 
years  later  the  city  was  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  another  Gothic 
invader.  Alaric  had  advanced  on  a  career  of  unbroken  con- 
quest across  the  Thessalian  plain  and  through  the  pass  of  Ther- 
mopylai,  which,  according  to  the  old  tale,  a  few  hundred  had 
held  against  the  myriads  of  Xerxes.  But  although  at  Athens 
Alaric  met  with  no  resistance,  he  was  to  find  among  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  mountains  a  formidable  antagonist  in  the  Van- 
dal Stilichon,  a  general  of  Honorius,  and  to  escape  ^'^' 
from  his  legions  across  that  narrow  strait  of  the  Corinthian 
gulf  which  in  the  days  of  Athenian  greatness  had  witnessed  the 
splendid  achievements  of  Phormion.' 

Events  far  more  momentous  were  now  to  give  to  the  Greek 
people  (a  nation  they  cannot  be  more  strictly  called  than  they  were 
in  the  days  of  Perikles)  an  importance  of  which  the  wildest  fancy 

'  See  pp.  289-291. 


662  THE  LATER    GREEK    PEOPLE..  [Book  VI. 

could  never  have  formed  an  idea.  Before  Christianity  became 
the  religion  of  the  Empire,  the  Greeks  had  organized  a  Chris- 
_,      ,  tian  Church,  and  worked  out  a  systematic  and  subtle 

ofthelm-  theology;  and  when  Constantino  transferred  the  im- 
from'the'^"'^^  perial  throne  from  the  old  Rome  to  the  new,  he  was 
old  Rome  laving  the  foundation  of  a  new  empire  for  the  Greek 
new.  language  and  Greek  thought,  while  he  was  also  raising  a 

3--ii  A.D.       barrier  between  the  East  and  West  which  has  never  been 
more  than  paitially  thrown  down.     Llndei*  its  new  name  of  Constan- 
tinople, Byzantion'  became  the  home  of  the  Roman  Cajsar  ;  and  the 
code  of  Justinian  was  put  forth  in  a  city  which  had  be- 
The  Byzan-    come  the  stronghold  of  the  thought  and  the  language  of 
tme empire.    Athens.     In  short,  the  Roman  empire  in  its  new  home 
gradually  became  Byzantine  ;  and  the  change  may  be  regarded  as 
having  been  achieved  when  the  Isauriau  Leo  III.,  suc- 
ceeding the  second  Justinian,  imparted  to  the  adminis- 
tration a  strictly  ecclesiastical  character."    The  edict  against  picture- 
insurrection   worship,  which  obtained  for  him  the  title  of  Iconoclast 
Iconoclasm     (Eikouoklastes),  roused  a  feeling  of  vehement  indigna- 
726  A.D.       tion  in  the  continental  and  insular  Hellas  of  ancient 
times.     The  Greek  cities  dared  to  elect  a  rival  emperor,  to  man  a 
fleet,  and  to  sail  to  Constantinople.     Leo  overthrew  the  fleet  by  the 
Greek  fire  ;  the  rival  emperor  was  taken  and  beheaded  ;  but  the  fail- 
ure of  the  enterprise  is  of  itself  evidence  that  the  Greeks  were  still 
able  to  assert  and  to  fight  for  what  they  regarded  as  their  rights. 

For  some  centuries  the  history  of  European  Hellas  is  merged 
in  that  of  the  composite  Greek  people  who  had  learned  to  speak  of 
themselves  as  Romans:  and  this  history  under  the  Basilian  sove- 

m.  T>  •,•  reicfns,  who  followed  the  stronger  dynasty  of  Isaurian 
The  Basilian        .=     '.,  -  .  *  ii.,i  -• 

emperors.       princes,  19  that  of  an  empire  oppressed   by  the   renne- 

ments  and  complications  of  its  organisation.  Law  had  given 
place  gradually  to  the  arbitrary  will  of  the  emperor ;  and  the 
mind  of  the  emperors  was  fixed  wholly  on  the  retention  of  their 
power  and  the  maintenance  of  their  state.  From  tliis  extreme 
centralisation  followed  necessarily  the  decay  of  judicial  adminis- 
tration in  distant  regions,  which  suffered  further  in  the  neglect  of 
their  public  works,  the  sums  needed  for  roads,  bridges,  and  aque- 
ducts being  diverted  to  the  expenses  of  the  sumptuous  pageants  of 
the  capital.  Discontent  was  thus  undermining  the  imperial  authority 
[nroad!*  of  in  the  border  lands  of  the  empire  and  making  the  task 
kian^Tiirks.    ^^  conquest  easier  for  the  Seljukian  Turks  when  once 

1057-67.  they  had  forced  tlieir  way  across  the  frontiers.  The 
folly  of  Constantine  X.,  who  allowed  the  independent  Armenians 
to  fall  under  the  Mohammedan  yoke   and   sacrificed  the   frontier 

'  See  p.  64.  "  Finlay,  Greece  under  the  Romans,  443,  501. 


Chap.  II.]         ATHENS  AND  CONSTANTINOPLE.  663 

fortress  of  Ani,  helped  them  still  more.     The  hosts  of  Alp  Arslaii 
swept  like  a  tempest  over  Asia  Minor ;  but  the  wisdom  of  Sulei- 
man,  the  general  of  his  son  Malekshah,  did  more  to  weaken  his 
great  enemy  by  treating  as  proprietors  of  the  soil  (subject  only  to 
the  payment  of  a  moderate  tribute)  the   free  or   servile  laborers 
who  had  thus  far  tilled  the  ground  for  the  benefit  of   the  great 
pyzantine  nobles.     The  Christian  peasants  were    thus   effectually 
won  over  to  the  side  of  the  invaders,  against  whom  the   emperor 
was  about  to  implore  the  aid  of  Latin  Christendom.     The  danger 
was  imminent.      Mountains  visible  from  the  dome  of  Sancta  Sophia 
were  already  within   the   borders   of  Turkish  territory,  and  the 
Seljukian  sovereigns  hold  their  court  in  that  city   of       ,pjj"  ^^^ 
Nikaia  (Xice)  in  which  had   been  assembled  the  first       sades_ 
general  council  of  Christendom.     The  help  for  which 
the    envoys  of   Alexios   Komnenos  urged  their  master's  prayer 
before  the  Council  of  Piacenza  (Placentia)  was  given  by  the  cru- 
sading hosts  whose   object  was  not  the   defence   of  the  Eastern 
Empire  but  the  rescue  of  the  Holy  Sepulchre  from  the  hands  of 
the  infidels.     The  presence  of  these  Western  warriors  filled  Alexios 
with  fears  scarcely  less  potent  than  those  which  had  been  wakened 
b}^  Seljukian   inroads  ;  nor  was  the  effect  of  the  intercourse  thus 
brought  about  between  the  East  and  West  more  happy  on  the  sub- 
jects of  the  Byzantine  Caesars.     For  the  Greeks  feudalism   was  a 
thing  of  the  remote  past,  of  the  days  of  Solon  and  of  the  Thessa- 
lian  and  Theban  nobility  which  had  been  among  the  most  efficient 
allies  of  Xerxes.'     For  the  crusading  chiefs  nothing  was  so  hateful 
as  the  idea  of  a  central  authority  which  pressed  on  all  orders  of 
the  state  alike  :  nothing  was  so  precious  as  local  tyranny  and  the 
right  of  pri\'ate  war.     For  the  subjects  of  the  Eastern  Empire  the 
protection  of  person  and  property  was  everything,  and  to  secure  this 
they  were  willing  to  put  up  with  a  large  amount  of  oppression  and 
corruption  in  their  governors.     The  gulf  which  thus  separated  the 
mind  of  the  East  from  that  of  the  West  was  further 
and  hopelessly  widened  when  in  the  fifth  crusade  the 
forces  of   Latin   Cl)ristendom,  after  the  conquest  of  Zara,  were 
diverted  to  the  task  of  restoring  the  Emperor  Isaac  Angelos  to 
the  Byzantine  throne.     This  consummation  had  been 
brought  about  chiefly  by  the  entreaties  of  Alexios,  the 
son  of  Isaac ;  but  when  the  young  prince  was  associated  with  his 
father  in   the   imperial   dignity,  the   difficulty  of   satisfying  the 
crusading  leaders  was  forcibly  brought  home  to  him,  and  the  in- 
sidious counsels  of  xVlexios  Doukas,  commonly   known   as   Mour- 
zoufle  from  the  shaggiuess  of  his  dark  eyebrows,  led  him  to  send  a 

'  See  p.  25. 


664  THE  LATER    GREEK    PEOPLE.  [Book  VI. 

squadron  of  fire-ships  into  the  fleet  of  his  allies.  It  was  his  last 
exploit.  After  his  deposition,  the  throne,  having  been  filled  for  a 
time  by  one  or  two  more  emperors,  passed  to  Mourzoufle,  who, 
having  failed  in  his  attempts  to  negotiate  a  peace  with  the  Venetian 
doge  Dandolo,  put  Alexios  to  death.  The  professed  grief  and  rage 
Capture  of  of  the  crusaders  at  the  murder  of  their  former  friend 
Coustantino-  qq^-^\^  j^g  soothed  only  by  placing  a  Latin  emperor  0:1 
1204.  the  throne  of  the  Eastern  Caesars.  A  siege  of  four 
days  made  the  Latin  warriors  masters  of  the  city  ;  and  the  ex- 
cesses which  followed  their  triumph  tui'ned  the  indifference  or 
aversion  of  the  Greeks  for  the  Western  Christians  into  burning 
hatred.  The  patriarchal  chair  in  the  church  of  Sancta  Sophia,  the 
magnificent  -work  of  Justinian,  was  polluted  by  an  abandoned 
woman  who  with  disgusting  gestures  and  in  shameless  attire 
screamed  out  from  it  a  drunken  song.  AVretches  blind  with  fury 
drained  off  draughts  of  wine  from  the  vessels  of  the  altar  :  horses 
were  driven  into  the  churches  to  bear  away  the  sacred  treasures, 
and  if  they  fell,  were  lashed  and  goaded  till  their  blood  streamed 
upon  the  pavement.  '  How,'  asked  the  Pope,  Innocent  IIL,  '  shall 
the  Greek  Church  return  to  ecclesiastical  unity  and  to  respect  for 
the  Apostolic  See,  when  they  have  seen  in  the  Latins  only 
examples  of  wickedness  and  darkness,  for  which  they  might  justly 
loathe  them  worse  than  dogs  V 

The  crusaders  had  come  to  a  people  which  to  some  extent 
might  be  described  as  in  a  state  of  decrepitude,  but  to  a  land, 
The  Latin  nevertheless,  not  less  Christian  than  Italy  or  France, — 
Coiistautiiio-  ^o  ^  '^'^"^^  which  boasted  churches  of  an  antiquity  more 
pic.  venerable  than   those  of  Milan,  Ravenna,  and  Rome 

itself,  and  in  whicli  the  ritual  of  the  Church  had  taken  root  while 
Western  Christianity  was  in  its  cradle,  ani  had  moulded  the  life, 
the  thoughts,  the  very  being  of  all  its  members.  This  ancient 
civilisation  the  crusaders  now  fancied  that  they  could  crush  or 
sweep  away.  All  dignities,  offices,  and  lands  were  shared  exclu- 
sively among  the  conquerors.  The  code  of  Justinian  gave  place  to 
the  Assize  of  Jerusalem,  and  not  a  single  Greek  was  permitted  to 
take  part  in  the  administration  of  the  law.  But  the  old  spell  of 
Greek  learning  and  art  had  not  altogether  lost  its  power.  The 
Pope  sent  young  men  from  the  schools  of  Paris  to  strengthen 
themselves  by  the  wisdom  of  the  East :  the  French  king  Philip 
Augustus  invited  young  Crreeks  to  Paris  to  receive  instruction  in 
the  creed  and  ritual  of  the  West.  Botli  were  playing  with  edged 
tools  :  both  were  encom-aging  that  intercourse  of  thought  which 
was  in  the  end  to  scatter  to  the  winds  the  theory  of  the  divine 
right  of  temporal  despots  and  the  infallibility  of  spiritual  rulers. 


Chap.  II.]         ATHENS  AND  CONSTANTINOPLE.  665 

The  power  of  the  old  Byzanthie  Ciiesars  was,  however,  rather 
divided  than  crushed  by  the  Latin  crusaders,  who  held  Con- 
stantinople for  more  than  half  a  century.  Theodore  Laskaris,  the 
son-in-law  of  the  usurper  who  dethroned  Isaac  Angelos,  jjjgg  of  new- 
established  himself  at  Nice,  first  as  despot,  then  as  ^J?P're9at 

•  •  •         JNiCG    1  re  01" 

eraperor.     Other  parts  of  the   empire  were   likewise   zond,  and 

irf  revolt  against  the  new  Caisars.     The  governors  of   Durazzo. 

Trebizond,'  without  changing  their  titles  at  first,  became  sovereigns 

of  their  province  and  laid  the  foundations   of  their  later  empire. 

A  power  not  less  formidable  sprang  up  in  the  city  of  Durazzo,  the 

old  Epidamnos^  which,  to  avoid  what  to  them  seemed  a  name  of  ill 

omen,  the  Romans  had  called  Dvrrhachium  ;  and  when     ,„^, 

at  length  the  general  of  Michael  Palaiologos  wrested  the 

capital  from  the  Latin  conquerors,  the  Greeks  were  left  with  a  bitter 

hatred  of  the  laws,  customs,  and  government  of  Latin  Christendom. 

But  whatever  may  have  been  the  amount  of  evil  thus  wrought, 

it  Avas  to  some   extent  compensated  by  the  first  crusade,  which 

carried  Godfrey  and  Tancred  to  Jerusalem.    The  doom  „.      ,,. 

•  11  imi  111        Rise  of  the 

of  the  empire  was  sealed  unless  the  lurks  could   be   Ottoman 

drawn  away  from  Bithynia  and  Phrygia,  in  which  '^'^'■'^^■ 
their  armies  could  now  work  their  will.  In  the  western  warriors 
of  the  Cross  the  Seljukians  for  the  time  found  their  match.  The 
capital  of  the  Turkish  sultan  of  Iloum  was  transferred  from  Nice 
to  the  remote  and  obscure  city  of  Cogni  (Ikonion)  :  the  authority 
of  the  Byzantine  emperor  was  re-established  along  the  coasts  of 
Asia  Minor,  and  the  existence  of  his  empire  prolonged  for  nearly 
350  years.  Diu'ing  this  long  period  the  course  of  the  composite 
Greek  people  ruled  by  the  Byzantine  Ctesar  was  steadily  down- 
ward, while  under  the  training  of  Othman  and  of  his  son  Orkhan 
the  Ottoman  Turks  were  bracing  themselves  for  the  final  .struggle 
with  the  empire  of  the  East.  The  stern  discipline,  the  well-ordered 
life,  and  the  good  faith  of  this  nomadic  tribe  under  these  earnest 
leaders  won  for  them  the  adhesion  of  many  tribes  wliich  had  been 
the  subjects  of  the  Seljukian  chiefs,  and  opened  for  them  the  gates 
of  many  a  Greek  city.  The  laws  of  Orkhan  welded  his  rude  mass 
of  followers  into  an  organised  polity  ;  and  the  wisdom  of  his  brother 
Allah-ed-deen  suggested  a  scheme  which  was  to  be  the  deathblow 
of  the  Byzantine  power.  This  scheme  was  the  creation  of  an 
army,  in  which  every  man  should  be  for  life  a  member  1329. 
of  the  sultan's  family.     This  force  consisted  of  Chris-   Theenrol- 

1-11  1  meiitof  the 

tian  children  taken  at  an  age  when  they  could  be  brought   Janissaries, 
up  in  the  faith  of  Islam  without  the  forcible  conversion  of  prisoners 

■*  Trapezous,  see  pp.  57,  511.  See  p.  G3. 


666  THE  LATER    GREEK    PEOPLE.  [Book  VL 

forbidden  by  the  Koran  :  and  in  these  troops  the  Ottoman  leaders 
found  supporters  more  devoted  than  the  Popes  have  found  in  the 
Mendicant  Orders  or  the  Jesuits.  An  education  equally  sound  and 
vigorous  would,  if  inipartc^d  by  their  parents,  have  made  them  not 
less  strenuous  in  support  of  Eastern  Christendom  :  the  fact  that  it 
could  not  be  or  was  not  given  speaks  volumes  for  the  degraded 
state  of  the  Greek  population  generally.  Nay,  the  taking  of  the 
children  seems  by  this  wretched  folk  to  have  been  rather  wel- 
comed as  a  boon  ;  and  when  Orkhan  imposed  a  regular  tax  of 
tribute  children  to  be  levied  in  every  conquered  district,  it 
was  received  by  many  as  a  measure  which  saved  their  sons  from 
starvation. 

Constantine  XL,  the  last  of  the  Byzantine  Ciesars,  was  crowned 
at  Sparta.     Two  years  later  the  death  of  the  Sultan  Murad  II.  left 
Coronation     the  Ottoman  throne  to  the  man  who  was  resolved  that 
o/Constan-    Jje  would  reign  in  the  new  Rome  of  Constantine.     The 
1449.  Eastern  Emperor  was  indeed  already  his  vassal  ;  and 

an  ill-timed  attempt  to  play  the  part  of  an  independent  monarch 
led  to  the  final  struggle,  which  after  a  desperate  resistance  ended 

.  in  the  sacking  of  Constantinople.     The  chief  care  of 

stantiiiopie.    the  conqueror  was  to  render  it  a  worthy  capital  for  the 
1453.  Ottoman  sovereign  ;  and  for  this  purpose  it  was  practi- 

cally necessary  to  repeople  it.  The  arms  of  Mohammed  II.  wei'C 
afterwards  victorious  in  Trebizond  and  Sinope,  in  Lesbos  and  tlic 
Peloponnesos  :  and  from  all  these  a  large  number  of  Greek  families 
(how  many,  we  cannot  say)  were,  after  the  fashion  followed  by 
Dareios  and  Xerxes,  removed  to  Byzantion. 

In  this  there  was  not  nnich  gain.  The  liand  of  the  Ottoman 
Turk  gradually  effaced  such  relics  of  old  Greek  customs  and 
Ottoman  character  as  had  survived  the  formal  ceremonialism 
adininistra-  of  the  Byzantine  court  or  the  rigid  uniformity  of 
Wi"icm  Eastern  orthodoxy.  Ancient  Ilcllas  was  now  placed 
Greece.  under  a  feudal   system  which   left  the  wealth   of  the 

country  in  the  hands  of  the  timariots  or  vassals  of  the  Sultan  ;  and 
the  exaction  of  every  fifth  child  by  way  of  tribute  brought  about  a 
dull  acquiescence  in  a  system  which  took  their  sons  to  replenish 
the  ranks  of  the  janissaries  and  their  daughters  to  fill  the  harems  of 
Turkish  nobles.  Nearly  two  thirds  of  the  Ottoman  revenues  were 
furnished  by  the  haratch  or  capitation  tax  levied  with  a  few 
exceptions  on  every  male,  not  a  Mohammedan,  above  the  age  of  ten 
years.  The  decay  of  commerce,  the  neglect  of  the  public  ways, 
and  the  difficulty  of  getting  produce  to  a  market,  led  the  country 
people  to  accept  as  a  boon  the  land-tax  which  demanded  a  fixed 
portion  of  produce  in  kind  ;  and  thus  a  system  was  fastened  on 
the  land  wliich  may  be  said  as  surely  to  inslave  it  as  the  system 


Chap.  II.]         ATHENS   AND   CONSTANTINOPLE.  667 

against  wbicli  Solon  indignantly  j^rotested,'  and  which  in  certain 
points  it  resembled.     None  could  house  their  crops  until  the  tax- 
gatherer  should  have  carried  away  the  portion  reserved  for  the 
government ;  and  the  Moslem  lord,  aided  by  a  Moslem  collector, 
had  the  power  of  oppressing  the  farmer  and  the  peasant  much  as 
he  might  please.    Such  a  system  left  no  room  for  improvements  in 
tlie  processes  of  cultivation,  and  effectually  checked  the  investment 
of  cajDital  in   land.     The   old  tools  were  used,  the  old  methods 
retained,  only  with   greater  listlessness   and   want  of  spirit  and 
intelligence.    During  these  ages  of  oppression  the  Greek  population 
continued  to  decline.     Perhaps  no  time  can  be  pointed  out  when 
things  were  otherwise,  since  the  days  when  Polybios  bitteily  de- 
plored the  effects  of  the  luathsome  vices  which  had  eaten  like  a  can- 
ker into  the  very  heart  of  the  people.    But  the  decay  was  now  vastly 
more  rapid.     There  were  no  longer  the  comparatively  flourishing 
cities  which  counteracted  the  ravages  caused  by  the   Slavonian 
inroads  of  the  sixth   century  :  there  was,  in  short,  no  scope  for 
patriotism  or  enterprise  of  any  kind,  jind  if  the  victory   victory  of 
of  Lepanto  enabled  the  Venetians  lo  purchase  peace  by    t.he  Vene- 
pledging  themselves  to   pay  a  yeaily  tribute   for  the    Ljpanto. 
island  of  Zante  (Zakynthos),  it  in  no  way  hindered  the      ^^"^• 
Turks  from  making  up  their  losses  by  demanding  fresh  seamen  and 
fresh  ships  from  the  Greeks  whether  of  the  islands  or  of  the  main- 
land.    The  Turkish  conquests  had,  further,  the  effect  of  drivino- 
away  the  learned   class  who  had  thriven  on  the  Avealth  of  the 
Byzantine  nobles.     To  the  land  which  they  deserted  this  was  little 
loss;  to  Western  Europe  it  was  in  the  end  a  positive  benefit :  but 
the  change  left  the  peasantry  to   represent  the  old  Greek  popula- 
tion ;  and  these  peasants  delighted  to  think  of  themselves  not  as 
Greeks   but  as  Romans  and  Christians,  the   descendants  of  the 
conquerors  of  the  world  and  the  professors  of  the  orthodox  faith.''^ 
More    than  a    century    had  passed  away  since    the    battle  of 
Lepanto,  when  the  Venetian  Senate  saw  in  the  defeat  of  the  Turks 
by  John  Sobieski  at  Vienna  a  reason  for  beginning  a    campainTis 
war  bv  which  they  miffht  hope  to  repay  themselves   oftheVcne- 
the  costs  of  the  contest.     This  motive  led  directly  to  a   siniin 
series  of  campaigns  in  Greece,  under  the  command  of   ^rreece. 
Francesco  Morosini,  who,  after  many  solid  and  some  brilliant  suc- 
cesses, occupied  Athens  and  laid  siege  to  the  Akro- 
polis.     The  magnificent  structures  of  the  old  Greek 
architects,  which  graced  this   little  hill,  were  still  in  great  part 
perfect :  but  the  Turks  had  made  use  of  the  Parthenon  as  a  powder- 
magazine,   and   a   Venetian  bomb   falling   into   it  shattered  and 

'  See  p.  76. 

^  Finlay,  Greece  under  OtJioman  and  Venetian  Domination,  p.  143. 


668  THE   LATER    GREEK    PEOPLE.  [Book  VI. 

partially  destroyed  the  work  of  Pheidias,  Iktinos,  and  Kallikrates.' 
Thirty  years  later  the  peace  known  as  that  of  Passarovitz,  whicli 

1718.  secured  to  Venice  its  conquests  in  Dalmatia  with  some 

Peaceof  other  towns,  left  the  Peloponncsos  once  more  in  the 
liands  of  the  Sultan  ;  but  the  condition  of  the  people 
h^fhecon^-*^"'^  ^^ '''''  iicvertheless  changed  for  the  better.  In  place  of 
dition  of  the  personal  labor  the  peasant  now  paid  a  fixed  portion 
peop  e.  ^£  ^j^^  produce  of  the  soil,  or  its  value  in  money,  and 

he  thus  became  either  the  leg-nl  tenant  or  the  owner  of  the  land 
on  ^vhich  he  toiled ;  and  the  result  of  the  change,  a  result  much 
like  that  ^hich  followed  the  reforms  of  Solon",  was  a  state  of 
feeling  which  would  have  rebelled  against  the  exaction  of  the  tri- 
bute children,  if  that  impost  had  been  still  a  present  reality.  This 
spirit  of  independence  Avas  still  further  fostered  by  the  French 
Eevolution,  and  the  songs  of  Rhiga  of  Yelestinos  bore  fruit  a 
generation  later,  although  their  author  fell  a  victim  to  the 
treachery  of  his  fellow-countrymen. 

The  tusk  of  shaking  oS  the  Turkish  yoke  was  a  work  of  nearly 
thirty  years ;  and  the  warfare  on  both  sides  was  such  as  might  be 
Rebellion  of  expected  where  the  antagonism  both  of  race  and  of 
the  Western  creed  has  been  exasperated  by  ages  of  oj)prcssion  and 
asainst  the  suffering  into  unreasoning  hatred.  The  intricacies  of  mo- 
Tiirks.  (jgj.,j  diplomacy,  which  can  seldom  go  straight  to  a  mark 

in  matters  even  of  the  clearest  right  and  duty,  came  in  to  multiply 
difficulties,  and  to  prolong  the  contest  by  raising  hopes,  and  dis- 
appointing them,  and  then  raising  them  again.  That  the  Greeks 
should  enter  on  such  a  struggle  without  the  faults  which  had  marked 
them  even  in  their  best  days,  none  but  dreamers  could  expect ;  and 
the  hindrances  raised  by  want  of  union  and  the  jealousies  of  faction 
Declaration  Avere  fully  as  great  as  those  which  were  presented  by 
dcnce'''^'^"      ^''^  arms  of  their  enemies.     The  declaration  of  indo- 

1821.  pendence    put   forth    at   the    Achaian    Kalavrita  was 

followed  by  a  massacre  of  the  inhabitants  of  Patras  on  the  entry  of 
the  pasha  of  Lepanto  for  the  relief  of  the  Turkish  garrison  ;  and 
the  crime  of  the  (ireeks  of  the  Peloponncsos  in  seeking  lo recover 
their  freedom  was  avenged  on  the  Greeks  of  Constantinople  who 
had  nothing  to  do  with  it.  The  richest  Greek  bankers  wore  mur- 
dered fo)'  the  sake  of  their  wealth  ;  the  patriarch  was  killed,  and 
the  Greek  churches  were  destroyed.  l>nt  the  fall  of  Tripolitza,^  a 
town  standing  in  the  triangle  formed  by  the  three  ancient  cities  of 
Tegea,  Mantineia,  and  Pallantion,  cost  the  Turks  the  lives  of  6,000 
men  and  carried  the  Greeks  somewhat  nearer  to  the  end  atwhich  they 
were  aiming.    The  provisional  government  now  .set  up  published  a 

'  See  p.  259.        *  Finlay,  Greece  under  Othoman  Domination,  p.  30. 
»  See  p.  595. 


Chap.  II.]  ATHENS  AND  CONSTANTINOPLE.  <)69 

decree    al)olisliing    slavery   and  forbidding  the   sale  of  Turkish 
prisoners  ;  the  Turks  retorted  by  a  massacre,  iitterly  wanton  and 
unprovoked,  which  left  Cliios  a  desert.  Forty  thousand 
of  the  islanders,  who   had  taken  no  part  in  the  enter- 
prise of  their  western  countrymen,  had  been  ruthless-   chioT*(Scio) 
ly  slain,    when  the  consuls  of  England,  France,   and   by  the 

J  '  iT>  >  >  Turks 

Austria  came  forward  to  assure  the  miserable  fugi- 
tives who  had  lied  to  the  mountains  that  they  could  trust  to  the 
sincerity  of  the  Turks  who  promised  a  complete  amnesty  to  all 
who  returned  to  their  liomcs.  Seven  thousand  came  back,  and  all 
were  mercilessly  slaughtered;  and  thirty  thousand  captives  sold  in 
the  markets  of  Smyrna  and  Constantinople  perhaps  more  than  paid 
the  expenses  to  which  the  Turks  had  been  put  in  murdering  their 
kinsfolk.  Years  dragged  slowly  on,  marked  by  some  capture  of 
heroic  exploits  and  some  miserable  deeds,  until  the  ^^e^^Jij^Y 
capture  of  Athens  seemed  to  forebode  ultimate  failure  1827. 
to  the  Greek  cause.  The  ruffian  Kiutaki  who  commanded  the 
Turks  fancied  that  Lord  Cochrane  and  General  Richard  Church 
were  among  his  240  prisoners,  and,  having  had  the  eighteen 
European  volunteers  found  among  them  cut  down  in  his  presence, 
ordered  the  rest  to  be  massacred.  To  Lord  Cochrane  and  still 
more  to  General  Church  in  his  Akarnanian  cainpaign  the  Greeks 
were  indebted  for  a  series  of  operations  whicli  changed  the  course 
of  things  on  land.  At  sea,  the  Turkish  fleet  under  Battle  of 
Ibrahim  Pasha  provoked  a  contest  with  the  allied  Navariuo. 
squadrons  of  England,  France,  and  Russia  in  the  bay  of  Navariuo, 
where  Demosthenes  had  won  his  victory  over  Brasidas.'  The 
English  admiral.  Sir  Edward  Codrington,  was  no  enthusiastic 
Phil-hellen  ;  but,  while  acting  strictly  Avithin  the  letter  and  ac- 
cording to  the  spirit  of  his  instructions,  he  could  not  regret  that 
the  Turks  had  thus  chosen  to  bring  on  themselves  a  signal  punish- 
ment for  former  crimes  against  humanity  and  law. 

The  '  Great  Powers,'  which  had  at  first  left  the  Greeks  to  get  on 
as  best  they  could,  now  stepped  in  for  the  settlement  of  affairs 
which  fell  within  the  sacred  circle  of  diplomacy.  The  Greeks  were 
to  be  placed  under  an  hereditary  sovereign  who  should  be  the  inde- 
pendent tributary  of  the  Sultan  ;  and  the  office  was  in  the  first  in- 
stance offered  to  Leopold,  afterwards  King  of  the  Belgians,  and 
refused  by  him.  Some,  perhaps  many,  of  the  evils  which  Appoint- 
marked  the  reiscnof  the  Bavarian  Otho,  who  was  at  last   !"*;"''  ?f  ,. 

1  PI  .11  1-111  Otho,  by  the 

chosen  tor  the  post,  might  have  been  avoided  or  less-   Great  Pow- 
ened,  had  this  wise  and  careful  statesman  undertaken  the   onu^e  ^'°° 
irksome  task  of  replacing  faction  by  order,  and  self-  Greeks, 
seeking  by  single-hearted  efforts  for  the  common  good.    The  plan 
'  See  p.  316. 


670  THE  LATER    GREEK    PEOPLE.  [Book  VI. 

of  Otlio  was  to  govern  the  Greek's  by  thrusting  his  Bavarian 
followers  into  all  lucrative  offices  ;  but  this  system  was  summarily 
.  .  cut  short  by  the  bloodless  revolution  of  1843.  Nine- 
ofotho.  teen  years  later  another  revolution,  equally  bloodless, 
1862.  deposed  the  Bavarian  king  ;  and  the  Greek  people  them- 

selves chose  first  the  English  prince  Alfred,  and,  on  leannng  that 
this  choice  could  not  be  carried  out,  took  the  Danish  prince  George. 
That  man  must  be  sanguine  indeed  who  can  bring  him- 
self to  think  that  during  the  years  which  have  since  passed, 
the  evils  which  affect  Greek  society  have  been  attacked  at  their 
Present  con-  root.  Littlc  has  been  done,  perhaps  nothing,  towards 
dition  of        settling  the  countrv  by  the  making  of  roads  and  bridixes. 

Western  fe>  .•'''»,.  ,     *     ,  .       '^     ' 

Greece.  by  tlie   suppression  oi  brigandage,  by  encouraging  tiie 

investment  of  capital  in  land,  by  drainage  of  the  soil,  and  by  im- 
proving the  methods  of  agriculture.  The  old  Turkish  land-tax, 
welcomed  at  first  almost  as  a  boon,  has  been  retained  with  so  much 
success  as,  in  the  words  of  the  great  historian  of  modern  Greece, 
to  make  the  task  of  cultivating  its  soil  even  less  profitable  than  that 
of  writing  its  history.'  The  old  faults  of  the  Greek  character  still 
produce  their  evil  fruit  of  personal  corruption,  of  reckless  place- 
hunting,  of  selfishness,  faction,  jealousy,  and  slander.  The  memory 
of  a  great  past  still  leads  to  talking  rather  than  to  action  ;  and  the 
close  of  half  a  century  of  independence  leaves  the  Greeks  much 
where  they  were  when  the  first  years  of  freedom  seemed  to  give 
promise  of  better  things.  Perliaps  these  evils  will  remain  much  as 
they  are  now,  until  a  wider  revolution  shall  have  changed  the  face  of 
South-Ecistern  Europe.  It  is  scarcely  reasonable  to  suppose  tliat 
one  small  portion  of  the  composite  (irreek  people^  can  be  brought  to 
orderly  government  and  self-control,  while  a  vastly  larger  portion 
still  lies  under  the  yoke  of  a  senseless  and  intolerable  tyranny.  The 
countries  in  which  Herodotos  took  pride  as  the  loveliest  and  richest 
of  the  workP  have  been  reduced  by  the  grinding  exactions  of  cen- 

■  Finlay,  Orecce  under  Othoman  lannruacre  which  they  speak.     The 

Domination,  p.  30.  latter,  after  the  Ottoman  conquest, 

^  Time  may,  perha})S,  be  better  was  floodedwidi  Turkish  andother 
spent  than  iu  attempts  to  determine  foreign  woids  ;  the  foriiuir  have 
how  far  the  presentcondltionof  the  been  interminfrled  with  the  con- 
people  is  owing  to  the  influence  of  querors  who  have  successively 
language  or  to  affinity  of  blood,  swept  over  the  land.  But  the  task 
There  can  l)e  no  doubt  that  the  cs-  of  throwing  off  these  foreign  words 
tablishment  of  NewRomestrength-  has  been  found  more  easy  than  the 
ened  the  foundations  of  the  wide  regeneration  of  Greek  society.  The 
empire  whicii  the  conquests  of  reason  is  obvious.  In  Mr.  Finlay'a 
Alexander  had  insured  to  dialects  words  '  the  language  retained  its 
marked  by  a  singularly  tenacious  ancient  structure  and  grammar  : 
vitality  ;  nor  is  tliere  any  reason  for  the  people  had  lost  their  ancient 
Bupposing  that  the;  pco])!*^  of  the  virtues  and  institutions." — History 
Hellas  known  to  Tliucydides  and  of  (rvcece,  1453-1831^  '>  350. 
Xenophonareless  Hellenic  than  the        '  See  p.  101. 


Chap.  II.]         ATHENS  AND  CONSTANTINOPLE.  671 

turies  to  a  desert  in  which  the  living  scarcely  suffice  to  bury  their 
dead,  while  the  robbers  squander  their  gains  on  costly  palaces,  on 
enervating  debauchery,  and  useless  ironclads  at  Constantinople.  In 
dealing  with  the  Greeks  of  the  Pelopoiuieso»,  or  of  Attica  only,  we 
are  dealing  with  a  bare  fragment  of  a  people  which,  if  united,  would 
be  a  mighty  nation,  and  would  at  once  start  into  life  and  energy. 
That  union  must  embrace  Greek  and  Serd,  Albanian,  Rouniaii,  and 
Bulgarian  ;  but  this  consummation  caonot  be  looked  for  until  the 
invading  horde,  for  such,  in  strictness  of  speech,  the  Turks  are 
still,  shall  have  been  '  driven  back  to  its  native  deserts,  or  else 
die  out,  the  victim  of  its  own  vices,  on  the  soil  which  it  has 
too  long  defiled.'  Their  departure  would  indeed  leave  open  the 
grandest  of  all  fields  for  the  great  experiment  of  Monarchic 
Federalism  ;'  but  whether,  the  problem  is  to  be  solved  thus  or  in 
some  other  way,  it  is  hard  to  repress  a  feeling  of  impatience  and 
indignation  at  the  continuance  of  evils  not  only  unchecked,  but 
stimulated  and  intensified  by  the  supreme  selfishness  of  tyrants  to 
whom  the  righteous  title  of  rulers  cannot  be  applied  without 
a  ludicrous  misuse  of  words. 

'  Freeman,  Federal  Oovcrnment,  711. 


OHBONOLOGIOAL    TABLE. 


B.C. 

VG70- 
570 
?6J0 


PAGE 

43 


74 
118 


Sikyon 

Athens 
Egypt 


?585 
560 

■xyj 

44 

82 
97 

? 

104 

539 
545 

82 
106 

544 

111 

9 

'527 
?525 

114 

84 

118 

119 

?  532 

126 

?520 

123 

y  5i« 

514 

124 
130 

85 

510 

60 

86 

46     Megara  . 

Corinth  . 

Athens  . 
Media 

Asia  Minor 


Athens     . 
Asia  Minor 


Babylon 
Athens 
Egypt . 


Samos 
Rrsia. 


Babylon  . 
Scythia  . 
Athetis 

Korkyra  . 
Athens     . 


29 


.  Time    assigned    to   the   Orthagorid   dynasty, 

ending  witli  Kleistlienes. 
.  Conspiracy  and  failure  of  Kylon. 
.  Founding  of  Naukratis  in  the  reign  of  Psam- 

mitichos. 
.  Tyranny  of  Thea^enes. 
.  Death  of  the  tyrant  Periandros. 
.  Seizure  of  the  Akropolis  by  Peisistratos. 
.  Defeat  and   dethronement  of  Astyages  (?)  by 

Cyrus,  who  establishes  the  Persian  empire. 
.  Conquest  of  the  Asiatie  Hellenes  by  Kroisos 

(Crffisus)    king  of  Lydia.     ?  First  conquest 

of  Ionia. 
.  Death  of  Solon. 
.  Fall  of  Kroisos.     The  Lydian  empire  absorbed 

in    that    of    Persia.     ?  Second  conquest  of 

Ionia. 
Revolt  of  Paktvas  against  Cyrus. 
Conquest  of  Lydia  by  Harpagos.     ?  Third  con- 
quest of  Ionia. 
.  Siege  aud  capture  of  Babylon  by  Cyrus. 
.  Death  of  Peisistratos. 
.  Invasion  of  Kambyses. 
Failure  of  the  Persian  expedition  to  Amoun, 

and  abandonment  of  the  expedition  against 

Carthage. 
.  Death  of  Polykrates,  tyrant  of  Samos.    Despot- 
ism of  Maiandrios  and  Syloson. 
.  Election  or  accession  of  Dareios  to  the  Persian 

throne. 
Suppression  of  the  Magian  rebellion. 
.  Revolt  and  conquest  of  Babylon. 
.  Scythian  expedition  of  Dareios. 
.  Conspiracy  of  Aristogeiton,  and  death  of  Hip- 

parchos. 
.  Foundation  of  the  colony  from  Corinth. 
.  Invasion  of  Kleomenes,  king  of  Sparta,  who 

expels    Hippias.      Fall   of    the    Peisistratid 

dynasty. 


674 


CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE. 


PAGE 

87 


92 


136 
137 
139 


140 


143 
149 


144 


145 
147 


150 
151 

154 
155 
157 

160 


Atfietcs 


Plataiai 
Boiotia 


Sparta 


Ncaos. 


Asia  Minor 


Sparta    . 
Miletos    . 


Ionia  .    . 
Thrace    . 


Athens  and 


Marathon 


JParos . 
Persia 


Factions  between  the  Alkmaionid  Kleisthenes 
and  Isagoras. 

Reforms  and  expulsion  of  Kleisthenes,  followed 
by  his  return. 

Embassy  from  Athens  to  Sardeis,  to  ask  for  an 
alliance  with  the  Persian  king. 

Alliance  of  Plataiai  with  Athens. 

Victories  of  the  Athenians  in  Boiotia  and  Euboia. 
Four  thousand  Athenian  Klerouchoi  placed  on 
the  lands  of  the  Chalkidian  Hippobotai. 

Alliance  between  Thebes  and  Aigina,  followed 
by  a  war  with  Athens. 

Hippias  pleads  his  cause  before  a  congress  of 
Peloponnesian  allies. 

The  Corinthians  protest  against  all  interference 
with  the  internal  affairs  of  autonomous  com- 
munities ;  and  Hippias  returns  to  Sigeion, 
where  he  busies  himself  in  intrigues  for  the 
purpose  of  precipitating  the  power  of  Persia 
upon  Athens. 

Some  oligarchic  exiles  from  Naxos  ask  help 
from  Aristagoras  of  MUetos,  at  whose  request 
Artaphernes  sends  Megabates  to  reduce  the 
island. 

Ionian  Revolt.  On  the  failure  of  the  expedi- 
tion Aristagoras  revolts  against  Dareios,  and 
goes  to  ask  help  first  from  Sparta,  where  he 
gets  nothing,  then  from  Athens  where  the 
people  dispatch  twenty  ships  in  his  service. 

Buniing  of  Sardeis. 

Extension  of  the  revolt  toByzantion  and  Ks.ria. 

Defeat  and  death  of  Aristagoras. 

Capture  and  death  of  Histiaios. 

Defeat  of  the  Ionian  fleet  at  Lade. 
.     .  Deposition  and  exile  of  Demaratos. 
.     .  Fall  of  Miletos  in  the  sixth  year  of  the  revolt. 

Suppression  of  the  Ionian  Revolt.    Third 
(?  fourth)  conquest  of  Ionia. 
.     .  Political  reforms  of  Artaphernes  and  Mardonios. 
.     .  Destruction  of  the  fleet  of  Mardonios  by  a  storm 

on  the  coast  of  Athos. 
Sparta.  The  Persian  heralds  sent  by  Dareios  to 
demand  earth  smd  water  are  said  to  have  been 
thrown  into  the  Barathron  at  Athens  and  into 
a  well  at  Sparta. 
.  .  Landing  of  Hippias  with  the  Persians  at  Mara- 
thon. 

Pheidippides  sent  to  Sparta  from  Athens  to  agk 
immediate  help  against  the  Persians. 

Alleged  debates  in  the  Athenian  camp  at  Mara- 
thon. 

Defeat  of  the  Persians  and  departure  of  their 
fleet. 

The  raising  of  the  white  shield,  and  alleged 

charge  of  treacherj  against  the  Alkmaionidai. 

.    .  Expedition  of  Miltiades  to  Paros.  On  its  failure 

he  is  sentenced  to  a  flue  of  flfty  talents,  but 

dies  before  it  is  paid. 

.     .  Death  of  Dareios  who  is  succeeded  by  Xerxes. 

Xerxes  makes  preparations  for  invading  Egypt. 


CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE. 


675 


173 


174 
177 
163 

167 
171 

172 
179 

180 
182 

191 

183 

187 
192 


193 

194 

195 

196 
198 

200 

304 

205 


Egypt 
Persia 


Athens    . 

Corinth.  . 
Hellespont 
Thrace    , 

Thessaly  . 

Sparta 
Magnesia 

Artenuslon 

Thermopylai 

Euboia    .    . 


216 


AMica, 
Fkokis 


Athens 
Salamis 


67 
209 

Sicily  . 
Thrace 

210 

211 

Andros 
Aigina 

212 
213 

Attica. 

.  Reconquest  of  Egypt.  .    ,  .,  .        .j    , 

.  The  invasion  of  Hellas,  suggested,  it  is  said,  by 
Mardonios  and  opposed  by  Artabanos,resolved 
upon  by  Xerxes,  who  marches  to  Sardeis. 
.  Ostracism  of  Aristeides. 
Two    hundred    ships    built   by  the  advice  of 
Theraistokles. 
.  Pan-Hellenic  congress  at  the  isthmus. 
Mission  to  Gelon,  tyrant  of  Syracuse. 
.  CoBstruction  of  the  bridge  of  boats  for  the  pas- 
sage of  the  Persian  army. 
.  Review  of  the  Persian  army  at  Doriskos. 
Hellenic  and  other  cities  laid  under  forced  con- 
tributions. 
.  Xerxes  at  Tempe. 
Abandonment  of  the  pass  of  Tempe  by  thealUes, 
and  consequent  Medism  of  the  Thessalians. 
.  June.     Departure  of  Leonidas  for  Thermopylai. 
.  Destruction  of  a  large  portion  of  the  Persian 

fleet  by  a  storm  on  the  Magnesian  coast. 
.  The  Greek  fleet  takes  up  its  station  on  the 

northern  coast  of  Euboia. 
.  March  of  Hydarnes  over  Anopaia  for  the  pur- 
pose of  cutting  ofl"  the  Greek  army. 
Victory  of  the  Persians  and  death  of  Leonidas. 
.  A  Persian  squadron  sent  round  Euboia  to  take 
the  Greek  fleet  in  the  rear. 
In  the  first  action  off  Artemision  the  Greeks 

take  thirty  ships. 
A  second  storm  docs  further  damage  to  the  Per- 
sian fleet. 
In  a  second  sea  fight  the  Greeks  have  the  advan- 
tage, but  resolve  to  retreat  to  Salamis. 
Fortification  of  the  Corinthian  isthmus. 
.  Migration  of  the  people  to  Troizen,  Salamis,  and 

Aigina. 
.  Devastation  of  Phokis  by  the  Pei-sians  who  are 

defeated,  it  is  said,  at  Delphoi. 
.  Occupation  of  Athens  by  Xerxes. 
.  Themistokles  by  sending  a  message  to  the  Per- 
sians prevents  the  intended  retreat  of  the  allies. 
Battle  of  Salamis. 

Xerxes  determines  to  go  home,  leaving  Mardo- 
nios to  carry  on  the  war. 
Departure  of  the  Persian  fleet. 
Mareh  of  Xerxes  through  Thessaly  and  Thrace 
to  the  Hellespont. 
.  Defeat  of  the  Carthaginians  at  Himera. 
.  Siege  and  capture  of  Olynthos  by  Artabazos, 

who  fails  in  his  attempt  on  Potidaia. 
.  Siege  of  Andros  by  Themistokles. 
.  Gathering  of  the  Greek  fleet  at  Aigina  under 

Xanthippos  and  Leotychides. 
.  Mardonios  ofiers  specially  favorable  terms  to  the 
Athenians.  On  their  rejection  he  occupies 
Athens,  but  abstains  from  doing  any  injury  to 
the  city  or  country,  until  he  learns,  from  the 
entrance  of  the  Spartan  army  into  Attica,  that 
there  was  no  hope  of  carrying  out  his  plans 
successfully. 


676 


CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE. 


218 

223 

234 
235 
236 

227 

Mykali    . 

228 
230 

233 

Sestos .    . 
Athens     , 

233 
234 
235 

Asia  Jlinor 

235 

Byzantion 

236 

Asia  Minor 

237 

254 


239 
245 


347 
348 


249 


250 


251 


257 

256 
249 


251 
252 


240 


Soiotia    .    .    .  Retreat  of  Mardonios  to  Thebes  after  the  bum- 
iug  of  Athens. 

Advance  of  the  allies  into  the  territory  of 
Plataiai. 

Battle  of  Plataiai.  Defeat  and  death  of 
Mardonios. 

Retreat  of  Ai-tabazos. 

The  Pei-sian  camp  stormed. 

Siege  of  Thebes.  The  Theban  prisoners  put  to 
death  at  the  Corinthian  islhnins. 

Probably  midsummer.  The  allied  fleet  sails 
first  to  Samos,  then  to  Mykale. 

Battle  of  Mykale.    Ruin  of  the  Pei-sian  fleet. 

Foundation  of  the  Athemax  Empire. 

Siese  of  Sestos. 

Rebuilding  of  the  city,  and  fortification  of 
Peiraieus. 

Mission  of  Themistokles  to  Sparta. 

Building  of  the  walls  of  Themistokles. 

Victories  of  Pausanias  at  Kypros  (Cyprus)  and 
Byzantion. 

Pausanias  sends  his  prisoners  to  Xerxes,  is  re- 
called to  Spartii,  and  deprived  of  his  command. 

Dorkis  and  the  Spartan  conuuissioners  withdraw 
from  all  interference  in  the  aflfairs  of  the 
Asiatic  Greeks,  and  leave  the  ground  open  for 
the  establishment  of  the  Athenian  confederacy. 

Assessment  of  tribute  by  Aristeides  on  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Delian  confederaej'. 
Sparta     .     .    .  Treason  and  death  of  Pausanias" 
Athens    •  .  Development  of  the  Kleisthenean  constitution. 

Ostracism  of  Tliemistokles. 
Death  of  Aristeides. 
Sicily  .         .    .  Fall  of  the  Gelonian  dynasty. 
Naxos ....  Revolt  and  subjugation  of  Kaxos. 
Thaso.<    .    .    .  Revolt  of  Thasos,"whieh  is  conquered  at  the  end 

of  two  ycai-s. 
Pdoponmsos     .  Revolt  of  "the  Helots.  Dismissal  of  the  Athenian 
troops  by  the  Spartans.     Alliance   between 
Athens  and  Argos. 
Alliance  of  Megara  with  Athens. 
Building  of  the  Long  Walls  of  Megara. 
Atheris     .    .     .  The  Athenians  send  a  fieet  and  array  to  aid  the 

Egyittiaiis  in  their  revolt  ag:iinst  Artaxerxes. 
Aigiiia     .     .     .  Siege  of  Aiuiua  by  the  Atlienians. 
r&opoiDums     .  Defeat  iif  the  Corinthians  by  Myronides. 
At/ieris     .    .     .  Buikling  of  the  Long  Wallsof  Athens. 
Boiotia    .    .    .  Defeat  of  the  Athenians  at  Tanagra. 

Victory  of  the  Athenians  at  Oinophyta. 
Greatest  extension  of  the  Athenian  "empire. 
Athens     .     .    .  Banishment  of  Kimon. 

Reforms  of  Ephialtes,  followed  by  his  murder. 
Pelop(mnesos     .  The  expelled  Helots  placed  by  the  Athenians  in 

Naupaktos. 
Aigina    .    .     .  Conquest  of  Aigina  by  the  Athenians. 
£^jpl ....  Destruction  of  the  Athenian  fleet. 
hyprox    .     .     .  Final  victories  and  death  of  Kimon. 
(Cyprus)      .     .  Alleged  convention  of  Kallias. 
Magnesia     .     .  Death  of  TheniistokJes. 


CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE. 


677 


B.C. 

PAGE 

253 

446 

?443 

258 

• 

272 
259 

440 

260 

437 
436 

259 
261 

262 

433 
432 

263 
264 

265 

1 

Soiotia 
Euboia 
AUvens 


Samos  . 


A  mph  ipolis 

Korkyra .     . 


.  Defeat  of  the  Athenians  under    Tolmides    at 

Koroneia.    Evacuation  of  Boiotia. 
.  Revolt  of  Euboia  from  Atliens. 
.  Megara  follows  tlie  example  of  Euboia. 
.  Banishment  of  Thoukydides,  son  of  Melesias. 
Building    of    the    third  wall,   parallel    to    the 

western  or  Peiraie  wall. 
Accusation  and  death  of  Pheidias. 
Extension  of  Atlienian  settlements  to  Lemno.', 
Imbros,  Skyros,  and  Synope. 
.  Revolt  of  Samos,   effected  by  the  oligarchical 
part}',  is  followed  by  the  revolt  of 
Byzantion. 

The  Samians  ask  help  from  the  Spartans",  who 
summon  a  congress  of  their  allies,  in  which  the 
Corinthians  insist  on  the  right  of  every  inde- 
pendent state  to  the  management  of  its  own 
affairs. 
.  Founding  of  Amphipolis  by  Hagnon. 
.  The  Korkyraians  refuse  to  help  the  demos  of 
Epidamnos,  who  apply  to  the  Corinthians. 
A  Corinthian  army  admitted  into  Epidamnos. 
The  Korkyraians  express  their  readiness  to  sub- 
mit to  arbitration  :  the  proposal  is  rejected  by 
tiie  Corinthians. 
Surrender  of  Epidamnos. 

The  Korkyraians  seek  to  effect  an  alliance  with 
the  Athenians,  who  decide  on  a  defensive  alli- 
ance, and  send  ten  ships. 
These  ships  take  part  in  a  sea-fight  in  which  the 
Corinthians  defeat  the  Korkyraians.  Hence  the 


FIRST  ALLEGED  CAUSE  OF   THE   PELOPONNESIAN  WAR. 


266 


On  the  arrival  of  a  second  Athenian  squadron 

the  Corinthians  return  home. 
Potidaia  .    .    .  The  Makedonian  chief  Perdikkas  tries  to  stir  up 

revolt  in  Potidaia  against  AUiens. 
The  Athenians  send  a  fleet  to  Potidaia. 
Embassies  from  Potidaia  to  Athens  and  Sparta. 
The  Corinthian  Aristeus  forces  his  way  into 

Potidaia. 
Blockade  of  Potidaia  by  the  Athenians.    Hence 

the 


SECOND  ALLEGED  CAUSE  OF  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR. 


431 


267 


270 


271 


AtMns     .     .     .  The  Athenians    pass    a    decree   excluding  the 

Megarians  from  all  Athenian  ports. 
Sparta     .    .    .In  an   assembly   of    Peloponnesian    allies  tho 
Corinthians  insist  on  war  with  Athens. 

In  a  secret  debate  of  the  Spartans  the  majority 
decides  for  war. 

Autumn.  In  a  congress  held  at  Sparta  a  large 
majority  of  the  allies  resolve  on  war. 

Efforts  of  the  Spartans  to  bring  about  the 
banishment  of  Perikles. 

The  final  demands  of  the  Peloponnesians  re- 
jected by  the  Athenians,  who  express  their 
readiness  to  submit  to  arbitration. 


678 


CHEONOLOGICAL  TABLE. 


PAGE 

273 


274 


275 


Flataiai  .  .  .  Surprise  of  Plataiai  by  a  party  of  Thebans  who 
are  adinittcd  into  the  city  by  Naukleidcs. 

The  Thebaus  in  tlieir  turn  are  surprised  by  the 
Plataians  wlio,  in  breach  of  their  promise  to 
the  Theban  reinforcement,  slay  all  their 
prisoners. 

The  Plataian  ■women  and  children  removed  to 
Athens. 


PELOPONNESIAN   WAR.    FIRST  YEAR. 


277 

278 


279 


280 


Peloponnesos 


Aigina 


Jfegara 
Athens 

Thrace 


Athens 


The  Peloponnesian  forces  under  Archidamos  in 

vade  Attica  and  attack  Oinoe. 
Ravaging  of  the  demos  of  Achamai. 
The  Athenians,  aided  by  the  Korkyraians,  attack 

Methone.    Brasidas  throws  liimsclf  into  the 

citj'. 
The  inhabitants  of  Aigina  expelled  by  the  Athe- 
nians are  allowed  by  the  Spartans  to  settle  in 

Thyreatis. 

The  Athenians  ravage  Megaris. 
A  reserve  fund  of  1,000  talents  placed  in  the  Akro- 

polis. 
Sitalkes,  chief  of  the  Odrysai,  becomes  an  ally  of 

Athens,   with  which  Perdikkas  again  makes 

peace. 
Funeral  oration  of  Perikles. 


SECOND  YEAR. 


281     Attica ....  Second  invasion  of  Attica. 

Outbreak  of  the  plague  at  Athens. 

283  Unpopularity  of  Perikles    consequent  on    the 

ravages  of  the  disease.     He  is  lined,  but  re- 
elected Strategos. 

286  Fotidaia  .  .  .  Terrible  losses  by  the  plague  in  the  Athenian 
camp.  Surrender  of  Potidaia  to  Xenophon. 
Athens  .  .  .  The  Spartan  envoys  to  the  Persian  court  inter- 
cepted in  Thrace  by  Sadokos,  son  of  Sitalkes, 
are  brought  to  Athens,  and  tliere  \n\t  to  death 
along  with  the  Corinthian  Aristeus, 


287 

288 

289 
290 


THIRD  YEAR. 

Flataiai  .  .  .  The  Spartan  army  with  their  Boiotian  allies 
invades  the  territory  of  Plataiai.  On  the  re- 
jection of  his  ])roposals  for  neutrality  Archi- 
damos invests  the  jjlacc. 

Chalkidike,  .    .  Defeat  of  the  Athenians  under  Xenophon. 

Akariiania  .  .  The  Spartan  Knemos,  wishing  t<>  detach  Akama- 
Tiia  from  Alliens,  (U'ternruus  to  attack  Stratos. 
Defeat  of  the  elans  in  Alliance  v.itli  him.  Re- 
treat of  Knemos. 

Naupaktox  .  .  Phormion  intercepts  the  Corinthian  fleet,  and 
wins  a  splendid  victory. 

Krcte  ....  Fruitless  Athenian  expedition  to  Kretc. 


CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE. 


679 


PELOPONNESIAN  WAR.       THIRD   YEAR  {continued). 


PAGE 

291 


392 


293 


Naupaktos  .  .  The  Peloponnesian  fleet  contrives  to  entice  Phor- 
ffiion  into  the  Corintliiangulf ;  but  tlie  triumph 
of  the  Spartans  is  turned  into  a  second  victory 
for  Phormion. 

SalaruU  .  .  .  Brasidas  and  Knemos,  being  compelled  to  give 
up  a  proposed  night  attack  on  Peiraicus,  make 
a  raid  on  Salamis,  and  carry  off  the  Athenian 
guard-ships. 

Makedwiia  .  .  Sitalkes,  the  Odrvsian  chief,  advances  to  Anthe- 
mous  ;  but  through  the  intrigues  of  Perdikkas 
he  is  constrained  to  retreat. 


428 


FOURTH  YEAR. 

294  Lesbos     .    .    .  Revolt  of  all  Lesbos  from  Athens,  with  the  ex- 

ception of  the  town  of  Methymna. 

295  Kleippides,  sent  with  forty  ships  to  reduce  the 

island,  allows  the  Lesbians  to  send  envoys  to 
Athens. 

296  On  the  prayer  of  the  Lesbian  ambassadors  who 
appear  at  the  Olympic  festival  a  Peloponne- 
sian fleet  under  Alkidas  is  ordered  to  support 
the  revolt. 


427     297 


298 

299 
300 

301 
302 
304 
305 

306 

307 


FIFTH  YEAR. 

Aitica  .  .  .  Invasion  of  Attica  by  the  Peloponnesian s  under 
Kleomenes. 

Lesbos     .    .    .  Tlie  oligarchs  incautiously  arm  the  demos  who 

insist  on  a  distribution  of  corn,  threatening 

in  default  to  throw  open  the  gates  to  the 

Athenians. 

The  Mytilenaian  oligarchs  make  a  convention 

with  Paches. 
Alkidas  arrives  too  late  and,  being  resolved  to 
return  home,  massacres  his  prisone^^t  Myon- 
nesos.  ^ 

AtJiens  .  .  .  The  Mytilenaian  prisoners,  1,000  in  number,  are 
sent  to  Athens. 
In  the  debate  which  follows,  Kleon  proposes  the 
execution  of  the  whole  Mytilenaian  people. 
The  sentence  is  ])assed,  but  revoked  the  next 
day,  chiefly  tlirough  the  strenuous  exertions 
of  Diodotos.  Tlie  Mytilenaian  prisoners  at 
Athens  are  slain,  but  the  trireme  sent  to  arrest 
the  execution  arrives  just  in  time. 

Flataial  .  .  .  Upwards  of  200  Plataiains  manage  to  escape 
from  the  city.  Tlie  rest  are  compelled  to 
surrender  through  famine,  and  in  accordance 
with  the  Thebari  ]ilan  are  all  put  to  deatli. 

Korkyra  .  .  The  prisoners  sent  back  from  Corinth  carry  a 
decree  establishing  tlie  ancient  friendship  with 
the  Peloponnesians. 
They  bring  a  charge  of  Attikism  against  Peithias, 
who,  being  acquitted,  retaliates  by  accusing  the 
nobles  of  cutting  stakes  in  the  grove  of  Zeus. 
Murder  of  Peithias. 


680 


CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE. 


PELOPONNESIAN  WAR.     FIFTH  YEAR  {continued). 


308 
309 


310 
311 


Megara 
Athens 
Melos  . 

Trachis 


yikostratos,  the  Athenian  admiral,  seeks  toallaj 
the  feud  between  the  oligarchs  and  the  demos. 

Indecisive  victory  of  Alkuias. 

The  Athenian  admiral  Eurymedon,  anxious  to 
get  to  Sicily,  connives  at  the  massacre  of  the 
oligarchs. 

Conquest  of  Minoa  by  Nikias. 

Second  outbreak  of  plague  in  the  summer. 

Unsuccessful  expedition  of  Nikias  to  the  Spar- 
tan colonies  of  Melos  and  Thera. 

Foundation  of  the  Spartan  colony  of  Herakleia. 


426 


312 


313 
314 


SIXTH  YEAR. 

Akamania  .  .  The  Akarnanians  beseech  Demosthenes  to  mock- 
ade  Leukas. 

Demosthenes  resolves  on  a  campaign  in  Aitolia, 
with  the  view  of  advancing  iuto  Boiotia,  and 
there  restoring  the  supremacy  of  Athens. 

His  defeat  and  return  to  Naupaktos. 

The  Ambrakiots  seize  Olpai. 

Defeat  and  death  of  the  Spartan  general  Eury- 
lochos,  followed  by  the  ignominious  retreat  of 
the  Peloponnesians  under  Menedaios. 

The  Ambrakiot  reinforcements  cut  off  at  IdomenS. 


425 


315 
317 

318 

3ft 

320 

321 
322 

323 
326 
827 


SEVENTH  YEAR. 

Pylos  ....  Demosthenes  occupies  Pylos,  from  which  Brasi- 
das  in  vain  tries  to  dislodge  him. 
The  Spartan  fleet  defeated  bj-  tlie  Athenians  in 

tlie  harbor  of  Spliakteria. 
Blockade  of  theS[)artan  hoplites  in  the  island. 
Terras  of  truce  arranged  on  tlie  surrender  of  the 
fleet  to  the  Athenian  generals. 
AtJiens    .    .    .  Spartan  envoys  appear  at  Athens  to  negotiate  a 
peace.     Klcon  demands  the  surrender  of  the 
hoplites,  and  brings  about  the  dismissal  of  the 
ambassadors. 
I)/lo8  .    .    .    .  TlicAtlienians  refuse  to  restore  the  Spartan  fleet. 

Distress  of  the  besiegers. 
Athens     .    .    .  The  news  from  Pylos  causes  great  dissatisfaction. 
Nikias  treacherously  abandons  liis  command 
to  Kleoii,  who  promises  to  return  victorious 
in  twenty  days. 
I)/los  ....  Attack  on  Sphakteria.     Capture  of  292  hoplites, 
who  arc  conveyed  to  Athens. 
Establishment  of  a  jjermanent  Athenian  garrison. 
Ravages  caused  l)y  .Messenians  from  Naupaktos. 
Athens    .    .    .  Artaphernes,    the   Persian   envoy  to   Sparta,  is 
brought  to  Athens,  and  sent  back  to  Epliesos, 
witli  some  Athenian  envoj's,  who  are  compell- 
ed to  reluni  on  tlie  dcatli  of  Artaxerxes. 
Chios  ....  The  Chians  arc  ordered  by  the  Athenians  to  poll 
down  the  new  wall  of  their  city. 


CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE. 


681 


B.C. 

424 

PAGE 

327 

328 

* 

329 

330 

361 

331 

333 

334 

335 
336 

338 

PELOPONNESIAN  WAR.      EIGHTH  YEAR. 

Pdopouiiesos  .  The  Athcuiaiis  establish  a  garrison  iu  Kythera, 
and  take  Thyrca.  The  Aiginetans  captured 
within  it  are  talcen  to  Atliens  and  put  to  death. 

Alleged  massacre  of  2,000  Helots  by  the  Spartans, 
who  receive  overtures  from  Perdikkas  for 
combined  operations  against  the  Athenian 
empire. 

Brasidas  is  sent  in  command  of  the  expedition 
into  Thrace. 

The  Athenians  get  possession  of  Nisaia,  but 
retreat  from  Megara  when  Brasidas  offers 
battle. 

The  Megarians  demolish  their  Long  Walls.  • 
Sicily ....  In  the  congkess  of  the  Sicilian  Greeks  at 
Gela  Hermokrates  inveighs  against  the  ag- 
gressiveness of  the  Athenians.  General  peace 
between  the  Sikeliot  cities. 
Boiotia  .  .  .  Failure  of  the  plan  of  Demosthenes  for  the  sub- 
jugation of  Boiotia. 

Battle  of  Delion  ;    decisive    victory  of  the 
Thebans. 
Thrace    .    .    .  Brasidas,  having  marched  through  Thessaly,  ap- 
pears before  Akanthos,  where  the  people  are 
averse  to  the  idea  of  revolt  from  Athens. 

The  Revolt  of  Akanthos  is  brought  about  by 
the  eloquence  and  the  threats  of  Brasidas,  sup- 
ported bj'  the  oligarchic  faction. 

Surreuder  of  Amphipolis  to  Brasidas. 

Thucydides  arrives  on  the  same  day  at  Eion.  For 
his  remissness  in  failing  to  save  Amphipolis  he 
is  banished  or  goes  into  voluntary  exile. 

Brasidas  takes  Torone. 


NINTH  YEAR. 


423 


363 
338 


339 


Sparta 


Sicily  . 
Thrace 


The  Athenians  accept  the  year's  truce  offered  by 
the  Spartans  on  the  basis  of  maintaining  the 
status  quo.  , 

Dismantling  of  Leontinoi. 

.  Brasidas  is  received  into  Skioue  against    the 
wishes  of  the  party  favorable  to  Athens. 

The  commissioners  arrive  to  announce  the  truce. 
Brasidas  insists  that  Skione  revolted  before  it 
began. 

Revolt  of  Mcnde  from  Athens.  It  is  recovered 
by  Nikias  and  Nikostratos. 


TENTH  YEAR. 


422 


341 


342 
343 


Athens 
Thrace 

29* 


Kleon  is  placed  in  command  of  the  army  for 

operations  in  Thrace. 
Recovery  of  Torone  by  Kleon. 
Battle  of  Amphipolis.    Death  of  Brasidas  and 

of  Kleon. 


682 


CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE. 


PELOPONNESLiN  WAR.      ELEVENTH  YEAR. 


B.C. 

431 


PAGE 

343 
346 
347 


348 


Athens  .  . 
AmphipoUs . 
Athens    .     . 


Feloponnesos 
Peloponnesos 


Ratification  of  the  peace  of  Nikias. 

Tlie  Cliallvidians  refuse  to  give  up  Amphipolis. 

Separate    treatj-    between   Athens  and    bparla. 

The  Athenians  surrender  the  prisoners  taken 

at  Sphakteria. 
Formation  of  the  new  Arrive  confederacy. 
The  Athenians    are    induced  to  withdraw  the 

Messenians  and  Helots  from  Pylos  and  place 

them  in  Kephallenia. 


420 


353 


TWELFTH  YEAR. 

Peloponnesos    .  Alliance  between  Argos  and  Sparta. 

Athens    .    .    .  Defensive  alliance  between  Athens,  Argos,  Elis, 

and  Mantineia. 
Olympia .    .    .  The  Athenians  present  at  the  games.     Victories 

of  Alkibiades. 


419  I  353  I  Peloponnesos 


THIRTEENTH   YEAR. 

Alkibiades  makes  a  progress  through  Achaia. 
The  Athenians  bring  the  Messenians  and  Helots 
back  to  Pylos. 


418 


354 
355 


356 


FOURTEENTH  YEAR. 

Pelopmmesos  .  Invasion  of  Argos  by  the  Spartans  under  Agis, 
who  grants  the  Argives  a  truce  of  four  months. 

Battle  of  Maijtineia.  Complete  victory  of 
the  Spartans,  who  thus  regain  their  old  position. 

Oligarchical  conspiracy  of  the  One  Thousand  at 
Argos. 


417 


357 


FIFTEENTH  YEAR. 

Peloponnesos  .  Rising  of  the  Argive  demos  against  the  oligarchs. 
Building,  and  demolition  of  the  Long  Walls  of 
Argos. 

Makcdonia  .  .  Unsuccessful  attempt  of  the  Athenians  to  reco- 
ver Amphipolis. 


416 


358 
363 


SIXTEENTH  YEAR. 

Melos  ....  The  Melians,  refusing  to  join  the  Athenian  con- 
federacy, are  besieged,  and  on  their  surrender 
are  massacred. 

Athens  .  .  .  Arrival  of  envoys  from  Egesta  in  Sicily  to  ask 
help  apiinst  the  people  of  Selinous.  The 
Egestaians  promise  to  bear  the  whole  costs  of 
the  war. 


415 


364 


367 
368 


SEVENTEENTH    YEAR. 

Athens    .    .    .  Alkibiades,    Nikias,    and  Lamachos  appointed 
generals  of  an  expedition  to  Sicilj'. 
Mutilation  of  the  Iiermai. 
Accusation  of  Alkibiades  on  a  charge  of  profana- 


CHRONOLOGICAL   TABLE, 


683 


PELOPONNESIAN  WAR.  SEVENTEENTH  YEAR  (conolnued). 


369 
370 

Syracuse 

371 

Italy  .    . 

373 

bicily 

373 

375 

Syracuse 

379 

Sparta    . 

tion.     His  trial  postponed  until  after  his  re- 
call from  Sicily. 
Departure  of  the  fleet  from  Athens. 
Hermokrates  warns  the  Syracusans  of  the  coining 

invasion.    He  is  contradicted  by  Athenai^oras. 
The  Athenian  fleet  reaches  Rhegion.  The  wealth 

of  Egesta  turns  out  to  be  a  mere  cheat. 
The  Athenians,  having  sailed  first  to  Syracuse, 

occupy  Katane. 
Alkibiades,  summoned  to  Athens,   makes  his 

escape   from  Thourioi,   and  is  sentenced  to 

death  in  his  absence. 
Landing  of  the  Athenians  in  the  Great  Harbor. 
The  Athenians  win  a  victorj',  of  which  Nikias 

makes  no  use. 
Alkibiades  urges  the  active  resumption  of  the 

war  against  Athens,  the  mission  of  a  Spartan 

general  to  Syracuse,  and  the  establishment  of 

a  permanent  garrison  in  Attica. 


414 


883 

383 
384 
385 

386 

387 

387 
388 


EIGHTEENTH  YEAR. 

Syracuse     .     .  Landing  of  the  Athenian  army  at  Leon. 
Surprise  of  Epipolai. 
The  Athenians  build  a  fort  on  Labdalon. 
The  first  Syracusan  counterwork  taken  by  the 

Athenians. 
Lamachos  is  killed  at  the  taking  of  the  second 

counterwork. 
The  Athenian  fleet  returns  from  Naxos  to  the 

Great  Harbor  of  Syracuse. 
The  Athenians  again  have  everything  in  their 

favor,  and  Nikias  again  makes  no  use  of  the 

opportunity. 
The  Syracusans  depose  Hermokrates  from  his 

command. 
Gylippos   crosses  to   Taras;  Nikias  makes  no 

eff'ort  to  intercept  him  at  sea. 
Gylippos,  having  entered   Syracuse,   takes  the 

fort  on  Labdalon. 
Nikias  fortifies  Plemmyrion. 
Victory  of  the  Syracusans.   Nikias  writes  to  ask 

for  more  help  from  Athens. 


NINETEENTH  YEAR. 

413  1  390  I  Attica     .    .    .  The  Peloponnesians,  by  fortifying  Dekeleia,  be- 
I         I  gin  the  so-called 


391 
393 
395 
396 


DEKELEIAN  WAR. 

Syracuse     .    .  A  naval  victory  of  the  Athenians  is  made  worth- 

less  by  the  loss  of  Plemmyrion. 
The  destruction  of  the  fleet  of  Nikias  prevented 

by  the  arrival  of  Demosthenes  with  73  triremes. 
Failure  of  the  night  attack  of  Demosthenes  on 

Epipolai. 
Nikias  refuses  to  retreat,  or  even  to  withdraw 

the  fleet  to  Katane  or  Naxos. 


684 


CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE. 


PELOPONNESIAN  (DEKELELA.N)  WAR. 
(cmitinued). 


NINETEENTH  YEAR 


B.C.     PAGE 


399 
400 
402 
403 

406 

407 
409 
411 

412 
413 


Athe7is    . 
Attica     . 

The  Egean 


Eclipse  of  the  moon.    Nikias  refuses  to  stir  for 

27  days.  [don. 

Defeat  of  the  Athenian  fleet.   Deatli  of  Eurjme- 
The  Syracusans  close  the  Great  Harbor. 
Destruction  of  the  Athenian  fleet. 
The  Athenian  retreat  delayed  by  a  stratagem  of 

Hermokrates. 
After  a  retreat  of  terrible  suffering  extending  over 

7  days, the  division  of  Demosthenes  surrenders, 

on  the  promise  that  their  lives  shall  be  spared. 
Surrender  of  Nikias  to  Gylippos.    The  prisoners 

are  thrown  into  the  quarries  of  Epipolai. 
Demosthenes,  in  defiance  of  the  compact  made 

with  him,  is  put  to  death  along  with  Nikias. 
The  Athenian  slaves  desert  in  large  bodies  to 

the  Spartans  at  Dekeleia. 
Dismissal   of    the  Thrakian  mercenaries,  who 

massacre  the  people  of  Mykalessos. 
The  catastrophe  in  Sicily  aggravates  the  dislike 

of  the  oligarchical  factions  for  Athens. 
The  Euboians  and  Lesbians  ask  help  from  Sparta 

in  their  meditated  revolt  from  Athens. 
The  Persian  king  claims  the  tribute  assessed  ou 

the  Greeks  b^'Dareios. 


TWENTIETH  YEAR. 

415  Mission  of  Aristokrates  from  Athens  to  Chios. 
Western            \  Victory  of    the  Athenians  over   the  Pelopon- 
JBellas               j     uesians  at  Peiraion. 

416  The  Egean  Revolt  of  Chios,  Lebedos,  and  Erai.  On  receiv- 
ing tidings  of  these  revolts  the  Athenians 
resolve  to  make  use  of  the  reserve  funds  in  the 
Akropolis. 

417  Revolt  of  Miletos.  First  treaty  between  the 
Spartans  and  the  Persians. 

418  Insurrection  of  tiie  people  in  Samos  against  the 
oligarchical  government. 

Revolt  of  Lesbos,  which  is  reconquered  by  the 
Athenians. 

419  The  Atlicnians  ravage  Chios. 

421  The  Atlicnians  muster  a  fleet  of  104  triremes  in 
Samos. 

422  Second  treaty  between  the  Spartans  and  the 
Persians. 

The  Athenians  fortify  Delphinion,  and  ravage 
Chios. 

434  Revolt  of  Rhodes  from  Athens  brought  about 

by  the  oligarchic  faction. 

425  Alkibiades  takes  refuge  with  Tissapherncs,  and 
makes  overtures  to  the  Athenian  (oligarchic) 

426  officers  at  Samos,  promising  tliem  the  help  of 
the  Persian  king  if  tlic  Athenian  democracy 
is  put  down. 

427  Opposition  of  PhrjTiichos  to  the  counsels  of 
Alkibiades. 

428  Athens   .    .    .  Mission  of  Peisandros  to  Athens  from  Samos. 


CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE. 


fi85 


PELOPONNESIAN  (DEKELEIAN  OR  IONIAN)  WAR.     TWENTIETH 
YEAR  (continued). 


PAGE 

429 


430 


The  Egean 


The  Athenians  appoint  10  commissioners  to  set- 
tle matters  with  Tissaphernes. 
Organization  of  the  oligarchical  conspiracy. 
Victory  of  the  Athenian  fleet  at  Rhodes. 


433 
436 


437 

439 
440 

441 
442 

443 
444 
445 

447 


TWENTY-FIRST    YEAR. 

Athens   .     .     .  Reign  of  terror.    Usurpation  of  the  Four  Hun- 
dred. 
Samos    .    .    .  The  Athenian  army  resolves  to  maintain  the 
Kleisthenean    constitution.      Being    heartily 
supported  by  the  Samians,  they  declare  Athens 
to  be  in  revolt  from  the  people. 
Alkibiades  elected  Strategos  by  the  citizens  at 
Samos. 
Athens     .    .    .  Fortilication  of  Eetionia  by  the  Four  Hundred. 
Destruction   of   the  fort  with   the  sanction  of 
Tlieramenes. 
Euboia    .    .    .  Defeat  of  Thymochares.     Revolt  of  the  island. 
Athens    .    .    .  Suppression  of  the  Four  Hundred.    Practical  re- 
storation of  the  Periklean  polity. 
Trial  and  execution  of  Antiphon. 
Asia  Minor     .  Revolt  of  Byzantion  from  Athens. 

Tissaphernes  sends  back  the  Pheuician  fleet  from 

Aspendos. 
Victory  of   the  Athenians  under  Thrasyboulos 
and  Thrasylos  off  Kynossema. 


449 


TWENTY-SECOND   YEAR. 

Asia  Minor     .  Battle  of  Kyzikos.      Death   of  Mindaros ;  de- 
struction of  the  Peloponnesian  fleet. 
The  Athenians  again  become  masters  of  the 
highway  of  the  Hellespont. 


452 


653 


TWENTY-THIRD  YEAR. 

TJie  Egea7i  .    .  Thrasylos  cuts  ofi  the  Syracusan  squadron. 
I)/los  ....  Recovery  of  Pylos  by  the  Spartans. 
Megara  .    .    .  The  Megarians  recover  the  port  of  Nisaia. 
Sicily  ....  Destruction  of   Selinous   by  Hannibal  Giskon, 
who  storms  Himera. 


453 
454 


TWENTY-FOURTH  YEAR. 

Asia  Minor     .  The  Athenians  reduce  Chalkedon. 

The  younger  Cyrus  sent  down  as  Persian  com- 
mander-in-chief in  Asia  Minor. 


455 

456 
457 


TWENTY-FIFTH  YEAR. 

Lysandros   organises  a  system  of    Clubs  as  a 
means  of  Increasing  his  own  i^owcr. 
Athens    .    .    .  Return  of  Alkibiades. 
The  Egean  .    .  Defeat  of  the  pilot  Antiochos  off  Notion. 

Alkibiades  plunders  Kymg.    He  is  deprived  of 
his  command. 


686 


CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE. 


PELOPONNESIAN    (DEKELEIAN    OR    IONIAN)    WAR. 
SIXTH  YEAR. 


TWENTY- 


PAGE 
458 


461 
463 


465 
469 


471 
473 
474 


Kallikratidas,  having  succeeded  Lysandros, 
storms  Methynina,  and  blockades  Konon  and 
Archcstratos  in  Mytilene. 

Battle  of  Argennoissai.  Victory  of  the 
Athenians.    Death  of  Kallikratidas. 

The  Athenian  generals  commission  Theniraenes 
and  Thrasyboulos  to  rescue  the  crews  of  the 
disabled  vessels.  A  storm  prevents  the  exe- 
cution of  the  order. 
Athens  ...  A  despatch  from  the  generals  makes  known  these 
facts  ;  and  Theramenes  resolves  to  destroy  the 
generals.  He  avails  himself  of  the  festival 
Apatouria  to  increase  the  feeling  against  them. 

Proposal  of   Kallixenos    that  the  people  shall 
proceed  at  once  to  pronounce  judgment  on  the 
generals  in  a  lump. 
Athens    .    .    .  Protest  of  Sokrates. 

Murder  of  six  of  the  generals. 
T?ie  Egean  .    .  Eteonikos  compels  the  Chians   to  pay  for  the 
support  of  the  Peloponuesian  troops. 

Appointment  of  Lysandros  as  secretary  to  Arakos. 

Demolition  of  Akragas  [Agrigentum]. 


TWENTY-SEVENTH  YEAR. 


405 

476 

477 
478 
481 

482 

483 

405- 
367 
404 

I 

i 

487 

488 

489 

491 

492 

493 
494 

495 

496 

497 

Atheiis 


Sicily . 
Alliens 


Lysandros  takes  Lampsakos.  The  Athenian 
fleet  is  posted  at  Aigospotamoi,  and  is  be- 
trayed into  the  hands  of  Lysandros. 

Escape  of  Konon  to  Kypros"(Cyprus). 

Lysandros  orders  the  Athenian  garrisons  in  all 
the  conquered  towns  to  go  straight  to  Athens. 

The  pressure  of  famine  is  thus  increased ;  but 
some  political  relief  is  obtained  by  the  Pse- 
pliisma  of  Patrokleides. 

Lysandros  blocks  up  the  entrance  to  Peiraieus 
with  150  ships. 

SuRKENDEK  OF  ATHENS,  followcd  by  tlic  dis- 
mantling of  the  Long  Walls. 

Despotism  of  the  elder  Dionysios. 

Tyranny  of  tlic  Thirty  at  Athens,  supported  by 

the  Spartan  harmost  and  garrison. 
Opposition  of  Tlieramenes  to  Kritias. 
Dcatli  of  Theramenes. 

The  exiles  under  Tlirasyboulos  occupy  Phylg. 
The  Thirty,  after  massacring  o(t()  Eleusinians, 

are  defeated  by  the  exiles,  aud  Kritias  is  slain. 
Lysandros  returns  to  Athens,   after   subduing 

the  Semians,  and  thus  bringing  to  an  end  the 

Peloi'onnesian  Wak. 
The  exiles,  with  the  aid  of  Pausanias,  the  Spar- 
tan kini,',  )iiit  down  the  Tliirty. 
Restoration  of  the  Democracy.    Revision  of  the 

laws  of  Drakon  and  Solon. 
Limitation  of    the  citizensliip  to   the  sons  of 

citizen-parents  on  both  sides. 


CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE. 


687 


EMPIRE  OF   SPARTA. 


PAGE 

497 

Phrygia .    . 

499 
500 

Asia  Minor 

503 

Mesopotamia 

507 
,511 
515 
530 
509 
549 

Trapezous    . 
Bijzantion    . 
Athens     .     . 

Siyarta    .    . 

551 
552 

Asia  Mbior 

553 


554 
555 


556 
557 


558 
559 


560 


Asia  Minor 


Thebes 


Pelopomiesos 


557 

Knidos   .    . 

Boiolia    . 

560 

561 

Asia  Minor 

563 

Athens     . 
Corinth  . 

.  The  Spartans  bring  about  the  murder  of  Alki- 

biades. 
.  Cyrus,  having  resolved  to  dethrone  his  brother 
Artaxerxes,  gathers  an  army  of  Greek  mer- 
cenaries,    among     wliom    is    the    historian 
Xenophon. 
.  Having  marched  to  Kunaxa,  lie  is  there  slain  in 
a  sudden  attack  on  Artaxerxes. 
Retreat  of  the  Ten  Thousand  under  Xenophon. 
.  Arrival  of  the  Ten  Thousand  at  Trapezous. 
.  The  Ten  Thousand  at  Byzantion. 
.  Trial  and  execution  of  Sokrates. 
Return  of  Xenophon  to  Athens. 
.  Dcatli  of  Agis.     Election  of  Agesilaos  as  king 
in  liis  place. 
Conspiracy  of  Kinadon. 
.  Derkyllidas,  liaving  put  down  Meldias,  the  mur- 
derer of  Mania,  reduces  Atarneus. 
Operations  of  Derkyllidas  in  Karia. 
The  Spartans  send  Agesilaos  to  settle  the  affairs 

of  the  Asiatic  Greeks. 
The  Thebans  interrupt  his  sacrifice  at  Aulis. 
.  Agesilaos  despatches  Lysandros  totheHellespont 
Death  of  Tissapliernes. 
Rising    of    the    Rhodian    demos    against    the 

Spartans. 
Murder  of  the  Rhodian  Dorieus  by  the  Spartans. 
.  Tlie  Rhodian  Timokrates  is  sent  by  the  Persian 
Tithraustes  to  Tliebes  to  stir  up  war  against 
Sparta. 
BoiOTiAN  Wab  between   Thebes    and    Sparta. 
Lysandros  is   ordered  to  march  from  Hera- 
kleia  and  attack  Haliartos. 
The  Thebans  ask  aid  of    the  Athenians,  who 

grant  it  unanimously. 
Lysandros  is  slain  before  the  walls  of  Haliartos. 
Evacuation  of  Boiotia  by  the  Spartans. 
.  An  alliance  between  Thebes,  Athens,  Corinth, 
and  Argos,  converts  the  Boiotian    into  the 
CoRiNjniAN  War. 
Recall  of  Agesilaos  from  Asia. 
The  Battle  of  Corinth  insures  the  Peloponnesian 
ascendency  of  the  Spartans.    A  few  days  later 
the  maritime  empire  of  Sparta  is  overthrown 
by  the  victory   of  Konon  in  the  Battle  of 
Knidos. 
.  At  Chaironeia,  Agesilaos  hears  of  Konon's  suc- 
cess, but  conceals  his  knowledge  till  after  the 
battle  of  Koroneia,  in  which  he  wins  a  doubt- 
ful victory. 
Agesilaos  returns  to  Sparta  by  way  of  Delphoi. 
.  Ai^ydos  alone  holds  out  for  the  Spartans  under 

Derkyllidas. 
.  Rebuilding  of  the  Long  Walls  by  Konon. 
.  The  Spartans  pull  down  portions  of  the  Long 
Walls    between    Corinth    and    its    port    of 
Lechaion. 
These  being  rebuilt  by  the  Athenians,  the  Spar- 


688 


CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE. 


578 


579 

580 


584 

585 
586 


PAGE 

563 

Asia  Minor 

564 

Athens    .    . 

566 

568 

Boiotia    .    . 
Pelopotinesos 
Olynlhos 

569 

Tliebej     .    . 

Olynihos 

573 

Thebes     .    . 

573 

Attica      .    . 

574 

Thebes     .    . 

575 

Naxos .    .    . 

Alliens     .    . 

576 

577 

Korkyra 

Boiotia    .    . 

EMPIRE   OF   SPARTA  (continued). 


tans  despatch  Antulkidas  to  the  Persian  king 
to  obtain  a  peace  on  tlie  basis  of  the  indepen- 
dence of  every  Hellenic  city. 

.  Antalkidas  procures  the  arrest  of  Konon. 
Death  of  Thrasyboulos  at  Aspcndos. 

.  Attack  of  Teleutias  on  the  Peiraieus. 
Peace  of  Antalmdas  imposed  on  the  Greeks 
by  the  Persian  kinj^. 

.  The  Spartans  restore  Plataiai. 

.  The  Spartans  break  up  the  city  of  Mantineia. 

.  They  resolve  to  suppress  the  Olynthian  Cowr 

FEDERACY. 

.  Phoibidas,  one  of  the  generals  sent  against  the 
Olynthians,  seizes  the  Kadmeia  of  Thebes  on 
his  way. 
Execution  of  Ismenias. 

.  After  a  strenuous  resistance  the  Olynthians  are 
compelled  to  join  the  Spartan  confederacy. 

.  Conspiracy  of  Pelopidas. 
Surrender    of    the    Spartan    garrison    in    the 
Kadmeia. 

.  The  unsuccessful  attempt  of  Sphodrias  on  the 
Peiraieus  leads  to  the  formation  of  a  new 
Athenian  confederacy. 

.  Establishment    of    the  Sacred    Band   by    Epa- 
mcinondas. 
Decay  of  Sjiartan  power.     The  Thebens  defeat 
and  slay  Phoibidas. 

.  Defeat  of  the  Spartan  admiral  Pollis  by  the 
Athenian  Chabrias. 

.  The  growth  of  Theban  power  rouses  the  jealousy 
of  the  Athenians,  who  make  peace  with  the 
Spartans.  But  this  is  followed  almost  imme- 
diately by  a  renewal  of  war. 

.  Iphikrates  "intercepts  a  squadron  of  ships  sent  by 
Dionysios,  tyrant  of  Syracuse,  to  aid  the 
Spartans. 

.  The    Thebans    seize    Plataiai ;    and    the   Athe- 
nians, appealing  to  the  terms  of  the  peace 
of    Antalkidas,    call   on   the   Spartans  to  in- 
force  them.      The  attempt  leads  to  a  decla- 
ration of    war  by   the   Si)artaus  against  the 
Boiotians. 
March  of  Kleombrotos  to  Lcuktra. 
The  empire  of  Sparta  brought  to  an  end  by  the 
victory  of  Epamcinondas  in  the  Battle  of 
Leuktra. 
Punishment  of  the  Orchomenians  and  Thespians 
by  the  Tln'hans,    who   obtain  a  verdict  from 
the  Amphiktyonic  Assembly  against  the  Spar- 
tans. 

.  Assassinatiti '  '>\l*"-'..son  of  Pherai. 

.  Havini,^  re-i'stablislied  Mantineia,  the  Arkadiana 
ask  lu'l])  of  the  Thebans. 
Epantcinouthis  invades  Lakonia,  advancing  close 

to  Sparta. 
Tlie  Spartiins  ask  aid  of  Athens,  and  receive  it 
Epamcinondas  founds  the  city  of  Megalopolis, 


Thessaly .    . 
Fdopotineios 


CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE. 


689 


PAGE 

587 


590 


591 

592 
593 

594 


606 


607 


EMPIRE   OF   SPARTA  (continued). 


restores  the  Messenians,  and  builds  the  city  of 

Messene. 
He  forces  liis  way  through  a  Peloponnesian  and 

Athenian  force  near  the  isthmus. 
In  The  Tearless   Battle  the  Arkadians  ai-e 

defeated  by  Archidamos. 
Again  enteringPelopounesos,Epameinondas  adds 

the  Achaian  cities  to  the  Theban  confederacy. 


Siclhj 
JBoiotia  . 


Samos    .    . 

Sestos      .     . 
Thessaly 

Peloponnesos 


595 

599 

Athens    . 
Egyi^t     . 
Athens    . 

600 

3Iakedonia 

60i 

601 

Euboia   . 

603 

Alliens    . 

605 

Makedonia 

Phokis    . 

Athens 


Tyranny  of  the  younger  Dionysios. 

The  Thebans  obtain  from  the  Persian  king  a  re- 
script proclaiming  the  supremacy  of  Thebes 
and  the  independence  of  Messene. 

Peace  between  Thebes,  Corinth,  and  other  cities, 
the  Spartans  being  self-excluded. 

Conquest  or  recovery  of  Samos  by  the  Athenian 
general  Timotheos. 

The  Athenians  recover  Sestos. 

Death  of  Pelopidas  in  the  Battle  of  Ktnos- 
kepualai. 

Irritated  by  the  jealousies  of  the  Arkadians,  the 
Thebans  again  send  Epameinondas  into  Pelo- 
ponnesos. 

Having  failed  to  take  Sparta  and  Mantineia 
by  surprise,  Epameinondas  attacks  the  Spar- 
tans at  once. 

Battle  of  Mantinelv.  Victory  and  death  of 
Epameinondas. 

Execution  of  Leosthenes. 

Death  of  Agesilaos  on  the  road  to  Kyrene. 

The  Second  Athenian  empire  reaches  its  furthest 
limit  by  tlie  recovery  of  the  Chersonesos. 

Philip,  father  of  Alexander  the  Great,  becomes 
king  shortly  after  the  death  of  Perdikkas. 

Philip  withdraws  his  garrison  from  Amphipolis, 
of  which  he  again  obtains  possession  a  few 
months  later. 

The  recovery  of  Euboia  by  the  Athenians  is 
followed 

by  the  Social  War,  in  which  the  second  Athe- 
nian empire  is  practically  overthrown. 

Condemnation  of  Timotheos. 

Tlie  Olynthians,  rejected  by  the  Athenians, 
make  an  alliance  with  Philip.  Birth  of 
Alexander  the  Great. 

Outbreak  of  the  jacred  War,  in  consequence  of 
a  tine  inflictecTon  the" Phokians  by  the  Ain- 
phikt3'onic  Assembly. 

On  the  defeat  and  death  of  Philomelos,  Onomar- 
chos  becomes  general  of  the  Phokiaus. 

After  compelling  Philip  for  some  time  to  aban- 
don Thessaly,  Onomarchos  is  himself  defeated 
and  slain  by"  Philip. 

On  hearing  these  tidings  the  Athenians  fortify 
Thermopylai,  but  on  hearing  a  report  tirst  of 
Philip's  illness,  then  of  his  death,  again  be- 
come inactive,  in  spite  of  the  urgent  remon- 
strances of  Demosthenes. 


690 


CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE. 


PAGEl 

611  I 

612  I 

613 
615 


616 
617 


618 


619 
620 


621 
653 


622 


623 


624 


625 


EMPIRE  OF   SPARTA  (coritiiuied). 

The  Olynthians  again  ask  aid  of  Athens.    The 
promise  is  given,  but  not  fulfilled. 
Demosthenes  urges  the  appointment  of  Com- 
missioners to  see  to  the  laws  relating  to  the 
Theorio  Fund. 

Euhoia  .  .  .  This  island  again  revolts.  Tlie  Athenians  try  in 
vain  to  subdue  it. 

Olynthos     .    .  Fall  of  Olyulhos.     Philip  dismantles  the  city. 

Boiotia  .  .  .  The  Tiiebans  invite  Pliilip  to  aid  them  in  bring- 
ing the  Sacked  War  to  an  end. 

Athens    .     .     .  The  Allieuians,  irritated  by  tlic  couduet  of  the 
Pliokiaus  under  Phalaikos,  seek  an   alliance 
with  Philip. 
Mission  of  .F^schines,  who  is  won  over  by  Philip. 

Makedonia  .     .  Philii)  expresses  his  readiness  to  accept  a  peace 
which  shall  secure  to  eacli  party  its  own  pos- 
sessions at  the  moment  of  tlie  ratification. 
The  Athenians  assent  to  the  exclusion  of  tiie  Pho- 
kian  name  from  the  Peace  of  Philokkatks. 
..^schines,  being  sent  with  Demosthenes  and 
others  to  receive  the  oath  of  Pliilip,  treacher- 
ously delays  to  do  so,  until  Philip  is  close  to " 
Thermopylai. 
The  submission  of  Phalaikos  to  Philip  brings  the 
Sacked  Wau  to  an   end.      Philip,  throwing 
ofl"  his  disguise  of  friendliness  to  Athens,  de- 
clares himself  the  ally  of  Thebes. 
Philip,    being   elected    into   the   Amphiktyonic 
brotherhoo  I,  acquires  the  fornuil  right  of  in- 
terfering in  Hellenic  atlairs. 

Corinth  .  .  .  Timoleon  is  ordered  to  go  to  the  aid  of  the  Syra- 
cusans. 

Sicily  .  .  .  Timoleon,  having  gained  possession  of  Syracuse, 
sunnnons  1(),()00  new  colonists  from  Pelopon- 
nesos. 

Athens   ...  A  dispute  between  Philii^  and  the  Athenians  re- 
specting the  inlet  of  Halonnesos  is  followed 
three  years  later  by  a  fresh  oH'ence  in  the  nuueh 
of  Pliilip  across  the  Chersonesos. 
The  Athenians  now  declare  war. 

Sicily     .     .     .  Battle  of  the   KkimEsos.      Decisive    victory 
of  Tinu)leon  over  the  Carthaginians. 
Having  put  down  all  the  Sicilian  tyrants,  Timo- 
leon resigns  his  power. 

Tliracc    .    .     .  Philii)  '**  battled  at  Perinthos  and  Byzantion. 

Athens    .    .     .  Financial  reforms  of  Dejiiosthenes. 

The  Athenians  order  the  gilt  shields  in  the 
Delphian  temple,  taken  from  the  Thcbans 
after  the  battle  of  Plataiai,  to  be  reburnished. 

Fhokis  .  .  .  The  Lokrians  denounce  the  impiety  of  replacing 
these  oli'erings  wittiout  re-consecration, 
^schines  retorts  the  charge  of  imiiiety  by  de- 
nouncing the  violation  of  the  curse  pronounced 
against  Kirrha  in  the  days  of  Solon, — thus 
bringing  about  the  TniKDt^ACKED  Wak. 
The  Atiieniaus  und  Tiiebans  refu.se  to  send  en- 
voys to  the  Amphiktyonic  Assembly  for  the 
spring  meeting. 


CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE. 


691 


B.C. 

PAGE 

636 

Boiotia  .  . 
Athens    .     . 

338 

627 
628 
629 

Boiotia  .  . 
Peloponnesos 

336 

631 
632 

Makedouia  . 

633 
647 

634 


635 


636 
637 


639 
647 


648 

I  640 
329 
328  i  641 

] 

i 
326  I  642 


643 


Thebes    . 

Athens    . 
Udlespout 

Asia  .    . 


Egypt .     . 

Asia    .     . 


Peloponnesos 

Athens    .    . 
Asia   .     .     . 


EMPIRE  OF  SPARTA  {continued). 


.  On  liis  way  to  Phokis,  Philip  fortifies  Elateia. 
.  Demosthenes  urges  successfully  an  immediate 

unconditional  alliance  witli  Thebes. 
.  Battle  of  Chaironeia.      Total  defeat  of  the 
Athenians  and  Thebans. 
Thebes  is  surrendered,  and  a  Makedonian  garri- 
son is  placed  in  the  Kadmeia. 
Philip  restores  the  Athenian  prisoners  on  con- 
dition that  the  Athenians  acknowledge  him 
supreme  chief  of  all  the  Hellenes. 
.  Philip  receives   the  Greeks  in   a    congress    at 

Corinth. 
.  Assassination  of  Philip  at  Aigai. 
Alexander  the  Great  becomes  king;  he  goes 
first  to  Thermopylai,  then  to  Corinth,  where  lie 
guarantees  in  his  own  interest  tlie  autonomy  of 
every  Hellenic  eit}'. 
.  The  absence  of  Alexander  in  nn  expedition  to  the 
north  of  the  Balkan  Mountains  gives  rise  to  a 
report  of  his  death,  which  leads  the  Thebans 
to  take  up  arms. 
Siege  and  storming  of  Thebes.     Destruction  of 
the  city. 
.  iEschines,  by  a  charge  iindcr  the  writ  Graphs 
Paranomon ,  arrests  the  proposal  of  Ktesiphon 
to  crown  Demostlienes. 
.  Alexander  crosses  the  Hellespont  to  carry  out  his 
enterprise  of  the  conquest  of  Persia. 
Battle  of  tue  Granikos. 
Alexander,  having  spent  the  winter  in  conquer- 
ing Lykia,  Pamphylia,  and    Pisidia,  goes  to 
Gordiu  and  cuts  the  Knot. 
.  Battle    of    Issos.       Second    routing    of    the 
Persian  forces. 
Expedition  into  Phenicia.  Siege  and  fall  of  Tyre. 
.  March  into  Egypt.    Founding  of  Alexandria. 
.  Battle   of   Gaugamela   or   Arbela.     Third 
total  defeat  of  the  Persian  forces. 
Plundering  of  Babylon  and  Sousa,  Persepolis 

and  Pasargadai. 
Death  of  Dareios. 

Alexander  murders  Philotas  and  Parmenion. 
.  Death   of  the  Spartan  king  Agis  in  a  battle 
fought  for  the  purpose  of  throwing  off  the 
Makedonian  yoke. 
.  Demosthenes  defeats  ^schines  by  his  speech  on 

the  Crown. 
.  Alexander  crosses  the  Oxus  and  Jaxartes,  and 
mutilates  tlie  murderer  of  Dareios  at  Zariaspa. 
Murder  of  Kleitos. 
Alexander  marries  Roxana. 
Murder  of  Kallisthenes. 

Alexander,  having   crossed  the  Indus,  founds 

Boukephalia  on  the  spot  where  his  horse  died. 

He  reaches  the  Hyphusis,  beyond  which    his 

troops  refuse  to  advance. 
Having  returned  to  Sousa  through  the  Gedro- 
sian  desert,  he  marries  Stateiraand  Parysatis. 


692 


CHRONOLOGICAL   TABLE. 


EMPIRE    OF   SPARTA   {continued). 


644 
649 


650 
651 


645 
652 


655 


655 


656 


657 


Asia    . 
Athens 


Asia    . 
Qreece 


Atheiis 


Sparta  .  . 
Thebes  .  . 
Makedonia  . 
Empire  of  \ 
Alexander  \ 


Athens 


658     Asia  Minor 
I  Athens 


Makedonia  . 
PelcjMnnesoa 


i659! 

660  lEorkyra  .    . 
\PeloponHCSos 


Korkyra  .     . 
Pcloponncsos 


Death  of  Heplia'stion. 

Arrival  of  Harpulos  with  his  treasure,  which  is 

placed  in  tlie  Parthenon. 
Demosthenes,  with  other  citizens,  is  charged  by 

Hypereides  with  embezzling  a  portion  of  it. 
Condemnation  and  exile  of  Demosthenes.     This 

sentence  is  rescinded  by  the  Athenians,  who 

send  a  trireme  to  Troizen  to  bring  him  back. 
Death  of  Alexander  at  Babylon. 
The  Lam  IAN  Wak  ends  in  the  complete  subjuga- 
tion of  the  Greeks.     Deatli  of  Demosthenes. 
Banishment  of  1:3,000  Athenian  citizens.     Pho- 

kion  remains  in  power,  aided  by  Demades. 
Death  of  Demades. 

Kassandros,  son  of  Antipatros,  obtains  admis- 
sion for  Nikanor  into  the  fcrtrcssof  Mounj'chia. 
Return  of  the  exiles. 
With  the  help  of  Phokiou,  Nikanor  seizes  the 

Peiraieus. 
Phokion,  deposed  from  his  command,  hastens  to 

the  camp  of  Polyspcrchon,  who  sends  him  to 

Athens  for  trial. 
Execution  of  Phokion. 
The  Phalerean  Demetrios  ai)pointed  governor  of 

the  city  by  Kassandros. 
The  Spartans  build  a  wall  round  their  city. 
Restoration  of  Thebes  by  Kassandros. 
Extinction  of  the  family  of  Alexander  the  Great. 
The  title  of  king  is  assumed  by  Antigonos  and 

Demetrios    Poliorketes    in    Makedonia,     by 

Ptolemj'  in  Egypt,  by  Lysimachos  in  Tlirace, 

and  by  Seleukos  in  Babylonia. 
On  the  appearance    of  Demetrios  Poliorketes 

before    Peiraieus,    tlie    Phalerean    Demetrios 

makes  his  escape  to  Egj'pt. 
A  law  being  passed  that  no  philosopher  should  be 

allowed  to  teach  without  the  sanction  of  the 

Senate  and  people,  all  the  philosophers  leave 

Athens. 
In  the  following  year  the  law  is  repealed,  and 

the  philosphers  return. 
Battle  of  Irsos.    Death  of  Antigonos. 
Demetrios    Poliorketes     besieges     and    takes 

Athens. 
Antigonos  Gonatas  succeeds  his  father  Demetrios 

Poliorketes. 
Extension  of  tlie  Achaian  League. 

Career  of  Aratos. 

Korkyra  and  Epidamnos  become  allies  of  Rome. 

Mcgaloj)olis  destroyed  by  Kleomenes. 

Defeat  of  Kleomenes  at  Sellasl-s. 

Treaty  Ijctwciii  Philip  and  Hannibal. 

Deatli  of  riiilopoinu'n. 

The  dyiui>ty  of  the  Antigonid  kings  comes  to 

an  enil  willi  I'crseus  on  the  conquest  of  the 

country  by  the  Romans, 


CHRONOLOGICAL   TABLE. 


693 


EMPIRE   OF    SPARTA  (continwd.) 


B.C. 

146 

PAGE 

661 

A.D. 

267 

324 

662 

397 

661 

583 
711 
726 

1057- 

1067 

1095 

[662 

1204 

663 

1205- 
1261 

)664 

1329 
1449 

665 
666 

1453 
1573 
1687 

667 

1718 

668 

1821 
1822 
1827 

669 

1832 

i 

1843 
1862 

670 

Corinth  .     .    .  Sacking    of    Coriiith    by    the    Romaus    under 

Muramius. 
The  Achaian  League  comes  to  an  end  as  a 

military  power. 
Establishment  of  the  Roman  province  of  Achaia. 

Athens    .    .     .  Storming  of   Athens  by   the  Goths,  who  are 

driven  out  by  Dexippos. 
Bijzantio7i   .     .  Foundation  of  Constantinople,  or  New  Rome,  as 

the  seat  of  Roman  empire. 
Western  Greece  Invasion  of  Alaric,  who  escapes  from  Stilichon, 

the  General  of  the  Emperor  Honorius. 
Byzantion   .    .  Promulgation  of  the  Justinian  code. 

Reign  of  the  Iconoclast  Leo  III.,  the  Isaurian. 
Lco'III.  suppresses  the  rebellion  of  the  Greeks. 

Inroads  of  the  Seljukian  Turks. 

The  Emperor  Alexios  asks  the  help  of  Europe 

at  the  Council  of  Piacenza  (Placentia). 
The  army  of  the  Fifth  Crusade  appears  before 

Constantinople. 
Capture  of  the   city  by  the   Crusaders,   who 
establish    the    Latin    dynasty    in    Constan- 
tinople. 
Enrolment  of  the  Janissaries. 
Sparta    .    .    .  Coronation  of  Constantine  XL,  the  last  of  the 

Bj'zantine  C;esai-s. 
Constantinople   Conquest  of  the  empire  by  the  Ottoman  Turks. 
Lepanto  .     .     .  Victory  of  the  Venetians  over  the  Turks. 
Athens   .     .     .  Siege  of  the  Akropolis  by  the  Venetian  Morosini. 
Destruction  of  the  Parthenon. 
The  Peace  of  Passakovitz  leaves  thePelopou- 

nesos  in  the  hands  of  the  Sultan. 
Rebellion   of  the  Western  Greeks  against  the 
Turks. 
Kalavrita    .    .  Declaration  of  independence. 
Chios.     .     .    .  Massacre  of  Chios  (Scio)  by  the  Turks. 
Athens    .    .    .  Capture  of  the  city  by  the  Turks. 
Navarino    .     .  Battle    of    Navarino.     Destruction    of    the 
Turkish  fleet  by  the  combined  fleets  of  Russia, 
France,  and  England. 
Athens    .    .     .  The  Bavarian  Prince  Otho  recognised  as  king 
by  the  National  Assembly. 
He  is  compelled  to  dismiss  hisBavarian  followers 
The  deposition  of  Otho  is  followed  by  the  elec- 
tion, first,  of  the  English  Prince  Alfred,  and, 
secondly,  of  the  Danish  Prince  George. 


INDEX. 


ABA 

i  BAI,  106 

A    Abydos,  164,  476 

Achaian  League,  658 

Achaians,  27 

Achaimenes,  161,  188 

Achamai,  2T7 

Achradina,  376,  381 

Adeiinantos,  the  Corinthian,  192,  199,  202 

—  the  Athenian,  456,  466 ;  betrays  the 
Athenian  fleet  at  Aigospotamoi,  479 

Admetos,  the  Molossian  chief,  239 

Adoption,  8 

Adrastos  and  Atys,  106 

.^gina,  .iEginetans  [Aigina,  Aiginetans] 

.^gospotami  [Aigospotamoi] 

.^olians  [Aiolians] 

.iEschines,  610 ;  antagonism  of,  with  De- 
mosthenes, 610 ;  in  Euboia,  613 ;  in 
Peloponnesos,  615;  mission  of,  to  Philip, 
616;  conversion  of,  617;  delays  in  taking 
the  oaths  of  Philip,  618  ;  treachery  of, 
621 ;  provokes  the  Third  Sacred  War, 
624;  accuses  Ktesiphon,  6-18;  at  Rhodes, 
649 

^schylos,  154,  199,  note 

JEtolians  [Aitolians] 

Africa,  Greek  colonisation  in,  64;  com- 
mercial settlements  in,  65 

Agbatana,  the  Median,  101 

—  the  Syrian,  122 
Agesandridas,  441 

Agesilaos,  elected  king  of  Sparta,  549 ;  sent 
into  Asia  Minor,  553 ;  recalled,  560  ;  at 
Koroneia,  560  ;  returns  to  Sparta,  561  ; 
in  Boiotia,  575  ;  dies  in  Egypt,  599 

Agesipolis,  559,  570 

Agias,  506 

Agis,  son  of  Archidamos,  315;  invades 
Argos,  353  ;  grants  the  Argives  a  truce, 
354  ;  wins  the  battle  of  Mantineia,  355  ; 
at  Dekeleia,  411  ;  fails  iu  an  attempt  to 


ALE 

surprise  Athens,  435  ;  second  failure  of, 
451 ;  death  of,  549 

—  falls  in  battle  with  Antipatros,  648 

Aglauros,  197 

Agrigentum  [Akragas] 

Aigina,  siege  of,  by  the  Athenians,  250 ; 
conquest  of,  251 

Aiginetans,  at  Salamis,  201 ;  expulsion  of 
the  from  Aigina,  278 ;  attacked  in 
Thyrea ;  the  prisoners  carried  to  Athens 
and  slain,  328 ;  restored  to  their  island 
by  Lysandros,  564 

Aigospotamoi,  476 

Aiolians,  119 

Aitolians,  defeat  Demosthenes,  312 

Akanthos,  revolt  of,  from  Athens,  335  ; 
refuses  to  join  the  Olynthian  confedera- 
cy, 567 

Akarnanians,  2,  26,  62,  288,  313 

Akeratos,  195 

Akragas,  653 

Akropolis  of  Athens,  83,  258 

Akte,  64 

Alaric,  661 

Aleuads  of  Thessaly,  172 

Alexander  the  Great,  631  ;  early  years  of, 
631  ;  becomes  king,  631  ;  at  Thermopy- 
lai,  and  Corinth,  632  ;  destroys  Thebes, 
633;  crosses  the  Hellespont,  634 ;  wins  the 
BATTLES  OF  Granikos,  634  ;  Issos,  635  ; 
and  Arbela,  637  ;  founds  Alexandria, 
637  ;  takes  Babylon  and  Sousa,  638  ; 
murders  Phllotas  and  Parmenion,  639  ; 
massacres  the  Branchidai,  640  ;  murders 
Kleitos  and  Kallisthenes,  641  ;  founds 
Boukephalia,  643;  marries  Stateira  and 
Parysatis,  643;  receives  embassies  from 
all  the  world,  644  ;  dies  at  Babylon, 
645 

Alexandros,  the  Makedonian,  212,  220 

Alexandres  of  Phcrai,  592,  599 


696 


INDEX. 


AT.B 

Alexiklcs,  440 

Alexios  Komnenos,  663 

Alexios  Doukas,  663 

Alkamenes,  413,  415 

^Ikibiades,  349  ;  entraps  the  Spartan  en- 
voys, 351 ;  proposes  and  carries  an  alli- 
ance with  Argos,  352  ;  victories  of,  at 
the  Olympic  festival,  352  ;  appointed  to 
command  in  Sicily,  364  ;  not  guilty  of 
the  mutilation  of  the  Hermai,  368 ;' 
charged  with  profaning  the  Eleusiuian 
mysteries,  369  ;  recalled  from  Sicily  to 
take  his  trial,  373  ;  escapes  from  Thou- 
rioi,  and  is  condemned  to  death,  374  ; 
jit  Sparta,  379  ;  urges  the  occupation  of 
Pekeleia,  380  ;  advises  the  Spartans  to 
Eide  with  Tissaphemes,414;  brings  about 
the  revolt  of  Chios  from  Athens,  416  ; 
makes  his  escape  to  Tissapherncs,  425; 
invites  the  Athenian  oligarchs  in  Samos 
to  upset  the  constitution,  426  ;  cheats 
tha  Athenian  commissioners,  431  ; 
elected  Strategos  by  the  Athenians  serv- 
ing at  Samos,  437  ;  escapes  from  Tissa- 
phemes,  449  ;  returns  to  Athens,  453  ; 
guards  the  sacred  procession  to  Eleusis, 
456  ;  attacks  KjTne,  457  ;  is  deposed 
from  his  command,  457  :  warns  the 
generals  at  Aigospotamoi,  477;  death  of, 
497 

Alkidas,  297,  298,  308 

Alkiphron,  354 

Alkmaioiiiuai,  74,  83,  85 

Allies  of  Athens  and  Sparta  in  the  Pelo- 
ponnesian  war,  276 

Alp  Arslan,  663 

Alyattes,  99 

Amasis.  118,  119 

Ambrakiots  seize  Olpai,  313  ;  defeated  at 
Idomene,  316 

Ameinias,  201 

—  Spartan  commissioner,  3^11 
Amestris,  231 

Ammon,  Amoun,  120 

Amompharelos,  222 

Ami)hiktyonia,28;  sentence  of  the,  against 

Sparta,  585 
Amphipolis,     attempt     to    settle,     248 ; 

founded  by  Ilagnon,  259 ;  receives  Bra!ri- 

das,    3X> ;    battle   of,   3J3 ;    taken    by 

Philip,  604. 
Amphipolos  of  the  OljTnpiun  Zeus,  654 
Amyntas,  134 

—  567,  568,  688 
Anaia,  298 

Anaxagoras,  50,  271,  521 
AnaxarchoB,  611 


ASI 

Anaxibios,  512 
Ancestors,  worship  of,  8 
Anchimolios,  86 
Andokides,  374 
Andros,  210 
Andvari,  103 
Androkles,  432 
Androkrates,  219 
Andromedes,  349 
Aneristos,  286 
Anopaia,  184 

Antalkidas,  peace  of,  ££C 
Anligonos,  656 

—  Gonatas,  657 
Autileon,  511 
Antiochos,  456 
Antipatros,  633,  648,  654 
Antiphon,  429,  443,  444 
Antisthenes.  423 

Auytos  fails  to  defend  Pylos,  452;  accuse? 
Sokrates,  520 

Apatouria,  469 

Aphetai,  the  Persians  at,  192,  193 

Aphrodite,  12 

Apis,  120 

Apollodoros,  613 

Arakos,  475 

Aratos,  658 

Archedcmos,  466 

Archelaos,  568 

Archeptolemos,  443 

Archestratos,  458,  484 

Archias,  572 

Archidamos,  269;  invades  Attica,  226 

Archidamos,  son  of  Agesilaos,  573 

Archons,  72,  89 

Archon  Basileiis,  73;  Eponymos,  73;  Pole- 
raarchos,  73 

Arciopagos,  council  of,  73,  00,  256 

Arethousa,  14 

Argennonssai,  461 

Arginusa;  [Argennonssai] 

Argivcs,  19  ;  neutrality  of,  ia  the  Persian 
war,  177;  secret  treaty  of  the,  witli  Mar- 
donios,  216  ;  invade  Epidauros,  353  ;  de- 
feated at  Mantineia.  355 

Argos,  ancient  supremacy  of,  26;  con- 
federacy of,  347 

Ariaios,  506 

Ariobarzanes,  590,  591 

Arion,  46 

Aristagoras  of  Kyme,  138 

—  Miletos,  136,  140 
Aristarchos  of  Samos,  52 

—  one  of  the  Four  Hundred,  440 

—  the  Spartan,  517 

Aristcides,  150;  ostracism  of,  172;  at  Sala- 


INDEX. 


697 


ARI 

mis,  200 ;  mission  of,  to  Sparta,  233  ; 

assessment  of,  230  ;  death  of,  245 
Aristeus,  266 
Aristippos,  499 

Aristodemos,  the  Messcniaii,  34 
— ;  the  Spartan,  187 
Aristogeiton,  85 
Aristogenes,  458,  466 
Aristokrates,  the  Arliadian,  36 

—  the  Athenian,  413,  439,  456,  458 
Aristomenes,  33,  36 
Aristonymos,  339 
Aristoplianes,  531 
Aristophilides,  129 
Aristophon,  psepliisma  ef,  497 
Aristoteles,  488 

Aristotle,  on  slaver3',  486  ;  and  Alexander 

the  Great,  630 
Arrhibaios,  329,  331,  339 
Art,  Greek,  influence  of,  50 
Artiibanos,  161,  165 
Arta))azos,  172,  208,  220;  retreat  of,  225 

—  604 

Artaphernes,  135,  145,  147 

—  Persian  Envoy  to  Sparta,  326 
Artaxerxes,  239,  252 

—  Mncnion,  499,  556 
Artayntes,  211,  231 
Artemis,  14 

Artemisia  at  Salamis,  203 
Artemision,  the  Greek  fleet  at,  191 
Aryan  civilisation,  5,  69 
Aryandes,  125 

Asidates,  519 

Assassinationg,  political,  at  Athens,  432 

Assemblies,  primary  and  representative, 

12 
Assessment  of  Aristeides,  236 
Asia  Minor,  geography  of,  101 
Asklepios,  544 
Aspasia,  271 
Aspathines,  122 
Aspendos,  445 
■  Assize  of  Jerusalem,  663 
Assyrians,  99 
Asterodia,  51 
Astronomy,  Greek,  54 
Astyages,  97 
Astyochos,  419,  422,  444 
Athenagoras,  370 
Athenian  character,  174  ;  deterioration  of 

the,  448,  474,  600,  610,  650-7 
Athenian  constitution,  96  ;   reformed  by 

Kleisthenes,  87;  developed  by  Ephialtcs 

and  Perikles,  955 
Athenian   empire,  growth    of   the,   246 ; 

benefits  conferred  by  the,  on  the  subject 
30 


ATI! 

cities,  336,  358,  429,  484  ;  greatest  exten- 
sion of  the,  251 

Athenian,  dislike  of  responsibility,   159, 
412,  473,  599,  614,  628 

—  drama,  524;  rlietoric  and  dialectic,  526  ; 
comedy,  530 

Athenians,  misery  of  the,  in  the  time  of 
Solon,  76  ;  send  an  embassy  to  ask  for 
an  alliance  with  the  Persian  king,  92; 
victories  of  the,  in  Boiotia  and  Euboia, 
94 ;  second  embassy  of  the,  asking  an 
alliance  with  Persia,   135  ;    alleged  in- 
gratitude of  the,  158  ;  abandon  Attica, 
194  ;    at  Salamis,  199  ;   at  Plataiai,  223  ; 
at  Mykale,  2;30  ;    lay  the  foundation  of 
their  empire,  236  ;  fail  in  an  attempt  to 
colonise  Amphipolis,  248  ;  make  an  alli- 
ance with  the  Argives,   249  ;    besiege 
Aigina,  250  ;    defeated  at  Tanagra,  251  ; 
victorious  at  Oinophyta,  251 ;  defeated  in 
Egypt,  252 ;    make  peace    with    Artax- 
erxes, 252;  are  defeated  at  Koroneia  and 
evacuate  Boiotia,  253  ;    not  chargeable 
with  bringing  about  the  Peloponnesian 
war,  267,  273  ;  bring  the  Plataian  women 
and  children  to  Athens,  275  ;  relations 
between,  and  their  allies,  296  ;  interfere 
in  the  afl'airs  of  Sicily,  311,  361 ;  place 
a   permanent   garrison  in  Pylos,  326 ; 
fail  in  an  attempt  to  regain  Megara,  328; 
allow  Brasidas  to  march  into  Thrace, 
334  ;  give  up  the  Sphakterian  prisoners, 
347  ;  make  an  alliance  with  Argos,  352  ; 
fail  in  an  attempt  to  recover  Amphipolis, 
357;  massacre  the  Melians,  357;  promise 
to  help  the  Egestaians,  363  ;  lose  their 
fleet  and  army  in   Sicily,  398  et  seq.  ; 
make  use  of  their  reserved  fund,  417; 
ravage  Chios,  419  ;  at  Samos,  swear  to 
maintain  the  Kleisthenean  constitution, 
430  ;  win  the  battle  of  Kynossema,  447  ; 
change  in  the  character   of   the,  448; 
win  the  battle  of  Kyzikos,  450  ;  masters 
of  the  Propontis,  450;  reduce  Chalkedon, 
453 ;  recover  Byzantion,  453  ;   win  the 
battle  of  Argennoussai,  4G1;  murder  the 
six  generals,  473  ;    lose  their   fleet  at 
Aigospotamoi,  477  ;  conquered  by  the 
Spartans,  484  ;  oppressed  by  the  Thirty, 
488  ;  in  alliance  with  the  Thebaiis,  558; 
form  a  new  confederacy,  574;  in  alliance 
with  Amyntas,  588;  kill  their  gencnds 
because  they  arc  unsuccessful,  599  ;  let 
slip  the  opportunity  of  recovering  Am- 
phipolis,  600 ;    recover    Euboia,    602 ; 
weakened  by  tlie  Social  War,  602  et  seq. ; 
fortify  Thcrmopylai,  607  ;   declare  war 


698 


INDEX. 


ATH 

against  Philip,  623  ;   defeated  at  Chai- 
roneia,  627 

Athens,  late  growth  of,  47,  64  ;  occupied 
by  Xerxes,  196  ;  by  Mardonios,  214  ;  re- 
building of  the  walls  of,  233 ;  and  her 
allies,  a47  ;  Long  Walls  of,  250  ;  plague 
at,  281  ;  political  assassinations  at,  432 
tyranny  of  the  Four  Hundred  at,  434 
besieged  and  taken  by  Lysandros,  480-3 
Long  Walls  of,  breached,  i84;  tyranny 
of    the   Thirty   at,    489  ;     the   demos 
restored  at,  496;  Long  Walls  of,  rebuilt, 
562  ;  Alaric  at,  661 

Athos,  canal  under,  163 

Atossa,  128,  129 

Attaginos,  216,  227 

Attalos,  631 

Attica,  4 

Atys,  105 

Autono5s,  195 


BABYLON,  112 ;  taken  by  Cyrus,  114 ; 
revolt  of,  124 

Babylonian  science,  54 

Bacchiad  oligarchs  of  Corinth,  44 

Baktra,  119 

Banishment.  9 

Barathron,  36 

Basilian  emperors  of  Constantinople,  602 

Behistun,  inscription  of,  118,  121,  123. 121. 
130 

Besses,  638, 639 

Boar's  Grave,  battle  at  the,  35 

Boiotarchs,  26 

Boiotian  war,  between  Thebes  and  Sparta, 
558 

Boiotian  confederacy,  26 

Boiotians  refuse  to  jield  up  the  Athenian 
dead  at  Delion,  332 

Boukephalos,  &13 

Boul  ,  17,73 

Boulis,  286 

Boundaries,  household,  8 

Bran,  196 

Branchidai,  106, 137,  &40 

Brasidas,  saves  MethOne,  278 ;  makes  a 
raid  on  Salamis,  292  ;  at  Korkyra,  30S  ; 
atPylo8,317;  marches  through  Thessaly, 
.333 ;  at  Akanthos,  334  ;  at  Amphipolis, 
.3*5  ;  at  TorOne,  3:^8  ;  at  SkiOnf.  3:38  ;  at 
Mende,  a39 ;  falls  at  iVmphipolis,  313 

Brennus,  196 

Bribery,  425 

Bucephalus  [Boukephalos] 

Byzantion,  46,  64,  234,  260,  444,  453 ;  the 


COR 

Ten  Thousand  at,  515 ;  becomes  New 
Rome,  662. 


CALENDARS,  intercalations  in  Greek, 
353 
Carthage,  64,  120 
Carthaginians,  67 
Cetense  [Kelaiuai] 
Chabrias,  564,  574,  575,  577,  602 
Chaireas,  4.36,  438 
Chairephon,  523 
Chaironeia,  627 
Chalkedon.  453 
Chalkideus,  415,  419 
Chalkidians,  64 
Chalkidike,  61 
Chaos.  52 
Charadrai,  3 
Chares,  602 
Charidemos,  591,  611 
Charilaos,  37 
Charites,  14 
Charminos,  421,  423 
Charon,  573 
Cheimarroi.  3 
Cheirisophos,  506,  515 
Chersonesos,  144 
Chians,  ordered  to  pull  down  their  city 

wall,  327  ;  the  oligarchs  ask  the  aid  of 

Sparta  in  revolting,  413 
Chileos,  of  Tegea,  215 
Chios,  212 ;    ravaged  by  the  Athenians, 

422;  massacre  of,  by  the  Turks,  669 
Chromon,  313 

C'hurch,  General  Richard,  669 
Cithseron  [Kithairon] 
City,  the,  12,  89,  281 
Civilisation,  ancient  Aryan,  5,  39 
Clan,  the,  11 

Clubs,  political.  10  [Hetairiai] 
Cochrane,  Lord.  669 
Con.stantine  founds  New  Rome,  660 
Constantine  X.,  662 
—  XL,  666 
Constantinople,  662;  Latin  empire  of,  664; 

taken  by  the  Turks,  666 
Corinth,  sacke<l  by  Mummins,  659 
Coinage,    debasem-jnt   of,    attributed,  to 

Solon,  79 
Coincident  events,  alleged,  67,  230 
Comedy,  Athenian,  5.30 
Comic  poets,  531  ;  not  to  be  trusted  as 

historical  guides,  532;  political  influence 

of  the,  5.32 
Corcyra  [Korkyra] 


INDEX. 


699 


COR 

Corinth,  Isthmus  of,  fortification  of  the, 

193 ;  Mummius  at,  661 
Corinthians,  61 ;  insist   on  the   right  of 

autonomous  cities  to  manage  their  own 

affairs,  96;  and  to  deal  with  their  allies. 

^60 ;   disputes  of  the,  with  the  Korky- 

raians,  261 ;  discontent  of  the,  against 

the  Spanans,  553 
Creditor  and  T)(>btor,  alleged  early  law  of, 

in  Attica,  76 
Crete  [Krete] 
Croesus  [Kroisos] 
Crusades,  the,  661 
Cyprus  [K3T)ros] 
Cyrus,  97,  107 
—  the  younger,  454 ;  expedition  of,  501 ; 

falls  at  Kunaxa,  503 


DAISIAGETOS,  37 
Damarete,  68 
Damasithymos,  202 
Damis,  34 
Damon,  272 
Dandolo,  604 
Daneistai,  77 

Dareios,  son  of  Ilystaspes,  122  ;  Scythian 
expedition  of,  130 ;  death  of,  160 

—  Nothos,  497 

—  III.,  638 
DasUon,  375 
Datis.  149 

Debtor   and  Creditor,  early   law   of,  in 

Attica,  76 
Deiokes,  98 

Dekarchiai,  494,  548,  581  7iote 
Dekeleia,  380 
Dekeleian  war,  390 
Deliau  Apollon,  48 

—  festival,  47 

—  confederacy,  236 ;  objects  of  the,  246 
Dclion,  fortified  by  the  Athenians,  331  ; 

battle  of,  332 
Delos,  47 
Delphian  Apollon,  49 

—  priestess  [Pythia] 
Delphinion,  422 

Delplioi,  49  :  restoration  of  temple  at,  85 

Demades,  632,  655 

Demagogue,  the  oligarchic,  41  ;  Kleon  as 

a,  299 
Demagogties,  Athenian,  murder  of  the  sis 

generals  not  the  work  of,  474 
Demaratos,  94,  149,  169 
Demeter,  72 
Demetrios,  the  Phalerean,  656 

—  Poliorketes,  657 


DRA 

Demiourgoi,  72 

Democracy,  Athenian,  87  et  seq. 

Demochares,  657 

Demoi,  Attic,  72 

Demokedes,  126 

Demosthenes,  the  general.  Aitolian  cam- 
paign of,  312  ;  occupies  Pylos,  315  ;  takes 
the  Hoplites  in  Sphakteria,  323  ;  at  Me- 
gara,  330  ;  at  Siphai,  330  ;  sent  to  Sicily, 
390 ;  reaches  Syracuse  with  reinforce- 
ments, 394  ;  fails  in  a  night  attack  on 
Epipolai,  395  ;  surrender  of,  406;  niur- 
dered,  409 

—  the  orator,  60S ;  opposed  by  .^schines 
and  Phokion,  610  ;  inforces  the  petition 
of  the  Olynthians  for  aid  against  Philip, 
611 ;  foiled  by  jEschines  in  the  embassy 
to  Philip,  618  ;  financial  refonns  of,  623 ; 
urges  and  carries  the  proposal  of  imme- 
diate and  unqualified  alliance  with 
Thebes,  626  ;  defends  Ktesiphon,  648  ; 
accused  of  embezzling  the  treasures  of 
Harpalos,  651  ;  recalled  from  exile,  651 ; 
dies  at  Kalaureia,  652 

Derdas,  279 
Derkylidas,  548,  552 
Despots,  the  Greek,  40 
Dexippos,  661 
Diagoridai,  37 

Dialects,  Greek,  21 ;  Arj-an,  24 
Dialektic,  .526 
Dienekes,  187 
Diitrephes.  411 
Dikastai,  89,  256 
Dikasteria,  89,  256,  489  note 
Diodotos,  301 
Diogenes,  634 
Diognetos,  624 
Diokleides,  374 

Diomedon,  419,  429,  436,  457,  464  ;  mur- 
dered, 473 
Diomilos,  382 
Dionysios,  of  Phokaia,  142,  143 

—  the  elder,  of  Syracuse,  570,  577,  590,653 

—  the  younger,  653 
Dior'-sos,  633,  641 
Diophani  ')S,  596 
Discussion,  free,  429 
Dorian  migration,  20 
Dorians,  19 

Dorieus,  the  Khodian,  449 

—  the  Spartan,  65, 181 
Doriskos,  234 
Dorkis,  236 
Douketios,  58 
Dragon  Kings,  16,  35 
Drakon,  74 


700 


INDEX. 


DRA 

Drakontides,  488 
Drama,  Athenian,  524  et  seq. 
Dynastic  and  tribal  legends,  16 
Dyrrhachium,  665 

EETIONIA,  440 
Egesta,  embassy  from,  to  Athens,  363 

Egypt,  116  ;  invaded  by  Kambyses,  118 

Egyptian  astronomy,  53 

Egj'ptians,  117 

Eion,  207,  234,  33S 

Eironeia,  350 

Eisphora,  80 

Ekbatana  [Agbatana] 

Ekklesia,  87,  256 

Eleatic  philosophers,  521 

Eleians,  541,  592 

Elenchos  of  Sokrates,  523,  54 

Eleusis,  72 

Endios,  351 

Ennea  Hodoi  [Amphipolis] 

Epameinondas,  522  ;  in  the  Congress  at 
Sparta,  578  ;  victorious  at  Leiiktra,  580  ; 
invades  Lakonia,  586 ;  founds  Mega- 
lopolis, restores  the  Messenians,  and 
establishes  the  city  of  Messene,  58?  ; 
again  invades  Lakonia,  593 ;  fails  to 
surprise  Sparta  and  Mantineia,  594  ; 
falls  in  the  moment  of  victory,  596 

Epeirotai,  62 

Ephetai,  74 

Ephialtes  the  Malian,  184 

—  the  Athenian,  255  ;  murdered,  257 
Ephors,  30,  42 

Epidamnos,  62,  261,  660,  665 

Epigonoi,  643 

Epipolai,  377,  882 

Epitadas,  317 

Epiteles,33,  588 

Epyaxa,  501 

Erasinides,  388,  458,  464 ;  murdered,  473 

Eretria,  150 

Erythrai,  413 

Eteonikos,  461,  462,  475,  516 

Ethiopians,  120 

Ethnological  traditions,  untrustworthi- 
ness  of  Greek,  24 

Euagoras,  478,  554 

Euboia  revolts  from  Athens,  and  is  recon- 
quered by  Perikles,  254  ;  asks  help  of 
Agis  in  a  second  revolt,  413  ;  revolts 
again,  442,  613 

Euboulos,  617 

Eudamidas,  568 

Eudoxoa  of  Knidos,  52 

Eukleides,  archbishop  of,  496 

—  the  Phliasian,  518 


GRA 

f 

Eukles,  336 

—  the  Syracusan,  386 
Euktemon,  421 
Eumenes,  634,  644 
Eunomos,  609 
Eupatridai,  39,  72 
Euphemos,  378 
Eurybiades,  192, 198,  204 
Enryelos,  382 
Euryleon,  66 
Eurylochos,  313 
Eurymedon,  battles  of  the,  247 

—  the  Athenian,  308,  362,  390,  399 
Enrj^jtolemos,     453 ;     defends    the    six 

Generals,  470 
Eurysthenes,  19 
Euthydemos,  390 

FAMILY,  the  ancient  Aryan,  6,  11 
Father,     original    meaning    of    the 
word,  6 
Festivals,  Greek,  15 
Five  Hundred,  council  of  the,  89,  433 
Five  Thousand  at  Athens,  434,  439,  442 
Four  Hundred  at  Athens  in  the  Solonian 
constitution,    80  ;   usurpation    of   the, 
434,  442 
Free  discussion,  the  foundation  of  Athe- 
nian polity,  429 
Funeral  oration  of  Perikles,  279 


GALEPSOS,  342 
Games,   23 ;  Nemean  and  Isthmian, 

49  ;  Olympian,  48 
Gamoroi,  39 
Gargaphia,  219        , 

Gela,  congress  of  Sicilian  Greeks  at,  361 
Gelou,  founder  of  the  Gelonian  dynasty  at 

Syracuse,  66,  177 
Generals  [Stratcgoi] 
Geological  features  of  Continental  Greece, 

2 
Geomoroi,  39,  72,  418 
Gerousia,  30,  42 
Gobryas,  122 
Gomates,  122 

Gongylos  of  Eretria,  235,  519 
—  the  Corinthian,  387, 388 
Gordian  Knot,  635 
Gorgias,  361 
GorgOpas,  564 
Gorgo,  138 
Gorgoleon,  S75 
Gothic  invasions,  660 
Qrfecia  Magna  [Megale  Hellas] 
Graikoi,  26 


INDEX. 


YOl 


(JRA 

Graphe  Paranomon,  470,  613 
Greece,  geography  of,  1  et  seq. 
Greek  Christianity,  660 

—  Declaration  of  Independence  in  182], 
668 

Gseek  tribal  legends,  16  ;  national  char- 
acter, 22  ;  physical  science,  51  ;  philo- 
sophy, 53  ;  trade  in  Egypt,  M,  118 

Greeks,  Asiatic,  conquered  by  Kroisos,  101 

Gyges,  103 

Gylippos  sent  to  Syracuse,  381 ;  enters  the 
city,  387  ;  sentenced  to  death  for  theft, 
478 

Gymnopaidiai,  356,  581 

TTAGNON,  founder  of  Amphipolis,  259 
J-L    Halonnesos,  dispute  about,  between 

Philip  and  the  Athenians,  692 
Hamilkar,  67,  652 
Hannibal,  son  of  Giskon,  652 

—  treaty  of  Philip  III.  with,  660 
Ilaratch,  capitation  tax,  666 
Harmodios,  84 

Harmostai,  the  Spartan,  483 

Harpagos,  97 

Harpalos,  650 

Hasdrubal,  652 

Hegenionia,  248 

Hegesistratos,  228 

Hekataios,  137 

Hekatonymos,  514 

Hektemorioi,  77 

Helen,  17,  20 

Heliaia,  89,  256 

Heliastai  [Dikastai] 

Helikou,  2 

Holixos,  444 

Hellas,  not  a  geographical  name,  1 ;  Spora- 
dike,  56 

Hellenes,  21 ;  want  of  union  among,  174, 
622,  632;  at  Salamis,  197  ;  vices  of  the, 
486,  573,  574 

Hellenotamiai,  236 

Hellespont,  163 

Helots,  32  ;  revolt  of  the,  248  ;  placed  by 
the  Athenians  in  Naupaktos,  249  ;  mas- 
sacre of  2,000,  328  ;  in  Messene,  588 

Hephaistion,  634,  &14 

Hephaistos,  14 

Herakleia,  Spartan  colony  of,  311,  558. 

Herakleidai,  16,  17 

Herakleides,  377,  386,  51 S 

Herakles,  637 

Herippldas,  561 

Hermai,  mutilation  of  the,  367 

Hcrmippos,  141 

Herraogencp,  536 


Hermokrates,  the  Syracusan,  at  Gela,  362; 
deprived  of  his  command,  3S6  ;  delays 
the  retreat  of  the  Athenians,  403  ;  in  the 
Egean,  420,  445,  453,  652 

—  the  Spartan,  447 
Hermon,  440 

—  the  Megarian,  461 
Herodotos,  28,  259 
Hesperides,  65 
Hetairai,  486 
Hieromnemon,  624 
Hieron,  69 
Hiketas,  653 

Himera,  battles  of,  67,  652 
Hipparchos,  the  astronomer,  53 

—  son  of  Peisistratos,  84 
Hipparinos,  653 
Hippeis,  79 

Hippias,  84,  86,  94 ;  intrigues  of,  at  the 

Persian  Court,  135  ;  at  Marathon,  151 
Hippobotai,  94 
Hippoklos,  85 
Hippokrates,  330  ;  falls  at  Delion,  332 

—  secretary  of  Mindaros,  450,  453 
Histiaios,  131,  136, 141 

Homicide,  jurisdiction  of  the  Areiopagos 
in  cases  of,  256 

Homoioi,  32 

Honorius,  661 

House,  the  primitive  Aryan,  8 

Houses,  union  of,  in  the  clan,  11 

Hydames,  122  ;  at  Anopaia,  184 

Hykkara,  375 

Hyperakrioi,  83 

Hyperbolos,  347  ;  ostracism  of,  361  ;  mur- 
der of,  435 

Hypermnestra,  2 

Hypomeiones,  32,  650 

Hyroiades,  107 

Hystaspes,  122 

TASON  of  Pherai,  576  ;  assassimited,  589 

1     Iconoclasm,  662 

Idomene,  314 

Immortality,  ideas  of,  as  affecting  the  an- 
cient Aryan  family  life,  8 

Inaros,  161,  251 

Income-tax,  Athenian  [Eisphora] 

Inheritance,  laws  of,  9 

Innocent  III.,  pope,  664 

Intaphernes,  122 

Intolerance,  patrician,  7  et  seq. 

lolaidas,  590 

Ionia,  revolt  of,  139 

Ionian  fleet  at  Lade,  141 

lonians,  47, 142  ;  at  Salamis,  201 ;  sluggish- 
ness of  the,  247 


7u2 


INDEX. 


IPH 

Iphikratos,  563,  577,  587,  591,  002 

Ipsos,  battle  of,  657 

Irony,  350 

Isaac  Angelos,  663 

Isagoras,  87 

Isaios,  609 

Isehagoras,  341 

Ischolaos,  586 

Ismcnias,  559 

Isokrates,  571,  621,  629 

Issoi?,  635 

Itoly,  Greek  settlements  in,  58 


JANISSARIES,  665 
''     Jury  Courts  [Dikasteria] 
—  men  [Dikastai] 
Justinian,  code  of,  662,  664 


KADMEIA  of  Thebes,  569 
Kadmos,  575 

Kallias,  convention  of,  252 

Kallibios,  488 

KuUikratidas,  45S,  462 

Kalliniachos.  90  ;  at  Marathon,  152 

Kallixenos,  469,  473 

Kallistratos,  574.  577,  578 

Kamarina,  373,  377 

Kambounian  range,  2 

Kambyses,  118 

Kandaules,  103 

Kapron  Sema,  35 

Karians,  140 

Kassandros,  655,  656,  657 

KatanO,  ::01  ;  joins  the  Athenians,  373 

Keadas,  36 

Kepliisodotos,  474,  480,  589 

KiTaintikos,  85,  280 

Kcrsiblci)tc?,  590 

Kimmcrians,  99 

Kimon,  victories  of,  at  the  Euri'medon, 
247 ;  dismissed  by  the  Spartans  from 
IthOmC,  249 ;  at  Kypros  (Cyprus)  252  ; 
ns  a  statesman,  253 

Kiii.ulon,  conspiracy  of,  551 

Kincas,  86 

King  and  t3Tant,  distinction  between,  40 

Kiiiirs,  Greek,  40 

Kings,  Spartan,  42 

Kiutaki.  6(j9 

Klcandridas,  386 

Kleandros,  517 

KIranor,  50C 

KIcarchos,  444,  451  ;  and  Cyrus,  499 

Klcarldaa,  341 


ETE 

Kleigenes,  567 

Kleippides,  295 

Klcisthenean  constitution,  87  et  seq, 

Kleisthenes,  of  Sikyon,  43 

—  of  Athens,  70,  87  ;  expulsion  and  return 
of,  92 

Klcitos,  634 
Kleoboulos,  348 
Klcodemos,  660 
Klcokritos,  493 
Kleonibrotos,  214 

—  son  of  Pausanias,  King  of  Sparta,  572, 
575  ;  marches  to  Leuktra,  p79  ;  is  there 
defeated  and  slain,  580 

Kleomcnes,  King  of  Sparta,  86,  93,  loS, 
149,  181 

Kk'on,  299,  319  ;  procures  the  dismissal  of 
the  Spartan  envoys,  320 ;  sent  with  re- 
inforcements to  Pylos,  321 ;  and  Thucy- 
dides,  a36  ;  sent  into  Thrace,  341 ;  takes 
Torone,  342  ;  falls  at  Amphipolis,  344 

—  the  Sicilian,  C41 

Kleonymos,  son  of  Sphodrias,  573,  580 

Kleopatra,  631 

Klerouchoi,  94,  252,  259,  442,  575,  591 

Kuemos,  288 

Knidos,  battle  of,  257 

Kodros,  72 

KOes  of  Mytilene,  130 

Koiratadas,  517 

Konon  in  command  at  Naupaktos,  393, 
456,  457  ;  at  Samos,  458  :  blockaded  in 
>IytilCne,  461  ;  escapes  from  Aigos- 
potamoi  to  Salarais,  477  ;  activity  of, 
554 ;  at  Sousa,  556  ;  victorious  at 
Knidos,  557  ;  rebuilds  the  Long  Walls  of 
Athens,  562  ;  death  of,  563 

Korkyra,  60  ;  seditions  in,  306  ;  massacres 
at,  309  ;  in  alliance  with  Athens,  576 

KorkjTaians,  61  ;  hold  aloof  in  the  Per- 
sian war,  177  ;  quarrel  between,  and  the 
Corinthians,  261  ;  seek  to  ally  them- 
selves with  Athens,  %ii  ;  take  part  in 
the  Sicilian  expedition,  393 

Koroneia,  battles  of.  253,  500 

Korylas,  514 

Korypbasion,  316 

Kotys,  590 

Kratesippidas,  454 

Krete,  177 

Kritias,  468  ;  one  of  the  Thirty  Tyrants, 
488  ;  massacres  the  Eleusiuians,  492 

Kroisos,  82,  10-J 

Kronos.  15 

Kroton,  59 

Krvptcia,  32,  551 

Ktoslas,  5.56 


INDEX. 


T03 


KTE 

Ktcsiphon,  613  not£,  648] 

Kunaxa,  battle  of,  503 

Kyaxares,  99 

Kyloii,  74 

Kynegeiros,  154 

Kynoskephalai,  death  of  Pelopidas  at,  592; 

defeat  of  Philip  III.  at,  ti60 
KjTiossema,  447 
Kypselos,  44 
Kyrene,  65 
Kythera,  171 ;  occupied  by  the  Athenians, 

327 
Kyzikos,  battle  of,  450 


T  ABDA,  44 

^    Labdalon,  382 

Labynetos,  99 

Lachares,  657 

Laches,  363 

Ladg,  143 

Lakiines,  110 

Lamachos,  364,  872,  385 

Lainiau  war,  653 

Land-laws,  ancient,  77 

Landmarks,  78 

Languages,  Hellenic  and  Pelasgic,  21 

Latin  Empire  of  Constantinople,  664 

Law,  voluntary  obedience  to,  170 

Laws  of  inheritance,  9 

Leagues,  Achaian,  658  ;  Aitolian,  Epeirot, 

and  AkaiTianian,  659 
Legends,  djTiastic  and  tribal,  16 
Legislation,  of  Drakon,  74  ;  of  Solon,  78 
Leitourgiai,  80 
Leo  ni.,  the  Isaurian,  662 
Leon,  419,  429,  436,  457  ;  murdered,  473 
—the  Spartan,  431 
Leon  of  Salamis,  486 
Leonidas,  181 
—the  Molossian,  630 
Leontiades,  569,  572 
Leontinof,  361,  362 
Leopold,  669 
Leosthenes,  599 

Leoty chides,  211,  228  ;  at  Mykale,  229 
Lepanto,  battle  of,  667 
Lesbians,  revolt  from  Athens,  294  ;   ask 

help  from  Sparta,  296  ;  make  proposals 

to  Agis,  413 
Lcuktra,  battle  of,  580 
Libys,  brother  of  Lysandros,  493 
Liclia::,  356  ;  and  Tissaphernos,  423.  445 
Liturgies  [Leitourgiai] 
Loans,  question  of,  in  the  time  of  Solon, 

76 
Lokroi,  35 


MEG 

Long  Walls  of  Megara,  219, 330 ;  of  Athens, 

250,  484,  561  ;  of  Argos,  357 
Lydiau  dynasties,  103 
Lygdamis,  84 
Lykians,  114 
Lykiskos,  471 

Lykon  accuses  Sakratos,  520 
Lykophron,  43 

—  of  Pherai,  606 
Lykourgos,  29,  37 

—  the  orator,  624  note 
Lyrkeios,  3 

Lysandros,  454,  458  ;  appointed  secretary 
to  Arakos,  475  ;  slaughters  his  Athenian 
prisoners,  478  ;  besieges  Athens,  4S1  ; 
pilgrimage  of,  549  ;  falls  at  Ilerakleia, 
558 

Lysias,  239,  570 

Lysikles,  428 

Lysimachos,  630,  657 


MACEDON,  Makedouia,  62 
Magna  Graicia  [Megale  Ilellas] 

Magnesia,  182 

Magon,  654 

Maglans,  122 

Maiandrios,  126 

Makedonian  kings,  568,  657 

Mania,  552 

Mantineia,  joins  the  Argive  confederacy, 
347 ;  victory  of  the  Spartans  at,  355  ; 
broken  up  by  the  Spartans,  566  ;  re- 
established, 585 

Marathon,  150 

Mardonios,  146, 161, 203  ;  seeks  the  alliance 
of  the  Athenians,  2/2  ;  occupies  Alliens, 

214  ;  secret  treaty  of,  with  the  Argives, 

215  ;  slain  at  Plataiai,  224 
Mardontes,  211 
Marriage,  ancient  ideas  of,  7 
Masistcs,  231 

Masistios,  218 
Massagctai.  115 
Massalia,  57 
Master  Thief,  14,  367 
Medeia,  20 
Medes,  97 
Medios,  645 
Megabates,  137 
Megabazos,  134,  250 
Megabyzos,  122 
Megakles,  43,  &3 
Megale  Hellas,  57,  60 
—  Taphros.  35 

Megalopolis,  583  ;  founded  by  Epameinon- 
das,  587  ;  left  in  ruins  by  Kleomenes,  660 


Y04: 


INDEX. 


MEG 

Megara,  early  greatness  of,  46  ;  allies  her- 
self with  Athens,  349 ;  revolts  from 
Athens,  253  ;  factions  in,  329 

Megarian  colonies,  64 

Megarians,  excluded  from  Athenian  mar- 
kets, 26",  271 

Megistias,  185 

Meidias,  552 

—  assaults  Demosthenes,  613 

Melanippos,  43 

Melauthos,  413 

Meletos,  accuses  Sokrates,  530 

Melians,  357 

Melkarth,  636 

Mellon,  571 

Mclos,  massacre  of,  358 

Memnon,  the  Rhodian,  634 

Menandros,  390,  474 

Mende,  revolts  from  Athens,  339  ;  retaken 
by  the  Athenians,  340 

Menedaios,  315    • 

Menekles,  472 

Menon,  500,  506 

Menyllos,  655 
■•  Mercenaries,    Thrakian,   S4 ;    Greek,  499, 
517,  563,  591,  599 

Mermnad  kings  of  Lydia, 

MessSne,  583  ;  founded  by  Epameinondas, 
587 

Messenian  wars,  33 

Messenians,  19, 28  ;  brought  back  to  Pylos, 
353  ;  restored  to  their  country  by  Epa- 
meinondas, 587 

Metoikoi,  at  Athens,  88 

Michael  Palaiologos,  665 

Miletos,  143  ;  revolts  from  Athens,  417 

Milou  the  athlete,  59 

MUtiades,  90,  131,  144;  at  Marathon,  150; 
at  Paros,  157 

Mindaros,  445 ;  at  the  Hellespont,  446 ; 
slain  in  the  battle  of  Kyzikos,  450 

MinOa,  taken  by  Nikias,  310 

Mitliridates,  508 

Mnasippos,  576 

Mnesiphilos,  198 

Mohammed  II.,  666 

Monarchy,  ancient  and  modem  ideas  of, 
■41 

Morosini,  campaigns  of,  in  Greece,  667 

Mortgages,  alleged,  in  Attica,  77 

Mothakes,  5.50 

Mounychia,  231 

Mourychides,  914 

Mourzoiifle  [Alexios  Donkas] 

Murad  II.,  666 

Mutilation  of  the  human  body,  22 

MykalC,  battle  of,  22!) 


NYM 

Mykalessos,  massacre  of,  411 

Myron,  34 

Myrouides  defeats  the  Corinthians,  250 

Mysteries,  530 

Mytiiologj',  general  character  of  Greek,  13 

Mytilene,  surrenders  to  Paches,  297 


"VTABOPOLASSAR,  99 

-Li  Nation,  the  idea  of  a,  hateful  to  the 
Hellenic  tribes  generally,  13 

Naukrariai,  71 

Naukratis,  118 

Naupaktos,  Helots  at,  249 

Nausikles,  607 

Nautodikai,  71 

Navarino,  battle  of,  669 

Naxos,  150,  247 

Nebucadnezzar,  99 

Neces.sity,  doctrine  of,  109 

Nektanebis,  599 

Neodamodcs,  551 

Neon,  517 

Nepheres,  556 

New  Rome,  660 

Nikanor,  6:54,  655 

Nikarchos,  50(3 

Nikias,  takes  Minoa,  310  ;  refuses  to  go  to 
Pylos,  322  ;  occupies  Kythera,  327 ;  re- 
covers Mende,  340 ;  peace  of,  345  ;  ap- 
pointed to  command  in  Sicily,  364  ;  un- 
designedly increases  the  scale  of  tlie  en- 
terprise, 366 ;  successfully  lauds  the 
Athenian  army  at  Syracuse,  375  ;  wins 
a  battle  which  has  no  results,  376 ;  in- 
capacity of,  379 ;  asks  for  reinforce- 
ments, 381  ;  occupies  Epipolai,  382  ;  lets 
slip  the  opportunity  furnished  by  the 
capture  of  the  first  and  second  Syracusan 
counterAvorks,  384  ;  allows  Gylippos  to 
enter  Syracuse,  387;  fortifies  Plcmmy- 
rion,  387  ;  defeats  Gylippos,  388  ;  writes 
to  the  Athenians,  38i»  ;  wins  a  naval 
victory  and  loses  Plemmyrion,  .390  ;  re- 
fuses to  retreat,  396;  surrenders  to  Gy- 
lippos, 407  ;  put  to  death,  409 

Nikolaos,  286 

Nikomedes,  251 

Nikostratos,  at  Korkyra,  307  ;  at  McndG. 
I      340 

I  Nile,  valley  of  the.  116 
I  Nine  Roads  [Amphipolis] 
I  Nineveh,  99,  100 
I  Ni.saia,  4.52 
I  Nomothetai,  612 
'  Nymphodoros,  279 


INDEX. 


705 


ODR 

ODRYSAI,  293 
Oligarchs,     generally     opposed     to 
Athens,  412 

Oligarchical  conspiracy  at  Athens,  429 

Olympia,  47 
,0]yiupias,  631 

Olyntlios,  besieged  by  Artabazos,  209  ;  for- 
mation of  the  confederacy  of,  567  ;  sup- 
pression of  the  confederacy  of,  570 ;  asks 
aid  of  Athens,  604 ;  destruction  of,  615 

Onomakles,  430,  443,  488 

Onomarchos,  605 

Oracles,  106,  175 

Oration,  funeral,  of  Pcrikles,  279 

Orestes,  37 

Orkhan,  666 

Ormuzd,  164 

Oroites,  125 

Ortygia,  37^ 

Ostracism,  91 

Otanes,  122 

Othman,  664 

Otho  of  Bavaria,  669 

Othryades,  38 

Ottoman  Turks,  665 

Ouranos,  13 

Oxyartes,  641 

P ACHES,  207,  303 
Pagondas,  331 

Paktj'as,  110 

Pauakton,  fort  of,  345,  349 

Panathenaic  festival,  85 

Panhellenic  festivals,  48 

Panionic  festival,  47 

Paraloi,  83 

Paralos,  284 

Paranomon  Graphe  [Graphe  Paranomun] 

Parmenides,  521 

Parmenion,  634  ;  murdered,  639 

Parthenon,  259,  667 

Parysatis,  454,  555 

Pasargadai,  638 

Pasimelos,  562 

Pasion,  502 

Pasippidas,  453 

Patrokleides,  psephisma  of,  481 

Pausanias,  march  of,  to  Plataiai,  215, 
218  ;  reduces  Byzantion,  235  ;  sends  his 
prisoners  to  Xerxes,  235  ;  treachery  of, 
236,238 

—  murders  Philip,  631 

—  king  of  Sparta,  at  Athens,  495 ;  in 
Boiotia,  558  ;  exile  of,  559 

Peace  of  Nikias 

—  Philokrates,  649 

—  Aiitalkidas,  663 

30* 


PHE 

Peace  of  Passarovitz,  668 

Pedaritos,  422,  430 

Pediaioi,  83 

Peiraieus,  fortified  by  Themistokles,  234  ; 

attacked  by  Teleutias,  564 
Peisandros,  428,  431 

—  the  Spartan,  557 

Peisistratidai,  expulsion  of  the,  80  ;  in- 
trigues of  the,  149 ;  at  Athens  with 
Xerxes,  197 

Peisistratos,  82 

Peithagoras,  66 

Peithias,  306 

Pelasgians,  21 

Pelopidas,  571,  575,  580,  588;  at  Sonsa, 
590  ;  falls  at  Kynoskephalai,  592 

Peloponnesian  war,  real  causes  of  the,  248, 
252,  267;  continued  through  the  period 
called  the  Peace  of  Nikias,  347  ;  ended  in 
Samos,  494 

Penestai,  25 

Pentakosiomedimnoi,  79 

Perdikkas,  279,  293  ;  invites  Brasidas  into 
Thrace,  329  ;  renews  his  alliance  with 
Athens,  340 

Periandros,  44 

Pcrikles  builds  the  Long  Walls  of  Athens, 
250  ;  other  public  works  of,  258  ;  fiivors 
the  alliance  witli  Korkyra,  264,  270 ; 
funeral  oration  of,  279 ;  unpopularity  of, 
after  the  plague,  283 

—  sou  of  Periiiics  and  Aspasia,  284,  457 ; 
murdered,  472 

Perioikoi,  31,  32 
Persepolis,  638 
Perseus,  657 

Persia,  geography  of,  100 
Persian  heralds,  treatment  of,  at  Athens 
and  Sparta,  148 

—  fleet,  numbers  of  the,  of  Xerxes,  167 

—  wars,  147  et  seq. 

Persians,  97  ;  defeated  at  Salamis,  201  ;  at 
Plataiai,  224  ;  and  at  IMykale,  229  ;  claim 
the  tribute  of  the  Asiatic  Greeks,  413 

Phaiax,  362 

Phalaikos,616,  620 

Phalanx,  Theban,  627 

—  Makedonian,  627 
Phalinos,  504 
Phanes,  119 
Pharax,  555 

Pharnabiizos,  413,  444,  450;  in  alliance 
with  Konon,  555 ;  at  the  Corinthian 
isthmus,  562 

Phayllos,  606 

Pheidias,  259,  271 

Pheidippides,  151 


706 


INDEX. 


PHE 

Phenicia,  120 

Phcnician  fleet  r.t  Aspendo?,  445 

P.ienicians,  120  ;  at  Salamis,  200 

Philip,  sou  of  Am j-ntas  and  father  of  Alex- 
ander the  Great,  589 ;  becomes  king, 
600  ;  early  training  of,  601  ;  takes  Am- 
phipolis,  604;  gives  Potidiaia  to  the  01.vn- 
thians,  605  ;  defeats  the  Phokians,  0U6  ; 
takes  Pherai,  606;  false  report  of  the 
death  of,  007  ;  at  Thermopylai,  619  ;  de- 
clares himself  the  friend  of  Thebes,  620  ; 
fortifies  Elateia,  625;  victorious  at  Chai- 
roneia,  027  ;  takes  Thebes,  698  ;  acknow- 
ledged supreme  chief  of  the  Hellenes, 
629  ;  assassinated  at  Aigai,  631 

Philip  III.  defeated  at  Kynoskephalai,  660 

Philippos,  572 

Philiskos,  590 

Philokles,  463,  479 

Philokrates,  peace  of,  649 

Philomelos,  605 

Philopoimen,  660 

Philosophy,  Greek,  55 

Philosophers,  Greek,  influence  of,  56 

Philotas,  633,  6:34  ;  miu-dered,  639 

Phoibidas,  569,  575 

Plioibos,  13 

Phokaia,  111 

Phokians,  at  Anopaia,  185,  190 ;  fined  by 
the  Amphiktyons,  605 

Phokion,  603  ;  general  policy  of,  604,  655  ; 
put  to  death,  656 

Phokis,  25 ;  devastation  of,  by  the  The- 
bans,  620 

Phormion,  266,  238  ;  defeats  the  Corin- 
thians, 290 ;  second  victory  of,  in  the 
Corinthian  gulf,  292 

Phraortes,  99 

Phratriai,  11 

Phrynichos,  the  tragic  poet,  144 

—  the  general,  420  ;  protests  against  the 
plans  of  Alkibiades,  427  ;  joins  the  oli- 
garchic conspiracy,  430 ;  murdef  of, 
440 

Phye,  84 

Phylakos,  195 

Phyle,  492 

Phylo-basileis,  74 

Physical  science,  growth  of,  51 

Pindar,  643 

Plague  at  Athens,  282;  in  the  Athe- 
nian camp  before  Potidaia,  283 

Plataiai,  2j;  alliance  of,  with  Athens,  93; 
the  confederates  at,  218  ;  battle  of,  223  : 
surprised  by  the  Thebans,  274  ;  destruc- 
tion of,  301  ;  restoration  of,  566  ;  again 
seized  by  the  Thebans,  576 


RHI 

Plataians,  at  Marathon,  152  ;  besieged  by 
the  Spartans  and  Thebans,  287 

Plato,  527 ;  his  Apologia  of  Sokrates,  536  ; 
the  Phaidon  of,  544 

Pleistoanax,  253,  :345 

Plemmyrion,  387 

Ploutarchos  of  Erctria,  613 

Plynteria,  455 

Pnyx,  433 

Polls,  89,  2&4  ;  [City] 

Polles,  342 

Pollis,  575 

Polos,  517 

Polybiades,  570 

Polydamas  of  Pharsalos,  576 

Polydamidas,  340 

Polydoros,  589 

Polykrates,  118,  125,  51S 

Polyphron,  589 

Polysperchon,  655 

Polyzelos,  69 

Poros,  642 

Potidaia  assailed  by  Artabazos,  209  ;  re- 
volts from  Atliens,  2()6  ;  surrender  of,  386 

Praxiergadai,  455 

Prexaspes,  121 

Primogeniture,  8 

Prisoners  of  war,  treatment  of,  10 

Probouleutic  Council,  256 

Prodikos,  528 

Prokles,  45 

Property,  earliest  notions  of,  9 

Protagoras,  530 

Prote,  318 

-Protomachos,  458,  466 

Proxcnos,  500,  506 

Prytaneis,  471 

Psanimenitos,  119 

Psammitichos,  64 

Psephisnia,  of  Patrokleides,  481 

Ptolemy  the  sou  of  Lagos,  634,  657 

Ptoiodoros,  330 

Punishment,  theories  of,  301 

Pydna,  battle  of,  661 

Pylos,  occupied  by  Demosthenes,  316 ;  re* 
taken  by  the  Spartans,  452 

Pythagoras,  55 

Pythia,  venality  of  the,  86 

Pythios,  163 

Pythodoros,  362 

—  archonship  of,  496 


r>  ELIGION,  character  of,  ancient  Aryan, 
^    7,  10 
Rhetors,  526 
Rhianos,  34 


INDEX. 


707 


RIII 

Rhiga  of  Velestinos,  668 

Rhodes,  524,  555,  556 

Roman  interference  in  Greece,  660 

Rome,  Kew,  663 

^oum,  Turkish  sultans  of,  665 

Roxaua,  641,  656 

SACRED  Band  of  Thebes,  574 
Sacred  Wars,  005,  620,  623 
Saguntum,  5" 
Salamis,  battle  of,  201  ;   raid  of  Brasidas 

and  Kuemos  on,  2!)2 
Samians  rise  up  in  favor  of  Athens,  418; 

subdued  by  Lysandros,  494 
Samos  revolts  from  Athens,  259 ;  declares 

in    favor  of  Athens,    418;    attempted 

oligarchic  revolution  in  the  Athenian 

army  at,  435;  recovered  to  the  Athenian 

alliance,  591 
Sandanis,  104 
Sardeis,  siege  and  capture  of,  by  Cyrus, 

108,  110;  burning  of,  139 
Scio  [Chios] 
Scythians,  99 
Seisachtheia,  77,  79 
Seleukos,  634,  657 

Selinous,  quarrel  between  and  Egcsta,  363 
Seljukian  Turks,  662 
Sellasia,  battle  of,  660 
Senate  [Boule,  Probouleutic  Council] 
Sestos,  230 
Seuthes,  294,  515 
Seven  Persians,  the,  123 
Sicily,  Greek  colonisation  in,  57 
Sikanos,  377 
Sikiunos,  199 

Sinope,  57  ;  the  Ten  Thousand  at,  515 
Sitalkcs,  279,  293 

Six  generals,  murder  of  the,  at  Athens,  473 
Six  hundred  at  Syracuse,  384,  395 
Skedasos,  579 

SkiOne  revolts  from  Athens,  338 
Skirouides,  420 
Skirphondas,  411 
Skvlax,  137 
Skyllias,  191 
Slavery,  410,  486,  588 
Slaves,  9  note 
Slavonian  inroads,  665 
Smerdis,  121 
Society,  Aryan,  6 
Sokrates,  at  Delion,  350 ;   at  the  trial  of 

the  generals,  471 ;  and  the  Thirty,  486 ; 
accusation  of,  520  ;  and  the  Daimonion, 
522 ;  and  the  Elenchos,  513  ;  and  tlie 
Delphian  oracle,  533;    and    the   comic 


STR 

poets,  532  ;  with  Kritias  and  Alkibiades, 
5;55;  and  the  sophists,  536;  trial  and 
defence  of,  536  et  f^eq.  ;  death  of,  544; 
positive  and  negative  teaching  of,  515 

Sokrates,  the  Achaian,  500,  506 

Solon,  75  et  seq. ;  travels  of,  81 ;  and  Kroi- 
sos,  82 ;  character  of  the  constitution  of, 
87 

Solygeia,  326 

Sophainetos,  SCO 

Sophists.  526 

SophoUles,  son  of  Sostratides,  363- 

—  the  poet,  260 

Sophroniskos,  520 

Sosikles,  95 

Sostratos,  622 

Sparta,  38  ;  constitution  and  early  history 
of,  30 ;  predominance  of,  in  Hellas,  94  ; 
influx  of  money  into,  550 

Spartan  empire,  character  of  the,  487,  547, 
581 

Spartans  summon  Ilippias  to  a  congress 
of  their  allies,  94  ;  intreat  the  Athenians 
to  stand  firm  against  Mardonios,  213; 
make  a  secret  treaty  with  the  Thasians, 
!i48;  promise  the  Potidaians  to  invade 
Attica,    266  ;    make    overtures    to    the 
Persian  king,  275  ;  make  a  truce  for  one 
year  with  the  Athenians,  3:38 ;  ratify  the 
peace  of  Nikias,  346  ;  excluded  from  the 
Olympic  games,  357;  alliance  between, 
and  the  Argivcs,  356  ;  send  Gylippos  to 
Syracuse,   380 ;    fortify    Dekeleia,    390 
make  a  treaty  with  the  Persians,  417 
make  a  second  treaty  with  them,  422 
order  the  murder  of  Alkibiades,  425 
inforce  the  peace  of  Antalkidas,  564 
restore  Plataiai,  566;  break  up  the  city 
of  Mantineia,  566 ;  declare  war  against 
the  Thebans,  578  ;  appeal  to  Athens  for 
aid  against  Epameiuondas,  586 

Spartoi,  574 

Sperthias,  286 

Sphakteria,  316 

Sphodrias,  573,  583 

Spintharos,  86 

Stageiros,  335,  *13 

Stages,  417 

State,  slow  growth  of  the,  11 

Stateira,  643 

Stephanos,  614 

Stesilaos,  153 

Sthenelaidas,  269 

Stilbides,  398 

Stilichon,  661 

Strategoi,  90,  256 

Strombichides,  417,  431 


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